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## The Liquisa massacre

*On 12 January, Indonesian troops murdered six villagers in the village of Gariana, Liquisa district, claiming that they were guerrillas. A statement from the CNRM, the East Timor council of resistance that the victims were civilians who had been shot dead in cold blood was later confirmed by the BBC World Service. The massacre was widely condemned, forcing Jakarta to investigate the affair.*

Liquisa is a small town on the north coast of East Timor, some thirty miles west of Dili. It has never before figured in reports about guerrilla activities so army claims that guerrillas were active in the area came as something of a surprise.

The six victims of the massacre were Jose Nunes, kampung head, Abel Nunes, a relative, Augusto Pinto Nunes, Victoria, the son of Augusto, Americo Araujo and Osario Soares. The day before they were captured on 11 January, there was an encounter between soldiers and guerrillas during which a soldier was injured; all the guerrillas got away with weapons seized from the army. Hoping to avenge their botched operation, the troops entered the village of Gariana the next day, to hunt down the guerrillas. They captured the

kampung head, Jose Nunes and three others and forced them, with their hands tied, to lead them to where the guerrillas were thought to be hiding. An alleged guerrilla named Antonio was found hiding in a hut with two others. Antonio fled to the hills with soldiers on his heels but he escaped. The troops returned, rounded up the two men who had been found in the hut. They and the other four were then dragged to the river Magatai and shot dead. [Forum Keadilan, 16.III.1995]

### Army revenge

A Reuter report from Jakarta on 14 March confirms that a day before the killing of the six a major gun-battle took place between the Timorese armed resistance and Indonesian

## New press clampdown

### Journalists arrested

*Within a single week in March, security officers raided the offices of three organisations and arrested a number of people. On 10 March the offices of PIJAR and ALDERA were raided; a week later it was AJI's turn.*

Already for several weeks rumours circulated that the authorities would take stern action against several publications, in particular those published without the obligatory SIUPP printing licence. During the 10 March raid on PIJAR and the arrest of Tri Agus Siswomihardjo, editor of its publication, *Kabar Dari Pijar* (News from PIJAR), it became clear that the press clampdown of June 1994 when three major weeklies were closed down was far from over. A week later, five members of AJI, the Alliance of Independent Journalists, were arrested: Ahmad Taufik, Eko Maryadi, Danang, J. Sahir and Abdul Haris. Both PIJAR, an outspoken NGO based in Jakarta and AJI, set up in the wake of

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troops. Timorese sources told Reuter that the 11 January clash was one of the biggest in years in the territory confirming that guerrilla activities are far from over. It involved 60 guerrillas including the leader Konis Santana. In this clash one Timorese was killed while the Indonesian troops suffered two casualties. "... That made them angry, which is why they killed the six civilians", the source said.

Since 1992 Indonesian troops have captured three of the main resistance leaders, including Xanana Gusmao.

When it emerged in early February that diplomats in Jakarta from the Australian, Canadian, US and Dutch embassies were seeking clarifications about the killings, it was clear that Suharto would have to act before international protests



snowballed out of control. International concern was in any case spreading because of the alarming reports from Dili about hooded gangs who were terrorising the community. [See separate item.]

## The army's version

The army was quick to present its own version of what had happened. Having said initially that 'six guerrillas' had been killed, the story changed. They now said, two were guerrillas and the other four were civilians who were supporting the guerrillas and therefore legitimate targets.

When interest persisted, the local military commander elaborated on the operation, claiming that the local district chief had reported the presence of guerrillas in the area. The army then sent out a unit to hunt down a group of 45 guerrillas. They captured the kampung chief and three others found in his house all of whom had allegedly been in regular contact with the guerrillas. These four captives were then ordered to help the soldiers hunt down a guerrilla named Antonio da Silva. After a day's fruitless search, they came to a hut where Antonio and two others were allegedly hiding. The troops opened fire. Antonio escaped and the others were shot dead in the hut. As this was going on, the four captives ran off whereupon another group of soldiers opened fire, killing them all.

With interest in the incident growing, armed forces com-

mand-in-chief General Feisal Tanjung reported the results of initial investigations to President Suharto. This led State Secretary Moerdiono to announce that army procedures had been violated and courts martial might follow. Two army investigations were then initiated, one under the command of the Inspector-General of the armed forces which confirmed that violations had occurred, but it was left to an Honorary Council of Officers (DKP) to identify the mistakes and the punishment. As we went to press, the findings of the Council had not been announced.

All the while, the officers in charge of operations in East Timor, Colonel Kiki Syahnakri in Dili and his superior in Bali, Major-General Adang Ruhiatna, Udayana regional commander, were insisting that the troops had acted correctly, vigorously denying that innocent civilians had been killed. Justification for the massacre also came from General Feisal Tanjung who claimed that the guerrillas had been hoping to establish a base in Liquisa, near Dili, from where they could draw world attention to their presence.

## Enter the KOMNAS HAM

Meanwhile, the National Commission for Human Rights decided to initiate investigations, its first venture into East Timor affairs since its establishment two years ago. The investigation team was headed by its chair, Ali Said, former Chief Justice, with its only East Timorese member, Clementino dos Reis Amaral, taking part. Since the team pressed ahead with plans to meet and question villagers and eyewitnesses, it was bound to come up with a version different from the army's.

A brief summary of its findings was made public on 1 March. Although it confirmed that all the victims were civilians, it confused things by saying that "it had not yet been possible to ascertain their status". However, the Commission insisted that the six men were intimidated and tortured before being put to death, that the troops had acted 'recklessly', that the shooting was 'in violation of the law' and that relatives had been prevented from obtaining information and the bodies had been treated inhumanely.

The Commission has been criticised by the Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) for not publishing its findings in full; they will only be made available to the government. "This reinforces public doubts about the Commission's objectivity and independence," the Institute said in a statement on 9 March. It called for a National Investigation Team to be set up, composed of NGOs, members of the press and other persons known for their integrity.

## TAPOL calls for military to withdraw

In a statement welcoming the National Commission's initial findings, TAPOL said that the armed forces may be compelled to replace officers and discipline others as it did after the Santa Cruz massacre but this would not lead to any improvements. The international community should press for the withdrawal of all military forces from occupied East Timor as a matter of urgency, it said. \*

## Stop press

According to unofficial reports, five army officers will be dismissed for the killing of six civilians in Liquisa. They include the military commander, Colonel Kiki Syahnakri and his deputy, Lt Colonel Gleni Kairupan, the command's spokesperson Major L. Simbolon, the Liquisa district commander Lt. Colonel Tri Syarawan, and 1st Lt Jeremias Kase, who headed the unit in charge of the operation.



## Situation in Timor goes from bad to worse

*The killings in Liquisa (see front page) are only one incident in a pattern of escalation in human rights violations. While Indonesia is increasingly feeling international pressure over human rights violations in East Timor, it seems that this is, in some quarters, only creating an escalation of abuses.*

### Ninja death squads in action

Death squads known as "ninjas", dressed in black, with black masks and armed with knives, have been terrorising the population of Dili. A delegation of women went to Bishop Belo on 24 January to report that the gangs had been roaming through the neighbourhoods throwing stones since early December [UCAN, 1 Feb]. On 6 February, Manuel Carrascalao, a member of the provincial parliament and member of GOL-KAR, admitted that, to his knowledge, eight pro-independence activists had been murdered by these death squads since early January. He also said that "about 5,000" farmers had stopped tending their fields due to fear of the "ninjas", creating the threat of many more deaths through famine. [AP, 6 Feb]

A few days later, a Dili politician referred to the situation as "out of control", and sources spoke of at least 30 people having "disappeared", houses burned down, and terror sweeping Dili [Reuter, 10 Feb].

It is well-known in Dili that the "ninjas" are recruited, trained and equipped by the army. Dili residents single out two men, the notorious Timorese collaborator Labut Melo, and another man named Alan, as the primary recruiters and leaders of the gangs. They say that "ninjas" who have been captured by Dili residents report that they are being highly paid by the military.

In fact, both uniformed troops and paramilitary gangs seem to have been involved in a raid on the house of Gilman Gusmao, the brother-in-law of Xanana, on 9 February. Gusmao's house and those of his neighbours were destroyed, and six young men were arrested [CNRM press release, 9 Feb]. Nothing has been heard of these young men since the raid.

### People organise themselves

In response, people in Dili set up their own neighbourhood protection squads to defend themselves against the "ninjas". It may well have been this development, rather than the terror activities of the gangs themselves, which prompted the military authorities to deploy troops throughout Dili in force on 14 February, allegedly to "protect" the local population. In fact, they arrested and charged twelve men who, it seems, were pro-independence activists and involved in the neighbourhood protection vigilante squads, rather than members of the "ninja" gangs at all, as police chief Sugianto admitted [Reuter, 21 Feb]. It is also reported that one young man, Joaquim Dorego Caetano, was shot dead after two truckloads of troops and informers launched a pre-dawn raid on 15 February [Reuter, 16 Feb].

When asked whether he agreed that the ninjas were organised by the resistance, Bishop Belo said: "Why on earth should Fretilin ninjas appear now? Why not in 1974 or 1976? According to me, the ones entitled to say what the ninjas are

are the people here. They are the ones who know what's going on." [Tiras, 2.III.1995]

The ninja campaign has also terrified local, mainly Chinese, traders. According to a recent report, a thousand Chinese have decided to pack up and leave East Timor.

After the troops moved into Dili, one resident reported, the "ninjas" began to operate in outlying villages instead. Residents also reported continuing arrests and harassment, and said that four young men, arrested on 17 February, had "disappeared" [Reuter, 20 Feb].

According to a source who was in contact with Irish journalist David Shanks, this is all part of a "very, very systematic and careful elimination" of young men whose "political attitude is not right ... Young people are picked up in the fields and disappeared -- anyone with any sentiment of liberation or independence." According to this source, Bishop Belo receives visits almost every day from parents coming to report the killing of their sons [Irish Times, 25 Feb].

While all this has been going on, foreign journalists have been denied access to East Timor, and police and military officials have said that they will not discuss the matter with the press [Reuter, 20 and 21 Feb]. David Shanks of the *Irish Times* reported that his request to visit East Timor during a planned trip to Indonesia was turned down. ▽



*The notorious KOPASSUS red berets marching in Dili. It is widely recognised that these units started the ninja gangs.*



Ninjas are not new to East Timor. This kind of terror was employed in 1991 and was associated at the time with Prabowo, the army officer son-in-law of President Suharto. There is no evidence to suggest he is involved this time. In fact his close associate at that time, Abilio Osorio Soares, who is now governor of East Timor has apparently fallen out of favour and was ordered to leave East Timor for six months to attend a course of study.

## Arrests, disappearances and trials

One *Reuter* report [20 Feb] made reference to a man who is probably Henrique Belmiro, whose arrest and subsequent torture were reported in TAPOL Bulletin 127. The report noted that he remained in police custody, and that a relative who had visited him had seen signs of torture.

Others arrested are David Ximenes, Nano Karbelo and Mau Hunu. Their arrests prompted the Jakarta-based Joint Committee for the Defence of East Timorese to write to the Dili chief-of-police on 15 February expressing dismay at reports that the three were in the hands of the notorious Joint Intelligence Unit or SGI which is an infringement of the Criminal Procedural Code according to which suspects should be investigated by the police and their cases handed on to the public prosecutor, if charges are to be made. The Committee said that Ximenes was a client of theirs. Ximenes recently completed a long term of imprisonment in Jakarta's Cipinang Prison.

Mau Hunu, a guerrilla leader, was arrested in the aftermath of Xanana Gusmao's arrest and has for some time been held in semi detention, occasionally being presented to journalists as a convert to *integrasi*. His re-arrest suggests that the conversion was not for real.

More details have come to light concerning the East Timorese youths who "disappeared" after the 9 January demonstration at the University of East Timor. At least five of the students who were involved have not been seen since the demonstration, and Indonesian police admitted late in February that these five are considered to be "missing" [*Reuter*, 28 Feb]. Residents of Dili report that five bodies wrapped in rice sacks have been discovered, and they suspect that these are the bodies of the missing students. Other sources report that nine, rather than five, Timorese students were killed after the demonstration, shot by soldiers from Battalion 744 (the "Timorese battalion") at their headquarters. They also report that, when the father of one of the young men went to battalion headquarters to enquire after his son, he too was shot dead.

Meanwhile, according to police chief Sugianto, 11 East Timorese and one man from Sulawesi will be standing trial over the riots in Baucau on 1 January, and 16 Timorese youths will be tried over the 9 January demonstration.

Those arrested on 9 January will be charged under Article 154 of the Criminal Code for "insulting the President".

Trials of a number of people involved in incidents on 12 and 13 November have begun. The prosecutor's office says that 18 or 19 people will be put on trial. The first six were tried in January, charged under Article 187 (arson) and Article 55 (inciting others to commit a crime).

