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
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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 66.

November 1984

Indonesia rocked by unrest

Since the demonstration in Tanjung Priok on 12 September when heavily-armed troops killed dozens of people who were calling for the release of four members of the local mosque, the political atmosphere in Jakarta has been shaken by a whole series of incidents, bombings, explosions and deliberately-started fires in well-known shopping centres. Illegal leaflets are circulating in many cities, and there have been a large number of arrests. Newspapers report that some individuals, businesses and a few embassies have received calls warning of attacks. After years of apparent calm, the political atmosphere in Indonesia has suddenly become charged with uncertainty and a sense that there is widespread, organised opposition to the regime.

Although General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces was quick off the mark, giving the press his version of the Tanjung Priok massacre and making it clear that no other explanation would be tolerated, he appears to have been at a loss since then to explain the many events that have rocked the capital and other cities.

- On 4 October, three bombs exploded in major business districts. Two badly damaged branches of Indonesia's largest private banking corporation, the Bank of Central Asia, and the third damaged a shop near one of the bank branches. The BCA is owned by Liem Sioe Liong, Indonesia's richest financier and business magnate, and a very close business associate of the Suharto family. It has since been established that the third bomb was to have been used to blow up the headquarters of the BCA, but there was a last-minute change in plans because the head office was too heavily guarded by security forces.

- On 17 October, the Super-Mie factory situated on the road from Jakarta to Bogor was blown up. The major noodle factories in Indonesia are owned by Lie Sioe Liong, who also holds the monopoly over the import and distribution of flour. There is little doubt that this target was selected because of its association with the Liem business conglomerate.

- On 22 October, a large branch of the Sarinah department store company, situated in the southern suburb of Kebayoran, was gutted by fire, a day after the store had been warned that the building would be burnt down. The fire also destroyed an extension of the store that was to have been opened in December. The proprietor expressed amazement at the extent of the damage and could not understand how fail-safe, fireproof devices had failed to function.

- On 23 October, police discovered a number of bombs on the premises of Jogjakarta's main railway station.

- On 25 October, police in Surabaya, East Java, discovered a truckload of ammunition which the proprietor described as "scrap-iron".

- On 29 October a luxury restaurant, a theatre and many shops were gutted in a fire that destroyed several storeys in Pasar Lindeteves, one of Jakarta's main shopping centres. Later that day, the most alarming incident of all occurred when the Marine Corps ammunition dump in the suburb of Cilandak literally blew up, after a fire broke out on the premises. The ammunition dump is situated in an area surrounded by Marine barracks and residential districts. Many houses were destroyed as shells and ammunition exploded, shooting out in all directions. Some of the shells landed several kilometres away, causing havoc in many



Sarinah departmental store ablaze

parts of Jakarta. Many thousands of families living near the dump fled with their belongings as the region covering a radius of several kilometres "resembled a battlefield".

The Cilandak incident renewed calls that had previously been made for such dangerous premises to be moved from built-up areas. Since the incident, families returning to homes in ruins have complained bitterly about the lack of help from the government to rebuild their dwellings. According to official figures, at least 15 people were killed in the Cilandak incident.

- On 1 November, a newly built departmental store on Malioboro, the main shopping thoroughfare in Jogjakarta was burnt down. On the same day, petrol bombs were discovered near the premises of a cinema in the city where a film on the 1965 events was being shown.

- On 11 November, the Kartika Plaza building, which houses one of Jakarta's most luxurious hotels as well as a number of company offices, went up in flames. The army is closely associated with the ownership of this building.

- On 13 November, the central Sarinah departmental store in Jalan Thamrin, one of Jakarta's main thoroughfares, was burnt down. This was the first multi-storey departmental store to be built in Jakarta, constructed during the days of Sukarno.

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No organisation has claimed responsibility for any of these attacks though it is not difficult to see that they are well-co-ordinated. Nearly twenty people were arrested following the 4 October bombing incidents; most are known to be members of the *Gerakan Pemuda Kaba'ah* (GPK), an organisation set up shortly before the 1982 elections to help mobilise young people in support of the Muslim party, the PPP. Though the GPK was

never a PPP affiliate, it was oriented towards that party but has recently shifted away, especially since the party betrayed its Islamic principles, culminating in its decision in August to comply with the "Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle" demand of the government.

Early comments on the 4 October incident described it as an act of reprisal by Muslims for the Tanjung Priok massacre. A far more likely explanation is that both the Tanjung Priok demonstration and all subsequent incidents reflect a rising level of anger among Muslims about a whole range of government policies, most notably the Societies Act which is now being pushed through Parliament, requiring all organisations to adopt the Pancasila as their only principle.

There has been outspoken condemnation of government policy in a number of mosques. M. Nasir (not to be confused with Moh. Natsir, former leader of the Muslim party, Masyumi) said in a speech at the mosque in Tanjung Priok on 12 September, the day of the massacre, that 19 *mubaligs* (lay preachers) had been summoned by the Deputy Governor of Jakarta to "account for" sermons they delivered during Idul Fitri which fell this year in June. In Tasikmalaya, West Java, the district head (bupati) has ordered mosques throughout the district to stop inviting *mubaligs* from outside Tasikmalaya, in an attempt to control the political content of preaching in the mosques. He is reported as having complained that "15 times in July and August alone, *mubaligs* 'infiltrated' and delivered 'inflammatory' sermons". (*Tempo*, 10 November 1984.)

There is no doubt that the government is also very alarmed at the amount of illegal literature and cassettes now circulating in many parts of the country. Cassettes of speeches made in Tanjung Priok in the days before the massacre are apparently particularly popular.

Call for inquiry into Tanjung Priok Massacre

Four days after the Tanjung Priok massacre, a group of politicians and retired generals issued a White Paper challenging Murdani's account of the incident. The Paper described the incident as having been sparked off by offensive and provocative behaviour by the local military officer (*koramil*) who entered the mosque without taking off his shoes and smeared notices on the mosque wall with filthy drain water.

The three concluding sections of the White Paper read as follows:

Conclusions from this report

People of the Muslim faith feel deeply offended by the desecration of their holy place of worship. There was no attempt by the authorities to resolve this problem properly. Members of the public not guilty of anything were arrested, detained and subjected to arbitrary treatment. The provisions of the Procedural Code were not heeded. A gathering of people was confronted by troops armed with automatic weapons, supported by armoured vehicles. The statement issued by the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief is therefore at variance with the true facts.

Cause and effect

The above relates the events that led to the tragedy of 12 September. But these events were simply the trigger which sparked off tensions that have for a very long time been rumbling below the surface of apparent stability. People like the late Moh Hatta (Vice-President 1945-1956) and the late Adam Malik (Vice-President 1978-1983) as well as many civilian and military personalities who are still living, have long since warned the authorities that many issues are causing public anxiety and creating unrest in social-economic and political affairs. The cause of all this unrest

goes back to one primary source: the government's violations of the contents and spirit of the 1945 Constitution, reaching a climax with the Five Laws concerning the "regulation" of political life, in particular, the concept of "Pancasila-as-a-single-principle". More generally, those in power have deviated from the following broad principles:

- belief in one God
- civilised humanitarianism
- unity of Indonesia
- democracy guided by wisdom based on consultation and representation
- social justice for the entire Indonesian people.

People have no power to change things by democratic means. Thus, the Tanjung Priok incident is not an isolated event: it is a consequence of the present system.

Proposal

In the interests of justice for all, including the government, an independent commission should be set up to collect reliable information about the event in Tanjung Priok in September 1984. The report of this commission should be made public so that we can all draw lessons from this event.

Among those signing the White Paper were politicians, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, former Finance Minister, and Burhanuddin Harapan, former Prime Minister, both of the Masyumi party, and H.M. Sanusi, formerly of the Masyumi party and a minister in the 1966-68 cabinet; and retired Armed Forces Generals, Ali Sadikin (Marine Corps and former Governor of Jakarta), Hugeng (Police Chief till 1972) and Azis Saleh, H.R. Dharsono and Suyitno Sukitno (army).



Tempo, 13 October 1984

BCA's head office in Jakarta

One of the bank branches blasted on 4 October

New arrests

Since the three bombing incidents on 4 October, the security forces have arrested a large number of people. The media in Indonesia have reported only the arrest of people said to be directly connected with the bombings, plus occasional arrests in connection with the distribution of illegal leaflets.

The most important "bombing suspect" is **Rachmat Basuki**, a well known Muslim activist who was arrested in 1978 in connection with the so-called "20 March" affair. On that occasion, he was tried and sentenced to two years for trying to convince Islamic members of the upper legislative assembly (MPR) not to support the government's P4 (Pancasila indoctrination) plans which were to be ratified by the MPR. Basuki is also a member of the **Gerakan Pemuda Kaba'ah**. Several more detainees have been named, but others are said to have gone into hiding. The military authorities have been quoted as saying that some of this group will be brought for trial before the end of November.

Well-known dissidents arrested

But besides these reported arrests, a number of people connected with groups like the Petition-of-50 or well-known dissident figures have also been detained. These have not been reported in the Indonesian press, but information has nevertheless reached the outside world either through direct contact with people on the spot or, in one or two cases, from foreign press agency reports. They include:

Tony Ardhie, a *mubalig* who was previously arrested and tried in 1983 for a speech strongly attacking the government on the question of head-scarves.

General Dharsono, a signatory of the White Paper and member of the Petition-of-50 group. For the first few years, Dharsono was chief-of-staff of the Siliwangi (West Java) Division, but came into conflict with Suharto over his "more radical" views on how to deal with the political parties. He later was given a civilian post as Secretary-General of ASEAN until his dismissal for supporting the Petition-of-50.

A.M. Fatwa, secretary of dissident Ali Sadikin, former Governor of Jakarta and active in the Petition-of-50. Fatwa has been arrested a number of times for "inflammatory" sermons, and was once subjected to severe beating by military officers, which led him to sue the authorities. The litigation encountered difficulties; his team of lawyers were so badly intimidated that they were forced to abandon the case.

Rhoma Irama, leader of the best known pop group in Indonesia, and originator of the *dangdut* music which became extremely

popular a few years ago. Until the latest PPP congress, he supported that party. His group performed extensively during PPP rallies in the 1982 elections.

