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TAPOL Bulletin No. 140

April 1997

# More atrocities in East Timor

23 March 1997 will go down as yet another date to be commemorated because of an atrocity in East Timor. Scores were injured, many seriously, and four are reported to have died in and around Hotel Mahkota in the capital Dili. Earlier, the Pope called for 'a prompt and internationally acceptable solution to the question of East Timor'.

Between 300 and 500 East Timorese youths and students took to the streets early on 23 March, to make their way to Hotel Mahkota, hoping to meet Mr Jamsheed Marker, a Pakistani diplomat who was appointed earlier this year as the Special Representative of the new UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Marker was on a visit to East Timor to gather information in preparation for the post-poned meeting of the foreign ministers of Portugal and Indonesia, under UN auspices.

While in Dili, Marker met several civil and military officials as well as Bishop Belo but a meeting at the University of East Timor did not take place. Disappointed, the students, who had prepared hundreds of pages of documents to hand over to Marker, decided to go to his hotel the next day.

They managed to enter the hotel but no sooner had they entered and asked at the reception to meet the UN envoy than armed security forces began to stab and beat the peaceful demonstrators. Shots were fired and tear-gas canisters thrown. Once the youths were inside, the doors were locked, preventing them from leaving. The security forces were intent on trapping them inside and creating mayhem. A woman named Dirce fell in the hotel lobby when tear gas was used and was subjected to sexual harassment as she lay on the floor. Two women, Olga Quintao Amaral and Celina Pires da Costa who were among those arrested and taken to a detention centre were stripped naked there.

Of the scores injured, eighteen had gunshot wounds. Others were injured by stabbing or by broken glass as they tried to make an exit through the windows.

Meanwhile, troops surrounded the hotel outside where many more young people had gathered. Scores who managed to escape from the hotel, covered in blood, took refuge in nearby buildings, in Motael Church or in the clinic next door. Troops also gave chase. The streets of Dili were deserted for the rest of the day except for troops on patrol.

A list of the victims compiled three days later names 18 people wounded by gunshot, 34 less seriously wounded and 90 people reported missing.

#### UN envoy expresses concern

As these events were unfolding on a lower floor and outside the hotel, Jamsheed Marker remained in his room. In any case, the violent onslaught in the hotel made dialogue with the students out of the question.

On the next day, speaking to journalists before his departure from Dili, Jamsheed Marker said that he deeply

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regretted the incident. 'I was very sorry for what happened. I asked the local police to settle the matter as soon as possible. In fact I learned in the morning that an incident would happen because they (the students) informed me. I saw it by myself. I deeply regret the incident and would like to express my sympathy with the victims.' [Radio Republik Indonesia, Indonesian state radio, 24 March]

#### Charged for 'showing hatred'

Although the number of people arrested is known to have been around one hundred, the police only acknowledged that they had arrested 48 of whom half were soon released. Twenty-four are to be charged with 'showing hatred' for the Indonesian government. Scores of East Timorese have been charged and tried in the past few months following a series of incidents going back to Christmas Eve, when Bishop Belo returned home after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo.

#### Timorese students in Java meet UN envoy

After the failed attempt to meet the UN envoy in Dili, East Timorese students in Java decided to take things into their own hands and meet him in Jakarta. On 25 March, 33 students forced their way into the Austrian embassy and announced that they would remain there until UN envoy Jamsheed Marker agreed to meet them. They made it clear they were not seeking asylum and did not want to leave the country.



Jamsheed Marker, the UN Special Envoy on East Timor meeting President Suharto.

They made public a letter to the UN envoy. Significantly the letter is signed by the leaders of the Yogyakarta, Solo, Malang, Salatiga, Surabaya and Jember branches of the government-recognised organisation of East Timorese students, *IMPETTU*. It was a bold move indeed for people regarded by the authorities as 'reliable', to go record like this.

The letter expresses frustration at Indonesia's inflexible attitude which has prevented UN-sponsored talks from solving the question of East Timor. It condemns the armed

forces 'for the genocide, terror and intimidation in East Timor which is still going on until today'. After calling for the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East Timor, it urges the UN Secretary-General to devise a new format for the UN-sponsored talks on East Timor, enabling the participation of the leaders of the East Timorese resistance. It calls for the release of Xanana Gusmao and all East Timorese political prisoners and condemns the ruthless assault by the Indonesian army against demonstrators in Dili on 23 March.

The UN envoy agreed to meet three of the men and received their letter as well as a number of documents. The meeting was arranged by the Austrian ambassador, Johann Demel.

Before leaving the embassy on 27 March, Austrian diplomats obtained assurances from the Indonesian authorities that they would come to no harm. However as they left the embassy, there was a police van waiting for them. The police said their names would be checked and they would be held for questioning 'for a few hours'. As we go to press, their precise whereabouts are not known.

#### Envoy meets Xanana Gusmao

Before leaving Jakarta, the UN envoy held a meeting with jailed East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao. The meeting took place somewhere in Jakarta, outside the prison where Xanana is being held. Marker would not reveal the contents of their discussion but later told a press conference that he hoped to come forward with a proposal which will give impetus to the ongoing dialogue. (The UN-sponsored talks planned for last December were postponed when Kofi Annan was appointed to take over as UN Secretary General.) Marker stressed that his purpose in visiting Indonesia and East Timor was to move towards a political solution. 'We don't intend to waste any time on this. It's just a matter of structuring the meetings,' he said, adding: 'We shall start the process fairly quickly.' [Reuter, 27 March]

Earlier however, the UN envoy had been told by President Suharto that 'East Timor's status as Indonesia's 27th province is non-negotiable'. This drew a comment from Nobel laureate Jose Ramos-Horta, East Timor resistance leader abroad, that 'nothing else could be expected from the dictator in Jakarta.... This confirms my lack of optimism about any change being possible with Suharto in power'. [RDP Radio, Lisbon, 20 March]

#### Bishop Belo: Abuses continue to worsen

Speaking to a Portuguese radio station during Jamsheed Marker's visit to Dili, Nobel laureate, Bishop Ximenes Belo said that Indonesia had given no signs of easing up on oppression. While stressing that the Nobel awards had brought the problem into focus internationally, 'there have never been so many arrests as at present'. In response to the wave of euphoria over the Nobel awards, the reaction from the military was to seek 'to counterbalance the joyfulness by stepping up the actions of the pro-government militias, the gardapaksi ('upholders of integration') who during the night roam the villages and search houses looking for young people connected with the underground network, as they call it, to arrest and intimidate them.... There have never been so many arrests as in the last week of December and then throughout January, especially here in Dili. But early in February was the worst of all.' [Radio Renasenca. 22 March]

Meanwhile, the East Timor Human Rights Centre in Melbourne, in a report on the human rights situation during 1996, said that during the 12-month period, there had been '24 suspected extra-judicial executions, most of which have not been investigated by the Indonesian authorities, and numerous reports of "disappearances". 'Almost every month in 1996, there was armed contact resulting in death and injury throughout the territory.'

The Centre, whose chairman is Bishop Hilton Deakin, said: '1996 saw a high level of arbitrary arrests, with up to 381 East Timorese people being arrested. Reports have continued that detainees are systematically subjected to torture and ill-treatment, and sentenced at trials which are unfair.' [AAP, 14 March]

For the first time, the inhabitants of Ambeno, also

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known as Oecussi, the enclave situated on the north coast of West Timor, have risen up in protest. The incident occurred on 22 February and was sparked off when a priest attending a halal bihalal gathering to mark the end of the Muslim Ramadhan fasting month was handed a box containing leftovers. Seeing this, an East Timorese standing nearby spread the news of this insult which led to hundreds going out onto the streets and attacking the commercial sector which is controlled by migrants from Indonesia. The unrest in Pante Makasar, capital of Ambeno, continued for two days during which as many as six thousand Timorese attacked and burnt houses of migrants.

# Konis Santana condemns British Hawks deal

For the first time ever, Konis Santana, leader of the armed resistance in East Timor, appeared on television on the BBC's main evening journal. The interview was part of a twelve-minute exposure of the role of British arms exports in beefing up ABRI's internal security measures against its own people and against the people of East Timor.

Speaking to the BBC's Sue Lloyd-Roberts who visited East Timor in March for *Newsnight*, Konis Santana commander of FALINTIL, the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance, who took over after the arrest of Xanana Gusmao, condemned the British sale of Hawks to Indonesia which commenced with the first deal for eight Hawk jets concluded in April 1978.

The war in East Timor would have taken another course if the Indonesians had not received military support from abroad, including the Hawks that Great Britain offered during the crucial period after the invasion. Hawks killed so many people [...] that today whenever people hear the noise of the Hawks flying, they are scared and the authorities know they will not leave their homes.

He said that the Indonesian air force no longer uses British jet fighters for bombing missions but for intimidation. [*The Independent*, 27 March] It was in this role that they were spotted by the British journalist, Hugh O'Shaughnessy, while in Dili in November, 1995.

#### **Demonstration halted in Baucau**

Newsnight also filmed young East Timorese trying to unfurl pro-independent banners during the ceremony in Baucau on 19 March when the new bishop, Basilio do Nascimento was officially consecrated. As soon as they started raising the banners, dozens of black-shirted men within the crowd grabbed the banners, scuffles broke out and the protesters were taken away. One poster in Tetum reads: *Viva Amo Belo, Nobel Timor Nian* which means: Long live Bishop Belo, winner of the Nobel for Timor.


#### Indonesians also condemn UK arms sales

The report, broadcast on Newsnight on 27 March, also included an interview of the sister and mother of one of the students killed in Ujung Pandang in April last year when British armoured vehicles crashed onto a university campus. The mother, Sahbahnur Tasnifaston, told Sue Lloyd-

Roberts that the soldiers responsible for her son's death had been given only three months in jail. 'Is that fair? In my opinion, Britain sells these vehicles to Indonesia in the belief they will be used in times of war. But this was not war. It was to scare the students.'

Students who took part in a demonstration forty days later in Bandung were also interviewed. The demonstration was broken up when Indonesian police, using water cannon supplied by Britain, sprayed them with liquid. One of the students said: 'We wanted to show our solidarity with the students in Ujung Pandang. We held a peaceful demonstration but the police immediately ordered us to disperse. We don't believe western governments supply this equipment deliberately to be used against the people. The Indonesian government probably tell them that it is needed for defensive purposes.' They said the liquid contained ammonium which burnt their skins and dozens were injured.

This important film further reinforces the evidence already compiled by TAPOL showing that UK-supplied equipment is being used in contravention of the criteria which are said to determine the sale of arms to Indonesia.



# **Election spells trouble for New Order**

Unlike the past five elections under Suharto's New Order which have worked to plan, giving the regime the outcome it needed to renew its claim to legitimacy, this year's elections are not running smoothly. Cynicism about the much vaunted 'Festival of Democracy' is widespread and even without an organised boycott, many voters are likely to stay at home. To secure a 'successful outcome', security forces will be on high alert throughout the campaign.

A joke doing the rounds in Jakarta says it all. An Englishman said to an Indonesian: 'In Britain, the results of our elections will be known within hours because we use computers.' The Indonesian replied: 'That's nothing. In Indonesia, even without computers, the results will be known before the voting starts.'

The elections, held every five years under Suharto's New Order, have nothing to do with changing the government, they have everything to do with giving the regime a renewed claim to legitimacy. Everything is regulated to ensure that the government party, GOLKAR, will score a seventy per cent victory. Under a system devised in the early 1970s by Suharto himself, only three parties are permitted to contest. The two 'also-rans' are the PDI, the Indonesian Democracy Party, and the PPP, the United Development Party. Enjoying massive financial and logistical backing of local and national government as well as the army, GOLKAR has always been able to steamroller voters into voting for the government ticket. But Suharto was cunning enough to realise that a three-party system would give his system a democratic facade. Hence the creation of two other parties, after parties which survived the 1965 onslaught were forced to merge.