## Bobby Xavier tortured

Bobby Xavier is worth a special mention. He was one of several Timorese youths tried and sentenced in 1992 for allegedly killing a Timorese on the premises of Motael Church on 28 October 1991. No charges were ever brought for the

killing of Sebastiao Gomes who was killed on the same day and whose death was being commemorated on 12 November that year when the Santa Cruz massacre took place. Bobby served most of his sentence in Kupang, West Timor and was released last October. He returned to Dili and immediately became immersed in pro-independence protest.

A colleague smuggled a letter abroad in March describing what happened to him. Less than a month after his release, Bobby took part in the protests that shook Dili from 12 to 18 November and later went into hiding. After returning home to celebrate Christmas with his family, Bobby was rearrested on 26 December and heavily tortured:

*He was tied to an iron chair and wires fastened to his body. He was then given electric shocks and beaten till he fell unconscious to the floor. After regaining consciousness, the torture continued as soldiers under the command of Lt.Col. Amir slashed his forehead with a razor. Bobby told me others captured with him and held because of the November protests were similarly tortured. When delegates of the International Red Cross visited the place where they were detained, one detainee named Antonio Aitahan Matak ignored warnings from their captors and told the visitors the truth about their treatment. In retaliation, after the Red Cross officials left, he was severely tortured again and forced to drink his own urine.*

The Dili contact said that, after hearing that he might be killed, Bobby managed to escape and again went into hiding.

## Arrests follow Liquisa investigation

Soon after the National Commission for Human Rights announced its findings following its investigation into the killing of six civilians in Liquisa, the police and army in Dili announced that thirty people had been arrested in Liquisa and Dili on 4 March. The detainees have not been identified. It is feared that some may be villagers who agreed to be questioned by the Commission in its search for evidence about the atrocity. \*

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to the army in security. But with the widening gap between the palace and the army, Suharto relies more and more on the police. Police officers get better training, receive modern equipment but above all have won more prestige and power. In many places, not least in East Timor, the police are playing an increasingly important role in security. The police now have yet another chance to flex their muscles. The worsening human rights situation in Indonesia these days has much to do with the frenzied activities of the police.

## International protest

Within hours of the first news of the arrests of *AJI* members, the International Federation of Journalists in Brussels had issued a resounding call to its members in 92 countries to "protest most strongly at this campaign of intimidation". General Secretary Aidan White announced that the IFJ would be sending an international mission of solidarity to Indonesia to investigate the crisis. The IFJ accepted *AJI* as a member within weeks of its birth.

Protests and letters to President Suharto also came from the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists and the London-based Article XIX which last year produced a major report on press freedom in Indonesia. Amnesty International was quick off the mark with an Urgent Action. TAPOL also came out with a Press Release and Urgent Action. The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation also issued a strong statement condemning the arrests and announcing that it had formed a defence team to help those facing possible trial. Other organisations like Infight and LBH Nusantara have also issued strong statements against the arrests.



## East Timor becoming central to Indonesian politics

*The killing of 6 villagers in Liquisa was headline news in the Indonesian press for many weeks. Several political weeklies focused attention on East Timor. There has been a major shift in reporting and public opinion. Indonesian society is becoming more aware of the fundamental issues involved.*

The turning point was the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991. Before the bloodbath, reporting on East Timor in the Indonesian press was minimal, mostly reflecting the government's version. Reading between the lines, which has become a habit for readers of the heavily controlled Indonesian press, was the only way to get some inkling of the realities in East Timor. Since the Santa Cruz massacre, several factors have contributed to the change in perceptions.

For many Indonesians the Santa Cruz tragedy was an eye-opener; it helped them realise that there was something fundamentally wrong in East Timor. In addition, there was the international outcry; instead of being an isolated issue in a faraway place, East Timor was now firmly on the international agenda. The Indonesian press and some well-informed Indonesians were well aware that the government was having to cope with massive international pressure. The sacking of three senior officers and the jail sentences, albeit derisory, passed against several junior officers who were held responsible for the wrongdoings at Santa Cruz, was unprecedented. Since then, news from East Timor has become a regular feature in the press. Although most reporting was heavily biased, some journals took an independent line, particularly the weekly magazines *Tempo*, *Editor* and *DeTIK* which were banned in June 1994. Reporting in the daily press has also improved enormously.

A few years ago only glowing reports about developments in East Timor appeared. Nowadays there is mention of the huge unemployment problems and ethnic tensions between the Timorese and Indonesian migrants. The re-emergence of *ninjas*, masked and hooded gangs, has been well reported in the press.


The increased volume of news in the international media and regular reports by the BBC World Service, Radio Nederland and Radio Australia have also contributed to a greater understanding of the issues among news-hungry Indonesians. The truth about East Timor is not hidden any more for the Indonesian public, and the facts can be obtained in many ways.

### The issue gathers momentum

Incidents occurred one after the other; from 12 November 1991 to the Liquisa killings of 12 January 1995, there were 23 actions in East Timor. In 1994, at least fourteen demonstrations by Timorese were reported in the Indonesian press. The arrest and trial of Xanana Gusmao was a major event; his ability, locked away in Cipinang prison in Jakarta, to keep in the news has made him a household name. Frequent condemnations of Indonesia by the international community created enough material for press reports as well as spin-offs like the creation of *Komnas HAM*, the National Commission of Human Rights, initiated by President Suharto himself. This commission was seen by most human rights activists in Indonesia as a face-saving device of the government against the many attacks from foreign governments on human rights violations. The Santa Cruz massacre undoubtedly paved the

way for the establishment of *Komnas HAM*, an assertion that would be vehemently denied by the Indonesian authorities.

The persistent actions by Timorese youth, directly or indirectly organised by the Timorese clandestine movement, has also contributed to growing awareness of the Indonesian public. In particular the huge demonstration on 14 July 1994 at *Universitas Timtim* in Dili and the daring act of twenty-nine Timorese on 12 November who occupied the US embassy grounds in Jakarta were reported under banner headlines in the national press. The many actions of the Timorese helped to shatter the myth that anti-Indonesia sentiments were merely an expression of a 'tiny majority of Timorese fanned by some anti-Indonesia groups abroad'. The Timorese resistance has matured over the years and their well-planned actions in East Timor as well as in several cities in Java and Bali are making it far more difficult for the Indonesian security forces.



*A picket-line outside the Indonesian Embassy in Manila. East Timor solidarity work is spreading to all corners of the globe.*

Greater global awareness of the East Timor drama and the continuous tensions in the region itself has had an impact on political life in Jakarta. At different levels the East Timor issue has moved centre stage. The APEC summit in November 1994 was a clear example of how Timorese students filled the television screens around the world with their actions. The summit, surrounded as it was by excessive security measures, paled into insignificance. The deeds of the Timorese had a tremendous impact on the Indonesian authorities. The flamboyant Major-General Hendropriyono, the Jakarta military commander, was held responsible and was sacked by Suharto.

Growing tensions between *Bina Graha* (President Suharto's office) and *Cilangkap* (Armed Forces headquarters) are being played out these days with East Timor as the battleground. The Liquisa killings [see separate item] is another example of how Suharto is using his powers to remove military opponents because of developments in East Timor. ▷



## National Commission

The inquiry by *Komnas HAM* (National Commission of Human Rights) into the Liquisa killings created its own momentum and once again became front page news. From the beginning it was clear that members of the Commission were not impressed by the army's version of events.



*The action during the APEC conference which caught the headlines everywhere.*

The two visits to East Timor prompted interesting statements by members of the team. Prof. Muladi, a jurist and Dean of the Diponegoro State University in Semarang, Central Java said: "*Although it (East Timor) has been part of Indonesia for nearly 20 years, conditions are unchanged. Surely there must be something wrong. Now we need to know what is actually wrong*" (*Kompas*, 27 Febr. 1995). Prof. Muladi questioned the development programme. Referring to the many roads that have been built, he said: "*Is this really what the people want?*", adding that maybe they need cooperatives or other forms of development.

Another Commission member, Marzuki Darusman, went further, declaring that a policy review is needed. During his visits, he gained the impression that an increasing number of people are disillusioned with the results of *integrasi*. It does appear that members of the Commission met a much wider range of East Timorese than is normally the case of visiting Indonesian officials. Nurcholis Madjid, another member of the Commission, that the commission decided to speed up their Liquisa inquiry because of the flood of letters from abroad about the incident. [*Bernas*, 28.II.1995] As for Darusman, he frankly acknowledged that information available to Commission members from abroad is often not available from the government. [*Republika*, 20.II.1995]

The Liquisa investigation will be a testcase for the credibility and independence of *Komnas HAM*. The commission has grown in prominence; more citizens are filing their complaints with the Commission. Human rights organisations abroad and at home will constantly scrutinise its work; it will either function as an extension of the government and or it will act as a kind of Ombudsman.

## East Timor as part of the strategy

While government ministries like Foreign Affairs and the Interior as well as the security apparatus are these days being

forced to fill their days with Timor affairs, this holds true for other strata in society. The view that East Timor is a colony of Indonesia is not longer uncommon. But a variety of views are circulating among Indonesian NGOs on how to deal with the East Timor issue. Some mainstream NGOs don't want to touch the issue, still regarding it as the kiss of death. Such a view dates back several years when the East Timor issue was still seen as a taboo. These NGOs fear that the security apparatus will immediately clamp down on their activities if they make an issue of East Timor.

Along similar lines but in a kind of quasi-theoretical framework some NGOs argue that as agents of change, their role lies in bringing about fundamental change in Jakarta. Once changes have occurred in Jakarta, the pre-conditions will exist for change in Dili. The followers of this theory, former *Orde Baru* proponents but now strongly anti-Suharto, also argue that raising the issue of East Timor will ultimately strengthen the regime: Suharto will close the ranks with the military and all the different military fractions will join forces to face the East Timor proponents.

But a growing number of young human rights and political activists have adopted a principled stance on East Timor, taking the same position as the Timorese resistance. The Timorese Peace Plan has been published in Bahasa Indonesian along with important statements by Xanana Gusmao. There is growing admiration for young Timorese who have time and again captured centre stage. The theory that change in Jakarta must come first is rejected for a variety of reasons. Human rights violations in East Timor are blatant and for this reason alone, East Timor should be highlighted. Moreover the spotlight on East Timor has gravely tarnished Indonesia's international image, making it easier to raise human rights issues in Indonesia itself like the freedom of association and freedom of the press. Timorese petitioners at the UN Human Rights Commission have themselves raised those issues alongside the East Timor issue. This will only strengthen the campaign on human rights violations in general in Indonesia and put the Indonesian government further onto the defensive

## The Liquisa killings

The Liquisa killings have again thrust East Timor into the centre of Indonesian politics. From many different angles the Liquisa case reflects the growing awareness of the public on Timor affairs. The version produced by platoon leader Lt. Jeremias Kase and backed by his superiors has been contradicted by the press and by statements of individual members of *Komnas HAM*. Top-ranking military officers and Suharto's spokesperson Moerdiono were forced to admit that there had been a "violation of procedures". That the six killed were innocent villagers, confirmed by different sources, has become the accepted version of the more informed sections in the Indonesian society.

The uproar that greeted the Liquisa tragedy reflects the political changes that have taken place in society. The heavily corporatist political structure is gradually disintegrating. Society, in particular the middle class, now demands more openness and believes that voicing different or even contradictory views is no longer taboo. East Timor, now at the centre of the international and domestic agenda, is helping to accelerate this process of pluriformity. There are good grounds to believe that the East Timor issue could hasten the process of change in Jakarta and become an important factor for the process of democracy and improvement of human rights. \*

## Human Rights High Commissioner to visit East Timor

*Once again, when appalling human rights abuses are occurring in East Timor, the United Nations Human Rights Commission opted for a "consensus statement" on East Timor, rather than the strongly-worded resolution which the Timorese, and solidarity groups, had hoped for. The comparison with 1992, when a consensus statement was passed only months after the Santa Cruz massacre, is unavoidable.*

The statement, released on 28 February, does at least express "deep concern" over reports of human rights violations, and, more significantly, calls for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, to visit East Timor in 1995. Nevertheless, it is a very disappointing document.

With the powerful report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, having been presented at the session, devastating new revelations of the executions in Liquisa and the "ninja" terror in Dili receiving international attention, a strong resolution was expected.

Although Portugal and Ireland pressed for a stronger stand, they did not receive the support they expected from other European Union countries and other Western countries. The United States was preoccupied with the attempt to put forward a resolution condemning the human rights situation in China, while France was concerned largely with Chechnya. It may also be the case that the countries strongly supporting East Timor were persuaded to step back on the grounds that a resolution at this time might jeopardise the "all-inclusive talks" between Timorese, currently due to take place in Salzburg, Austria from 24-26 April under UN auspices.