Abdul Qadir Jaelani like Rachmat Basuki was previously arrested in 1978 in connection with the "20 March Movement". On that occasion he was sentenced to 2½ years. He is chairman of the Indonesian Islamic Students Organisation (*Persatuan Pelajar Islam Indonesia*).

H. Mawardi Noor, a lawyer, and formerly chairman of the Indonesian Mubalig Corps.

H.M. Sanusi, a leader of the reformist Muhamadiyah organisation and formerly leader of the Muslim party, Masyumi, now a member of the Petition-of-50 group. He was Minister for Textiles and Handicrafts in Suharto's first cabinet and a member of Parliament till 1977.

Altogether 131 mubaligs arrested

According to the Malaysian journal **Panji Masyarakat**, altogether 131 mubaligs have been arrested since the Tanjung Priok Massacre. Apart from **Tony Ardhie**, **Mawardi Noor**, **Abdul Qadir Jaelani** and **A.M. Fatwa**, the journal also mentions the following names: **Salim Kadar**, **H. Alwi Djamilulail**, **Machmudin Sudin**, **Suryani Tahar**, **Husin Umar**, **Moh. Nasir**, **Deliar Noor**, **Ir. Imanuddin**, **Endang Saefuddin** and **Anwar Haryono**.

Meanwhile, it now appears that the authorities are imposing a new regulation requiring mubaligs to have Mubalig Permits (*Surat Izin Mubalig*) before being allowed to deliver sermons in mosques. An ulama (religious scholar) named **K.H. Sahal** complained about this new regulation, describing it as "an obstacle", during a recent meeting between *ulamas* in Central Java and the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General **Benny Murdani** (*Sinar Harapan*, 12 September).

According to the **Far Eastern Economic Review** (22 November), two of those arrested, General Dharsono and Fatwa are accused of having attended meetings shortly after the Tanjung Priok incident at which discussions were held about retaliation for the massacre, though the *Review* suggests that these two are said to have "advised against rash destructive action".

Other members of the Petition-of-50 group are now under threat. Ali Sadikin was bitterly attacked in an editorial in the **GOLKAR** daily, **Suara Karya**, an attack which he will not be able to answer because his statements are banned from the media.

Foreign Office comes to Indonesia's defence

Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, is involved in a lengthy correspondence with the Foreign Office about Indonesia's Societies Law. We publish below extracts from the correspondence which brings to light British Government efforts to protect the Indonesian Government from examination of its current plans to eliminate altogether freedom of organisation.

A Straightforward Inquiry

Lord Avebury's first letter to Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, asked what the British Government knew about the five new political Bills now before Parliament, particularly the Societies Bill which will impose new restrictions on social organisations.

Sir Geoffrey Howe replied on 25 July:

"... We of course follow developments in Indonesia with interest. But let me make quite clear that the subjects you raise are internal matters for Indonesia. It would not be right for me to comment on them..."

Lord Avebury Presses the Foreign Secretary

Not satisfied with that reply, Lord Avebury pursued the matter in a letter dated 10 August:

"In answer to questions in our House on religious persecution Janet Young said the other day that our diplomatic posts had standing instructions to report on these matters.

It follows that you must have received word of the legislation I asked you about. I am not asking you to comment on it at this stage, though I notice that you are sometimes prepared to discuss human rights abuses. All I am asking is for you to let me know what are the terms of the legislation. I hope that with this clarification, you may be able to provide me with some information."

Foreign Office quotes Suharto

The Foreign Office reply, this time from Minister for Overseas Development, Timothy Raison, dated 5 September, read as follows:

"Our Embassy in Jakarta has reported that the Indonesian authorities have not yet made available copies of the Bills but it appears from our enquiries that most of the legislation under review is more a modification of existing Government powers than new policy. President Soeharto has gone out of his way to make clear that the measures are designed to promote national harmony. He also stated that "religious freedom is very firmly guaranteed by the Constitution" and "It is one of the most fundamental rights of man".

Until the Bills are released I am afraid I am unable to provide you with information about their terms. The Bills have yet to pass through the Indonesian Parliament and may well be amended in the process."

Lord Avebury astonished at Foreign Office lack of knowledge

Lord Avebury's next reply, dated 14 September, read in part as follows:

"Frankly, I was astonished by your statement that "our Embassy in Jakarta has reported that the Indonesian authorities have not yet made available copies of" the draft legislation I asked about. I have since discovered that not only were the five Bills in question introduced in the Indonesian Parliament in August, but their existence and contents were public knowledge even before this. In addition, the full text of the Bills has been published in the Indonesian press. They have been discussed and debated widely at all levels of Indonesian society. If your Embassy staff are doing their job properly, I find it incredible that they would have no information on the terms of this legislation.

This apparent lack of knowledge is all the more troubling when one considers the importance of this legislation. You say that the Bills are seen as "more a modification of existing government powers than new policy". However, this view is not shared by Mr Mulya Lubis, the respected Director of the Legal Aid Institute, who was recently quoted as saying (*Sinar Harapan*, September 3) that the draft "Societies Law", one of the five Bills, is causing deep anxiety among organisations, which regard its provisions as a threat to their existence. They are particularly worried, he said, about clauses providing for the control, suspension and dissolution of organisations. Nor is your view shared, apparently, by *The Times* correspondent in Jakarta, who wrote on Wednesday about opposition to the proposals. He mentioned "strong, domestically respected voices" which have been raised against the Bills...

In the light of the above, would you like to reconsider the view you expressed that the draft legislation is nothing more than a modification of existing laws?"

Foreign Office: "Critical groups... should not be over-estimated"

The next Foreign Office reply, signed this time by Minister of State Malcolm Rifkind, dated 8 October, read in part as follows:

"... The main substance of the drafts was, of course, as you say, widely known and discussed in the press. Our Embassy was well aware of this but we had not thought it proper, as we told you, to comment on the terms of the legislation until the Bills had gone through all the necessary steps of parliamentary consideration and possible amendment..."

As to their content and their implications in human rights terms, there

UK frigates for Indonesian Navy

Three British Tribal-Class 81 frigates are at present being refitted at the Vosper Thornycraft shipyards in Portsmouth for export to Indonesia. The refitting contract is worth £20 million.

The frigates have a tonnage of 2,400 tons and are each equipped with two launchers for surface-to-air Seacat missiles. They will also carry Wasp helicopters, cannons to fire 4.5 inch rockets and 20 mm calibre guns. They have a maximum speed of 25 knots, and carry a crew of 253 including 13 officers. The three frigates are HMS Zulu, HMS Tartar and HMS Gurkha, and have been in use in the Royal Navy since the 1960s.

These three naval vessels will be the latest additions to the Indonesian Navy in their modernisation programme. In the past five years, the Navy has acquired four submarines from West Germany, three corvettes from Holland, eight high-speed patrol boats from South Korea, 12 patrol boats from Belgium and two patrol boats from West Germany. Indonesia is planning to build six more German patrol boats in its own shipyards.



General Sir Edwin Bramall, Britain's Chief of the Defence Staff, visited Indonesia in November. He is seen here with General Benny Murdani and the British ambassador, Alan E. Donald. *Sinar Harapan*, 1 November 1984.

seems no reason to change the view we expressed earlier that the legislation appears to be no more than a modification of existing government powers and a re-statement of well established policies. There has indeed, as you suggest, been some criticism of the legislation by local groups in Indonesia. But the weight and influence of these groups should not be over-estimated. . ."

Lord Avebury takes issue with the Foreign Office

Lord Avebury's reply, dated 26 October, read in part as follows: ". . . In his original response, Geoffrey Howe said flatly that he could not comment on the matters I had raised. . ."

Tim Raison's reply to my second letter contained the inexplicable statement that "the Indonesian authorities have not yet made available copies of the Bills", this a full three months after the full text of the Bills had been published in a major Jakarta newspaper. . .

Finally, I discovered in your latest letter that our Embassy in Jakarta had known about the Bills all along. . . This news at least allays my fears about the competence of our Embassy, but it begs the question of why Geoffrey Howe's reply to my original letter did not include a similar statement, an inclusion which would have saved time and paper for both the Foreign Office and myself.

. . . Having carefully studied the Bills and their reception in Indonesia, I must disagree with your positions on these issues.

First of all, our government's principal source of information about this legislation appears to be the Indonesian authorities. I am not at all surprised that President Suharto, who is quoted in Tim Raison's letter. . . would speak favourably about legislation that they themselves have proposed. You dismiss those who have spoken out against the Bills, saying that "the weight and influence of these groups should not be overestimated". I refer you again to an article which appeared in *The Times* on September 12, calling attention to "strong, domestically respected voices" being raised against the proposals, including those of the late Vice-President Adam Malik; the former Asean Secretary-General, General Dharsono; seniors in the Roman Catholic Church; Muslim political party members; a former Army chief of staff; and several former Cabinet members. These people and others formed the so-called "Petition of 50 Group" which in August produced a pamphlet warning legislators that the new laws were intended to institutionalise a military dictatorship. The Secretary of the Group is now in detention and others have been arrested. . . In a repressive society, people who are critical of the government are by definition in a position where they will have little

"weight and influence". Where there is press censorship, a severely restricted party system, and indefinite detention without trial, the voices of those who speak out for freedom and human rights will often seem muted and weak. . . Whatever one thinks about the nature of the opposition to the draft legislation, the fact remains that a number of prominent Indonesians have criticised it. Why should they oppose these Bills if they are, as you claim, simply "a restatement of well-established policies?"

Two of the five laws can be considered as amendments to existing laws, another increases the number of seats in the Parliament, and a fourth stipulates that the Constitution may only be amended by referendum. The net effect of these four Bills would be to further tighten government control over political life and to decrease the likelihood of the Constitution ever being amended. While they do not represent a new departure for the Indonesian regime, it is understandable that these Bills would be criticised by those who oppose the Suharto government and support independent political parties.