The two smaller parties are required by law to adhere to the State ideology, *Pancasila*, and to refrain from engaging in political activity at the lower levels of society, while GOLKAR whose members include the entire civil service has a dominating presence throughout the country. All the country's six million civil servants are required to join KORPRI, which is affiliated to GOLKAR, and to vote for it, along with their families.

GOLKAR's built-in majority in the DPR's 425 contested seats is reinforced by 75 seats allotted to the armed forces. As for the upper house which elects the president and establishes the guidelines for state policy for the coming five years, five hundred seats go to presidential appointees from the regions and the other five hundred to the DPR.

## The security approach

Acutely aware of nation-wide dissatisfaction about the elections, Suharto and the armed forces have made it clear that the police and troops, backed by tanks and armoured vehicles of all descriptions are being mobilised to keep the streets clear of 'trouble-makers'.

In late February, Suharto declared that anyone who tried to unseat him 'unconstitutionally' would be 'clob-bered'. [Republika, 1 March] Two days earlier, the armed

forces commander-in-chief, General Feisal Tanjung said that during the election campaign, troops would be under orders to 'shoot on sight' anyone who 'violates the law'. After Suharo's 'clobber' threat, Feisal Tandung said that the armed forces would not 'compromise with anyone, especially those wishing to thwart the 1997 general election and the 1998 session of the MPR.... ABRI is not prepared to play high stakes with the nation's integrity and stability merely in order to tolerate unreasonable concepts and measures'. [Suara Pembaruan, 28 February and Kompas, 2 March.]



2% Laba refers to a Suharto decree for a 2% additional tax.

On 20 February, the army staged a show of force involving ten thousand troops and a range of heavy equipment, including British-supplied Scorpion tanks, to cover the capital city during the election. This 'second line of defence' involves troops from all the crack units within the armed forces. [Republika, 21 February]

## Growing support for a boycott

The removal of Megawati Sukarnoputri as chairperson of the *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* (PDI), at the instigation of the government and the armed forces, is the event above all else that has alienated millions of voters. The rising tide of protest against Soerjadi, the regime's chosen figure to lead the rump PDI, has led to widespread discussion at all levels of society about how to register this anger on polling day. Some say that this should take the form *golput* - *golongan putih* - or 'white group', which means invalidat-

ing voting slips by piercing none or all the party emblems; others suggest that voters should simply stay away. Another possibility is that groups may try to disrupt the election; Megawati supporters might decide to turn up at polling booths en masse to protest against the exclusion of their candidates.



But calls for an out-and-out boycott have gathered pace. Groups organised by the *Partai Demokrasi Rakyat* (PRD), many of whose leaders are now in jail and on trial for subversion, have organised a boycott campaign, pasting up posters and distributing leaflets in a number of cities. Several activists have been arrested and will soon face charges. The recently-established *Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia* (PUDI), whose leader, the former MP Sri-Bintang Pamungkas was arrested in early March, has also called for a boycott of the election. Indeed that was the immediate reason for his arrest. [See separate item.]

Lending weight to the idea is a statement issued in February by Cardinal Julius Darmaatmadja, SJ, as head of the Catholic Bishops Conference, telling Catholics that .'it is not a sin not to vote'.

## Will a boycott work?

Opinions differ over the chances of a boycott having a major impact on the turnout. No one doubts that people living in villages will be under strong pressure to vote, both from local officials and the army. However, when a youth group organised an opinion poll among young people in Malang, East Java, they came up with the surprising result that more than 92 per cent said they would not vote. The poll which involved mostly well-educated 'trend-setting' young people also revealed that nearly half of those saying they would not vote were the children of government officials or members of the armed forces, indicating that young people are less likely these days to follow the advice of their parents.

Two parties, the PRD and PUDI, have publicly called for a boycott and PRD activists have been out on the streets, leafleting. On 3 March, people in eleven major cities throughout the country woke to find walls covered with slogans reading: 'Without Megawati, boycott the 1997 elections' and 'Until the dual function is abandoned, boycott the 1997 election.' This is a high-risk strategy and several activists have already been arrested while others have gone into hiding. Four young people in Central Java are

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now on trial for pasting up stickers in Purwokerto, advocating support for *Golput*. They have been charged under Article 161 of the Criminal Code for inciting others to 'commit a crime' and face a penalty of up to four years. In fact, it is *not* a crime under Indonesian law not to vote. In Bogor, West Java, several printing machines used to print pro-boycott leaflets were confiscated and the security forces said that they were hunting down those responsible. [*Jakarta Post*, 7 March]

In Central Java, two students have been given one-year sentences for distributing leaflets which said: 'Protect the elections from cheating'. Altogether four students have been arrested for the same offence. All four are being held at a prison in Ambarawa. A large crowd of students staged an unsuccessful attempt to rescue them as they were being driven back to prison. [Bernas, 5 March]

Although Megawati herself has yet to issue a statement on the PDI's position, PDI supporters have been rallying in large numbers in many towns and cities. In courts throughout the country, local pro-Megawati activists have challenged the Soeryadi leadership and sought to have local PDI candidates disqualified. As PRD activist, Wilson, has written from his prison cell (he is now on trial for subversion), even without instructions from Megawati who as yet is confining herself to challenges in the courts, the members of her PDI, through extra-parliamentary actions, are siding with the boycott.

#### Rigging the system


Even though the real PDI has been excluded from the contest, the government is very apprehensive about what will happen. In countries like Nigeria, Burma, Serbia and Algeria, election results have simply been annulled because they went the wrong way for the rulers. Suharto has been smart enough make sure he always gets the right result. Arguably, fifty per cent for GOLKAR would be enough to control the DPR, still more the MPR, but that doesn't convey the message Suharto craves. In a display of the New Order's lack of confidence in its own future, the regime has gone to extraordinary lengths, introducing a string of new rules which ensure far greater control than ever before:

- \* All candidates for each of the three parties have been subjected to screening by military intelligence. This is nothing new. Candidates will need a *Surat Keterangan Tidak Terlibat* or 'non-involvement certificate'. This no longer only means non-involvement in the G30S/PKI (the events of 1965 and the communist party, the PKI). Other factors too have been taken into account such as 'loyalty to the Pancasila' and the past performance of prospective candidates who have served in previous national and regional parliaments. In December, it was announced that the election committee had rejected 130 PPP candidates, 106 PDI candidates and 21 GOLKAR candidates. This means that 257 candidates, more than ten per cent of the total of 2,293 candidates, failed the screening test.
- \* No street rallies, demonstrations or street parades will be permitted. This decision was taken at the behest of President Suharto who said that 'shows of force' (as long as they're not by the army!) should be avoided. In past elections, public rallies were pretty much the only chance the smaller parties had to test their popularity. It was usually

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the PDI which could bring out the largest crowds, especially before they were banned from displaying photos of Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, whose name is still hugely popular, especially among the younger generation.

\* A zoning system has been introduced. The country will be divided into six zones. On each of the 27 days during which campaigning is allowed, each of the parties will only be allowed to campaign in two designated zones so that only one party will campaign in any zone at any time. When an area is designated for one party, the other contestants will be required to remove all their election posters from the streets. The PPP has strongly objected to this rule because its key speakers will have to travel huge distances from one day to the next day, involving costly air fares. GOLKAR will not face this problem as all provincial governors and officials are members and will be able to address election meetings in their zone. It also means that the parties are only allowed nine campaigning days instead of the 27 stipulated by law.



- \* All election campaign meetings will require police permission and the police will have the authority to halt an election meeting should 'violations' occur. Minister of the Interior (ret'd general) Yogie S. Memed, said these violations might be 'administrative, political or criminal'. In addition, the only campaigning materials allowed will be the party's political programme based on the state ideology, Pancasila, with a clear commitment to 'national development'. Moreover, meetings and events may only take place between 9am and 6pm.
- \* Public meetings may only be held in smaller towns and municipalities, at locations determined by the district chief and the local police. The local police must be given seven days' notice of all campaign plans and meetings which may only go ahead after obtaining identification papers for the persons in charge. Campaigners may not criticise members of the government and must stick to development issues and comments of a 'constructive' nature.
- \* The police must be given seven days' notice of all vehicles, along with registration numbers, to be used to transport supporters to any campaign events. The smaller parties see this as totally unworkable as they have no way of knowing in advance how people will travel to their meetings.

\* Regulations regarding the use of radio and television during the campaign have been drawn up by the Information Minister, Harmoko - who is also chairman of GOL-KAR. All the scripts for broadcasts on radio and TV will have to be examined and approved in advance by government election officials. In addition, only RRI and TVRI, the officially-run radio and TV stations, will be permitted to broadcast election programmes. These programmes will be beamed from the centre, which may then be rebroadcast by local stations. This blatant censorship of campaigning material is perhaps the ultimate proof of how fraudulent Indonesia's elections are.

#### The 'war of colours' in Central Java

With the Soeryadi-led PDI trying desperately to withstand the onslaught of pro-Megawati groups hounding its local leaders in all parts of the country, it has fallen to the PPP to wage a rearguard action against the election rules that discriminate so blatantly against the smaller parties. In Solo and elsewhere in Central Java, local PPP branches have decided to boycott the election campaign, though not yet, it seems, the election because the rules are so disadvantageous. To boycott the election itself would put it on a collision course with the regime.

PPP activists in Solo and many other towns in Central Java have however been waging a 'war of colours' with local government officials who ordered all walls, fences, monuments, public facilities and even trees to be painted yellow, because it is 'the traditional local colour'. In fact, yellow is the colour of GOLKAR. In a gesture of defiance, PPP activists decided to repaint everything a neutral white. The district chief then alleged that such repainting was 'illegal' without government approval. But this has not halted the battle. Joining the 'war of colours' local pro-Megawati supporters have re-painting everything red and white, the colours of the Indonesian flag.

A local academic, Andrik Purwasito, sees the conflict as a symptom of GOLKAR's declining popularity. 'In the villages, there are warnings that GOLKAR will have a difficult time dominating this election.' [Sydney Morning Herald, 19 March]

This local spat has provoked much comment in the national press and has served to highlight dissatisfaction at the way local officials use their position to promote the government party.

#### Monitoring the election

It was the establishment of KIPP, the Independent Monitoring Committee, in March last year that drew attention to the need for monitoring. As things stand, monitoring at every stage of the elections is the monopoly of the government's Election Implementation Board. Even the contestants play no role which in fact leaves the two small parties out in the cold because all officials are members of GOLKAR. Even supervision of vote-counting is in government hands.

The emergence of KIPP, chaired by former TEMPO editor Goenawan Mohamad, with lawyer Mulyana W. Kusumah as secretary, prompted many other groups to set up monitoring groups. The fact that there are 300,000 polling booths renders the task formidable for groups with very limited resources.

Once Megawati had been ousted as chair of the PDI as a result of regime machinations, KIPP went on record say-

ing that the elections should not go ahead until the PDI question had been resolved. 'It was important for us to warn the government about this but we haven't the force to prevent the elections from taking place,' Goenawan told a press conference. He said KIPP volunteers would monitor the final stages of the election in eight cities: Pematang Siantar, Palembang, Bandarlampung, (all in Sumatra), Jakarta, Cianjur, Semarang and Malang (all in Java) and Ujung Pandang (South Sulawesi). Besides the monitoring, KIPP hopes the general public would profit from the exercise by gaining a better understanding of the political process. [Republika, 17 March]

Having had the issue of monitoring forced onto the agenda, the government has now said that it would invite foreign observers to monitor the events. However, it is being highly selective and only intends to invite officials from a few neighbouring governments like Singapore and Malaysia. However, foreigners 'will not be allowed to in-

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vestigate or pass judgment ' as this would be regarded as 'meddling'. Officially invited observers would be given facilities but not foreigners who come on their own initiative. [Jakarta Post, 15 March]

Army chief-of-staff General Hartono has made it clear that his men will arrest foreign observers who make any attempt to 'intervene' in the process. He warned people not to come to Indonesia as tourists and then start observing the elections. 'It's okay for people to observe things but they should not try to inject concepts from abroad which differ from ours.' The armed forces were part of the election supervisory mechanism, he said, and would take action on the spot against anyone straying from the rules. [Jawa Pos, 19 March]

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of soldiers in full battle dress are once again part of the daily scene.