The Timorese delegates to the Commission issued a multi-party statement on 1 March, signed by representatives of CNRM, FRETILIN, UDT and RENETIL. It makes the point that "The EU, having opted for a Chairman's statement, and other members ... who favoured this approach, are now under moral responsibility to ensure the full implementation by the government of Indonesia of all its commitments contained in the 1992, 1994 and 1995 Chairman's statements. It is the credibility of the EU and the WEAO (West Europe and Others) and in fact of the CHR members as a whole that is at stake"

The statement goes on to remind CHR members that "not one single provision contained in the 1992 and 1994 Chairman's statements has been implemented by the Indonesian government ... The Indonesian dictatorship, in the manner and tradition of all dictatorships, has never shown good faith or willingness to reform itself and abide by the democratic will of the people and the rule of law. Hence, the East Timorese do not have any illusions that this time the Indonesian military rulers will honour their commitments to the international community." The statement also notes that the human rights situation in East Timor has deteriorated dramatically, as documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch/Asia, and others.

The Timorese delegates express a guarded hope that this statement seems slightly stronger than the 1992 and 1994 statements, and suggests that "the Indonesian delegation faced the prospect of a strong resolution if it did not negotiate in good faith and accept several substantive provisions."

It appears that the visit of the Human Rights Commissioner, at least, will take place, though no date has yet been set. Irawan Abidin, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, said the Indonesian government would "welcome" the visit of Lasso, the highest-ranking UN official to visit East Timor, and hoped that he would present a more "balanced" view of the situation (*Reuter*, 2 March).

However, it is also important to ensure that the visits of the several thematic rapporteurs which the statement calls for should also take place. Though less high-ranking than Lasso, the special rapporteurs and working groups are more likely to issue substantial reports, like that of Ndiaye.

### Scepticism borne out

Within days of the 'consensus statement' being signed, Jakarta was showing it had no intention of acting accordingly. On the one hand, dozens of people were arrested in Liquisa and Dili in early March, while on the other, the Indonesian government seemed content upon sabotaging the 'all-inclusive talks between East Timorese. It began to challenge the right of the UN to draw up the list of invitees and issue the invitations. Their idea seems to be to turn these talks into a slightly broader version of the "reconciliation talks" that were held twice in the UK in 1993 and 1994 which were under Jakarta's control. \*

*continued from page 8*

at length testimony from East Timor resistance leader Ramos-Horta about recent use of Hawk aircraft in East Timor, she challenged the government to investigate this evidence.

Human rights are a factor in deciding whether to issue an export licence, along with design and capability as well as assurances from the recipient government about equipment not being used for internal repression. But because decisions are not open to public scrutiny, she said that it was difficult to challenge the basis on which any decision was made.

Referring to claims by Tory MP, Patrick Nicholls, following a visit to Indonesia and East Timor that the human rights situation is improving, Ann Clwyd said the claim does not bear scrutiny. "We get very angry when we hear the apologists for the Indonesian regime constantly making unsustainable assertions that the human rights record is improving."

Replying, Minister of State Alastair Goodlad defended arms sales to Indonesia and said "we need to see evidence rather than unsubstantiated assertions", claiming that foreign visitors to East Timor had not reported Hawk sightings. [Are they likely to be left around when foreign visitors are present?] He repeated the government's assertion that it is "through constructive dialogue within wider relationships" that human rights improvements will come about.



## CNRM co-chair visits the UK

*Jose Ramos-Horta, the co-chair of the East Timorese resistance movement, the CNRM, visited the UK in February and was received by a Minister of State. He was received at the House of Commons by Opposition spokesperson for foreign affairs, Ann Clwyd MP, who has repeatedly raised the East Timor issue on the floor of the House, and Lord Avebury of Parliamentarians for East Timor.*

### Meeting with Minister Goodlad

The government's decision for Ramos-Horta to be received for the first time by Minister of State at the Foreign Office Alastair Goodlad signals a shift in the government's position. *The Times* [1.II.1995] described the meeting as "confirmation that (the government's) patience over Indonesia's refusal to compromise, despite years of United Nations entreaties, is rapidly running out". Clearly also, the government was unable to ignore the strength of public opinion in Britain about East Timor. Ramos-Horta outlined the CNRM's Peace Plan. Minister Goodlad was clearly interested in hearing the details. He assured the East Timor representative that the British government does not recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor.

Ramos-Horta addressed a meeting at the Grand Committee Room of the House of Commons convened by the Parliamentary Group on Human Rights, chaired by Lord Avebury. He outlined the CNRM's efforts to work for an agreement with Indonesia in a way that would allow the colonial power to disentangle itself from East Timor with the least damage to its diplomatic standing. Ann Clwyd MP, Labour Party spokesperson for foreign affairs and human rights, who visited East Timor in 1989, described her efforts to extract information from the Government about its relations with Indonesia.

Ramos-Horta also met Labour Shadow Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Shadow Defence Secretary David Clarke, Sir David Steel, president of the Liberal International and a number of left-wing Labour MPs.

### Public meetings

More than three hundred people attended a public meet-



*Demonstration in front of the British parliament. From left to right: Lord Avebury, Ann Clwyd MP and Jose Ramos Horta.*

ing organised by the BCET at which film-maker and journalist John Pilger, and Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL also spoke. There has been a steady rise in the number of people at public meetings about East Timor in the past six months or so.

There was also programme of events in Coventry, the location of Alvis, manufacturers of the Scorpion tank. Besides attending a vigil at the factory, the East Timor leader met the Anglican Bishop of Coventry and addressed a well-attended meeting of trade unionist, peace and human rights activists convened by the Coventry trades council. The chair of the council stressed that it was categorically opposed to the Alvis tank deal with Indonesia.

### Parliamentary round-up

Since her appointment to the Labour Opposition foreign affairs team, responsible for Asia and human rights, Ann Clwyd, a long-time friend of East Timor, has devoted much time and energy to pressing the government, through parliamentary questions, for information about its trade and aid policy towards Indonesia. At an Amnesty International meeting in London on 25 February, she said that despite the government's commitment to 'good governance' principles in its aid programme, no aid to Indonesia had been withheld because of this criterion. She said it was important for the Labour Party to have its own list of the world's worst human rights offenders for whom no aid should be forthcoming.

### House of Commons debate

On 15 December last year, Ann Clwyd initiated a debate in the House of Commons on Indonesia and East Timor. Such

debates are rare as foreign affairs has such low priority in the Commons. Speaking for the best part of an hour, Ann Clwyd gave a detailed account of abuses by the Indonesian regime since its rise to power in 1965 and since the invasion of East Timor in 1975. Insisting that the international community must share responsibility for these abuses, she said:

*The long and well-documented record of human rights violations in Indonesia and East Timor remains one of the greatest challenges to the international community in fulfilling its obligation to promote and protect human rights.*

On the growing UK arms sales to Indonesia, she drew attention to evidence from East Timorese that Hawk aircraft had been used in East Timor. She rejected the government's failure to monitor the end use of arms exports because "it is not practical to monitor their use once they have reached their destination"; yet other countries already do so. Quoting

*continued on page 7*



# World-wide solidarity with East Timor

*The two main regional networks for solidarity with East Timor, the informally organised network of European solidarity groups and the more formally organised APCET (Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor) have held meeting recently, the European network in Brussels from 17-19 January and APCET in Bangkok on 5-6 February.*

The APCET conference was attended by representatives of solidarity groups in nine countries, including Indonesia, and one CNRM representative, Abe Barreto Soares who now lives in Canada. The report from the Indonesian delegation was particularly interesting, and it was stressed that Pijar and INFODH (Indonesian Foundation for Human Dignity) intend to make East Timor a major part of their campaigning work. The solidarity movement is gaining momentum in many Asia-Pacific countries; for instance, a demonstration was held in front of the Indonesian Embassy in Korea for this first time this year.


Discussions of projects and actions included the need to raise awareness of the roles of Australia and Japan with regard to Indonesia; initiating a mission to East Timor by Parliamentarians for East Timor; producing a regular newsletter which will include a women's column; and ensuring an APCET presence at events including the UN Commission on Human Rights, the PP21 preparatory meeting in Sri Lanka, the World Commission on Human Rights in Upsala, Sweden, in June, and the UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in September. Days of action were proposed for November 16, the beginning of the APEC meeting in Osaka (when there will be pickets at Indonesian Embassies throughout South-east Asia) and December 7, which the meeting proposed should be declared as the International Day for East Timor.

The next APCET conference will take place in an ASEAN country, with preference going to Malaysia if this proves to be possible.

The meeting of European solidarity groups in Brussels included representatives from thirteen countries, and from three Timorese organisations, CNRM, UDT and Renetil, the latter represented by Domingo Sarmiento Alves, who organised the occupation of the US Embassy in Jakarta last November.

This meeting also stressed the importance of December 7 as a joint day of action; SOS Timor, the Brussels-based solidarity group, volunteered to produce resource materials for actions on that day. There was considerable discussion of how to work more effectively in the European Parliament and other European institutions. At the level of the United Nations, it was felt to be very important to press for the visits of the relevant special rapporteurs and thematic working groups as soon as possible. Some progress has been made on the campaign for an arms embargo on Indonesia (Belgium, Sweden and Italy have agreed to stop arms sales), but this still needs a lot of work and continues to be an important focus of campaigning. It was also felt to be important to step up campaigning on behalf of Timorese political prisoners.

There was a long discussion of the issue of Indonesian migration into East Timor, and a feeling that it was urgent to press for an immediate halt to all new migration. Several possible actions were suggested for groups to take on this



*The person-size poster produced by ETISC, the Irish Solidarity-Campaign, for campaigning purposes.*

issue, and it was also stressed that more research on migration and population issues should be done.

As well as 7 December, days suggested for actions included 16-19 November (picketing of Japanese Embassies was suggested), and the 50th anniversary of Indonesian independence on 17 August. In Britain, there will be a focus as well on the commemoration of the 1975 murder of five journalists at Balibo on 16 October, and in Germany there will be large actions around the Hanover Messe arms fair, which Suharto himself is expected to attend.

## A growing movement

The most recent additions to the world solidarity movement for East Timor are in Denmark, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka and South Korea. In Britain, many local Coalitions for East Timor have been founded in the past year.



## Major top-level ABRI reshuffle

*The relations between Suharto and top-level ABRI (Indonesian armed forces) officers are strained, to say the least. The removal of General Wismoyo, the army chief-of-staff, is a clear example of the growing tensions between Bina Graha, the President's office, and Cilangkap, (ABRI headquarters).*

General Wismoyo had all the necessary qualifications to become ABRI's Number One. In the seventies he served as Suharto's adjutant during which time, he became close to the First Family. Relations became even more intimate when he married the younger sister of Madam Tien Suharto. These two connections became the gateway for a brilliant career in the army. Although he never shone while he was a cadet, his career rocketed and within ten years, Wismoyo had reached the top echelons of the army.



*The outgoing man General Wismoyo, already in civilian dress, and the new man, General Hartono.*

But there was a major flaw in his life-style: he is a notorious womaniser which sister-in-law Madam Tien, who upholds strict Victorian values about marriage, took seriously. Although he was destined to become *Pangab* (Commander-in-Chief) of ABRI, Wismoyo's many liaisons became his downfall. Already in January this year, it was apparent that Wismoyo would be ditched and sent into retirement. He was offered either a post as ambassador or chairman of the Indonesian Olympic Committee, as a face-saving device. The obstinate general grudgingly accepted only the last offer and will now join the ranks of the growing number of disgruntled generals.

The downfall of Wismoyo had been expected for months and it came as no surprise to the general public.

### Growing conflict

The Wismoyo case is a prime example of the strained relations between Suharto and the top echelons of ABRI. Political analysts in Jakarta now speak about *ABRI Cendana* or *ABRI loyalis* for officers close to Suharto and *ABRI Merah Putih* (the Indonesian

flag) or *ABRI Sapta Marga* (the military oath) for the majority of officers who do not see loyalty to the armed forces as being synonymous with loyalty to Suharto. Those in the latter group, mostly groomed in the eighties, the period when General Benny Murdani was commander-in-chief, are now drifting away from the president.

The political views of ABRI officers up to 1965 covered a wide spectrum, reflecting the many political parties and ideologies they supported or espoused. After the Suharto takeover, a wide-ranging shake-up took place, creating a smooth working relationship between Suharto and the generals as the core of the *Orde Baru*. Though rifts appeared in the early seventies, Suharto managed to maintain a steady alliance with most of the officers. Only after 1980, when Suharto began to impose a strongly personalised style of government, did important sections of ABRI start to display open discord. As Indonesian civil society is now beginning to show signs of a return to the pluralistic political society of the fifties, the military have begun to express the same tendencies.

Suharto's style of riding in tandem with ABRI is now a thing of the past and a different set of criteria now applies for an officer to rise to the top. In theory ABRI has its own mechanism for determining suitability for an officer's selection for a post but Suharto has the final say as *Panglima Tertinggi* (Supreme Commander). At the end of the day, it is Suharto who, after getting advice from *Cilangkap*, will make the decision.

