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## The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 112

August 1992

# Britain arming Suharto

*First there was the Green Rover, a replenishment ship for the Indonesian navy. Next, the Bandung aerospace symposium, a meeting of military manufacturing minds. Soon, the British arms industry will play its trump card: the sale of 40 Hawk fighters to Indonesia. This £600m deal explains a lot about the British government's present behaviour.*

British Aerospace will supply the Indonesian airforce with up to 40 Hawk fighter-trainers in a deal to be completed over the next two months. Last year, the company signed a memorandum of understanding with IPTN, Indonesia's state aerospace company, for production of Hawk fighter-trainer aircraft. The year-long negotiations are now in their closing stages, 9 months after the Indonesian army's vivid display of brutality at Santa Cruz in East Timor.

The sale of forty Hawk fighter-trainer aircraft will not be the first Hawks that British Aerospace has sold to Indonesia: 13 were sold between 1978 and 1981. Other major deals include £340m worth of Rapier air defence missiles and £3m for a technology college in East Java. British Aerospace has turned Britain into Indonesia's second biggest arms supplier. Meanwhile, growing demand from

this regional military power has favoured other military manufacturers in Britain. The BAe agreement will provide Rolls Royce with its biggest yet deal with Indonesia, to supply the jet-engines. "Indonesia is a very exciting part of the world", said Rod Williams, a company representative. So it is.

### Hypocrisy

At around the time of the BAe/IPTN memorandum, in June 1991, the European Community's Council of Ministers adopted a Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports, specifying 8 criteria for national arms export policies, including respect for human rights and international law in the country of final destination. Indonesia's

## Acehnese refugees demand UNHCR protection

A group of 43 Acehnese men, women and children went into the UN High Commission for Refugees office in Kuala Lumpur on 22 June and refused to leave, demanding political refugee status to protect them from being forcibly returned to Indonesia. As we went to press, the group had spent more than a month in the UNHCR compound and still refuse to leave.

This act of desperation highlights the fear among Acehnese, so many of whom face imminent danger of refoulement (repatriation against their will) to Indonesia which could mean death, torture or imprisonment. [For the background, please see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 111, June 1992.]

They entered the UNHCR premises one week before expiry of a Malaysian government ultimatum requiring all 'illegal immigrants' to register with the authorities by 30 June or face arrest and deportation. Almost all are from Indonesia. Whatever the reasons for the ultimatum as far as

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occupation of East Timor alone should have rendered it unacceptable. Not so, according to Britain. From 1986 and 1991 it sold £522m worth of advance weapons systems to Indonesia and clearly intends to expand its position in the Indonesian market.

In August 1991 Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd urged the European Commission to cut aid to countries that violate human rights [*Sunday Times*, 18.VIII.91]. Two weeks after the Santa Cruz massacre, the European Council of Ministers adopted a Declaration linking human rights to relations with developing countries. Britain's response to the massacre was consistent with neither of these positions. While Canada, Denmark and Holland suspended aid, Britain quietly admonished the Indonesian ambassador in London. Three months later, the sale to Indonesia of a refurbished ex-Royal Navy support ship, the *Green Rover*, was announced. The announcement had been discreetly postponed because of the massacre.

The government defends the Hawks deal by insisting that the aircraft are 'fighter-trainers' only, and not suitable for repression or for operations in East Timor. What the government ignores, however, is that the aircraft are easily convertible to fighters as was established with the first batch. Indonesia is understood to have been swayed in the negotiations by the promise of "technology transfer" [*Guardian*, 26.VI.92]. Both British Aerospace and Rolls Royce will find the Bandung aerospace symposium next October very useful [*TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 111].

To argue that arms sold to Indonesia have no direct use in East Timor or Aceh or West Papua is both untrue and deceitful. First, we now have photographic evidence that Land Rovers are used by the army of occupation in East



*A British Land Rover in East Timor, with Indonesian combat troops carrying M16 automatic rifles (photo by Stephan Schoor, taken in August 1991).*

Timor. But more generally, *any* supplies to the Indonesian armed signals support for its barbaric practices.

Hot on the heels of the BAe deal came the news that UK aerospace company, Lucas Industries has won a joint contract with a German computer company to supply up to £350m of flight control systems to IPTN.

The promotion of British goods is a skilled art, especially in a recession. That IPTN is a state-owned company only underscores the point. The conclusion must surely be that these deals are the factors determining Britain's hypocritical and obstructionist stance on relations with Indonesia. ★

## Indonesian officers to train in Britain

*Documents containing details of Indonesian army officers who will come to the UK this year for training have come into our possession. The British government persistently refuses to give information about military training programmes. After years of secrecy, the documents make interesting reading.*

The details are contained in application forms and supporting papers for three army officers who will take courses at universities or academies with costs borne by the *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Scholarships and Awards Scheme* and the *UK Military Training Assistance Scheme*. Of particular interest is the comment made on each application form by an official of the British Embassy in Jakarta, explaining how the candidate meets FCO SAS criteria:

*"The candidate is proposed with the full support of the Embassy's Defence Attache. It has previously been agreed with the CRD (?) that the position of the Armed Forces in Indonesian society is such that its members are important decision-makers and opinion-formers and do, therefore fall within the scope of FCO SAS. Up to 40% of the participants in Indonesia's political fora are drawn from the Armed Forces and they are a target for support under the FCO Schemes in Indonesia."*

In one application form, the question: "Are there any potential commercial interests in this award?", has the following reply by Embassy official:

*"The Government of Indonesia is looking increasingly to Britain and to the British model in the development of its approach... [a few words are missing from this apparently standard comment; the text continues] ...equipment orientation in his career to date and in future will hold posts directly concerned with equipment management and procurement. Britain does well, therefore, to be the provider of training at an influential stage of the candidate's career development."*

The close connection between the training and Britain's desire to invest in future association with men likely to hold key state positions and the promotion of British exports to the Indonesian armed forces could hardly be made plainer.



Replying to questions from Lord Avebury about the three army trainees, Baroness Chalker, the Minister for Overseas Development, was unable to contest the details about the men. Asked for details about UKMTAS, she said: "A total of £14.7 million is available under UKMTAS worldwide in this financial year. The allocation of funds to individual countries varies from year to year and is not made public, and details of the training courses paid for under UKMTAS are not normally disclosed." [Emphasis added.]

She also revealed in response to questions from Lord Avebury that the FCO SAS had met the costs of training for five officers from Indonesia in 1991-92 and is expected to pay for seven officers to attend courses in 1992-93.

Details about three of these officers are now known. One is **Minulyo Suprpto** who applied for a course at the Royal Military College of Science in Cranfield will, according to Baroness Chalker, take an MSc course in information technology at the Institute of Technology in Cranfield. Since 1987, Minulyo has been a Rapier missile technician; Rapier missiles worth more than £300m were sold to Indonesia by Britain Aerospace in the 1980s. He twice attended British Aerospace courses at Stevenage - in 1987 and 1988. He states in his application form that his preferred fields of study with the UK scholarship are 'military vehicle technology' and 'gun system design'.

**Kustanto Widiatmoko** has, since 1987, been an armour platoon leader in the First Armour Squadron of the Presidential Security Service. He will take a masters degree course in Defence Administration at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham.

**Akhmad Buldan** was communication platoon leader with an infantry battalion from 1983 to 1986, since when he has been a field-communication sub-detachment leader. Although he applied for a place at the Royal Military College of Science in Shrivenham, Baroness Chalker told Lord Avebury he would take a masters course in information technology at Nottingham University.

### Commons motion

After learning of these scholarships, members of Parliament tabled an Early Day Motion regretting the scholarships for

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the three men and, in the light of the recent massacre at Santa Cruz, urging the government to cancel the scheme targetted at supporting the Indonesian armed forces immediately, until those responsible are brought to justice. In less than ten days, more than 40 MPs had signed the motion.★

### UK advisors for Indonesian police

The Indonesian police has turned to the British police for advice on plans to professionalise and modernise its manpower and equipment. Commander of the Indonesian Police Force, Police General Kunarto, said in an interview [Editor, 18.08.1992] that teams of British policemen are inspecting police operations at six locations in West Java and Central Java, to give advice about personnel management and re-equipping the force. Twelve police officers would visit the UK later this year for further briefings, before plans under consideration were put into operation.

The police commander, in confident mood after being promoted to full general, putting him on a par with the armed forces commander-in-chief, admitted that his men were lacking in discipline and poorly equipped so he looked to his British advisors to raise standards. The tie-up will undoubtedly bring Britain yet more orders for equipment.

In the last year, there have been numerous exposures of cases of wrongful imprisonment in the UK; many persons serving long sentences have had their convictions quashed because of false evidence from the police. The Indonesian and British police will have a lot of common experiences to share! ★

# Britain wants arms deals, not human rights

*The British government is so deeply engrossed in boosting its arms trade with Indonesia that its advocacy of linking aid to human rights and good governance has been chucked out of the window. It obstructed Portuguese efforts during its EC presidency to pronounce on East Timor and rejected all demands here in the UK for the suspension of aid.*

There was much fanfare when Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd announced last August that he had called on the European Commission to cut aid to countries that violate human rights [Sunday Times, 18-08-1991]. The sequence might suggest that the 28 November 1991 Declaration of the EC Council of Ministers "that the Community and its Member States will explicitly introduce the consideration of human rights as an element of their relations with development countries" came largely as a result of British pressure. Coming a fortnight after the Santa Cruz massacre, what better test of this commitment than to apply it to Indonesia?

The point was made by Labour's Shadow Minister for Overseas Development, Ann Clwyd MP, in a letter to the *Financial Times*, to which Minister Lynda Chalker replied:

*... the foreign secretary told the Indonesian foreign minister (on 5 February) that he welcomed the action taken so far but sought assurances that they would complete as promised the next stages of the investigation to bring to justice those responsible, search for the missing and take measures to prevent a recurrence.*

*Indonesia remains one of the 50 poorest countries with*

*the fifth largest population. It has a well-deserved reputation for sound macro-economic management... Following the shootings in East Timor on November 12 the donor countries concluded that projects already agreed with the Indonesian government should continue as planned. Our projects include a number relating to tropical forestry, energy efficiency and the environment. These are key areas. [Financial Times, 19.02.1992]*

Ali Alatas could hard have put it better.

## Britain's silent diplomacy

On 14 July 1992, a deputation from the British Coalition for East Timor met Gavin Hewitt, head of the Southeast Asia Department at the Foreign Office, to protest at British Aerospace's forthcoming sale of Hawks to Indonesia. Nick Harvey MP, Liberal Democrat, Ann Feltham from Campaign Against Arms Trade, and Liem Soei Liong of TAPOL had a heated discussion about UK relations with Indonesia. While admitting that the human rights situation in East Timor was "far from satisfactory", Mr Hewitt said: "Foreign policy is *realpolitik*." Though he complimented the East Timor lobby in the UK for its effectiveness, he was scathing about Portuguese diplomacy. Britain prefers 'silent diplomacy' to 'megaphone diplomacy', he said.

During Portugal's presidency of the European Community, from January to June 1992, Britain, in its position as the next EC president, represented Portugal in Indonesia, attending the trials of East Timorese and the military trials. While it certainly performed this duty thoroughly well and was better informed than most about the gross injustices of the trials, it would not allow these and other developments in East Timor to impinge on EC attitudes or its arms deals. The crunch came at the Lisbon EC Summit when Portugal was hoping to include a statement about East Timor in the Final Communiqué. But Britain was not willing, so the matter was shelved; EC decisions are all adopted by consensus. Nor would Britain agree to a joint EC statement on human rights being made at the Paris meeting of the aid-donors club, the Consultative Group on Indonesia.