The security forces justify their heightened vigilance because of a series of spectacular bank robberies in January and February, in particular a daring attack on the Lhøkseumawe branch of Bank Central Asia. A bank security guard and a cashier were killed and three soldiers were hit in a volley of bullets. The bank robbers got away with Rp 405 million. The authorities claim that the robbery was carried out by *GAM* members and a hunt for the robbers has been mounted by combined military units, including more than a hundred paratroopers of *Linud 100/PS*, the army's air-borne unit.

According to Amnesty International [ASA 21/14/97] some of the people detained may have been arrested in connection with an alleged attempt to sabotage a gas pipe near Lhokseumawe.

#### A GAM comeback?

Major General Sedaryanto is hinting that there is a resurgence of *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka* activity. The confiscated firearms would appear to point in this direction, according to the military commander.

Aceh was the battleground of fierce combat between the Indonesian army and the *GAM* armed resistance from 1989 till 1993. It peaked in late 1990 and early 1991 when ABRI forces brutally applied its 'low intensity conflict' strategy by killing thousands of innocent villagers, including children and the elderly. Aceh was also the scene of political killings, disappearances and arrests. At least 50 people have been convicted and given heavy prison sentences. Thousands of Acehnese villagers were forced to flee to neighbouring Malaysia and it is a public secret that many *GAM* activists also moved across the Malacca Straits to prevent further killings of innocent Acehnese by the army. [Difficulties faced by Acehnese refugees in Malaysia were reported in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 139, February 1997.]

The gruesome methods applied in those years have left thousands of people scarred by the unexplained loss of close relatives and has intensified Acehnese anger towards the Indonesian armed forces. The Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front based in Sweden recently submitted a statement to the 53rd session of the Human Rights Commission in Geneva referring to dozens of mass graves in different parts of Aceh. While refusing to reveal the whereabouts of these graves, they demanded that an independent inquiry be set up and stressed the necessity of establishing an international tribunal in The Hague for the arraignment of those responsible for the killings in Aceh between 1989 and 1995.

The Indonesian authorities are now claiming that the situation is 'back to normal', but even if this is true, such relative 'peace and order' can disintegrate at any time because of the massive injustices and crimes against humanity perpetrated against the Acehnese. While in some parts of Indonesia, the security forces adopt 'carrot and stick' tactics, in regions like Aceh they only apply the stick.

#### Another twenty-year sentence

On 13 February the district court in Kisaran sentenced Iswarnaidi alias Agam, 27 years, to twenty years' imprisonment for smuggling 5,000 bullets into Indonesia from neighbouring Malaysia. He and a friend named Mochtar succeeded in getting the goods through the Tanjung Balai harbour, but unluckily for them, they were caught in a routine traffic-police control check-up on the Trans Sumatra highway on the way to Aceh. In a shoot out Mochtar managed to escape. According to news reports, Agam joined *GAM* in 1989 and fled to Malaysia in 1994. This is the first political trial to be conducted in Aceh for several years.

The wave of trials in 1991 against alleged members of *GAM* resulted in many heavy sentences. In the capital Banda Aceh alone, 12 people are still serving their sentences: Adnan Beuransyah (9 years), Hasbi Abdullah (17 years), Nurdin AR (13 years), Imran Hasan (7 years), Mulkan Usman (14 years), Ridwan Ibas (8 years), Idris Achmad (11 years), Ibnu Hasan (15 years), Azis Bakini (10 years), M. Yacob (11 years), Jamaluddin Usman (16 years) and TM Said (10 years). It is feared that with the new wave of arrests, many more trials will follow.

# Tough security measures the order of the day

With unrest erupting in many parts of the country, the Indonesian armed forces have had to devise a new strategy to cope with its restive population. But the armed forces are also under instructions from Suharto, in the run-up to the elections on 29 May, to 'clobber' anyone using 'unconstitutional' means. The only way the armed forces can ensure that the elections are 'successful' is to mobilise its forces massively to prevent protests, boycott actions and possible anti-election street actions.

On 20 February, there was a huge show of force in Jakarta by a number of army units and ten thousand troops to make preparations for security in the capital and its environs during campaigning and on polling day. ABRI (armed forces) commander-in-chief General Feisal inspected the troops and the range of military equipment on display included British-supplied Scorpion tanks, armoured vehicles, anti-riot personnel carries, hundreds of trail vehicles and helicopters. [Republika, 21 February] Similar shows of forces are also reported to have taken place in other parts of the country.

But the forthcoming elections are not the only event threatening 'law and order' and the stability which Suharto so craves. Apart from the major eruptions of unrest that have exploded in West Kalimantan, Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok, riots and clashes have been occurring in many other places on a smaller scale. This has made it incumbent on ABRI to prepare for a new kind of warfare pitting itself against the whole of civil society.

#### From the bush to the cities

The military commander of East Timor Colonel Mahidin Simbolon has called the strategy *HGAT* for hambatan, gangguan, ancaman & tantangan, or obstructions, disorder, threats and challenges. Coming from him, it reflects the present situation in East Timor where the most serious threat is from unrest in urban areas. But Simbolon's words clearly have a much broader application.

Dealing with urban unrest is now at the top of ABRI's agenda and it has become clear that the red-beret special troops in *Kopassus* are not enough on their own to handle the situation. *Kopassus* commander-general, Major-General Prabowo Subianto said recently his forces were ready to conduct operations with other units to deal with unrest. [Kompas, 27 February]

It is argued that fighting guerrillas in the bush is much less complex as anybody in the bush can be regarded as the enemy. In the cities, adversaries are more difficult to identify. Moreover, shooting at random as happened in the Dili massacre in November 1991, which was a public relations disaster for the regime because it led to public outrage at home and abroad, has to be avoided as all costs. However, although on Java, troops have tried not to resort to fire-power, it is another matter in West Kalimantan where troops have been involved in several grave atrocities (see separate item).

Until recently, only Kopassus, the notorious red berets commando outfit and two divisions of Kostrad, the reserve

troops, were looked upon to deal with widespread unrest. The two infantry divisions of *Kostrad* has a full complement of tanks, field artillery, air-defence units plus considerable sea and air power. These rapid deployment forces can be sent to any corner of the archipelago at 24 hours notice. On 10 March, army units were involved in exercises in the capital to test their ability to zoom in on an area without delay, including bringing troops in by helicopter.

Kopassus has developed a special anti-terror squad, previously called Detasemen 81 but nowadays known as Grup5/Anti Teror. The present Kopassus commander, Suharto's son-in-law Major General Prabowo, served in the anti-terror squad in the seventies. Prabowo typifies the modern Indonesian soldier: well trained, well educated and equipped with modern technology. He has encouraged the establishment of more anti-riot brigades and has stated in public that the military budget should be increased.



Posko, the vigilance command posts, were set up after the urban unrest in many places. Many political analysts believe that sections in the army were involved in fanning the disturbances.

Besides these units, the air force has also set up an antiterror unit called *Paskhas TNI-AU Bravo*, the police has a special anti-terror task force called *Satuan Gegana* and the Jakarta military command has a special unit called *Tim Saber (Sapu Bersih, Clean Sweep Team)*. In other words, all arms of the armed forces are being mobilised to take part in ABRI's central task of dealing with internal disorder. All are equipped with modern equipment and anti-riot vehicles. [*Tempo Interaktif, 15 March*]

The massive order for more than 350 armoured vehicles from the UK (see separate item on the Judicial Review) is

clearly intended to provide the equipment for the new ABRI strategy.

#### District level command posts

In the wake of the incidents in Tasikmalaya and Rengasdengklok, Suharto ordered the establishment of so-called 'vigilance command posts' at the *kodim* level, the army commands located in the 460 districts into which the country in divided. These *posko* are intended to be the eyes and ears of the army, coopting informal leaders who are expected to tell the army of potential trouble-makers, so as to halt unrest in its tracks. The army's chief of general staff, Lt-General Tarub recently told his troops: 'We are living in conditions of uncertainty which obliges us to be more vigilant'.

Some commentators believe that Suharto took this decision to cut through the disarray that has occurred within the army because of the discord between officers and the lack of a reliable and effective line of command. After the 27 July attack on the PDI headquarters, Suharto replaced more

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than 100 senior officers who were punished for not wanting to support the vicious attack.

It also means that, like almost everything else, political command and co-ordination is now firmly in the president's hands. It remains to be seen whether this new line of command will prove to be effective. [Rocky Gerung in *Tiras*, 6 March]

#### State of emergency

Another weapon in the strategy is to provide ABRI with new powers in a law being promoted by the gruff-spoken ABRI chief of staff of social and political affairs, Lt. General Syarwan Hamid. By further formalising the special powers already exercised by the armed forces, the new law, UU Keselamatan Negara or 'national safety law', would place the country in a permanent state of emergency, reviving the dreaded SOB of Dutch colonial days.

# **Growing dilemmas for ABRI**

The fat years for ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces, from 1965 till the mid eighties, are long since over. ABRI is now experiencing lean years and its fortunes are still declining. Weak leadership, a lack of new ideas and a below-average crop of senior officers sums up its present state. Indonesian society is changing rapidly but its foremost institution, ABRI, is proving incapable of meeting the challenge.

ABRI's present leadership, yes-men like commander-inchief General Feisal Tandjung and army chief-of-staff General Hartono, reflect the present crisis within ABRI. They excel in one thing only, loyalty to President Suharto (or his family). They are models of mediocrity, their press statements are an insult to the intelligence while ABRI's standing in society is in steady decline.

## The LIPI report: Dwifungsi contested

Criticism of the all-embracing role of ABRI in society has usually come from the pro-democracy movement and NGOs. But reflecting the present zeitgeist, criticism has now come from *LIPI*, the Indonesian Academy of Sciences. This prestigious institution received a tall order from President Suharto in February 1995 when he asked it to conduct a study of the social and political role of ABRI, a nice way to describe dwifungsi, the dual role of ABRI, as a defence force and as a social and political force. Two years later LIPI presented their findings to the public in a seminar. They had interviewed the top brass of ABRI including retired officers like Soemitro, Sayidiman and Hasnan Habib. In every province, LIPI scientists interviewed up to twenty people from all walks of life, including villagers.

LIPI's recommendations are quite shattering. The academics concluded that ABRI should reduce its role in society, in practical politics, social organisations and parties. By 2007 ABRI should no longer have representatives in parliament and only a limited presence in the MPR, the

People's Congress. ABRI's role in government should also be rolled back and limited to the regions.



The report caused quite a stir among the ABRI top brass. Even more liberal-minded retired generals like Z. A. Maulani and Hasnan Habib were stunned. The dwifungsi is a sacred cow and treated as such by all but a few brave souls in the pro-democracy movement. LIPI's report is an-

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other sign that Indonesian society is changing fast. Many Indonesians who work as professionals in the bureaucracy and the private sector have their own bitter experiences dealing with military and their insatiable demands for *uang pelicin*, or bribes. *Dwifungsi* is often called dwiporsi, or double portion.

#### A look back at history

The golden days of the dwifungsi began after the military takeover in October 1965. While Sukarno was nominally president until 1967, Suharto and his generals virtually took control of the country. As the red drive took its gruesome toll in late 1965, many positions in the administration, from cabinet posts to village heads, fell vacant because of the killings and imprisonment. Overnight, thousands of military officers became village heads, district heads or governors.