### Adjutants, loyalty above all

During the era when General Benny Murdani was ABRI Commander-in-Chief, top-ranking military officers had similar qualifications: they had had a stint of combat in East Timor, had completed a course at *SESKOAD* (the Command and General Staff College) and, preferably, originated from intelligence ranks and/or *KOPASSUS*, the elite red-beret commando troops. The Benny era is now over and the three major waves of personnel changes, from January 1994 up to February 1995, have been characterised by a phasing out of all Murdani elements, *de-Bennyisasi*, as it is commonly called. It is estimated that fifty per cent of army officers are considered to be Benny loyalists and regarded by the Suharto group as potential dissenters. Suharto has now dispensed with all the Benny criteria and put in its place one simple criterion: undying loyalty to Suharto. Arbi Sanit, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia, put it like this:

*"The main reason is the centralised system of power. The New Order rule is increasingly centralised. The selection of the elite will be more closely scrutinised. Within the military itself we see criticism. From inside we notice the power of the executive growing while criticism from outside is also mounting. This makes recruitment by the ruler more selective. Those who are close to the president are close to power. The trusted and loyal ones are the adjutants. [Sinar, 11 Febr. 1995]*

In the last few weeks this criterion has been used to excess: Major-General Wiranto was appointed Jakarta military

commander; Ret'd Field Marshall Soepandi became the director of Garuda, the national airlines; Brig.General Dibyo Widodo became the Jakarta Chief of Police. Lt. General Soejono became the Chief of Staff of the General Staff. All four had served stints as adjutants to Suharto. Previous adjutants who managed to get to the top are Ret'd General Try Sutrisno (Vice-President of the Republic), ret'd Police General Kunarto (former National Police Chief), ret'd Marshall Siboen (former Air Force Chief-of-Staff), Admirals Muhammad Arifin and Tanto Koeswanto (former and present Navy Chiefs-of-Staff), ret'd Major General Kentot Harseno (former Jakarta Military Commander) and Lt. General Soeryadi (former Army Vice-Chief of Staff).

## Major reshuffle

Loyalty to Suharto was definitely the main theme behind the January reshuffle. Wismoyo's retirement came about not only because of his extra-marital affairs but first and foremost because of his personal views. It is said that on one occasion he told a group of colonels: "If it is the people's wish that Suharto should be replaced, I will follow their wish". Another popular Wismoyo anecdote is the story of the wrist-watch. On one occasion, Wismoyo told a group of officers with some passion what loyalty means in military terms. "If you are told by your superior to wear your watch on the right hand, then that is what you will do". Since then, many ABRI officers have worn their wrist-watches on their right hand as a sign of support for ABRI Merah Putih or even of being anti-Suharto. Wismoyo's removal had been expected for months; recently his followers have been busy preparing a manuscript of his memoirs. The book will be in the book shops in March.

The recent wide-ranging reshuffle wrought profound changes. Graduates from the 1965 and 1966 classes of the National Military Academy (AMN) have been moved into key positions. In particular the class of '65 has now assumed a central role in the army. Eight out of the ten territorial military commanders are from the AMN Class of '65. The new deputy for social and political affairs, which is a key post, will be Major-General Mochammad Ma'ruf of the '65 class. Some key figures like Vice Chief of Staff Lt.General Soeryadi (AMN '64) and Chief of the General Staff Lt.General Mantiri (AMN '62) have been offered ambassadorial posts.

The formal procedure for ABRI promotions is in the hands of a team called *Wanjakti*. Usually the team's choice proceeds without difficulty but for key positions President Suharto sometimes decides otherwise. The promotion or downfall of key officers is still the prerogative of the old man.

## Deep divisions

Suharto's meddling in the appointment of key persons at *Cilangkap* has created deep divisions among the generals. General Feisal Tandjung, the ABRI Commander-in-Chief is a staunch Suharto loyalist who has recently had frequent conflicts with Army Chief-of-Staff General Wismoyo. With the ousting of Wismoyo and the appointment of General Hartono as Chief-of-Staff, Suharto has managed to place two loyalists at the top of the ABRI hierarchy. Feisal Tandjung and Hartono are expected to cleanse *Cilangkap* from Benny Murdani 'contamination', the expression used by palace circles.


Indonesian analysts often describe Murdani as Suharto's nemesis. Bred and groomed for many years by Suharto, Murdani became too influential and had to be discarded. He was pensioned off, a trick played towards many of his men. The liquidation of BAIS (Badan Intelijen Strategis, Armed Forces Strategic Intelligence Agency) in 1994 was a heavy blow for the Murdani group. BAIS was Murdani's last institutional stronghold. In further reshuffles, intelligence officers close to Murdani were sidestepped. BIA, the replacement of BAIS is a much sanitised version and is no longer directly under the ABRI Commander.

## MILITARY

The 'civilian' Murdani rarely appears on the front pages these days but he still exerts influence among the more senior officers. Although seemingly powerless, Murdani together with an increasing number of disgruntled officers could emerge if a political crisis were to occur.

## General Hartono, the back-seater

General Hartono, the new army chief-of-staff and previously the chief of staff for social and political affairs (*Kassospol*) has already proven his credentials. Earlier *Kassospols* were staunch ABRI Merah Putih advocates and created many problems for Suharto's domestic policies. Hartono is quite different. He openly advocates the position of 'ABRI taking a back-seat' and is openly sympathetic with ICMI, the Muslim Intellectuals' Association, chaired by Minister for Research and Technology Rudy Habibie, a close Suharto trustee.



The question of whether ABRI takes a leading or back-seat position has been one of the major discussions in Indonesian politics. Hartono is from AMN Class of '62 and originates from the cavalry which has rarely produced officers at the top of the army. He is regarded as a brainy type. In 1976 he graduated from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, US. In 1982 he graduated from the Indonesian Staff and Command School (SESKOGAB) and in 1988 he completed a course at Lemhanas, the Institute for National Defence. In the last few years he has been promoted several times. From 1990 to 1993 he was military commander in East Java before being appointed commander of SESKOGAB. After only a few months at the job, he was appointed governor of Lemhanas, another promotion, but that job didn't last long either. Early in 1994 he became *Kassospol*, the Chief of Staff for Political and Social Affairs, arguably the most influential job after the army chief-of-staff. The *Kassospol* is responsible for determining the role of the military in society and coordinates the appointment of all military officers in civilian functions, from cabinet ministers to village heads.

The majority of ABRI officers take it for granted that the armed forces has a vanguard role in society; they have been doing so for more than thirty years. People like General Hartono accept a less prominent role for ABRI in society for a series of reasons. One is a re-interpretation of the military doctrine *Dwi Fungsi* (dual function) which justifies military intervention in civilian matters. Back-seaters like Hartono argue that in order to improve the quality of the armed forces (its security and order functions), it should reduce its involvement in civilian matters (social and political affairs). Retired General Suharto, in the early days of his rule a staunch *Dwi Fungsi* proponent, has for obvious reasons



moved to the 'ABRI back-seat position' and has appointed 'back-seaters' in prominent positions.

Taking back-seat position does not mean that Hartono and others will accept a 'back to barracks' position. Their reasoning is primarily a political one: the all-out implementation of the *Dwi Fungsi* from the mid sixties had everything to do with the need for a reckoning with the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. The situation is under better control now, justifying a switch from front-seat to back-seat. Nevertheless it should be clear that taking a back-seat does not mean that the military will allow civil society to determine its own course: military involvement in society will remain a permanent factor.

The new *Kassospol* Lt. General Mochammad Ma'ruf has followed in the footsteps of General Hartono and soon identified himself as a staunch back-seater. In his maiden speech Lt. General Mochammad Ma'ruf commented that ABRI takes a back seat when it comes to politics and allowing civilians to take the initiative. To back this up, he quoted an ancient Javanese saying: *tut wuri handayani*, which means supervising from behind. He warned however that ABRI could change its position overnight and moved back to the front-seat (*ing ngarso sung tulodo*) or middle position (*ing madyo mangu karso*). The active or more laid-back military position in civilian affairs is often called 'the Turkish model' which covers a wide range of possibilities, from scrutinising a civilian government from the barracks to becoming a brutal military dictatorship.

## Hartono in full flow

During his one-year stint as *Kassospol* (Chief of Social and Political Affairs), General Hartono was never idle. Army meddling in major issues is hardly a sign of taking a back seat. 1994 was a particularly bad year for human rights in Indonesia: the crackdown and trial of labour activists, the clamp-down on the press and the actions against the Muslim organisation *Nahdlatul Ulama* and the nationalist party, the PDI, are just the tip of the iceberg.

The ruthless harassments of NU's Abdurrachman Wahid and Megawati of the PDI are typical of the operations originating from the *Kassospol* office. Abdurrachman Wahid, or Gus Dur as he is popularly called, and Megawati lead movements which represent millions of people and are seen by *Bina Graha*, the palace clique, as a grave threat. Gus Dur, recently re-elected as chairman of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), the biggest Muslim organisation (with 25 to 30 million adherents, arguably the biggest organisation in the world), is one obvious danger while Megawati, the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia's first president as chair of PDI, a federation of nationalist and Christian parties, could emerge as a viable alternative to rule by Suharto. Ever since their elections, Gus Dur and Megawati have had to endure all manner of slurs and have had to fend off numerous attacks. While attacks on Gus Dur have been highly personalised, emphasising his close connections with Benny Murdani and secular groups (including activist NGOs), the attacks on Megawati have accused the PDI of harbouring communists.

The spectre of NU and PDI joining ranks against the regime is creating nightmares for the Suharto clique. Although so far, attempts to unseat Gus Dur and Megawati have been unsuccessful, Hartono's efforts were rewarded by Suharto with his quick promotion as chief of staff. In other words, back-seatism is merely a question of loyalty.

Indonesian society has become infinitely more complex than in the early days of Suharto's rule. A burgeoning working class, the emergence of a plural middle class and nationwide social protests from the young generation are making it more difficult for Suharto to rule along the old lines. Stories about his deteriorating health are persistent and he has made no moves yet to appoint a successor. Even his most loyal supporters are getting worried about the lack of safe scenarios. All the signs are that Suharto cannot take the risk of stepping down which means that he will opt for a seventh term in 1998. The prospect of Suharto clinging on will diminish the prospects of peaceful change. It will only exacerbate the antagonisms. Some anti-Suharto factions, not least those in the military, may see no other way than to force him out. \*

## Human rights briefs

### Soothsayer hauled in for predictions

A soothsayer who chairs the country's Association of Psychics has been hauled in for interrogation because of his predictions about 1995 being a turbulent year. In particular his forecasts about likely successors to President Suharto are deemed to be "provocative and potentially disruptive to national stability", according to the Attorney-General's office.

Permadi's remarks were made in a radio interview in Yogyakarta, Central Java last year. A cassette of the interview have been on sale for Rp10,000 for some time.

The most bruising prediction was that Megawati, daughter of the late President Sukarno, now chair of the PDI party, might succeed Suharto. "I mentioned her but she was only one of several possible successors" said Permadi.

Following a five-hour interrogation session, Permadi said: "It is a naive joke, a sign of an unhealthy situation in this country if such a prediction is considered as disturbing national stability." [AP, 16.III.1995] Permadi criticised Central Java military commander Major-General Soeyono for saying Megawati should stay at home. "Why doesn't he say a similar thing about Mbak Tutut?" [Jakarta Post, 9.III.1995] Tutut, daughter of Suharto, is deputy chair of GOLKAR and one of Indonesia's richest business tycoons.

### Trial highlights campus paramilitaries

The trial of twelve students from the National University in Jakarta, has drawn attention to the intimidating presence on campuses of army-backed student regiments known as *Menwa*. The twelve are on trial for destroying the campus HQ of the regiment last October. All are members of the Association of Nature Lovers whose own office came under attack from the paramilitaries and were acting in retaliation. A key issue being raised by the defendants is therefore: why has only one side in the clash been brought to justice?

The twelve are being tried in two groups and all sessions have been attended by scores of student supporters who use every occasion to protest against the presence of student regiments on campuses throughout the country. The defendants have appeared in court wearing black T-shirts with anti-*Menwa* graphics. At the end of one session, the defendants grabbed their lawyers' microphone and made a speech condemning the regiments and shouted slogans like: "We want justice!" and "Ban the student regiments from campus".

The twelve stand accused under charges of assault and damage that could result in sentences of five and a half years.

*Menwa* units have been challenged on many campuses because they are known to be an extension of army intelligence, keeping an eye on activists and containing the level of student activism which has been on the upswing recently. There have been many calls for the regiments to be disbanded.

