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TIMOR

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SUMMARY

Sentences have now been passed on the East Timorese on trial in Dili and Jakarta, either for direct involvement in the demonstration which led to the November 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, or with protests relating to the shootings (see *Timor Link* 22, February 1992). Court martials have also been held for several low-ranking Indonesian officers. While cruelly long sentences have been given to the former, the military escaped with light sentences (p5).

Meanwhile, sources inside East Timor report continued repression, including closure of the last remaining Portuguese school in Dili. Indonesia has faced censure for its human rights record in East Timor in several UN bodies (p3).

On the diplomatic front, new peace proposals from the East Timorese resistance have given a boost to the prospect of UN-sponsored negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and the East Timorese. This issue of *Timor Link* looks at the reactions (p6).

In July Portugal's presidency of the EC ended with its failure to get East Timor mentioned in the final communique concluding Lisbon's term. The Portuguese government, however, has since obstructed EC attempts to upgrade its trading links with Asean of which Indonesia is a leading member (p6).

As *Timor Link* went to press, Britain, the new EC president, was to decide whether to give British Aerospace the go-ahead over the sale of Hawk trainer jets to the Indonesian regime, despite parliamentary criticism (p1-2). Britain was also one of several countries to increase its World Bank foreign aid contribution to Jakarta. In the US Congress, on the other hand, a bill has been presented to suspend all aid to Indonesia (p7).

This issue also carries extracts from an interview given in Indonesia by Bishop Belo, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili (p7-8).



Credit: Paddy Donnelly

Ann Clwyd MP leads members of the British Coalition for East Timor during the presentation of a petition to 10 Downing Street on 16 July 1992. The petition asked the British government to cease arms sales to Indonesia and to press for a UN-brokered settlement of for East Timor with Timorese participation. Left to right: BCET chairman Estevão Cabral, honorary secretary Jonathan Humphries, and Maria Elena Arana.

Britain ready to sell more arms

As criticism of Britain's role in supplying military equipment continued to be raised in both the House of Commons and the House of Lords during July and August, it emerged that British Aerospace is close to finalising a deal with the Indonesian government to supply 44 Hawk fighter/trainer aircraft.

The deal, believed to be worth US\$1.2 million, will include the setting up of a production line in Indonesia, with parts of the aircraft assembled in Indonesian factories. Britain, after the United States, is the second largest supplier of military equipment to the Suharto regime.

The Hawk is primarily a training aircraft but can be modified to attack targets on the ground. There is considerable concern among human rights groups that these planes will be used by Indonesia for internal

security and repression. There is evidence of Hawks having been used in East Timor.

License to kill?

An export licence must now be obtained for the sale to go ahead. The British government routinely states, when pressed on the morality of supplying arms to a regime like Indonesia's, that 'all applications... are rigorously scrutinised on a case-by-case basis. We apply strict criteria and reject many applications for a wide range of countries. One aspect to which we attach considerable importance is the human rights record of the recipient nation and whether this might be affected by a particular export proposal. Whenever there is reason to believe that a prospective purchase is likely to be deployed against a civilian population, the application is refused.'

Indonesia, however, has already bought 20 Hawks from Britain in the past. And

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human rights groups fear that the current economic recession in Britain will make the granting of the licence much easier. If the sale does go ahead, it will represent a salutary indication of what can be expected of British government policy on East Timor during Britain's current presidency of the European Community.

During Portugal's presidency of the EC, which ended in July, Britain obstructed Lisbon's every initiative over Indonesian occupation of East Timor and even prevented the subject from being mentioned in the final communique marking the end of Portugal's EC presidency (see p6).

An indication of the limited criteria used by the British government in its judgement of the Suharto regime came in the reply of Foreign Office minister Lynda Chalker to a letter published in the *Financial Times* of 19 February 1992 from Ann Clwyd, overseas development spokeswoman of the opposition Labour Party.

Challenged on the application of human rights standards to British aid to Indonesia, Lynda Chalker contended: 'Indonesia remains one of the 50 poorest countries with the fifth largest population. It has a well-deserved reputation for sound macroeconomic management and for making effective use of aid. It has considerably reduced the incidence of absolute poverty over the last 15 years.'

In July Britain increased its share of World Bank aid to Indonesia (see 'International round-up', p7).

House of Lords debate

At the same time, however, there is growing support among Conservative parliamentarians for an arms embargo and aid suspension to Indonesia, as illustrated in a House of Lords debate on East Timor on 16 July. The debate, which lasted for an hour and a half, represented the most comprehensive airing of the issues surrounding the illegal occupation of East Timor and British government policy ever held in the Palace of Westminster.

Lord Rea (Labour), opening the debate, noted that Indonesia had no external enemies and that its armed forces existed 'solely to keep order within its own territories; in other words to suppress its own people.'

Lord Finsberg (Conservative), contrasted the world's reaction to the invasion of Kuwait with that of East Timor, and wondered 'whether there are double standards when a nation is further away and out of the limelight'. The human rights of the people of East Timor, he said, 'have been appallingly broken. They have not been allowed to preserve their own political destiny or to preserve their cultural or linguistic identities.'

Peers from other parties and the Bishop of Worcester, as well as independent Lord Haden-Guest, also spoke in condemnatory terms of British government policy and added their support for an arms embargo, aid suspension and withdrawal of other military training.

