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The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 106

August 1991

Workers strike against slave wages

Strikes, work-stoppages and demonstrations are sweeping through the satellite industrial towns on the outskirts of Jakarta and in other parts of Java. Workers, mostly women and young girls, are demanding an end to slave wages and recognition of the right to organise. Political and Security Affairs Minister-Coordinator, Sudomo announced he would investigate workers' actions because they could undermine political stability and stifle economic growth.

Since 1986, the Suharto regime has promoted export-led economic expansion in order to reduce the country's dependence on exchange earnings from oil and natural gas. In the industrial sector, many companies from abroad, in particular the so-called NICs (New Industrial Countries), Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and Singapore, have built factories making shoes, garments, wrapping material, assembling toys and canning food, attracted by the low wages in Indonesia and the absence of a trade union movement capable of defending workers' rights and better conditions.

Slave wages

In order to appear to be protecting workers against low wages, the government constantly reiterates its policy of enforcing regulations regarding minimum wages which range from Rp. 850 a day in some regions to Rp. 2,600 in Jakarta; the latter is worth around \$1.30. Manpower Minister Cosmas Batubara himself admits that the minimum wage is equivalent to only 60 per cent of a person's basic needs. In fact, it is far worse than that. Referring to a recent study, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* writes: "For a married worker with two children in Jakarta, the minimum wage provides 31 per cent of minimum physical needs. For a married worker with three children in West Java, the minimum wage provides 15 per cent of minimum physical needs." [*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 June 1991].

Writing in February this year, the *Financial Times* referred to Indonesia's "officially-sanctioned low wages", and said this plus the "almost total absence of labour unrest" has been one of the main factors attracting large amounts of foreign capital to the country. [*Financial Times*, 15 February 1991]

The vast majority of factories pay their workers much less than the minimum wage and the government is powerless or indeed unwilling to do anything about it. According to an economist in Semarang, 90 per cent of all enterprises in Central Java fail to pay their employees the minimum wage. Drs Surutal HW warned that the pressures on grossly

underpaid workers in the private sector could only intensify following a government decision last month to increase the salaries of government employees and members of the armed forces by 15 per cent. [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 10 June 1991]

Many of the strikes in the past few months have drawn attention not only to slave wages but to other infringements of workers' rights. One very common grievance is that employers insist on workers doing several hours' overtime every day, with little extra pay – and anyone refusing to


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work overtime is punished by having their wages cut. Many workers are not allowed any days off, working through the weekend and on public holidays.

Strikes, the only way out

The other side of the coin is the abysmal state of the right to organise. The only union permitted to exist is the SPSI, the All-Indonesian Labourers' Union. Even though the SPSI is widely regarded as nothing more than an extension of the government, many employers obstruct moves by their workforce to set up SPSI branches. When workers in some factories have tried to create an SPSI branch as a way to improve their bargaining position vis-a-vis the company, they soon discover that this is not a simple democratic procedure. A ministerial decision introduced in 1986, when Sudomo was Manpower Minister, gives management a decisive say over who may be elected to lead an SPSI branch. No wonder workers tend to regard their local SPSI branch, where one does exist, as being closer to the boss than to them.



*Pengusaha = Boss, Pekerja = Worker
Kebutuhan Fisik Minimum = Basic Physical Needs*

Formally speaking, the right to strike is no longer outlawed, following a government decision last year to revoke a late fifties presidential decree banning strikes in 'vital enterprises'. But the Manpower Minister made the government's view clear on the matter last November, when he said: "The right to strike is protected under the constitution, but exercise of that right is still not tolerated in Indonesia because it is harmful to all sides." [*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 20 June 1991]

Hemmed in by these restraints on their freedom to defend their rights and improve their wages, workers in many of the new industrial estates are resorting to strikes and work-stoppages. There have been so many lightning strikes in the last few months that space does not permit mention of more than a fraction of them.

In May, 3,000 workers at the garment factory, PT Ever Shinetex in Bogor went on strike for better wages, for a collective agreement, for the payment of transport allowances and for sick pay. They also demanded that the company pay them seven days' overtime money owed for work performed during the Lebaran holiday week. According to one of the strike organisers, workers had been forced to do the overtime when the only factory gate had been

locked. Workers were warned that those who refused to work through the holiday period would be sacked.

Spirits ran high during the two-day strike, with the women workers filling the courtyard in front of the factory, singing songs and shouting slogans. Troops were out in force to intimidate the mostly female workforce. Although some of the demands were met, the employers later took reprisals against the activists, assisted by the local military command. Six workers who visited the Manpower Ministry in Jakarta to discuss their grievances were summarily sacked and summoned by the military for questioning about their views of the New Order, their understanding of Pancasila, whether they had been involved in illegal gatherings and so on.

The company has since announced plans to sack 300 workers and replaced them with 'more skilled' workers. Already 40 workers have been fired. [*Pelita*, 26 June 1991]

A strike involving 2,000 workers at the Great Rivers Garment Industries factory near Bogor on 19 and 20 June was widely reported in the press. In this instance, the list of demands was conveyed to the management by SPSI leaders. Troops were brought in to try to restore order, claiming they had come to protect the premises from physical attack.

On the second day of the strike, the management announced that six of the 22 demands would be met.

At around the same time, strikes were taking place at Trinunggal Komara factory in Cibinong where 2,600 workers downed tools, at a lamp factory in Surabaya where 150 women workers walked out after failing to persuade the employers to pay them a better wage, at MPG factory in Bogor where 500 workers demanded action against foreign staff from Korea for treating them very badly, and at the Dahwa Prima Indonesia shoe factory in Tangerang after the company refused to raise wages to the minimum set by the government.

End military involvement

Besides strikes at the workplace, demonstrations have occurred, with many dozens of workers' representatives from several factories going to the Department of Manpower. In one such demonstration, some three hundred workers, mostly women, from factories in Cimanggis, Citeureup, Cibinong and Bekasi gathered outside the Department for over three hours demanding better wages, condemning the SPSI as "toothless", calling for an end to compulsory overtime and demanding that company bosses who maltreat their workers or violate regulations should be charged in court. They also called on the Minister to annul a 1986 ministerial decree to involve the military in the resolution of labour disputes.

A week later, workers' representatives from Ever Shinetex and four other factories in Cimanggis, Bogor also called for an end to military involvement in labour disputes. At a press conference given by some fifty workers, they insisted that strikers should not be treated like criminals. A worker who refused to give her name, from PT Great River Garment Industries - where strike action has been under way for some time - spoke of the frustration among workers with grievances, because of the procedures available to them.

The difficulty arises from a ministerial decision, also introduced by Sudomo in 1986, which says that when a 'wild strike' breaks out, the company should act in coordination with the local administration, police and military command to prevent any physical assaults by the

strikers. Following a strike at a factory in Ciluar, Bogor in May, twenty strike leaders were held for eight days at the local police station. But the ultimate penalty for strike leaders, even when some of the demands are met by the company, is dismissal. [*Tempo*, 8 June 1991]

Sudomo to investigate

The wave of strikes has led Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, to announce that an investigation will begin to discover who is 'masterminding' the strikes. Referring to the work-stoppage at the Great River Garment Industries factory, Sudomo said: "How could 2,000 workers at a company go on strike at the same time if they were not coordinated?" [*Jakarta Post*, 1 July 1991] *Tempo* [13 July] quoted him as saying that firm action would be taken against anyone 'up to their tricks'.

Sudomo was commander of the security agency *Kop-kamtib* from 1974 until 1983 when he became Manpower Minister for five years. He evidently has no intention of dropping his heavy-handed supervision of the country's workforce. One newspaper warned him against dealing with workers' action as a security matter rather than recognising the socio-economic issues that underlie the current unrest. [*Jakarta Post*, 1 July 1991]

A senior official of the Manpower Department said that the AFL/CIO is the target of Sudomo's threat. "The union has been pressing Congress and the Bush Administration to withdraw trade privileges under the GSP [Generalised System of Preferences] from Indonesia. Previous applications from the AFL/CIO have three times been refused by the US Trade Representative.

In May the AFL/CIO submitted a new petition regarding workers' rights in Indonesia, complaining that the Setiakawan Free Trade Union has been refused recognition and that the right to strike was not being honoured. According to *Tempo*, the Indonesian Government feels so threatened by this latest move that it has hired a US law firm to help it fight off the challenge.

But Jeffrey Ballinger, the AFL/CIO Asia representative, based in Jakarta, is doubtful whether the union will win the case. "Indonesia has a powerful lobby in Washington and the US Administration has no intention of sacrificing its ties with Indonesia for a number of underpaid workers."

Jakarta army chief warns

On top of Sudomo's threat has come a warning from Major-General Kentot Harseno, the Jakarta military commander, who said his troops will take action against workers who demonstrate in the streets or on the premises of offices or factories as this would not be tolerated. "Any worker or workers found demonstrating will be arrested and brought to trial." He would only allow workers wanting to protest about their conditions to go to Parliament, and leave the matter with them.

He also warned that the free trade union, Setiakawan, was operating illegally and told workers not to approach it with their problems. [*Jakarta Post*, 20 July 1991]

Factory dormitories

Many factories that employ thousands of women insist on their employees living in dormitories on factory premises. This saves the company money in transport allowances and makes it easier to enforce a regime of overtime. Conditions in these dormitories are little better than prison.

A recent study describes conditions at the company dormitory of the Busano factory, 25 kms from Jakarta. A

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clause in the labour agreement stipulates that "all female workers must live in the women's dormitory".

The dormitory's design is very basic, just a row of rooms enclosed by a 4 to 5 metre masonry wall. The occupants are all unmarried employees and they live 8 or 10 people in 5-7 square metre rooms equipped with 4 or 5 iron bunk beds, a wardrobe and a kitchen. The bathrooms at the back of each room have only one toilet... The most difficult part is changing shifts, having to wake up at 4 am or even earlier....

The dormitory head is a member of the company hierarchy charged with direct supervision of the workers. One of the tasks is to grant menstruation leave. It is a granted right but is extremely difficult to obtain. Workers must follow procedures every month in order to be granted their leave. One section of the factory which employs nearly 40 people only grants menstruation leave to 1 or 2 people at a time.

There are many other rules to be obeyed. Workers cannot enter the dormitory after 7 pm, cannot meet with people outside the enclosure and cannot use cooking utensils. Several of the workers describe the factory and dormitories as "a prison". [*AMPO, Japan-Asia Quarterly Review*, Vol 22, no. 1]

An article in a recent issue of *Tempo* describes the tribulations of women workers who live in company dormitories. One woman said the security officers impose a strict discipline with punishment for anyone breaking the rules. There are slaps and punches for anyone returning to the dormitory after hours and sometimes an order to perform a cleaning chore throughout the night.

So why don't you move?, asked the journalist. "Where to?," replied the woman. "It's just the same in all the factories. For anyone who's a worker, there's no point talking about justice."