# From errand boy to press tycoon

*Errand-boy-to-press-tycoon sagas used to be part of the dream of prewar America. But the success story of Harmoko, information minister for three terms, is typically Indonesian. His appointment as chair of GOLKAR in October 1993 turned him into one of the most powerful figures in the country. His most important asset, undying loyalty to Suharto, is the best way to get to the top.*

Achmad Harmoko started his journalistic career in the late fifties as an errand boy at *Merdeka*, one of the major nationalist newspapers and gradually climbed from corrector to journalist. He also became known as a cartoonist although at one point the Communist daily *Harian Rakyat* was able to prove that Harmoko had 'borrowed' a drawing from a German cartoonist. His colleagues of those days remember him as an ambitious social climber.

During the turmoil of 1965-67, when the military took over, Harmoko emerged as an energetic and relentless campaigner against the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party and other allegedly left-wing organisations. Although he wasn't a leading figure in the action fronts, this period was the stepping stone to a brilliant career. Close working relations with fellow journalists at army newspapers opened many doors to the aspiring Harmoko. This hectic period was also characterised by the emergence of many sensational pulp newspapers, none of which lasted long.

## Pos Kota, a goldmine

Harmoko recognised the huge opportunities in the market and in 1970 he started his proprietorial career with *Pos Kota*, the main ingredients of which are violence and sex. Within a few years, with a circulation of 600,000, the newspaper emerged as the largest national newspaper. Often compared with Rupert Murdoch and his pulp paper *The Sun*, Harmoko adopted the same strategy, using *Pos Kota* as his flagship to build a glittering media empire. In 1973 he became chair of *PWI*, the union of journalists, which had already been purged of all so-called leftwing elements. He held the *PWI* chair for two terms and used the position to the limits to expand his political and economic assets. A few years later he became a member of the *Dewan Pers*, the Press Council, officially the highest body in the media world.

*Pos Kota* branched out with other publications like *Pos Film* (weekly), *Terbit* (daily), *Majallah Film* (weekly), *Wartasari* (monthly), *Bisnis Maritim* (weekly), *Aksi* (weekly) and *Sehat* (weekly), a wide range of family, entertainment and youth magazines. The huge population of Indonesia, the fourth largest in the world, provides a lucrative market for the Harmoko kind of boulevard magazine. After becoming minister of information in 1983, his financial grip on the press expanded phenomenally.

## Greed is the name of the game

Harmoko's nickname nowadays is the *Dewa Pers Indonesia* (God of the Indonesian Press), an appropriate name as Harmoko's name invariably pops up in every new publication as a shareholder. According to *Independen*, the journal of *AJI* (the new Association of Independent Journalists), Harmoko and his family own shares in at least 32 publications. Another source gives an even higher figure of 42 publications. The shares are either in Harmoko's name, that of Mrs. Sri Dhiyati



*Brazenness is Harmoko's asset. Others call him Hari-Hari Omong Kosong (Forever talking rubbish).*

(his wife) or Adi Sutrisno, Ali Usodo, Noor Slamet Asmoprawiro and Achmad Wibowo, all younger brothers of Harmoko.

Besides the *Pos Kota* Group, which remains at the core of Harmoko's business activity, the Harmoko family owns shares in *Citra* (weekly), *Bola* (weekly), *Surya* (daily), *Hopla* (weekly), *Bernas* (daily) and *Jakarta Post* (daily) - all part of the *Gramedia* Group, *Kartini* (bi-weekly) and *Amanah* (bi-weekly) - part of the *Kartini* Group, *Bisnis Indonesia* (daily), *Indonesian Business Weekly*, *Prospek* (weekly), *Sarinah* (monthly), *Pertiwi* (monthly), *Pelita* (daily), *Sportif* (weekly), *Senang* (weekly), *Gema Olahraga* (weekly), *Bintang* (weekly), *Tiras* (weekly), *Sriwijaya Post* (daily), *Aneka* (bi-weekly), *Pesona* (monthly), *Nusra* (daily), *Gatra* (weekly), *Paron* (bi-weekly), *Komputek Computer World* (monthly), *Citra* (weekly) and *Suara Pembaruan* (daily). Harmoko also partly owns the private TV stations *SCTV* and *ANTEVE* and the private short-wave radio stations *Radio Kayumanis* and *Radio Rakosa*.

Harmoko's business interests have also expanded beyond the media world. *PT Metro Pos* (printing industry) and *PT Gede Karang* (paper factory) were logical expansions of his press-empire. The Harmoko family has major interests in *Paradiso Holidays Tours & Travels* and in a video rental & production company, *PT Golden Multi Cahaya Video*. The family is also increasingly involved in the supply of newsprint.



## 'Empty shares' and new SIUPPs

Most of the shares acquired by the Harmoko dynasty were acquired after his appointment as information minister in 1983. The shares are known as *saham kosong* (empty shares) which means that Harmoko paid nothing for them. New publications need a *SIUPP* (press publication business licence) and it is the prerogative of the Minister of Information to issue or revoke these highly controversial permits. It is a public secret that Harmoko demands a percentage of the shares from the proprietor of any new publication in exchange for the *SIUPP* - 5, 10 or even 20%, depending on the negotiations. Two new publications *Bisnis Indonesia* and *Indonesian Business Weekly* only received their licence after Madam Sri Dhyati Harmoko was registered as a 20% shareholder.



Harmoko's greed goes beyond share-grabbing. *Independen*, *AJI's* three-weekly journal which goes to press without a *SIUPP*, has reported that Harmoko also puts a price-tag on the granting of a *SIUPP*. For a big publishing group, it costs between 200 and 250 million rupiahs (US\$100,000 to 125,000) and a monthly fee of between 5 and 10 million rupiahs. Harmoko has turned *SIUPP*-licensing into an effortless way of raking in easy bucks, a veritable goldmine.

Another way of abusing the *SIUPP* system for easy profits is when internal conflicts occur within a publication. The *SIUPP* license is revoked, a compromise is arranged and a new *SIUPP* is issued, involving another money transaction. Or the publication is banned and allowed back under a new name, which means a new *SIUPP* and more money changing hands.

In the Indonesian Constitution there are no restrictions on ministers engaging in business. Harmoko has become the supreme example of welding his government position and business interests into a lucrative combination. It has given him many assets but also many enemies.

## Censorship King

By definition, the information minister is also in charge of censoring the press. Harmoko is a typical exponent of *Orde Baru* ideology which fears any ideology outside the state ideology of *Pancasila*. In a speech to journalists the minister explained:

*Although communism has disappeared from Indonesian soil, we must remain on guard against extremist elements and*

*those ideologies which threaten the state ideology Pancasila... The press should avoid the trappings of liberal and communist ways of thinking and must not indulge in creating disturbances in the way the communist-backed press did in the 1960s (Jakarta Post, 30 September 1993, quoted from The Press Under Siege, Censorship in Indonesia, Article XIX, November 1994).*

Harmoko has indeed flexed his muscles. In 1984, his first year as information minister, a decree was issued giving the minister the power to revoke *SIUPP* licences for not conforming with the requirements. Since he became minister he has banned six major publications: *Prioritas* in 1986, *Sinar Harapan* in 1987, *Monitor* in 1990 and the three weeklies *Tempo*, *Detik*, *Editor* in June 1994. Harmoko's ministerial stint has also become the era of what has become known as the *budaya telpon* (the phone culture), phoning editors at all hours of the night to instruct them on what or how to write about a certain topic or ordering them to refrain from writing about something. Many Indonesian journalists cannot understand how Harmoko, himself a former journalist, is not averse to imposing such 'self-censorship' on his former colleagues.

## King of Golkar

In 1993 Harmoko was appointed chair of *GOLKAR*, the ruling party, which is also called the party of the ruler. This appointment by President Suharto was quite unprecedented. *GOLKAR* was set up in 1964 by a group of army officers as a political counter-weight to the *PKI*, the Communist Party. After 1965, it was transformed into the political vehicle of the ruling clique round Suharto and always stuck to the tradition of having a retired army general as chairman. Harmoko's appointment was clearly meant to deflate the *Dwi Fungsi* which is used to justify the army's role in society, reflecting the growing gap between the president and the army [see separate article].

*GOLKAR* is a strange creature. Several Indonesianists have written lengthy books about it. It easily won all five elections held since 1972 with a built-in majority of more than two third of the votes. It has set up 27 provincial branches (including East Timor) with virtually unlimited funds at its disposal. *GOLKAR* is more an extension of the government and the civil service than a political party. In fact *GOLKAR* refused to be called a political party. Ever since its inception, *GOLongan KARya* (which stands for the 'functionaries' group) has defined itself as an association untainted by any ideology. Nominally *GOLKAR* is a kind of federation with several components. Harmoko was given the task of turning *GOLKAR* into a more centralised structure with individual membership, the purpose of which has been to precipitate a decline in the army's influence.

Obviously Suharto regards Harmoko as well fitted for the job. Harmoko certainly has qualities as an orator. By contrast with Suharto who sends people to sleep when he makes a speech, Harmoko is a lively speaker, a true populist. He insists on being called *Bung Harmoko*, instead of the more official *Bapak*, a way to popularise himself. His ability to convey Suharto's wishes to a larger public along with his unflinching loyalty has earned him a prominent place at the core of the Suharto clique. In many authoritarian states, the role of the information department is crucial. With his propagandist qualities, Harmoko has served Suharto's purposes very well. In his youth, his ambition was to become a *dalang* (a puppeteer), a traditional story-teller. In many ways he has fulfilled his childhood dream.

## 'As Instructed'

Harmoko is also known in Jakarta as *tokoh petunjuk* (freely translated: somebody who works under instructions).

As information minister he often meets the president to receive instructions. When Harmoko meets the press after leaving *Bina Graha*, the presidential office, almost every other sentence starts with: 'As instructed by Bapak President Suharto....'. President Suharto uses many trusties like Harmoko but Harmoko has qualities which other loyalists lack. He is able to translate Suharto's wishes and commands into easily digestible forms; it is as if Harmoko can penetrate the president's mind, making life much easier for Suharto. He simply leaves it to Harmoko to do all the official explaining to the outside world.

His job as chair of *GOLKAR* takes Harmoko to the remote corners of the republic. His frequent trips to the provinces,

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nicknamed the Harmoko Safari, keeps him constantly in the limelight. On his travels, he often gets a traditional welcome and with it, another front page picture of the minister dressed in a some exotic costume. Everywhere he goes he delivers lively speeches containing the same hollow message. As they say, empty vessels make the most sound. Indonesian political life has become unthinkable without the dashing Harmoko. But more critical minds detest his constant presence at the centre of state power. Harmoko is one of the infamous '4 ha's' (or ha ha ha ha) for Harto, Habibie, Harmoko and Bob Hasan, the four most notorious characters in the Republic of Indonesia.

# A new wave of strikes

*The Ramadan month of fasting is supposed to be a month of self-reflection, restraint and tranquillity. On the Indonesian labour front the opposite is the case. The annual bonus, given prior to Idul Fitri, the end of the fast, is a major conflict between management and workers.*

TAPOL receives numerous reports about labour conflicts, not only from newspaper clippings but also from Indonesian NGOs. This time we want to limit ourselves to a few cases in East Java, a region not often in the spotlight but a place with many labour disputes.

Of the many strikes in East Java, three cases are summarised, all situated in or around Surabaya. The companies are *PT Multi Manao Indonesia (PT MMI)*, *PT Yusan Miky Sejahtera (PT YMS)* and *PT Salim Brothers Perkasa (PT SBP)*. All three are typical examples of the Asia-Pacific manufacturing industry: producing cheap goods for export in appalling working conditions. Lack of trade union representation is a common feature, compelling the workers to organise themselves in an association called *Perwakilan Buruh* (Workers Representation). One of the main targets of the workers' actions is the *Depnaker* (Manpower Department) Office. In labour conflicts the Department participates in the negotiations and in most cases functions as an extension of the management. Workers' grievances against officials of this Department are well-founded.

*PT MMI* produces wooden furniture for export to the USA, Japan, Taiwan and Korea. The initial workforce of 650 people (1980) is now down to 300. *PT YMS* is a textile sweat shop working for the European and US market producing jackets and trousers. The workforce was about 150, 95 per cent of them women, but after the labour conflict it fell to 67. *PT SBP* is situated in Sidoarjo, some 50 kms from the capital Surabaya and produces sports shoes for export (Japan and US) and the domestic market. The company has a workforce of about 900 people (90 per cent women).

## 110 workers suspended

*PT Salim Brothers Perkasa (PT SBP)* has two factories in Sidoarjo. The management is fond of imposing a kind of military discipline for the workers and forcing them to wear uniforms which they have to pay for themselves. The initial conflict was about working conditions usually called *hak normatif* (normative rights). These normative rights are supposed to be automatically met by the management but there have been many labour conflicts because of the manage-

ment's stubborn refusal to acknowledge these rights. In the *PT SBP* case the conflict was about the monthly menstruation leave, health insurance and minimum wages. The first actions started in November last year and continued with a strike from 9 - 14 January 1995. During this strike the management requested the assistance of the police. While hundreds of women workers were standing in front of the factory gates in the pouring rain, the security forces stepped in and used brute force. Several women were hurt, and three fainted during the incident.