Parliamentarians mobilise

On 7 July, in advance of the Paris meeting of the World Bank's consultative group on

Indonesia — the new aid consortium formed after Indonesia's dissolution of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI, see *Timor Link* May 1992, p7) — a letter signed by members of all British political parties urged Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd to suspend British aid to Indonesia.

The letter, signed among others by Conservatives Viscount Brentford, Edward Garnier, Anthony Coombes and Jim Lester, asked the government to issue a statement emphasising British concern about the human rights situation in East Timor and requested the foreign secretary to challenge Indonesia's rejection of human-rights conditionality on economic aid, illustrated by its dissolution of the Dutch government-chaired IGGI. The letter added:

'We propose that Her Majesty's Government make known its dissatisfaction with the commission of inquiry set up by the Indonesian Government and the savage sentences passed on survivors of the 12 November massacre. We hope that the Government will make it plain that British aid to Indonesia cannot continue unless all East Timorese held and tried in the wake of the massacre are released and the bodies of all those who died in the massacre are returned to their families. There should be a proper investigation to establish who in the upper echelons of the army was responsible for the massacre. HMG should signal that giving sentences of a few months

each to a handful of low-ranking soldiers is unacceptable in response to the call by the international community for those in the armed forces responsible for murder to be brought to justice.'

The letter finally asked for the immediate publication of the report of the UN Secretary-General's special representative, Amos Wako, who visited Dili, the East Timorese capital, in February.

Jose Ramos Horta, external representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, has strongly criticised the role of the British government and expressed his fear that Britain's current presidency of the EC will be a tragedy for East Timor. 'The situation in the territory is bound to get worse, with the Indonesian regime feeling that it has such support,' he told *Timor Link*, pointing to British economic and military support for the Jakarta regime.

The UK, he said, merited the Nobel Prize for hypocrisy. While the UK had dispatched a massive task force to the South Atlantic to defend the right to self-determination of 2,000 colonisers in the Falklands, it was now blocking self-determination for the people of East Timor.

● *The Campaign Against the Arms Trade is asking its supporters to write to the British Prime Minister, John Major, 10 Downing St, London SW1, asking him to stop the Hawk sale and arms sales to Indonesia. You may wish to join them. Further information from CAAT, 11 Goodwin St, London N4 3HQ.*

Weighted scales

Sentences have now been passed on the eight people on trial in Dili for subversion and expressing hostility to Indonesia during the demonstration which preceded the Santa Cruz massacre (see *Timor Link*, May 1992). In all cases the heavy sentences demanded by the prosecution were granted.

In contrast, soldiers facing court martials in connection with the Santa Cruz massacre were charged with disobeying orders and received sentences of between 8 and 20 months. Nine out of the ten had admitted shooting at the crowd. Their trials lasted a mere eight days.

We list below details of the sentences passed on the eight East Timorese.

Francisco Miranda Branco, 41, charged with subversion and being a member of the organising committee which planned the 12 November demonstration, received a 15-year prison sentence. The prosecution argued that the demonstrators behaved provocatively and that they were armed. According to reports, it appears that Branco was not even present at the demonstration and had not supported its organisation.

Gregorio de Cunha Saldanha, 28, accused of being a ringleader of the demonstration, was given a life sentence. De Cunha, a member of a committee formed to make contact with members of last September's aborted parliamentary delegation from Portugal, was injured during the demonstration. He told the court

that Indonesian law did not apply in East Timor, as integration has not been recognised internationally.

Other sentences were passed as follows: **Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves**, 34, (10 years); **Saturnino da Costa Belo**, 21, tried in Bacau (nine years); **Carlos dos Santos Lemos**, 30, (eight years); **Juvenio de Jesus Martins**, 32, (six years and ten months); **Bonifacio Magno Ferreira**, 35, (six years); **Filomeno da Silva Pereira**, 50, five years and eight months).

In Indonesia, heavy sentences were also meted out to **Fernando Araujo** and **João Freitas da Camara**, on trial for subversion for having organised a protest in Jakarta at the Santa Cruz massacre. They received sentences of nine and ten years respectively in May 1992.

Indonesian justice has been demonstrated to be upside down in its application. While those who carried out the Santa Cruz massacre have gone relatively unpunished, participants in what was described by foreign observers (in testimonies which were not even considered by the Indonesian courts) as a peaceful demonstration have been victimised. But as Amnesty International, in its September document, 'Indonesia/East Timor: the Suppression of Dissent', states, 'Peaceful protest, including demonstration against human rights violations, has been treated as "subversive activity" by the authorities. Those who voice

EAST TIMOR: Time for change

Timor, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the easternmost islands of the Indonesian archipelago and lies 300 miles north of Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western part of the island formerly a Dutch colony, belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony.

In 1974 Portugal decolonised East Timor whose newly formed political parties began discussing options for the future — federation with Portugal, independence, or integration with Indonesia. The Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially favoured the first option but then joined a coalition with the nationalist liberation movement, Fretilin, to demand independence. A small third party, Apodeti, was used as a vehicle for Indonesian propaganda in favour of integration.

On 11 August 1975 the UDT staged a coup to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil war, 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 1975, however, Fretilin was in control of virtually all of Portuguese Timor, following the defection of Timorese colonial troops to the liberation movement's side.