Child labour

Tempo also reports that many of the workers are under age. One young woman, now 14 years old said she and many others were confined for eleven months in a cloths factory, sewing ladies' underwear. They worked from 7 am to 10 pm for Rp. 25,000 a month. Sixty-two under-age girls were kept in a dormitory 6 by 8 metres, sleeping on the bare floor. "While we were on the job, we were not allowed to talk or doze off. The food we got twice a day consisted of a quarter of a plate of rice, a portion of vegetables and a piece of *tempe*. And the cook was not allowed to use salt as this would cause our legs to swell, making it difficult to work the sewing-machine."

Another horror story comes from a wrapping paper factory, Maju Jaya Mas Sejati, North Jakarta where eleven youngsters, about 13 years old were isolated in a room from 8 am to 9 pm every day sticking up cardboard boxes. The workshop is surrounded by a 4 metre high wall, topped with barbed wire. When they arrived at the factory two and a half years ago, the company took away all their personal belongings. Their sufferings came to an end when the mother of one of the girls reported that her daughter was missing and persuaded a local army officer to gain entry to the factory and rescue her. [*Tempo*, 8 June 1991] ★

Setiakawan leader abducted

Saut Aritonang, the General Secretary of the recently-established independent trade union, Setiakawan, was taken into custody and held for three days by unidentified assailants the day before he was due to lead a demonstration outside the office of the International Labour Office in Jakarta.

Since the creation of Setiakawan last November, the government has used underhand tactics and intimidation against the union. Although it has refused to give the union official recognition, it has refrained from outlawing it, knowing that this could lead to international protest and might strengthen the case of the US trade unions, the AFL/CIO for trade preferences to be withdrawn from Indonesia on the grounds of lack of trade union rights.

It was on Sunday, 2 June that a taxi taking Saut Aritonang to his office in was forced to stop by six armed men in two military vehicles, and forced at gunpoint to go with them to an unknown destination. Saut was returning from a visit to a hospital where Setiakwan's president, Poncke Princen was undergoing treatment. They had discuss preparations for the demonstration on the following day.

The abduction came after the union's office in Jakarta had been subjected to continual surveillance for several days by persons recognised as being from army intelligence. On the Sunday morning of his abduction, two intelligence officers from the local army office of *Bakorstanasda* (the regional wing of the national stability agency) came to the office and asked Saut to accompany them to their headquarters to provide information about the occupants of the union's office. Saut refused to go but provided the information requested.

At the time of his abduction that afternoon, a colleague who was riding in the taxi with him was punched in the stomach when he got out to see what was happening. Saut's abductors did not identify themselves and had no insignia, nor did they produce an arrest warrant. As he was driven off, Saut was blindfolded and handcuffed and taken to a place where he was held for four days. The abductors grabbed the ignition key of the taxi, making it impossible for the driver to give chase. Soon afterwards, the key was found on the roadside.

ILO protest

The day after Saut's abduction, the demonstration that he was to have led took place as scheduled. Some 300 workers from a number of factories gathered outside the head office of the International Labour Office (ILO) which is located in the UN Jakarta headquarters. They had a series of demands and complaints which they intended to hand over to the ILO representative but were unable to gain access as the entrance was blocked by armed security guards.

Besides drawing attention to many grievances about wages, workers' rights, working hours and trade union rights, the demonstration which had been organised by the Setiakawan Free Trade Union expressed opposition to the coming appointment of Indonesia's Manpower Minister, Cosmas Batubara as the president of this year's International Labour Conference which was due to commence in Geneva on the following day.

The day after the demonstration, five workers among them



Workers from several factories demonstrating in front of the ILO office.

one woman from the DWA sponge factory in Cengkareng, West Java who had taken part were taken from their place of work without arrest warrants to the *Koramil* (local military command) headquarters and held till midnight. They returned home, their faces black and blue from beatings.

Army denies responsibility

Saut's abduction was widely reported domestically and by the international news agencies, a sign that Setiakawan's progress is being followed with considerable interest. The armed forces issued a press release after he had returned home, saying they had no knowledge of the affair. Political and Security Affairs Coordination Minister Sudomo also feigned ignorance of the abduction and said there would be no investigation to discover those responsible; it was up to Saut himself to take legal action against his abductors, if he so wishes. However, Sudomo knows very well that this is not possible as Saut has no idea who they were nor does he know where he was taken.

Accompanied by lawyers, he visited the Jakarta Police after his release to make a full report of his experience. He said for the first few hours he was held in a tiny, foul-smelling room 1 x 1.8 metres, and later transferred to a larger room. On the second day of his abduction, he was interrogated about the protest about the ILO meeting and asked about the union's activities. Before being taken to a vehicle which drove him away from his place of abduction, he was again blindfolded and driven off to another part of Jakarta where he was released.

Saut: 'Stop the repression!'

A week after his abduction, Saut issued a statement, calling on the security forces to stop curbing political rights. "Violence and undemocratic action will never stop labourers flaring up if they do not settle the problems of their basic rights."

Yoppy Matulesi, one of the workers picked up at his place of work after the ILO demonstration, said: "We complained to the ILO. It's terrible that we were picked up by military officers and got beaten before they released us at midnight." He said that other workers had been told they risked their jobs if they joined Setiakawan. [Reuter, 10 June 1991]

Portuguese walk out of ILO meeting

Prior to the selection of Cosmas Batubara to preside over

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this year's ILO conference, representatives of the Portuguese trade union movement spoke out against the decision, in solidarity with the people of East Timor. After Batubara was appointed, as the sole candidate for the post, the Portuguese trade unionists walked out, followed by the Portuguese government representatives and representatives of Portuguese employers. ★

A sixth term for Suharto?

Elections in Indonesia's ORDE BARU have always been stage-managed and are no indicator of the true standing of the political parties. Only three parties may contest the elections, by contrast with the dozens of parties that participated in the 1955 general elections. Nevertheless, the political atmosphere is heating up as the April 1992 elections approach. Political issues have begun to surface. Suharto's 70th birthday celebrated recently did not escape the attention of political pundits: will he stand for another term or will he resign?

The major issue in the coming election is undoubtedly the succession. If Suharto decides to run for another term, it will be his sixth but so far he has been tightlipped.

Four hundred seats in the DPR (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*) or Parliament will be fought over by Golkar, the PDI and the PPP. Another 100 parliamentary seats are reserved for members of ABRI, the armed forces. In April 1993, the MPR (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*), the People's Congress, will elect the president. The MPR has a thousand members, the 500 DPR members and 500 appointees (provincial governors, local representatives and

the like). Sixty per cent are therefore appointed and to judge by earlier presidential elections, Suharto has nothing to fear. Every time since 1968, Suharto has been the sole candidate and his 'election' supported by 100 per cent of the votes has always been a foregone conclusion.

Will things will be different this time?

It was Suharto who started to give signals that this might be his last term. In his controversial autobiography he indicated that his family wanted him back as the *pater familias*. Last year he invented a new term *topp*, for *tua*, *ompong*, *peot* & *pikun* (old, toothless, shrivelled and senile). In an informal meeting at the palace the cunning Suharto made a joke about himself, stating that Indonesia doesn't need a *topp* person as president. Typically, this drew a variety of responses. The more slavish politicians saw this a hint from the boss that he needed more pressure to stand for a sixth term; others judged the statement at face-value and concluded that Suharto was planning to step down.

In the meantime the atmosphere of 'openness' (largely initiated and controlled by Suharto) has created more leeway to voice opinions in public. A discussion was timidly started about having more than one candidate, quite unthinkable a few years back. Then Yahya Nasution, a PDI leader unexpectedly proposed General Rudini, the powerful Interior Minister, as a candidate for the presidency. Nasution's plunge paved the way for others. The nationalist student organisation, GMNI, called for the 'culture of sole-candidates' to be abandoned while others said there should be nine candidates, three from each political party. Then someone mentioned the name of the high profile Minister for Technology B.J. Habibie, darling of the western arms producers.

The discussion about having other candidates still starts from the assumption that Suharto will run for a sixth term. Others think Suharto should step down in 1993 and plans for the succession should start immediately.

Suharto versus ABRI

It is a public secret that many at ABRI headquarters do not see eye to eye with the president. The huge business



The seventy-year-old president is now being compared with the octogenarian Yang Shang Kun, the Chinese president.

interests of the Suharto kids is resented by many officers. Political analysts seriously believe that Suharto is now quite vulnerable and the spectacular growth of the Suharto business empire will eventually lead to his downfall. Some high-placed generals are already taking their distance from Suharto, to avoid going down together with the first family.

After the 1977 general elections, so the story goes, Suharto agreed to step down and make way for General Surono, the first man in the army at the time. The generals and Suharto were said to have reached consensus about the idea of Suharto making way for another general. At the last moment Suharto backed down, arguing that he had not yet finished 'the job' properly. Since 1978, his relations with the army leaders have deteriorated and any consensus regarding the succession has melted like snow in the midday sun.

It is now apparent that a major group in *ABRI* wants more pressure on Suharto to resign and allow the first man in *ABRI*, General Try Sutrisno to take over. Somebody had to give the sign to Suharto; the ungratifying task fell to Brig. General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, spokesperson of *ABRI* who told a *New York Times* reporter:

I am just talking personally, but a lot of us think he has served long enough. We want to make sure that his last term is successful. It is time for him to retire. It is up to the army to make sure there is a smooth transition. (NYT Magazine 2 June 1991).

A month later General Nurhadi retracted his statement, claiming that the writer, Margaret Scott had misunderstood what he said. Nurhadi may have been scolded by Bina Graha (Suharto's office) and forced to retract, but political analysts see Nurhadi's earlier statement as a friendly but determined attempt at persuading Suharto to leave office in 1992. This political manoeuvring is bound to increase in the coming months.

Controlling the elections

The general elections or *pemilu* (*pemilihan umum*) have always been carefully controlled, from the centre to the villages. The 'floating mass' policy is still valid; political party campaigning is forbidden below the district level. As the majority of Indonesians live in the rural areas, the government party, *GOLKAR* enjoys a huge advantage in electioneering in the villages. But here too things are gradually changing. Suharto chairs the advisory board of *GOLKAR* and is in full control of the board. The 72 per cent of votes won by *GOLKAR* does not seem to impress anybody any more. Suharto is now flirting with Muslim groups and intellectuals outside *GOLKAR*. *KORPRI*, the huge organisation of civil servants was formerly the backbone of *GOLKAR*, as civil servants and their families were required to vote for *GOLKAR*. The influential Minister of Defence General Benny Murdani tired of *GOLKAR* five years ago and started flirting with *PDI*, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia* during in the 1987 elections.

The *PDI* has achieved more political clout with their new star, Guruh Sukarnoputra, son of the still popular first president, Sukarno. The *PDI*'s scoop is being compared with parties in other Asian countries where sons, daughters and wives of deceased politicians have risen to the top on the political scene. Another event that boosted the *PDI*'s fortunes was the well-planned event in May when about 50

retired *ABRI* officers joined *PDI* with the blessing of top generals, including Murdani. The shift in the political loyalties of the fifty officers created quite a stir and not a few complications. Formally speaking, retired officers of *ABRI* must join *PEPABRI*, the veterans' organisation, which is part of *GOLKAR*. The breakaway of the fifty made the split within *ABRI* ranks a fact.

