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## The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 142

August 1997

# Arms sales to Indonesia must stop

*There is growing anger in Britain that the Labour Government's much-proclaimed ethical foreign policy will leave Britain's arms sales to Indonesia largely unchanged. Arms companies are lobbying hard to keep their lucrative business intact. But shifts seem more likely in Britain's aid programme for Indonesia.*

Speaking to an invited audience of NGOs, academics and journalists on 17 July, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook confirmed that the Government will not allow the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression and promised 'changes to the present policy governing licencing of riot control vehicles, small arms and other equipment for sale to the security forces of certain regimes'. He was speaking about the Government's forthcoming review of the arms licencing policy due out at the end of July.

While Indonesia was not mentioned, this apparently means that in future no licences will be granted for the export to Indonesia of equipment such as water cannon. It is not clear how far the change in policy extends to armoured vehicles. Welcome as it is, if this is as far as Robin Cook is prepared to go, it is too little too late. In particular, it appears that the Government will not revoke licences granted in 1996 for the export of 16 Hawk aircraft valued at £160 million, and for the export of water cannon and armoured vehicles [see *TAPOL Bulletins* Nos. 140 & 141, April & June 1997].

Robin Cook's speech was widely reported on radio, TV and in the press. Virtually everywhere, Indonesia was one of the chief topics of discussion, the litmus test as some commentators pointed out. Next day, the *Financial Times* led its front page with an article suggesting that the sale of the Hawks is set to go ahead. But in an editorial, it posed the question "...if British Hawk jets are sold to Indonesia, who can say they will never be used for internal repression?" An *Observer* editorial called for the Hawk contract to be stopped, whatever the financial cost. In response, Government officials stated that a final decision on the revocation of licences would only be made when the export-licencing review is completed.

### Government fears compensation claims

The Foreign Office public relations machine swung swiftly into action to inform the media about alleged

obstacles in the way of cancelling the licences, claiming that cancellation could prove costly in terms of compensation. However, according to legal advice received by the World Development Movement, if foreign policy shifts to give more emphasis to human rights, the Government is entitled to revoke licences which contravene human rights criteria, without being liable to compensation. The Government claims to have legal advice warning against revocation but has refused to divulge the contents.

In relation to the Hawks, Government sources allege that there is no evidence that the aircraft are being used in East Timor. In 1994, when he was Shadow Foreign

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## ARMS SALES

Secretary, Robin Cook even told Parliament that 'there was no evidence whatever that the Hawks had been used in East Timor'.

There is in fact plenty of evidence that Hawks have been used in East Timor, but this misses the point. There is no question that a regime, which has shown contempt for international law and world opinion by its brutal 22-year occupation of East Timor and which has in the past used combat aircraft (of whatever provenance) against East Timor, *might* use any equipment at its disposal to further suppress the East Timorese people. For this reason alone, the Government should stop all arms exports to Indonesia, it should revoke all existing licences and it should state publicly that it is doing this because of the appalling human rights situation in Indonesia and East Timor.

If Robin Cook fails to revoke the licences he will be contravening the Government's stated policy, a point that was forcibly made by Ann Clwyd MP on a Point of Order in the House of Commons on 18 July when she demanded a Government statement to the House.

To make matters worse, the Government intends to announce the results of its review at a time when Parliament will have risen for the summer recess, allowing no time for a Parliamentary debate. By then, the Labour Government will have been in power for three months, an intolerable delay. As Liberal Democrat Foreign Affairs spokesperson, Menzies Campbell MP, has pointed out, the review will not tell us anything about Indonesia that we do not already know.

### MPs call for end to arms sales

A motion tabled in the House of Commons on 3 July calling for an end to arms sales to Indonesia gained the support of 130 MPs within three weeks. **Early Day Motion No 201**, tabled in the name of Ann Clwyd MP, calls on the Labour Government to stop the export of all military, security and police equipment to Indonesia. It also calls on the Government to withdraw invitations to the three Indonesian generals to attend the Royal Navy and British Army Equipment Exhibition in Farnborough in September. Besides Labour MPs, the signatories include Liberal Democrats as well as MPs from the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru.

The Motion will remain on the Order Papers until the end of the present Parliamentary Session in November. Readers are urged to write to their MPs, urging them to sign if they have not already done so.

### British aid to be re-directed?

Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, seems to be more inclined to ensure that her actions follow her words. She has said that British aid now provided to governments which offend human rights will be redirected to non-governmental organisations. In relation to Indonesia, the signs are that she will stop Aid and Trade Provision (ATP) funding which accounts for approximately one half of aid to Indonesia and which is primarily beneficial to British companies involved in the projects. If this means ending all government-to-government aid, the change in policy will go some way towards meeting TAPOL's demands.

In a Parliamentary written answer on 15 July, Clare Short stated: 'Our existing support for sustainable forestry in Indonesia is likely to continue, with increased emphasis on benefits to poor people living in forest areas. We shall be looking for opportunities to support local non-government organisations in East Timor and if possible projects supporting Trade Unions in Indonesia'. Much of this is fine but many people would like to know what is meant by 'sustainable forestry in Indonesia'.



*UK-made water cannon in the streets of Jakarta*

In a meeting with José Ramos-Horta on 8 July, the external representative of the East Timor resistance movement and Nobel Peace Laureate, Clare Short gave an assurance that no further government-to-government aid would affect East Timor.

So, what about Britain's aid commitments normally announced at the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) which met in Tokyo on 16 and 17 July? Although the Department for International Development (DFID) had stated that there would be no new aid commitments this year, press reports of the meeting listed Britain as having made a commitment of \$16 million. Officials at DFID were slow to explain the contradiction but eventually assured TAPOL that the \$16 million related to expenditure for existing projects and insisted that no new commitments had been made.

While welcoming the decision to make no new commitments, TAPOL regrets the failure of the DFID to issue a statement explaining the reasons for the decision. The Labour Government should have the courage to state clearly that the new policy is in response to Indonesia's appalling human rights record. Failure to do this has considerably weakened its political impact.

In a submission to DFID in relation to its review of development and aid to Indonesia, TAPOL pointed out that DFID should be very careful about which NGOs it supports. Many are part of the government system which is responsible for repression and inequality. TAPOL has urged the DFID to fund only genuinely independent organisations working for political and economic change for the poor and oppressed.

In relation to East Timor, TAPOL has stressed that the provision of aid to NGOs should not detract from the right to self-determination and the Government of Indonesia should not be involved in any way. It should not imply that poverty and underdevelopment are the main problems facing East Timor today. \*



## Britain, the top Western investor in Indonesia

*During the 30 years of the Suharto regime, Britain has been Indonesia's largest foreign investor, apart from Japan. It is by far the largest European investor, and has invested more than twice the amount of any other country outside Southeast Asia. What effect will this have on the Labour Government's policy towards Indonesia?*

When he launched the Foreign Office's Mission Statement on 12 May, and pledged to put human rights at the heart of foreign policy, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, also made it a top priority for overseas posts to promote British business [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 141, July 1997]. There is obvious potential for conflict between these two objectives, and it is already clear that Indonesia is a test case for the new policy. British trade and investment interests in Indonesia are huge and it is feared that human rights will be sacrificed in favour of more profits for wealthy shareholders at home. The Department for International Development has made an important move in refusing to commit any further aid to the Indonesian Government this year, but crucial decisions on issues such as arms exports are still awaited [see separate item].

Between 1967 (the year in which Suharto opened up Indonesia to foreign investment) and 1996, Britain was Indonesia's largest foreign investor in **chemicals, paper, electricity/gas/water, food and plantations**. These, and **hotels and restaurants**, are the main sectors for British investment. Britain is also heavily involved in the **oil and gas industry** and **finance** sectors, which are excluded from the official investment statistics.

The number of UK projects is smaller than the number involving the other leading foreign investors, Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and the United States, but they (Japan apart) have invested less financially. British investors appear to favour larger, more expensive projects.

In a bid to attract greater foreign investment, Indonesia introduced a series of trade liberalisation measures in 1994. After that, foreign investment increased dramatically. The measures mean that both foreign and domestic private companies can invest in major infrastructure projects, and more sectors have become open to investment by 100% foreign-owned companies.

In 1995, Britain emerged as Indonesia's largest foreign investor due mainly to the large amount invested in oil refinery projects (classed in the chemicals sector). It obtained approval for a massive **US\$6.32 billion** worth of projects, almost double Japan's figure. In 1996, it slipped back to second place behind Japan with **\$3.4 billion** worth of approvals. Overall, Britain's approved investments since 1967 totalled **\$30.6 billion** as against Japan's total of **\$34.6 billion**. The next highest was Hong Kong with approvals of **\$18.6 billion**.

### Recent major investments

**Rio Tinto** (formerly Rio Tinto Zinc - RTZ) has invested up to **\$850 million** in Freeport Indonesia's copper and gold mining operation in West Papua. The project is worth over **\$3 billion**, and is Indonesia's largest single

foreign investment. Since its inception, the project has met with fierce criticism from human rights groups who point to the numerous human rights abuses in and around the mine, and the denial of indigenous land rights amid sustained opposition by local tribes [see previous *TAPOL Bulletins*].

Through Freeport, Rio Tinto has also invested in the **\$700 million** copper smelter at Gresik, East Java and owns half of Indonesia's largest coalmine, Kaltim Prima. This **\$550 million** mine is located in East Kalimantan. Rio Tinto also owns the largest goldmine in Southeast Asia, Kelian Equatorial Mining, a **\$231 million** mine also located in East Kalimantan.

In all, Rio Tinto has total or part ownership of at least 14 Indonesian registered companies.

**British Petroleum (BP)** holds the remaining 50% stake in Kaltim Prima. In petrochemicals BP holds the majority share in Indonesia's first polyethylene plant, PT PENI, West Java. This year the company has been planning a processing plant in West Java with Japanese partners estimated to cost between **\$500 million - \$1 billion**. BP also holds a 10% share in a **\$180 million** polypropylene plant east of Jakarta. BP has total or part ownership in at least six Indonesian registered companies.

**Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI)** plans to establish a **\$200 million** polyurethane plant in West Java.


**British Gas** has the majority shareholding in the Bumi Serpong Damai gas fired power plant. Situated in West Java, the project is estimated to cost **\$500 million**.