## UK-Portuguese disagreements intensify

Although Portugal had to live with its failure to take initiatives on behalf of East Timor during its EC presidency, it has since seized on the opportunity of pressure in the EC to renew its cooperation accord with ASEAN by insisting that this will not happen until there is a marked improvement in the human rights situation in East Timor. The EC foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, which was to have discussed renewal on 20 July, was forced to drop the matter without further debate because Foreign Minister Joao de Deus Pinheiro made such a powerful speech about East Timor, stunning the meeting into 'complete silence', according to *Reuter*.

There is pressure in both regional groupings to renew the present cooperation agreement by upgrading economic ties and including political cooperation. This was to be on the agenda of this year's ASEAN-EC meeting in Manila at the end of July but Portugal has effectively blocked further progress in this direction. The UK argues that Lisbon's stance is "counter-productive" as the new EC-ASEAN accord will contain human rights provisions which do not exist in the current agreement. [Financial Times, 21-07-

1992] But ASEAN countries, with Indonesia and Malaysia very much to the fore, have insisted in past discussions with the EC that ASEAN countries have a 'different concept' of human rights. Hence, formulations agreed upon would give prominence to these differences and provide no basis for protecting human rights victims in Indonesia or ASEAN generally.

In any case, human rights provisions which are not backed by positive action – as with the EC's 28 November 1991 Declaration – get nowhere with Jakarta. The UK may find it more difficult to persuade Portugal to confine itself to 'silent diplomacy', now that Portugal is no longer presiding over EC business and is freer to act according to its conscience.

Portugal's decision to block renewal of the agreement could put it on a collision course with the UK which was hoping to use its EC presidency to the greatest effect for a variety of political objectives.

## Public opinion in the UK

There has been a shift in public opinion about East Timor in the last eight months. It is no longer an unknown country. When former Defence Minister Alan Clark was challenged on Channel Four TV about Britain training Indonesian officers following the Santa Cruz killings, he poured contempt on 'all this fuss'. "Does anyone know where East Timor is?" he asked the audience, to which many replied: "Yes!" After explaining that arms deals mean jobs, he asked: "Shouldn't we do this?", to which the audience replied: "No!"

Parliamentary support for actions against Indonesia is getting broader. Motions in the House of Commons to halt the arms trade and suspend aid now have Conservative MPs among the signatories. The House of Lords debate and the letters from MPs and peers to Douglas Hurd are signs of growing concern among Tories, making it more difficult for the government to ignore public opinion in its dealings with Indonesia. ★



Two Timorese refugees, Estevao Cabral and Dolores Joaquim, in front of the Indonesian Embassy in London, on Human Rights Day, December 1991.

Photo: Paul Slattery



# The 'case' against Francisco Miranda Branco

*Following widespread criticism of the grotesque discrepancy between verdicts for East Timorese demonstrators and soldiers who opened fire on them, General Benny Murdani defended the results as being in accord with Indonesia's legal system. The Timorese, he said, "were found guilty of subversion while officers were found guilty of ignoring instructions". That speaks reams about justice in Indonesia but more to the point, all the trials were strictly in conformity with a scenario serving political aims. Gradually, the extent of the frame-up is becoming clearer as our analysis of both sets of trials shows.*

Francisco Miranda Branco, 41, was one of eight East Timorese to be tried for the 12 November demonstration and got a 15-year sentence, second only to life for Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha. The following summarises his Defence Plea, received recently in London, entitled, "Aspirations and innermost feelings of the East Timorese on trial". The 'case' against him is similar in many respects to the cases against most of the others (see box).

Despite what Murdani said, only two were actually tried for subversion. The other six were tried under articles of the Criminal Code which allow a maximum of seven years; however, three got in excess of that. Had the prosecutor had his way, all would have got more than 8 years.

The prosecution argued, and the courts agree, that the plan to hold a demonstration was aimed at undermining East Timor's integration. Ignoring all the documented evidence, particularly the Yorkshire TV footage which was not so much as mentioned, the prosecution argued, and the court agreed, that the demonstrators behaved provocatively and even that some were armed.

The defendants argued that the status of East Timor is a matter for the international community to resolve. They were hoping to use the UN-sponsored MPs' visit to express their aspirations and call for negotiations.

## The Comité Executivo

Francisco had worked for the Portuguese administration. In January 1976, he got a job working for the Indonesian administration and became a member of Korpri, the association of civil servants which all Indonesian government employees must join. At the time of his arrest, he was working for the economics department of the local government administration. He is married with six children, aged from 2 to 15 years. He did not attend the demonstration in Dili on 12 November. He was arrested on 6 December 1991.

Branco was one of eight East Timorese who formed an ad hoc body, the *Comité Executivo* (CE), set up to handle the sensitive task of making contact with the Portuguese parliamentary mission which was to have visited East Timor. Branco and his friends wanted to take advantage of this UN-sponsored mission, hoping to enjoy the protection officially provided for anyone wanting to contact the MPs.

Of the eight CE members, six have been tried and sentenced. The two not tried are **Constancio Pinto** whose whereabouts is unknown (if indeed he is still alive) and **Filipe Gama Xavier**. One mystery surrounding the trials is the role of Pinto. There is little doubt of the seniority of his position in the clandestine front and his arrest in January 1991 sent shock waves through the movement. He was released within days and although it was said then that he

was under orders to spy on his colleagues, he clearly did not lose their confidence as he played such a prominent role in the preparations for the MPs' visit. In his defence plea, Gregorio notes that while he was in hospital after the demonstration, being treated for injuries, a security officer told him that Pinto is "working with us". Gregorio gives no hint of whether he believed this or not.

## Planning to meet the MPs

Since Pope John Paul's visit East Timor in October 1989, it had become the tradition for Timorese to demonstrate whenever foreign visitors came, the only chance for them to convey their feelings to the outside world, preferably in the presence of journalists. The Portuguese MPs' visit was to have been the climax of this strategy, an occasion for which the East Timorese spared no effort.



*Francisco Miranda Branco entering courtroom.*

The visit had been planned for years under UN auspices. Yet, Branco and his friends have been savagely punished for nothing more than trying to make use of this event. Branco explained why the CE was set up:

*On the basis of the Terms of Reference [for the mission]*

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agreed on 27 June 1991 by Portuguese and Indonesian representatives at the UN, under the auspices of the Secretary General, Constancio Pinto took the initiative to set up a *Comité Executivo* to hand a petition of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) to the parliamentary mission, asking for dialogue.

The two critical paragraphs of the Terms of Reference are:

**Paragraph 9:** The Portuguese parliamentary delegation shall have unhindered access to all parts of the territory, within the context of the agreed objective of the visit, in conditions of peace and security.

**Paragraph 10:** The Portuguese parliamentary delegation shall be free to meet whoever it wishes and anyone who wishes to meet the Portuguese parliamentary delegation will be allowed to do so. No action, including of a security nature, may be taken by the Indonesian authorities that could prejudice any potential or actual contacts. Individuals who meet the Portuguese parliamentary delegation shall not be made to suffer any adverse consequences as a result of these contacts.

Branco said: "The CE was set up to ask the parliamentary mission to urge the Portuguese government to enter into dialogue with the Indonesian government and with representatives of the East Timorese people, including those for and against integration with Indonesia. This was in line with UN General Assembly Resolution 37/30, passed on 23 November 1982, to reach a solution of the East Timor question that would be acceptable to all sides."

The CE decided on 26 October to make preparations to welcome the parliamentary mission when it arrived on 4 November with a petition drafted by Constancio Pinto and signed by all the members; it asked the Portuguese and Indonesian governments together with East Timorese representatives, for as well as against integration, to seek a solution to the East Timor question acceptable to all sides, under UN auspices.

## Non-violence and peace

Branco was explicit about his own political stance: "I uphold the principles of non-violence and peace. So, after the outbreak of the civil war in East Timor on 20 August, 1975, I decided that whereas up till then, my sympathies lay with ASDT/Fretilin, I would no longer take sides with any party, including Fretilin, which is my position to the present day. In my opinion, parties only result in antagonism and conflicts between the East Timorese which can lead to their destruction, ultimately benefitting others."

## On integration

Branco set forth his understanding of the events leading up to Indonesian integration. He incorporated into his defence plea the political programmes of the three main parties, ASDT/Fretilin, UDT and Apodeti. Although they had different demands for East Timor's future, they all, including Apodeti (which favoured integration with Indonesia), wanted a referendum.

He referred to the 30 November 1975 Balibo Declaration signed by leaders of four East Timorese parties including UDT and Apodeti, asking for integration with Indonesia but said that some of the signatories had since disavowed it. [This document is used by Indonesia to back its claim that


integration took place 'at the request of the East Timorese people'.]

Branco quotes extensively from the report produced in 1990 by sociologists from Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, under Dr Mubyarto, which highlighted trauma and deep-rooted dissatisfaction in East Timor with life under Indonesian occupation. After quoting from the ten resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly, he said that Resolution 37/30 of 23 November 1982 mandates the Secretary General to consult with all parties directly concerned, which further legitimises the intentions of the CE.

Then came the Indonesian invitation in 1987 to the Portuguese Parliament to send a mission to East Timor. This led ultimately to arrangements for the mission to take place and the adoption of the Terms of Reference on 27 June 1991. This is what led to the initiative to set up the CE.

## Branco and 12 November

From the testimony of witnesses summarised in the Defence Plea of his lawyers, it transpires that Branco was not in favour of a demonstration to greet the Portuguese MPs; he would have preferred a welcome with dances and the presentation of flowers. When the visit was aborted, he apparently did not favour holding a demonstration on 12 November, so did not attend and went to work instead.



Posters listing the Santa Cruz victims, at a demo in front of the Indonesian embassy, 7 January 1992.



## Draconian sentences for survivors

The seven others tried were:

**Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha**, 28, given a life sentence for taking the lead in the 12 November demonstration. A member of the CE. Employed for many years at Dili General Hospital, he was active in protests during the Pope's visit and the US ambassador's visit to Dili. He was wounded during the demonstration. He told the court he should not be tried under Indonesian law as integration has not been recognised internationally. He was previously arrested in 1989 for distributing 'illegal leaflets'.

**Jacinto das Neves Raimundo Alves**, 34, was sentenced to ten years, two years more than asked by the prosecution. He was a member of the CE. He accepted the services of the court defence lawyer, Ponco Atmono. Little was reported about his trial; *Antara* said he fainted twice during the proceedings.

**Saturnino da Costa Belo**, 21, was sentenced to nine years. The only one to be tried at Baucau district court, he refused to be defended either by the Legal Aid Institute or the court lawyer, Ponco Atmono. He told the court he only wanted a Fretilin lawyer. Press reporting of his trial was minimal.

**Carlos dos Santos Lemos**, 30, married with two small children, was sentenced to eight years. He worked as a truck driver for the local government. He was a member of the CE. Most press reports of his trial described him as a 'Fretilin journalist' because he had the task of taking photos of the 12 November demonstration to be sent abroad. His camera was later seized and none of his photos were published. He agreed to be defended by the court lawyer, Ponco Atmono, even though his wife had arranged for the Legal Aid Institute to defend him. According to evidence in other trials, he wrote a book, *Timor Leste, Terra de Esperança* about atrocities under the Indonesian occupation.

**Juvencio de Jesus Martins**, 32, was sentenced to six years and ten months. A civil servant working at the fisheries, land and building tax office. A member of the CE, he was responsible for contacts and transportation. He was accused of keeping contact with tourists; he met and arranged contacts for the Portuguese journalist, Mario Robalo, who visited Dili in August 1991, an unnamed British journalist who was in East Timor in September, and met a Japanese Catholic sister and asked her to get support for East Timor in Japan.

**Bonifacio Magno Ferreira**, 35, sentenced to six years. He too accepted the services of Ponco Atmono. Not a member of the CE but had an organisation of his own called *Fetun*, close to the CE. He was previously in prison from 1984 till 1986.

**Filomeno da Silva Pereira**, 50 years, was sentenced to five years and eight months. He was on the staff of the Governor's Office, in the logistics office. He was a CE member and helped prepare banners for 12 November. He translated Portuguese clippings.