The Bill which has aroused the most opposition, however, is the so-called "Societies Law", which introduces a whole new range of restrictions on all social organisations. This proposed Bill is not merely "a modification of existing government powers". There has previously been no law covering social organisations as a whole. This law would require all such organisations to adopt Pancasila, the official government ideology, as their only principle. It requires the government to dissolve any organisation that "adheres to, advocates and disseminates ideas and teachings that are in conflict with Pancasila and with the 1945 Constitution, in all their forms and manifestations". The government is also given the power to suspend the executive of an organisation "if it engages in activities that disturb security and public order, or receives assistance from foreign sources without government approval". In other words, this law would give the government complete control over all groups that are "set up voluntarily by Indonesian citizens to engage in co-operative activity". This includes religious-based organisations, which have so far been the most outspoken against the Bill.

Based on the information I have provided in this letter, is the Foreign Office now prepared to reconsider its position that this legislation is unimportant and the opposition to it insignificant? I would be grateful if you would comment on the points I have raised."

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At the time of going to press, Lord Avebury had not yet received a reply to this letter from the Foreign Office.

A cartoonist's view



"Just a load of scrap-iron, Sir . . ."



"Very popular these days, aren't you?"

"Beware of the extreme left and extreme right!"
"What about the extreme centre?"



Cilandak ammunition dump

From: Sinar Harapan Minggu

The provocation and victimisation of Muslims

by Jusfiq Hadjar

People who read about the growing hostility of Indonesian Muslims towards the Suharto government may be thinking that a situation is developing that is comparable with Iran before the fall of the Shah. Although there are grounds to compare Suharto with the Shah, there are at present no grounds for believing that a figure like Khomeini is likely to emerge in Indonesia. No one in Indonesia could possibly claim to become a Khomeini figure. This is first and foremost because Islam in Indonesia is *sunni*, not *shi-ite*, and it is therefore unthinkable for an *imam* to emerge who could claim to speak for the whole archipelago. Also the very concept of Islam becoming an undivided political power in Indonesia is not applicable because Islam in Indonesia is pluralistic, and this pluralism is reflected in the attitudes of Indonesian Muslims towards the government of General Suharto.


A large number of devout Muslims in Indonesia collaborate with the military dictatorship. Idham Chalid, the well-known, older-generation opportunist and chairman of Nadhlatul Ulama, the largest Muslim organisation in Indonesia, and others who are on the central council of the PPP (the officially-sanctioned Islamic party) are not the only ones to stand squarely behind Suharto. Other, more critical leaders of the younger generation are now showing no opposition to the regime. Abdurrachman Wahid, the most critical of this generation who many of us hoped a year or so ago would be dedicated to an Islamic revivalist movement, has recently thrown his support enthusiastically behind the repressive ideology of the regime.¹

There are some devout Muslims who are critical of the regime though this does not mean that they are anti-western. One of the most influential people in this category is Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, chairman of the Indonesian Mubalig² Corps; he was once president of the Java Bank (the state bank under Dutch

colonialism) and a Minister of Finance under the Republic, and is certainly one of the few real democrats of his generation. The pluralistic character of Islam in Indonesia is one of the reasons that Suharto has never been particularly threatened by Islam. If all Muslims stood behind a policy of hostility towards General Suharto, his government would never dare to hold general elections.

But much blood flowed in Tanjung Priok, and hostility certainly exists. We need to look at the facts so as to determine where these feelings lie. The event which led directly to the outburst in Tanjung Priok was the initiative taken by the government to present five bills to Parliament (see **TAPOL Bulletins** Nos. 64 and 65, July and September 1984). This package of bills will have the effect of scrapping the last remaining vestiges of freedom of organisation and freedom of thought. A considerable number of politicians and social leaders have expressed outrage at these bills. Among them are the Petition-of-50 (50 prominent political figures of the old and new generation who signed the well-known petition in 1980), the League for Awareness of the Constitution (whose leaders include retired General Nasution) and four student organisations, HMI and PMII (both Muslim), the PMKRI (Catholic) and the GMKI (Protestant).

The joint council of the five officially-sanctioned religions has also expressed opposition to the Bills, in particular the obligation for all parties and organisations to accept the Pancasila as their sole principle, the so-called *azas tunggal Pancasila*. But the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) and the Bishops' Conference (MAWI) have since withdrawn their opposition. The Indonesian churches have never been conspicuous in their defence of individual freedoms and human rights. They have all



Scapegoat

From: *Berita Tanpa Sensor*, No.5, 1984.

too frequently and all too quickly given up any opposition to repressive regulations.

On 17 August, a joint declaration was secretly published by a group of five organisations, among them a number of retired Armed Forces officers; the publication included three articles written by Mohamad Natsir, a former Prime Minister, Sanusi Hardjadinata, a former Minister of the Interior, and General Nasution.³ The broad spread represented by this publication indicates that opposition to the Suharto government is not confined to the Muslims.

The Indonesian Mubalig Corps of which the Rawa Badak mosque in Tanjung Priok is a member, is also opposed to the five bills, in particular the Pancasila-as-a-sole principle obligation. The Corps defends the right of any organisation to preserve its own ideology and is doing all it can to oppose the laws. There is however little that can be done to prevent the bills from becoming law; they are almost certain to be approved by the rubber-stamp chamber that passes for a parliament in Indonesia. Like anyone else in Indonesia who thinks differently from the government, the Corps is denied access to the media. It is trying nevertheless to spread its views in Friday-service sermons, and by means of discussions held among its own supporters and within the geographical confines of mosques sympathetic to its ideas. Some of these mosques have also stuck up notices about meetings on their walls.

It is worth noting that in their campaign for such a fundamental right, they are keeping to the limits of democratic fair-play, concerning themselves with the stifling effects of the regime's laws and presidential edicts. But in the eyes of the government, their campaign has gone too far. Their discussions,

like discussions held by other groups, have been spied on by secret service informants equipped with walkie-talkies. The wall-notices in the Rawa Badak mosque were removed by police agents, an act which even Indonesian law prohibits. Not only did they tear up these notices or smear them with black paint, they also entered the holy sanctuaries of Muslims wearing their jackboots, whereas people should enter such places only with bare feet. It is quite understandable (not to say justifiable) for crowds at the Rawa Baddak to have then gone to the length of burning this man's motorbike. It is not correct to say therefore that the events in Tanjung Priok were evidence of hostility towards the regime by devout Muslims. They were simply a response to the everyday practices of the military dictatorship. Or to be more exact, this was again a case of provocation by the government on the eve of discussions of a very sensitive subject in Parliament, intended to intimidate any members of Parliament who might want to express views not in line with those of the government. This was the objective too of previous secret-service provocations—the *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command) in 1978, and the hijacking of a Garuda plane to Bangkok in 1981. In 1984 it is Rawa Badak. In all these incidents, the Muslims have been the scapegoats and at the same time the victims.

Footnotes

¹Abdurachman Wahid was recently named as one of the 113 so-called *manggalas*, the top-level, officially-certified ideologues and tutors of the Pancasila.

²*mubalig*: lay preacher.

³This document entitled *Save Democracy* is summarised in *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 65, September 1984.



Commander-in-Chief Benny Murdani has summoned thousands of *ulamas* to meetings held in West Java, Central Java and East Java in the past few weeks, to tell them that the government expects them to drive "irresponsible elements" out of the mosques. The gist of his speeches has been that Muslims must themselves do the work of the security forces. "It's better for you to tell (these irresponsible elements) to get out than to wait for the Military Commander to bring along ten truckloads of troops to arrest one person." (*Sinar Harapan*, 12 November). Murdani spoke to 4,000 *ulamas* in Central Java, 2,000 in West Java and a similar number in East Java.

From: *Tempo*, 17 November, 1984.

Threats by phone have added to the general sense of insecurity. Though several Sarinah employees said that warnings were received by phone before the Jalan Thamrin store was burnt down, Murdani still says that the fire was "probably an accident". Any other explanation would only reinforce the feeling that the security forces have lost control.



Repatriation plans totally rejected by refugees

West Papuan refugees in the refugee camp at Black Water Creek, near Vanimo in the north-west of Papua New Guinea greeted Indonesian officials with a hail of stones and abuse when they tried to enter the camp earlier this month. The demonstration involving virtually all the refugees in the camp held high banners condemning Indonesia's occupation of their country and calling on the UN to support their demand for independence.

The Indonesian officials were members of a "verification team" led by Brigadier-General Sugiyono, Vice-Governor of Irian Jaya (West Papua) which was planning to visit all the refugee camps in PNG in preparation for a repatriation programme already agreed upon by the Indonesian and PNG governments.

Already two weeks before the visit took place, refugees at Black Water made it clear that they did not want to have anything to do with the team of Indonesians, and warned that they would be risking their lives if they attempted to visit the camp. (*Niugini News*, 18 September 1984). About a month ago, the refugees refused to receive a group of Catholic and

Protestant churchmen because they do not trust the motives of any Indonesians attempting to make contact with them. Earlier this year, a journalist from the Jakarta weekly, *Tempo* was forced to leave the same camp in a hurry after the refugees organised a demonstration complete with OPM flag and banners, and chased the journalist out of the camp (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 63, July 1984).

The latest and most powerful demonstration has put an end to Indonesian efforts to organise the repatriation of more than 10,000 West Papuan refugees who have fled to PNG since February this year. After months of haggling between Indonesia and the PNG, during the course of which the PNG government seemed to think that it could persuade the refugees to return home provided Indonesia gave written guarantees about the refugees' safety, it is the refugees themselves who have put an end to the repatriation plans. Immediately after the incident at Black Water, Brigadier-General Sugiyono announced that the team were returning home immediately and the remaining programme of camp visits was being abandoned.

Black Water was the third camp on the team's itinerary. The first camp they visited was Kwek, where 881 refugees are thought to be living, but when the team arrived at the camp, they found it completely deserted. At Green River camp, which holds about 275 refugees, the team was welcomed by demonstrators carrying a large number of banners supporting the OPM. The Indonesian officials asked the PNG security forces to have the banners removed but the refugees refused to comply. Some of the slogans on the banners have been reproduced in the Indonesian press: "We categorically reject the PNG-Indonesian



Brigadier-General Sugiyono, Deputy Governor of Irian Jaya, after being attacked in Vanimo

From: *Sinar Harapan*, 5 November, 1984.

KEONG

PRAM 84



"I'm Raden Mas Pambudi Mulyopangarso; my middle name is Patience. Humiliated internationally, chased like a market thief, yet I'm always patient... He-he..."