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## PARTNERS IN REPRESSION:

### The reality of British aid to Indonesia

Paul Barber



PARTNERS IN REPRESSION: The reality of British aid to Indonesia

## UK-INDONESIA TIES

**Power Gen** holds a 35% share in the \$1.65 billion coal fired power station, Paiton II in East Java.

**Trafalgar House**, recently taken over by Kvaerner of Norway, holds a 40% share in the Jakarta-to-Bandung toll road project. Estimated to cost \$625 million, the project was only made possible by the 1994 deregulations, which opened the infrastructure sector to foreign investors for the first time. Trafalgar House was the first foreign company to invest in a tollroad project. In 1994 the project was pledged a \$28 million grant from the British government.

**Royal Dutch/Shell** had two huge oil refinery projects approved recently in a joint venture partnership. A \$1.5 billion refinery planned for Situbondo, East Java was approved in 1994, and a refinery for Bontang, East Kalimantan approved in 1995. Until 1994, Shell owned 7 Indonesian registered mining companies, which it sold to Gencor (South Africa). It now concentrates on at least 3 Indonesian registered companies, and its long-standing oil and gas activities.

**Taylor Woodrow International** and **GEC Alstom** (50% owned by GEC) have signed an agreement to build a \$1.2 billion metro system for Surabaya in East Java. The Indonesian partner in the joint venture will be the Bimantara Group controlled by Suharto's second son Bambang Trihatmodjo.



*Maggie Thatcher vocal on investments, silent on human rights abuses.*

### Oil and Gas

The Indonesian state oil company Pertamina awards Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) to foreign oil companies for production and exploration. By this route, a number of British companies are able to make significant investments in Indonesia's oil industry, and gain considerable profits.

British companies have been quick to exploit the **Timor Gap Treaty** between Australia and Indonesia, which applies to the waters between East Timor and Australia thought to be rich in oil and gas reserves. The Treaty infringes East Timor's right to control its natural resources, and it is arguably unlawful under international law.

**Royal Dutch/Shell** holds exploration rights in 4 license blocks in the Timor Gap. Since 1991, it has also held 2 contracts for oil exploration in the Java Sea, and since 1992, a further 4 contracts for offshore drilling. In 1995 it was awarded a contract for exploration and development off the coast of East Kalimantan.

**Enterprise Oil** holds exploration rights in 2 license blocks in the Timor Gap. Until mid-1994 it also held interests in the Camar productive oil field, off the coast of Java. The company currently has exploration interests in Block II, North West Natuna Sea.

**Hardy Oil and Gas** holds a 15% share in 1 license block in the Timor Gap, which has been described as one of the companies two major assets.

In 1995 **BP** was granted three contracts for offshore exploration and development: one off the Lombok coast and two off the coast of South Sulawesi. BP holds a 36% share in 3 productive gas fields - the Kangean Block - located east of Java, off the Bali coast. Until December 1994 the company also held interests in 2 license blocks in the Timor Gap.

Since 1991 **LASMO** has held an exploration contract in the Cumi-Cumi region of the West Natuna Sea, and holds a contract for exploration at Runtu, off the East Kalimantan coast. Its 37.85% share in the productive Sanga-Sanga gas fields, which continue to be explored, represents Lasmo's largest single gas reserve anywhere in the world. The company also holds a 50% stake in one of the world's largest liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants which is located at Bontang, East Kalimantan. In 1995 Lasmo's total assets in Indonesia amounted to £696 million.

Towards the end of 1995 **Clyde Petroleum** was granted a contract to explore both on and offshore around the Halmahera area, North Maluku. Since early 1996 Clyde has also held a 31.25% share in the four productive oilfields known as Kakap PSC in the West Natuna Sea.

**Premier Oil** has a contract to explore the Pangkah block. The area is close to rich oil and gas reserves off East Java. Premier also hold a share in the Halmahera contract.

In 1995, **British Gas** was granted a PSC for the Malingping area off West Java.

### Finance

British-owned finance companies play a significant role in a number of large investment projects. UK companies also provide financial services in Indonesia, and offer loans for both domestic and foreign business ventures.

In recent years **Barclays**, usually through its BZW subsidiary, has been involved in at least seven large projects as financial arranger, adviser, and underwriter: a \$422 million petrochemical project in Merak, West Java; the \$1.8 billion Paiton I power station; the \$600 million Corridor Block gas project in Sumatra; the \$700 million Gresik Copper Smelter project; a \$650 million paper plant in Riau, Sumatra; the \$225 million Senkang power plant in Sulawesi; and the \$500 million Nityasa Prima pulp and paper project. The company has a representative office in Jakarta, and has granted a number of syndicated loans to business projects in Indonesia.

**HSBC Holdings** has been involved in three large projects as financial adviser: the \$625 million Jakarta to Bandung tollroad (see above); the eastern half of the Jakarta Water System project; and the \$300 million

*CONTINUED ON PAGE 8*



## Cosmetic economic deregulation

*A few days before the Consultative Group on Indonesia met, new deregulation measures were announced. This annual ritual is intended to convey Jakarta's good intentions as part of the family of free market states. But behind the facade, key sections of the Indonesian economy continue to be controlled by Suharto clan business interests.*

There have been always two sides to the Indonesian economy, a place for investors to earn huge profits and a notoriously corrupt economy run by a bureaucracy and executive rife with nepotism and favouritism. Indonesia is attractive to investors because of its abundant natural resources and huge domestic market of 200 million people. At the same time it is a high-cost economy with phenomenal hidden costs that often exceed 30 per cent of a company's outlay.

The CGI, the aid consortium for Indonesia (formerly called the IGGI), was set up to bring Indonesia back into the fold of the free market global economy. It earmarks financial aid from various sources, including multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and bilateral aid from Japan, Canada, USA, Australia and most European countries. The World Bank which convenes the CGI conference, produces an annual report on the performance of the Indonesian economy.

### CGI, business as usual

The CGI conference which was held this year in Tokyo was attended by 17 donor states and 11 multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank's 1997 report assesses the Indonesian economy as follows: "On the basis of broad economic indicators the Indonesian economy is performing very well. Gross domestic product increased, inflation dropped and local and foreign investment have been increasingly buoyant".

As usual the report also gives voice to some concerns, including a fall-off in the pace of government deregulatory moves, a weak banking sector and high core inflation. Jean Michel Severino, the World Bank's vice-president for East Asia and the Pacific, cautioned Indonesia on the sliding value of other Southeast Asian currencies like the baht, the peso and the ringgit, and expressed concern over the ability of the Indonesian education system to produce skilled labour. The World Bank uses the term 'soft infrastructure' as an oblique way of criticising the bureaucracy and calling for more transparency. It also stressed the importance of sustainable development, in particular with regard to tropical forestry.

Indonesia this year received a commitment of US\$5.3 billion, about the same as last year (US\$5.26 billion). As usual, the World Bank, the ADB and Japan provided 85 per cent of the total. World Bank aid rose from US\$1.2 billion to \$1.5 billion while Japanese aid fell from US\$1.916 billion to \$1.869 billion.

### Debt service problems

Indonesia is one of the world's largest debtors along with Brazil, Mexico and China. Its foreign debt is now es-

timated at around US\$115 billion. The debt service ratio (DSR) of more than 30 per cent is ten per cent higher than what is regarded as acceptable at the present stage of the Indonesian economy.

Several leading economists have warned the government about the heavy burden of debt repayments. In financial year 1993/1994 about half of the routine budget was eaten up by debt repayment which in turn affects the wages of civil servants. Low wages for civil servants only exacerbate the rampant corruption. During the past decade, loans by the private sector have exceeded government loans. The Bank Indonesia is unable to produce reliable figures but estimates suggest that more than 60 per cent of the debt burden is private foreign debt.



*TIMOR car, an expensive venture for the Indonesian taxpayer.*

### Deregulation, nothing more than a slogan

On the eve of the CGI meeting, the Indonesian government announced *Pakjul* (*Paket Juli*, July Package). The aim of deregulation is to create a more competitive climate for industry and the market so as to compete more favourably in the global market, along the lines promoted by the World Trade Organisation. Deregulation means lowering tariffs and opening up the market to new players in the economy.

In Indonesia, this should also mean opening up certain sectors that are controlled by monopolies. Two obvious targets should be the wheat/flour monopoly and the petrochemical industry both of which are in the hands of the Suharto clan. Needless to say, these two sectors were not touched by *Pakjul*. For years economists have called the

flour monopoly into question but to no avail because many top officials are on its secret payroll.

The *Pakjul* measures failed to address the key problems of the Indonesian economy, concentrating not on the sectors in need of deregulation but on sectors like banking where deregulation has gone so far as to create virtual chaos.

## PT Bogasari

The *PT Bogasari* (PTB) monopoly is almost as old as Suharto's New Order and is in the hands of Liem Sioe Liong, Suharto's longest surviving crony, plus some members of the Suharto family. PTB is part of Indonesia's largest conglomerate, the Salim Group (SG).

The way the monopoly operates is very simple: all wheat produced in Indonesia must be sold to *BULOG*, the State Logistics Bureau, which also handles all wheat imports. The wheat is then delivered to PTB. After milling which is a minor operation, the flour is sold back to *BULOG* at a huge profit. PTB has also fine-tuned a tradition of transferring large sums of money to top echelon bureaucrats, creating a favourable business climate for Liem Sioe Liong who is one of Southeast Asia's richest men.

In the meantime an SG subsidiary called Indofood Sukses Makmur (ISM) produces a wide range of food products such as instant noodles and baking products and has emerged as Indonesia's largest listed food company. In July it was announced that QAF Ltd. in Singapore would buy 50.1 percent of ISM for US\$1.92 billion, an indication of the huge assets of the Salim Group.

## Petrochemical industry

Another sector left untouched by deregulation was the petrochemical industry, a highly competitive global industry. Several big companies are involved, including giants like Chandra Asri and Trypolita and textile and garment companies like Kanindo and Mayatex which use petrochemical products. The key player is Bambang Trihatmodjo, Suharto's second son. His flagship company is the sole importer of petrochemical products and at the same time holds major assets in all the up- and down-stream companies in the petrochemical sector. Imports of raw chemical products, monopolised by the Suharto offspring, are usually priced at 40 per cent above global prices.