Indonesia, like the United States, was worried by the proximity of an independent state with radical policies and continued to threaten East Timor, despite previous assurances that Jakarta would respect the right of the East Timorese to independence. In September 1975 Indonesia closed West Timor to journalists and on 7 December launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor with the knowledge of the United States and the encouragement of Australia. East Timor was proclaimed the '27th province' of Indonesia.

The invasion and annexation of East Timor has been brutal: up to 200,000 people, a third of the population, have died as a result of Indonesian rule. But the majority of Timorese have not accepted subjugation; Indonesia has been unable to eliminate the desire of the East Timorese for self-determination and

an armed resistance movement still remains in the hills.

Although the invasion has been condemned by successive UN resolutions, the international community has done little or nothing to implement them, given the major economic and geopolitical interests of the United States, Japan and particularly Australia in the region. Indonesia's crucial strategic location and regional status — it has the world's fifth largest population, and large reserves of oil and other natural resources — have all encouraged the world to downplay East Timor's agony.

In recent years, however, several events have combined to break East Timor's isolation and bring its continued occupation to international attention. In 1989 the Pope visited the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still considered the administering authority of East Timor by the UN, created huge expectations of change. To huge disappointment in East Timor, the delegation was forced in October 1991 to call off its visit.

On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops shot dead up to 200 East Timorese civilians during a funeral procession held at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, the East Timorese capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre provided indisputable evidence to the outside world of Indonesian atrocities.

The Santa Cruz massacre has forced governments around the world to criticise Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus into diplomatic efforts to bring about a solution to East Timor's suffering. Since 1983 the UN secretary-general has been entrusted with the achievement of a settlement to the dispute; and with the post-Cold War era providing a new international climate for negotiations, Indonesia faces increased pressure to reach a solution with Portugal and the East Timorese under the auspices of the UN.

even the mildest criticism of government policy have been dubbed opponents of the state.'

Meanwhile, in the trial relating to the Motael Church incident in which Sebastião Gomes was killed on 28 October 1991, five young Timorese were sentenced on 24 June, charged with involvement in the murder of Afonso Henriques, an alleged 'informant' whose body was also found with stab wounds in the grounds of the church. It was during the memorial mass for Gomes that the Santa Cruz massacre took place.

Boby Xavier, 18, received 3 years and **Aleixo da Silva** 27 months. **João dos Santos**, 23, and **Jacob da Silva**, 27, both received two years, while **Bonifacio Barreto** was sentenced to 20 months.

School closed

The only remaining Portuguese school in Dili was closed in July and its pupils were moved to other local schools.

The school, with courses in Portuguese and Bahasa and minimal instruction of *Pancasila*, Indonesia's national ideology, had a controversial reputation with some citizens and Indonesian officials. Many of its students participated in the funeral procession which led to last November's Santa Cruz massacre.

The local Indonesian military have viewed the closure with satisfaction. For his part, R. Tri Wartanta, head of the East Timor Office of Education and Culture, claimed that the decision had been made 'with happiness and without any pressure from either side' at a meeting with the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Bishop Carlos Belo, at the bishop's residence on 27 March.

Resistance outlines peace plan

In recent meetings at the European Parliament and the United Nations and the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, Jose Ramos Horta, special representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM), outlined a peace plan to bring the tragic conflict in East Timor to an end. Arnold Kohen looks at Jakarta's attitude to a settlement.

As summarised by Ramos Horta, the peace plan calls for initial talks leading to a cessation of all armed activities in East Timor, followed by a five-year period of autonomy under Indonesian rule. During this second phase, the duration of which might be extended, East Timor would govern itself in most respects, except for foreign relations, which would be conducted by Indonesia.



Eventually an act of self-determination, by means of a referendum, would decide the final status of East Timor in accordance with the preference of its people. Jakarta has yet to accept the CNRM peace plan.

As *Timor Link* went to press, talks were due to resume between Indonesia and Portugal at the United Nations on 26 September. Some experts on the region claim that after initial procedural talks between Indonesian and Portuguese diplomats, East Timorese participants will be brought to the conference table. If true, this would be an unprecedented move, indicating that Jakarta, despite denials, is preparing to engage in formal talks with the East Timorese for the first time in recent memory.

Ploy

There are a number of caveats. As the new head of the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations (NAM), Indonesia obviously can only benefit by appearing to be conciliatory on the East Timor issue, even if such an appearance is deceptive. Indeed, Jose Ramos Horta has said that he is aware of no move to bring East Timorese representatives into the Indonesian-Portuguese talks, announced by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali during the NAM summit in Jakarta in the first week of September.

The talks, and unconfirmed reports of possible East Timorese participation, have therefore been seen as an Indonesian ploy to defuse international pressure and pave the way for an uneventful visit to the UN by Indonesian President Suharto, who was to address the UN General Assembly on 24 September. In short, there is huge distance between rumours of talks with Timorese participation and the emergence of substantive discussions leading to a negotiated settlement.

Providing an opening

The CNRM peace plan provides the possibility of a face-saving means of bringing Jakarta to the negotiating table. By not directly challenging Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor in the early

stages, the plan could facilitate Jakarta's participation in talks, assuming that there are elements within the Indonesian government which want to find a negotiated way out of the Timor debacle.