Although *GOLKAR* is still expected to win comfortably, it seems the marginal parties *PDI* and *PPP* are to be allowed to compete in a more evenhanded way.



During the campaigning, Sukarno portraits will not be allowed, as they were in the 1987 elections.

Old ways die hard

While things are changing on one front, the organisation and management of the *pemilu* seems to be just as rigid and authoritarian as ever. Ret'd General Hari Sugiman, the Director-General for Social and Political Affairs at the Home Ministry is concurrently Secretary of the *LPU*, the Institute for General Elections. This hardline general has already issued several prohibitions: it is forbidden to display portraits of the late President Sukarno and no public rallies will be allowed during the campaign. His superior, General Rudini, the Home Minister, has also come with some strange remarks, directed at provincial governors. In his capacity as the *KORPRI* leader, he has told them he will punish governors who do not achieve the targeted amount of votes for *GOLKAR*, but as Home Minister he will be neutral. For government officials who want to keep their jobs, Rudini's words are not very reassuring. ★

Council of Europe: Arms embargo for Indonesia!

The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, at a meeting of its Standing Committee in Helsinki on 28th June 1991, unanimously adopted an unprecedented resolution on East Timor, calling for an embargo against Indonesia. The Council of Europe includes virtually all the countries of Europe, excluding some East European countries. Hungary is already a member and others are in the process of joining. The text of the resolution is as follows:

1. East Timor was annexed by Indonesia on 17 July 1976 with total disregard for the rules of international law and the rights and obligations of Portugal, which was the governing power. The annexation was accompanied by various violations of human rights and a policy of forcible assimilation.

2. The annexation has been condemned not only by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations but also by the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries, the Inter-parliamentary Union, the European Parliament, the ACP-EEC* Joint Assembly and many other international, parliamentary, political and religious organisations.

3. From the outset the Indonesian occupying forces were involved in violent confrontation with an armed Timor resistance movement which has always had the support of the East Timorese people and in recent years more particularly of the young.

4. The Assembly condemns the annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, which it regards as a violation of international law and more particularly of peoples' right to self-determination and independence.

5. It likewise condemns the continual grave violations of human rights which the Indonesian occupying forces have inflicted on the people of East Timor and it affirms the right of the Timorese people to decide their own political destiny and preserve, develop and assert their cultural, linguistic and religious identity.

6. It points out that Portugal, which is the governing power recognised by the United Nations General Assembly, is morally and legally obliged to "promote and guarantee the rights of the people of Timor to self-determination and independence" (Article 297 of the Portuguese constitution) and supports Portugal's many representations in this matter since 1975.

7. It endorses the mediation endeavours of the Secretary General of the United Nations and encourages parliamentary and other initiatives aimed at enforcing the United Nations resolutions.

8. The Assembly demands that the Indonesian government:

- i. ends all violation of international instruments establishing human rights and people's right to self-determination and independence;
- ii. opens East Timor's borders and allows international aid and human rights organisations, starting with the Red Cross,

to carry on their work there;

iii. orders an immediate cease-fire with the Timor resistance forces, withdraws its armed forces from East Timor and creates the political preconditions for free exercise of self-determination.

9. Lastly, the Assembly calls on Council of Europe member states to:

i. insist upon a political solution negotiated within the United Nations and involving Portugal, Indonesia and the East Timorese people;

ii. urge countries which have economic links with Indonesia to bring pressure to bear on Indonesia to halt all violation of human rights and all appropriation of East Timor's natural resources and assets;

iii. support food and health aid to the East Timorese people;

iv. implement an arms embargo in respect of Indonesia until the objectives set out in paragraph 8 have been achieved. ✱

* ACP-EEC: Africa-Caribbean-Pacific/European Economic Community.


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Europe's Greens also want arms embargo

A meeting of the European Greens held in Zurich on 1-2 June adopted a proposal submitted by the Portuguese Ecology Party for action to demand an embargo on all arms sales to Indonesia, because of its invasion and illegal occupation of East Timor. The resolution reads:

Considering the dramatic situation that continues to prevail in East Timor and the genocide that has taken place there since the Indonesian invasion,

And considering the need of the Maubere people, particularly at the present time, for solidarity and understanding from the international community, we propose to launch a campaign on behalf of the Greens in Europe and worldwide at all possible levels, towards Parliaments and Community institutions, for a halt to all the sales of arms to Indonesia. ✱



Timorese soccer players defect in Australia

Four East Timorese soccer players defected while in Darwin for the Arafura Sports Festival. Two reached the Portuguese Embassy in Canberra and soon left for Lisbon; the other two have asked for asylum in Australia.

Joao Pedro Ribeiro, 24, and Julio Goncalves do Rego, 26, were the first to escape from the twenty security minders accompanying the soccer team on 27 May. With the help of East Timorese in Darwin, they reached the airport, bought tickets to Canberra and reached the safety of the Portuguese Embassy within hours. At a press conference, they said they had taken part in peaceful demonstrations in Dili, were on a blacklist and feared for their safety. They had only been allowed to go to Darwin because of their sporting skills.

The other two defectors, Francisco Lam, 19, and Francisco da Gama, 36, captain of the team, went missing shortly after the first two left Darwin, and turned up at the local immigration office to ask for asylum.

The defections drew much media attention in Australia and came as a great shock to the Indonesian authorities. Ribeiro, the goal-keeper of the team, and do Rego, who has been described as Timor's star mid-field player, told a press conference in Canberra that they had decided to leave because they knew they were both on a security blacklist in Dili as they had participated in demonstrations. They had been allowed to leave only because of their sporting skills and the assumption that security-minders could keep control.

The two men said they had decided to defect before leaving Dili but their relatives at home knew nothing at all. They told of torture, killings and the disappearance of Timorese who challenge Indonesian rule.

I couldn't go back to Dili. We live in constant fear. It is the law of the jungle there and they (the Indonesians) are the ones with the guns.... There is constant bashing and harassment from the military. I myself have been bashed. It happens all the time. After 6 o'clock, we are all too scared to go out because of military patrols.

The defections were made possible thanks to the well-organised support of the East Timorese community in Darwin. Local Timorese met them at Darwin airport and bought them tickets for the journey to Canberra via Sydney.

Remarkably, after the first two had disappeared, the next two were also able to make off.

Emotional stress

When the remaining eleven team members made their way by bus to Darwin airport to return to Dili, there were dozens of local Timorese at the airport, urging them to defect as well. When they reached the airport, the men remained in the bus for more than half an hour. Photos published in the Australian press show the men, in the bus, in a state of anguish bordering on hysteria as they faced the dilemma of deciding what to do.

In the airport, they were taken to a conference room and allowed to speak freely to the Fretilin representative in



Joao Pedro Ribeiro (left) and Julio Goncalves do Rego after defecting.

Darwin, Alfredo Ferreira, an Australian lawyer, immigration officers and an official from the Portuguese embassy in Canberra; they all decided to return home. Alfredo Ferreira said afterwards: "Their families are there and it is their country."

Stunned Indonesians

The incident was widely reported in the Indonesian press. Sportsmen or women defecting used to come from the Soviet Union, China or Eastern Europe before the political changes there, so defections from Indonesia made sensational reading.

Reactions from senior officials were diverse and sometimes even contradictory. The Indonesian consul in Darwin described the affair as 'an embarrassment' for Indonesia. "It's up to the people in Jakarta whether there will be future visits like this. It will only disturb good relations between Indonesia and Australia."

Governor Carrascalao suggested it might have something to do with financial difficulties or worries about unemployment. In fact, the soccer-team is owned by Bank Summa and the members receive Rp. 120,000 a month plus a bonus for matches as well as having other jobs. Da Gama, for example, works for the provincial administration in Dili.

While Foreign Minister Ali Alatas shrugged it off as 'a joke' [which is what he called the MPs meeting with UN Secretary-General Peres de Cuellar in March], General Try Sutrisno, armed forces commander-in-chief, said it's not a 'defection'. "Just call it a family reunion." MP Theo Sambuaga blamed it all on the Portuguese.

Vice-President Sudharmono took the affair seriously enough to order the Minister of Sports, Akbar Tanjung, to

carry out an inquiry. Akbar Tanjung himself, in the hot seat, as it were, could only say: "We were taken completely by surprise. We never imagined that such a thing would happen."

Later, *Suara Pembaruan* published a lengthy account of what happened, accusing the Timorese in Darwin of using terror to make the sportsmen defect. Interestingly enough, their only source was Harry Silalahi, one of the team

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managers; not a single returning soccer-player was asked to say anything.

Meanwhile, the four defectors have asked the International Red Cross and Amnesty International to press for protection for their relatives against the possibility of retaliations. ✦

Seven arrested in Baucau

Five men and two women were arrested in Baucau on 13 July in a round-up by red-beret commandos aimed at discovering people in contact with the guerrilla movement. Four of the men are members of the Civil Guard's 'saka team' [this probably stands for *kesatuan keamanan*, or security unit]. These arrests followed six weeks after a guerrilla named Celestino was captured and heavily tortured to force him to divulge the names of clandestine contacts in Baucau.

The seven detainees, who are still in army detention are:

Mau Dolar Gama, 25 years, married, from Saelari-Baucau, member of Saka.

Dominggas Gama, 23 years, the wife of Mau Dolar.

Fernando Alin, 25 years, from Saelari-Baucau, formerly fought with Falintil in the bush.

Juliao Haekoni, 26 years, a native of Baguia, also a member of Saka.

Anita Gama, 28 years, from Saelari-Baucau; her husband is fighting in the bush.

Juliao Wakala, 26 years, from Saelari-Baucau, a member of Saka.

Manuel Ximenes Pereira, 25 years, from Soba village, Laga, a member Saka.

All seven were tortured for information about persons in contact with the guerrillas.

In Dili, a teacher named Constantine Pinto who was arrested in January 1991, then released, and Nuno Corvelho (previously arrested in July 1989) are on the run.

Japanese MPs barred from East Timor

Four Japanese MPs who applied for permission in June to visit East Timor for three days in July have had their request turned down. At first, a message was conveyed informally by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the MPs that it takes six months to prepare for a visit to the territory. A few days later, they received a letter from the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires in Tokyo, flatly rejecting the request.


The confusion was compounded when a spokesperson of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Jakarta, commenting on a *Jakarta Post* report that the request had been turned down, denied that the Department had received any request for a visit by Japanese MPs. A few days later, Jakarta's position changed again. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was quoted as saying that the request was "under consideration".

The four MPs are members of the 91-strong Diet Forum on East Timor. They made the application to the Indonesian embassy in Tokyo and asked the Japanese Foreign Ministry for help. The MPs are Satsuki Eda of the United Social Democratic League, two Diet members from the Socialist

Party and one from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party.

In his letter to the Indonesian ambassador, Satsuki Eda said the purpose of the Diet Forum on East Timor is "to gather and analyse accurate information on the situation in East Timor and study the role which Japan should play towards the achievement of a comprehensive solution to the question". The group was planning to meet the governor, the military commander, International Red Cross officials, the Catholic bishop and others. It would have been the first ever visit to East Timor by a group of Japanese MPs.