The decision several years ago to set up huge petrochemical plants like Chandra Asri and Trypolita was taken by Suharto together with the kids, Bambang and Tutut Suharto, and a new crony, Prayogo Pangestu. Despite global overproduction and fierce competition between petrochemical multinationals, it was decided to go ahead. From the outset Chandra Asri and Trypolita needed heavy protection from the state, without which they would have collapsed as soon as they confronted global competition.

## Automotive industry

The latest scandal is the Timor car, a major topic these days in the business press at home and abroad. Here too, Indonesia has a large domestic market with the demand for cars rising phenomenally. Sales in May 1997 reached 37,000 units, up 42 per cent on the same period last year. For years the Indonesian market has been dominated by Japanese cars with Toyota in the lead. Most of the cars are

domestically assembled with most spare parts being imported.

Car prices in Indonesia are very high, up to 3 or 4 times the price in the country of origin. Last year, the idea of producing an Indonesian national car was mooted. It is not clear whether it came from Suharto or from his youngest progeny, Tommy, but it was Tommy who announced the project to the public. The car was to be called the 'Timor', produced by a joint venture between an economically weak Korean car producer KIA and PT Timor Putera Nasional, in which Tommy Suharto is the main share-holder. From the outset, the project was a scandal. Indonesia's 'national car' would not even be assembled in Indonesia but shipped ready for use from Korea. Tommy was granted a 50 per cent tax break, enabling him to undercut other cars of similar size. The Timor enterprise has become the example *par excellence* of regulation and state protectionism. All three major car producers, the US, the EU and Japan have filed complaints to the WTO because of the protection given to Tommy's (or is it Suharto's?) Timor car.

With such a price advantage, the scheme should have worked but things have turned out differently. The middle class, the potential buyers of the *mobnas*, proved to be less than impressed as other car manufacturers were able to narrow the price differential. The first delivery of 12,000 cars sweltered in the harbour for months. As it turns out, Tommy's company, a newcomer in the automotive industry, did not have the necessary infrastructure of salesrooms and service points. Inevitably, the costs mounted dramatically. Instead of making a profit, the *mobnas* turned into a disaster, just like Tommy's other ventures. But this time too, Big Daddy's State came to the rescue.

Much to the dismay of several cabinet ministers and the Governor of Bank Indonesia, Suharto ordered a consortium of 13 state and private banks to cough up US\$1.3 billion to rescue the project. Making a mockery of the deregulation measures announced a few days earlier, the banks had to bail Tommy out. On top of that, all state departments and local authorities have been instructed to purchase Timor cars for their employees. These days *mobnas* no longer stands for 'national car' but for 'civil service car' (*mobil dinas*).

Meanwhile back in Korea, KIA Motors of Korea has run into trouble with serious cash flow problems and is also the target of a bail-out. Korean financial institutions had to tighten credit lines after the collapse of two major corporations, including the steel giant, Hanbo Steel Co. The KIA group debts totalled US\$12 billion at the end of May. Who knows, it may fall to Indonesian financial institutions to join in the rescue operation to save KIA from bankruptcy.\*

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### CONTINUED FROM PAGE 18

21 years, Indonesia was still having trouble convincing the international community and the East Timorese that its rule in East Timor is legitimate. Riwanto said Jakarta was 'unrealistic' in its insistence that the Balibo Declaration was legitimate and that the question of East Timor was solved. 'Indonesia is trying to convince the world and the East Timorese based on these unrealistic assumptions, but I'm afraid it's not going to work,' said Riwanto. [*Asian Age*/AFP, 18 July]

This frank comment goes to the very heart of Foreign Minister Ali Alatas' strategy and, as *AFP* points out, represents the views of a number of political analysts in Jakarta.\*



# Post-election blues and re-shuffles

*A post-election atmosphere of discontent from top to bottom; at the grassroots, Golkar's landslide only confirms claims of huge electoral rigging; at the top, Suharto's surprise reshuffle of several key players during the election campaign, notably Information Minister Harmoko and ABRI chief of staff for social and political affairs Lt. General Syarwan Hamid. Five regional military commanders have been shunted off into parliament.*

The 1997 elections were unusually violent [see *TAPOL* Bulletin No. 141, July 1997] and political analysts expect political unrest to continue up to the presidential election in March 1998. Indonesia's political future remains uncertain, in particular the burning issue of Suharto's succession. Will this cocktail of trouble keep the political situation on the boil in the coming months?

## Excessive rigging

It is hard to say whether electoral rigging was more widespread than in previous elections but what is certain is that the political conditions were starkly different. Although some newspapers were warned about their coverage of the elections, electoral manipulations were well reported [see article on press censorship]. The unrest in different cities was a sign of unprecedented cynicism and frustration among the general public about the elections.

According to poll watchers, most of the manipulations were perpetrated by government officials, in particular sub-district or village chiefs. Having been set targets by their superiors for the Golkar vote, it was left to the creativity of the officials to achieve the target. There was tampering with ballot boxes, double voting, intimidation, misuse of government facilities and bribes.

What marked the 1997 election was the declining trust in the legitimacy of the elections, underlying which was a decline in the regime's credibility in the eyes of the general public. In many places government offices or polling booths became the target of public anger. East Java in particular suffered an eruption of post-election violence. In Jember and several districts on the island of Madura, there were bitter clashes between demonstrators and security officers, while government buildings, shopping centres and places of worship were torched.

## A clogged-up political system

While much of the unrest was sparked by anger at rampant corruption and social disparities, one should not underestimate the volatile political system. Instead of allowing more political freedoms, Suharto has only tightened things up. None of the New Order political institutions provide outlets for the political aspirations of the masses. The yawning gap between the political elite and the general public is widening and millions of young, well-educated Indonesians see no alternative but to demand drastic political changes. The result is escalating physical conflicts between security officers and the general public.

The forceful removal of Megawati from the political arena only made things worse. The political system is nothing less than a clogged-up machine. On top of the

power structure sits Suharto, wielding state power on his own; all the crucial decisions are in his hands with even his closest buddies being taken by surprise at almost everything he does.



*The many places  
of social unrest*

## The HaHa reshuffle

Four days after the elections, a major reshuffle was announced. It was clear that Suharto was not content with the way the elections had been conducted. Two key people directly involved in the Golkar campaign were removed from office.

The first to go was Golkar's chair and Information Minister Harmoko. He was appointed Minister of State for Special Affairs, a position without portfolio, without an office and without any staff. His new job is to 'coach' members of parliament on how to function as MPs. Harmoko has been a high-profile politician for almost two decades, holding the influential position of Information Ministry for 14 years. A staunch Suharto loyalist, he is a flamboyant speaker, unlike his boss. Suharto made him chair of Golkar in 1992, a position previously reserved for the armed forces. Suharto's intention was clear, to make Golkar more independent of the military. Ever since 1995 Harmoko has been constantly on the move, campaigning for Golkar; he visited almost all the more than four hundred districts throughout the country.

Harmoko is also known as Indonesia's Rupert Murdoch, the owner of several major newspapers and a share-



holder in practically all the important publications. Now, like a deflated balloon, he is likely to take over as chair or vice-chair of Parliament and the MPR (the upper house) which is nothing more than a ceremonial position.

The second man to go was army chief of staff General Hartono who took over from Harmoko as Minister of Information. He had been expected to become ABRI commander-in-chief or minister of defence. Hartono raised the hackles of army officers when, during a Golkar rally, he appeared not in uniform but in a Golkar jacket and proclaimed ABRI's allegiance to Golkar, even though ABRI is supposed to stand above all the parties.

There's a joke in Jakarta about the end of the HaHa-HaHa reign. The four Ha's are (Su)Harto, Habibie, Harmoko and Hartono. Two have now been demoted, with another two to go.

## Major overhaul in ABRI

Two weeks after this reshuffle there was another major overhaul, this time in ABRI. In the last ten years there has been a serious bottleneck in the upper ranks. While a larger number of graduates have poured out of the armed forces academies, structures in the army, navy, air force and police force have not been adjusted to take up the slack, with the result that many officers only reach the rank of colonel, to take command of a military district. The situation has been handled by faster rotation, with officers moving up after 18 months instead of three years.

In July some 300 officers were promoted to new positions. The navy, air force and police introduced new structures, each establishing a general staff in line with the army. All forces have created the new post of deputy chief of staff.

A week earlier the new army chief of staff was appointed: Lt General (new General) Wiranto, formerly commander of Kostrad, the army's strategic command. He fought for several years in East Timor, from 1975 till 1979 during the Seroja Operation, the military's code name for the invasion. Wiranto served as adjutant to President Suharto from 1990 till 1993, after which his military career soared. From December 1994 till March 1996, he held the prestigious position of Jakarta military commander.

## Timor veterans re-emerge

Another appointee is also an old East Timor hand, Major-General (now Lt Gen.) Yunus Yosfiah who previously headed the ABRI Staff School. He takes over as ABRI chief of staff for social and political affairs, arguably the second most powerful position in the armed forces. He was responsible for killing Nicolau Lobato, President of Fretilin, in 1978 as well as the cold-blooded murder of five journalists in Balibo in 1975. Yunus attended the staff school in Fort Leavenworth in the US, usually an important stepping stone in a military career. He also spent a year at the British College of Defence Studies.

Yunus Yosfiah's assistant will be Major-General Bambang Yudhoyono, previously commander of the South Sumatra military command. From 1986 till 1988 he was a battalion 744 platoon commander in East Timor and became a staff officer at the Udayana military command which oversees East Timor. Yudhoyono also attended a

course at Fort Leavenworth, received training in the Airborne Warfare School in Panama and took an anti-tank course in Belgium and West Germany. In 1995 he was attached to the UN Contingent in Bosnia.

## Shunted off to Parliament

Another spectacular move was the demotion of six top army generals who will become MPs in the new Parliament which is to be installed in October this year. President Suharto seems to be punishing them for their clumsy handling of affairs during the elections.