Witnesses' testimonies not refuted by Branco suggest that the CE did not plan the 12 November demonstration.

Four of Branco's colleagues on the CE testified: Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha, Carlos dos Santos Lemos, Juvencio de Jesus Martins and Filomeno da Silva Ferreira. Gregorio told the court that his interrogation statement (BAP) was made under duress and he therefore withdrew it.

Two other civilian witnesses testified, both Indonesians with Balinese names, about the procession on 12 November which they saw while standing along the route or in offices passed by the procession. In neither case would Branco comment on their testimony as he was not present.

Four military witnesses were called but only one appeared – Lamiren (rank not stated), a deputy group commander from Battalion 303. His testimony dealt with what happened before and after the troops opened fire. Again, Branco made no comment.

The three soldiers who failed to appear because of 'duties elsewhere' were: Private Dominggus da Costa, Major Andi Gerhan Lantara and Rudolf Roja. The first two were allegedly wounded by demonstrators, so their non-appearance is all the more incomprehensible, particularly the non-appearance of Lantara, an officer with Battalion 700 whose role in events surrounding the demonstration has been totally obliterated; his battalion was spirited out of East Timor within days of the massacre. Lantara himself left immediately after the massacre and has avoided any publicity ever since. None of the soldiers tried in the courts-martial was from Battalion 700.

The defence were unable to produce any witnesses. They named two – Laurentina and Emanuel da Costa Belo – but the prosecutor who should have summoned them to appear, claimed that they did not want to come as they said they "know nothing about the activities of the accused or the 12 November demonstration".

## Lawyers' defence

Branco's lawyers raised a host of major issues. They were clearly disturbed by the mystery surrounding so many incidents before the massacre and provided important new data about the so-called 'brawl' on 28 October at Motael church. (See page 8.) They vehemently rejected prosecution claims that the CE meetings were 'illegal' or 'clandestine'. Anyone could have attended and they took place in people's homes with no attempt at secrecy. They also drew heavily on the prevailing atmosphere of fear in East Timor and quoted also from UN resolutions to prove that its status is still a matter for international settlement.





## Motael victims punished

*Five young East Timorese have been sentenced on charges of involvement in the murder of an East Timorese who was one of a group of Indonesian agents who attacked Motael church, Dili, where they were taking refuge, when their colleague, Sebastiao Gomes was also killed. However, no-one has been charged for the murder of Sebastiao Gomes.*

These trials yet again highlight the bias of the Indonesian courts in trying a group of men who were targets of a premeditated attack on their place of refuge while those who killed their colleague Gomes are allowed to go scot free.

Sebastiao Gomes was murdered at Motael Church on 28 October 1991. It was his death that was being commemorated on 12 November when troops opened fire on peaceful demonstrators.

Bobby Xavier, at 19, the youngest of the group, was sentenced to three years. From the start, he told the court that the men with Afonso Hendrigues who died in the incident, should be charged with Sebastiao's murder. During the course of the trial, he was clearly under very great emotional strain and broke down while one session was in progress. He had just told the court that he was under

duress during interrogation and now wanted to retract the statements attributed to him in the interrogation report which he signed. Instead of trying to investigate this very serious complaint, the judge proceeded to persuade him not to retract his earlier statements.

When sentence was pronounced on 24 June, Xavier greeted the verdict with: *Viva Timor!* When the judge asked whether he would appeal against the sentence, his response was: *"I will not appeal or seek presidential clemency. It would be better to appeal to and seek clemency from Xanana Gusmao in the jungle."*

The others sentenced with Xavier are: Aleixo da Silva, 22, given two years and three months; Joao dos Santos, 23, and Jacob da Silva, 27, who were both given two years; and Bonifacio Barreto, who was sentenced to 20 months. ★

## What really happened on 28 October?

*Lawyers defending Francisco Miranda Branco have shed new light on the incident in Motael Church on 28 October 1991, when Sebastiao Gomes was killed. Their defence plea, read out in the Dili district court on 23 May 1992, gives some very pertinent facts. This account, slightly abridged below, highlights the need for a thorough investigation to discover what triggered the events on 12 November.*

A religious dignitary believes that what happened on 12 November has its roots in earlier events when a number of youths who felt threatened sought refuge in Motael Church. Security officials said they had nothing to fear and they should go home, but when they did, they were threatened and others in their families were threatened as well.

On 5 October 1991, during the Army Day celebration, the military commander, Brig-General Warouw, made a remark expressing his dissatisfaction with this state of affairs.

On 27 October in the late afternoon, according to the same source, several people on motor-bikes who were shouting loudly, rode round and round the church, occasionally throwing stones at it. Soon after midnight, on 28 October, several people who were also shouting, started throwing stones more persistently in the direction of the church poly-clinic. The young people inside rushed out to chase these trouble-makers off. It was not possible to avoid a fight in which Sebastiao Gomes was involved. He was shot by someone firing from the direction of the sea-front to the north, as he came through the front gate. He fell to the ground, hit by four or five bullets. Another bullet hit a tree in front of the church; that bullet is still embedded in the tree. His body was found in front of the church gate. An autopsy was performed at the hospital and he was buried at Santa Cruz Cemetery.

An eye-witness added that at almost the same time, the body of Afonso [Hendrigues] was found on the same road with injuries inflicted by a sharp implement. It is not clear



*Timorese taking refuge in Motael church, October 1990, Dili. Back row, centre: Aleixo da Gama (sentenced to 2 yrs 3 mths) and, squatting on the right: Gregorio Saldanha (life sentence).*

who killed him. According to the eye-witness, the body of Afonso, who was known in the community as an agent working for the security forces, was lying about 20 metres from Sebastiao's body. Blood was smeared several metres away from the body, to the west. There is strong reason to believe that Afonso was not killed at the place where the fighting took place but had been killed earlier, somewhere else, and his body put in front of the church. This was done so as to create the impression that he was killed with a sharp implement used by youngsters taking refuge in the

church.

Local inhabitants who had been awakened by the continuous ringing of church bells rushed out to see what had happened at the church but were held back by security forces who were standing guard in a radius of tens of metres from the church; they told the people to go home.

Brig. General Warouw's 5 October remarks and the fact that troops were on guard to prevent people from getting near the church have led people to suspect that the death of Sebastiao was pre-arranged. Later, troops entered the church and carried out a search. Some weeks later, reports appeared in the press that a number of sharp implements, banners and other things had been found hidden away in the church. The parish priest, Father Alberto Ricardo da Silva, said he knew nothing about any such things being found; he only saw them later when summoned by the police. The police admitted that it was an 'oversight' on their part not to draw up a record of confiscation.

Another aspect confirmed by Fr Ricardo is that an escaped prisoner, known to his friends as 'Aliong' had taken refuge in the church. This gave the security forces an excuse to enter the church in the days prior to 28 October in order to search for him. According to another version, Aliong was 'let out' and told to take refuge in the church some days before 28 October to give the security forces an excuse to search the church. This is undoubtedly the man who escaped from prison with Jose Antonio Joaquim Galucho, whose wife is shortly to go on trial.

### Prisoner's wife to be charged for slander

Yet another extraordinary case is soon to come to court in Dili. The accused will be **Joanita de Jesus Viegas Galucho**, whose husband, **Jose Antonio Joaquim Galucho**, is serving a two-year sentence for his part in the demonstration which greeted US ambassador, John Monjo, when he was on a visit to Dili in January 1990.

The case against Mrs Galucho truly exceeds all comprehension. She is to be charged for slandering government

## EAST TIMOR TRIALS

officials. Why? Last October, when visiting her husband in prison, he told her a co-prisoner had overheard prison officials discussing a plan to exterminate him. Shocked by the news, she wrote to Governor Mario Viegas Carrascalao, seeking protection for her husband. It is not at all unusual for people in Dili to turn to the governor as he has often been willing to help in cases of injustice.

Wishing to pursue the matter, Carrascalao sent copies of her letter to other officials, including the military commander, and added a plea of his own that Galucho had already been punished and no further action should be taken against him. As a result, Joanita was summoned for interrogation and told she would be charged with slander.

Meanwhile, her husband and a co-prisoner identified in the Indonesian press only as 'David' managed to escape from prison on 21 October. David is almost certainly **David da Conceicao Sinai** also known as Aleong, whose name appeared in a list of prisoners, along with that of Jose Antonio Joaquim Galucho, received from Dili in the early part of 1991. Sinai was re-arrested in Motael Church on 28 October but Galucho remained in hiding until March 1992 when he was re-arrested in Liquica.

Even Governor Carrascalao has expressed amazement that charges are being brought against Mrs Galucho. Luhut Pangaribuan of the Legal Aid Institute, to whom she has turned for help, said her letter was private and it was the governor who showed it to others. If anyone has to be sued for slander, it should be the governor, he said. [*Kompas*, 10.06.1992]

However, the Dili prosecutor's office later announced that Mrs Galucho would be tried under Article 310 and 311 of the Criminal Code for slandering officials. [*Kompas*, 19.06.1992]

★

## Indonesian 'comfort women' speak out

Following revelations by Korean women who were forced into prostitution as 'comfort women' by the Japanese Imperial Army during the Pacific War, Indonesian women who were similarly humiliated have begun to speak out.

A former member of an Indonesian armed militia, R. Winarso, now 64, said that many girls and young women were tricked into becoming 'comfort women' in and around Solo, Central Java. "It's hard for us to erase such things from our memories."

The women were just as harshly treated as men who were taken off on forced-labour gangs as *romusha*, he said.

Some young girls were enticed by promises that they would be given schooling but were locked up inside a brothel in Solo known as Fuji Rokyan and treated like slaves. The brothel was kept under heavy armed guard at all times to prevent the women from escaping.

The head of the Women's Militia in Surakarta (Solo), Mrs Pramani, 73, said this resulted in terrible sufferings among the women. Some of the young women forced into prostitution were coerced by their own parents, who thought that this might win them favours from the Japanese authorities.

Under pressure from Korean women who are demanding compensation from the Japanese government, the Japanese authorities have begun to examine the archives and have discovered documents showing that 200,000 Asian women were compelled to become prostitutes.

The Indonesian government issued a statement on 13 July asking the Japanese government to continue with its investigations but saying that it "does not want to blow up the issue out of all proportion". [*Suara Merdeka*, 16 July 1992] Considering the collaborationist role of many of Indonesia's so-called '1945 Generation', in particular President Suharto who was himself a soldier in the Japanese-run Indonesian armed force, *Pembela Tanahair*, it is not surprising that the government would prefer to keep this atrocity under wraps.

★



## The military trials and the truth behind the Dili massacre

*Short sentences were meted out to soldiers by military courts in connection with the Santa Cruz massacre. A Timorese student at the trials felt sure they were held to satisfy foreign governments. They took only 8 days to complete. But more seriously, the question of which military unit fired first at the defenceless crowd is still unresolved.*

The military trials took place as a result of Suharto's decision to adopt several measures after the massacre. The installation of the *DKM* (*Dewan Kehormatan Militer*, Council of Military Honour) to investigate and take disciplinary action in the army was unprecedented in the 26 years of Suharto's rule. In the face of stinging criticism, Suharto realised he had lost his grip over the military, especially in East Timor. The *DKM* had to sort things out. Disciplining officers and punishing soldiers would impress foreign governments and restore Suharto's hold over the military. Suharto knew he could not take things into his own hands so needed the *DKM* as broker.

### Cleaning the stable

It is no accident that Lt. General Feisal Tanjung was chosen to chair the *DKM*. Known as one of the few intellectuals among today's generals, he is not loyal to General Benny Murdani in the *Hankam* group. A common feature of the members of this group are their interest in East Timor. Practically the entire top brass of *ABRI* has done combat duty in East Timor or won rapid promotion because of this. Some have retired from active army and hold senior posts. Lt. General Sugiarto is Minister of Transmigration, Major-General Sembiring Kami Meliala is a member of the People's Congress (*MPR*), Major-General Dading Kalbuadi is Inspector-General at the Defence Ministry. Lt. General Sahala Rajagukguk and Lt. General Harsudiono Hartas are top ranking officers at *ABRI* headquarters.