From: *Sinar Harapan*, 5 November, 1984.

programme for repatriation", "UN should help our people who want independence for West Papua", "Indonesia must end its colonisation of Papuan soil and restore our human rights" and "The West Papuan refugees are not the affair of Indonesia".

Repatriation efforts abandoned

Obviously humiliated by this well-publicised rebuff by West Papuans now in PNG, the Indonesian government appears to be accepting the fact that their plans for repatriation will have to be scrapped. **Tempo** (17 November) reports that Indonesia seems inclined to let the refugees themselves decide whether they want to return, and leave them to return home on foot.

Attention now seems to be turning to reports that OPM units near the border with PNG are receiving supplies of new weapons from abroad. **Tempo** reports one claim that planes dropping food supplies to refugees in camps in the Vanimo region have been dropping cases containing weapons as well. One opposition PNG politician, Mr Okok had compared the present developments as being similar to the situation that preceded Indonesia's invasion of East Timor at the end of 1975.

Vanimo refugees arrested by the PNG authorities

According to Indonesian press reports, the PNG authorities

have arrested nine of the refugees who are thought to have been responsible for organising the demonstration at Black Water camp and intend to put them on trial. A tenth is apparently going to be expelled from the country. The ten refugees are: Tom Ireeuw, a Cendrawasih University lecturer, Jimmy Wawar, a civil servant, Michael Kareth, a student, Eliza Awom and John Jamboani, army deserters, Yance Hambring, OPM leader from Genyem, Costan Ruhukail, civil servant, Demi Kurni, civil servant, Dominggus Mesas, community leader from the region of Arso and Mrs Corry Ap, the wife of the murdered museum curator, Arnold Ap.¹

Efforts to pass sentences against the refugees are bound to arouse a great deal of public condemnation in PNG where, according to **Tempo**, there are growing demands for the government to allow all refugees who refuse to return to Indonesia to stay in the country. The Catholic bishops in the two border provinces, Bishop Gerard Deschamps of Daru (Western Province) and Bishop John Etheridge of Vanimo (West Sepik Province), have both publicly voiced this demand.

¹An Indonesian official has since complained bitterly (**Sinar Harapan**, 17 November) that only one of these "ring-leaders"—Costan Ruhukail—is among the nine people now being tried in PNG.

Profiteering from forced Asmati labour

The following extracts on the exploitation of Asmat people by timber concession companies are from a report by Max J. Wajong to the Seminar on Development in Irian Java held in Jakarta from 30 April–2 May this year. The report, entitled "Limiting the Damaging Effects of Development on the Social Values of the Asmat People", shows that exploitation of the Asmat tribespeople in the interests of timber-racketeering described at length two years ago (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 52, 1982) is still very much in progress.

★ ★ ★

Can't timber concession licences in the Asmat region be temporarily suspended?

While not intending to revive all the commotion of the past few years regarding the negative features (of timber logging) which, up to a point, received some attention . . . I nevertheless think it necessary on this occasion to raise the issue. . . Let us start by studying some data which I obtained from people who hold timber concessions in Asmat:

A timber-concession holder operating in the Asmat region with an area of 785 hectares for 1982/83 incurred the following production costs per cubic metre of timber:

Export tax	Rp. 7,760
IHH*	Rp. 2,100
IHHT	Rp. 140
Grading fee	Rp. 250
MPO export	Rp. 1,280
S.P.S.W	Rp. 2,000
Stevedoring	Rp. 1,000
Reforestation	Rp. 3,880
Bank Commission	Rp. 101.35
Production ie. labour costs	Rp. 10,575
Other costs	Rp. 2,750
Total	Rp. 31,836.35

Production costs for 4,000 cubic metres at Rp.31,836 per cubic metre:	Rp.127,345.400
Export earnings at a price of Rp.970 per cubic metre	Rp.174,600.000
Profit	Rp. 47,254.600

*We have not attempted to identify the abbreviations.

The Asmat tribesman who has been forced to go into the forest to cut down timber actually receives only Rp.4,500 of the Rp.10,575 paid out as production (labour) costs, plus an additional Rp.1,500 for waiting until the timber can be loaded on board ship for export. The remainder of his earning is shared out between officials: 60% for the sub-district chief (*camat*) 20% for the police, and 20% for the sub-district army officer (*koramil*).

We can well ask whether such a wage is reasonable for the Asmat man who is required to work so hard. To give an idea of what is involved, during a period of logging which lasts anything from one to two months, all the adult men in a kampung have to go into the forest to cut down timber, during which time each man will produce 5 to 10 cubic metres of timber, depending on circumstances and how hard he works. He thus earns anything between Rp.25,000 and Rp.50,000. But before being paid he must wait till the timber is loaded on board, and even then, it will take some time before payment is made bearing in mind the lack of communications. Then, when payment is made, money will first be deducted for "contact" goods such as packed tobacco, distributed to the men as an incentive before they went logging. Nor can the Asmat people check the way their timber is measured, which is done by the concession-holder.

Then, when payment is made, the local shops, all run by outsiders (ie. Indonesians) will do brisk business by marking up their prices. In a single day, one of these shops can easily make a net profit of one to two million rupiahs. As for the Asmat people, they pay whatever price is marked because they have money in their hand and feel pleased that they can buy something. The little money they receive is therefore almost certain to be spent in a single day. While the men have been away cutting timber, their kampung has been left empty, the houses uncared for, bushes untended, the children left without sustenance and gardens untilled. So what is the value of the money they earn compared with these negative factors, whilst others profit from the ignorance of the Asmat people about timber logging or the wage they ought to be paid because they have no experience of a market economy?

And how much, we should ask, of the foreign exchange earnings and taxes amounting to more than Rp.20,000 per cubic metre goes back to the Asmat region? What do they get in the form of education, health services, teachers, doctors, co-operatives, communications facilities and so on!

In view of all this, is it not time to postpone for the time being these timber concessions? . . .

Planned relocation of the Papuan population

The Army's "Special Territorial Management"* for Irian Jaya

In the last issue of TAPOL Bulletin, we published a diagram of a plan to re-locate the Papuan population of Irian Jaya, which was attached to a document issued in April this year by Brigadier-General Meliala Sembiring, military commander of the 17th/Centrawasih Divisional Command, and promised to give a detailed account of the plan. Since then, the plan has been described in an article by Brigadier-General Sembiring, dated 19 October 1984, published in Kompas in October. The article, being more succinct than the earlier voluminous document, is used in the following.

We summarise Sembiring's plan because it envisages a comprehensive upheaval of West Papuans in the interests of Indonesia's security objectives. His "smiling", anthropological approach is a cover for direct and invariably brutal military intervention in all aspects of people's lives. His plan to create controlled population settlements is also evidence that the army's efforts so far to annihilate the OPM have got nowhere.

Sembiring starts by stressing that the region and society in Irian Jaya is "completely different" from the rest of Indonesia. Its special features are:

"... full of dense jungle, high mountains and marshes, a great diversity of tribes, each with their own distinct customs, (a region) sharing a border with a foreign state whose people are of the same race as the people of Irian Jaya, and, most important of all, the continued existence of the GPK" ("security disruptor gangs", the army's designation for the OPM, the Free Papua Movement).

To cope with these special conditions, the 17th/Cendrawasih Division has, since mid-1982 implemented a special type of territorial management in Irian Jaya because the "wrong approach" could "obstruct the development process and disrupt regional stability". The "right approach" involves "socio-anthropological, socio-religious and socio-psychological approaches".

Centres for Social Development

The section of Sembiring's article on the relocation of the population is worth quoting in full:

"The basic strategy for restoring security in Irian Jaya is concentrated on separating the people from GPK, inculcating a spirit of non-cooperation/resistance among the people towards the GPK, localising the security-disruptors, striking out at those disruptors who persist, and consolidating and rehabilitating the region.

"The smiling policy implemented by the 17th/Cendrawasih Division before the middle of 1982 was the first step in our efforts to detach the people from the influences of the GPK separatist idea, and this policy must be further developed by means of more basic management. Territorial smiling reflects a territorial attitude guided by the eight duties of the Armed Forces. Territorial smiling means acting with human feelings and outlooks, honest openness and friendship from the (army) apparatus towards the people in its area. This can in practice be done by face-to-face encounters, house-visits, especially in the more remote regions, and other such family activities.

"The next step which is now needed is to separate the people from the GPK, mentally and physically, by setting up Centres for Social Development (*Pusat Pengembangan Masyarakat*) or PPMs, that is to say, setting up settlement locations especially in the more remote regions, taking account of local customs, religious beliefs, life-styles, historical background, inter-tribal relations, and the aspirations of the local community. A programme to raise living standards and improve social and economic conditions is a powerful magnet to attract the people in the vicinity to settle in the PPM locations so as to detach them from the influences of the GPK separatists."

Forming opinion and creating a national identity

Sembiring then sets out to explain the need for a vastly expanded

programme of Pancasila indoctrination (P4) "to cultivate national pride, self-respect and broaden people's horizons so as to create a consciousness of being (part of) a nation, part of the Indonesian state, and to defend the state". The trouble is, he admits, that the Pancasila ideology has not yet taken root because of "the simplistic way of thinking of the population". The number of people being subjected to P4 indoctrination is far from adequate to keep pace with the growth of the population, so the territorial apparatus (ie. the army) must "socialise" the Pancasila, simplify it in terms familiar to the people. The army must employ the "tutor system" so as to penetrate more effectively; once they can function as "leaders and guides" they will be able to follow through with "territorial management".

Turning to the lack of skills among Papuan youth, which results in widespread unemployment, Sembiring stresses the need for vocational training to be provided through the PPMs, with projects organised by World Vision International and the Department of Social Affairs.

"Cultivating a national identity in society will certainly make society resilient, ideologically, politically, economically, socially and culturally and in defence . . . (all of which is) the basis for people's resistance to the separatists." Sembiring claims that this special "territorial management" has already helped to isolate the GPK, forcing some of them to surrender, though others are still persisting. He claims that since 1982 [when, it should be noted, the army was claiming that the OPM was already a "spent force"], 593 OPM fighters have surrendered or been captured, together with 5,886 supporters.