The problem, as demonstrated during short-lived talks between the Indonesian military and the Fretilin independence movement in 1977-78, 1983, and most recently 1991, is that the Indonesian government has yet to show a willingness to take sustained steps that could lead to a comprehensive solution.

Jakarta's abortion of the long-awaited visit to East Timor of a Portuguese parliamentary delegation last year (see *Timor Link*, February 1992), for example, would appear to have been based on the mistaken assumption of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry that the appearance of calm in East Timor would somehow lead to a solution. But after the Santa Cruz massacre last November it became clear that the problem was still there and needed to be addressed. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was repeatedly questioned on East Timor during his February visits to Europe, the United States and Japan.

Is Jakarta serious about reaching an agreement that deals with Timorese and international concerns, or is the Indonesian government simply engaged in tactical manoeuvres for public relations purposes, with no real willingness to address the underlying causes of the conflict?

Specialists on Indonesia like Benedict Anderson of Cornell University argue that comments by Indonesian authorities since March 1992 suggest that Jakarta is preparing to eventually relinquish East Timor. Anderson and others say that some official Indonesian attitudes during and after the NAM summit in September have signalled such a change.

On the other hand, in mid-September Indonesia's military commander in East Timor tersely rejected a renewed offer of peace talks by Xanana Gusmao, leader of East Timor's resistance movement, saying that one cannot make peace with criminals. One awaits concrete evidence that this longstanding attitude has changed.

aberration and those who have dared to confront Indonesia, such as East Timorese protesting in Jakarta and the Dutch government which suspended aid, have been severely punished or rebuffed and accused of excesses. It looks as if Indonesia has literally been allowed to get away with murder.

Changing wind

However, for the first time since Indonesia's invasion in 1975, it is possible to point to signs of an international stirring on East Timor and to speak with guarded hope about a political settlement of this tragic episode in human affairs.

The publicity surrounding the Santa Cruz massacre has been a major factor in this. Like nothing else in recent years, it has stripped the scales from the eyes of many,

including people with influence like editors, church leaders, academics and bureaucrats, and has stimulated increased diplomatic action, some of it unprecedented.

The Indonesian media has also reported East Timor more fully than at any point since 1975 and in March Indonesian NGOs addressed the issue for the first time and publicly called for a non-violent settlement of the conflict.

The renewed activity on East Timor has occurred in a rapidly changing international situation which, to some extent, favours East Timor. In a post-Cold War era, Indonesia can no longer justify repression in East Timor on ideological grounds.

The UN is also enjoying some success as a peace-keeper and peace-maker. Many believe it is high time the world body, whose lofty principles have been so blatantly violated in East Timor, turned its attention to this piece of 'unfinished business' as US Under-Secretary for Defence Paul Wolfowitz recently referred to East Timor.

The East Timorese resistance is particularly alert to the change in wind direction and has adjusted its sails accordingly, though without losing sight of its goal of independence. The resistance, through its international representative, Jose Ramos Horta, has again tabled its offer of talks with Indonesia under UN auspices. The move has been backed by Portugal and would seem to have been well received within the European Community (see p3).

Change in line?

The burning question is how Indonesia will respond. Its first reaction has been flatly negative. The official line from Jakarta is that there is nothing to talk about: East Timor was properly incorporated in 1976 (a position which most reject) so Indonesia has no reason to talk to 'its own citizens' under UN auspices.

However, some observers think this may not be the end of the matter. They believe there are signs that the Indonesian government is preparing the ground for an about-face on the question and that this could happen after the March 1993 presidential election when President Suharto is expected to be given another five years in office.

Whether Indonesia co-operates, however, will ultimately depend on the international community. The East Timorese can continue to resist in East Timor and make their presence felt 'like a sharp stone in Indonesia's shoe', to quote Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas. But they cannot dictate to Indonesia, whose capacity to impose its will administratively and militarily is undeniable. The variable is which party does the international community align itself with. There are signs that finally the balance of power may be shifting in East Timor's favour.

Even a slight shift in world centres of power may be enough to convince debt-ridden, aid-dependent Indonesia that the time has come to deal with the East Timorese. Our responsibility is to make sure that this happens.

What you can do

Write to, and get others around the world

Time for the UN to act

Pat Walsh appeals for the UN to act on its commitment to a peaceful settlement of the East Timor dispute, responding to the recent East Timorese peace proposals. A comprehensive solution, he writes, can only be achieved with East Timorese involvement.

For many years the indifference of the international community to the conflict in East Timor has been a source of deep concern, if not despair. The sins against the East Timorese have been manifold and mortal, but the general absolution Indonesia seems to enjoy (thanks to its economic and political place in world affairs) has allowed it to continue to maltreat the East Timorese with impunity.

Even the brutal Santa Cruz massacre last November has been explained away as an

to write to the new UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in New York. The UN has a major responsibility for East Timor and has ten resolutions on its books on the question (see *Timor Link*, May 1992, p4), one of which obliges the Secretary-General to 'consult with all parties directly concerned, with a view to . . . achieving a comprehensive settlement of the problem'. Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali should be left in no doubt early in his term that East Timor is one piece of 'unfinished business' that he is expected to address.

● Letters, insisting that respect for fundamental rights and implementation of the UN principle of self-determination are essential for a resolution of the conflict in East Timor, should be addressed to: His Excellency, Mr Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General, United Nations, New York, NY 10017, United States.