At the first stage of the saga, assistant to Satsuki Eda Kiyoko Furusawa said of the need for six months' notice: "This is not satisfactory. We thought one month would be enough time. The Indonesian government said that East Timor was open (but) it does not want a visit at this time. The group now plans to go in July 1992." [Reuter, 5 July 1991]



Occasional Reports no.15 contains TAPOL's submission to the 1991 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee.

Price £1.00 including postage

The letter from the Charge d'Affaires gave a rehash of the Indonesian claim that East Timor had been integrated according to UN resolutions on self-determination and said:

As you know, the Japanese Government firmly recognises East Timor's incorporation into the Republic of Indonesia and also supports UN proposals for a settlement.

On this basis, the Indonesian Government sees no need for a visit to Indonesia/East Timor by you and your group. In order to add to your information, we invite you to read and examine honestly the documents we sent you a while ago.

The claim that the Japanese Government recognises East Timor's incorporation by Indonesia is not correct. For instance, the Japanese Government's advises publishers, when consulted, that a boundary should be shown between West and East Timor in maps because the status of East

Timor is still undecided.

Xanana's family harassed

On 31 May, Indonesian army intelligence officers forced their way into the house of the parents of Xanana Gusmao, in the district of Vila Verde, Dili, in an attempt to discover the whereabouts of the leader of the East Timor armed resistance.

It was part of an army operation to intimidate the family of Xanana Gusmao, after the authorities discovered that the leader of the resistance secretly visited Dili in March and April [see opposite page].

After dark, army agents in civilian clothing pulled up in a vehicle with no numberplate, forced their way into the home of Xanana's parents and threatened to rape his sister, 35-year old Manuela Gusmao. They were taking her out of the house when a group of Timorese, alerted by her screams, freed her from the clutches of the soldiers. The agents tried to force her to say where her brother was; when she refused they threatened to take her away for interrogation. [*Expresso*, 8 June 1991] ★

Timorese youth being transferred to Java

In a move to defuse political tensions in East Timor, in time for the forthcoming visit of Portuguese parliamentarians, hundreds of unemployed Timorese have been moved to Java and placed in low-paying jobs. The scheme is being encouraged by the military on the assumption that rebelliousness among young East Timorese is caused by unemployment and dissatisfaction with their lot. The Portuguese parliamentary mission is likely to visit East Timor before the end of the year.

The scheme is being run by *Yayasan Tiara*, a new foundation set up by Suharto's oldest daughter, 'Tutut' Hardiyanti Rukmana, an ambitious businesswoman with her finger in many business pies. Francisco Kalbuadi, chair of the foundation, first visited East Timor to discuss the scheme last October, when the security forces were clamping down hard on students, school-pupils and other young Timorese. [*Sunday Territorian*, 26/5/1991] Tutut's recruitment drive has the approval of *BAIS*, the Strategic Intelligence Agency, which is keen to reduce the political pressure in East Timor.

Yayasan Tiara offered its 'trainee' recruits a period of training and a job in Batam industrial complex at Rp 300,000 a month. The first group of 132 Timorese who accepted the offer soon discovered that 'training' meant a two-week indoctrination course under the psychologist, Kak Seto. Over 70 were then transported to Bawen in Semarang district, Central Java, put to work at the PT Kanindotex textile factory and paid only Rp. 70,000 (about £30) a month. After deductions for food, lodging and transport, they receive only Rp. 11,000. Others were given jobs with similar conditions in Bandung, Bogor, Jakarta and Salatiga.


Clashes and arrests

Already in two places, tensions have flared up between local workers and the Timorese. In Semarang, the Timorese were accused of being ungrateful for the 'special facilities' they were given. Fighting broke out on 18 May; the local army and police intervened, threatening the Timorese with

firearms. The next day, four Timorese went to Jakarta to complain to *Yayasan Tiara* but got no response. They went to Salatiga for help from the Timorese student organisation, *IMPETTIM* which wrote on their behalf to Kanindotex chief executive, Robby Tjahyadi, again with no results.

Meanwhile in Bandung, 12 'trainees' were placed in a textile factory. Here too tensions flared when local people alleged the Timorese were getting special treatment but were ungrateful. Clashes broke out which led to police intervention. Two Timorese, **Egas Jose Quintas** and **Francisco da Cunha**, both 18-20 years, were arrested on 22 June, after police made several visits to the hostel where they were staying. They were taken to Sumedang Prison and are believed to be still in custody there. The father of Egas was killed by the Indonesian armed forces and his mother who lives in Viqueque has often been abused by soldiers.

Besides *Yayasan Tiara*, another business, *Bukaka Electronics*, owned by a successful newcomer to the Jakarta business world, Fadel Mohamad, has also started to recruit young Timorese. Fadel visited East Timor along with General Try Sutrisno for the army's Lebaran festivities in June this year. It may be that he is interested in employing Timorese who have completed training at an advanced technology school in Fatumaca who, despite their skills, fail to find jobs in East Timor. It is understood that *Bukaka Electronics* has already taken more than a hundred young Timorese to Jakarta. ★



For a just peace in the 1990s

A new campaign for peace talks in East Timor has been launched in Australia to draw attention to the continuing conflict in East Timor and the need for a lasting settlement.

The campaign is calling for a ceasefire and talks between the East Timorese and Indonesia to resolve the conflict. Last November, the leader of the East Timorese resistance, Xanana Gusmao, called for a ceasefire and offered to participate in talks 'without preconditions', under the auspices of the United Nations. He called on the Australian government to intercede with the Indonesian authorities to press for talks, but the request was flatly rejected by Australia's Foreign Minister, Senator Gareth Evans who was in Indonesia at the time, discussing details for implementing the Timor Gap Treaty.

The talks initiative is moderate and constructive and has the potential to gain support from a wide cross section of the international community, as well as some sections of Indonesian society where concern about East Timor has grown in recent times.

In a 16-page document entitled, *East Timor, for a Just Peace in the 1990s*, published by ACFOA, the Australian Council for Overseas Aid, it is argued that many international factors now work in East Timor's favour. Portugal is successfully pressing the issue within the European Community, concern about East Timor within the Japanese Diet and the US Congress is gaining strength, and the crisis of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe means Indonesia can no longer justify its presence in East Timor on security or political grounds, if ever such grounds existed.

Many circles feel that it's now East Timor's turn, that following the Gulf crisis, independence in Namibia, plans

for a UN-supervised referendum in the Western Sahara and Eritrea's advance to independent statehood, the UN should turn its attention to East Timor.

For copies of the booklet, *East Timor: Towards a Just Peace in the 1990s*, write to: ACFOA Human Rights Office, 124 Napier St, Fitzroy 3065 Australia Tel. (03) 417 7505 Fax (03) 416 2746 ★

Xanana in Dili for five weeks

Xanana Gusmao, commander of the armed resistance, FALINTIL, and leader of the National Council of Maubere Resistance, was able to get into Dili in March and is understood to have spent five weeks there, well protected by clandestine forces.

This happened six months after Xanana's unprecedented meeting in the bush with Robert Domm, the Australian lawyer, a meeting that could only have been possible thanks to a carefully-planned escort, taking the Australian through Indonesian lines.

Xanana's proven ability to move even in towns where there is a heavy Indonesian military presence means that it should be possible for him to meet members of the Portuguese parliamentary mission when it visits East Timor. It is understood that the UN Secretary General supports the view that the purpose of the mission cannot be fully achieved without such a meeting taking place.

Two PKI tapols released 3 years late

Two Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) political prisoners, Rewang and Martosuwandi, were unexpectedly released on 24 July from Cipinang Prison, Jakarta. Rewang should have been released in January 1988. Persistent efforts by his wife to secure his release, assisted by the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta, were unsuccessful. Martosuwandi's release was also several years overdue.

Another prisoner, Police Brig.General Sutarto, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency, BPI, whose release was also due in 1988 but who was not freed, went mad soon afterwards.

Rewang was given a life sentence in December 1971. The sentence was upheld on appeal in June 1975. However, on 17 August 1985 his sentence was commuted to 20 years and he was twice granted three-months' remission, on 17 August 1986 and on 17 August 1987. [Remission would not have been possible on a life sentence.] This meant that his release was due in January 1988.

After numerous inquiries including a fruitless approach to the Vice-President, his wife was informed by the Justice Department in February this year that, since the prisoner

had not asked for clemency from the President, it was not possible for his life sentence to have been commuted to twenty years.

That seemed to be the end of the matter till her husband was released on 24 July.

Subandrio and Omar Dhani to follow?

Justice Department circles in Jakarta are quoted as saying former Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Subandrio, and former Air Force commander, Air Marshal Omar Dhani, both serving life sentences, may soon be released as well. Both had death sentences which were commuted to life following clemency pleas to Suharto.

One prisoner whose name has not been mentioned for release is Colonel Latief, one of the army conspirators involved in the 1 October 1965 kidnap and murder of senior army generals. Latief had for many years been a subordinate of Suharto; during his trial, he said he informed Suharto of the kidnap plans just a few hours earlier. Unlike his co-conspirators, Untung and Supardjo who were sentenced to death and executed many years ago, Latief was given a life sentence. ★

Aid and human rights in Indonesia

Should aid to Indonesia be made conditional on human rights? This issue is argued out each year between NGOs and governments around the time of the annual meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the club of Indonesia's main creditors. Despite signs of a changing attitude in other international fora – such as the EC – IGGI remains resolute. This year, the Group, whose lending is dominated by the World Bank and the Japanese government, promised a record \$4.75 billion – with not a whisper of human rights. Below, we outline the state of the conditionality debate.

Indonesia is popular with its donors. It is a good debtor, obediently keeping up with debt-servicing payments, deregulating the economy in line with World Bank and IMF demands and welcoming the kind of large-scale, capital intensive 'development' projects – dams, roads, power stations – the donor nations (and their engineering and service industries) prefer. Given these favourable circumstances, governments tend to brush off arguments that development aid should be linked to respect for human rights and democratisation.

The British Government, for example, has shied away from discussing human rights conditionality – indeed its much-condemned refusal to impose trade sanctions against the South African government is a measure of its aversion to link human rights and investment, trade or aid, where the partner is what Britain considers a 'friendly country'. The UK prefers instead to have a discreet word with Indonesian officials, when abuses can no longer be ignored. Thus, in reply to a letter from TAPOL which urged the Foreign Secretary to raise the question of East Timor and West Papua at the 1990 IGGI meeting, Foreign Office Minister Tim Sainsbury said: "You will wish to know that our delegate at the IGGI made representations to the Indonesians in the margins of the meeting." [See *TAPOL Bulletin* 100, August 1990]

One of the few attempts by a government minister to make a direct link between aid and human rights came in 1990 when Dutch Overseas Development Co-operation Minister and IGGI Chair, Jan Pronk postponed the signing of a US \$13 million bilateral special assistance agreement in protest over the execution in February 1990 of four long-term political prisoners and the imminent execution of six more. The action, combined with diplomatic pressure from other European governments, halted the executions, but without guarantees that they would not take place at a later date. Minimal though the sanction was, Pronk's commitment to linking aid to human rights was warmly welcomed by NGOs both in Indonesia and abroad. The issue also sparked a row in the Dutch parliament between those who backed Pronk's position, and the Dutch Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek, who is known to favour the conventional approach of 'silent diplomacy'.