After giving the names of OPM members of leaders who are now active along the border or in refugee camps in Papua New Guinea, Sembiring claims that the OPM president, Efraim James Nyaro has twice, through the intermediary of the Bishop of Vanimo, John Holdridge (sic), offered to hold negotiations—"but we were forced to reject this because it implied recognising him as 'president'". However, Sembiring concludes, somewhat optimistically in view of the recent experiences of Indonesia's "verification team" at refugee camps in PNG, "we shall generously and open-heartedly welcome back the border crossers as Indonesian citizens if they consciously return to the fold of the Motherland".

*"Territorial management" (*pembinaan territorial/wilayah*) is part of the army's basic "defence" doctrine called *perang wilayah dan pembinaan wilayah* (territorial warfare and territorial management) which asserts that the type of warfare the Indonesian army must prepare for is guerrilla warfare against internal or external enemies. Hence the need for the army, at all times, to organise "total people's defence" (*hankamrata*) by means of its "management" of society right down to the lowest units.

PNG visitor discusses the refugee question

The following interview of Mr Gregory Mongi of Papua New Guinea took place in London, shortly after he briefly visited some refugee camps near the PNG border with the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya (West Papua). Mr Mongi gave the interview in his personal capacity as a private citizen of PNG and was not speaking on behalf of any organisation.

Please explain developments surrounding the refugee question over the past few years.

I will go back to 1981 when I first came into personal contact with refugees. In that year, 11 political refugees set off for PNG but only 10 arrived; the eleventh was shot and killed by the Indonesian military as they were escaping across the border. Most were Cendrawasih University students. They were taken to Vanimo by the authorities and questioned. I believe an attempt was made to send them back to Jayapura but it didn't work. They feared for their lives.

Why did they decide to leave? Does PNG collaborate with Indonesia to repatriate refugees from West Papua?

That was a time of tensions in Jayapura and many groups supporting independence had begun to get organised. These 11 men must have been under close surveillance, so they decided to run away.

As for your second question: No, that is not the practice. I personally am not aware of any political refugees being repatriated. They normally receive help from the UN High Commission for Refugees for asylum in a third country, and get permissive residence to stay in PNG until asylum is found.

The next group to arrive and contact me was Seth Rumkorem and nine others. Seth Rumkorem and two others have been offered asylum in Greece but the rest are still waiting for a country to accept them. Then in 1983, a group of 32 refugees walked across the border undetected by our border authorities. Later they were taken to Vanimo for questioning; they were tried and convicted for illegal entry. Public opinion was against this verdict and favoured a more compassionate response by the PNG government because they are our Melanesian brothers and sisters. In June 1983, I went to Vanimo to visit them in jail but the authorities refused to allow me access.

The really huge wave of refugees began this year—300 in February but by July the figure had risen to 10,000, most of them women and children. These mass crossings followed in the wake of the flag-raising ceremony in Jayapura after which the Indonesian military began a crack-down against anyone suspected of "subversive" activity. My own figure—checked and re-checked—was 10,110. But sometimes, people slip back and forth across the border to collect food from their gardens, then return to PNG.

So, some people occasionally return home? What else is this for besides tending their gardens?

I should explain that many of those who have come across do not under the concept of refugee that you have in the West. The most educated Papuans can and do express love for their motherland. But the simple villager is more concerned with his/her garden, land, fruit-trees, livestock and few basic possessions. Even the simple digging-stick is very important to them. All these possessions constitute life to us Melanesians. Therefore I can easily sympathise with my displaced brothers or sisters when they decide to go for a walk which, I know, is more than just a walk. They want to be back with everything that makes them complete human beings even though it means taking risks on the way.

People I met at the camps expressed a firm longing to return to their beloved homeland as soon as the tensions die down, on condition, that is, that their lives are safeguarded. I was told about an elderly person who chose to stay at home, preferring to die on his ancestral land than flee to safety in PNG. I heard that

he is still alive, happy to know that the women and children are safe in PNG. There are cases where whole hamlets have crossed over.

What has caused the renewed influx of refugees in the past few months, with refugees coming over not just in the north but also in the south?

You should realise that there is a great deal of fighting between the OPM and the Indonesian military, but the clashes are not always major armed confrontations. West Papuans have human feelings, and know what they like or what they won't accept. Whenever they express dissatisfaction, the army assaults innocent people. This means that dialogue is difficult. I do not accept Indonesia's claim that the people are being incited by the OPM to run away. From my own discussions with people at the border camps, I conclude that there is a lot of fighting going on. People can provide precise information, with date and place. But the fighting in West Papua cannot be compared with Africa or Central America. There are no large-scale military operations, but people are disappearing or being killed all the time.

I admire the way Indonesia claims to be a country with rich cultural diversity, yet united. But, why use military force if the cultures live in such harmony? The military serve only to prolong the resistance and the hatred people feel for the Jakarta



OPM fighters armed with rifles and spears.

From: *Tempo*, 17 November, 1984.

government. I have good friends in Indonesia, and to generalise that all Indonesians are bad would be false and unjust. But Jakarta's transmigration programme will eventually force a lot of Melanesians off their ancestral land, destroying the dignity of these people for ever, if care is not observed now. Land being taken for transmigration is not compensated for by the Jakarta authorities. Is that cultural harmony?

If the OPM only has 250 people, as the Indonesians claim, how can such a small number incite over ten thousand tribal villagers and public servants to leave everything they most cherish and flee to PNG as refugees? They told me about the army burning down houses, destroying gardens and fruit trees, raping women, killing livestock, desecrating Christian symbols. I was told of a 15-year-old boy who was beheaded for drawing the West Papuan flag and scrawling his name in the sand. He was the son of one of the men who kidnapped the Swiss pilot earlier this year, so I was told.

We have heard a lot about the transmigration programme and Indonesian attempts to include Papuans as "trans-locals". Are you aware of any attempts by the Indonesians to concentrate bush people in resettlements like the strategic resettlements in East Timor?

That's precisely what people are afraid of and what the Indonesians are doing—driving them off their traditional lands and telling them to live elsewhere. This cuts right across the Melanesian tradition. West Papuans object strongly to being forced off their land where their ancestors are buried, and being



Dani tribesmen planting rice instead of potatoes. It's all part of being absorbed into Indonesian society, say the authorities.

From: *Sinar Harapan*, 28 October, 1984.

told to live on land that doesn't belong to them but to a different clan. The Indonesians have no conception of the meaning of clan membership.

How would you explain the PNG government's hesitation about letting the UNHCR get involved? Is it the result of Indonesian pressure?

My impression is that there is apprehension that the UNHCR might be used to help Indonesia get rid of as many Papuans as possible so as to leave more space for the Javanese to settle. There's a feeling too that if the UNHCR, or more correctly, the UN as a whole wanted to get involved, they should go back to the beginning, to 1962 (when the New York Agreement was signed between Indonesia and Holland, handing West Papua over to Indonesia) and to 1969 when the "Act of Free Choice" which Papuans call the "Act of No Choice" took place. That's the root of the problem, and as long as that isn't solved, people will go on spilling over into PNG. So, I think that allowing these people to settle in our territory or finding them places elsewhere isn't really helping the cause of the West Papuans.

But at the same time, the PNG government takes the position that the refugee problem must be solved bilaterally with Indonesia, which means accepting the outcome of the Act of No Choice. Yet as for raising the issue at the UN (as distinct from the UNHCR), I think the PNG government feels that Indonesia's bargaining position is too strong. So the PNG faces a dilemma, a stalemate, not knowing how far it can trust the UN to solve the problem. But what we do want is for the government to deal with the UNHCR as a refugee agency.

But there's a problem because the UNHCR only has a liaison office in Port Moresby, with only one official plus a legal officer. They really need someone with authority to help PNG withstand Indonesian pressures. When arguments take place between our government and Indonesia, it would be helpful to have a full-blown UNHCR office.

Famine again hits the Baliem Valley

At least 200 people are known to have died of starvation in the region of Kurima, Jayawijaya, the district of West Papua located between Jayapura district in the north and Merauke province in the south. Kurima lies in the Baliem Valley and is the region that was severely hit by famine two years ago when it was reported that over a hundred people died of hunger.

Sinar Harapan (8 November 1984) reports that the official death figure is 117 but according to its own independent sources (which are probably church missionaries in the region who are in contact with the Christian newspaper), the figure is actually nearly twice as much. Another 3,173 people, mostly small children and the elderly, are said to be in a critical state. As in the previous instance of famine, the authorities complain that it is difficult to reach the people affected because they live in remote regions.

But the district head, Albert Dien, gives a rather different explanation. He mentions on the one hand a pest called *suklum*, as large as a butterfly, which attacks tubers, making them inedible. The second cause reflects the disastrous impact on the people of being forced to adjust to a money economy with the result that they are deserting their gardens to find work which can earn a cash income. Many people, says Dien, sought work at a road-construction project under way nearby since April this year, but found that they were not able to buy marketed food in the area with the money they earned, whereas their own food producing activities had been abandoned for the project. Dien does not explain the circumstances in which the local people were "persuaded" to go and work on the project, nor does his explanation tally with the report that the people are too remote to be reached.

The critical conditions described by *Sinar Harapan*, which warns that many more victims are likely to die because they are already far too weak to move, recalls comments made by people helping West Papuan refugees in PNG. Many of the refugees from central and southern regions of West Papua show signs of long-term food deficiencies and suffer from illnesses that should have been treated long ago, they say.



Refugees in PNG. A PNG Red Cross report concluded that 90–95% are "suffering from moderate to severe malnutrition", much of it from before leaving West Papua. (*National Times*, PNG, 30 August, 1984.)



Suharto told the Sultan of Brunei during his recent visit: "Indonesia won't be expansionist".

Mochtar: "We'll only allow visits that are in our interests"

The Indonesian Foreign Minister has announced that, in addition to allowing persons from diplomatic missions to visit East Timor, it will also consider issuing permits to persons proposed by foreign embassies in Jakarta, "provided the Indonesian Government considers that the visit would be in Indonesia's interests". The first mission to be allowed in on this basis was one last month led by Charles Morrash, Indonesia



Diplomats from Jakarta visit a sugar plantation in East Timor. (Source: *East Timor After Integration* (1983), Jakarta.)