The high-profile Lt General Syarwan Hamid, chief of staff of social and political affairs, was the most senior of these victims. Having spent years as the most voluble of ABRI officers, in charge of some of the most spectacular blunders under the New Order (under instruction from Suharto of course), he will now have to make do with being the chair or vice-chair of Indonesia's toothless legislature. Five regional commanders have also had to pack up their uniforms, apparently for allowing their areas of command to descend into violence during the elections. They included Major-General A. Rivai, commander of the Udayana command, whose performance in East Timor kept him in the limelight. His removal followed on the heels of the removal of the Dili military commander and police chief two weeks earlier. The new Udayana military commander will be Major-General Syahrir MS. \*

## CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4

Bandung LRT transport project. The bank also has branches in six Indonesian cities, and its Indonesian subsidiary provides corporate finance, stockbroking, and underwriting. Like Barclays it continues to offer syndicated loans to Indonesian projects.

The Prudential Corporation has provided debt cover for the \$1.6 billion Paiton II (PT Jawa Power) power project. It has invested in companies such as Rio Tinto and ICI who are involved in major projects in Indonesia, and owns three Indonesian registered companies.

Standard Chartered has invested in mining. It also offers banking facilities at branches in five Indonesian cities, owns two Indonesian registered companies, and has recently made Visa cards available to customers in Indonesia.

## Other British investors

Over 50 British companies have complete or part ownership of Indonesian registered companies. Although many of these are involved in smaller projects than those already listed their cumulative effect is undoubtedly as great. The Indonesia-British Business Association claims to have more than 230 members which maintain 'direct links with business in Indonesia'.

Bass has plans to extend its Holiday Inn chain to 9 hotels in Indonesia. BTR, who manufacture Dunlop products, and Rowe Evans Investments (agriculture) each have full or part ownership of five Indonesian subsidiaries. Unilever (manufacturing) and Inchape own at least four, whilst Coats Viyella, the clothing and textile manufacturers, and Plantation and General Investments (agriculture) each own at least three. Cadbury Schweppes, Charter, Courtaulds, Glaxo Wellcome,

CONTINUED ON PAGE 12

## Cipinang, a view from inside

*Cipinang Prison, Jakarta is now 'home' for tapols (political prisoners) of many different political hues. Recently, TAPOL received messages from a prisoner, from an ex-prisoner and from a visitor to the prison.*

'We are inside Jakarta's fortress-like Cipinang prison for a Sunday afternoon potluck lunch. Relatives and friends of the political prisoners have brought specially-prepared home-cooked dishes for the day's celebration. Anom Astika of the People's Democratic Party (PRD), arrested last year with the entire party leadership, has just turned 26,' writes the visitor. 'All of Suharto's jailed foes, from 17 to 70 years old, from all different political tendencies, are gathered here for the occasion. Some one hundred people here have been through painful times but one wouldn't know by looking at them now. There isn't a serious face around and the laughter is as abundant as the food.'

Among those at the party are six PRD tapols, all recently convicted; three men in their seventies, the so-called '1965 prisoners', all of whom have been held for more than thirty years; several East Timorese including Xanana Gusmao, leader of the resistance, now serving a 20-year sentence; a Muslim tried for wanting to set up an Islamic state; several supporters of Megawati Sukarnoputri, the ousted leader of the PDI; Sri Bintang Pamungkas, who recently founded PUDI and who is serving a sentence for 'defaming President Suharto' while facing new charges because of his *Lebaran* greetings card, calling on people to boycott the elections; and four members of the Muslim party, PPP, the most recent arrivals at the prison.

The PRD activist, Wilson, who got four years in June, is master of ceremonies, sharp, quick-witted with as much talent for mass organising as for scholarly writing. In December 1995, he took part in a joint action with East Timorese students who jumped into several embassies to denounce the Indonesian occupation of East Timor and support self-determination.

### Parents' unswerving support

Most of the mothers of the PRD prisoners are present, including Wilson's. In face of the military's wrath, they have not been intimidated. Wilson's mother, who spent hours making a delicious beef curry, said of her son and his friends: 'They fight for the poor. There's no shame in that.' She has withstood eight sessions of police questioning and repeated visits of intelligence agents to her home. She once told journalists: 'If any despot is going to rob my son's life, I will stand in front of him and defy him.' Wilson was very surprised. 'She's a very gentle person. I've known her for 28 years and I've never heard such a strong statement coming out of her mouth. Physically speaking, this is an unequal fight: the New Order vs. my mother.'

The father of Budiman Sudjatmiko, chair of the PRD, is also present although his son is not here but in Salemba Prison. He told people that he had distributed one of Budiman's statement at his place of work, Goodyear Tire. When he was warned by the company and told to keep quiet, he decided to take early retirement. He has no com-

plaints against his employers but is still aggrieved that General Syarwan Hamid, the armed forces' 'social and political affairs' chief-of-staff has neither retracted nor apologised for alleging that he and his wife were communists.



*Megawati and Abersson after his trial (see page 20)*

Another of the visitors is Father Sandyawan, who harboured some of the PRD activists when they were still in hiding. He may soon find himself on the inside as he will shortly be charged for helping people to evade arrest. Outside, he works in the 'parish of the poor' where he runs daytime schools for scavengers and street children and evening classes for adults.

Anom tells his visitors that many key PRD activists are still at large. One of its most beloved members is the one-eyed poet, Wiji Thukul, who is still in hiding. Military intelligence officers blinded him in one eye two years ago during a torture session. As a worker, a kind of folk hero in poor communities, Wiji attracts a particular kind of hatred from the military, if they catch him this time, his friends say, he is likely to be killed.

The four PPP members are in a dreadful physical state. They were arrested during the final stages of the election campaign and are soon to face charges. Fahmi was kicked and severely beaten with rifle butts. When he arrived in Cipinang, his body was covered in cuts and bruises, there were swellings on his head, severe pains in his rib-cage, and he suffered constant headaches. One of his friends had lashes on his skull and was bruised all over. This is what happened to them at the local police resort in South Jakarta.



# POLITICAL PRISONERS

## The 1965 prisoners

The prisoners and their visitors sit together on reed mats spread out on a concrete floor. A cool breeze enters from two sides of the hall surrounded by an ugly metal fence. The openness facilitates both ventilation and surveillance. A gaggle of intelligence agents stand nearby, watching. The prisoners say that a camera is hidden behind a second floor window of the facing building, but no one seems to care in the slightest and the party continues.

One of the prisoners is Colonel Latief, who was part of the group of army officers who launched the kidnappings in Jakarta on 1 October 1965. He walks with a severe limp because of a gunshot wound inflicted when he was captured, which was allowed to turn gangrenous. He was held incommunicado for eleven years in Salemba Prison. Having been given a life sentence, all efforts to convert this into a fixed-term sentence have failed. At his trial in 1978, he told the court that General (now President) Suharto was told in advance of their plan to kidnap six generals and he did nothing to stop it. Latief probably knows more than anyone else alive about what really happened on that fateful day. Following a stroke last year, he now speaks with some difficulty and is visibly irritated by the inability of his face muscles to keep pace with his thoughts. Someone suggests that his various ailments should be treated by an acupuncturist.

Asep Suryaman, another of the 1965 prisoners who is under sentence of death, has watched dozens of his comrades taken off for execution. Earlier this year, one of his comrades, Sukatno, died in tragic circumstances after years of deteriorating health. Yet he has retained his sanity and good humour. He tells the visitors as he shakes their hands goodbye that he has been feeling much better since the PRD prisoners arrived; their animated and intelligent conversation has revived his spirits.

## Xanana's 51<sup>st</sup> birthday

Another occasion for celebration was a birthday party on Sunday, 22 June, two days after the 51<sup>st</sup> birthday of Xanana Gusmao. Like Nelson Mandela in South Africa, he continues to give inspiration to his comrades in the field,

years after he himself was captured. When Jose Ramos Horta was informed that he would receive the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, the first thing he said was: 'The person who really deserves this Prize is Xanana Gusmao.'

Now fluent in the Indonesian language, he spends most of his time reading about the political situation in Indonesia and devouring books about Indonesian literature. He attaches much importance to mixing with all the other political prisoners, sharpening his own assessment of Indonesia's pro-democracy movement. He's a football fanatic and used to be the goal-keeper of a football team in Dili, before the invasion in 1975.

It so happens that the latest round of UN talks on East Timor held in New York fell on his birthday. Sad to say, though, he was not given permission to be present so that he could blow out the candles on a birthday cake decorated with a map of East Timor and the words, 'A luta continua'.

This was a joint birthday celebration as three days later, PUDI chairman, Sri Bintang turned 52. Our prisoner contact wrote to say that internal security has been intensified recently, with the arrival of more intel officers from BIA and Bakorstanas to keep an eye not only on the prisoners but also on their visitors.

Perhaps, another of our contacts suggests, Sri-Bintang was fated to spend time in Cipinang so that he could meet Xanana Gusmao. The radical programme of his party, PUDI, fails to make any mention of East Timor and he now realises that it was only here in prison that he could gain a thorough understanding of this question. This joint birthday party is can also be seen a symbol of the alliance between the pro-democracy movement and East Timor's resistance to the Indonesian occupation.

## PRD prisoners in East Java

The PRD prisoners in Cipinang are acutely aware that their comrades in East Java are going through very difficult times at present. Following a prison riot in Medaeng Prison earlier this year, the three of them, Dita Indah Sari, Coen Husein and Mohamad Sholeh, were blamed for the incident, without a shred of evidence. The two men were dragged off for interrogation and sustained serious face injuries while Dita was transferred to Kebon Waru prison in Malang. For the first time, she has been isolated from her friends and is now much farther away from her family.\*

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## CONTINUED FROM PAGE 19

Being himself a great lover of awe-inspiring, equatorial mountainous terrain, Daniel also describes the many moments when he sat alone, able to forget the circumstances that had brought him there, gazing at the stunning panorama through which they travelled.

Although the hostages were finally rescued by Indonesian troops and their commander Major-General Prabowo is mentioned in the Acknowledgements, the army can gain little comfort from Daniel Start's book. The Prologue consists of a lengthy extract from a report published by Bishop Munninghoff in July 1995 about atrocities perpetrated by the Indonesian army around the Freeport mine, although the author did not see this document until after his return home in 1996. He also describes how the village of Geselama, the final resting-place for the hostages and their OPM guards, when hopes of a peaceful release ran high,

was the target of revenge bombings and shootings by Indonesian troops, in retaliation for Kwalik's decision to renege on the agreement that had been reached with the International Red Cross.