In fact, dwifungsi began with General Nasution, the eminence grise of ABRI. In November 1958, a period of turmoil, Nasution formulated the idea of ABRI's double role as a military and a social and political force. He probably never expected it to go to the extremes it assumed in less than a decade. In the first Orde Baru cabinet in March 1966, twelve of the 27 ministers were from ABRI as well as more than half the secretaries-general of government departments. Twelve of the 26 provincial governors were military men. In the 1973 cabinet, there were 13 military ministers. Only four governors were civilians and about four hundred army officers filled the top strata of the bureaucracy. The seats in Parliament allocated to the armed forces were increased to 100 in 1985, 20 per cent of the total, twenty per cent of the total. In those days, the standard joke was follows:

A father asked his three sons what they wanted to be. One said he wanted to be a doctor, another said he wanted to be a lawyer, but the third said he wanted to join ABRI so that he could be anything from the president down.

The military also had a major share in the economy. In the forefront was Lt-General Ibnu Sutowo who for many years was president-director of Pertamina, the state oil company. Many officers were 'dropped' into state companies often with disastrous results. Companies were used to siphon assets into local commands or private coffers.

From 1950 till 1957, when democratic institutions held sway, the military remained in the barracks but in 1957 President Sukarno, under Nasution's influence, established the *Dewan Nasional* (National Council) which led to the obliteration of existing political institutions. Top soldiers like Nasution became members of this unelected body. These changes ushered in the period known as 'guided democracy' but often called 'disguised dictatorship'. This was when ABRI gradually assumed a commanding position with the help of the 1945 Constitution, which confers virtually absolute powers on the executive. When Suharto took over the presidency he retained the guided democracy institutions and such 'achievements' as the anti-subversion law and the corporatist structure.

ABRI's dual function is now enshrined in several laws. In 1982 a law on defence and security was adopted reiterating ABRI's two functions and in 1988 a second law further enhanced ABRI's social-political role.

#### Eroding the dwifungsi

Although ABRI grew fat during the golden days of the dwifungsi, it was Suharto who hit the jackpot. He was perched at the top of the pyramid and never allowed the Orde Baru regime to become a military junta. In fact, by 1980 it was more accurate to describe the Indonesian regime as the Suharto regime. He and his sons, daughters, grandchildren and in-laws have been the main beneficiaries of the dwifungsi and have emerged as one of the richest families in the world.

Suharto's increasing importance as the leading political and economic force inevitably led to a decline in ABRI's fortunes. The birth of mighty conglomerates in the mid eighties, in one of the booming tiger economies of Asia, left ABRI on the sidelines. While few military benefited from the spectacular growth, it was the Suharto family and their cronies who reaped the harvest.



Suharto and his loyalist ABRI top brass

Similarly in the political institutions and the bureaucracy, ABRI's seats in parliament fell to 75 in 1993. The military in Suharto's present cabinet have become a small minority and the number of governors from ABRI is in decline. This is partly because more well-educated civilians are filling posts in the bureaucracy, but it is also because it is in Suharto's own interests to keep the army weak.

The Orde Baru system destroyed all existing political institutions, leaving ABRI as the only political force. In the seventies, the ABRI leadership made strenuous but futile attempts to challenge Suharto's leadership. In 1985, Suharto introduced drastic changes by imposing five draconian political laws which placed political life in a legal straitjacket.

When General Benny Murdani became ABRI commander-in-chief in 1983, he was given the job of carrying out a total overhaul. The territorial commands were trimmed down and the combat capacity of ABRI was greatly enhanced. It soon became clear that ABRI's social and political thrust was being reduced while ABRI's tasks as a fighting force were being brought to the fore.

ABRI's territorial commands are a shadow government beside the civilian administration down to village level. Territorial commanders often behave like regional warlords, as Suharto did when he commanded the Diponegoro Central Java division in the mid fifties. It is crucial for an officer to develop a strong power base and enter into the heart of national and regional politics. But in the new structure there are ten territorial commands as compared with 27 provinces, including the illegally occupied East

Timor, making it structurally more difficult for territorial commands to control the civilian administration.

ABRI's social-political decline went even further in the nineties when two Javanese sayings were popularised. *Ing ngarso sung tulodo* means that ABRI should be in the vanguard while *tut wuri handayani* assigns ABRI to a back seat. Today's top generals like Feisal Tandjung and Hartono are firm back-seaters and accept directives from President Suharto as absolute commands.

#### ABRI as a fighting force

Military analysts usually describe ABRI as a fusion of KNIL and PETA. KNIL was the Dutch colonial army whose prime duty was to suppress domestic dissent. KNIL was useless as an army and collapsed within days when the Japanese attacked the archipelago. PETA was the auxiliary force set up during the Japanese occupation. Practically all the generals who came to power in 1965, including Suharto, were PETA veterans. They had received rigorous military training, with a heavy dose of militarism, a combination of Japanese bushido and the Javanese ksatrya tradition.

ABRI's tradition as fighting force is a pitiful one. They were capable of killing hundreds of thousands of innocent and defenceless peasants in 1965 and 1966. But in the face of determined guerrillas in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, the structural weaknesses of ABRI as a fighting force have shown through.

Indonesia was relatively stable up to mid-1994, not because of ABRI's capacities as a fighting force but rather because of its extrajudicial institutions like Kopkamtib,

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Bais and their successors, Bakorstanas and BIA. Indonesian security and intelligence forces penetrate down to the villages and neighbourhoods in the cities. People can be arrested at random and an atmosphere of fear is dominant.

#### Enhancing ABRI's combat capacities

President Suharto is supreme commander of ABRI. In pushing back ABRI's dual function role, he had to give something in return to satisfy the rank-and-file. Already in the Benny Murdani days it was clear that ABRI was promised better training and modern equipment. General Murdani had to tell his officers that the days when they could become corporate tycoons were over, but what he could deliver was a slim, professionalised ABRI.

However, in contrast with neighbouring countries, ABRI's professionalism is not very impressive. The Singapore, Thai and Malaysian economies are in much better shape which is reflected in higher military expenditure. Another obstacle for ABRI is that the military industrial complex is in the hands of Rudy Habibie, the powerful minister for technology, leading to serious friction. Habibie's aspirations to design and build aircraft has literally emptied the state coffers, reducing ABRI's ability to buy sophisticated weaponry. The decision to buy 39 second-hand East German navy vessels enraged many at ABRI headquarters. It is becoming increasingly difficult for President Suharto to keep all parties happy.

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## A new strategy from Jakarta?

All these events have drawn a flurry of activity from the Indonesian government which was clearly worried about what they saw as 'a public relations exercise by Jose Ramos-Horta and his friends'. Dino Patti Djalal from the Indonesian embassy in London was one of Horta's main challengers. Jakarta also sent three Timorese: Clementino do Amaral, member of the National Commission of Human Rights, Domingus Polycarpo, marketing director of the Regional Development Bank in Dili, and Francisco da Silva, a businessman, to argue their case and heckle speakers at the seminars. Other Timorese who joined in included Joao Mota, the foster son of Major General Prabowo and Tito Batista who works for the Indonesian mission at the UN in New York.

Earlier this year, the Indonesian embassies in Washington and Ottawa held emergency meetings to work out a strategy to counter the seminars. Some seminars were attended by as many as a dozen Indonesian diplomats in addition to the pro-Indonesian Timorese.

Until now, seminars and conferences on East Timor and Indonesia which have been conducted for years in many parts of the world have been largely ignored by Indonesian diplomats, but it now appears that the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and military intelligence realise that the regime's

reputation is taking a severe battering and have decided to monitor the meetings and spy on the Indonesians and East Timorese who take part. In some cases Indonesian diplomats were even prepared to take their place on the panel of speakers. Dino Patti Djalal, Indonesia's star diplomat and their much-vaunted expert on East Timor, was so busy trailing the Nobel laureate that Ramos Horta said he felt like Jody Foster, being followed by a stalker.

Indonesia's team concentrated on events in 1974 and 1975 and the alleged human rights violations perpetrated by Fretilin after the brief civil war between UDT and Fretilin. While coverage in the Indonesian press gives the impression that Jose Ramos Horta and his supporters were 'cornered', the opposite is the case. Every attempt to discredit the Nobel laureate got short shrift from the many activists present while audiences were angry at the constant heckling during question time.

Jakarta's latest foray has only increased public awareness about the true nature of the Suharto regime whose reputation as a pariah state is growing fast. One of the key issues raised during the seminars was how to take forward moves to impose economic sanctions against the regime. As the reputation of Suharto and his cohorts plummets, it will become easier to win support in the US for the legitimate aspirations of the people of East Timor.

# Dozens of political trials in progress

The number of people being dragged before the courts is growing by the day. Two more PRD leaders face subversion charges, while many people are now on trial for daring to defy the government's threat against anyone advocating an election boycott. Leaders of PUDI have been arrested and charged with subversion, including former MP, Sri-Bintang Pamungkas. Labour leader Mochtar Pakpahan has had a particularly gruelling time in court and is now in hospital.



#### Greetings card brings subversion charge

When former MP, Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, sent a Lebaran greetings card - marking the end of Ramadhan - to all his former colleagues in Parliament and a lot more people besides, he probably knew this would land him in trouble. He had taken the novel step of including in the card the three-point programme of his party, the Partai Uni Demokrasi Indonesia, PUDI, set up last May. The three-point programme calls for an election boycott, rejects a seventh term for Suharto and calls for preparations for the post-Suharto era. Inevitably hackles were roused. An invitation to lunch from an Attorney-general's official turned out to be the prelude to arrest, not only for him but also for two other party leaders, Julius Usman and Saleh Abdullah. They were all taken to the attorney-general's office. Sri-Bintang was detained immediately and the others were taken into custody the next day. On 6 March, all three were charged with subversion.

Bintang is no stranger to the courts. In 1996, he was tried and found guilty of insulting the head of state in a lecture he delivered while on a visit to Germany the year before. He was given a 34-month sentence against which

he has appealed. He was not being held in detention, awaiting the outcome of the appeal but he was prevented from going abroad by a travel ban issued by the attorney-general's office.

Bintang's wife, Ernalia, told the press that the issue of the *Lebaran* card had been known to the authorities for several months without anyone reacting. The decision to arrest and charge him came only after Suharto issued his order in late February for people using 'unconstitutional' means to unseat him to be 'clobbered'. (This is rich, coming from a man who seized power by the most violent means.) Ernalia says she strongly supports her husband in all his political activities. When asked whether she agreed with some people who say he is 'too revolutionary', she replied:

'That's nonsense. We've been ruled by him (Suharto) for thirty years. How long should someone go on ruling? ... It's because he has ruled for so long that collusion and corruption are so prevalent. And nothing's being done about it. We need an alternative. The people should be given an alternative. The people who chair the three parties should have the guts to nominate themselves for president. But they don't. Everyone's too afraid.' [Tempo Interaktif, 15 March, 02/02 edition]

Sri-Bintang has shown himself to be a man of integrity and courage, determined to challenge the secrecy and deference that strangulates political life in Indonesia. One of the first moves of his new party was to draw up a draft Constitution for Indonesia, reducing the powers of the president, enshrining democratic rights and allowing autonomy for the regions. In a regime where the 1945 Constitution is sacrosanct, this is a bold move indeed.

## Interrogator uses violence

As with all people arrested on charges of subversion, Sri-Bintang and his two colleagues are being held at the attorney-general's head office in Jakarta. In cases of subversion, the attorney-general, not the police, are in charge of the investigations.

A week after he was held, it became clear that Bintang was having great difficulty with the attorney interrogating him because of his insistence on knowing precisely what the charges would be. The clash led to Bintang demanding that the interrogator be changed. When the two men met n 13 March, Silangit started beating Bintang when he refused to continue with the interrogation. As reported in *Media Indonesia* (19 March), Bintang said the interrogator used violence against him. Denying this, Silangit said: 'All I did was put my arm round him to get him to sit down.'