Pronk's March 1990 visit to Jakarta as IGGI Chair saw unprecedented meetings with human rights activists, including members of the newly-formed Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights [INFIGHT]. But expectations raised by Pronk that these discussions would continue at the IGGI meeting in June last year came to nothing. Instead it was 'business as usual', with Indonesia getting more aid than ever. The van den Broek approach

gained the upper hand; the Dutch cabinet decided that human rights should fall under the remit of the Foreign Minister, not the ODA.

When Jan Pronk visited Jakarta this year, and was again pressed by students and NGOs to link aid to greater democracy and respect for human rights, there was less faith in his ability to influence the IGGI. Pronk said as much himself when he urged Indonesian activists to direct their protests to the foreign ministers of IGGI nations, since he was 'only the chair'.

Pronk did at least manage to raise the issue of social justice in discussions on the economy with the government in Jakarta. He called for restraint on the expansion of the private sector as it might threaten the environment and cause injustice and exploitation of labour. He wanted to see stronger, independent labour unions, more participation of the people in development and a policy of "economic democracy" to reduce growing inequality between rich and poor. [*Jakarta Post* May 18, 1991]

The Pronk approach has not been adopted by IGGI as a whole. It can be argued that for the time being, the advocates of silent diplomacy have won and attempts to get human rights on the IGGI agenda will fail. Most aid agreements are hammered out before IGGI meetings in bilateral negotiations between Indonesia and individual



The high-profile Ali Alatas is one of the many candidates for the post of the UN Secretary-General.

donors, leaving the June meetings with little more function than a rubber stamp. Logically, it is during these bilateral negotiations, that efforts to raise human rights should be concentrated. But with more flexibility on the issue of linkage emerging in other fora, the double standards of IGGI's position must also be challenged.

Assessments from the UNDP

One of the IGGI donors is the United Nations Development Programme, which in its 1991 *Human Development Report*, argues for a different strategy than that adopted by IGGI. Its main conclusion is that for development, conventional economics isn't enough: "Lack of political commitment, rather than lack of financial resources, is usually the real cause of neglect". It suggests that

external development partners can often raise sensitive political issues, such as those surrounding land reform or military expenditure.. [p.9]

The report states however, that direct linkage of aid to policy reform including social objectives and political freedom "is a controversial matter," and favours directing social priority aid to countries which "support human development, signalling unobtrusively to everyone the conditions for receiving aid." [p.76]

Winds of change in Brussels?

Controversial or not, European foreign ministers decided to raise democratisation and human rights in their meeting with ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] foreign ministers in May. Luxembourg's Jacques Poos warned that the EC was ready to "incorporate respect for human rights and the promotion of democracy" into its links with Asia. Economic means must go hand-in-hand with political democracy and military means should not be used to solve political problems, he said. Democracy and human rights are "not only a question of legitimacy but also the most appropriate means of achieving sound economic development".

But the EC ministers stopped short of directly linking human rights and democracy to aid, stressing instead a "constructive approach", with the emphasis on "encouraging" countries which move towards democracy and carefully avoiding "interference" in third countries. They are committed however, to introduce a tough human rights clause, and reference to environmental protection in the revised cooperation agreement with ASEAN.

Non-ASEAN Burma, however, received different treatment. The EC ministers called on their ASEAN counterparts to join international attempts, using sanctions and embargoes if necessary, to persuade Burma's military rulers to hand over power to elected representatives. [FEER 20/6/91]

Any linkage of human rights to aid – however much it is watered down – is always interpreted as interference and therefore is always unpalatable for ASEAN. "Let me...stress that ASEAN countries accept and recognise fundamental freedoms but with respect to their implementation, we believe national jurisdiction should prevail," said Indonesian Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas. [Indonesian News July 1, 1991]

ASEAN's response may also have been fuelled by the fear that the EC response to Burma might one day be applied to their own governments.

The 'interference argument' is typically accompanied by the accusation that the West is attempting to apply foreign

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values to Asia and by stressing a difference in the interpretation of human rights. Alatas said the Western concept of human rights was too narrow, being limited largely to civil and political rights, whilst ignoring economic and social rights, such as freedom from hunger. ASEAN countries could not be judged by the same standards as the West while they were still overcoming the blight of colonialism, he said.

In other words, the EC ministers' overtures were flatly rejected by their ASEAN counterparts. They also made it clear well in advance that they would not be giving any ground when the matter was raised at the July meeting with EC ministers in Kuala Lumpur, this time stressing that economic and social rights "should override individual rights as perceived in Western eyes."

The EC-ASEAN clash is manifest in the omission of any reference to human rights in the final joint statement issued after the May meeting. The crumbling of the EC ministers' position before ASEAN and the bland statement was condemned by human rights organisations including TAPOL.

TAPOL protests to Portugal

TAPOL and other human rights organisations were particularly critical of Portugal's failure to raise human rights in East Timor at the meeting. In June, TAPOL wrote to Mario Soares, the Portuguese President, condemning the omission of any reference to East Timor in the Declaration. TAPOL wrote:

Portugal always made a point of insisting in every possible forum that due attention be paid to the situation in East Timor. For this reason, we see the Declaration as a setback. With Portugal becoming a member of the Troika which governs EC affairs from 1 July... we do urge you to make sure that East Timor receives due attention on EC councils.

TAPOL also drew the President's attention to the atrocities being perpetrated in Aceh and urged him to ensure that Portuguese representatives raise it at the EC and on occasions when meetings are held with ASEAN representatives.

Overlapping arguments

There is an interesting overlap between the views of Third World governments and those of Southern activists. Writing in *Third World Resurgence*, the journal of the Malaysia-based NGO, Third World Network, Chandra Muzaffar criticises the UNDP's Human Freedom Index on similar grounds. "How can a human freedom index ignore freedoms – such as the freedom from hunger – which are fundamental to the very survival of the human being?" [Third World Resurgence 11].

Muzaffar too, points out the failure to include freedom of peoples and nations "which millions and millions of people in Asia and Africa struggled for during the long decades". If this freedom had been taken into account, he argues, Hong Kong would not have ranked so high on the scale.

Collective freedom should be included because it "has a direct bearing upon the individual citizen's ability to shape the political future of his society."

The denial of the right to collective freedom by one people of another is also discussed, illustrated by the example of Israel and the Palestinians. "It looks as if the UNDP's Human Freedom Index gave maximum weightage to Israel's observance of human rights and political liberties vis-a-vis its own Jewish population and ignored or played down its gross violations of the basic freedoms of the Palestinians, as individuals and as a community".

Smokescreen

If there is overlap in what the NGOs and the governments of the ASEAN region say, there is a world of difference between their motives, however. The NGOs are fighting against human rights abuses and in doing so, expose the role played by Northern governments in perpetuating these abuses. Governments such as the Suharto regime use the same arguments as a smokescreen behind which they continue to deny basic human rights to their own people. Moreover, it is not only the human rights within the Northern definition - the political and civil - that are abused, but also the very rights within the Southern interpretation that Indonesia says must be recognised. Thus Alatas is hoist by his own petard when he says:

the rights of the individual are balanced by the rights of the community, in other words, balanced by the obligation equally to respect the rights of others, the rights of the society and the rights of the nation". [Indonesian News, July 1, 1991]

What about the collective rights of the East Timorese people? How many of their collective rights are recognised? Indonesia has ruthlessly denied the rights of *their* society and the rights of *their* nation, by invading and annexing their country. The famine which followed denied the East Timorese their right to be freed from hunger. West Papuans too, have been denied their right to self-determination, the right to choose their own development and to benefit from their natural resources.

If the collective rights of the East Timorese and West Papuans were calculated into Indonesia's ranking on the Human Freedom Index, like Israel, Indonesia would find itself even further down the scale.

Valid points

The Southern NGOs are right to expose major shortcomings in the North's interpretation of human rights or human freedom, as propounded by the UNDP Index. The arguments used both by NGOs and governments are valid. True, governments such as Indonesia use them for the worst possible reasons - to deflect criticism from the appalling abuse of human rights that goes on in their countries - but this does not mean that in themselves the arguments are invalid. The Human Development Report, of which the Index is an annex, fails to stress the role of Northern governments and their industries in the continuing denial of social and economic freedom in the South by their domination of a world economic system heavily weighted in their favour. The narrow definition of human rights adopted by Northern governments does not include

the sense of responsibility it should. The North's double standards in choosing to impose sanctions against some countries and not others also needs to be exposed. Political and economic self-interest, not humanitarian considerations, dictates the selection of Burma for special punishment for its failure to install the elected government, for example, while Thailand's military coup and the subsequent suppression of community organisations goes unreprimated. These are the same double standards that led to US-led intervention against Iraq, while Indonesia's 15-year long occupation of East Timor is no longer even condemned, let alone acted upon.

In this context, people are quite right in asking: what right have Northern governments to link human rights to aid when the world's economic and political system is skewed in their favour? For if the economic system were more equitably balanced, the South would not need the North's 'aid'.

The answer lies in the fact that Northern economic domination is maintained in part by the co-opting of elites in the South, who stand to gain politically and personally from development aid which flows their way. Therefore, for the opposition in countries with oppressive regimes such as Indonesia, demanding human rights linkage to aid may be one of the most effective means of exposing abuses with a view to influencing government policies. This pragmatic approach is the one adopted by the opposition in Indonesia and this is why TAPOL calls for aid to be made dependent on human rights. ★

From the editors: We would welcome comments from our readers on this important and controversial topic.

The 1991 IGGI meeting

This year's meeting, on June 11 and 13, agreed to provide a record US \$4.75 billion in aid to Indonesia. As usual, the World Bank was the biggest donor, providing just over a third of the amount, with Japan committing 21%. The only difference from recent years was that IGGI declined to provide non-project aid that goes directly to the government to help balance the budget - special assistance. Instead, they supplied US \$1 billion in fast-disbursing aid, [a modified version of special assistance] in view of Indonesia's worsening current account deficit.

Mild criticism came from the World Bank, which called for measures to guard against preferential treatment for large firms, and expressed its disapproval of trade barriers and monopolies - including Tommy Suharto's domestic clove trading monopoly - because they put pressure on the poor and exacerbate regional disparities.

Staged rallies as killings continue

Despite claims by the authorities that the situation in Aceh is now under control and attempts to rally the population in the government's support, reports of human rights violations and armed clashes continue to reach the outside world. More Acehnese refugees continue to flee to Malaysia and documented cases of disappearances have been made public. As the 1992 elections approach, the authorities desperately need to restore some degree of normality in Aceh.