The relatively independent Feisal Tanjung is Dean of *SESKOAD* (the Army Higher Staff School). The rather messy job of cleaning the stable (the army command in East Timor) needed to be done by someone outside headquarters.

The *DKM* findings were spectacular: six officers disciplined, three dismissed from the army and three removed from their positions. The entire top echelon in East Timor was removed. On top of that, the *DKM* ordered the court martial of nine soldiers and a police officer. Suharto risked open revolt in the army. The *DKM*'s proposals were devastating for the rank-and-file. Officer corps discontent bordered on the brink.

To repair the damage, Suharto this month invited all 121 battalion commanders to his private ranch in West Java after chief-of-staff General Edi Sudradjat, likely to become the next commander-in-chief, gave 11.2 billion rupiahs (about US\$3.5m) to the commanders to improve conditions for the troops. President Suharto addressed the commanders as a father-figure, concerned with the economic welfare of the soldiers. To boost morale, Sudradjat told the officers: "The Dili incident should not make you afraid or hesitant in taking decisions".

### The military trials

All the military trials were held at military courts in Den



Anti-riot squads beating East Timorese protesters, January 1990.  
Photo: Jenny Groves

Pasar or the regional police headquarters. They were open to the public and British and Japanese embassy staff were present. Press reporting was extensive.

The ten defendants can be divided into four groups. Three were NCO officers: Sergeants Udin Syukur, Aloysius Rani and Petrus Saul Mada and two were privates, Mateus Maya and Afonso de Jesus. The third group consisted of low-ranking officers: 2nd Lieutenant Mursanib, 2nd Lt. John Arlan Aritonang and Handrianus Eddy Sunaryo. The others, Lt Yohannes Alexander Penpada and Police Corporal Marthin Alau (see box) are the fourth group.

The three sergeants had been assigned to stay at the subdistrict military command, *KODIM 1627*. According to their testimonies, they went into action on seeing their superior, Major Gerhan Lantara and his aide Private Dominggus carried in, bleeding, after being stabbed by demonstrators. They all admitted shooting at demonstrators. None was wearing full military dress when they rushed to the scene of the demonstration.

The two privates were assigned to drive Major Lantara to the hospital and admitted shooting at random at demonstrators from the car.

The three sergeants were in command of three platoons (72 men) as riot control units for the demonstration. The front line was a *Brimob* (Mobile Brigade) unit, while platoons II and III were from Battalion 303. At one point the two platoons moved forward, as instructed by Lt. Mursanib and after hearing shooting from other, unidentified forces, they also opened fire.

The fourth group were assigned to monitor the demonstration. Lt. Penpada, deputy intelligence officer at the district military command *KOREM 164*, after learning

about the stabbing of Major Lantara, rushed to grab his pistol. He said he slapped demonstrators but denied using his gun.

Marthin Alau was the only police officer put on trial (see Box).

All were tried under Article 103 section 1, for disobeying orders, despite the fact that nine admitted shooting at the crowd.

### Corporal Alau is a murderer

Corporal Louis Pereira Marthin Alau, a policeman convicted on 30 May 1991 of injuring a demonstrator during the Santa Cruz massacre and sentenced to 17 months, is mentioned in testimony by a Timorese who was badly injured in the massacre and who saw him kill two wounded demonstrators. The testimony was found among documents received in Lisbon from the resistance movement earlier this year.

The witness, whose name cannot be divulged, first describes how he fled as the soldiers fired into the crowd and was hit in the right shoulder and the left buttock. As other wounded people were being stabbed to death, he pretended to be dead. He continued:

*I lay on the ground, immobile. Meanwhile a secret policeman notorious for the number of killings he has committed, known by the name Alau, was chasing a colleague who could hardly run and who had a large red stain on his chest. Alau kicked the unfortunate man to the ground. He continued to attack him, stabbing him three times on his left side, and as the victim was still groaning, he shot him in the head, blowing his brains out. Terrified, I closed my eyes.*

*As I was barely three or four metres away, I tried to make out that I was dead. Then, a short way ahead of me I heard a noise; I opened my eyes and saw Alau running towards a young man who was on the ground, covered in blood, screaming with pain. Seeing that the man was still alive, Alau stabbed him twice which silenced him for ever.*

Corporal Alau was found guilty of cutting off the ear of one of the demonstrators. ★

### Frame-up?

Till now, all the burning issues regarding the massacre remain unresolved. With the exception of the 19 graves, no other graves have been disclosed. The first official casualty figure of 19 dead was changed to 50 dead and 90 missing but no names have been revealed. The KPN, the National Inquiry Commission, issued its final report which is yet to be made public by Suharto.

There is every reason to be suspicious of the military trials. How were the ten defendants selected? Everybody in platoons II and III had fired at the demonstrators (93 rounds). The defendants gave the impression of a chaotic, poorly disciplined Indonesian army. This reinforces the amok theory propagated by the army. Though admittedly, a demonstration of 5,000 high-spirited people can throw troops into a panic, the truth lies elsewhere.

### Portuguese Parliamentary Visit

Preparations for the visit of the Portuguese MPs (PPD) were proceeding at a high pitch. Months in advance, fresh troops had arrived in East Timor as if a second invasion was under way. In 1991, a new intelligence operation, *Operasi Elang*

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(Operation Eagle) was installed to deal with the *Frente Clandestine*, the Clandestine Front of youth in the cities. From captured documents (see *TAPOL Bulletin* no.105) the aim was to expose clandestine networks in Dili, Baucau and elsewhere and discover the plans for the MPs' visit. The intelligence operations were coordinated by *BAIS* (Strategic Intelligence Agency) which had been created by Benny Murdani to consolidate his power base.

Besides *BAIS*, there is the older *BAKIN*. But in East Timor things are even more complex as several lines of command exist side by side.

### Kolakops

Unlike other territorial commands, East Timor has *Kolakops* interposed between *KODAM*, the Area Military Command, and *KOREM*, the Regional Military Command. With *KOLAKOPS*, territorial forces in East Timor can bring in reinforcements from other military commands. *KOLAKOPS* is both territorial and operational and divides East Timor into three regions – A in the east; B, centre and west; and C, Dili. East Timor is also classified into zones, 'red' zones where guerrillas are active, 'green' zones where guerrillas are less active, and 'yellow' zones where they are practically non-existent. The red zone, mostly in mountains, are battle zones where skirmishes take place. The yellow zones require a combination of territorial and combat operations.

Military units in East Timor include troops from *KODAM Udayana* in Bali and units from other *KODAMs*. The battalions brought in are territorial or combat.

In November 1991, the Dili Military Command, *KOREM 164 Wiradharma*, was run by Colonel J.B.Sepang (since, removed) with 6 territorial and 4 combat battalions, includ-



*Sultan Suharto still enjoys support from substantial sections of the military.*



ing Battalion 744 (mainly East Timorese) an *Udayana* battalion, Battalion 303 from West Java, and Battalion 700 from South Sulawesi. The latter are combat forces who were stationed in the red B zone but were transferred to Dili for the expected demonstrations. Battalion 303 is from *KOSTRAD*, the elite reserve troops. Together with Battalion 700 (an airborne battalion) they were given a 10-day crash course in riot control.

Law and order are now taken care of by the police so Dili has well-trained *Brimob* (Mobile Brigade) unit and anti-riot police squads.

## Who fired first?

The trials of 2nd Lts Sugiman Mursanib (SM) and John Arintonang (JA) produced some far from conclusive bits of evidence. SM was in command of an anti-riot force consisting of *Brimob* platoon 5486 and platoons II and III from Battalion 303, in that order. His task was to monitor and report every move of the demonstration. JA was commander of platoon II. When they arrived at the cemetery, they faced thousands of demonstrators. SM told the court that, confronted by an uncontrollable crowd, he ordered the 303 platoons to go ahead of the *Brimob* troops and claims that the first command to shoot did not come from him. As his troops neared the cemetery, they heard shots from the main gate. *"There were unidentified troops. We only heard the shots"* [Editor, 13.06.1992]. SM said the order to go to the cemetery was so hasty, he had no time to dress fully.

When Yorkshire's *Cold Blood* was shown on TV, Timorese refugees in Lisbon recognised SM, in a T-shirt, giving orders to troops around the cemetery. Former prisoner Donaciano Gomes told Channel Four News that SM had interrogated and tortured him.

Besides this shooting, a hail of bullets came from the southern side of the cemetery. JA confirms that shooting came from two directions and identified the troops as coming from A Company, Sector C of Battalion 303. He said some wore uniforms while others wore a variety of clothing.

On hearing the shooting, the two 303 platoons joined in. People were falling to the ground but the shooting continued, especially from the unidentified troops. The judges did not probe further. The unidentified *pasukan liar* (irregular troops), as the Indonesian press calls them, remained *liar* (the word also means 'wild').

## Provocation and amok theories

The trials of Lt. Mursanib and Lt. Arintonang support the amok theory but leave many questions unanswered. Both spoke about the unidentified troops. The other defendants also stuck to the amok theory with no suggestion of provocation.

The provocation theory suggests that the Santa Cruz massacre was premeditated murder, a traditional intelligence operation of letting the enemy (here, an unarmed crowd) come into the open so as to strike. The killings in Tanjung Priok in 1984 had the same ingredients. They give the military justification to hit hard. Another justification for the use of violence in Dili was the claim that the demonstrators were carrying weapons and started the shooting.

The prosecution took care in the trials of the East Timorese to produce evidence to support this version. In Gregorio da Cunha Saldanha's trial, it was claimed that some

demonstrators were carrying firearms and grenades. They dragged along Afonso Gomes, father of the murdered Sebastiao Gomes, to say this as a witness, though he was clearly under strain; one press report said that his words were scarcely audible.


A hearing in Gregorio's trial was held at the police weapons depot to display the weapons which had been confiscated; when Gregorio asked for the Yorkshire film (where no-one is seen bearing weapons) to be shown the judge said it was not relevant.

Mursanib claimed that there was shooting from the crowd. But the crucial point is not whether some demonstrators were carrying firearms, but whether they were genuine demonstrators or intelligence plants. Reliable sources insist that intelligence agents were in the crowd and behaved provocatively. The verdict against Gregorio listed firearms – Mauser and Garrand rifles, FN 46 and Colt 36 pistols, Korean hand-grenades and ammunition – as having been confiscated; no evidence was produced about who from.

## What happened to Battalion 700?

The missing link is Battalion 700, in particular because the trials pinned the blame squarely on Battalion 303 which reinforces the amok theory. It was shown that shooting came from three directions; two from where 303 units were. But the crucial shooting which started first and ended last, remains a mystery.

The army's original version claimed that troops were infuriated on hearing that Major Gerhan Lantara had been stabbed, rushed to the scene and started firing at random. This can only be part of the story, as the shooting from the unidentified troops seems to have been less 'accidental'. The Timorese Battalion 744 was not on the spot, while Battalion 700 was on duty that day as confirmed by Brig.General



Occasional Reports no.19 contains TAPOL's submission to the 1992 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee.

Price £ 1.00 including postage

Rudy Warouw who was then in charge of East Timor.

Major Gerhan Lantara, deputy-commander of Battalion 700, is an interesting figure. His battalion was sent to East Timor on special assignment to deal with the clandestine front, and he was put in charge of intelligence in Sector C (Dili). Lantara is widely acknowledged to be a 'Murdani man'. Unlike most soldiers who regard service in East Timor as a hardship post, Major Gerhan accepts his tours of duty in East Timor with missionary zeal. As a young cadet from the military academy, he spent time fighting the guerrillas. After graduation, he was again assigned to East Timor and has spent altogether eight years there.