Desk officer at the State Department in Washington. This mission, like the earlier Australian parliamentary and ambassadorial missions, is specifically described as *not being* a fact-finding mission but only a routine, orientation mission.

In an interview with *Newsweek* recently, Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja said that none of the official missions which have visited East Timor recently have found anything to support the "propaganda" being spread by groups about conditions there. This is hardly surprising since he has himself

made it clear that only visits serving Indonesia's interests will be permitted.

Mochtar accuses US Congressmen of "not reading what they sign"

Mochtar also said that it was an "open secret" that many members of the House of Representatives "sign things without knowing what they are signing". Reporting this highly offensive remark, *Sinar Harapan* (26 October) said this was assumed to be a reference to a statement about East Timor recently signed by 213 (sic) members of the US Congress.

Increased transmigration to East Timor

Indonesian plans to carry out large-scale transmigration to East Timor in an attempt to overwhelm the local population and quell the resistance appear to be in progress. When the plans were announced earlier this year, no figures were given, but according to a report in *Merdeka* (23 August 1984), 500 "model peasants" from Bali and Java are soon to be settled in the south-western region of East Timor in the very near future.

Two sites are being prepared, one in the village of Salele, near Tilomar (a few miles from the border with West Timor) and the other in the village of Beko, near the district capital of Suai. Each of the sites will be inhabited by 500 families, half of them from Bali and Central Java and the rest "translocals", that is to say East Timorese.

The tactic of forcing the local inhabitants to live in Javanese/Balinese communities follows the pattern being used in West Papua though in that region, the "translocal" mix is kept at 25%. A report in *The Observer* (23 September 1984) described the Indonesian plans as "swamp tactics" and asserted that the policy of transmigration had been denounced at the United Nations as "internal colonialism".

Morrison and Murdani: A 20-year friendship

Australia's new ambassador to Indonesia is to be Bill Morrison who, it has recently been revealed, has a long-standing and very close friendship with General Benny Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces.

The two men first met in Bangkok in 1965 when Morrison was Third Secretary at the Australian Embassy and Murdani was in Bangkok on an intelligence mission for Suharto, under cover as a Garuda Airways administrative employee, but in fact organising secret contacts with the Malaysian government to sabotage the Indonesian government's policy of confrontation with Malaysia.

The Jakarta daily, *Sinar Harapan* (25 October 1984) reported that after the two men became close friends in Bangkok, they were then both posted to Kuala Lumpur where their friendship continued to flourish. It was some time later, when Morrison held a diplomatic post in Singapore that he was "discovered" by Australian Labour Party leader, Gough Whitlam and persuaded to go into politics (*The Australian*, 24 October). It was not long before he won a seat in Parliament for the ALP, and then became Minister of Defence in the Gough Whitlam government which gave Suharto the go-ahead for an all-out invasion of East Timor in late 1975. It could well be that Morrison's eligibility for high political office in a country where relations with Indonesia dominate foreign affairs, was based on his closeness with Murdani, then as now a key figure in Indonesian army intelligence.

After the present Labour Government took office in Canberra last year, Morrison headed a parliamentary delegation to East Timor and produced a report very favourable to Indonesia. It was Morrison personally who ignored efforts by two Fretilin guerrillas who stopped his car on the way to Baucau to invite members of the delegation to meet resistance leaders and hear the views of the East Timorese people.

Under the direction of an ambassador who is so close to the second most powerful man in Indonesia today, it is difficult to see how Australian policy towards Indonesia can do anything but serve Indonesia's interests.



Three communist prisoners under threat of execution

It has recently been announced that death sentences passed against three communist political prisoners have been upheld by the President; now that they have exhausted all avenues to have their sentences commuted, they could be executed at any time.

All three men, Djoko Untung, Gatot Lestario (Sutaryo) and Mohamad Munir were arrested during or after the South Blitar (East Java) affair of 1968 when many PKI leaders who escaped arrest in 1965 went underground and attempted to organise resistance to the military government. Djoko Untung (63 years old), a member of the PKI (Communist Party) East Java provincial committee was arrested on 6 July 1968 in South Blitar; Gatot Lestario (59 years old), chairman of the PKI East Java provincial committee was arrested on 19 January 1969 in Jakarta or East Java; and Moh. Munir (59 years old), chairman of the National Council of the all-Indonesia trade union federation, SOBSI, was arrested in August 1968.

The announcement that Djoko Untung's and Gatot Lestario's clemency pleas had failed came in a press report (*Suara Karya*, 11 October 1984). A spokesman of the East Java Public Prosecutor's office said that senior military and police officers in East Java were discussing the date of the execution, which could take place "soon". The spokesman told the press that Djoko Untung's clemency plea was rejected on 31 October 1983 and Gatot Lestario's plea was rejected on 14 August 1984, yet it has since been established that, up to the beginning of November this year, neither men has been notified of the decision, nor apparently has the prison governor of the Pamekasan (Madura) Prison where they are being held. They only heard news of the rejections from relatives who were understandably alarmed at press reports about possible early executions. Thus not only have these men been subjected to over 15 years' imprisonment, half the time under death sentence; they are also being tormented by an outrageous disregard for their legal rights to know what is happening to their cases.

Djoko Untung and Gatot Lestario were tried together in late 1975 and sentenced to death early in January 1976. A third man, Basuki, was charged together with them but did not survive the trial ordeal; he died on 15 December 1975. When the trial commenced, the men asked to be defended by well-respected barristers, Buyung Nasution, then head of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, and Yap Thiam Hien. In flagrant violation of their rights as defendants to appoint lawyers of their choice, the court simply ignored their request and appointed lawyers of its own choice.

Prisoners' procedural rights treated with contempt

The persistent procedural violations committed by the

authorities in the case of Munir have caused immense confusion and distress both for the convicted prisoner and for his family. They are typical of what many convicted prisoners have experienced (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 63, July 1984). In late 1982, Munir's relatives were under the impression that his clemency plea had been rejected and that execution was imminent. After a flood of protests reached Jakarta, the authorities announced that his case had not yet reached the clemency stage, but was still under consideration by the Supreme Court (*kasasi*).

At the time, the official explanation was (*Kompas* 1 October 1982) that Munir's appeal against sentence to the High Court was rejected on 23 November 1981, that he was notified of this nearly five months later, on 8 April 1982. Four days later, he submitted his *kasasi* plea to the Supreme Court; he could hardly have done it any earlier. Then, six months after the *Kompas* report, there came a report in *Sinar Harapan* (25 April 1983) that Munir's *kasasi* appeal had been turned down without coming before the Court because it was submitted after the time limit between High Court verdict and *kasasi* plea had lapsed!

As far as is known, there have been no executions of communist prisoners (the so-called "1965 generation" of political prisoners) since the late 1960s although many dozens are known still to be under sentence of death. The sudden recent announcements about rejected clemency pleas have raised the spectre that the military may be planning to proceed with some executions again. Whether this is connected with their present political difficulties is not clear, though some generals at the top of the military hierarchy have implied that there was a "PKI connection" to the Tanjung Priok demonstration in September this year.

In November 1982, the Dutch Foreign Minister, C.A. van der Klaauw who had just made a visit to Indonesia, wrote to the Dutch Communist Party saying he had been assured by the Indonesian government that none of the outstanding death sentences would be carried out. But Imran bin Muhammad Zein was executed on 13 April 1983 and Timzar Zubil was executed around the same time.

Muslim prisoner's life sentence upheld

The East Java public prosecutor's office has also announced (*Suara Karya*, 11 October 1984) that a Muslim prisoner, Ismail Pranoto (Hispran) has had his life sentence upheld; his plea for clemency was turned down by the President on 3 August 1983. He is now serving his life sentence in Kalisosok Prison, Surabaya.


Political prisoners of the military



HR Dharsono, retired general, former ASEAN Secretary-General, arrested 8 November 1984.



Gatot Lestario, PKI prisoner, arrested January 1969. He could be executed soon.



Muhammad Idris, Free-Aceh Front leader recently given a life sentence. His defence plea in support of Free Aceh was "wildly cheered" by the crowds in court. (*Tempo*, 24 November 1984.)



Rachmat Basuki, deputy chairman of the *Kaba'ah Youth Movement's* Jakarta branch, arrested in October 1984 for alleged complicity in 4 October bombings.

Government to speed up process of landlessness

The Indonesian government has come out with an extraordinary new programme that will speed up the process of landlessness and impoverishment by stating that it plans "to eliminate all land holdings of less than half a hectare" in the near future and eventually "to eliminate all holdings of less than a hectare". The plan was revealed by the Agriculture Minister, Ir Achmad Affandi who said that, according to official statistics, there are now 8.7 million peasant families trying to live off half a hectare of land or less. This figure was given in President Suharto's 16 August speech this year, and represented a fall from 11 million peasant families with such tiny plots in 1980. This trend is regarded by the government as "an improvement", without saying anything about the circumstances of the millions of peasants who have been driven off their land.

The Agriculture Minister claimed that peasants "would not be forced" to give up their land, although even the censored press in Indonesia manages to publish enough reports (see below) to show that this is precisely what is happening all the time. Peasants would, he said, "be advised" to transmigrate or to cultivate land now managed by nucleus estates which are functioning in many parts of the country. He said the government intends to cut the number of peasants with less than half a hectare by half before the end of the current five-year plan which ends in 1989.

Commenting on the announcement, **Merdeka** (23 August 1984) said that such a programme violates the basic right to own land.

According to the Basic Agrarian Law, peasants who do not own any land or who own less than the minimum fixed by law should be given land to enable them to produce . . . and those who own more than the maximum fixed by law should have their holdings reduced. What is happening now is the very opposite: those with large holdings are being left alone while those with not enough land are to have their land rights eliminated. Is this what is meant by justice and progress?

Will the peasants to be deprived of their land be given due compensation, asks the paper, and what about peasants in villages where they are being pushed around and intimidated by those in power locally?

The following reports taken from recent issues of Jakarta newspapers show the worth of government pledges that force will not be used against peasants.