Rudini visits Aceh

A report about mass killings in *NRC Handelsblad*, a *Reuter* report of public executions and a damning report about Aceh in *Los Angeles Times* have focused international attention on the situation in Aceh. The government has had to launch a counter offensive for the benefit of world opinion. The centrepiece of the offensive was a visit to Aceh by Minister of the Interior, ret'd General Rudini in July, with a party of fifteen journalists and many officials. The group visited North Aceh, East Aceh and Aceh Pidie where units of GAM [*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, or Free Aceh Movement] have been most active. Everywhere they went, they attended well-organised rallies attended by thousands of Acehnese armed with bamboo spears and holding aloft pro-government posters and banners swearing to exterminate the rebels. Everywhere, Rudini received reports from local officials, asserting that the situation is now back to normal. Everywhere the emphasis was on how the people are standing shoulder to shoulder with the army to crush the rebels.

Indonesian journalists who joined in Rudini's 'safari' were hardly likely to carry out independent investigations of the true situation. But even so, the reports that have appeared do not hide the crude stage-management of the trip.

In many parts of Aceh, villagers have been required to set up so-called *Unit Ksatria Penegak Pancasila* (Units of Warriors of Pancasila Upholders). The Indonesian army think they can persuade people to believe that these paramilitary units have been set up on the initiative of the people but *Ksatria* is a sanskrit term familiar to the

Javanese and alien to the Acehnese. Every village must supply 10-20 youngsters for rigorous training for eight hours a day. The military commander of Aceh Utara, Lt.Colonel Budi Triarso, proudly boasted to journalists that these Acehnese youngsters had been taught to sing Indonesian nationalistic songs, "to make the Acehnese youth more conscious of their own national heritage".

District commander Colonel Syarwan Hamid told the minister and the journalists that since May, the cooperation between the armed forces and the population resulted in the capture of 300 Aceh rebels. He estimates that only 50 rebels are still fighting in the mountains of Aceh.

The army has also created another paramilitary force, *Rakyat Terlatih* (Trained Peoples' Units) or *Ratih* for short. *Ratih* is part of the "armed forces total defence concept", where people in the villages are actively involved in hunting down rebel forces. No fewer than 60,000 villagers have been recruited for *ratih* training. Both in Aceh and East Timor, where armed insurrection enjoys great support of the villagers, the army has resorted to using the *ratih* concept in an attempt to sever communications between the guerrillas and the people and isolate the rebels.

More tough talk from Pramono

The regional military commander, Major-General Djoko Pramono, last November proclaimed that he had told people: "If you see a GPK, you should kill him. There's no need to investigate. Just shoot him or knife him." [*Tempo*, 17 November 1990]. Now, as Rudini sought to assuage public opinion about conditions in Aceh, Pramono spoke at some length about the operations under way since he became commander in June last year.

They are urban guerrillas; they are everywhere and live together with the people. In the street stalls, in the markets, in the kampungs, that's where you'll find the GPK [GPK = security disruptor gangs, the initials by which the Aceh Freedom Movement is officially known.] At first, it was difficult for us to differentiate between good people and the GPK. The question was how to pluck out the hair without spoiling the flour.

They are people who want a state separate from Indonesia. That involves the national interest, so we gave it all we could. We waged a military operation because they are people with a concept, with weapons and on the field, they have mass support [punya massa]. This means that without a military operation, the thing will never be finished.

Our way of looking at it is the Pancasila way and the 1945 Constitution way. We're not like them [Amnesty




The Bukit Martajam camp in Malaysia, a police lock-up for 140 Acehnese refugees.

International]. In fact, we are behaving very well. If this were not so, I would have murdered the lot of them.

It's perfectly clear that they [the people in custody] are involved but we have our own assessment. Whether the involvement is slight or not slight is up to us to assess. If [after releasing them] we later get proof that they are leaders, then we'll take them into custody again. [Editor, 13 July 1991]

A civilian governor

After months of speculation that the governor of Aceh Ibrahim Hasan, might be replaced when his term expired last month, he was re-appointed. During the Rudini visit, Ibrahim Hasan was much to the fore. The technocrat-governor of Aceh, an ethnic Acehnese, had to campaign hard in 1987 to reverse *GOLKAR*'s poor showing at the general election in 1982 and could only do this with promises of development projects. Many Acehnese have been disappointed and grumble: *GOLKAR* promised us development and instead they sent us guns. Ibrahim Hasan will have a difficult task, winning another *GOLKAR* victory next year. Jakarta had no choice but to reappoint him. Giving him the sack might have been interpreted as blaming him for failure to keep the support of the Acehnese. Ibrahim Hasan's position is not unlike that of Carrascalao's in East Timor, a local man and a technocrat, always in the limelight and often frank about the central government's failings. Yet in fact, he is little more than a figure-head, now that armed insurrection has swept the region.



Ibrahim Hassan,
governor of Aceh.

Counter-insurgency strategy

If official claims are to be believed, it seems that the army's counter-insurgency strategy which is along the lines of its strategy in East Timor, is bearing fruit. After two years of fighting, the army is now claiming that special commandos have captured or killed some high ranking *GAM* fighters. Hamzah and Teungku Abdul Rachman were ambushed in the mountains and killed with their bodyguards. On 13 July Saleh Gedong an important *GAM* commander was killed in a raid. No details were given but reports say he was planning to cross the Malacca Strait for a visit to Malaysia and to report to Hasan di Tiro, leader of the insurrection.

The Acehnese boat people

Since our last issue, more Acehnese refugees have arrived in Malaysia. In July, two more groups of boat people arrived, bringing the total to around three hundred. In the meantime forty Acehnese refugees who arrived in Malaysia

earlier this year are reportedly to go on trial before a court in Taiping, Merak, charged with illegal entry. *TAPOL* wrote to the Malaysian High Commissioner in London to express the fear that if these trials go ahead and they are found guilty, they might face repatriation in defiance of the protection they are entitled to under the UNHCR protocol on Refugees.

About 140 Acehnese refugees are locked up in stuffy, tin-roofed barracks in the police compound in Bukit Mar-tajam on the Malaysian mainland, opposite the island of Penang. The large Acehnese community in Malaysia is providing food and medicines to supplement the meagre rations from the Malaysian government. The situation of the refugees is still precarious as the Malaysian government will not allow the UNHCR to meet them.

Asia Watch report

For the second time in six months, the US-based human rights organisation *Asia Watch* has published a report on Aceh. [*Indonesia: Continuing Human Rights Violations in Aceh*, June 19, 1991.] The report concludes that summary executions, disappearances, torture and arbitrary arrests by the Indonesian army continue. After conducting an on-the-spot investigation, *Asia Watch* has produced invaluable information about the political trials of alleged Acehnese rebels with evidence of the use of torture to extract confessions from prisoners. Defendants had to sign interrogation depositions under duress, detainees were not allowed to see their families and were denied defence counsel of their own choice.

The June report is the first analytical account of the subversion trials in Aceh and Medan. In none of the 17 trials thus far have witnesses for the defence appeared. An appendix gives the names and details of 73 prisoners and detainees suspected of involvement in *GAM*. It includes Acehnese who have already been convicted or who have appeared as witnesses for the prosecution. *Asia Watch* believes that virtually all the prisoners and detainees have been victims of torture, illegal detention or unfair trials.

The *Asia Watch* report also confirms the widespread imposition of curfews and travel restrictions. Despite denials of any curfews by the Indonesian authorities, *Asia Watch* says that people violating curfews run the risk of arrest or even death. The curfews vary, sometimes lasting from 6 pm to 6 am.

Another nasty feature of Indonesia's reign of terror in Aceh is the harsh action against family members of alleged members of *GAM*. The most common form of reprisal is arrest and *Asia Watch* suspects that this may be a major reason why villagers in East Aceh flee to Malaysia by boat.

Disappearances

Disappeared persons in countries like Indonesia often turn out to have been killed by the army. In the last *TAPOL Bulletin*, we reported a massacre on 12 September 1990 when a truckload of 56 detainees from Rancong detention centre were shot with M16s and their bodies dumped in a ravine. In a separate report issued in July, *Asia Watch* revealed that it had obtained information from Aceh that eight detainees from Lhoknga prison disappeared after being taken from the prison by security officers. The first three, Yusri, Jafar and M. Yusuf were taken on 3 February while the other five, Mahdi Yusuf, Amiruddin, Abdullah Ibrahim, Idris Ishaq and Ibrahim Hasan were taken from their cells on 4 March 1991. They have not been seen since.

Another detainee, Syukri, was reportedly taken from his cell in the military detention centre in Lamlo, Pidie together with seven others and executed early in 1991. Fellow prisoners report that the eight bodies were buried in a mass grave on the grounds of the military barracks in Lamlo.

Hundreds of Acehnese have been taken from their houses but only a few dozen are accounted for and have been put on trial. Some are still in prison for further interrogation while others have disappeared.

Asia Watch issued an urgent action on behalf of the nine disappeared people and called on the Indonesian government to account for the date and whereabouts of the nine men reported missing. The organisation also called for an investigation into allegations of torture in Acehnese prisons and detention centres, and urged the Indonesian government to prosecute military or police personnel believed to be responsible for such torture.

Ongoing trials

Since June (see *TAPOL Bulletin* no. 105, June 1991) several more harsh sentences have been passed. There have been five more sentences, bringing the total of verdicts to 21.



The defendant Muhammad Thaib being taken into the Lhokseumawe District Court. He received a sentence of 20 years.

Three more defendants were tried at the District Court of Lhokseumawe, allegedly involved in terrorist activities.

Umaryah bin Hamzah, a civil servant, 35 years, received a sentence of 20 years on 19 June. The prosecution had demanded a life sentence. He was allegedly involved in the attack and burning of a truck on 20 April 1990.

Muhammad Nazar bin Abdullah, a worker at PT KKA, 28 years, was accused of stealing 3 kg of explosives from PT Kertas Kraft Aceh (paper and pulp company), to be used for attacks on police stations and the Arun gas installation.

The prosecution demanded 20 years imprisonment and on 29 June, he was sentenced to 14 years.

Ibrahim Muhammad Jalil alias Ibrahim Gayo, a truck-driver, 36 years, was accused of making an attack on an army sentry at PT KKA when arms were taken. He was sentenced to 16 years.

The following cases were tried at the Medan District Court:

Abdul Jalil bin Muda Sali, an itinerant photographer, 36 years, was accused of functioning as a liaison officer for GAM between Aceh and Malaysia, attending illegal

ACEH

meetings and circulating subversive material. The prosecution demanded 15 years, and on 6 July he got 10 years.

Surya bin Umar, a food vendor, 30 years, was allegedly involved in smuggling weapons from Thailand into Aceh. On 26 June the judges passed a verdict of 8 years after the prosecution demanded a sentence of 12 years.

Lawyers in Indonesia agree that the trials in Aceh are a travesty of justice. *LBH*, the Legal Aid Institute has not been allowed to assist the defendants. The *LBH* director in Medan called the trials a "drama where everyone is told what part to play" [*FEER* 25 July 1991]. *FEER* correspondent Adam Schwarz wrote:

One lawyer in Banda Aceh, who helped defend three GPK-Aceh suspects, said the defendants told him they were forced to confess under torture. They did not speak up in court, he said, "because they had been told that if they made trouble they would be sent back to military facilities for further questioning. They knew this meant more torture. [FEER, 25 July 1991]

Eight of the Banda Aceh verdicts went to the High Court for appeal. Four sentences were increased, three were cut while one remained unchanged.