Although their ordeal was harsh, Daniel shows no bitterness towards the OPM. On the contrary, he came away with his sympathies clearly with the West Papuans. As he wrote in *The Times* soon after his book was published, following a return visit to the area: 'Almost every Papuan believes in the cause of the OPM,' adding that '(t)he OPM's refusal to release us was foolish but it was defiant' [*The Times*, 28 June 1997] *The Open Cage* is an account of how one man went to West Papua on a scientific mission, knowing nothing about the injustices suffered by its people, and returned home understanding that the root of the problem is the Indonesian colonisation of their land. \*

Carmel Budiardjo

## New Information Minister takes charge

*Less than a week after the general election in May, it was announced that Harmoko had been sacked as Information Minister and replaced by General Hartono, the army chief-of-staff. The sudden removal of Harmoko, one of Suharto's most loyal cronies, and his replacement by a general has raised the prospect of even tighter control over the Indonesian press.*

The reasons for Harmoko's sudden fall from grace have been the subject of much speculation. Besides being Information Minister, Harmoko is chair of GOLKAR, the government party which had just scored its highest share of the vote in the history of the regime's rigged elections. However, it appears that Harmoko's relations with Sri Hardiyanti Rukmana, otherwise known as Tutut, President Suharto's oldest daughter, who is also vice chair of GOLKAR, have been strained because of her high-profile campaigning for the party, which was seen as threatening Harmoko's position. The appointment of General Hartono to replace him as Information Minister has added credence to this belief as Hartono is known to be Tutut's closest political ally. Hartono took over the portfolio just after retiring from active military service.

It is also widely believed that Harmoko's performance in failing to control the press during the election infuriated Suharto. Although the press has been buffeted recently by many harassments (see below), the fact is that there was substantial coverage of the many disastrous incidents that erupted during the elections and of the alliance that sprang up between Megawati supporters and rank-and-file PPP members that became known as the Mega-Bintang alliance. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 141, July 1997].

Another sore point with Suharto is the recently-adopted Broadcasting Bill, shepherded through Parliament by Harmoko, which he has refused to sign into law. Suharto's objections are thought to centre on its provisions regarding privately-owned television companies, most of which are owned by Suharto's offspring and cronies. Suharto has now instructed Parliament to take the unprecedented step of revising the bill so as to take on board the amendments he is demanding.

Harmoko has been appointed Minister for Special Tasks, his 'special task' being to give *pembekalan* ('input'), the latest euphemism for indoctrination, to all the members of the newly-elected Parliament. Even within the establishment, there have been raised eyebrows at the idea that a member of the Executive should be conducting thought-control courses for members of the Legislature which is what his 'special task' amounts to. One would have thought that the political screening of parliamentary candidates before their nomination would have been enough to ensure that honorable MPs will not be a cause of embarrassment for the regime.

### Army chief takes over

Suharto's decision to appoint Hartono, a four-star general, as Information Minister also came as a surprise. He is expected to take a tougher line towards the press; given his close ties with Tutut, he can be expected to use his banning powers to protect Tutut and other members of the Suharto

clan against criticism and exposures in the press. He has already made it known that he does not intend to repeal Harmoko's 1984 decree giving the Information Department powers to rescind press licences known as SIUPP, even though this is in contravention of the 1982 Press Law which rules out press bans.

According to Daniel Dhakidae, who sits on the editorial board of *Kompas*, SIUPP has destroyed the autonomy of the print media. He was contemptuous of an assurance given by General Hartono that he would try to avoid banning newspapers. 'Why should the press be pleased with such an assurance from an official? This is already guaranteed under the law so it's not for anyone in the Executive, up to and including the President, to give such an assurance.' [*Tempo Interaktif*, 2 July, Edition 18/02]

### Novel ways of terrorising the press

The Indonesian press confronts many forms of control that don't necessarily emanate from the centre or from state institutions. The prevalence of corruption at the local level, with collusion rife between local security forces and local administrators, can spell trouble for any journalist who takes it into his or her head to expose such misdeeds. Already two courageous journalists have paid with their lives for daring to investigate and expose corruption at the local level. The murder last August of Fuad Muhammad Syafruddin, who worked for *Bernas*, a Yogyakarta-based daily, following a series of articles exposing the corrupt practices of the Bantul district chief, still remains unsolved. The police have gone to extraordinary lengths to sabotage the investigations into the journalist's murder, including destroying a blood specimen given to them by the dead man's widow. An innocent man accused of being involved in a fictive love-triangle with the journalist's wife is to go on trial shortly, while nothing has been done to go after the obvious suspects, men who are known to be in the pay of the Bantul district chief.

In June this year, the battered body of Mohammad Sayuti, who worked for *Pos Makassar*, a weekly in Ujung Pandang, was discovered by the roadside. During an investigation into a scandal about deforestation and embezzlement of reforestation funds, he visited the Kaya sub-district chief in the district of Palopo, South Sulawesi at his home and it is believed that he was physically assaulted there. A doctor is later believed to have confirmed that he died as the result of having been struck with a heavy implement. Few people give any credence to police claims that Sayuti died as the result of a traffic accident.

### Novel forms of censorship

The May issue of SWA, the monthly economic and business journal, disappeared altogether from the shops



## CENSORSHIP

after two men, claiming to come from the State intelligence agency, BAKIN, visited the editorial office, went straight to the printers and bought up the whole issue which contained an exposure of a bank loan scandal plaguing Bank Pacific. The bank belongs to Endang Utari Mokodompit, daughter of Ibnu Sutowo, former president-director of the state oil company Pertamina. The two men then phoned agents for the magazine in all parts of the country, warning them not to circulate the magazine to subscribers and vendors. SWA journalists who were stunned by this crude form of censorship tried to have the May issue re-printed but were advised by their managing editor to 'lie low'.



A number of national newspapers, including *Media Indonesia* and *Merdeka*, received warnings from the authorities about their reporting during the elections, forcing them to change tack. Some sections of the media did indeed report extensively on election manipulations until warned to desist.

The daily *Republika* was the hardest hit when it was compelled to replace its editor-in-chief, Parni Hardi, because the paper had suggested that economic disparities were the cause of the riots which erupted in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya earlier this year, rather than the favoured view that 'third parties' had masterminded the trouble. *Republika* is owned by ICMI, the association of Muslim intellectuals which is the brain-child of Dr Habibie, for long one of Suharto's golden boys. Pressure for Parni Hardi's removal was a sign of shifting alliances in the regime. The only journalists' organisation to complain about Hardi's dismissal was the independent AJI, whereas Hardi's own organisation, the State-backed PWI, kept quiet. Three years

ago, when three leading Indonesian periodicals were banned, Hardi supported the government's decision. AJI might well have seen Hardi's fate as being a piece of his own medicine but decided instead to uphold the freedom of newspapers to run their own affairs.

### South Sumatra daily banned

The Palembang-based newspaper, *Sriwijaya Post*, was ordered to halt publication on the orders of the provincial department of information. The order banning the paper states that the proprietors had 'behaved arrogantly' and had failed to reach an accord with the governor. *Sriwijaya Post* had been allowed to reappear a month earlier, on 9 June, after being out of circulation for fifteen months.

### Attempts to control the Internet

In the past few years, the Internet has become the key platform for unbridled critical discussion of the Indonesian regime. A variety of alternative media sources, untrammelled by press controls, are today the source of information that is unobtainable in the Indonesian press. Indeed, much of the information given above and elsewhere in this *Bulletin* comes from these sources.

In an attempt to gain control of this alternative source, the Secretary-General of the Department of Post and Telecommunications, announced that he had asked all Internet service providers to monitor their clients so as to weed out those who make postings harmful to the interests of the State. Tri Agus S. Siswomihardjo, a journalist who was recently released from prison after serving a two-year sentence, said: 'Having been able to censor all the mass media, it's now the turn of the Internet.' Service providers are bound by rules of confidentiality not to divulge the names of their clients. It remains to be seen whether the new Information Minister will try to take on the Internet.

As yet, the regime has confined itself to setting up homepages, hoping to counteract the highly damaging material circulating on the Internet. The latest one to try this on is the East Timor governor, Abilio Osorio Soares. He told the press that the aim of his administration's homepage would be to contradict reports circulating on the Internet that 'corner' the Indonesian government. The focus would be on disseminating information about economic development in East Timor, so as to discredit all the 'negative issues' spread on the Internet. [*Kompas*, 19 July] \*

### CONTINUED FROM PAGE 8

**Guardian Royal Exchange, Paterson Zochonis, Siebe, Simon Engineering, and ZENECA**, the chemical and pharmaceutical manufacturer, each own at least two Indonesian companies.

**Thames Water, National Power, and Rolls Royce** have major investments in projects in the country's utility sector, and **National Grid** has plans for investment in electricity transmission.

Other UK companies operating in Indonesia include the manufacturers **Dewhirst** (clothing) and **Peter Black** (footwear), **BICC** and **BOC**, the retailers **Marks & Spencer** and **Next**, the construction company **AMEC**, and

### Burmah Castrol (LNG transportation).

A number of other UK companies, mostly from the financial sector, have invested in projects or companies in Indonesia in recent years. These include: **National Westminster, National Power, Fleming Enterprise Investment Trust, Export Credit Guarantee, Norwich Union, Commercial Union, and Provincial Insurance.**

Detailed information and analysis on all these investments will be included in a report on British investments in Indonesia to be published by TAPOL shortly. \*

# News from the Labour front

*In Geneva, Indonesia came under fire at the ILO session not only because of the lack of workers rights but also because of the jailing of Mochtar Pakpahan. The draft Law on Manpower has been strongly criticised at home and abroad. In the meantime, strikes continue to hit the industrial belt of Java. Bus strikes in Jakarta and Bogor paralysed life in the cities for several days.*

The ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions) annual report to the ILO conference in Geneva in June pointed to China, Indonesia and Colombia as the worst offenders of workers' rights. The ICFTU is the largest international labour federation, linking 124 million workers in 195 unions in 137 countries. The report strikes hard at globalisation as a highly damaging assault on workers' rights around the world, as employers strive to exploit free markets and economic globalisation to push up profits. Many Asian governments, said the ICFTU, regard trade unions 'as alien institutions bent on frustrating economic progress'.