During the demonstration Major Lantara got into a scuffle with demonstrators after taking out a camera to make photos, and was allegedly stabbed. Private Second Class Dominggus, who rushed to help him, was also hurt. The next day Lantara was rushed to the Army Hospital in Jakarta and was seen by some eyewitnesses who were travelling on the same plane. Four days after the massacre, Battalion 700 was quietly withdrawn from East Timor. Two weeks later, Battalion 303 left East Timor amid great fanfare. Why was Major Lantara never summoned as a witness? Why were all the military defendants from 303? Why did Lantara and Battalion 700 disappear from the scene of the crime?

One likely answer is already suggested above; this confirms the amok theory. But political analysts have another interesting hypothesis and link the issue with the conflict over the leadership of ABRI. Suharto wants his brother-in-law Maj-Gen. Wismoyo to take over, at the very least as deputy chief-of-staff of the army. Putting all the blame on Battalion 303 means pointing the finger at Wismoyo, commander of KOSTRAD.

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### The controversial 'opening up'

A detective story always needs a motive. If Battalion 700 was involved in the premeditated killings, what was the motive? To find the answer we must look at the conflict in Jakarta over military rule in East Timor between Suharto and his kitchen-cabinet, and the HANKAM group.

For external reasons Suharto was in favour of "keterbukaan" (opening up) in East Timor. Access to East Timor became easier but there were negative consequences for the military. The flow of information from East Timor became easier, the clandestine movement became stronger and bolder. The well-publicised demonstration during the visit of US ambassador John Monjo in January 1990 was an embarrassment for the security forces. In 1991, the military knew that preparations were under way for a huge rally originally intended for the Portuguese MPs but replaced by the Santa Cruz demonstration, so they used it to make their point. Their message to Suharto was: the people have become uncontrollable, we had to step in. What we do in East Timor is our business, don't let foreigners interfere.

The final word has not yet been spoken. The several groups are still at odds and, as one Indonesian oppositionist says: "East Timor can become Indonesia's Mozambique".

Further reading:

*Who gave the order?*, FITUN no.6, Jan.1992, pp 1-8

*East Timor, the Courts-Martial*, Asia Watch, vol.4 no.16.

*Whatever happened to Gerhan Lantara?*, Tim Kell, Jan.-1992.

## More juggling with figures

After sticking for months to official figures for the Santa Cruz massacre of 50 dead and 90 missing, a military team assigned by Suharto to investigate the dead and missing published its 'findings' on 14 July. It has now concocted a completely new set of figures, claiming that there were altogether 115 people missing, not including Kamal Bama-dhaj, the New Zealander who was shot dead.

This version now says that 18 East Timorese were killed and are buried in Hera cemetery, 31 have returned to their homes, leaving 66 who are unaccounted for. Now, it seems, the military have reverted to the '19 dead' claim of General Try Sutrisno immediately after the atrocity, repudiating the figures announced by the National Inquiry Team (KPN) after reporting to Suharto.

But the figure of '50 dead' was itself an invention; when the KPN first arrived back in Jakarta they confirmed Sutrisno's figure but this was met with such a gasp of disbelief, not least among diplomats in Jakarta, that, after reporting their 'findings' to Suharto, the KPN revised its figure upwards to 50.

### The gap between truth and falsehood

The military team claims to have carried out 'intensive research', checking figures from village chiefs, schools and the International Red Cross. It says it investigated places where local people said there were mass graves but found nothing. [Jakarta Post, 15.07.1992]

By contrast, a BBC correspondent who visited East Timor at the beginning of June reported that not one body has been returned to its family for burial. People told the BBC "that the army has made no effort to find the bodies". East Timorese say the bodies are buried in mass graves outside Dili. They say, "the army knows where the bodies are but does not want to account for them because the numbers are much higher than officially made public."

### Syafei hopes they're all dead

To seal the grotesque obscenity of the army's latest invention, Brig.Gen. Theo Syafei declared a few days after the '66 missing' figure was announced, that as far as he was concerned, they were all "best dead". [UPI, 20.07.1992] ✱





## House of Lords debates East Timor

*Peers from all sides of the House of Lords made ringing condemnations of Indonesia's annexation and war of aggression against East Timor, during a debate on 16 July 1992. This is the first time East Timor has been discussed so comprehensively in the British Parliament. Top of the peers demands were an arms embargo, the suspension of economic aid, and an end to training Indonesian officers in the UK.*

The one-and-a-half hour debate was initiated by Labour peer, Lord Rea, who visited East Timor with other British parliamentarians in March 1989. He devoted much of his speech to telling the East Timor story, because it has not before found its way into *Hansard*. Indonesia's war over the past 16 years has been exceptionally brutal while resistance to Indonesian rule has been remarkably consistent. He gave an overview of human rights and massacres in Indonesia going back to 1965, then turned to Britain's arms trade. *"When criticised, the Government's usual response is that all countries are entitled to purchase arms for their legitimate defence. But Indonesia has no external enemies. Its armed forces exist solely to keep order within its own territories; in other words, to suppress its own people."*

It was up to the international community, he said to show in actions as well as in words *"that it will not tolerate any further violation of internationally-accepted human rights standards"*.

### Tory peer's maiden speech

Lord Finsberg, formerly Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, the Conservative MP for Hampstead and Highgate, devoted his maiden speech to East Timor. This being a special occasion, friends were in the House to support him, notably Baroness Thatcher who, as she later congratulated him, must have wondered why he spoke so passionately against Indonesia, a regime favoured by her during her premiership.

He said he had led UK delegations to the Council of Europe and the Western European Union for the past five years where Portuguese MPs had asked them to discuss East Timor. Confirming everything Lord Rea said, he went on: *"The contrast between the world's immediate reaction to Iraq's annexation of Kuwait and what has happened in East Timor makes us wonder whether there are double standards when a nation is further away and out of the limelight.... The human rights of the people of East Timor have been appallingly broken. They have not been allowed to determine their own political destiny or to preserve their cultural or linguistic identities."*

He referred to the resolutions on East Timor adopted by the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and the WEU and reminded the Government that both had called for an immediate arms embargo and the suspension of military support for Indonesia. What response had it given? Ending, he said: *"East Timor has been the subject of murder, rape and pillage for well over 15 years.... Let us at least do something for the people of East Timor who, as I know from conversations with them and with Portuguese, feel cut off and ignored by the civilised world. That is a charge which should lie heavily on our consciences."*

Lord Avebury, Liberal-Democrat, chair of the *Parliamentary Human Rights Group* and co-initiator of *Parlia-*



*Lord Rea arriving at Dili airport, March 1989.*

*mentarians for East Timor*, dealt in a speech of more than half an hour with many aspects. He assailed the government for having stood in the way of any EC summit statement on East Timor.

After strongly criticising the Indonesian commission of inquiry and describing the present situation in East Timor, he regretted the fact that the report of Dr Amos Wako's visit to East Timor had not been made public. *"That statement must be made public if donors are to evaluate the atrocity and Jakarta's response to it. In any case, we paid for it... and are entitled to know the contents."*

Of special interest is Lord Avebury's reference to the *Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War* which prohibits killing, torture, unlawful deportation and so on. As party to the Convention, the UK is obliged under Article 146 *"to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches"*. What checks do we make of the background of personnel from the Indonesian armed forces seeking entry to the UK, including those invited to undergo training here, to see whether they should be brought before our courts and tried?

### The Bishop of Worcester

The Bishop of Worcester, Dr Philip Goodrich, paid special tribute to the courage of Bishop Belo who has called for a

determined intervention by the international community for a well-conducted referendum. It was regrettable that no army officer had been tried for ordering the massacre. Calling for an arms embargo, he asked: *"Can we justify the sale of 40 Hawk aircraft and the invitation to three Indonesian army officers to study in the UK?"* Cutting such military support would, he said *"be clear signals that we cannot condone the present ugly regime in East Timor"*.

Lord Hatch of Lusby, Labour, has persistently questioned the Government about East Timor. In his speech, he asked about Britain's arms trade with Indonesia. Was it true that the UK sold major weapons systems worth £522m to Indonesia from 1985 to 1990? *"Where do the government stand when the UN condemns another state for aggression? Do they continue to supply that country with aid despite the fact that (they) have laid down... that in future aid will depend on good governance? Let them come clean now?"*

An Independent peer, Lord Haden-Guest was next to speak, noting the heartening change in international opinion and growing awareness of what is going on in East Timor. There have been well-informed articles in the serious British press and important contributions from the PHRG, the British Coalition for East Timor and TAPOL. He dealt also with the recent decision of the US House of Representatives to cut military aid and a resolution by the Conference of US Mayors calling for a resolution on East Timor at the UN General Assembly. He ended by saying that all governments, including the UK *"should join ranks and, by withholding arms to Indonesia, bring to an end the appalling state of affairs in East Timor"*.

Lord Judd, formerly Frank Judd, Director of OXFAM, drew the debate to a close with a long speech devoted largely to the arms trade, with Britain's role second only to the US, the soon-to-be-concluded Hawks deal, and the sale of the Green Rover to the Indonesian Navy. Regarding the Santa Cruz massacre, the Government had admitted that British Land Rovers were used by troops responsible for that outrage but had later argued that *"these are not arms"*. Arms or not, said Lord Judd, they obviously played a crucial part in that atrocity.

[Baroness Trumpington, speaking later for the Government, showed the shallowness of her grasp, saying: *"My farmer friends would laugh about the part in the speech of Lord Judd about Land Rovers and to think they were driving around in offensive weapons."*]

Lord Judd made the link between arms exports and British policy: *"To make matters worse, the Government's willingness to sell arms has been translated into a consistent series of abstentions in the UN on resolutions condemning the Indonesian Government. Perhaps even more sinister is the fact that this is almost certainly what lay behind the repeated, cynical manoeuvres by the British Government to frustrate humanitarian initiatives by the EC under the leadership of the Portuguese during their presidency of the Community."*

Turning to aid to Indonesia at a yearly average of £20.27 from 1988-1990, making it the biggest recipient of UK aid in the Far East, he said this *"contradicts certain key factors which normally determine the allocation of aid. For example, Indonesia is neither one of the poorest countries in the region nor is it a member of the Commonwealth. Moreover, its poor human rights record and illegal occupation of East Timor raise fundamental issues about its suitability for such aid."*

The remainder of his speech consisted of a series of questions, after which he accused the Government of using

## EAST TIMOR

smooth diplomatic talk and hypocrisy in its approach on Indonesia. *"It is high time for them to emulate their determination on Kuwait and vigorously use their presidency of the EC to ensure that in the Community and at the UN effective pressure is at last brought to bear on the cruel tyrants of Jakarta."*


### The Government's response

Baroness Trumpington, for the Foreign Office, stuck closely to her brief, answering questions about which she had been given advance notice, and simply refusing to give way when Lord Avebury interrupted to seek clarifications.

No, the government did not have Dr Wako's report as the UN Secretary-General has decided not to release it. Yes, we still look to the Indonesians to pursue follow-up action according to the UN Human Rights Commission statement on 4 March 1992 [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 111]. Yes, we did make representatives on 30 June about the discrepancies in sentencing those charged in connection with the events (sic) in Dili. Yes, we do take full account of human rights issues in determining aid policy for different countries but, *"As regards Indonesia, we believe that its poverty and its record of sound economic policy justify a continuation of aid."*

Aid in 1991-92 was £21.4m plus debt relief of £2.27m and would be at about the same level in 1992-93. As for arms, defence sales were subject to strict export controls. As for training army officers, this was intended *"to improve the competence and discipline; and by introducing them to our principles, methods and values, it increases their awareness of the importance of good government, democracy and respect for human rights"*.