Land cleared of fruit trees to make way for nucleus estate

Many peasants in South Banten, West Java have lost their livelihoods because their coconut trees, clove trees, banana trees and coffee bushes have been cut down without their permission to make way for a plantation of palm-oil trees managed by a nucleus estate. The peasants complained that when they tried to resist, they were summoned by the local military officer (*koramil*).

The company in charge of the nucleus estate is a state-owned

enterprise, PTP XI. When it first commenced operations a couple of years ago, local peasants were promised 1.5 hectares of estate land to care for, once the trees had become productive, as well as 0.3 hectares for gardens and 0.2 hectares for dwellings. So far, however, none of this has happened. As a result, what was once a busy fruit-growing region, dispatching truckloads of fruit to market every day, has now been turned into a ghost-district, with peasants sitting around most of the time, waiting to hear whether they are going to get a share of the land now being cultivated by the nucleus estate. Many of the people working for the estate have been brought in from outside the region.

One peasant complained that he lost trees that used to earn him Rp.50,000 a month from *jengkol* fruit alone. Another elderly peasant was described as sitting, crying helplessly as she watched her clove trees being cut down to make way for palm-oil seedlings. Yet another said he had lost land which contained nearly 600 trees growing a variety of fruits.


Reporting this scene of injustice and deprivation, **Kompas** (11 September 1984) pointed out that while so many peasants have lost their livelihoods, local village heads (*lurah*) have been enjoying a bonanza, constructing new homes and buying diesel colts, no doubt with the profits from pay-offs to help the nucleus estate acquire the land they wanted.

Peasants being forced to sign away their land

In another part of West Java, around the village of Mekarsari in the district of Pandeglang, comes an equally harrowing report. More than 350 peasants are being told that they must sell off their rice-land (*sawah*) so that it can be turned over to the construction of shrimp ponds for a private company. The peasants, who between them own about a thousand hectares of land, say that they are being so constantly harassed and intimidated by local government officials and the village *babinsa* (village-level army officer) that they are afraid to stay at home. Some say that in order to avoid meeting officials who come to their homes at night, they are taking refuge in nearby forests for the night.

They now fear that they will lose their land rights whether they signed the required documents or not because many title-deeds are already in the hands of the authorities "for renewal". Some explain how these deeds were forcibly taken from them. The villagers, who have now sought the help of a Jakarta-based lawyer to protect their interests, say that in addition to their *sawahs*, land which is now used for homes, mosques and gardens is also to be taken from them for shrimp ponds. "If we are forced to sell up altogether, what will become of us?" they ask. They insist that they are not interested in getting compensation, whatever the amount offered. All they want is to be allowed to continue to grow rice. They feel they could not turn to trade as an alternative because they lack experience, whereas the prospects of purchasing sawah-land elsewhere are negligible.

Source: **Kompas**, 3 September 1984.



Resistance in East Timor unbowed

Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, *The War against East Timor*, Zed Books Ltd and Marram Books, London; Pluto Press Australia, Leichhardt, NSW; In de Knipscheer, Haarlem. 253pp. £6.95 paperback (UK). [Available to TAPOL readers for £4.50 plus postage.]

Much of the information to have emerged from behind the wall of silence that has surrounded East Timor since the full-scale Indonesian invasion of December 1975 has been made available only in the relatively ephemeral form of bulletins, newsletters and pamphlets. Whilst the importance of such sources is certainly not to be underestimated, the appearance of full-length accounts is always to be welcomed. Such accounts¹ bring together information that is not always readily available to a wider public outside the international solidarity movement itself, and publication in book form opens up a broader potential for distribution. *The War Against East Timor* is a valuable addition to the available resources, providing a concise but detailed account of the East Timorese national liberation movement and of the continued resistance against Indonesian aggression. It also covers Western collusion with Indonesia and begins to spell out the implications of a continued war in East Timor for Indonesia itself. The authors draw on a very wide range of source material, ranging from statements from Fretilin to CIA intelligence reports, from interviews with Timorese churchmen to the terrifying accounts given by refugees. Its most valuable single contribution to our knowledge of the situation inside East Timor is, however, the publication of the full text of nine Indonesian military documents captured by Fretilin in late 1982. These give the lie to the repeated claims made in Jakarta to the effect that Fretilin is a spent force and that the final 'integration' of East Timor is only a matter of time. Whatever the Suharto regime may say in public, Indonesian personnel on the ground are well aware of the fact that they face an opponent whose strength is growing rather than declining.

One of the more striking features of the war in East Timor has always been the consistency of reports from sources that are geographically dispersed, independent of one another and politically disparate. Even in the early stages of the invasion, the claims made in Fretilin's broadcasts on Radio Maubere were inevitably confirmed by outside sources and even by information emerging from within the Indonesian military. The captured documents published here conform to that pattern. They carry security ratings ranging from 'Restricted' to 'Secret' and cover a wide variety of topics: breaking up Fretilin support networks in villages and a 'resettlement camps', in-

telligence gathering, search and destroy missions against suspected Falintil positions (Falintil is Fretilin's military organisation), and even the use of torture. The latter document advises that photographs should not be taken of torture sessions; they may get into the wrong hands. The picture of Fretilin that emerges from these documents is one of a resistance movement which is present in every village and camp, in every locally conscripted unit. It clearly possesses an intelligence network capable of helping Falintil to outmanoeuvre Indonesian units with remarkable consistency and ease. References to the problems caused by 'local loyalties' (ie. nationalism and a commitment to liberation) indicate a realisation that *integrasi* is not working, despite the implementation of much-vaunted educational programmes designed to capture the hearts and minds of future generations. Quite simply, these are not the kind of counter-insurgency manuals that are issued to an army facing only demoralised and fragmented guerrilla bands. Indonesia's invasion and occupation of East Timor is the largest military operation undertaken by the republic since its inception; it has yet to show any real signs of success.


Fretilin's resurgence

The resurgence and recovery of Fretilin and its fighting forces are remarkable by any standards. The initial resistance to the full-scale invasion of December 1975 — in itself an escalation in response to the failure of the earlier incursion and destabilisation tactics of *Operasi Komodo* — was on an unexpected scale and US military planners described the Indonesian performance

as 'woeful'. If anything, that is an understatement, as by August 1976 an invasion force of some 32,000 Indonesian troops controlled only the major towns and communications routes, with the Fretilin-held areas in the mountainous interior left virtually untouched. What began to turn the tide in Indonesia's favour was the supply of advanced military hardware from its Western allies. A particularly important role was played by US-supplied Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft; Falintil has virtually no anti-aircraft capability. Indonesia has subsequently taken delivery of US Skyhawks (the backbone of the US airborne forces in the Indochina war), British-made Hawks and helicopters from Australia, as well as Dutch corvettes.

The Broncos were used extensively in the massive encirclement and annihilation campaigns of 1977–1978 which involved the deployment of ground forces on a huge scale and which were inevitably accompanied by saturation bombing and strafing. The third such campaign reduced resistance to its lowest ebb in November 1978, when a major Falintil base in the mountains to the south-east of Baucau finally fell. As Fretilin has admitted, however the defeat was not the result of military factors alone and had a lot to do with its own failings and internal inadequacies, failures which found expression in the attempts of former leaders like Xavier do Amaral and Alarico Fernandes to negotiate some kind of settlement. Paradoxically, the events of 1978 may have actually strengthened Fretilin in the long run by convincing the leadership of the impossibility of negotiating from a position of weakness and of the need to organise in the occupied zones as well as in the liberated areas. The captured documents, which are dated 1982, show the extent to which those lessons have been learned.

Since 1977, Indonesian policy in East Timor has centred upon population control



JUST OUT!

The War Against East Timor analyses Indonesia's military and political strategy to subjugate and integrate East Timor since General Suharto's invasion of this former Portuguese colony in 1975. The authors, Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong, present for the first time a comprehensive account of the current resurgence of Fretilin, which is the national liberation movement of the people of East Timor, following its earlier defeat in 1977-78.

Nine secret Indonesian Army documents, captured by Fretilin guerrillas in December 1982, are here published in translation. They constitute an extraordinary manual of counter-insurgency operations, as well as demonstrating how real is Fretilin's renewed challenge to Indonesian annexation.

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and the relocation of the population into fortified villages in the lowlands. Traditionally, most of the population of East Timor lives in scattered settlements high in the mountains; relocation has seriously disrupted agriculture and the availability of food supplies, leading to widespread famine and starvation. The fact that malaria is endemic in the coastal plains has added significantly to the death toll. All sources — the church, journalists and the few relief workers allowed in by the occupation forces — agree that living conditions for the civilian population are appalling. The figures speak for themselves. At a conservative estimate, 200,000 East Timorese have died since 1975 as a result of Indonesian massacres, malnutrition and disease. That is roughly the equivalent of the UK losing twice the population of Greater London. The sheer enormity of the death toll is equalled by the barbarity of the aggressors. Rape and torture are commonplace; prisoners are executed as a matter of routine; suspected members of Fretilin are tortured to death and their bodies mutilated. Indonesian officers are reliably reported to have indulged in cannibalism in an attempt to demoralise and terrorise the population.

Population control and counter-insurgency tactics may, however, be beginning to have unexpected effects. The forcible evacuation of the mountain population has given Fretilin guerrillas access to the gardens and other food supplies abandoned by the villagers. It has probably also given them more room to manoeuvre and regroup than they might otherwise have had. Indonesian tactics have also ensured that they have considerable numbers of real and potential enemies behind their lines; hence the emphasis on combating resistance in the villages and camps in the counter-insurgency manuals.