## International concern about Pakpahan

Mochtar Pakpahan's imprisonment was also raised at the ILO conference. Governments of the Nordic countries strongly criticised Indonesia for its treatment of the chair of SBSI (still unrecognised by the government). Mochtar Pakpahan has been hospitalised since March this year suffering from a number of ailments. Several organisations abroad have offered to provide medical treatment abroad for Mochtar.

Among the many foreign guests to visit Pakpahan in hospital were John Shattuck, the US Assistant Secretary of State and trade union leaders Klaus Zwickel from IG Metall in Germany and Marcello Malentacchi, President of the International Metalworkers' Federation. On 22 July Mochtar Pakpahan was told that the government has turned down his request to be allowed to go abroad for treatment.

## Campaign against the Manpower Bill

The Indonesian parliament is at present discussing a Manpower Bill drafted by the government. It is virtually unheard of for Parliament to reject a government bill. The draft gives government extensive control over every aspect of industrial relations, unlimited power to intervene in labour disputes and direct control over trade union activities on the shop floor. According to trade unions and labour activists in Indonesia, the new law will severely curtail the scope for organised workers' activities and reduce their collective bargaining powers.

The new law will replace or amend existing ordinances and laws which give more protection to the workers. Labour analysts argue that the aim of the new law is to transform labour conditions so as to conform with globalisation where labour standards need to be driven down in order to attract new investments. The new bill will impose severe restrictions on the right to organise and freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively and the right to

strike. Several Indonesian NGOs have condemned the draft bill as being fundamentally flawed.

A coalition of Indonesian NGOs and genuine workers' organisations have launched a campaign against the bill. About a million workers have signed a petition calling on the government to drastically revise the bill before it becomes law.



*Pakpahan  
in Canada*

An international campaign has also been launched to support the campaign. In the first instance, the campaign will involve collecting the names of trade unions, labour support groups, human rights organisations, NGOs and other concerned organisations to petition the Indonesian Government and/or Parliament. The solidarity action is coordinated by APEC Labour Rights Monitor (ALARM), email: [alarm@hk.super.net](mailto:alarm@hk.super.net) or Asia Monitor Resource Centre (AMRC), fax in Hong Kong (852) 2385 5319 or to the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), address: Jl. Diponegoro 74, Jakarta 10320, email: [ylbhi@indo.net.id](mailto:ylbhi@indo.net.id) or fax: (62 21) 330140.

## Thousands stranded

A strike by bus drivers in Jakarta and Bogor in June continued for two weeks, causing widespread chaos. It started with a strike by mikrolets (a kind of minivan) drivers; these vehicles ply the busy route from Kebayoran Lama to Tanah Abang. The strike quickly spread, hitting



# LABOUR

Pasar Minggu, Kampung Melayu, Pulo Gadung and Tangerang, and spread to other cities in West Java including Bogor, Bandung, Sukabumi, Cianjur, Serang, Krawang and Majalengka, highlighting the gravity of the situation. The strike crippled large parts of Jakarta and thousands of people had to walk long distances to reach their destination.

Public transport in Indonesia is mostly privately-owned. As a result, there are plenty of buses available, with a wide variety of vehicles. The dark side is that competition is fierce and, although in theory city governments regulate the routes by issuing licenses to bus companies, things work out differently in practice.



*Bus drivers  
on strike*

The more prosperous bus companies bribe officials to get licenses for profitable routes or to have new routes designed for them. Then what happens is that officials tend to demand unofficial levies from the bus drivers on these specially-created routes.

For the bus drivers, who have to hand out large sums of money to their bus company by the end of a shift, things have become extremely tough. As competition has intensified and traffic jams worsened, drivers have been forced to work longer hours. The granting of new licenses was the spark for the two-week strike which grew very tense when striking bus drivers prevented other drivers from picking up passengers. Then the Jakarta Metropolitan Police utilised covered police trucks to pick up stranded passengers and drive them to their destinations.

After the drivers went back to work, the government promised to improve things. Minivans will get clear numbers for designated routes and licenses will be tightened up. For the time being, the dispute is over.

## Wave of strikes

Each time the government announces the new minimum wage, known as *UMR*, strike are bound to follow because employers tend to be very slow in paying the new wages. In April the government announced the new adjusted *UMR*, an average increase of 10.07 per cent. By mid April a wave of strikes had started to erupt all over the industrial belts of Jakarta and Surabaya, the two main cities in Java. The present *UMR* for Jakarta is Rp 5,700 (US\$ 2.28) a day, which is adequate for little more than subsistence living.

Besides delaying the wage increases, companies often cheat the workers by charging excessive fees for facilities provided by the company. The lack of genuine workers' representation tends to exacerbate conflicts, while many companies avoid revealing company policy to the workers.

On 28 April, 6,200 workers in six factories in the Jakarta industrial area went out on strike to demand payment of the *UMR*. At **PT Southern Cross Textile Industry** in East Jakarta, 1,500 workers walked out, while in Tangerang, workers at three companies, the shoe factory **PT Grand Kupa**, the garment factory **PT Frans Brother Sejati** and the textile factory **PT Galzar Knitting Garment** all downed tools. Workers at two companies in Bekasi, the shoe factory **PT Surya Achilles** and the textile company **PT Hanin Nusa Mulya**, joined the strike.

## Barbie doll workers on strike

In June and July two strikes occurred at PT Matel, the Barbie doll maker, on the question of secondary working conditions. On 1 June, the work force of 7,200 people downed tools because the company had started to charge for housing the workers. Some fifty per cent of the workers live in the company barracks. As the strike began to bite, the company agreed to comply with the demands in the following month. But on 7 July, the workers went out on strike again because the company had violated the agreement reached. Instead of not charging for accommodation in the barracks, the company had increased the rent. This time, the strike lasted for two days. The workers demanded more clarity about other secondary demands like annual holidays, health insurance and monthly menstruation leave.

## Nike workers just do it

The strike at PT HASI was widely reported in the press. HASI, the largest producer of footwear for Nike, has a work force of 13,000, mostly women. They stopped work for four days.

There were a number of grievances. The management had started paying the minimum wage, but claimed that this would include overtime pay. The workers were also opposed to an agreement between suspect workers' representatives and the management. In this dispute, the workers were represented by the regional branch of SPSI, the official trade union, mostly run by GOLKAR stalwarts. Another bone of contention was that attendance bonuses had been omitted in the new wage deal. The owner and director of PT HASI is Mrs Siti Hartati Murdaya, a Jakarta celebrity who is famed for her philanthropic gestures. She is also one of the top Buddhist leaders in the country.

On 22 April the strike started with a 10km march of 13,000 workers from the factory to the Tangerang regional assembly, disrupting traffic in Tangerang for the whole day. The workers carried banners saying: 'We demand our rights' and 'We want a decent living'. Hundreds of security officers were present and were joined at a later stage by anti-riot squads.

Two days later, a deal was struck between the management and the workers in the presence of Tangerang MPs and a representative of the Manpower Department. When it became apparent the next day that the company had violated the agreement, a second, more destructive strike broke out. In their anger, the workers smashed all the windows of the company and destroyed several company cars. A car owned by the head of the regional Manpower Department was also vandalised.

Now, everything is back to normal and most of the demands have been met. But the intolerably low minimum wage of US\$2.28 a day continues to make it impossible for Indonesian workers to earn a decent living. \*

# Human rights abuses hit a new low

*Since the beginning of June, the human rights situation in East Timor has hit a new low. There has been a major crackdown in retaliation for the operations launched by the armed resistance at the time of the unlawful general elections held in East Timor on 29 May. The territory is closed to independent observers and journalists, allowing the forces of occupation to function with impunity. The need for on-site UN monitoring is more pressing than ever.*

The crackdown began in early June, immediately after the armed resistance, FALINTIL, launched a series of operations against army and police units in protest at the holding of elections in their illegally occupied territory. [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 141, July 1997] The operations targeted the army and the police force; more than fifty members of the security forces, mostly from the special police unit, BRIMOB, were killed. Many polling booths were also attacked.



The military commander and the police chief were both sacked and replaced within days. The new military commander, Colonel Slamet Sidabutar, was handpicked for the job by Major-General Prabowo Subianto. He was commander of Group II of Prabowo's elite commando regiment, Kopassus. Sidabutar immediately launched a new offensive called *Operasi Tuntas*, (meaning 'finish them off'), hoping to put an end once and for all to armed and unarmed resistance in East Timor. Contacts in East Timor say that the shadowy figure behind all operations in East Timor is Prabowo himself.

## Clandestine members targeted

In retaliation for the events in late May, young people suspected of being part of the clandestine front were targeted. As reported elsewhere in this *Bulletin*, the security forces also succeeded in capturing guerrilla leader, David Alex in Caibada, Baucau district.

It is extremely difficult to keep track of the numerous arrests although contacts inside have done their best, despite the risks, to send out reports of round-ups and supply the names of people known to have been taken into custody.

Baucau, where the military headquarters are based, appears to have taken the brunt of the crackdown. Reports from contacts in the area spoke of 85 people having been rounded up between 5 and 16 June. Detainees were taken to interrogation centres run by SGI, the intelligence unit of

Kopassus, the force which takes the lead in clampdowns in East Timor. Some may also have been held by the local police. Sources say that torture was used against the detainees as a matter of course, in an attempt to extract confessions about links with the armed resistance.

On 17 and 18 June, five more people in Baucau were arrested. On the night of 18 June, according to the same source, members of the armed forces fired shots into the air, forcing people to leave their homes. Shots were then fired at people out on the streets, in the vicinity of Baucau airport. Some people are believed to have been hit though no one was able to identify anyone as the casualties were immediately removed by the security forces.