The sentence of **Hasbi Abdullah** (brother of GAM leader, Dr Zaini Abdullah, in exile in Sweden) was increased from 14 to 17 years, **Mulkan Usman's** sentence went up from 12 to 15 years and **Nurdin Abdurrachman's** from 9 to 13 years. The latter two were involved in GAM activities in the 1970s and had previously been arrested. **Adnan Beuransyah's** sentence went up from 8 to 9 years. During his trial, Beuransyah responded to the summing up of the prosecution with a graphic account of the torture he experienced. His account is reproduced at length in the June 1991 *Asia Watch* report.

Amir Syam's sentence went down from 6 to 5 years. The sentences of **Azhar Rafsah** and **Marwan Yunus** were reduced from 8 to 6 years. The 5-year sentence of the ninth political prisoner, **Teuku Effendi**, was upheld. ★

LBH condemns abuses in Aceh

The Jakarta-based Legal Aid Institute (LBH) has issued a report strongly critical of the human rights situation in Aceh. It gives details of the torture inflicted on **Adnan Beuransyah**, before his trial.

The LBH accuses the authorities not only of torturing detainees but of obstructing their right to legal assistance; often there was no lawyer even for those charged with offences carrying a maximum penalty of death. The Aceh Merdeka trials were not open "and security was very tight, with helicopters hovering of the courtrooms", the report said.

LBH described the situation in Aceh as "a setback for human rights in Indonesia.... An LBH client who requested legal assistance in February this year disappeared after the military had picked him up and taken him round the village, showing him badly injured and his face covered with scratches.... Nobody knows whether he is alive or dead." [*Reuter*, 24 July 1991]

Muzzling the press

Moves to challenge the powers of the Information Minister to revoke press licences, thus increasing the scope for press freedom have ended in failure, after the Minister claimed that any change in the present regulations would "lead to anarchy".

A newspaper publisher in Indonesia requires a publishing licence, known as a *SIUPP*, which is issued by the Information Ministry. Although the Basic Press Law of 1982 stipulates that "the national press shall not be subjected to bans or muzzling", Information Minister Harmoko – himself a former journalist and newspaper proprietor – issued a ministerial ruling in 1984, based on the Basic Press Law, giving himself powers to revoke a licence if, "after hearing the views of the Press Council, he considers that the publisher of the publication in question no longer behaves in a way that befits a healthy press, a press that is free and responsible". Everything of course hangs on the meaning of 'responsible' and the fact that the interpretation is left entirely to the executive branch.

oom pasikom



.. Oh of course! You can criticise.... as long as it's responsible, positive and constructive, gives an alternative, as long as it's polite, considerate of others and sensitive, as long as you know your place and don't go against Pancasila, as long as it's not tendentious, it doesn't incite, it doesn't disunite, it's not offensive, it doesn't.... [Kompas, 5 June 1991]

The Press Council is appointed by the government with the Information Minister in the chair and a senior official of the Information Ministry as secretary-general. No wonder then that few people regard it as a platform for an independent review in cases where the government decides to act against a newspaper by withdrawing its licence.

Last September, the Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, Sudomo, stirred some hopes by expressing support for an end to the 'telephone culture' (editors being told informally, by phone, that this or that topic should not be reported), proposing that the Executive's powers to revoke *SIUPP* should be 'reconsidered', and saying it was futile to limit or prohibit the activities of foreign journalists. But any hopes that things might change were dashed when Harmoko upheld his special *SIUPP* powers; a boulevard periodical, *Monitor*, has since lost its *SIUPP*, the 'telephone culture' continues undiminished and a foreign journalist has been blacklisted and several foreign newspapers banned from circulating in Indonesia because of an article analysing the business activities of the Suharto family.

Reporting restrictions on Aceh events

At present, the most sensitive issue for the Suharto regime is the situation in Aceh where the armed forces are perpetrating massacres to stamp out opposition to rule from Jakarta, in support of the Aceh Freedom Movement. Reports on these events in the national press clearly reflect the official handouts. A *Reuter* story quoting an eye-witness who knew of five public executions in Sigli was rather crudely denied a few weeks later by *Tempo* [25 May] in a report that bore all the hallmarks of an official rebuttal.

In its recent report on Aceh, *Asia Watch* draws attention to the restrictions imposed on the local press in North Sumatra. It quotes a Medan editor as saying: "I'm not an editor any more. I'm a tailor (*tukang jahit*); I have to take the information and sew it into something new." A reporter who investigated reports of killings in Peureulak in May this year produced a detailed report containing several specific incidents of army abuses, despite military attempts to intimidate him. However, the printed version bore no relation to the original; all accounts of abuses had been removed "in what appears to have been self-censorship by the editor". [*Asia Watch*, 'Indonesia: Continuing Human Rights Violations in Aceh', June 1991, p. 15]

Asia Watch also believes that the sudden closure of two newspapers, *Aceh Post* and *Peristiwa* on the grounds of 'efficiency' may in fact have been related to the army's attempt to control press freedom in Aceh.

The editor of the Medan-based *Waspada*, Ani Idrus told parliamentarians that "military restrictions prevented her from reporting accurately on clashes between the military and separatist rebels in Aceh". [*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 27 June 1991]

Collusion

The latest *SIUPP* controversy began when several deputy chairmen of Parliament (DPR) publicly questioned the legality of the Minister's 1984 ruling, arguing that it contradicts the 1982 Basic Law which must take precedence over a ministerial decree. The string of statements attacking the press licensing system appears to have been part of an attempt by parliamentarians of all three parties, to show some muscle, reversing the impression that they are nothing more than a rubber-stamp for the government. The move followed complaints by some MPs that the press devoted little space to events at the DPR as compared to coverage of the government's activities.

Calls for an end to *SIUPP* began to reverberate in the media and the DPR's Commission I invited the editors of 23 leading national and regional newspapers to furnish it with arguments to place before the Information Minister.

Most of the editors, as it turns out, were not against the licensing system as such but only unhappy about the way a licence could be revoked. They argued that publishers should have the right to defend themselves against charges

of misconduct, either before the Press Council or by being formally charged in a court of law, rather than leaving the matter to the arbitrary decision of the Minister. They wanted the criteria for licence revocation to be spelt out. But no-one questioned the legal requirement that newspapers must behave 'responsibly'.

In fact, established newspaper proprietors have an interest in preserving the SIUPP system which they see as a form of protection against wealthy businessmen planning to set up new newspapers. Goenawan Mohamad, editor of the weekly, *Tempo*, argues that the SIUPP system was born just as much from a desire of publishers wanting competition to be regulated. "The SIUPP is therefore the product of a collusion of government and publishers' interests - to be blunt, of the owners of capital - who wanted some kind of protection." [*Tempo*, 22 June 1991]

Harmoko in confident mood

Information Minister Harmoko is one of the more determined and self-assured members of Suharto's cabinet, never flinching before a barrage of criticism, wherever it comes from. The bumptious confidence he always exudes only confirms the impression that he, perhaps more than most other ministers, enjoys Suharto's full backing and admiration. He also obviously enjoys the power he now exerts over people who, until his elevation to ministerial rank, were his professional workmates. He insists on upholding Suharto's dictum that the New Order is based on respect for the law even when he issues a ministerial ruling which clearly contravenes the law on which it is based. In large part, his confidence is based on the conviction that Suharto has no intention of relinquishing the government's power to revoke press licences, as the *FEER* puts it, "at least until after the presidential election in 1993".

But Harmoko has another card up his sleeve for on closer examination, the Basic Press Law is not so protective of press freedom as many commentators like to make out. As he has repeatedly reminded people throughout this controversy, the law stipulates in Article 19 that:

Press publications must be safeguarded against every possibility of being utilised by anyone for purposes that jeopardise state security, public order or national interests, or are harmful to society or disrupt the growth and development of a free and responsible national press, for instance, by disseminating the teachings of Communism/Marxism/Leninism, or with writings that harm the nation's morals, harm national integrity or incite discord between different ethnic groups, religions, races or groups.

Those who argue against the SIUPP system have a very flimsy case. No-one challenges this fundamental principle contained in the Press Law. Confronted by the iron logic of New Order political control, it is not surprising that the case against SIUPP finally collapsed. The DPR Commission's meeting with Harmoko which had been billed as the occasion for parliamentarians, backed by demands from the editors, to press for change in the system of press control, ended in an agreement that SIUPP "is still relevant in order to guide a healthy, free and responsible press". Any new ideas about SIUPP should be channelled to the Press Council where they will be considered and passed on to the Information Minister (its chairman!) for his consideration. Harmoko said that his powers to revoke licences are for the purpose of guiding the press, not banning newspapers. The press has nothing to fear. As long as they abide by the

CENSORSHIP

regulations and refrain from engaging in liberal practices, no-one will lose their licences under what he always refers to as "this beautiful regulation". [*Suara Karya*, 26 June 1991]

The *Jakarta Post* could not conceal its dismay at this anti-climax. Had the MPs forgotten to get the editors' message across? Not a word about editors having the right to defend themselves or about who should have the final say over the charge of violating the Press Law. Basically, said the paper, it is the government that has nothing to fear. There are strict security measures in place, preventing left-wing penetration of the press as anyone wanting to work for a newspaper "is asked about their family background, at least up to their grandparents". Then the editorial said:

Our editors are so careful now that they do not even have enough courage to print any stories about not-so-sensitive issues, let alone anything involving anti-Pancasila ideology which would mean a pointless and stupid suicide. [*Jakarta Post*, 27 June]

US student refused entry


A doctoral student at the University of Wisconsin who has spent years researching Indonesian social issues was refused entry when she arrived in Jakarta in July for a visit.

Kay Mohlman has visited Indonesia several times; in 1979-1980 she taught English at Andalas University, Padang and studied Indonesian in Malang. In 1987, she applied for permission for research on squatter settlements, a project endorsed by Satya Wacana University, Salatiga but the Institute of Sciences, LIPI turned it down. A year later, another research project was turned down.

Frustrated, she decided to do research work in the Philippines instead. She arrived in Jakarta from Manila to join her boyfriend on vacation in Bali. An immigration official claimed that she had applied for a visa at the Indonesian Embassy in Washington but had been refused. An Indonesian friend denied this and said she was on a private visit to Indonesia to be with her fiancé. [*Tempo*, 13 July 1991]

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New BAe Hawks accord with Indonesia

On 20 June, British Aerospace announced an agreement with Indonesia's aerospace industry, IPTN, for the joint production of Hawk fighter aircraft in Indonesia. In London for the deal, Dr. B.J. Habibie, chief executive of IPTN, said that Indonesia needs 69 Hawk aircraft which could cost a total of £2 billion. Prime Minister John Major received Habibie on the day before the agreement was signed.

CAAT and TAPOL oppose the deal

On 21 June, TAPOL together with the Campaign Against Arms Trade issued a press release announcing that they had written to Prime Minister John Major to protest against the agreement announced between British Aerospace and IPTN, for the co-production of Hawk jet trainer and light attack fighter aircraft.