Following this serious abuse, Bintang and the other two PUDI leaders have vowed not to answer any more questions until this dispute has be resolved. Meanwhile, on 18 March several dozen young people demonstrated outside the location where the three men are being held, carrying posters calling for their release and for the repeal of the anti-subversion law.

Mochtar Pakpahan, leader of the independent labour union, the SBSI, is now seriously ill in hospital with suspected lung cancer. His trial has therefore been suspended. Although clearly ill at several court hearings, he was refused proper medical treatment until after a stronglyworded letter was sent to Attorney-General Singgih from Bill Jordan, General Secretary of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Pakpahan has been the focus of many solidarity actions internationally. In Washington, the ICFTU General Secretary and John Sweeney, President of the AFL/CIO, led a protest rally to the Indonesian Embassy in Washington calling for Pakpahan's release. Sweeney called 'MP' one of the most remarkable leaders of our time and said the demonstration in Washington was only the start of an international campaign which will continue until Indonesia 'stop(s) harassing and firing men and women for trying to organise unions free and independent of government control. We will not rest until they free MP.' [AFP, 7 February]

Pakpahan's trial, as well as other subversion trials currently in progress, is being closely monitored by the International Commission of Jurists, the ICFTU and the International Bar Association.

Presiding judge Djazali P. Sudibyo has been so obstructive and spiteful towards the defendant, his lawyers and sympathetic witnesses that the defence team filed a formal protest and called for his dismissal from the bench hearing the case. It was only after a number of complaints from the defendant about his deteriorating state of health that the judge agreed to write to the prison authorities to 'pay attention to his medical needs'. However, the prison authorities said they needed authorisation from the judge. At the last hearing attended by Pakpahan before he became too ill to continue, the judge accused him of arriving late (his prison transport had been held up in a traffic jam) as a stunt to draw attention to his health. After a heated argument with the judge who refused to act further on ensuring medical treatment, Pakpahan fainted and the session had to be adjourned.

When one witness, Beria Fathia, withdrew statements contained in her interrogation report, saying that they had been made under 'stressful conditions', the judge accused her of perjury and ordered that she be held in a room under guard until she was willing to 'reconsider' her statements in court. The judge also took the unprecedented step of ordering the details of a bank account held in Pakpahan's name at a Dutch bank based in Jakarta to be disclosed in court. Funds of the SBSI have been impounded in the past in an attempt to cripple the union. As the Far Eastern Economic Review [27 February] wrote: 'While bank records often serve as evidence in corruption and embezzlement trials, this is the first time that the state has pressed for such financial disclosure in a political case.'

#### The PRD trials


In addition to the twelve PRD leaders and activists - eleven men and one woman - listed in our last issue as being on

# POLITICAL TRIALS

trial, two more have now been charged with subversion. They are Wilson and I Gusti Agung Anom Astika. Like their comrades who went on trial earlier, they have been accused of activities relating to setting up the People's Democratic Party, and for involvement in workers' and students' actions.

Disputing the grounds for the indictment against him and the legitimacy of the trial, Wilson said the Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, Soesilo Soedarman, had passed a political verdict against them on 29 July last year when he alleged that the PRD was responsible for organising the riots in Jakarta on 27 July. (As with the other PRD defendants, participation in the riots does not figure in the indictment.) Wilson told the court the PRD was trying to promote the people's aspirations.' Our generation was born on the golden bridge of the New Order and we know all about the abundance of wealth that has piled up on that bridge. But why is it that nothing has seeped down to those underneath? Although we are ready to accept imprisonment as the reward for what we have down till now, this trial will only intensify the pain felt by people who have already suffered so much and don't know the way out. We have done what we did in full consciousness of the consequences, determined not to allow all these sufferings to fester on as social ills.' [Kompas, 18 February]

The trials of the nine PRD activists in Jakarta and three in Surabaya have recently been dominated by the issue of whether they should agree to testifying in each others' trials as well as a number of walkouts by defendants as well as their lawyers. The walkouts occurred in protest against a court decision to allow statements made by witnesses during their interrogations to be read in court, in the absence of the witness in question. Trial procedures allow this to happen in exceptional circumstances but no satisfactory explanations have been given for the absences.



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As to whether they should testify in each others' trials, the matter was clarified in a letter from PRD president, Budiman Sudjatmiko, on trial in Jakarta, to Dita Indah Sari and her two colleagues who are on trial in Surabaya. He said that the prisoners in Jakarta had taken a collective decision not to testify because of the principle of non-self-incrimination, in line with the jurisprudence established by Supreme Court judge Adi Andojo during trials of a number of people charged in connection with the murder of labour activist, Marsinah (all those convicted later had their sentences quashed by the Supreme Court), and to protect their civil rights.

According to press reports, this came as a disappointment to Dita Sari and her lawyer who were hoping that her comrades would tell the court about their party. The lawyer argued that these were political cases and convictions were pre-determined, so why refuse to testify as this could only help to clarify things. However, the converse is also true: even if they agree to testify, the outcome of the trials will not be affected.

In the event, there was major media coverage when Budiman, Ignatius Damianus Pranowo and Ken Budha Kusumandaru travelled to Surabaya under police escort. On their arrival in court, there was an emotional re-union between Dita Sari and Budiman but when he was summoned to testify, he announced that he would not do so, adding that all statements made by him about his comrades had been withdrawn and should not be read out in court. When the court nevertheless allowed the statements by Pranowo and Ken Budha to be read out (Budiman's had not be given under oath), the two constantly shouted their disapproval. When Pranowo demonstrated his anger by turning his chair round and sitting with his back to the bench, he was removed from court for being disrespectful.

#### Prosecution asks for 8 years for Dita

In his summing up after witnesses had testified, the prosecutor asked the court to pass a sentence of eight years on Dita Sari and six years on Coen Pontoh. He claimed that the two were clearly shown to have been involved in activities to undermine the state ideology. Their respective organisations, Dita Sari's trade union, the PPBI, and Coen Pontoh's peasant union, the STN, had become affiliated with the PRD led by Budiman Sudjatmiko which was bent on creating a coalition government that would be based on the principle of a people's democratic, multi-party democracy. Furthermore, they had been involved in workers' struggles and had raised demands for freedom of association, a minimum wage of Rp 7,000 a day, an end to military interference in workers disputes and an end to the ABRI's dual function.

He justified his lower sentence demand for Pontoh by saying that he had not behave so badly as his co-defendant.

Sentence is likely to be passed in mid or late April.

## Charged for printing AJI newsletter

Suara Independen, the newsletter of the Independent Association of Journalists, AJI, has become a much soughtafter publication for printing news and reports other sections of the media do not dare to touch. In October last year, a printing press in Jakarta was raided and several

thousand copies of the publication were confiscated. Two people were arrested, of whom one is now on trial.

Andi Syahputra, 31, the manager of the printing house has been charged under Article 134 of the Criminal Code for deliberately insulting the head of state or his deputy, and could face up to six years. Jasrul Zen, in his sixties, an employee at the company, was released though some reports say he could still face charges and is under town arrest. The offending issue of the newsletter contained an article by Sri-Bintang challenging Suharto to agree to stand for presidential election in a direct vote, and not through the totally unrepresentative MPR, and another arguing that people no longer want to Suharto for president because the system over which he has ruled for more than thirty years has become authoritarian and heavily centralised.

Meanwhile Tri Agus Siswomihardjo, one of three journalists who were tried and convicted in 1995 for editing publications critical of the government, was released from prison in March after serving his full two years. His coprisoners, Eko Maryadi and Ahmad Taufik, who were transferred from Cipinang Prison in Jakarta to a prison in Cirebon, apparently as a punishment, have again be moved, this time to separate prisons in West Java.



Tri Agus Siswomihardjo released from prison

## Arrested for printing a book

Soebadio Sastrosatomo, one of Indonesia's many elder politicians from parties that were active, or made inactive, in the pre-Suharto era, is now secretary-general of the Indonesian Socialist Party, the PSI. The PSI was banned by Sukarno in 1960 and never unbanned by Suharto. He recently published a 20-page pamphlet entitled New Era, New Leadership: Badio Rejects the Machinations of the New Order. Within days of its appearance, the attorney-general announced that the pamphlet has been banned.

In March, the author was summoned for questioning by the Attorney-general's office as were several other well-known critics of the Suharto regime, including Ali Sadikin, a leading figure in the Petition-of-Fifty group, who was one of the first people to receive a copy. However, the choice for a scapegoat fell to a lesser known figure, the man who actually printed the pamphlet. Book banning is nothing new. Hundreds of book have suffered the same fate in the

# West Kalimantan conflict continues

The ethnic conflict between the Dayaks and Madurese transmigrants has escalated in the last three months. The troubles started on 29 December last year but at the end of January new clashes spread the conflict to the entire region. By mid February the situation was out of control. Thousands of troops were flown in but were not able to cope. For a time, Dayaks were in control of the key inland highways.

The unleashing of bitter inter-ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan is the result of decades of super-imposed developmental models that have failed to acknowledge the rights of local traditions, and failed to appreciate the resulting deep-rooted sense of alienation among the native inhabitants. The intrusion by a large Madurese community into a region inhabited by Dayaks with their very distinctive culture, produced a volatile mix of cultures that was bound, sooner or later, to explode. The racist, authoritarian regime centred on Java was incapable of recognising the trouble being stored up by an misguided transmigration programme. Both Dayaks and Madurese have suffered horrendous losses as a result of this short-sighted policy.



In the conflagration of the past few months, thousands of homes, mostly belonging to Madurese transmigrants, have been destroyed. One month after the bitter conflict erupted in Sanggau Ledo [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 139, February 1997] the conflict flared again when forty Madurese youths attacked the Santo Fransiskus Asisi Catholic secondary school attended by Dayak children in the capital, Pontianak. Other buildings were attacked and two Dayak women were stabbed and had to be rushed to hospital. A day later, on 30 January, Madurese halted public vehicles coming from Pontianak and started molesting Dayak passengers. These actions became more vicious the next day when in Peniraman some Dayaks were killed. This incident later became known as the Peniraman incident and was the start of a new stage in the conflict.

An important Dayak Tumengung (traditional leader) named Nyungkat was killed. It was this death that further fuelled the flames of Dayak fury. News quickly spread that there had been many casualties on both sides, adding to the mutual recriminations.

#### Heavy casualties

The military have throughout been determined to hide the true extent of the conflict. They claim that 300 people died in the clashes, with the two communities suffering roughly the same number of casualties. Other sources are convinced that the figure is much higher. Non-governmental organisations have made a tally of the number of victims in each of the districts in West Kalimantan and put the death toll at 1,720. The Muslim student organisation PMII conducted an inquiry in February and concluded that 1,200 people were missing. It has to be presumed that they confined themselves to Madurese communities. The team visited several Madurese villages and based their conclusions on reports from villagers. Other sources put the death toll as high as 3,000.

At least 19,000 Madurese have been displaced and it is not known how many Dayaks had to flee their homes. Journalists have been denied access to the interior but relying on a variety of sources, they have been able to produced a somewhat clearer picture of the conflict.

#### War situation

The Economist reported on 15 February that "driving inland from the west coast of Kalimantan is like entering a war zone". The Bangkok daily Asia Times reported on 20 February: "The burnings and killings continue. Despite repeated government announcements that the area is safe, the Dayak and Indonesian army roadblocks still stand. There is widespread fear that violence, even in Pontianak, can break out any time".

In the third week of February several Dayak communities sent out the 'red cup' across the region, according to Dayak tradition, the sign of a declaration of war. They called for support from all Dayak communities in the three provinces of Kalimantan. The red cup is in fact white but is filled with human blood to symbolise war.