[The British Coalition for East Timor plans to reproduce the debate, which runs into twelve pages of *Hansard*. Look out for an announcement of availability and price.] ★



The London-based Survival International is collecting signatures for a petition on Indonesia's policies towards indigenous peoples. The petitions will be handed over to the Indonesian Government on 1 October 1992. Signatures should be sent to Survival International (310 Edgware Road, London W2 1DK, UK) by 15 September 1992.

### The petition reads as follows:

The Indonesian Government sees tribal people as 'backward and primitive'. Its policies push them off their lands and aim to make them give up their way of life. In Irian Jaya and Siberut in particular, transmigration, logging, plantations and forced resettlement threaten the very lives of the tribal peoples. Those who oppose such projects are systematically killed by the army. We, the undersigned, call on the Indonesian Government to recognise and uphold the rights of the tribal peoples to their lands. We also urge the Government to stop army reprisals against the tribal peoples.



# MPs from all parties want aid cut

*Members of Parliament from all the main parties in both Houses of Parliament wrote to Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd on 7 July 1992, calling on the British government to suspend aid to Indonesia because of the situation in East Timor. Their letter reads as follows:*

We write to ask you whether Britain will issue a statement on the occasion of the meeting in Paris on 16-17 July of the Consultative Group on Indonesia, the new aid consortium chaired by the World Bank, emphasising its deep concern about the human rights situation in East Timor.

As you know, it was at Indonesia's instigation that the former aid consortium, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, was disbanded, following criticism of the Santa Cruz Massacre by the Dutch Government which had chaired IGGI, and which suspended its aid to Indonesia pending a satisfactory response to their criticism. Similar action was also taken by Canada and Denmark.

However, the Indonesian Government aimed their criticism only at The Hague, and in so doing, signalled their rejection of conditionality of economic aid, which takes account of the recipient country's human rights record. We think that this should not go unchallenged; the principle of conditionality has been advanced by you (and Baroness Chalker) over the past year and was of course reiterated in the Queen's Speech at the opening of this Parliament.

Indonesia's decision to replace IGGI and dismiss the Dutch was also in defiance of the position adopted by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on 28 November 1991 "to explicitly introduce the consideration of human rights as an element of their relations with developing countries".

We propose that Her Majesty's Government make known its dissatisfaction with the commission of inquiry set up by the Indonesian Government and the savage sentences passed on survivors of the November 12 massacre. We hope that the Government will make it plain that British aid to Indonesia cannot continue unless all East Timorese held and tried in the wake of the massacre are released and the bodies of all those who died in the massacre are returned to their families. There should also be a proper investigation to establish who in the upper echelons of the army was responsible for the massacre. HMG should signal that giving sentences of a few months each to a handful of low-ranking soldiers is unacceptable in response to the call by the international community for those in the armed forces responsible for murder to be brought to justice.

Finally, we urge Her Majesty's Government to press for the immediate publication of the report of Amos Wako, the UN secretary general's special representative, of his visit to Dili in February this year. We believe the report should be made available to all donor countries in advance of the July meeting of the CGI.

## Members of the House of Lords:

Viscount Brentford (Conservative); Lord Avebury (Liberal Democrat); Lord Judd (Labour); Lord Rea (Lab); Lord Ennals (Lab); and Lord Hatch of Lusby (Lab)

## Members of the House of Commons:

David Alton (Lib Dem. Mossley Hill); David Anderson (Lab. Swansea E.); Dale Campbell-Savours (Lab. Workington); Ann Clwyd (Lab. Cynon Valley); Anthony Coombs (Con. Wyre Forest); George Foulkes (Lab.Co. Carrick, Cumnock & Doom Valley); Edward Garnier (Con. Harborough); Nick Harvey (Lib Dem. Devon N.); Jim Lester (Con. Broxtowe); Elizabeth Lynne (Lib Dem. Rochdale); Alice Mahon (Lab. Halifax); and David Trimble (Ulster Unionist).



*Lord Avebury and Anthony Coombs MP, chair and secretary of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, watching the COLD BLOOD film during the East Timor hearing in Westminster last December. They are both signatories of the letter.*

# Post-election politics

*The Indonesian elections can hardly be taken as a serious political indicator. At most, they have shown some trends. More important will be the presidential election next year and the post-election political atmosphere shows that many are gearing themselves for this event.*

As expected, *Golkar*, the ruling party lost some seats while the two others, the *PDI* and *PPP* gained seats. Under proportional representation *Golkar* went down from 73.2% in 1987 to 68%. They lost 17 seats (16 to *PDI* and one to *PPP*) and now have 282 seats. *PPP* rose from 15.9% to 17% (62 seats) and *PDI* from 10.7% to 15% (56 seats). The other hundred uncontested seats in parliament are reserved for *ABRI* (the Indonesian armed forces).

## Some conclusions


For the first time in fifteen years, *Golkar* lost votes but still has a huge majority. Past *Golkar* absolute majorities were ensured by full backing from the military. This is now shifting: important sections of the military have now taken a more neutral position while one small wing of retired officers openly joined the *PDI*. The election results are a result of these realignments.

It should be stated over and over again that the three existing political groupings do not reflect the real political map of Indonesia. *Golkar* is the extension of the all-pervasive government machinery while *PPP* and *PDI* represent old political parties forcibly fused by the authorities. *Golkar*, previously set up by the military as an anti-communist vehicle, has gradually turned into a huge monstrosity, arguably the most elaborate state apparatus. All ministers, the entire bureaucracy from top to bottom, as well as businessmen give allegiance to *Golkar*. It can be described as a super-ministry or like the communist party in former Eastern Europe countries – not to become a member can jeopardise your career.

This explains why *Golkar* gets so many votes. So many voters are directly or indirectly economically dependent on *Golkar*. Moreover it is customary for *Golkar* to set targets; in every region or even polling booth, a certain percentage of votes is expected. If the target is not met, which happened in many places, the responsible person will face the consequences. A polling booth can be in a school, government building or village where chiefs use all their 'creativity' to achieve the target. This can result in anything from aggressive electioneering to straightforward cheating. Local military authorities often use heavy-handed methods to win *Golkar* votes, although this is in decline.

## Golkar and the military

Military backing for *Golkar* is eroding. *ABRI*'s chief-of-staff for social and political affairs, Lt. General Harsudiono Hartas now rejects the idea of coalition between *Golkar* and *ABRI*, which was considered quite natural in the seventies and eighties. He represents the main body of *ABRI*; others still see *Golkar* as a natural coalition partner. In particular many retired officers still regard *Golkar* as their lifeline. The structure of *Golkar* is geared towards this phenomenon, the *Dewan Pembina* (Board of Guidance) is full of retired-generals and is chaired by President Suharto himself. They



include generals like Alamsyah, Panggabean, Supardjo Rustam and Rudini who have political clout but are not close to Hartas, Edi Sudradjat and Sahala Rajagukguk. Hartas describes the present relationship between *Golkar* and *ABRI* as one of "mutual aspirations and concepts".

## Election fraud

Intimidation, threats, tampering with polling boxes is quite normal in elections but it would be wrong to describe this as the dominant factor. With targets set, it is up to local officials to achieve them. The Indonesian media has reported several ugly incidents, most about tampering with votes. Although vote counting should be witnessed by all parties, quite often only *Golkar* was represented. Or, witnesses from *PPP* and *PDI* were threatened or physically restrained, which happened in many places in Aceh. In Lamceu, Aceh, villagers were flabbergasted when *PPP*, the Muslim federation, got only 3 votes while at least 100 villagers were ready to testify that they had voted for *PPP*. In Madura, a local paramilitary was caught with nine *Golkar* votes in his pocket. He said he was acting on the order of the village head who, naturally, strongly denied it.

A relatively new phenomena is election bribes. Empty



## ELECTIONS

promises are standard all over the world but in Aceh, always a difficult place for *Golkar*, a lot of money was involved. Ret'd Major-General Bustanil Arifin, Minister of Cooperatives and married to Tien Suharto's younger sister, was sent to Aceh to campaign for *Golkar*. Every subdistrict chief received 500,000 rupiahs and every village-head 100,000 rupiahs for a *Golkar* victory. Only *Golkar* can shower regions with money; the other parties struggle along on shoestring budgets.

### Preparing for the presidential election

Although Suharto has not announced his candidacy, all signs are that he is preparing for another term. The Dili massacre, or more accurately, the international outcry, his damage-limitation efforts and the widening gap between him and the army top, has delayed his efforts for a sixth term. Only now, after the elections, is he winning new loyalties and making realignments. Suharto has stepped into a new alignment with some Muslims, now under the umbrella of *ICMI*, the Indonesian Union of Muslim Intellectuals. It is chaired by B.J.Habibie, the Minister of Technology, who is now being tipped as Suharto's likely choice for vice-president. General Try Sutrisno, *ABRI*'s number one, is out of favour and is likely to be shunted off somewhere as an ambassador.

Another delicate matter is how Suharto will reshuffle the army general staff. Although as president, he is also *Pangti* (*Panglima Tertinggi*, Supreme Commander) and appoints and replaces generals, he must tread carefully with *ABRI*'s top brass. The present *ABRI* leadership is increasingly at loggerheads with Suharto and in the coming months, Suharto will have to take decisions about replacing generals. At present, there is a bottleneck; the present leadership has been due for change since last year but remain in their positions because they disapprove of Suharto's choice for the *ABRI* leadership. The present chief-of-staff of the air force was Suharto's personal pilot. General Kunarto, the present high-profile police chief was Suharto's aide for many years. The *Cilangkap* (*ABRI* HQ) general staff will all have to move on in the coming weeks and months, some promoted to more powerful posts, others kicked upstairs. General Edi Sudradjat is tipped to replace General Try Sutrisno as commander-in-chief while Lt.-General Sahala Rajagukguk, the present army deputy chief-of-staff, is expected to disappear into obscurity.

The Indonesian media has mentioned the name of Lt. General Feisal Tanjung as new army chief-of-staff while

Major-General Wismoyo (married to another of Tien Suharto's sisters) is tipped to become deputy chief-of-staff. Both are Suharto loyalists. Tanjung performed the daunting task of chairing the *DKM* Commission which led to the trial and discharge of some soldiers in connection with the Santa Cruz massacre.

Another controversial appointment will be the replacement of Ret'd Lt. General Ali Said as chair of the Supreme Court. The president wants to appoint ret'd Major-General Djaelani, who chaired the *KPN*, the National Inquiry Commission, while others, not least Ali Said himself, say that Djaelani is not senior enough for the job. It may be impossible for Suharto to get his way in this particular case.

These are hectic times for political analysts in Jakarta and the air is thick with rumours and speculations. ★



A PDI rally in Jakarta. 3 million people attended the rally but, strange to say, the PDI lost seats in Jakarta.

### British readers: don't let it pass!

Britain's 'silent diplomacy' methods in fact add up to one of the loudest declarations of support for the Indonesian military regime. In the light of recent revelations, an effective protest is needed now more than ever. The sort of outcry voiced in the Lords in July needs to be mirrored in the Commons. Please ask your MP to write in protest to the British Government, and to sign the following Early Day Motions: No. 244 calls upon the Government "to suspend aid to Indonesia" in the light of the trials of the East Timorese; No. 362 urges the Government "not to grant a licence for the British Aerospace deal"; and No. 398 "urges the Government to cancel FCO schemes targeted at supporting the Indonesian Armed Forces". In addition, EDM No. 303 "calls on the UNHCR to provide effective protection for [the] Acehnese in Malaysia seeking asylum. The FCO admits to having been impressed by our previous lobbying efforts, so keep it up!