On 16 January *PT SBP* announced that the factory would be shut and closed the gates. The announcement was made by Police Lieutenant Satirin to the hundreds of workers waiting at the gate. In the next few days, police officers visited the workers' compounds and told them to go home to their villages as the factory has been closed indefinitely. A week later the *PT SBP* management declared the factory open again but demanded a re-selection on its workforce. Those willing to sign a statement declaring the strike illegal were allowed back. Many workers were forced by the police to sign the statement. More than hundred workers refused to sign. ►



Time to Increase Wages



On 23 January the entire workforce marched to the local Manpower Department office. Military and police officers interfered and some workers' spokespersons were heavily intimidated. On 27 - 30 January 1995 about 160 *PT SBP* workers took firmer action, occupying the front lawn of the office. The workers were ignored by the local authorities. At first, the security officers left them in peace but on 30 January the workers received a final warning to leave the premises, which they did.

On 31 January the *PT SBP* management announced the suspension of 111 workers for 6 months. The 111 workers were seen as the core group of workers continually involved in the protesting. Some 160 workers continue their actions in front of the Manpower Office.

On 6 February a one-day demonstration of about 100 workers took place in front of the gate. In the evening, after leaving the factory, two women workers were abducted by four men in a jeep. They were taken to the local police headquarters to be interrogated by Police Lt. Satirin. Thirty colleagues waited outside the police office till after midnight. The two were conditionally released and told to report every week to the police authorities. Heavy pressure was imposed on them to stop their actions. One of the two women, A. Maria (29 years), is seen as a leader of the workers. The conflict is far from over, having gone from bad to worse. At the moment of writing the *PT SBP* management is trying to dismiss 160 workers. The workers have kept their spirits high and continue to demand their rights.

## Camping in front of the Depnaker Office

Hundreds of workers have set up camp in front of the *Depnaker* office to protest the conditions in their factories. Workers from two companies *PT Multi Manao Indonesia (PT MMI)* and *PT Yusan Miky Sejahtera (PT YMS)* joined ranks and camped outside for one week between 23 February - 1 March 1995. One day before the ending of Ramadan the authorities decided to pay the *THR (Tunjangan Hari Raya, annual bonus)* as much as Rp.50,000 for each person. The bonus was actually due from the company but the Department decided to concede to the demand by paying the bonus itself. The other demands still remain unanswered.


The conflict at *PT MMI* started last year. Between 17 - 23 November some 300 *MMI* workers went on strike in support of nineteen demands. The management responded by closing the gates and declaring the workers redundant. The workers continued their actions and in the following weeks actions were held in front of the local assembly and the *Depnaker* Office. Deputations were sent to the National Commission of Human Rights and the Chief of the National Police in Jakarta.

Between 13 - 15 December more than 200 workers of *PT MMI* occupied the *Depnaker* Office. The *Depnaker* officials called in the security and one truck of anti-riot police was sent in. Under the watchful eye of the security officers the workers had to negotiate with company lawyers, but no results were achieved. Two weeks later, on 28 and 29 December, a new action was launched and another occupation took place at the *Depnaker* Office, this time a combined action by workers of *PT MMI* and *PT YMS*. The same set of demands on normative rights and for direct negotiations with the own-

ers of both companies were fundamentally the same for both groups. After striking, workers from both companies were sacked. Since November workers of the two companies have received no wages.

Workers of *PT YMS* have been in conflict with the management since June 1994 when they launched a two day strike on woeful working conditions. In this conflict dozens of workers were given the sack. The conflict continued to escalate and from July till December 1994 the *PT YMS* workers made numerous appeals to *Depnaker*, the local assembly and by writing letters to authorities in Jakarta.

During the combined action on 28 December, workers were physically attacked by security officers and forcibly removed from the *Depnaker* building. Clubbing, kicking and hitting with bare fists were used against women workers. Four women, Padmi, Khotijah, Fatimah and Saroh, had to be treated in hospital. The molestation continued outside the *Depnaker* premises. Surabaya bystanders witnessed police brutalities against the workers. Reports registered the names of the police officers responsible. The results were minimal: the *Depnaker* officials promised to find a solution for the conflict.



*A security officer closing the factory gates to striking workers, a typical scene during labour disputes in Indonesia.*

Between 3 - 5 January about 50 *PT YMS* workers decided to step up their action and set up a camp in front of the *Depnaker* Office, to step up the pressure because the *Depnaker* Office hadn't come up with any solution. On the third day the peaceful camp ended in police brutality. A combined police force of more than 100 men ordered the workers to 'pack' their things and dismantle the tent. The only victory the workers got was the payment of their annual bonus and one month's wages.

On 18 January a historic demonstration took place when workers from the three companies, *PT MMI*, *PT YMS* and *PT SBP* held a combined action in front of the *Depnaker* Office. More than 1,000 workers joined the demonstration. They expected members from the National Human Rights Commission to be present, but nobody appeared. Without the existence of a trade union the workers of the three companies managed to join ranks through a self-organised *Perwakilan Buruh* in each of the companies. The relentless determination of the workers showed again in the one-week occupation of the *Depnaker* front lawn. The frequent actions received a lot of support from the Surabaya population. Although no concrete results has been achieved by the actions, the workers of Surabaya have gained a lot of experience. Several workers' leaders have been born in the actions and the support from the population has been impressive. Some workers might have lost their jobs in the actions but all the workers have gained pride and dignity. \*



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the June closures, have taken the lead in actions in support of press freedom.

## The PIJAR raid

The search warrant for the *PIJAR* office quoted Article 154 (insulting the government) of the Criminal Code. It is clear from the interrogation of Tri Agus that he was arrested in connection with the organisation's publication, of which he is chief editor. The Article 154 charge carries a maximum sentence of seven years.

Since the press clampdown in June 1994, publications like *KDP*, *Independen* and *Kompak*, a journal published by journalists in Bandung, have filled a gap for those thirsting for uncensored news. These samizdat publications are sold openly on the streets and are eagerly sought after.

In a press statement, *PIJAR* protested against the arrest of their colleague and stressed that the fundamental issue is press freedom. It also pointed out that at the time of raid President Suharto was attending the UN conference in Copenhagen on Social Development; the raid would only further blacken Jakarta's reputation as a human rights violator.

During the raid which took place late at night, valuable documents, diskettes and computers were confiscated.

After raiding *PIJAR*, the security forces decided on the spot to raid the nearby office of another organisation, *ALDERA* (*Aliansi Demokrasi Rakyat*, Alliance of People's Democracy). There were no arrests but the police confiscated more valuable documents. On 8 March another *PIJAR* member, Syahrul, was arrested but released a day later. In the next few days, another nine people were summoned by the police as 'witnesses'. They include Eros Djarot, former editor of the banned political weekly *DeTIK*, Sunarty, acting chair of the free trade union *SBSI* (the chair, Muchtar Pakpahan, is serving a four-year sentence), Standarkiaa, secretary-general of *ALDERA*, Santoso, chair of *AJI* and two prominent *PIJAR* activists, Hakim Hatta and Rachland Nashidik. By then it had become clear that some of these witnesses could end up in the dock as well.

## Five AJI activists arrested

The attack on *AJI* was not long in coming. On 17 March, the police raided and occupied the premises of *AJI*. Earlier the same evening, police agents forced their way into a social gathering organised by *AJI* to mark the end of *Ramadan*. During a tussle between police and guests who were trying to



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prevent *AJI* members from being seized, five people were arrested: Ahmad Taufik, Liston P. Siregar, Danang, Fitri, all *AJI* members and Sri Bintang Pamungkas, an outspoken member of Parliament. The police told the organisers that they were looking for Santoso, chair of the organisation, who was not present. This social gathering at a hotel in central Jakarta was attended by well-known critics of the government, along with diplomats from a number of embassies as well as several foreign journalists.

After spending three hours in a police cell, the five were all released, except for Danang. Early the following morning, Ahmad Taufik was dragged from his bed and three others, Eko Maryadi, J. Sahir and Abdul Haris were also taken into custody. Colonel Nurfauzi from the Jakarta Police Crime Investigation Squad, said that *AJI*'s unlicensed publication, *Independen*, was being subjected to close scrutiny. They will find plenty of interest to study. The lead story in the latest issue, No 12/1995 which was on sale at the *AJI* social event, is entitled: *The President sick? Feuding within the political elite*.

Another publication subjected to intimidation is *Media Mitra*, the journal of the women's organisation, *Kalyanami-tra*.

## PWI expulsions threaten jobs

As part of the overall attack on journalists who have boldly asserted their independence of government interference, the Jakarta branch of the PWI announced on 18 March the expulsion of thirteen journalists. The reason given for the expulsions was that they had all signed the *Sirnagalih Declaration* which led to the establishment of *AJI* last August. The branch chair also called on all editors to stop employing *AJI* journalists. Because of the institutional role of this yellow journalists' association, these journalists are now effectively banned from the profession.

The thirteen are Goenawan Mohammad, Fikri Jufri (both former editors of *Tempo*), Happy Sulistiadi, Ardian T. Gesuri, Diah Purnomowati, Budiman S. Hartoyo, Toriq Hadad, Yopie Hidayat and Moebanoe Moera (all *Tempo* journalists), Eros Djarot (vice-editor of *DeTIK*), Hasudungan Sirait (*Bisnis Indonesia*), Satrio Arismunandar (*Kompas*) and Yosep Adi Prasetyo (*Jakarta-Jakarta*).

The expulsions are likely to be followed by expulsions in other branches: altogether about fifty journalists were signatories of the Declaration. The future for press freedom in Indonesia becomes grimmer with every passing day.

There is no place in Suharto's corporatist system for more than one journalists' organisation. From the outset, those who boldly moved to challenge the regime on this crucial issue of freedom of association, knew that this would be a risky venture, putting their livelihoods on the line. Like the independent trade unions that have emerged in the past few years, the persistent meddling by the authorities calls for courage, determination and a long-term appreciation of the issues involved.

Many *AJI* members are young journalists who started their careers in the student press, until recently one of the few free places for freedom of speech. Today, many campus press organs are also feeling the heat of security forces control.

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## UK's deadly arms trade with Indonesia

*On 2 March Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, announced the issue of a licence to Alvis in Coventry to export armoured vehicles to Indonesia. In February the Foreign Office assured Jose-Ramos Horta of CNRM that Britain did not recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. This can only mean that the UK government recognises that Indonesian troops are illegally stationed in East Timor. The new export licences for more arms sales to Indonesia means the British government is contravening its own policy of non-recognition.*

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Britain was the second major supplier of arms to Indonesia in the years 1987/91, with only the US selling more. However huge deals secured since then are thought to have made Britain Indonesia's top arms supplier.

In October 1994, Field Marshal Peter Inge, the UK Chief of Defence Staff visited General Feisal Tanjung, the Indonesian Armed Forces Chief. Tanjung then told reporters that the Indonesia government would purchase Alvis Scorpion armoured fighting vehicles. The manufacturers, Alvis of Coventry, describe the Scorpion as been suitable to a range of duties including internal security and use in rugged terrain. *Janes Defence Weekly* at the time reported that Indonesia was to purchase between 120 and 140 newly built vehicles including Scorpion-90 and Stormer Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs). A further 16 British Aerospace Hawks ground attack fighter/trainers were also ordered. This Hawks order followed an order for 24 Hawks announced in 1993, worth about £500 million. Alvis has been in protracted negotiations to sell 600 FV-101 Scorpion light tanks to Indonesia since the 1980s.

Field Marshall Peter Inge, insisting that he would not comment on political issues, told reporters that Britain would strengthen defence ties with Indonesia and that co-operation would not be upset by international criticism of Indonesia's handling of affairs in East Timor.

Alvis has a history of involvement in arms trade with Indonesia since the late 1960s. The Military Balance of 1993-1994 listed the following Alvis vehicles as being in the possession of the Indonesian armed forces:

- 60 Saladin armoured reconnaissance vehicles
- 45 Ferret armoured vehicles
- 45 Saracen armoured personnel carriers

*Janes Defence Contracts* of June 1994 listed a \$10 million contract awarded to an Alvis Vehicles UK subsidiary - Helio Mirror Company - to supply upgrade kits for Saladin,

Saracen and Ferret vehicles in service with a South-East Asian country.

TAPOL Bulletin of May 1984 reproduced three pictures of three different types of Alvis tanks being paraded in the streets of Jakarta. The photographs included one of a student being arrested and dragged onto the back of an Alvis made Ferret-Scout armoured car in Jakarta.

On 2 Febr. protesters gathered at the Alvis factory which is on the outskirts of Coventry. The site will become a frequent site for demonstrators in the coming months. Later that day a public meeting was held in Coventry, hosted by the Coventry Trades Union Council. Jose Ramos Horta, the special representative of the CNRM, the Timorese resistance, was the main speaker and spoke strongly against the delivery of the Alvis tanks to Jakarta. The meeting was also addressed by Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL and Will McMahon from Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). TAPOL along with sup-

porters of Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT) and the British Coalition for East Timor (BCET) protested against the sale of the Alvis vehicles at the Alvis AGM in central London on March 7th.