## SOCIAL UNREST

#### Anjungan and Sungei Kunyit atrocities

There were many bloody incidents during the three months only some of which have been properly reported. The Anjungan tragedy started on 3 February when hundreds of Dayaks attacked a military post at Anjungan. Many Madurese were taking refuge there. What seemed to be happening was that Madurese were being killed by Dayaks and Dayaks were being killed by the military. In one incident, 17 Dayaks were shot dead by troops. The corpses of Dayaks and Madurese were buried in a mass grave at Mandor. A day later Madurese homes were set ablaze throughout the Pontianak subdistrict, in the villages of Sake, Salatiga, Mandor, Senakin, Pahauman, Darit and Ngabang. After large numbers of Madurese had been killed, Lt Colonel Untung Badja, the local military commander ordered his men to shoot trouble-makers on sight.

That afternoon, two truck-loads of Dayaks managed to break through a military road block at Anjungan. Troops punctured the tyres with their firearms and the trucks overturned. All the men on the trucks were shot dead in a volley of machine-gun fire. Their bodies were left to rot in the ricefields. An estimated one hundred Dayaks died in this atrocity. On 4 February an estimated 250 Madurese were killed in Salatiga, some of the corpses were discovered in a cave. Another 450 Madurese died in Tayan, 200 in Pahauman and another 100 in Ngabang.

Some reports we have received are really too gruesome to reproduce.

Another incident reported in the press occurred in the Sungai Kunyit area. On the evening of 17 February several thousand ethnic Dayaks gathered in Toho, the nearest village to Suak, a Madurese settlement. There were no troops in the vicinity to intervene in time. The next morning Suak was attacked by Dayaks armed with rifles, blow pipes and knives. When the military finally restored order, the entire village had been burned down and 17 people had been killed. More than a thousand Madurese had to flee from their houses. For the first time the army started rounding people up and 86 Dayaks and Madurese were arrested.

## Dayaks marginalised

Several articles in the Indonesian press have highlighted the marginalisation of the Dayaks. Many foreign companies have been attracted by the fabulous profits to be made from exploiting Kalimantan's natural resources. Mining companies, logging companies, plantations, private and state companies have joined the rat race. Needless to say, such unbridled exploitation of the island's wealth has left the Dayaks on the sidelines. The labour force has been brought in from elsewhere while the informal business sector including small traders and public transport companies, are all in the hands of non-Dayaks.

This marginalisation extends to the upper strata of the bureaucracy. Only one of the seven bupatis (district head) in West Kalimantan is an ethnic Dayak and he got the job only after the intervention of the present governor, Aspar Aswin, a retired major-general. Local customs used in the past for running community affairs have been ditched and replaced by the Indonesian way of doing things. What this

has meant is the spread of the venal corruption, nepotism and favouritism that thrive in Jakarta.

Already in the seventies, Dayak communities were feeling the impact of racism and discrimination. Their longhouses were destroyed because, the bureaucrats argued, they were unhygienic and promoted improper sexual relations. The fact that the Dayak lifestyle had evolved over many centuries, with its own distinctive cultural and social values, was simply brushed aside.

#### The Madura-Dayak conflict

The Madurese, a migrant ethnic group from the island of Madura, off the north coast of East Java, are bearing the brunt of Dayak fury, fuelled not only by cultural differences but also by political and economic discontent. The position of the Madurese is not unlike that of the Dayaks, poor and marginalised. With few exceptions, Madurese are at the bottom of the economic ladder. They are known to be hard-working and take unskilled jobs in construction and road building. On the other hand, many Madurese are farmers which means that they live cheek by jowl with Dayak communities.

As marginalised communities they have a lot in common but their conflicting roles and positions can put them on a collision course. The Madurese hold firmly to their own traditions, further intensified by the fact that they have been transplanted from their home base. Many Dayaks have been converted to Christianity in contrast with the Madurese who are very pious Muslims. The conflicts between the two ethnic groups is not new; in 1973, 1977 and 1979 serious ethnic clashes erupted. Every time the authorities thought they could solve the problem by staging peace ceremonies involving local leaders whom the local administrators regard as people representing the different communities. They tried the same thing this time as well without having the slightest effect on what was happening on the ground. The roots of the problem, social, political, cultural and economic, remain untouched.

## Dayaks and Madurese to be charged

According to independent reports, 164 people have been taken into custody and are likely to be tried on a number of charges. They include a group of Madurese to be charged with acts of violence at the start of the conflict, five Dayaks accused of acts of violence early in January, 29 Dayaks accused of mounting an attack on an army barracks in Anjungan on 4 February, a journalist working in the area for *Kompas* who is accused of circulating a chronology about the Senggau Ledo incident, plus a large number of Madurese who are being charged with many acts of violence.

Meanwhile, what may be fabricated documents alleging the existence of a movement for a Republik Dayak Merdeka or Free Dayak Republic, have been circulating widely in the region. Press reports in Jakarta suggest that seven Dayak community leaders could face subversion charges for alleged involvement in this movement. They include Stephanus Juweng, who heads the Institute of Dayakology in Pontianak, a body that has been researching the problems of indigenous people for several years, and S.M. Kaphat, a local MP who is also leader of the provincial branch of the PDI. All seven have denounced the allegations as pure fantasy.



# Wave of arrests in Aceh

After a period of relative calm, Aceh is in the news again. Fourteen people have been arrested for alleged involvement in the Free Aceh Movement. The Indonesian military have confiscated a large number of weapons. They still regard Aceh as one of the main trouble spots in the archipelago. Aceh is closed to outside investigation; no independent human rights observers have been allowed in.

Headlines like "GPK comeback?" in the Indonesian press suggest that considerable importance is being attached to recent events in Aceh. GPK is the derogatory acronym used against all liberation struggles including the Free Aceh Movement or GAM. Even more significantly, the North Sumatra military commander, Major General Sedaryanto admitted in an interview with the Jakarta fortnightly, Forum Keadilan that 'the situation here is not yet stable'.

Since 1989 ABRI, the Indonesian armed forces have been conducting continuous military operations in Aceh under the code name *Operasi Jaring Merah* (Operation Red Net). The operation has been renewed annually and *Operasi Jaring Merah phase VII* was concluded at the end of 1996.


ABRI is now conducting a new wave of operations because of renewed activities apparently being undertaken by the Free Aceh Movement. The 1997 operation has been code-named *Operasi Jaring Kikis*, or Operation Network Extermination.

#### Military operations

On 26 February, Major General Sedaryanto told the press that his troops had staged an ambush in Panggoi Bawah Cunda village in the Lhokseumawe subdistrict. Other military operations were also conducted by a territorial military intelligence squad backed up by *Kopassus*, the red beret special commando unit. The military operations began at the end of January and were still underway in mid-March.

The operations were initiated in Kampung Peudawa Rayeuk, East Aceh where the army claims to have confiscated five AK47 semi-automatic rifles, other firearms and ammunition. Two people were arrested. ABRI also ambushed a house in Tanjung Balai which is located outside Aceh, in North Sumatra and arrested a fisherman, Muhammad Daud Abubakar, who was allegedly operating as a courier for *GAM*.

Soon after, ABRI raided a house in the village of Lho'beuringin, subdistrict of Tanah Jambo Aye in North Aceh, confiscating more firearms. On 24 February ABRI claims to have ambushed a *GAM* headquarters near the village of Alue Bu Tuha, subdistrict of Peureulak in East Aceh. Nine people were arrested and yet more firearms and ammunition were seized. The following day a *Kopassus* unit attacked a house in Panggoi Lama, subdistrict of Muara Dua in North Aceh. Another 14 AK47s and M16



JOHN WADDINGHAM

machine guns were found, along with hundreds of bullets. During these and subsequent operations, the army claims to have confiscated nearly two hundred firearms.

(Readers should note that our information is based entirely on reports in the Indonesian press which relies almost exclusively on military sources. No information from the Acehnese resistance has been forthcoming.)

#### **Grim situation**

Military operations have clearly reached a new pitch as the situation in Aceh has reverted to the grim conditions of the early nineties. Roadblocks have been set up along all the main roads, with security posts manned by the combined forces of military, police and military-police, checking up on the travelling public. People are required to show their identity cards and are subjected to body searches. Night patrols have been intensified in the villages. One person who travelled from Medan to Banda Aceh, a distance of 570 kms, went through at least four patrol posts. Public means of transport like buses suffer long delays as each passenger is questioned by troops. Along the eastern coastal route in Aceh the situation is even worse. Platoons

continued on page 7

# Judicial review on hold

TAPOL, Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), and the World Development Movement (WDM) are considering their legal options after they failed to persuade the High Court to allow a review of the Government's decision to licence the export of water cannon and armoured vehicles to Indonesia.

The decision of Mr Justice Laws in the High Court on 25 March to dismiss the application made by TAPOL, CAAT and WDM for leave to apply for judicial review stunned many of those present in the court packed with supporters of the three organisations.

The organisations have the option of re-submitting their application to the Court of Appeal within ten days; at the time of writing, they are waiting for an eminent barrister to advise on their chances of success.

#### Re-equipping ABRI for the elections

On 9 December last year, just ten days after a National Audit Office report suggested that an aid project to train Indonesian police officers was used as a sweetener for arms sales [see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 139, February 1997], the President of the Board of Trade, Ian Lang, announced that he had granted two licences for the export to Indonesia of 50 armoured vehicles and a variety of police vehicles, including seven Tactica water cannon. It was only after questions about these licences were asked in Parliament by Ann Clwyd MP that the Government was forced to reveal that the 'variety of police vehicles' included over 300 armoured vehicles and that Britain is, therefore, involved in a major re-equipping of the Indonesian police force with a broad range of repressive and potentially lethal equipment. This equipment is likely to be used in the security measures being put in place for the Indonesian elections on 29 May.

According to Jane's Defence Weekly, the 50 armoured vehicles are Scorpions made by Alvis of Coventry. The licence for the water cannon and other police vehicles was issued to Procurement Sevices International Ltd., but the equipment is manufactured by Glover Webb of Hamble, Hampshire, a subsidiary of the GKN defence combine.

The British Government has always claimed that it does not licence for export equipment which is likely to be used for internal repression in Indonesia or East Timor, and that Indonesia has given assurances that British-supplied equipment will not be used for repressive purposes. The Government also claims to take account of international guidelines agreed by the UN Security Council, the EU and the Europe-wide OSCE, which require exporters to have regard to the buyer country's human rights record and its record of compliance with its international obligations.

One of the possible effects of the High Court judgment, as it stands, is that all these considerations will count for little or nothing if the Government makes a political decision that exports to a particular country should be allowed in view of 'overall foreign policy considerations'. In this case, the President of the Board of Trade has been able to

grant the two licences in the face of considerable evidence that previously-exported armoured vehicles and water cannon were used for internal repression in Indonesia.




A British Tactica armoured vehicle patrolling in the streets of Jakarta.

The Government was aware that in April of last year, British-made armoured vehicles were used in the violent assault on the university campus in Ujung Pandung, South Sulawesi, to stop students protesting against bus fare increases. This armed attack against defenceless demonstrators resulted in many injuries and three student deaths [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 135, June 1996]. The Government has acknowledged that excessive force was used on that occasion to repress legitimate internal protest and that the use of the armoured vehicles was a breach of the assurances given by the Indonesian Government.

Forty days later various peaceful demonstrations were held to commemorate the deaths of the students who died at Ujung Pandung. One such demonstration, in Bandung, West Java, was forcefully broken up by the use of chemicals sprayed on demonstrators from a British-made water cannon. TAPOL obtained photographic evidence of the assault on the demonstrators and a statement by Agus Edi Santoso, the Chairperson of *PIPHAM*, the Centre for Human Rights, Information and Education, based in Jakarta. According to him:

'During that action, the security forces led by BRIMOB [the Mobile Brigade is the shock force of the Indonesian

police] sprayed liquid from a British-manufactured armoured vehicle which is called WWC. The water sprayed was not plain water; it was mixed with a chemical. People hit by the liquid felt faint and lost their balance (they felt like falling to the ground).'