Pat Walsh is Director of the Human Rights Programme, Australian Council for Overseas Aid, and Coordinator of the East Timor Talks Campaign, 124 Napier Street, Fitzroy 3065, Australia. Tel: (03) 417 7505.

Xanana Gusmao statement on peace plan

In July a hearing on East Timor held by the UN Decolonisation Committee heard a statement from resistance leader Xanana Gusmao on recent East Timorese peace proposals (see p3).

The hearing, held on 27 July, was attended by 23 petitioners, including Amnesty International, Asia Watch, the Japanese Catholic Council for Justice and Peace, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, the International Platform of Jurists for East Timor, Pax Christi International, Fretilin, the British Coalition for East Timor and the East Timor Ireland Solidarity Campaign.

Special Representative of the Council for Maubere Resistance, Jose Ramos Horta, read a statement from Xanana Gusmao, the Timorese resistance leader, which had reached him only a few days previously.

Xanana, reminding the committee of its task of eliminating colonialism by the year 2000, expressed his confidence that 'the Special Committee on Decolonisation will not betray the sacred principles that gave birth to it. We are also certain that in dealing with the question of East Timor it will be guided by international law and all the relevant norms on self-determination and independence.'

Despite the end of the Cold War, Xanana noted that 'the West continues to make use of its veto power whenever just causes affect their economic interests' and accused some

Strong resolution passed by UN

On 27 August the 44th session of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities passed a strong resolution on East Timor.

The UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities voted in favour of the resolution on East Timor by 13 votes to six with four abstentions, the best support to date for the East Timor lobby in this UN body.

The Sub-Commission, composed of independent human rights experts, is an advisory body and does not carry the same weight as the UN Human Rights Commission (UNCHR), but the outcome was nevertheless an indication of the increase in concern that has developed on the East Timor question over the last year.

The resolution was tabled under Agenda Item 6, entitled 'Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and

segregation and of apartheid in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories: Report of the sub-commission under commission of human rights resolution 8 (XXIII).'

The text, recalling previous UN resolutions on East Timor and the consensus declaration agreed by Indonesia at the UNCHR in March (see *Timor Link*, May 1992, p5), expressed concern at the heavy sentences passed on the East Timorese involved in 'peaceful political activities' (see p??) and noted that Indonesia's draconian anti-subversion law had been condemned by the UN special rapporteur on torture.

The resolution regretted that human rights violations were reported to be continuing in East Timor and called on the Indonesian authorities to honour their commitment to give human rights organisations access to the occupied territory.

Significantly, the resolution called on the UN secretary-general to make the report of his personal envoy, Mr Amos Wako, who visited Indonesia and East Timor in February, available to the next session of the UNCHR. It also invited the Indonesian authorities to report on further measures to ensure that those responsible for the Santa Cruz massacre would be properly punished.

The Sub-Commission decided to review the situation in East Timor at its 45th session.

governments of having slipped back to 'business as usual'.

The Santa Cruz massacre, his statement declared, 'underscored the historical fact that people's nationalism cannot be liquidated by repression, nor can it be alienated by so-called economic development. Namibia emerged as an independent state 40 years later.'

Ready for talks

'Any solution to the problem of East Timor,' he went on, 'must be based on the respect for the expressed will of the people of East Timor. We are conscious of the fact that it is particularly difficult for the government of Indonesia to accept a solution that puts in question the fundamental interests of the Indonesian state, but we cannot abdicate from our own interests and rights.'

'Dialogue is the means to solve conflicts. This is the trend in today's world. Indonesia herself continues to play an important role in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. The whole argument of "internal affair" has been invoked time and again by the powerful.'

'What is happening in Yugoslavia, now focus of peace-making efforts by the UN and the EC, exposes the arrogance of those who continue to create obstacles to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Dialogue without preconditions preserves the mutual interests of the parties to the conflict. Both Portugal and the Maubere people are ready for dialogue.'

'However, the government of Indonesia, enjoying the status as beneficiary of Western economic and financial largesse, feels strong enough to reject the inclusion of the East Timorese themselves in the peace talks. We continue to invite Indonesia to round-table talks and we reaffirm our political will in endeavouring to find the best way to balance the interests of all parties to the conflict.'

'Portugal, the Administering Power recognised by the UN, stands for a process of dialogue with the inclusion of the East Timorese, without preconditions. Our flexibility regarding the involvement of the East Timorese is aimed at helping Portugal face the negotiation process seriously. It is the role of Portugal, legal Administering power of East Timor, in the context of its responsibilities, to work with the East Timorese towards finding formulas that might lead towards a comprehensive and lasting solution.'

The peace plan

'The Special Representative of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, Mr Jose Ramos-Horta, conceived and outlined a set of key-ideas with a view to contributing to a solution. I wish to elaborate on this plan.'

'Three elements emerge from this plan: a) An extremely important element to emphasise, without any doubt, is the fact that the territory remains under UN responsibility until a final solution of the problem; b) Concerning the Portuguese role

in the process, I believe that the role of Portugal has to be seen in the context of its commitment to engage in dialogue with Indonesia. Its role in the whole peace process is vital; c) In accepting a transition situation and recognising that a "de facto" situation exists in East Timor (Namibia was under South African domination and yet the UN did not relinquish its responsibilities), we wish to create favourable political conditions so that through democratic means and in a peaceful climate each party may persuade the people about the advantages of its policies. An act of self-determination, as the result and goal of this transition period, would be the true political act of free choice by our people.