Answering a question from a representative of TAPOL, an Alvis director tried to justify the deal by claiming that it was originally intended to supply tanks for Indonesian troops that might go to Bosnia for peace-keeping purposes.

The recently formed 'Stop the Hawks - No Arms to Indonesia' coalition will

continue to intensify its campaigning, challenging the UK government and pressing for accountability at the Annual General Meetings of British Aerospace, Alvis and the banks reported to be providing the financial backing for the Alvis deal. Other actions include speaking tours, articles and vigils.

Following the recent statement made by Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights condemning the January killings of six East Timorese civilians by Indonesian troops, TAPOL feels that licensing the export of the Alvis tanks and further Hawks is nothing less than condonation of such bestial behaviour. \*



*Picket-line at the entrance to Alvis. Close to the Alvis sign is Jose Ramos Horta, CNRM representative.*



## 1965 - 1995: 30 YEARS OF MILITARY RULE

### The story of the Buru forced labour camp

*On 16 August 1969, 1,500 political prisoners, "tapols", were herded onto a ship at Nusa Kambangan prison island in Central Java which set sail for the notorious Buru island forced labour camp. Among the tapols was Indonesia's best known writer and novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, one of the first to arrive and one of the last to leave. The publication of his memoirs is a major literary event.*

Pramoedya never beats about the bush when speaking about what has happened and is still happening to him. Imprisonment under the *Orde Baru*, the New Order, did not last only for the 14 years from the day of his arrest on 13 October 1965 till his return home from Buru in November 1979. It continues to this very day with infringements of his civil rights as a 'ex-tapol'. He still has the initials *ET* branded on his identity card.



*Buru island, many years of hard physical labour for tens of thousands of untried political prisoners. [Photo: Peter Schumacher]*

The decision to banish, without trial, tens of thousands of political prisoners who had been taken into custody after Suharto's seizure of power in October 1965 was a tightly-guarded secret. Women with whom I spent years in detention were never informed that their husbands had been transported more than a thousand miles away. This ranks as one of the most inhuman crimes against defenceless men and women committed by Suharto's *Orde Baru*.

Pramoedya's *Nyanyian Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, or Silent Song of a Dumb Man, was published in Indonesia earlier this

year, seven years after it made its first appearance in print in Malaysia. It remains to be seen whether the authorities will allow it to circulate freely or ban it, which has been the fate to date of all of Pramoedya's books, whatever the subject.

*Nyanyian Sunyi Seorang Bisu* is a detailed and harrowing record of conditions in the forced labour camp that became the focus of world attention during the 1970s, when Indonesia ranked as the country with by far the largest number of untried political prisoners. Pramoedya was its most famous inmate, whose presence on hell's island became a constant source of embarrassment to the regime. He was always among the group of prisoners brought to camp headquarters, *Mako*, to meet visiting journalists or government officials. Many of his conversations are recorded in detail. Inevitably the many foreign journalists he met were the ones who interviewed him with sympathy. But he says that when he met some of the Indonesian journalists who came, being interviewed by them was like being questioned by army interrogators.

#### Given the privilege to write

Because of the international interest in Pramoedya's fate, the authorities were forced to make concessions, allowing him the privilege of writing yet not giving him the wherewithal to enjoy the privilege. It was only by dint of support from his fellow-victims, who repaired a broken-down typewriter for him and provided him with his daily needs to free him from the back-breaking physical labour required from all the men, old or young, healthy or sick, that he was able to return to his profession as writer. The nine essays included in this book were all written thanks to this solidarity.

When the tide turned in the mid-1970s and the regime was compelled by world opinion to release all the untried *tapols*, Pramoedya, their celebrity prisoner, was listed among those to be sent back in the first group from Buru in 1977. It would have been quite a media event. But Pram had said something regarded as offensive by one of the officers in charge and his name was removed from the list. This misdemeanour added another two years to his detention in Buru.

#### 'Starting a new life'

The first essay is a letter to his daughter "which I will never be able to send". As he was setting sail for Buru, she was about to get married. "starting a new life" as the greeting for newly-weds puts it in Indonesian. The prisoners too were told that they were 'starting out on a new life', a life of 'useful labour' for the good of the state. Pramoedya reflects at some length on the fact that as they sailed in abominable conditions to their new life, Indonesia was celebrating the 24th anniversary of the country's independence on 17 August 1945. As those familiar with Pramoedya's works will know, he has written a number of novels against the background of ►



# 1965 - 1995: 30 YEARS OF MILITARY RULE

the Indonesian people's struggle for independence in the late 1940s.

Before he began to write again in Buru he spent several years alongside fellow-prisoners engaged in the unbelievably strenuous labour of opening up inhospitable savannah, often having to cut down the sharp-edged and tough stalks of *imperata* or *alang-alang*, as it is called in Indonesian, with their bare hands. He describes how many of the men who were banished to Buru had spent years of hardship and malnourishment verging on starvation at prisons and detention camps and were not in a fit state to do any kind of work, let alone the tasks required of them, transforming vast swathes of Buru island from a wilderness into a very productive agricultural project, exporting rice to other parts of the Moluccan archipelago.

One essay entitled *From and to My Children* is autobiographical, his reply to a letter he received from his children in 1972. It ranges over many topics, from his courtship with their mother to his attitude towards injustice to other artists during the Sukarno presidency. Pramoedya has been groundlessly accused of being responsible for the clampdown on writers and artists before 1965. He records his discussions with the many other artists in Buru on attitudes towards injustice.

## Roll-call of death

Pramoedya dedicated himself in particular to the task of recording the fate of the many men who died on Buru. The essay entitled '*... and those who departed*' looks at the circumstances in which a number of Buru *tapols* died. One was a young man named Kayun, still a teenager when he was arrested in 1965, who took it upon himself to work fero-

ciously hard to alleviate the burden on elderly men incapable of harsh physical labour. Being malnourished himself, he collapsed one day and was taken to the unit clinic, where he lay burdened by a sense of guilt because others were now having to care for him. One day the unit commander, Captain Sudjono Hadisiswoyo, came to the clinic, announced a roll-call and forced everyone to leave their sick-beds to attend. As Kayun stood trembling with fever, the captain struck him on the head with his baton. A few hours later, the older prisoners found his body lying in a ditch, foam coming from his mouth and a bottle of endrine by his side.

In order to keep a record of all the deaths at the Buru penal camp, Pramoedya asked fellow-*tapols* in every unit for the names of all the people who died each year. The records were meticulously kept from year to year until 1978 when the prison authorities got wind of what was going on and warned people to stop. The list of names is published as an appendix.

The *tapols* also decided to mark the graves of those who died, engraving the name of each person on a slab of stone, in the hope that one day relatives would be able to come and retrieve their bodies.

Pramoedya's *Nyanyian Sunyi* is a moving tribute to the hundreds of thousands who suffered and perished in the dungeons, secret detention camps, prisons and forced labour camps that accompanied Suharto's rise to power. It will go down in history as a literary work of great political significance, and its appearance in English will help confirm the author's position as a writer of world stature.

Carmel Budiardjo

## Flogging the official version

*Late last year, the Suharto regime came out with a 'White Book' purporting to reveal the truth about what really happened in October 1965 when General Suharto seized power. The State Secretariat was given the onerous duty of putting its imprimatur to this shoddy distortion of history.*

Any regime that comes to power in such a wave of violence and death as that which engulfed Indonesia in the months following 1 October 1965 will be anxious for the truth about who was behind those bloody events to be obliterated. Although numerous articles and essays have been written abroad analysing the events of October 1965, notably at Cornell University and by Professor W.F. Wertheim in Holland, the subject has been strictly taboo in Indonesia. Within hours of Suharto taking control of the Indonesian armed forces and instigating his bloody purge of the left-wing movement, he began to assert that the Indonesian Communist Party had masterminded the event.

Aware of the danger of allowing the study and interpretation of the event to fall into the hands of unauthorised persons, the *White Book* states at the outset that:

*the scientific study of the threat of Communism/Marxism/Leninism in order to protect the Pancasila must be properly guided and kept in the hands of the Government.*

## Alternative versions outlawed

Over the years, some brave souls in Indonesia have attempted publicly to launch an alternative theory about what really happened. One such was a lawyer named Sunardi who had defended Sawito, a man with pretensions to become the president of Indonesia. Sunardi soon discovered that thinking and writing about the unthinkable would land him in jail. Some years earlier, in 1977, one of the officers who organised the kidnappings and murders of seven generals (one of whom escaped) on 1 October 1965, Colonel Latief, made more than a hint at the role of Suharto in those events. It was he personally, he told a court, who informed Suharto that the generals were to be kidnapped in a few hours time. This was stated during his trial but his document never saw the light of day in Indonesia.

Early last year, it was the turn of another brave soul to try to lift the veil of secrecy that has stifled all discussion of such a forbidden subject. The man in question was Wimandjaja K. Liotohe, a prolific writer who decided to file a lawsuit accus-

## 1965 - 1995: 30 YEARS OF MILITARY RULE

sing General Suharto of being behind the move in 1965 to overthrow President Sukarno. When a copy of the lawsuit bearing the title *Primadosa* or *Prime Sin*, landed on Suharto's desk, having already been in circulation for several weeks, the dictator made no secret of his anger. He fumed against the document at a meeting with officers at his Tapos ranch in February last year.

Within days, the 'book' had been banned (in fact it wasn't a book but a collection of documents for submission to the courts) and the defiant Wimandjaja was hauled in for interrogation. There was talk of his being charged under Article 134 of the Criminal Code for insulting the President. He was reportedly under arrest. In the event, nothing happened and he has since left Jakarta for his native Sangir Talaud. Could it be that there are people in the security forces these days who are no longer very enthusiastic about putting away people who have a contentious story to tell about 1965?

Whatever the truth about what happened to Wimandjaja, it is certain that the episode made it imperative for Suharto to produce something that would be accepted as the official version, immutable and for posterity.

### History as told by the victor

The title of the White Book is *The 30 September Movement, the Rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party*. The first 125 pages set out to expose the PKI as a party of struggle, constantly engaged in rebellion, subterfuge and discord. Not a single 'fact' is sourced. We are grateful to Professor Wertheim for exposing a crude fabrication about the PKI on page 37. The reader is told that a meeting of the Central Committee in 1954 adopted The Combination of Three Forms of Struggle:

- a. Guerrilla struggle in the countryside consisting of peasant workers and poor peasants,
- b. The revolutionary struggle of workers in the towns, especially the transport workers,
- c. Intensive work within the ranks of the enemy, especially within the armed forces.

In fact, this was the party's programme during the struggle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949; the army described as the enemy was the Dutch, not the Indonesian. In 1954, the party adopted the parliamentary struggle as its programme.

Whatever the intentions of the regime, much of what it says about the PKI may make the reader feel that the party had something inspiring to offer the Indonesian people, as compared with the stagnant and putrid atmosphere that passes for politics in Suharto's *Orde Baru*. Indeed, the regime's film covering the same ground as the *White Book* which truckloads of school-children have been required to watch, has ended up making some people want to know more about the PKI! Could this explain why the book has not been easily available in the bookshops? Even members of Parliament were complaining some weeks after publication that they had not been able to find copies anywhere.

The remainder of the book gives the Suharto version of the events of 1 October 1965, based of course on army documents and pronouncements.

### A sceptical audience

The reports we have seen from the Indonesian press do not suggest that the book has been received with enthusiasm. On the contrary, some commentators argue forcefully that the only way to get an objective view of what happened is to



*The ruthless General Suharto wearing battle dress in October 1965.*

leave the job to historians. Dr Ruslan Abdul Gani, a senior politician during the days of Sukarno, told students that he was deeply concerned about how Indonesian history is being recorded.

*When you read history, look first at who is the writer because history is always written in the interests of those in power. [Waspada, 18.X.1994]*

Moerdiono, the State Secretary whose task it has been to defend the book, assured journalists that it was very scientific because it was based entirely on the verbatim records of the trials staged by the special military courts in the 1960s. These were of course kangaroo trials held precisely in order to establish Suharto's version of what happened. Why, Moerdiono was asked, had the authors not interviewed individuals who were directly involved in the events, an accepted method for writing up contemporary history? This would only have provided subjective interpretations, said Moerdiono. He might have added that many of the witnesses were dead anyway, murdered in the six-month orgy of slaughter that followed Suharto's seizure of power. But that side of the story is not even mentioned in the official version. \*

### Books to read on 1965

M.R Siregar: *Tragedi Manusia dan Kemanusiaan, Kasus Indonesia Sebuah Holokaus yang Diterima Sesudah Perang Dunia Kedua*. A 566-page, detailed account and analysis, thoroughly annotated. The first edition came out in a very limited number only. The second edition is due out shortly, with an Introduction by Professor W.F. Wertheim

We plan to review this important book in our next issue.