# More heavy sentences in Aceh

*Subversion trials in Aceh are a continuing saga. People from all layers of society, peasants, intellectuals, members of the armed forces and government officials, have been put on trial for their alleged involvement in Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, the Aceh Liberation Front.*

It is not easy to give a detailed account of the trials as reporting in the Indonesian press is fragmentary. At least 40 trials have been conducted in various district courts in Aceh, no fewer than 10 in Medan. As in East Timor, the central government is devoting much attention to Aceh. Governor Ibrahim Hassan brags that Aceh will receive 575 billion rupiahs (about US\$ 275 million), for its 1992/1993 budget, the highest allocation for any province outside Java.

It has been a matter of prestige for *GOLKAR* to be sure of electoral victory in Aceh. After a series of defeats against the nominally Muslim federation *PPP*, *Golkar* managed to wrest a slight victory over *PPP* in 1987. This was achieved with bribes, intimidation, torture and fraud with the ballot boxes. The 1992 elections were a repetition of 1987; most complaints of fraud were from there.

As for security and order, there are conflicting accounts. Colonel Syarwan Hamid from the district military command, *KOREM 011/Lilawangsa* claims that the capture and killing of *GAM* leaders like Tengku Yusuf Ali has driven *GAM* onto the defensive. The entire eastern coast is heavily patrolled and illegal traffic with Malaysia is no longer possible. On the other hand, army chief-of-staff General Edi Sudradjat has admitted that 'remaining militant separatists' are standing in the way of economic development and must be wiped out, in West Papua and East Timor as well as in Aceh. Many thousands of crack troops have been sent to Aceh since 1989 imposing a heavy burden on the military budget.

## The trials

Given the range of people put on trial, it can be concluded that *GAM* sympathies are to be found at all layers of society. In June, 4 members of *ABRI* were tried for subversion. The military court in Banda Aceh doled out three sentences of 11 years to Police Sergeant M. Yacob, 27, First Lieutenant Aide Ida, 50, and Sergeant Idris Achmad, 49. The charges were: involvement in *GAM*, attending meetings and circulating illegal pamphlets. Head Sergeant Maju Ali Siagian, 49, got 14 years for alleged support for *GAM* rebels. As commander of the Geumpang military sub-district, he concluded a cease-fire agreement with the local *GAM* leadership. The verdict said that the cease-fire had strengthened *GAM*'s position in the region.

Two academics were also tried in Banda Aceh, Drs. Abdullah Husen, 47, who was charged with being a member of *GAM* and organising meetings at his office. The authorities found a photo of Tengku Hasan di Tiro, the leader of the movement, in his office. He was sentenced to 6 years. Drs. Muhammad Gade Salam, 35, who allegedly attended meetings at Husen's office, was sentenced to 4 years.

In smaller places, district courts have also been busy with subversion cases. Two people were tried in the Sigli district court, Tarmizi bin Abdurrachman, 29, a peasant, and U

bin U (initials only), 36, village head of Seunong. Charges: burning down the Jabal Gafur University campus and two schools. They were said to be long-time *GAM* members supplying the movement with money and food. The prosecution has demanded a 16-year sentence.

In Lhok Seumawe Idris bin Ali (aka Nekrih), 52, received 17 years because in 1990 he, together with others, attacked the pulp-and-paper factory PT KKA in Krueng. Several soldiers were hurt and Private First Class Ismael was mortally wounded. The defendant has been a *GAM* member since 1988.

Sulaiman bin Mahmud, 54, was tried in Idi, East Aceh. Allegedly the local *Panglima* (commander) of *GAM*, he was accused of killing Head Sergeant Trimin in 1989. He hoisted the *GAM* flag several times above official buildings. Sulaiman received a sentence of ten years.

In May, the chief prosecutor, Soesandi announced that Ibrahim Ligadinsyah, 29, would go on trial in Takengon. The defendant is a well-known activist and allegedly an expert in explosives. He received military training in Libya in 1988. Nothing is yet known about his trial.

In the district court of Medan, North Sumatra, Syaiful Bachri, 31, was sentenced to 12 years, charged with *GAM* membership, possessing weapons, armed robbery and giving money to the movement. ★





Early May it was announced by the Chief of the Prosecution Soesandi that **Ibrahim Ligadinsyah** (29 yrs) will be taken to trial in Takengon. The defendant is a wellknown activist and allegedly an expert in explosives. He received

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*Continued from front page*

Indonesian workers seeking jobs across the waters are concerned, the operation will provide the cover for the deportation of hundreds of Acehnese in Malaysia who fear that the Indonesian authorities have been spying on them and are determined to get their hands on all those regarded as supportive of the *Aceh Merdeka* movement.

On 22 June, TAPOL faxed an urgent appeal to Mr Stan Bronee at the UNHCR Kuala Lumpur office, asking him, under no circumstances to oust the Acehnese until they have been given refugee status. He was asked for an assurance that all Acehnese in Malaysia who wish to claim refugee status will be interviewed without delay, to prevent forcible repatriation and to hold talks with the Malaysian government to grant them asylum or collaborate with the UNHCR in seeking third country refuge.

Three weeks later, it was learnt that the UNHCR had started issuing Refugee Identity Cards to the 43. But they were told that the UNHCR could give no guarantee that the Malaysian authorities would recognise this and they could still face arrest and deportation if they leave the compound.

In Aceh itself, troops have engaged in a violent crackdown; at least two thousand are thought to have been killed in the past two years.

## Malaysian collusion

The Malaysian government is collaborating closely with the Indonesians in this human tragedy. Although Malaysia is not a signatory of the 1958 Convention on Refugees, it is bound by international law not to return people against their will to a country where they have reasonable grounds for fearing human rights abuses.

Malaysian collusion started when the authorities rounded up Acehnese boat-people who fled to Malaysia last year, held them in lock-ups and refused access to the UNHCR whose task it is to investigate the wishes of people asking for asylum and determine their eligibility for refugee status. Still worse, Indonesian consular officials were given exclusive access to the detainees, even to the exclusion of

relatives and friends, enabling them to exert pressure on the Acehnese to return home. Already several hundred have succumbed and returned home, only to face arrest and in some cases, death.



Already several hundred Acehnese boat-people who fled from villages at the centre of the crackdown have been refouled. On 19 July, it was learnt that 62 Acehnese in Juru jail who have resisted all enticements to return home were moved without notice to join groups of recently arrested 'illegal economic immigrants' who are being readied for repatriation. TAPOL immediately wrote to the Malaysian government warning that it would hold them responsible if these refugees are returned to Aceh.

One former detainee in Juru prison, Getjihik Hamid, an elderly village chief who was used by Indonesian consular officials to persuade others to return with him, has now 'disappeared' and there are grave fears for his safety. ★

## Lawyers' Aceh Trials Report banned

A well-documented report by the Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute on the many subversion trials conducted in Aceh in the past few years has been banned by the Attorney-General on the grounds that it "could rupture and divide the unity of the nation" and that it "threatens to shake public confidence in the government by discrediting the security forces in Aceh". The book is entitled: *Summary of the Results of Trial Observations in Aceh*.

Other publications were banned at the same time: *The Chinese, Javanese and Maduranese in the Birth of Surabaya* and *A Hymn on Indonesian Culture*. The first was banned because it "could spark ethnic conflicts", and the

second, written by Joebaar Ajub, formerly a member of the now-banned cultural organisation LEKRA, because it "could lead to a revival of communist activities". All issues of *Progres*, an Indonesian-language periodical published in Australia, were also banned because "they could create misconceptions about the national leader".

In a press release regretting the ban of its Aceh report, the LBH said it was "designed to improve the working of the legal system in Indonesia and the development of Indonesian government policies in Aceh". It said that the Attorney-General banned 26 books during 1990 and 1991.

# More financial backing for Suharto

*Indonesia's financial backers have agreed to give the Suharto regime more in economic aid than ever before, more even than Indonesia was asking. While demonstrators from many European countries protested on the streets, inside the conference hall the Dili massacre, the East Timorese, the Acehnese, the West Papuans and all of Jakarta's victims were quietly forgotten. Suharto had done enough damage limitation after Santa Cruz to get business back to normal.*

## US\$200 million more

The Consultative Group on Indonesia, Indonesia's new aid consortium with the World Bank presiding, met in Paris on 16-17 July and pledged US\$4.94 billion for 1992-93, US\$200 million more than last year. Several countries and agencies have not yet announced their pledges so the total will probably exceed US\$5 billion.

Despite intense lobbying in many countries, by parliamentarians, solidarity groups and human rights organisations including Asia Watch and Amnesty International (which published a 21-page document, *Indonesia/East Timor: The Suppression of Dissent* three days before the meeting), human rights was not allowed to stand in the way of world financial backing for Suharto. The only delegation to formally raise human rights concerns in the meeting itself was the US delegation which read out a statement of concern about the trials and gross discrepancies between civil and military verdicts and about the failure of Jakarta to account for the dead and missing after the massacre. This was done solely because of pressure from the US Congress. Otherwise, human rights concerns were confined 'to the corridors'.

As for the European Community which was attending the donors' meeting for the first time, there had been intense pressure for a joint statement on human rights. However, the UK made sure this was done privately with the Indonesian Minister, Radius Prawiro. Radius responded by expressing gratitude to the British envoy for having raised the matter so discreetly.

## Expanded donors' group

The CGI, created in the wake of Indonesia's rebuke of the Netherlands, functions in the same way as the defunct IGGI. The Netherlands is no longer a member but five new members have been roped in: South Korea, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Saudi Fund for Development, the Nordic Investment Bank and the Islamic Development Bank.

To repair the damage in its relations with Indonesia, Dutch Foreign Minister van den Broek visited Jakarta just before the CGI meeting. Prime Minister Lubbers even took the extraordinary step of going especially to Paris on 16 July to pay his respects to Radius Prawiro. Such are the lengths to which Dutch ministers will go to ingratiate themselves with Suharto.

## Jakarta's dependency on foreign aid

While foreign governments have been willing to go on increasing their collective financial backing, there is deep concern in Indonesia that the country's foreign debt is reaching unmanageable proportions. Indonesia's total foreign debt now stands at US\$78 billion, the Debt Service

Ratio (the proportion of export earnings used for debt repayment and interest) will soon exceed 30 per cent. Almost half of Indonesia's routine budget expenditure goes to the repayment of foreign debt.

There was a US\$4.5 billion deficit in Indonesia's balance of payments last year and no prospects that things will improve this year. As a result of falling earnings from oil and gas exports, foreign exchange from this sector, which accounts for 37 per cent of export earnings, is likely to fall by \$1.7 billion. On the import side of the balance sheet, a year ago, Jakarta announced the postponement of all so-called mega-projects because they impose such a heavy burden on the balance of payments. Yet one of the projects, the *Chandra Asri* poly-olefin project, a business venture of *Barito Pasifik* run by Prayogo Pangestu, and *Bimantara*, the business house of Bambang Suharto, was suddenly allowed to resume operations. It is developments like this that create tensions not only in Indonesia but at the World Bank and among Indonesia's financiers.

Because of the severe strains on Indonesia's current account, the CGI agreed to give \$1.05 billion of this year's money in the form of fast-disbursing assistance to cope with Indonesia's foreign exchange crisis. In effect, the CGI is helping to finance the businesses of the Suharto clique.★

### This year's aid allocations

[The figures in brackets are for last year.]

Japan	\$1,320m	(\$1,320m)
Germany	\$ 135.5m	(\$76.2m)
USA	\$ 94m	(\$133.2m)
Britain	\$ 35m	(\$29.9m)
Australia	\$ 73m	(\$39.8m)
Belgium	\$ 16.4m	(\$13.7m)
France	\$ 176.9m	(\$111.6m)
New Zealand	\$ 2.7m	(\$2.1m)
Austria	\$ 9.6m	(\$8m)
Denmark	\$ 12m	
Switzerland	\$ 23m	(\$15.2m)
Finland	\$ 2.1m	
South Korea	\$ 14.5m	
World Bank	\$1,600m	(\$1,630m)
Asian Dev B	\$1,219m	(\$1,100m)
Islamic Dev B	\$ 30m	
Nordic Dev B	\$ 55m	

Only the main multilateral agencies are included.