There have also been numerous arrests in Dili, the capital and in Liquica, to the west of Dili. Vasca da Gama and eleven others were arrested on 16 June for alleged involvement in several attacks in the capital in late May. Ten people were rounded up in Liquica and detained in military installations on suspicion of having links with FALINTIL. As for the people arrested in Dili, the sources say they were held overnight and released after being very badly beaten. People in the capital seldom venture out of their homes after 6pm for fear of being picked up and questioned by the numerous Indonesian troops and plainclothes intelligence officers patrolling the streets in cars and on motorcycles.

Several weeks later, news was received of the arrest of fourteen people in Quelicai sub-district, the district of Baucau. Soon after being arrested, the fourteen reportedly disappeared.

A message which reached TAPOL in early July from a reliable source described the situation starkly:

*News received by phone from Baucau says that the region is completely like hell. People are living in great fear of military brutality. There are non-stop arrests at night and many people disappear. It is feared that some may have been killed.*

*Last Saturday (28 June), one person was killed in front of Baucau cathedral. Following the killing, the street was covered in blood.*

*The military have launched a major offensive against civilians in Baguia, Quelicai (in a village called Makalaku), in the district of Baucau (the villages of Kaibada, Buruma, Tirilolo, Bahu, Wailili and Gariuai) and in Vemasse.*

*According to the Diocesan Peace and Justice Commission, some two hundred people have been arrested - some of whom have been recorded as missing.*



## EAST TIMOR

A number of ABRI units are involved in the current wave of arrests. Kopassus troops are very much to the fore; they usually take their captives to an SGI interrogation centre in Colmera, Dili or to the notorious 'red house' in Baucau. Out on operations, Kopassus troops often wear black jumpsuits. Some arrests have been carried out by a so-called Team Saka which is believed to be a para-military force composed of mainly East Timorese recruits. Others carrying out arrests are men from infantry battalions brought in for eight-month tours of duty from various parts of Indonesia. Battalion 312 from West Java, probably part of the army's strategy command, KOSTRAD, is frequently mentioned as the arresting agent. The police also take their share of the work; detainees are likely to be transferred to police commands after having gone through brutal maltreatment at the hands of Kopassus troops.

East Timorese civilians also have to contend with the Garda Paksi (Upholders of Integration) composed of East Timorese whose special task seems to be to infiltrate the clandestine front and provoke intra-Timorese fights. This force is the brain-child of Prabowo and receives para military training in Java from Kopassus troops. East Timorese society is also riddled with spies known as 'bufo'. Bishop Belo recently described East Timor as a place where 'one half of society is paid to spy on the other half'.

The number of troops currently deployed in East Timor could be as high as 20,000. Dr Peter Carey of Oxford University, who visited East Timor in April 1997, was told that in the district of Ermera which is located some 35 kms south-west of Dili, no fewer than five new battalions of roughly 700 men each had recently been deployed. This is where Konis Santana, commander of FALINTIL was thought to be operating at the time.

### Nelson Mandela meets Xanana Gusmao

Nelson Mandela, President of South Africa, spent an evening with Xanana Gusmao, leader of the East Timorese resistance movement, during his State visit to Indonesia in July. The two men had dinner together at the State Guest House where the South African President was staying. Xanana Gusmao was fetched from Cipinang Prison where he is serving a 20-year sentence and escorted to the venue.

During this historic meeting which took place on 15 July, Nelson Mandela spoke at length about his own experiences. A statement issued a week later by his presidential office in Johannesburg said that President Mandela had requested the meeting in an expression of his desire to help the human rights situation in East Timor and to help achieve a peaceful solution to the question of East Timor. The meeting took place with the consent of President Suharto.

Lopes da Cruz, Indonesia's special ambassador for East Timor affairs, was also present at the meeting which lasted nearly two hours.

### Xanana welcomes UN endeavours

In an interview broadcast by Radio Renascenca on 18 July, Xanana Gusmao called on the UN to play a more active role in resolving the question of East Timor. He said he was encouraged by the greater commitment to the question of the present UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.

'The steps he has taken so far are more encouraging than in previous years.'

Commenting on the European Union, the East Timorese leader said: 'As long as the EU continues to be generously understanding towards Jakarta and the ASEAN countries so that it doesn't lose its markets in Southeast Asia, we'll keep waiting for more to be done.'

Asked if the situation in East Timor had changed since Bishop Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1996, he said: 'Apart from the euphoria, basically nothing has changed.'

The interview was smuggled out of Cipinang Prison.

### The need for on-site UN monitoring

East Timor is now closed to independent observers and foreign journalists. The International Red Cross (ICRC) has an office in Dili which functions under strict rules of neutrality and has limited access to places of detention. The Indonesian National Human Rights Commission has an office in Dili but is not trusted by the East Timorese. Since the office is situated opposite a military command, people are hardly likely to visit it anyway.

The only satisfactory solution is on-site UN monitoring, through the establishment of a UN office in Dili. This would also protect the population from constant abuses by the security forces. Jakarta has steadfastly opposed any UN presence in East Timor, alleging that this would undermine its claim to sovereignty over the territory. But Foreign Minister Ali Alatas even pulled out of negotiations with the former UN Commissioner for Human Rights for a UN official in Jakarta to have a monitoring mandate in Dili. Clearly, Indonesia will only accept the need for outside monitoring of human rights if the international community shows the political will to exert pressure on Jakarta as a matter of the utmost urgency. \*

#### *We urge readers and supporters to write to:*

1. *Mary Robinson, UN Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Human Rights Centre, Palais des Nations, C-1211 Geneva, Switzerland.*

*Readers in the UK should also write to:*

2. *Rt Hon. Robin Cook MP, Foreign Secretary, FCO, Downing Street, London SW1A 2AL.*
3. *Your MP, asking her/him to press Robin Cook on this. Letters to MPs should be sent to: House of Commons, London SW1A 0AA.*

*Call for a UN human rights office to be set up in East Timor. Urge the Foreign Secretary, in line with his proclaimed ethical foreign policy, to press his European Union partners to bring pressure to bear on the Indonesian Government to agree to on-site UN monitoring in East Timor.*

*In the interim, stress the need for UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Nigel Rodley to visit East Timor as a matter of urgency, as required by the resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission in April this year.*

*The people of East Timor, now facing unprecedented repression at the hands of the forces of occupation, urgently need your help and support.* \*

## Guerrilla leader put to death

*On 25 June, Indonesian troops captured David Alex, one of East Timor's most fearless guerrillas. Within 24 hours, the military announced that he was dead and had been buried. The circumstances of his death are shrouded in mystery.*

David Alex was captured along with four others, only three of whom have been identified by name: Jose Antonio Belo, Manuel Loke Matan and Gil. The military claim that David Alex was wounded in a shoot-out and subsequently died from loss of blood while being transported by helicopter from Baucau to Dili. However few people believe this explanation. A nurse at the military hospital in Dili where he was taken has reportedly confirmed that he was still alive and in a stable condition when he arrived but was dead the next morning. The four others are known to have been taken to the much-feared interrogation centre of the elite forces, Kopassus, in Baucau, where they are certain to have undergone severe torture.

A number of human rights organisations, including TAPOL and Amnesty International, have called for an independent investigation into David Alex's death, which should also include exhumation and an autopsy.

### Family under pressure

Acting with unprecedented haste, the military alleged that David Alex was buried at 8.30am on 26 June at the Santa Ana cemetery, Dili. However, relatives in Dili, including his 15-year old son, were not told about the burial or given access to the body for purposes of identification. In a letter to Colonel Slamet Sidabutar, the military commander in Dili, four relatives demanded an explanation. 'We believe David Alex is still alive. If he died, why don't we get his body? We were not even invited to his funeral,' they wrote. They demanded proof that he was dead and if so, asked for his body to be returned to the family. [*Jakarta Post*, 4 July]

The day after this letter was made public, the signatories were summoned to military headquarters where they were apparently shown photographs of David Alex taken by the military after his capture. A cousin of the guerrilla leader, Manuel Mira Freitas, thereupon expressed his 'satisfaction'; the question of gaining access to the body was no longer mentioned. The International Red Cross, which initially supported the family's efforts to gain access to the body, now said that it regarded the matter as 'closed'. This sudden turn-about can only mean that the family was warned to desist.

By being so secretive about the guerrilla leader's death, the military have only confirmed the widely-held belief that he was deliberately put to death during a torture session or by poisoning with an injection at the hospital in Dili.

### A much-feared guerrilla leader

At the time of his death, David Alex was second in command of FALINTIL, the armed forces. His name was

linked to a number of spectacular operations staged by the armed resistance around the time the forces of occupation unlawfully held general elections in East Timor on 29 May this year. These included an attack on a truckload of Brimob police as they were returning from patrols the day before the election, when seventeen police officers died, and an attack on a police command in Dili. [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 141, July 1997]



David Alex, who was in his late forties, had fought with the guerrillas for twenty-two years. Soon after Portuguese fascism was overthrown, opening up new prospects for East Timor, he joined FRETILIN and became a member of its armed wing, FALINTIL. He was born David Alex da Costa of a noble Timorese family in the hamlet of Sae-lari, near the town of Baucau. Until the time of the brief civil war in August 1975, he worked at the Department of Finance in the Portuguese colonial administration. Like most Timorese men, he served two years as a conscript in the Portuguese colonial army. When Indonesian troops carried out incursions from West Timor in late 1975, he was in the front-line of the fighting.

After the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, he withdrew to the interior and returned to his native region near Baucau in the east of the country. Following the serious reverses suffered by the resistance, culminating in the killing of FRETILIN president, Nicolau Lobato at the end of 1978, David Alex joined forces with Xanana Gusmao to reorganise the shattered resistance. In secret Indonesian military documents captured in 1982, David Alex was re-



ferred to as commander of Company II Red Brigade in the region on Nafatin.

David Alex is acknowledged as being one of the most tenacious and fearless of the FALINTIL commanders, frequently launching ambushes of Indonesian units to capture weapons and other supplies. In August 1996, a British film-maker, Dom Rotheroe, stayed with David Alex and the guerrillas under his command for two weeks and went out on an operation on 20 August, the anniversary of the

birth of the guerrilla army in 1975. Rotheroe's footage which has since been shown on Portuguese TV documents an ambush during which two Indonesian soldiers were killed. The film provides graphic evidence of the presence and threat posed to the forces of occupation by East Timor's armed resistance, which the military always dismiss as an insignificant force of a few dozen men.