'I reaffirm our collective political will to abide by the popular verdict if the Maubere people, under international supervision, decide to opt for integration with the Republic of Indonesia. We do not fight against Indonesia, we are not fighting against the people of Indonesia. We respect the great Indonesian nation, we respect our Indonesian brothers.'

Headquarters of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, in East Timor, 20 June 1992.

Portugal stalls and blocks

Pedro Pinto Leite assesses Portugal's efforts to keep East Timor on the EC agenda.

At the end of July resistance spokesman Jose Ramos Horta criticised the Portuguese government for its failure to press the case of East Timor with sufficient tenacity during its presidency of the EC. It was incomprehensible, he said, that the Portuguese foreign ministry had only one diplomat working part-time on the issue, when a team was needed with representatives in other EC capitals and the United States.

Several Portuguese opposition members of parliament agreed with his criticisms. Writing in *Público* on 12 May, a Christian Democrat spokesman, Narana Coissoro, said: 'The government has let the matter drop. The standing commission has not functioned for some time. It has reverted to its traditional posture of silence.'

Disappointment

East Timor solidarity groups were particularly disappointed that the final communique of the EC summit held in Lisbon on 30 June, while mentioning human rights in connection with economic aid, did not refer to East Timor once. Portugal's original draft statement had apparently contained a reference to East Timor, along with other cases, as an issue requiring the Community's attention.

According to the Lisbon-based Commission for the Rights of Maubere People (CDPM), 'Facts such as these raise

serious doubts about the credibility of Portugal's external policy on East Timor. Portuguese public opinion is entitled to a plausible explanation.'

It would appear that the Portuguese foreign ministry had, as often before, been under pressure from its EC partners to relegate the importance of East Timor on its list of priorities, confining itself to occasional statements like that issued on 3 July which berated Indonesia for its poor implementation of the consensus declaration agreed at the UN Commission on Human Rights in March (see *Timor Link*, May 1992, p5).

EC embarrassment

However, perhaps in an attempt to redeem its image, on 20 July Portugal caused embarrassment to the EC Council of Ministers by blocking its plans for a new co-operation agreement with the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean).

In a speech which was said to have stunned EC ministers into silence, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, João de Deus Pinheiro, denounced Indonesia's 'unacceptable violation of human rights' in East Timor. He proclaimed himself unwilling to accept any plans for a reinforced co-operation deal with Asean unless Indonesia (an Asean member) showed clearly that it would start respecting human rights. The people of East Timor should be allowed to decide their own future, he said, and reiterated the Portuguese government's desire to hold

UN-sponsored talks with Indonesia at which Timorese representatives should be present.

Portugal's stance caused irritation among other EC governments which argued that it would impair Europe's political influence in South-East Asia. The British government had undertaken to pay more attention to Asean and South Asian countries during its EC presidency and expressed a preference to follow what it considered a subtler form of diplomacy with Indonesia over human rights.

EC governments, however, decided on this occasion not to oppose energetically Portugal's principled position. They were worried that such a stance would prove unpopular with domestic public opinion at a time when the Maastricht Treaty was being ratified. They also realised that, with the introduction of majority voting by the Council of Ministers under Maastricht, the problem of a Portuguese veto would be dealt with once and for all.

In early September, however, the likelihood of Portugal maintaining its strong stand over the upgrading of the EC's trade links with Asean was placed in doubt, following announcement by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that UN-sponsored talks would be resumed between Portugal and Indonesia — without East Timorese participation. The talks were due to begin in New York in late September.

Meanwhile, on 3 September an EC official said in Brussels that the EC-Asean trade pact would be discussed at the next meeting between the two groups in Manila at the end of October.

European Parliament hearing on East Timor

The European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security held a one-day hearing on 'Respect for Human Rights in East Timor' on 23 April 1992. It was addressed by five East Timorese witnesses, one Indonesian, an eyewitness to the Santa Cruz massacre, a historian and the executive director of the US-based Human rights organisation, Asia Watch.

The Portuguese and Indonesian embassies were given an hour each to give their points of view, which led to some heated debate. The Indonesian ambassador to the EC, Suryo Atmono, said that human rights were written into Indonesia's constitution and that it was for the state to guarantee them, despite expressions of concern by other countries. The UN placed human rights in the context of international co-operation and gave no country or countries 'the right to act as judge and jury against others'. He also argued that the position of human rights were different in developed and developing countries.

The Portuguese embassy emphasised the necessity for Indonesia to carry out the undertakings it made in the consensus statement made at the UN Human Rights Commission in March 1992, and called for Timorese participation in new negotiations under UN auspices.

External spokesman for the National Council of Maubere Resistance, Jose Ramos Horta, said that in spite of the suffering of the Timorese people, the resistance movement still wanted negotiations without preconditions under UN auspices. He outlined a set of proposals for a three-stage solution (see p3).

These proposals were welcomed by the MEPs present and the committee resolved to continue to monitor the human rights situation in East Timor closely. A committee, chaired by French MEP Simone Veil, was set up for this purpose; it would make preparations to send a mission to the occupied territory to investigate further.

US to cut military aid?

Democrat Congressman Tony Hall introduced on 15 May a bill in the House of Representatives to suspend all US aid to Indonesia until it stops defying UN resolutions on East Timor.