The fast-disbursing funds, part of the above, will be provided by:

Japan	\$ 500m
World Bank	\$ 300m
Asian Dev B.	\$ 200m
Nordic Bank	\$ 30m
USA	\$ 25m



# New initiatives for West Papuan independence

*New initiatives on behalf of West Papua in the South Pacific and in Sweden could get the issue onto the international agenda.*

## Mawen calls for recognition

Bernard Mawen, southern commander of the OPM, called on members of the South Pacific Forum not to forget the struggles of the West Papuan Melanesians. The plea came as members met in the Solomon Islands in July.

Highlighting Australia's economic and military power in the region, Mawen asked the country to "do something positive" for West Papuan independence. Instead of concentrating on the problems of Cambodia and South Africa, he called on Gareth Evans, Australian Foreign Minister, to "look also at the freeing of the Melanesians of Irian Jaya from Indonesian bondage." The West Papuans are on Australia's doorstep, he added [PNG Times, 9.VII.92]. An OPM representative, Otto Ondowame, was in Australia to lobby political parties and the government to get West Papua on the parliamentary agenda [PNG Times, 2.VII.92].

Dismissing the outcome of the 1969 Act of Free Choice as unjustified and undemocratic, he said his people have been denied their right to determine their political destiny without fear and oppression.

In response to a PNG school teacher's comment about the safety of PNG children along the border, Mawen gave his assurance that it is the OPM's policy not to harm or interrupt the lives of PNG citizens [PNG Times, 9.VII.92].

## Sweden presses for West Papuan solution

Although the death of Swedish film-maker, Per-Ove Carlsson remains a mystery (see opposite), the cause he wanted to document has received more exposure in recent months. Initiatives supporting self-determination for the West Papuan people have been taken in Sweden.

The Swedish Social Democratic Party has urged parliament to recognise the OPM as the legitimate representative of the West Papuan people, give humanitarian aid to West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea and press the United Nations to pass a similar resolution to that of the Council of Europe on East Timor.

Given that Sweden has given refuge to several OPM members in exile, who in February set up a West Papuan consulate in Malmo, Sweden is already one of the more sympathetic European countries to the cause of the Free Papua Movement. In addition, it has called on European Community countries to:


- \* insist on a political solution negotiated under United Nations auspices, involving Indonesia and the West Papuans;
- \* press for an end to all violations of human rights and the appropriation of West Papua's resources and assets;
- \* support food and health aid to the West Papuans; and
- \* implement an arms embargo on Indonesia until these objectives are achieved.

## More trials in West Papua

The district court in Jayapura has tried two more men for sending supplies to the OPM. Both appear to have been

involved in the network which Theo Rumkabu, charged in April, had apparently coordinated. Although Rumkabu was charged with subversion in April, no reports have yet been received of his sentence.

Yeheskiel Patai, a local government official, was found guilty in June of supplying food and ammunition to the OPM, *Kompas* said. He started in 1987 when a friend introduced him to Marthen Prawar, the northern commander of the OPM.



*More than 70 Papuan political prisoners have been deported to prisons in Java. Lambertus Wellyb (left) and Saul Bomai (right) in Kalisosok prison, Surabaya.*

The second man, named only as GP, 51, has pleaded guilty. He is said to have received a letter from Sonny Seseray, an OPM leader, asking him to send various goods. Through Patai, GP apparently then sent lubricating oil, cigarettes, sugar, coffee, facial powder and eucalyptus oil to guerrillas hiding in Boda village on the border with PNG. He could not respond to a second request from Seseray for lack of cash. The prosecution has asked the court to sentence GP to six years [Jakarta Post, 27.6.92].

The timing of these trials, coinciding with the killing of Marthen Prawar, suggests that interrogation of the defendants may have helped the intelligence discover the whereabouts of Prawar. ★



## Swedish film-maker's murder unresolved

*At first, local police said it was suicide. PNG officials now admit the death is suspicious. Police investigations, however, have yet to come up with any explanation of how a Swedish film-maker came to have his throat slit on the morning of April 29 1992 in Kiunga, Papua New Guinea.*

Per-Ove Carlsson, a 36 year-old Gothlander from Sweden, had gone to Papua New Guinea in February after six months of research intending to make a documentary about the independence struggle of the OPM, whose operations are most prominent along West Papua's borders with PNG. Throughout his visit, Carlsson was in telephone contact with his long-time colleague, journalist Mats Brolin, including a call just the day before he died.

It was on 6 March, from Garoka in the PNG highlands, that the film-maker had first phoned Brolin to say he thought he was being followed. But not until 23 April, from Daru in the southwest, did he tell Brolin that he had made contact with the OPM. Whether Carlsson actually went into West Papua to film the OPM is not clear, but it is known that some time over the next few days he visited the East Awin refugee camp at Kiunga. Here he interviewed and filmed OPM supporters. Here also, he may have been watched by less sympathetic observers.

When he next phoned Brolin, he spoke carefully, letting him know that he thought the call was being tapped. He was still being watched, he said.

The following morning, on 29 April, Carlsson's host, a school teacher from the local mission, found him dead with a 14-inch slit across his throat. Carlsson had appeared nervous the previous evening, according to the teacher, who had seen the Swede alive for the last time at 3am. In the morning, the teacher said he had saw blood seeping from under his door, which was locked from the inside. Since the window to the room was two-and-a-half metres off the ground, and nothing seemed to be missing from Carlsson's belongings, he assumed that no one had entered the room and that Per Ove Carlsson must have committed suicide.

### Suicide claim disavowed

The local police first concluded that Carlsson must have taken his own life. But it was a week before the Swedish honorary consul was informed, or officials from Port Moresby visited the scene, by which time the area had been washed down. The PNG police have since amended the original finding as a 'misunderstanding', and are treating Carlsson's death as suspicious. The weapon used to cut Carlsson's throat, they said, was the saw blade of his Swiss Army knife. Strangely, the Swedish authorities, after their own autopsy, judged the cause of Carlsson's death to be 'probably suicide'. Apparently it is possible to make a deep 14-inch cut in one's own throat with a saw blade....

Mats Brolin and Carlsson's family are convinced that he was murdered. "You don't travel 20,000 kms and almost finish your work only to kill yourself," said his brother Paul. "He would never take his life. He was a cheerful man."

Carlsson was dealing with highly sensitive material. What confirms the family's suspicion is the disappearance of three important video tapes, which Carlsson said he was going to send out by courier, from his room on April 29, while his

passport and credit cards were all in order. The contents of the tapes, in the opinion of Brolin, may hold the key to his death.

After seeming to drag their feet, the Swedish police have now started carrying out thorough investigations and may soon extend their inquiries to the location of the crime.

In response to a suggestion on Radio Australia programme that the OPM may have been involved in Carlsson's death, Bernard Mawen, regional OPM commander, issued a statement saying that the OPM welcomes foreign journalists who come to document its struggle, but that it was not aware of Carlsson's identity and travel plans at the time of his death.

In the light of Indonesia's embarrassment at Max Stahl's film of the Santa Cruz massacre, together with Indonesia's ever-closer relationship with PNG, speculation in all quarters has been rife as to the roles played by the two countries' intelligence units. "It's not strange that he got murdered" said Jacob Prai, OPM leader now in Sweden. "He had information which was absolutely not allowed to get out."

Carlsson was an experienced traveller, having made documentaries with Brolin in China, Tibet and sensitive parts of Africa. The Committee for the Protection of Journalists has written to the PNG government asking for a full and open investigation of Carlsson's death. [Sources: PNG Times and independent material. See also, TAPOL Bulletin 111].

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*Per-Ove Carlsson in Kenya, 1990*



# More border incursions into PNG

*Following a string of OPM offensives earlier this year, the Indonesian security forces have been anxious to flush out OPM guerrilla groups operating near along the PNG border. The skirmishes have taken Indonesian troops into PNG territory.*

Fearful of increased OPM activity in the run-up to the June 9 election, Indonesian troops stepped up their offensive at the end of May, carrying out two attacks in the northern section of the border with Papua New Guinea.

In the first attack, Martin Prawar, military chief and northern commander of the OPM, was reportedly shot dead. Maj.Gen Abinowo, Commander of Indonesia's Trikora regional military command, said in a news conference that a special task force, whose orders were to capture Prawar, dead or alive, had raided an OPM base at Skouw on the border and shot Prawar dead. A colleague, Sulaeman Yefri, was captured in the raid, and arms, documents, radios and medicine was seized. Martin Prawar commanded the OPM division which was being supplied, according to recent trials, by Zeth Rumkabu and others [see *TAPOL Bulletin* 111 and separate item in this issue].

The Indonesian government usually tries to play down the effectiveness of the OPM, claiming its members amount to only around 200. But Maj.Gen Abinowo admitted that the OPM group Prawar commanded was particularly feared because most of its members are army deserters with war strategy skills. "But with the raid, their base for operations in the northern part of the province has been destroyed" he said [*Jakarta Post*, 6.VI.92].

Clearly, however, ABRI is concerned about more than the Skouw base. On the same weekend, Indonesian troops crossed into PNG and attacked an OPM camp near Wutung. Having captured an OPM member out looking for food, they forced him to lead them to the OPM camp, according to reliable sources in Vanimo [*Post-Courier*, 3.VI.92]. On reaching the camp, 3km northwest of Wutung, Indonesian troops opened fire, wounding two men. After shooting their captive, they set fire to the camp and left him there. Other occupants fled, the sources say. Villagers discovered the two wounded men, Jason Malo and Carlos Kosama, and drove them to Vanimo Hospital.

While local Papuans have been left 'frightened and angry' by the attack, police in Vanimo are preparing charges against the wounded victims, a situation reminiscent of the Santa Cruz aftermath in East Timor.

The PNG government has apparently raised no complaint at the border incursion, exposing the reality of intentions of the January Status of Forces agreement with Indonesia. It has, however, stationed PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) troops in the area. But while a PNGDF officer confirmed the incursion, in Jakarta armed forces spokesman Brig.Gen Nurhadi Purwosaputro strongly denied it. "Its not true. None of our members crossed the RI-PNG border." Several times since the agreement was signed in January, Indonesian officials have said that ABRI troops are prohibited from crossing into PNG [eg, *Antara* 9.IV.92].

That the incursion was denied only brings into question the role of the Indonesian soldiers deployed in a civic action programme announced in May. Troops will build a water supply system at Bena, as the first example of the civic cooperation agreed in January under the Status of

Forces agreement. Some PNG citizens are evidently not enamoured with the programme. "How stupid can you get?" asked Johnson Farekoi in a letter to the *PNG Times* on 28 May. The Defence Minister is inviting Indonesia to spy on PNG "to get ready when they take over", he wrote.

## Indonesian 'fishing vessels'

Soon after the border incursion, coastal villagers in PNG were disturbed to discover that two fishing vessels sighted near the coast were Indonesian, not Taiwanese as originally thought. PNG's intelligence service, NIO, confirmed that vessels belonging to the Indonesians were hired to fish between the mouth of the Sepik river and the border village of Wutung under an arrangement between the government and East Sepik businessman Daniel Takendu. Villagers have live in fear since the incursion and unusual sightings of the vessels have further intensified an already tense situation.

A village spokesman visited the vessel to meet its crew and was suspicious that two of them were active members in the Indonesian military. He has called on the NIO to immediately halt the operations of the two vessels. [*PNG Times*, 26-06-1992]

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## Books Received

The following will be reviewed in Bulletin 113:

*East Timor: Indonesian Occupation and Genocide* by A. Barbedo de Magalhaes [Oporto University, 1992]

*East Timor: A Western Made Tragedy* by Mark Aarons and Robert Domm, [The Left Book Club, 1992]

*Timor's Anschluss: Indonesian and Australian Policy in East Timor 1974-76* by Sue Rabitt Roff [The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992]

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