In the long term, the Indonesianisation of East Timor may also have a boomerang effect. In economic terms, Indonesianisation has meant the establishment of a plantation economy on a scale undreamed of by the Portuguese in over five hundred years of colonialism. The main cash crop is high grade coffee, one of the country's traditional exports, and is almost entirely in the hands of a company known as Denok. Little is known of the company's commercial organisation, but it is widely regarded as being a front for the business interests of the military; in the words of one officer, Denok was the only company to land in Dili with the marines. The authors show that the Indonesian doctrine of the dual function of the armed forces is being taken to new heights in East Timor, both in the economy and in the militarisation of the administration. The military men involved in the Indonesianisation of East Timor are becoming increasingly important in Indonesia itself. Service in East Timor ensures accelerated promotion — particularly if evidence of distinguished service in the brutalisation and torture of the population is forthcoming — and facilitates entry to

the elite Staff and Command School (Seskoad). Seskoad graduates and veterans of the Timor campaign now form a distinctive and powerful group within the military hierarchy and therefore within the ruling bloc in Indonesia. At their head is Benny Murdani, one of the original architects of the invasion and now concurrently head of State Intelligence, Commander of Kopkamtib and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It is Murdani who has reversed his predecessors' policy of starting to negotiate with Fretilin (partly a political manoeuvre, partly an admission of the strength of the resistance) and who has adopted a no-compromise stance. It is at Murdani's insistence that elite paracommandos are now bearing the brunt of day to day fighting rather than acting as shock troops and leaving the overall conduct of the war to less prestigious units. Given his central position in the hierarchy, a defeat or continued stalemate will have serious destabilising effects in Jakarta; after all, it is common knowledge that Murdani, who

is an intelligence officer rather than a field commander, owes his promotion and position to his loyalty to Suharto himself. The war in East Timor may well yet prove to be the regime's Achilles' heel.

Reading *The War Against East Timor* is at once a heartening and depressing experience. Heartening in that it provides conclusive evidence of the continued ability of Fretilin and the people of East Timor to resist and to fight back ever more effectively, despite the setbacks they suffered in 1977–1978. Depressing in that it also gives a vivid and angry portrayal of the sufferings they have endured since 1975. It deserves to be read on both counts.

David Macey

The major accounts are Jill Jolliffe, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, University of Queensland Press, 1978; Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, *An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor*, Tapol, London, 1979; James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed*, The Jacaranda Press, Queensland, 1983.

Sawito and the Shaky Seventies

David Bouchier, *Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup*. Interim Reports Series, No. 63, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984. (102 West Avenue, Ithaca, New York 14850)

At a time when the Suharto military regime is facing challenges to its rule not only in its colonial territories, West Papua and East Timor but also in Java, the heartland of the regime, it is instructive to study the forms of dissent took in the seventies, a decade when the regime staggered from one crisis to the next. Things were not going well for the military rulers; tens of thousands of troops were bogged down in a war against the people of East Timor that they couldn't possibly win, and the army's major source of funding, the petroleum company Pertamina, went bankrupt right

in the middle of the oil boom. As the decade wore on, protests were directed not only at corruption and the rule of jungle law, but at the very legitimacy of the regime.

None of the movements which erupted during the seventies however had the stamina to survive and David Bouchier's analysis of the 'phantom coup' associated with the name of Sawito Kartowibowo helps to explain why. The affair was breath-taking in its star-studded backing; the centre-piece was a document entitled "Towards Salvation" attacking the regime's moral degradation which was signed by the respected, conservative former Vice-President, Moh Hatta, and four acknowledged leaders of the main religions, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism and Mysticism or Javanism. Accompany-



Sawito after his arrest.

ing documents called on Suharto to relinquish the presidency and included a letter of Transfer modelled on Suharto's own "Supersemar", the 11 March 1966 document which he used to force Sukarno to relinquish his powers.

The documents could easily have been publicly ignored by the government, as many other critical documents before and since have been ignored, but they weren't. Even more surprisingly, the man said to be at the centre of the plot, Sawito Kartowibowo was put on trial, giving him a platform from which to assail the regime to the cheers and frequent amusement of the large crowds who packed the courtroom and forecourt of the courthouse. Sawito's impressive personality, his bubbling chirpiness, his reckless bravado and his irrepressible conviction turned him into a folk hero. Some of the bolder moves taken by Sawito and his determined team of lawyers reached an even wider audience, livening up the drab pages of the Jakarta press, not to mention the photographs of the ever-cheerful defendant waving to the spectators.

Of course, things were not easy for the defence. Numerous questions concerning the personalities supporting "Towards Salvation" were declared "irrelevant" by the court, and none of the signatories of the document was allowed to testify. Bouchier's chapter on the trial is a most useful guide to the machinations of the judges and prosecutor in their attempts to use a political trial for specific political purposes while making sure that things did not get out of hand.

But why did the trial take place at all? As the author shows, the affair expressed the views of a wide-ranging coalition of regime critics, left nationalists (among them Sawito himself) who never supported the

military regime, pro-PSI (Socialist Party) intellectuals who initially supported it but soon became disenchanted, and disgruntled senior Armed Forces officers whose positions had brought them face to face with the corrupt practices of the Suharto family. One of the central figures was hardly ever mentioned at all — General Domo Pranoto, chairman of the Armed Forces faction in the MPR (upper chamber) and a close friend of Suharto who, as the defence proved, was the man who first encouraged Sawito to draft "Towards Salvation". But Domo Pranoto was not to be allowed to testify; he died at the hands of army security before the trial began.

The main purpose of the trial was to depict the affair as the ravings of one man, to set Sawito up as a crank, a loner, a trickster who had deceived respected public figures to sign a document which "they hadn't read properly", a man convinced he had been chosen as Indonesia's *Ratu Adil* (Just Prince). But despite the constraints imposed by the court, the political ramifications of the "Sawito affair" became very clear. "The range of people who became involved", writes Bouchier, "hinted at a new kind of polarisation." True, but it was this very range of forces that made the movement sterile. Not only did it regard itself as just a moral force unconcerned with social change and interested only in changing personalities; it took no stand against militarism. On the contrary, the coalition included some of the most anti-democratic militarists within the Armed Forces. Unfortunately, this continues to characterise dissenter groups in Indonesia today.

The author analyses the inter-factional manipulations at the top of the regime that surfaced around the affair. Sawito proved that he was in regular communication with the central intelligence agency, Bakin, and also that the main source of information about the misdeeds of Suharto was the At-

torney-General, Ali Said. In fact, the trial appears to have been set in motion by the "AHM (Military Law Academy) faction", headed by Sudharmono, State Secretary, who runs the state apparatus and now chairs the government's party, GOLKAR, one of the most powerful men in Indonesia today. Ali Said was from the AHM clique and appears to have used Sawito to embarrass Suharto. Predictably, Ali Said then turned on the group, but by going ahead with the trial, the objective of embarrassing Suharto was nevertheless achieved. Not only were new facts about his family's corrupt practices made known, and in the most public of ways, but his set of beliefs, Javanism, were publicly ridiculed.

The events surrounding Sawito thus show how Suharto was at the time unable to control one of the leading factions in his regime. Since then, the AHM faction has undoubtedly gained enormously in strength while the main competing faction, that of Ali Murtopo, has gone into virtual eclipse. Unfortunately the author does not discuss how this happened, except perhaps by implication to suggest that Suharto was told the price he would have to pay to keep Ali Said and co. quiet.

David Bouchier's piece is an excellent example of the vigour of Australian scholarship on Indonesian affairs. Australian academics are streets ahead of those in the USA and Holland in their research into contemporary political developments in Indonesia, most of them providing important insights into the workings of the military regime. No wonder that pro-regime intellectuals in Indonesia like Subagio Sastrowardoyo now accuse Indonesian Studies in Australia of being anti-Indonesian. The problem with people like that is that they can't stand hearing some home truths about a political situation which they condone, donning the figleaf of offended patriotic pride.

Carmel Budiardjo


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General Suharto had a lot to offer when he met the directors of the US petroleum company, Diamond Shamrock, in October. The company plans to invest \$400 million a year in Indonesia in petroleum, natural gas and coal. We like Indonesia because it's a "relatively stable economy", said President-Director William Bricker. (*Sinar Harapan*, 18 October, 1984.)

Nearly 500 officers graduated from the Armed Forces Academy (AKABRI) in October. AKABRI is now to be split up into academies for the separate forces: "to reinforce professionalism", said AKABRI Commander-General, Lieutenant-General Moergito. (*Tempo*, 6 October 1984.)



Officers of "Satpam" ('units for security') who are in charge of vital enterprises, businesses and offices, were summoned to hear Jakarta Military Commander, Major-General Try Soetrisno, after the 4 October bombings.

With local police officers "renting out" firearms to the public for Rp.2.5-3 million a year because businessmen feel "they cannot depend on protection from the security authorities", (*Kompas*, 10 October 1984), who knows whether the "Satpam" will improve people's sense of security?

Muslim girls expelled from school for wearing headscarves

Many Muslim schoolgirls in West Java are being expelled from school because they insist on wearing headscarves at school. Disciplinary action has been taken against hundreds of pupils. According to a letter in **Tempo** (13 October), signed by six schoolgirls, as many as 150 girls have been expelled from a number of secondary schools in Bandung and at least 600 have been expelled throughout the province of West Java over the question of headscarves. There are reports that in some schools, girls are not allowed to sit in classrooms but must do their lessons in the corridors because they refuse to remove their headscarves.

The issue first arose a year ago when many girls organised protests against disciplinary action over school uniforms. It led to the arrest last November of Tony Ardie (see **TAPOL Bulletins** Nos 60 and 61, November 1983 and January 1984) after a speech at a mosque in which he attacked the government over the question of headscarves.

School uniforms standardised throughout Indonesia

Last year, the Ministry of Education introduced a regulation

standardising uniforms in schools throughout the country, and gave all schools one year in which to bring themselves into line with the uniforms stipulated by the Ministry. The renewed conflict over headscarves has emerged because schools are now required to conform with the 1983 regulation.

Appeals from pupils and from religious circles for tolerance and flexibility have clearly fallen on deaf ears. A senior official of the Education Ministry wrote a letter to **Tempo** (27 October) justifying this fascist-type regulation which is aimed, he said, "at eliminating differences based on ethnicity, religion, race and group. If school uniforms are standardised, all exclusivist attitudes will be stamped out . . . whilst reinforcing national discipline and cultivating a responsible spirit of patriotism".

The six girls who signed the letter in **Tempo** complained bitterly that they are being treated with the same severity as pupils who are disciplined for fighting in the streets with pupils of rival schools. They report that in some schools, all the pupils have signed protests against expulsions over the wearing of headscarves, and in one school, State Secondary School 2 in Bandung, all pupils went on strike for three days over the issue.



From: **Tempo**, 20 August 1983.

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