Robert Cribb, ed: *The Indonesian Killings 1965 - 1966: Studies from Java and Bali*. Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, No 21 published by Monash University in 1990.



## More killings in the Freeport drama

*Persistent reports from West Papua (Irian Jaya) for the period November 1994 to February 1995 indicate that there have been military operations in the vicinity of Freeport, the huge gold and copper-mine. According to the reports, Papuan villagers have been killed, intimidated and tortured.*

One handwritten message refers to an incident on 9 November 1994 where OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) actions alleged to have taken place in Tembagapura, the city built by the mining company, resulted in an expatriate employee of *PT Freeport Indonesia* being shot. A day earlier, an employee from Biak was shot dead by unidentified people. Indonesian military immediately retaliated by sending military aircraft loaded with troops to the area. As a result, the population of the village of *Tsinga* fled in fear of military actions. Another report says that the troops searched the forests and the lowlands.

Late in November it was reported that the military had shot people in *Tsinga* in the highlands. A few months earlier the same village was the scene of a flag-raising ceremony [see *Tapol Bulletin* No. 126, December 1994] after which the Indonesian army came down hard on the villagers. None of the reports give hard facts about the number of casualties. According to one, there were 12 casualties among the people from the *Tsinga* valley; whether these were all deaths or included some wounded people is not clear.

### Another flag-raising ceremony


The handwritten report refers to another flag-raising ceremony, this time on Christmas Day. Approximately 60 people gathered to raise the Morning Star (West Papua) flag near Tembagapura. The military responded to this act of defiance by killing one demonstrator. Others were arrested and interrogated. As punishment, they were locked up in metal containers for up to 5 days. The report also says that other people were shot.

It is likely that the metal containers belong to the mining company. In 1977, during an OPM operation against the company, there were reports of people being held in metal containers. This form of punishment has not been used anywhere else.

Flag-raising has long been the tradition of Papuan resistance against the Indonesians. Although largely a symbolic gesture, it reflects popular support for the aspirations for independence still deep-rooted among Papuans. Reports about human rights violations in densely populated areas like Java are more easily picked up by the press, but in remote West Papua brutalities by the Indonesian military often go unreported. The infrequent reports received by *TAPOL* and other human rights organisations about conditions in West Papua are often from protected sources or people who do not want to identify themselves. Under such circumstances, cross-checking the information is difficult. Reporting about abuses in West Papua in the Indonesian press is practically non-existent, just as reporting about East Timor used to be, a decade ago.

### Freeport's golden goose

*PT Freeport Indonesia Company* is often seen as the flagship of success for foreign investments in Indonesia. The New Orleans-based company, *Freeport McMoran*, entered



Indonesia in early 1966 in the very first months of the *Orde Baru* regime. Tanks were still rolling in the streets of Jakarta chasing alleged communists when *Freeport* managed to score a scoop with the very first foreign investment contract with the new Indonesian government. This project, exploiting a 10,000 ha copper mine, became one of the most lucrative enterprises in the mining industry. It soon became apparent that gold ore was also very substantial; in fact the *Freeport* mine has become the world's largest gold-mine and the second biggest open-pit copper mine.

The *Freeport* mining operation consists of 2 blocks. The *Ertzberg* mine (10,000 ha), block A, has been exploited since 1969, but is still a productive open mine. Previously a black shiny mountain, *Ertzberg* has become a deep water-filled crater. The new operation, block B, also called *Grasberg*, about 2 kms away, is a vast area of 2.6 million ha. Block B will be exploited in a few years time. The new operation will increase output to 900 million pounds of copper and 1.1 million ounces of gold by contrast with 770 million pounds of copper and 800,000 ounces of gold in 1994. Conservative figures made public last year estimated *Freeport* copper reserves to be worth US\$ 23 billion and its gold reserves to be worth a total of US\$ 15 billion.


### Huge expansion

The *Grasberg* operation has turned the project into the world's biggest single mining operation. The initial joint venture *PT Freeport Indonesia* consisted of three partners: *Freeport McMoran Copper & Gold* owns 80 per cent, the Indonesian Government 10 per cent and *PT Indocopper Investama*, a private company, 10 per cent. The *Grasberg* expansion will transform the entire region. The high-altitude boom town Tembagapura, inhabited by *Freeport* personnel is connected by a 75 km road to the coastal town Timika. Tembagapura is inhabited by 14,500 residents including many ex-

patriates from the US, Canada, Australia, Great Britain and the Philippines. The facilities at Tembagapura are like any affluent middle-class suburb: air-conditioned compounds, excellent medical care, cable television, two shopping complexes and subsidised clubs and bars. Two free schools are available plus tennis courts, a soccer field and basketball court. The *Freeport* management is so confident about the future that it has struck a deal with a real-estate company owned by Manpower Minister Abdul Latief to build a new city close to Timika. The US\$500 million town is for the administrative and logistical personnel now living in overcrowded Tembagapura. The new town will have abundant recreational activities: an 18-hole golf course, health clinics, swimming pools and a four star Sheraton Hotel. The growth-philosophy of *Freeport* is quite simple: "We need elbow room to grow and provide a hub city for many more Tembagapuras along the mountain chain", says George Mealey, *Freeport-McMoran* president. [FEER, 10 March 1994].

## RTZ joins in

The huge expansion created a cash flow problem for *Freeport McMoran (FMI)* and this brought the UK mining company RTZ into the picture. On 8 March it was announced that RTZ, the world's biggest mining company, will acquire at least 21.5 million *FMI* shares, a 10.4 per cent stake in the company. This will cost RTZ an initial US\$450 million but it is expected that more shares, up to US\$875 million, will be purchased. RTZ will also plunge a 40 per cent working interest in block A and B at a cost of US\$100 million. In block A RTZ will also provide 100 per cent of certain current mine expansion costs up to a limit of US\$750 million. In total RTZ investments might total a whopping US\$1,725 million, one of the biggest mining acquisitions in the nineties.



RTZ is also active in another *FMI* operation in Spain but with an Indonesian tail. An investment of US\$256 million has been made by RTZ to acquire 25 per cent interest in the Huelva copper smelter, Rio Tinto Minera (RTM) in Andalusia and another 25 per cent interest in *FMI*'s Spanish exploration program. *Freeport Indonesia* has provided the RTM smelter with 150,000 tons of copper concentrate in 1994 and this will gradually increase to about 50 per cent of RTM's requirements in 1996.

A copper smelter will also be built in Gresik, in East Java, a joint venture of the Japanese giant Mitsubishi (70%) and two American companies Fluor Daniel Inc. (10%) and *Freeport McMoran* (20%). The plant will have an annual capacity of 200,000 tons of copper cathode, primarily for domestic consumption. The smelter will also produce 600,000 tons of sulphuric acid as a byproduct which will be supplied to the state-owned Petrokimia Gresik plant. It is to be expected that RTZ will be involved in the Gresik smelter in the near future.

## What about the tribal people?

The two mining companies are notoriously neglectful of the rights of the native people and the environment. The local tribes, known under the combined name *Masyarakat Hukum Adat* (Adat Law Community) have lost all their traditional land. The tribes have lost almost 1 million ha to transmigration and 7,000 ha to Timika and now 25,000 ha to the new hub city at present known only as Kota Baru. The land expropriation occurred between 1983 and 1985 and many tribal people did not realise what was going on.

At a seminar last January held by the Environment Ministry and *Freeport*, the tribal people finally realised that they had lost all their ancestral land. The Amungme tribe who live round Timika have been particularly hard hit by the land-grabbing. As they know from past experience, loud protests can have grave consequences: the military are brought in and they are accused of being *OPM* (Free Papua Movement) rebel gangs. The Amungme and other tribes only demand the use of their traditional land in the unused areas between the transmigration sites and the towns. The Komoro, Iwaka, Dani, Ikari, Moni and Duga tribes have made the same demands for their traditional land along the newly built roads SP6 and SP7.

The plight of the local people was raised in the national parliament in Jakarta, some 3,000 kms from Timika. Some MPs argued that the profits earned by *Freeport* were probably far greater than the benefits the local people have received from the company's presence. One MP, Mike Prionggo, who visited the site, said: "...we got the impression that the company treats the area as part of the United States" [Jakarta Post, 21 June 1994]. But no-one was listening; in its 27 years of operation, *Freeport* has become an invaluable asset for Jakarta.

*Freeport* is one of the biggest corporate tax payers in Indonesia, contributing 47 per cent to Irian Jaya's gross domestic product. Together with RTZ they gather a lot of political clout and have close connections with Indonesian decision-makers. The interests of hunters and gatherers like the Amungme have had to make way for the insatiable hunger of two global mining companies. \*

## sources:

- Resume RTZ/FMI Deal, March 1995, Roger Moody.
- FEER 20 Jan. 1994, 10 March & 16 March 1994.
- Letter to the Governor of Irian Jaya from the Lembaga Musyawarah Adat & the Suku Amungme-Timika.
- Reuter dispatch, Miners face challenges in Indonesian "Copper City", John Owen-Davies, 25 April 1994
- Jakarta Post 21 June 1994, 15 July 1994, 25 febr. 1995, 6 March 1995, 9 March 1995
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- Reports from protected sources



## Targetting AJI and PIJAR

It is clear that *Pijar* and *AJI* have been selected as the targets in the current crackdown.

Several Indonesian publications have been used by the regime to float stories full of insinuations against *PIJAR*, portraying it as the instigator of all kinds of actions. *Gatra*, owned by timber tycoon Bob Hasan, the weekly that took over the licence of the banned *Tempo*, is playing a particularly despicable role in this respect. *PIJAR* is justifiably proud of its record of campaigning and support for actions on land conflicts, human rights issues and issues of a more general political nature. Several key members are still in jail, notably former chairperson Nuku Suleiman, serving a five-year sentence and Beathor Suryadi, serving four and a half years. Beathor had been allowed out on parole but was rearrested last June for taking part in protests against the press bans. Both were sentenced for insulting the President. Another founder-member, Bonar Tigor Naipospos, was released last year after serving the best part of an 8-year sentence. His only crime was to have been a member of a discussion group that occasionally discussed left-wing theories.

*KDP*, its publication, is being used as the pretext to hit hard at the organisation. Its June 1994 issue published a lively report of a public rally in Jakarta held on 23 June. The rally was one of a series of demonstrations against the banning of the three weeklies, *Tempo*, *DeTIK* and *Editor*. The report was factual, portraying the anti-government atmosphere of the demonstration. In the evening another gathering took place on the premises of the Legal Aid Institute, when the well-known human rights lawyer Adnan Buyung Nasution used strong words. He placed the blame for the chaotic situation squarely on Suharto. *KDP* headlined this quotation from Nasution's speech.

## AJI's fight for press freedom

The emergence of *AJI* in August 1994 was a direct result of the closure of *Tempo*, *DeTIK* and *Editor*. In several cities core groups of progressive journalists already existed but the clampdown accelerated the founding of *AJI*. For years dissatisfaction with the *PWI*, the only recognised journalists' association, was mounting. The *PWI* is nothing more than an extension of the government and a tool of Information Minister Harmoko, one of Suharto's most loyal cronies. [See Profile of Harmoko on page 13.] The heavy blow against the press provoked a huge public outcry but the *PWI* said only that it 'understood' the government's action. It was this statement that led finally to the creation of *AJI*.


## AJI journal makes its mark

It was a profoundly important move for the new organisation of journalists to start publishing its own journal. *Independen* quickly became a journal of note, dealing with a variety of political issues well beyond the scope of specific journalist interests. It has already published several well researched articles on the business activities of some of Suharto's closest allies. The Profile written in this issue about Information Minister Harmoko is largely based on articles published late last year by *Independen*. Some articles have caught the attention of foreign journalists and were featured in reports by wire services such as *Reuters*. Without the need to keep looking over their shoulders at the censors, writers could speak their minds and produce the facts. In the stifling atmosphere of the Indonesian media today, there was an eager market for the publication which was on its way to becoming a much sought-after journal where you could read things about Indonesian politics not available anywhere else in Indonesia.

## Suharto becoming more vindictive

There are many signs that the 73-year old president is losing his grip. He has alienated many former allies and has become distrustful of everyone, seeing plots lurking around every corner. He has always been vindictive but with age, this has got worse. As his position gets weaker, he becomes more vicious towards those he sees as potential enemies. The disturbing events in 1994 should be seen in this light: Suharto striking hard at what he perceives as dangerous people, institutions or organisations.

The vast Suharto family empire, now a multi-billion dollar business, is a major worry, aggravated by criticism at



home and abroad. Political analysts believe that Suharto has reached a point where he has decided that he cannot afford to step down in 1998. The only safeguard for the family fortunes is to hold on for yet another term.

The current press clampdown is also an example of the growing role of the police in security and order. Ever since Suharto came to power, the police have played second fiddle

continued on page 4

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