'This is strong legislation, but a strong response is long overdue to Indonesia's aggression, repression, and terror in East Timor,' Hall said. 'At a time when every US foreign aid dollar is undergoing rigorous scrutiny, why should the taxpayers provide aid to a nation which has seized and subjugated its neighbour? Congress can save both money and stand for principle in terminating aid to Indonesia'.

According to Hall's office, the bill would terminate all bilateral assistance and suspend the Generalized System of Preference trade benefits for Indonesian products, and require the US representative to the World Bank to oppose any loan to Indonesia. Indonesia has exported millions of dollars of duty-free products to the US. The US trade deficit with Indonesia is currently US\$1.3 billion.

Estimated 1992 military and economic aid for Indonesia is about US\$58 million with commercial arms deliveries worth another US\$43 million.

'It is insufficient to beg the Indonesians repeatedly to treat the East Timorese with basic human decency' said Hall. 'This is like condoning slavery, but asking the slave driver to spare the whip. Attention must instead be focused on getting the Indonesians to withdraw from East Timor and allow the Timorese to participate in a referendum on self-determination'.

An amendment to the bill by Republican congressman Ronald Machtley, proposing cancellation of all funding for International Military Education and Training (worth about US\$2 million) under the 1993 Foreign Appropriations Bill, was unanimously carried on 25 June, sending a strong signal to the Bush and Suharto administrations.

The bill, to be dealt with by the Senate later in the year, was criticised by Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, who claimed that 'essentially punitive responses from the international community are not appropriate'.

Joint US-Japanese letter

As *Timor Link* went to press, a letter co-signed by US senators and members of the Japanese *diet* (parliament) was about to be sent to UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, urging greater monitoring of the human rights situation in East Timor and greater involvement in resolving the underlying conflict. Its delivery would coincide with President Suharto's attendance at the UN General Assembly in late September. The letter, which had gathered the signatures of 150 Congress members and around 150 *diet* members by mid-September, urges the UN secretary-general to release the report of his personal envoy, Dr Amos Wako (who visited East

Timor in February 1992), to establish a UN presence in East Timor to monitor the human rights situation, to ensure access to the territory (as promised by Indonesia at the UN Commission on Human Rights in March), to push for the release of Timorese prisoners, to facilitate negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and East Timorese representatives, and to ensure self-determination for the East Timorese people along the lines of UN resolutions.

NAM ignores East Timor

Indonesia, chairing the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Jakarta on 1-6 September, saw to East Timor being kept off the agenda.

In the final declaration of the summit, which reiterated support for the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination and independence, the NAM proclaimed itself in favour of 'building a new and equitable international order . . . firmly rooted in the rule of law', and the principles of the UN charter. It also stated its commitment to the 'peaceful resolution of disputes in all regions of the world through a sustained process of dialogue and negotiation'.

Bishop Belo appeals for more freedom

In August 1992 the Indonesian monthly magazine *Matra* published a major interview with Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo who administers the Diocese of Dili on behalf of the Vatican. Consistent with previous interviews, Bishop Belo insisted that the people of East Timor should be consulted about the future of the territory in a referendum, even if they decide to accept integration with Indonesia.

Before a referendum, however, Bishop Belo said that conditions for the local population should improve considerably. The military should leave and the people should have greater access to the development that has taken place under Indonesian occupation, as well as the freedom to express their views.

Belo's position, while a plea for greater consultation and democracy from Indonesia, is broadly compatible with elements of the East Timorese resistance's recent peace proposals (see p3-4). On the other hand, it regards self-determination as a long-term goal, with integration a necessary phase in East Timor's development before final independence.

In any assessment of Belo's interview, it is important to bear in mind that he was addressing an

World Bank aid approved

Demonstrators outside the meeting of the World Bank's consultative group on Indonesia in Paris on 16-17 July failed to dissuade the new aid consortium from pledging US\$4.94 billion to Indonesia — US\$200 million more than the total aid for 1991/92.

The only government which publicly raised the issue of human rights was the United States, currently under pressure from the US Congress (see above). It read out a statement expressing concern at the trials and the confusion surrounding civil and military versions of the Santa Cruz massacre.

European concern for human rights, at the alleged insistence of the British government, was limited to discreet, closed-door meetings. To the satisfaction of Indonesia, many governments, including Britain, France, Germany and Austria, increased their contributions, despite a resolution by the EC Council of Ministers on 28 November 1991 to 'explicitly introduce the consideration of human rights as an element of their relations with developing countries'. The application of these criteria does not appear to apply to Indonesia.

Indonesian audience and that he was speaking as a bishop who has been repeatedly asked, if not instructed, by both the Indonesian government and sectors of the Roman Catholic Curia, to stay out of politics.

In East Timor the Church has been a source of spiritual solace in a profoundly traumatised society and has represented an element of continuity in terms of East Timorese identity. It is the only 'space' inside the country which has not been occupied by the Indonesian army.

Bishop Belo's starting point in the interview was the physical, emotional and spiritual needs of the human being. People needed freedom in order to develop and this entailed political rights, including democracy, consultation, freedom of movement and expression, and material development.

There were therefore times, Bishop Belo said, when the Church should defend the people and this was consistent with his role as a bishop. His concern for the material and spiritual welfare of his people transcended the sphere of politics, but the political atmosphere should be one which allowed 'the whole human being' to live in peace and freedom.