British water cannon were also deployed in Jakarta on 27/28 July last year, during and after the police-led raid on the headquarters of the Indonesian Democratic Party [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 136, August 1996]. TAPOL obtained video evidence of water cannon (not British in this case) spraying a pink substance (probably water mixed with CS gas or dye) at civilians during that weekend. The Foreign Office Minister, Jeremy Hanley, stated quite categorically, in Parliament on 30 October 1996, that the use of water cannon against peaceful demonstrators and the use of chemicals or dyes with the water cannon is 'totally unacceptable'.

All the photographic and video evidence was supplied to the Government at the beginning of February. An accompanying letter from Stephen Grosz of Bindman & Partners, the solicitors acting for TAPOL, CAAT and WDM, asked the Government to revoke the licences on the grounds that the decision to grant them was an 'irrational and unlawful' application of the Government's own clearly-stated policy on arms exports. At no point has the Government disputed any of the evidence submitted to it.

Concern about the likely use of the British equipment heightened in February when Scorpion tanks were displayed before the Armed Forces (ABRI) Commander in Chief, General Feisal Tanjung, as part of the equipment to be used by the security forces to 'safeguard' the 1997 elections. A few days later General Tanjung announced that ABRI would adopt an attitude of 'contained repression' and

# **UK-INDONESIA TIES**

troops would 'shoot on sight' 'anyone who violates the law'.

On 7 March, the Government wrote to Bindman & Partners to confirm that it would not revoke the licences. It contended that the decision to issue the licences was a matter for political judgment and that such decisions were affected by 'overall foreign policy considerations'. Mr Justice Laws effectively endorsed that approach in his judgment on 25 March. He decided that the Government had looked at the allegations and concluded that they did not suffice to stop the licences. Furthermore, even if the reference to foreign policy considerations represented a shift in Government policy, that shift in policy did not provide TAPOL, CAAT and WDM with a legal ground on which they could challenge the licenses.

The three organisations are seeking a legal opinion on the exact meaning and effect of the judgment, but it may mean that even if a buyer country's human rights record is poor, and even if equipment is likely to be used for internal repression, foreign policy considerations could lead to the grant of a licence in any event.

On receipt of further legal advice, the three organisations will assess their legal and campaigning options. An updated report will be included in the next TAPOL Bulletin.

#### continued from page 14

past few years. But what is new is to arrest and charge someone who was involved in having the publication printed.

Buyung Rachmad Buchory was summoned for questioning by the Jakarta police on 20 March. He was then detained as a 'suspect'. Buyung has been closely associated with Subadio for a number of years; he was requested by the author to find a printing works that would print the pamphlet. The arrest warrant which became available after he was summoned is from January 1997 though without any mention of a date. It states that he is 'strongly suspected of committing a crime by publishing a book that insults/discredits the Indonesian government and ABRI as stipulated under Article 137 (maximum penalty sixteen months) and Article 134 (maximum penalty six years) of the Criminal Code'.

#### ERRATA

In TAPOL Bulletin No. 138 details about the new edition of James Dunn's: TIMOR: A People Betrayed were wrong. The new edition is published by ABC Books. Copies can be obtained from the Australia-East Timor Association (AETA), P.O.Box 93, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065, Australia. Costs Austr. \$35 (post free within Australia, plus postage to other countries)

The latest issue of INDEX ON CENSORSHIP Vol. 26 No.2 March/April 1997 Issue 175 has a special report on Indonesia with articles by Xanana Gusmao, Francodyn Ananta Toer, Goenawan Mohammad, Santoso and others.

Price £7.99 /\$9,99 Order from IoC, Lancaster House, 33 Islington High Street, London N1 9LH, Tel. 0171-278 2313, Fax 0171-278 1878, email: indexoncenso@gn.apc.org

# UK academic course for ABRI scrapped

A plan to hold annual education courses over a five-year period for senior officers of the Indonesian armed forces by the Centre for Defence Studies which is part of Kings College, University of London, was scrapped after academics and human rights groups strongly expressed their objections to the idea.

The six-week course would have been held once a year in Indonesia commencing July 1997. The idea emerged following a visit to London last autumn by Major-General Prabowo, the son-in-law of President Suharto and commander of the army's most battle-hardened unit, *Kopassus*. The idea most likely germinated during the hostage crisis in West Papua in 1996 when Prabowo was in command of the operation to free the hostages of whom four were British and was in daily contact with the British military attache and other embassy officials. The British Government must have viewed this course as a way of 'repaying' Prabowo and his men for their services in rescuing the four Britons.

For Prabowo, such a course would serve his own plans to produce what he regards as a more highly professionalised and well educated officer corps, in promotion of his aim to restore ABRI's position as a social and political forces in the Indonesian body politic. (See item on ABRI in this Bulletin.)

#### CDS and the British Government

The CDS is funded by the Ministry of Defence and functions as a think-tank as well as providing courses for armies in various countries, in broad compliance with British government foreign policy interests. Such courses provide the CDS with additional income for its staff; the Indonesian course would have been funded by the Indonesian Government. The course would also have involved the Centre for South East Asian Studies at the University of Hull and the Royal Military College of Science in Shrivenham. All communications between the British organisers and the Indonesian armed forces would have been channelled through the British defence attache in Jakarta, Colonel Hellberg who also played a key part in negotiating the deal.

A CDS letter addressed to MPs, journalists and NGOs stressed that its insistence 'that issues pertaining to human rights and humanitarian law be included on the curriculum had met with no resistance whatsoever'.

#### Academics enraged

Publicity about the course got off to a bad start with a report in *The Guardian* [5 March] stressing Indonesia's appalling human rights record and quoting Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL as describing it as 'a neat arrangement to give the Indonesian forces a human rights gloss'. She also called it a 'new example of the cosy arrangement between the British government and the Indonesian armed forces'.

The very same day, academics at Kings were contacting TAPOL to seek our reaction and saying that they had no

idea that such a course was being organised by anyone at Kings until they read about it in *The Guardian*. It was immediately decided to convene a public meeting on the campus at which TAPOL, the Labour MP, Ann Clwyd, and Estevao Cabral, an East Timorese political exile living in the UK would speak. The meeting was convened by Professor Keith Ewing of the Law School at Kings. Even though it had been called at very short notice, the meeting was very well attended. A member of the CDS Board, Professor Lawrence Freedman, head of the Department of War Studies at Kings, sought to justify the course as a way of educating armed forces officers into a more open-minded approach to affairs in general and spoke of a better educated ABRI as being a 'force for change in Indonesia'.

Meanwhile, other senior staff at Kings had expressed their concern that this link would bring the College into disrepute and students started collecting signatures to a petition opposing any links with the Indonesian armed forces. The weekly newspaper of the University of London Union lambasted the plan on its front page. In Parliament, in the week before parliament was dissolved, some forty MPs supported a motion calling for the course to be scrapped.

Soon after the Kings protest meeting, Professor Freedland let it be known that he now realised that it would be very damaging to proceed with the course, for fear that it could 'tear Kings College apart'. By the time the CDS Board met a week later to consider what to do, it was clear that they would have to re-consider the whole idea. In a statement issued on 24 March, it was decided 'that it would be inappropriate for both educational and practical reasons to proceed with the course in 1997 or in subsequent years under existing circumstances'. It also stated that, at a future meeting, it would discuss 'the criteria against which future proposals of this kind can be evaluated'.

#### MA places for Indonesian officers

Another plan, to grant ten places to ten Indonesian army officers to take an MA one-year course at the Department of War Studies, was also restructured; instead of allowing ABRI to fill the places in a group, it will now be left to individual officers to apply for places and be accepted on merit. In a letter to the Principal of Kings College, Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL described this programme as equally contentious. She asked whether the military careers of these officers could be vetted to discover whether any had been involved in human rights abuses or extrajudicial killings. 'There will be a number of persons in this country, ourselves included, who would be anxious to know who they are,' she wrote.

# **HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEFS**

#### Draft labour law criticised by NGO

The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation - the YLBHI - has blasted the government for its manpower bill which it said would subject workers to even worse conditions than currently exist. Teten Masduki, for the Foundation, told Jakarta Post Tuesday [Jakarta Post, 26 December 1996] that the government-sponsored bill would legalise unfair labour practices, lessen workers' room to fight for their welfare, and could further enhance Indonesia's image as a source of cheap labour.

'The bill serves to meet the state's economic and political interests, using, as its justification, the need to face competition on the world market. 'The bill does not reflect the interests (of the workers),' Teten said.

If passed into law, the bill would make it even more difficult for the government to protect workers' rights in times of free and harsh competition, he pointed out.

The bill seeks to amend the 1969 Law No. 14 on Manpower, which stipulates that the government has the authority to conduct 'labour inspections' and enforce the law. If passed, the bill will allow the government to interfere in labour industrial disputes, without restraint.

The bill is expected to pass into law before the general election in May.

Many activists have criticised the bill for omitting provisions on workers' right to associate and to assemble. They believe this would, directly or indirectly, leave workers with no choice but to join the sole officially sanctioned All-Indonesia Workers Union Federation rather than establishing their own unions or join those that already exist.

Lutfi Hakim, director of the legal aid division at the Jakarta chapter of the independent union, the SBSI - the Indonesian Prosperous Workers' Union, said amending the law would be useless unless follow-up regulations are introduced.

The only point on which the government appears to have listened to NGOs is that it also covers workers in the informal section. Criticism of the existing laws includes lack of provisions on the protection of child workers, migrant workers and indigenous people.


Antara reported that only 68 of the 16,737 companies which violated manpower regulations in 1996 have been taken to court. Director general for supervision of workers of the Ministry of Manpower, Suwarto, said that of the 68 companies brought to court, 25 had been handed a verdict. Of these, five company owners were sentenced to imprisonment and 20 were fined. [Jakarta Post, 26 December 1996]

#### Seminar on elections cancelled

A one-day seminar on the need for free and fair elections was banned by the police who said that the organising committee had failed to notify the authorities of the event. Asmara Nababan, a member of the National Human Rights Commission, who was on the seminar organising committee, said that after discussions with the police, he had agreed to postpone the event for eight days. According to regulations, police must be informed of events at least one week ahead.

The seminar was convened by the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development, INFID, the Catholic Students Association, PIJAR and the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights Foundation, PHBI. The speakers were to have included Hadimulyo of the PPP, one of the three parties contesting the election, Mustahid Artari of GOL-KAR, and Alex Litaay of the pro-Megawati PDI which has been excluded from the elections. Other speakers were Mulyana W. Kusumah of the independent monitoring committee, KIPP, Marzuki Darusman of the National Human Rights Commission and political analyst, Arbi Sanit.

PHBI spokesperson Paskah Irianto, criticising the police decision, said that 'permit politics' were being used to curb people's initiatives. 'It clearly contradicts freedom of expression and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution,' he said. [Jakarta Post, 14 March]



#### Indonesian 'comfort women' cheated

A total of 249 Indonesian women who were forced to work as sex slaves by Japanese troops during the Japanese occupation of Indonesia have rejected a government plan to use \$4 million offered in compensation by the Japanese government for the establishment of rest homes. They plan to sue the Japanese ambassador to Indonesia and the Indonesian minister for social affairs if the plan is not cancelled and the money paid direct to the victims themselves. The Japanese government wants to channel the cash to the Indonesian ministry through the Asian Women's Club.

Budi Hartono, the lawyer representing the women, said that a UN resolution in July 1996 requires the Japanese government to apologise to the women before paying any compensation and urged Tokyo to withhold the money until the proper procedures have been followed.

The 249 women involved are only a small fraction of the thousands of Indonesian women forced to become so-called 'comfort women'. 'The Asian Women's Club should be dissolved because it's only a tool of the Japanese government's political engineering and has given misleading information about Japanese troops' atrocities,' said Budi. [Jakarta Post, 12 March]

# US seminars damage Jakarta's reputation

At a time when the Suharto regime is becoming a major political issue in the US, the issue of East Timor was discussed at seminars in more than a dozen university campuses in the US and Canada. A bill in Congress to introduce military sanctions is gaining support while in Massachusetts, the state legislature is discussing trade sanctions against Indonesia.