His capture and presumed death came as a shock to Timorese at home and abroad, but no one doubts that others, inspired by his example, will take his place at the helm of the resistance. \*

# New light on 'Balibo' declaration

*The 21st anniversary of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor was not a happy time for Jakarta in its quest to convince the world of the legitimacy of its claim to East Timor. The claim is based on the November 1975 'Balibo' Declaration signed by representatives of four parties, asking Indonesia to integrate their country. Now an Indonesian involved in the event has spoken publicly for the first time of the secret role of Ali Murtopo's intelligence agency, OPSUS.*

The 'Balibo' Declaration (named after a village close to the border with West Timor) was signed on 30 November 1975, two days after FRETILIN proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor. It has been established that the Declaration was signed in Bali, not Balibo. Moreover, two of the four signatories, UDT leader Joao Carrascalao, now living in Sydney, and Guilherme Maria Goncalves of the pro-integration party, APODETI, who is living in Jakarta, have dissociated themselves from the Declaration. Goncalves spoke out when he was attending the first All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue meeting in Austria in 1995. He declared that the document had been drafted by the Indonesians and the signatories were given no option but to sign. In retaliation for this courageous statement, Goncalves was prevented by the Indonesian authorities from attending the second Intra-East Timor Dialogue held a year later.

## OPSUS agent brags of his role

The man who spilled the beans about Jakarta's intelligence operation is Sugianto who was an operative for OPSUS, the intelligence outfit run by the late General Ali Murtopo. This was the group that conducted Operation Comodo to destabilise East Timor politically in the hope that this would hand Portuguese Timor over to Jakarta without the need for an invasion. In the months preceding the invasion, Sugianto was based in Kupang, in West Timor, dispatching Indonesian agents to what was then Portuguese Timor for purposes of infiltration and destabilisation.

Sugianto has remained in the shadows since Operation Comodo gave way to Operation Seroja, the military operation, which climaxed with the invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975 and the brutal war waged from 1975 - 1979. Like any agent who doesn't want his role in the affair to be forgotten, Sugianto now boasts, in an interview with *Kompas*, of how he drafted and typed the Declaration. After the Indonesian invasion, he took the signatories to New

York in an unsuccessful bid to foil efforts by Jose Ramos-Horta of FRETILIN, and the Portuguese Government, to press the UN Security Council to condemn the invasion and call for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops.

Sugianto says that his chief collaborator in the affair was Jose Martins, who died in suspicious circumstances during a visit to East Timor in August last year. Sugianto freely acknowledges that the only parties with roots in East Timor at the time were the pro-independence FRETILIN, the UDT which favoured association with Portugal, and APODETI, which favoured integration with Indonesia. Martins was the OPSUS agent who collaborated with Sugianto in drafting the 'Balibo' Declaration. Martins signed the Declaration on behalf of a party called KOTA but as Sugianto's explains, KOTA 'was in fact a new element in the integration process', acknowledging that this was a fictive party created simply as a platform for Martins to be a signatory of the 'Balibo' Declaration. APODETI was strongly pro-Indonesian but OPSUS apparently needed more than just two parties to make it appear as though the Declaration was truly representative of the East Timorese.

Unlike the other signatories, Martins did not return to East Timor from New York but spent the next twenty years in Portugal, during which time, Sugianto reveals, Martins continued to be on the payroll of Indonesian intelligence. [*Kompas*, 19 July]


Martins later became a familiar figure, travelling the world, trying to discredit Jose Ramos-Horta wherever he spoke in public.

## Balibo claims 'unrealistic'

While the authorities in East Timor were celebrating 'integration day' on 17 July, with General Wiranto, newly-appointed army chief-of-staff General Wiranto in attendance, a scholar at LIPI, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences piled on the agony for Jakarta by declaring that, after

**CONTINUED ON PAGE 6**

**The Open Cage: The Ordeal of the Irian Jaya Hostages**, by Daniel Start, published by Harper Collins. 336 pages with illustrations. Price: £16.99.



The four-month hostage crisis in West Papua in 1996 was an event that absorbed my attention for months and confronted me with a great dilemma. I have supported the righteous struggle of the OPM ever since I first understood the injustice of Indonesia's annexation of West Papua. I could understand why OPM guerrillas were desperate to seek the international attention that has eluded them ever since their country was seized nearly thirty-five years ago. But did this justify hostage-taking, which means turning innocent bystanders into victims of a struggle which lies beyond their control?

For four difficult months, I monitored Indonesian press reports of events on the ground and stayed in contact with officials at the Foreign Office to exchange news and ideas about how the crisis might be resolved. I wrote to Kelly Kwalik, the OPM commander, appealing to him to release the hostages, assuring him that their action had already drawn sympathetic international attention to their cause. I discussed the crisis on a number of occasions with Labour MP, Ann Clwyd who came up with many ideas about how she might help, even offering to go to Mapnduma herself to give international publicity to the hostages' release.

I savoured the intense feeling of relief when release finally came on 15 May, together with the sense of horror that two Indonesian hostages had been hacked to death just as their colleagues were fleeing to freedom. I also profoundly regretted that Kwalik had spurned the opportunity of releasing the hostages into the hands of the International

Red Cross, giving a huge propaganda victory to Major-General Prabowo and his Kopassus troops. For all these reasons, I read Daniel Start's book with a passionate interest, feeling a personal involvement as the events unfolded.

*The Open Cage* is a remarkably vivid and beautifully-written account by one of the four British hostages. It was Daniel Start, a Cambridge University biology graduate, who gathered together a team of newly-graduated scientists to spend ten weeks in the Lorentz National Park in West Papua, to collect data about the flora and fauna, focusing on ways in which the local people protected their natural habitat. Feeling that this should not be an ex-pat affair, he made a point of persuading members of the Biological Sciences Club in Jakarta to join their expedition.

Scientific preparations for the expedition were thoroughgoing and the team won encouragement and financial backing from several prestigious British institutions. But little did they realise that the political situation in and around Timika where the massive Freeport/RTZ copper-and-gold mine is based was explosive because of numerous protests in 1994 and 1995, resulting in a new wave of atrocities by the Indonesian army. The advice they received from the British embassy in Jakarta was that the Lorentz National Park was far enough away from Freeport to be of little concern to them and anyway, 'the OPM were too few in number and too disorganised to be a threat'. No one told them that the main cause of all the protests was that Freeport's concession had been massively increased in 1991 from 11,000 hectares to more than two million hectares, spreading alarm among many tribal people who until then had been unaffected by the destruction wrought by the mining company.

Nor did their Indonesian colleagues seem to know anything about the region, having undertaken no scientific research there. Given the distortions and lack of coverage in the Indonesian press about the political turmoil in West Papua, they could perhaps be forgiven for understanding even less than the British embassy staff about the dangers involved.

The team was located in Mapnduma, where the Nduga people live and the OPM guerrillas who took them hostage were also Ndugas. They were part of an OPM command structure led by Kelly Kwalik, himself an Amungme, a tribe whose sacred land had been stolen by Freeport and whose very existence had been devastated by the company. Four close relatives of Kwalik had been killed by the army in 1994. Little wonder then that a group of foreigners (two Dutch and one German were also taken hostage) offered the OPM a golden opportunity to bring pressure to bear on three western governments to support their demand for a Free West Papua.

Start vividly describes how the hostages managed to cope with the trials and tribulations of arduous treks through the jungle and the frequent lack of food. The relations with many of the hostage-takers was cordial, even close. He is generous in his praise for villagers who went out of their way to share their food, and gives a moving account of how he and his colleagues helped each other throughout the ordeal. Most remarkable is the fact that Martha Klein, the Dutch hostage who was three months pregnant at the start, came through it all with her unborn child unscathed.

CONTINUED ON PAGE 10



## Yet more victims of the political witch-hunt

### Priest and his brother to go on trial

Father Ignatius Sandyawan Sumardi, a priest well known for his social work in support of the poor in Jakarta, is to go on trial, together with his brother, Benny Sumardi, for harbouring three members of the People's Democracy Party, the PRD last August. While monitoring the victims of the 27 July attack on the head office of the Indonesian Democracy Party, the PDI, Father Sandy was contacted by three people who feared for their lives, after the Jakarta military commander had issued a shoot-on-sight order to his troops. He arranged for them to go to his brother's home in Bekasi, where they were arrested three days later.

Father Sandy will argue in court that he took the decision to harbour the men on moral and humanitarian grounds. He has since been awarded the Yap Thiam Hien Human Rights Award, the country's most prestigious award, named after Indonesia's foremost human rights lawyer.

### MP sentenced for insulting President

Aberson Sihalohe, 58, a member of the Indonesian Parliament from the Megawati wing of the PDI, has been sentenced to nine months after being found guilty of 'publicly insulting the head of state and other governmental institutions such as the armed forces and Parliament'. The charges arose from a speech he allegedly made at the free-speech forum held at the PDI head office during July. He is alleged to have said, among other things, that under the Suharto regime, 'we have been robbed of our freedom'. The prosecution had asked for 18 months.

The verdict was announced in a court-room packed with Megawati supporters, including Megawati herself. The court-house was surrounded by scores of riot police and armoured vehicles.

### Politician and assistant face charges

Subadio Sastrosatomo, 78, who co-founded the Indonesian socialist party, the PSI, in 1945, faces charges because

of a 22-page book he published criticising many aspects of the New Order government since 1965. The book is entitled: *New Era, New Leader: Badio rejects Manipulations by the New Order Regime*. Unlike Subadio who has not been arrested, his private secretary, Buyung Rachmat Buchori Nasution, who made arrangements for the book to be printed, is in the custody of the Jakarta police force and is likely to go on trial on 5 August. Under Article 134, he faces a maximum sentence of sixteen months while under a subsidiary charge of 'insulting the president' he faces up to six years in prison. Subadio himself was last questioned by police in early May.

The book was banned by the Attorney-General on 4 March.

### Two journalists released

Two journalists, Ahmad Taufik and Eko Maryadi, were released on parole from two remote prisons in West Java on 19 July after serving more than two years of a three-year sentence. They were convicted for publishing unlicensed publications and writing articles about the presidential succession and the wealth of the Suharto family. \*

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