As to predicting the result of a

referendum, Bishop Belo put aside his own judgement and emphasised that it was the people themselves who should be allowed to decide and then take responsibility for their decision. The past 15 years had had appalling consequences for East Timor and even if the territory became internationally recognised as part of Indonesia, the East Timorese would have to be treated with greater respect, granted more freedom and autonomy, and have their culture safeguarded.

This, he said, was consistent with the letter he had sent to the UN secretary-general in 1989 in which he complained that 'others speak in the name of the people'. He said he did not wish to do the same.

In speaking of the East Timorese taking responsibility for any decision they might take, however, Bishop Belo showed realism over possible outcomes to the conflict, recognising that an independent East Timor would need far more trained people than it possessed at present. That, he said, was why he complained that the good jobs went to foreigners, while East Timor's indigenous population was marginalised in its own land. He spoke of the need for regional autonomy — a looser connection with Indonesia.

Below, *Timor Link* reproduces key parts of Bishop Belo's interview.

Role of the Church

'The Church lives in the midst of the community in order to spread news about one thing, that it must be saved . . . The role of the Church is none other than that preached by Christ at the very beginning of the life of the Church, to spread the Gospel to all humanity.

'That's why the Church came to East Timor in the 16th century. Although Portugal left East Timor, the church remained. Indonesia came in. The church remained, living alongside the people to achieve God's call to save the world, especially the soul and the whole of humanity.

'And so the church strives to do everything in its power to create whole human beings, in the spiritual and material sense . . . The church's message relates to the whole human being. Our message relates to the soul, the sacraments and deliverance. We are also able to save people in other respects. We have ideas and opinions about social and economic matters, about justice and peace.

'This is what is sometimes misunderstood by some people. If I speak out, they say I'm engaging in politics. When I only busy myself with the sacraments, they say this is what the priests and bishops should be doing. But our duty relates to all aspects of life, in particular the moral, the ethical and the spiritual. We don't practise these things at a technical level. It is for the politicians to strive to realise the church's view of things in practice.

Freedom to be complete human beings

'The people of East Timor must be able to live in an atmosphere where they feel they have a place, that they are human beings, that they are being given attention; they

must be given the freedom to be complete human beings. These conditions can be achieved if physical and material development is accompanied by human development. That's what is not yet happening here . . . people should have the freedom to move, the freedom to express their opinions. The freedom to say that there are things they don't like. There is no such democracy yet.'

Explaining that the people had no sense of the development of East Timor being for them, the bishop went on: 'The most important thing of all is that we want to be a little freer. This is something very fundamental. Not free from Indonesia but free as citizens of this country. Others are free in Java; those living in Maluku are free. We also want to be as free as they are, here in East Timor. Not like the present, when I feel freer in Jakarta than I do in Dili. This means there's something wrong.'

Integration not the basic problem

The bishop blamed the representatives of the people for not speaking up for freedom. For him, being part of Indonesia was 'no longer a problem'. Rather it was a question of 'how this young region called East Timor can grow up.

'If there are those who still make an issue of integration, that's their problem. I want to be a democrat. As a democrat, everyone from the extreme right to the extreme left will have a place in my heart, although I don't necessarily agree with them . . . We must have the courage to sit down together, to have dialogue as civilised human beings, as democrats, to seek out the truth and put to right the things that are still wrong.

'What is clear is that this region should not be treated as a province in a state of emergency. We have a different background, a different history and culture from other parts of Indonesia. . . East Timor must be treated in a special way, given a special status — but I don't mean a state of emergency. . . There should be greater regional autonomy'.

On the referendum

Bishop Belo explained to the interviewer that his 1989 letter to the UN secretary-general asking for a referendum in East Timor (which was made public against his wishes) had aimed to establish once and for all the wishes of the people.

'The important thing,' he said, 'is to give us the freedom to choose. I think the people can see for themselves and judge the benefits of the past 15 years. After seeing all that, the people may choose integration. But what I want to emphasise is if a process of choice happens, with everyone aware of what has happened, those who made the choice will be responsible for the result. Since we were the ones who made the choice but then have to suffer the consequences, we would be able to take responsibility.

The role of the military

'I am deeply afraid because everything is done and built by the military. . . Excessive involvement of the military can mean not giving the community or civilians the chance

to work for development. . . The military should withdraw so that the community takes responsibility for progress and for their lives.'

Belo spoke of his role in trying to establish dialogue between the military and the people and emphasised that 'dialogue should be free'. He criticised the military for misrepresenting his actions to the people, portraying him as two-faced and someone who encourages people to demonstrate. 'This is very unpleasant. The result is that we live in an atmosphere of mutual distrust.'

The bishop said that the military needed to explain its role, as at present it was 'everywhere, in social affairs, the economy, culture, tourism, social communications. So what is left for civilians?'

A time to speak out

'I speak out when people are in a state of unrest, when they are being oppressed, when they are being treated unjustly and in conflict with *Pancasila* [Indonesia's state ideology]. I speak out because sometimes the situation demands that I should. I cannot stand by in silence when something needs to be changed. I must have the courage to take a stand.

'Sometimes people accuse me of being too strong. If this means my taking positions that are unpopular, so be it. That's the risk.'

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