The bill in Congress being sponsored by Representative Patrick Kennedy who visited East Timor last December is titled: the Indonesian Military Assistance Accountability Act. With the support of both Democrats and Republicans, it would make future military assistance to Indonesia conditional upon human rights performance. In the last fiscal year, the US provided \$26 million in military assistance to the Indonesian armed forces, plus \$600,000 for the military education and training programme, IMET.

Meanwhile in Boston, the Massachusetts legislature is considering a bill which would bar the state from doing business with companies which have ties with Indonesia, as well as divesting its pension funds of all Indonesian assets. A hearing on the bill was addressed by Nobel laureate Jose Ramos-Horta, while Jakarta sent three prointegration East Timorese to oppose the bill. The bill is sponsored by State Representative Antonio Cabral who said he had introduced the measure to protest at Indonesia's treatment of East Timor.

#### Clinton on a referendum for Timor

Soon after his election for a second term, Bill Clinton for the first time expressed an interest in the question of a referendum in East Timor. In a 27 December letter to Senator Russell Feingold of Wisconsin, President Clinton wrote: 'I note with interest your support of a UN-sponsored self-determination referendum in East Timor. I will take your idea into consideration.' He also spoke favourably of using 'a combination of engagement and pressure' on Indonesia. [IPS, 25 February]

The Clinton Administration now appears to be ditching the sale to Indonesia of F-16 fighter jets which was scheduled to be announced in January, immediately after Clinton's inauguration. Pressure to halt the sale has come from human rights groups and also because of the continuing scandal about Indonesian business donations to Clinton's election funding. According to the *Wall Street Journal* [25 March], after a number of delays in announcing the deal, it now appears 'dead in any immediate time frame where it matters'.

#### Seminars on East Timor and Indonesia

It was against this background that more than a dozen seminars were held across the US in February and March around the theme, 'Self-Determination for East Timor, Democratisation in Indonesia'.

Organised by the Foundation of Portuguese Universities in co-operation with universities in North America, they



Seminar at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. From left to right:: Dino Patti Djalal, Liem Soei Liong, Antonio Barbedo Magelhaes, Geoffrey Robinson, Clementino do Amaral and Bishop Hilton Deakin.

took place in such prestigious universities as Columbia, Harvard, Brown and the University of California in Los Angeles. The tour ended in Vancouver, with seminars at Simon Fraser University and the University of British Columbia. The seminars are the brainchild of Professor Antonio Barbedo de Magelhaes, who first started holding seminars on East Timor at Oporto University in the 1980s. The East Timor Action Network in the US and the East Timor Alert Network in Canada which both have chapters in many universities were also involved in organising the events.

Among the East Timorese who participated were Nobel laureate Jose Ramos-Horta, Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri and UDT leader Joao Carrascalao. US-based Timorese included Constancio Pinto and Joao Mariano Saldanha while two Timorese from Dili were also present, Dr. Armindo Maia, the Vice-rector of the University of East Timor and Dr. Arlindo Marçal, former leader of the Protestant church in East Timor. Among the Indonesian activists invited to were Dr. Kastorius Sinaga, Sugeng Bahagyo, Helmy Fauzy and exiles Dr. George Aditiondro and Liem Soei Liong. International guests included Bishop Hilton Deakin and Dr. Juan Federer from Australia, and Dr. Monica Schlicher and Loyang Soenario from Germany. From Portugal came Madaleina Almeida Veiga and Pedro Pinto Leite. Academics from Portugal included Professor Luis Filipe Lobo Fernandes, Professor Maria Lourdes Bettencourt Pires, Professor Vasco Garcia and Dr. Jose Azeredo Lopes. continued on page 11

# **BOOK REVIEW**

# EAST TIMOR'S UNFINISHED STRUGGLE, Inside the Timorese Resistance, Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine, South End Press, Boston MA, 1997, ISBN 0-89608-541-4

In the last few years, several excellent books have been written on East Timor but very few are by East Timorese themselves. This is what makes Constancio Pinto's book so exceptional. It stands out as a gem because it is the story of somebody who played a key role in the East Timorese resistance to the Indonesian occupation. Constancio Pinto embodies the gradual shift of the resistance from armed resistance to political resistance. He was born in 1963 which makes him part of the transitional generation between the founders of the independence movement like Nicolau Lobato, Xanana Gusmao and Jose Ramos Horta and the present generation of East Timorese students who rally in the streets of Dili or climb over the walls of embassies in Jakarta.

Constancio Pinto is now studying at Brown University, Rhode Island and represents the CNRM, the umbrella of the resistance movement, in the US. He has frequently represented the views of the Timorese on the international arena. His wife Gabriela joined him in exile a few years ago. They have two children Tilson and Tima. I have had the good fortune of meeting Constancio at several international gatherings.

Having followed the situation in East Timor since the invasion in December 1975, I can say that Constancio Pinto's book confirms everything I know. But because it is a personal testimony, it was so gripping that I could not put it down and was filled with many emotions. It is a must for anyone wanting to know why the East Timorese resistance is so effective despite the overwhelming presence of the occupation forces and the brutality used against the East Timorese.

Take the third chapter which describes the period of encirclement and annihilation. Like most Timorese, Constancio and his family had fled to the interior, still a liberated area. Life was relatively relaxed; there was plenty of food and Fretilin was well organised in the Remexio area, where he was staying. Constancio joined Falintil, the armed wing of the resistance, at the age of 14 for a brief period but never personally experienced any skirmishes with Indonesian troops. However, in September 1977 the situation changed dramatically. Saturation bombing began and large numbers of Indonesian troops drove the population of East Timor into captivity. "Food shortages, diseases and killings were all around us. The Indonesian army was always hunting us. We didn't know how to cope with the situation" [page 61]. It was little short of a miracle that Constancio and his whole family (his parents and seven sisters and brothers) survived. This chapter provides a compelling account of the terrible sufferings of the East Timorese people and why the Indonesians should abandon the place.

## Beginnings of the clandestine movement

Subsequent chapters are about the author's life under Indonesian occupation. At first it was a story of survival

but gradually, after Constancio joined the clandestine movement in 1983, the story reads like a thriller. Together with other East Timorese students like Donaciano Gomes and Jose Manuel Fernandes (both now in exile), he became part of a *nucleo* or cell which was in close contact with Commandant David Alex, one of the key guerrilla leaders in the armed resistance to this day. At first, the nucleo functioned mainly to give logistical support for the guerrillas but their tasks soon became more elaborate.

The year 1983 is a year to remember. Under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, the resistance emerged into the open and held its first ever negotiations with ABRI. Thereafter, the resistance took the shape of a trinity, the leadership in the bush, the clandestine front and the diplomatic front abroad. By 1985 the clandestine front network was nationwide with branches even in Oecussi, the enclave in West Timor, and East Timorese students living in Indonesia also became part of the network. At first, clandestine activities were underground but in 1988 it was decided that actions were needed to win over public opinion.

Suharto's visit to Dili in 1988, was a turning point. Faced with growing international criticism, Suharto wanted to show the outside world that Indonesia had nothing to hide in East Timor. A period of relative openness was launched. The visit of Pope John Paul to East Timor in October 1989 turned out to be a general rehearsal for the clandestine front's strategy to tell the world about the plight of the East Timorese. The clandestine front increasingly became a political front, showing open defiance to the Indonesian forces of occupation. Actions taken by East Timorese youth helped to shape international public opinion. Gradually East Timor became known to a wider public and the forgotten war was gradually transformed into the inspiration it now is in so many countries.

#### Raising the stakes

Then, Constancio and his comrades started taking more and more risks. After 28 May 1990, when the CNRM was established under the leadership of Xanana Gusmao, the clandestine front was reorganised and Constancio, then only 27 years old, was elected secretary of the executive committee. In the meantime, actions continued. In June 1990 during the visit of US Ambassador John Monjo, they launched another daring demonstration with pamphlets and banners which made the headlines. The visit by an Australian lawyer, Robert Domm, to the bush headquarters of Xanana, was largely due to the efforts of Constancio and his group. He remained a key leader of the urban resistance up to the demonstration of 12 November 1991 that led to the Santa Cruz bloodbath. His escape from East Timor and the problems that dogged him until his safe arrival in Macau, is one of the most gripping parts of the book.

## Working as a 'double agent'

Like many key people in the clandestine front, Constancio fell into the clutches of the military intelligence when he was arrested in January 1991. After being badly tortured, he decided to save his life by offering to work for the Indonesian intelligence. For a brief period he functioned as a kind of double agent, promising to lead the army to Xanana's hideout, but soon the military realised that he was involved in preparing a demonstration on 12 November at a time when most underground leaders were in detention. His most difficult problem was to conceal his connections with Xanana Gusmao, who was in hiding in

Dili. At one point Constancio was forced underground and named public enemy No 2 after Xanana Gusmao.

The co-author Matthew Jardine has written a useful introduction on the history of East Timor, the Indonesian occupation and the geopolitics of the US, along with an epilogue on recent developments and prospects in the international arena. Nobel laureate Jose Ramos Horta has written the preface while Allan Nairn, US journalist, survivor of the Santa Cruz massacre and a close friend of Constancio Pinto, has written the foreword.

This is not only a must for supporters of the East Timor solidarity movement but also for a wider public. Constancio Pinto's story shows why it is that the East Timorese deserve the solidarity of anybody who cherishes peace and justice.

Liem Soei Liong

East Timor's Unfinished Struggle by Constancio Pinto and Matthew Jardine can be ordered from ETAN/US P.O.Box 1182, White Plains NY 10602 USA, tel. 914 428 7299 or email etan-us@igc.apc.org. US\$ 16.00, add 30% for international airmail, 20% for surface mail.

# Bitter Paradise, The Sell-out of East Timor, a film by Elaine Brière, Snapshot Productions, 1997.

I had the good fortune to attend the premiere of *Bitter Paradise* in a packed hall in the heart of Vancouver, on the west coast of Canada. Elaine Brière received a standing ovation from the 700 people, which is truly well deserved. It is through Elaine's dedicated efforts over the years that the East Timor issue has become known to the average citizen in Canada.

It took Elaine Brière about 7 years to produce this film. Lack of finances, bad health and other problems led to what must have seemed like insuperable barriers. But the end result is powerful. It sets out to show how Elaine Brière first stumbled across East Timor in early 1974, before the upheavals in Lisbon which changed the country's history. During that chance visit, she took scores of stunning black-and-white photographs which have since become a familiar feature for East Timor campaigners around the world. After hearing of the invasion, her personal experiences of the beautiful, peaceful country transformed her into a dedicated campaigner for the people she had grown to love.

The 56-minute documentary portrays her deep affection for the people of East Timor and their culture and how the brutal invasion of Indonesia in 1975 changed everything. She focuses on the treacherous role of Canadian governments in ignoring the tragedy, preferring to promote Canada's commercial ties with Indonesia. She interviewed a number of Canadian businessmen who expressed ignorance, saying bluntly that what happens in East Timor is not their concern. Every Canadian citizen as well as decent citizens in any country cannot but be touched by the film. She also focuses on the growth of the international solidarity movement, giving credit to the many veteran activists around the world.

Elaine Brière is a founder/member of ETAN, the rapidly expanding East Timor Alert Network in Canada. She has written articles, spoken to audiences and travelled widely in support of the East Timor cause. My first encounter with

her was at the United Nations in New York and I'm proud to be one of her close friends.

Although she made this, her first film, with no previous experience in film-making, the documentary has been nominated for awards at three film festivals. Bitter Paradise is worthy of being shown around the world, not only in Canada, so I would urge readers to purchase the video and try to get a wider screening, in cinemas or on television.

Liem Soei Liong

Bitter Paradise can be ordered through SNAPSHOT Productions, 1657 East 55th Avenue, Vancouver, BC V5P 1Z4

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