The deal was announced during a visit to London by Indonesia's Minister for Research and Technology, Dr B.J. Habibie, who is also President Director of IPTN and head of all the other Indonesian state companies manufacturing armaments and naval vessels. Besides being received by John Major, Habibie held meetings with Government ministers, including Alan Clarke, Minister for Defence Procurement.

This is the latest in a long series of contracts between IPTN and British Aerospace involving the export of Hawk aircraft, Rapier missiles, the transfer of technology and the construction of a technology college for members of the Indonesian armed forces.

In their letter to John Major, CAAT and TAPOL protested that this deal would promote IPTN as the base for the manufacture of military aircraft for use not only in Indonesia but throughout Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

At a time when there is growing pressure worldwide to cut back arms production and exports and to reduce expenditure on military equipment, a principle which your own Government says it subscribes to, such a deal is totally unacceptable.

Moreover, as your Government is well aware, Indonesia is engaged in a war of aggression in East Timor in violation of UN Security Council Resolutions 384 and 389 which were supported by Britain. The Indonesian armed forces are also at this very moment perpetrating large-scale atrocities against the people of Aceh in North Sumatra. There can be no justification for the British Government to reinforce Indonesia's fighting capability when it is behaving in such an aggressive and repressive fashion.

The two organisations called upon the Government to reconsider any decision already taken and not to allow this agreement to go ahead.

CAAT also issued its own press release in which CAAT coordinator, Ann Feltham was quoted as saying: "In 1989 British Aerospace wanted to export the Hawk fighter to Iraq. After protests from CAAT and the Kurdish community, the Government finally decided not to allow the sale. BAe appears not to have learnt from this. They now want to sell to another dictator, General Suharto, whose armed forces have also invaded a neighbouring

territory, East Timor, and continue to occupy it in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions."


CAAT also said that despite the invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the appalling human rights record of the Suharto regime, the United Kingdom is a major supplier of weaponry to Indonesia. As well as previous Hawk deals in the late 1970s and the early 1980s, other sales have included frigates from Vosper Thornycroft, surface-to-air missiles from BAe and surveillance radar from Plessey. ✱

French and US deals to militarise CN-235 aircraft

Habibie has also struck major deals regarding equipment to convert the CN-235 aircraft, a civilian plane currently manufactured by IPTN under licence with the Spanish company, CASA, for military use. A deal concluded with Messier-Bugatti during the Paris Air Fair in May involves co-production of landing-gear to progress to the production of a military-type CN-235.

A deal with the US company, McDonnell-Douglas will facilitate the production by the IPTN of harpoon missiles, jointly researched by the two companies, to convert the CN-235 aircraft for use as maritime patrol aircraft. Habibie has also concluded a deal with the Allison General Motors Corporation gas-turbine division to enable IPTN to use the CMA-2100 engine on the N-250, enabling it to take off from a short runway. In exchange for a licence to use the CMA-2100 engine, IPTN will become a maintenance centre for the engine. [Indonesian News, 15 July 1991]

All-in-all, Habibie's trip to Western Europe this year has marked a significant advance for IPTN in the form of the transfer of technology, reinforcing the Indonesian company's role as a producer of military aircraft. ✱



Problems for refugees unresolved

Thousands of West Papuan refugees have been living at a camp in East Awin, Papua New Guinea for years with no prospect of a status that would give them freedom of movement or asylum in a third country. TAPOL has recently received several documents from the refugees which highlight the difficulties under which they now live.

Message for MPs whose camp visit never took place

A plan by the refugees to present a statement to Australian MPs who were in PNG earlier this year was thwarted by the PNG government's refusal to allow the MPs to visit the camp. A large group of MPs from the Australian Parliament's Defence, and Foreign Affairs and Trade Commissions were in PNG in February this year.

The statement which was signed by camp leaders Ignatius Ariak, Karel Waromi and Michael Kareth first recalled the history of betrayal which led to West Papua's colonisation by Indonesia. It drew attention to the atrocities that have been inflicted on the people under Indonesian rule. It urged the Australian government and parliament:

1. to bring the issue of West Papua to the attention of the UN Secretary General,
2. to call on the PNG government whose country now has to look after West Papuan refugees, to place the issue of West Papua on the agenda of the South Pacific Forum,
3. to call on the Dutch government to stand by its 1961 commitment to prepare an independent West Papuan state,
4. to call the UN to task for its failure (to reject) the 1969 Act of Free Choice, and
5. to intercede in setting up talks between Indonesia and the OPM (Free Papua Organisation).

Conflict with local landowners

A letter from refugees in Iowara camp (East Awin Camp is divided into a number of camps) draws attention to the repercussions of the PNG government's failure to compensate the landowners whose land has been taken over to accommodate the East Awin Camp. The letter says that on 10 June this year, the main road connecting Iowara camp with the Fly River at Rimsite was blocked by the Baad people who live between Lake Murray, Iowara and Nomet. Large trees were used to prevent trucks going along the road and people were camped along the road to prevent anyone going by foot. A similar road block was set up in March 1990 by the Dridamasuk people of the Awin tribe. In both instances the protest was directed at the PNG government for its failure to compensate the local people.

"We fully respect their demands but we and the camp officials are affected because it is impossible to travel to Kiunga or Iowara."

The letter reports that Khonoi Ikorere, head of the Border Affairs Commission, told the refugees on 21 June that according to the UNHCR, the refugees should now become self-supporting and not receive any more help, with the result that supplies of food and medicines are to be cut. The refugees will also have to pay for truck transport to bring in supplies. A Dutch agency, ZOA, which has been

supporting the refugees for some time will soon withdraw.

"Although we understand this decision, it is difficult to accept under the present difficulties. The distance from Iowara to Kiunga is 60 kms, 45 kms over land and 15 kms on water. There are no sago stands which also means no roofing material. Moreover, the soil consists of clay and is difficult to cultivate. The rivers have no water source so we will always have problems with water. The land for which no compensation has been paid is the main reason for our declining chance to become self-sustaining."

The letter concludes by saying that however much they may suffer, they will not return to Indonesia.

Youth Association letter

The West Papuan Youth Solidarity Association, based in the Blackwater Camp of East Awin, has also written to TAPOL drawing our attention to the poor conditions at the camp. It points out that there is pressure on the refugees to agree to return to Indonesia. "The PNG government lays greater emphasis on maintaining its relationship with Indonesia than on solving the refugee problem."

Submission to the UN


Refugees in East Awin have made a submission on their difficulties to the UN Human Rights Centre in Geneva. In a letter acknowledging the submission, Jakob Th. Muller, chief of the communications section, said the communication will be "confidentially submitted to the (UN) Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities". This means that the submission will be discussed at the Sub-Commission's August 1991 session in Geneva under Resolution 1503, a procedure which does not allow the discussions or the conclusions to be made public.


TAPOL has not yet received a copy of the submission.

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**The Indonesian Killings
1965-1966: Studies from
Java and Bali**

edited by Robert Cribb
Centre of Southeast
Asian Studies, Monash
University, Victoria,
Australia.
US \$ 13.25

This is a book that could and should have been published years ago, a criticism intended for all of us, academics and activists alike. Incredible as it may seem, it has taken a quarter of a century for a book to appear that attempts to analyse the nationwide massacres which accompanied Suharto's rise to power and to publish for the first time several important descriptive documents. Cribb rightly calls it a first attempt at mapping the significance of the killings for Indonesian history, rather than a final statement.

It is true that in other countries – Germany and Cambodia are the most obvious examples – events of this magnitude, as he says, have provoked deep introspection, but the comparison is not really applicable, for in Indonesia the criminals are still in power. Indeed, from time to time they publicly brag about their feats against defenceless victims. Take for instance Yasir Hadibroto, the self-proclaimed murderer of Aidit who later became the governor of Lampung, or the Acehnese parliamentarian who last year offered his services to the army to help exterminate 'GPK' rebels, boasting of how he had actively helped rid the region of communists in 1965.

The shortage of information, which Cribb discusses in his introduction, is the crux of the problem. The prime sources are those who witnessed the events, often intended victims who managed to survive. But deep fear has prevented them from speaking out and those who did put pen to paper have insisted on anonymity. One chapter of this book consists of accounts like this, supplied to TAPOL many years ago by a group of Indonesians then living in Germany. Others have become available recently as PKI members in Indonesia have started encouraging as many people as possible to write down everything they know. These are the people who might well be able to direct investigators to mass graves though, it must be said, such investigations could only be carried out in secret.

Two of the accounts published were the result of a research project about village education when the researchers discovered inadvertently how conflict between left and right among teachers in 1965 had led to a blood-bath in the village. The victims were arrested in October 1965, on the basis of membership lists of the PKI-dominated teachers' union used by the PKI's most militant adversary, himself a teacher.

As the days went by and the makeshift prison was filled, news began to get through of widespread killings in other parts of the residency.... So on about 20 October, the first group of those condemned were taken by the soldiers to a nearby field to be killed. A sizable number of villagers went along to watch..... By the time the killing was over, some 120 to 130 had been killed. This included seven lurahs, eighty SD [primary school] teachers and sundry pamong [local government officials].

The Purwodadi affair

In 1965 and 1966, the Indonesian press recorded virtually nothing of the killings that were sweeping the countryside. Strangely, Cribb explains this in terms of the stifling of investigative journalism before October 1965 when twenty-one papers were banned but fails to mention the closedown of all leftwing and pro-Sukarno newspapers on Suharto's orders by early on 2 October. From then on, the press became the platform for malicious anti-communist propaganda, not a word of which could be challenged. The role of the press in instigating and encouraging the slaughter cannot be underestimated.

It was not until early 1969 that the silence about the killings was shattered by a report in *Harian Kami*, quoting human rights activist H.J.C. Princen, just back from a trip to Central Java with two Dutch journalists, that two to three thousand people had been killed by troops in the Purwodadi area since November 1968. The army leadership tried to squash the story by calling Princen a communist. When the military commander of Central Java issued an open invitation to journalists to "see things for themselves", several took up the challenge, only to discover that they would have a guided tour under army escort.

Two lengthy reports are reproduced, one by Maskun Iskandar of *Indonesia Raya*, published in seven instalments under the title, "Report from Purwodadi, Area of Death", the other by Yopie Lasut of *Sinar Harapan*, of which five instalments appeared. The remaining instalments never appeared. Instead there was a brief announcement saying:

The government has concluded that Princen's information concerning mass killings in Purwodadi is connected with PKI remnants who wish to discredit the government. And if there were killings, then they were the result of military actions taken under martial law.

Although under escort, Iskandar heard a great deal but could not check anything. He was told by an official source that 300 prisoners had been killed in desa Simo, 250 in Cerewek, 200 in Kalisari, 100 in Kuwu, 200 in Tanjungsari. The following passage conveys his frustration at not being able to discover the truth:

Was it true that there was a grave behind Cerewek railway station which had recently been planted with banana trees?... Someone had told me there were graves along the river in Tanjungsari but our escort did not let us see any of these things. I got tired of writing down the names of villages where there were supposed to have been executions and burials....

There was an official who told me that the arrests had gone on for a month from 27 July [1968]. When the prisoners had been collected, they took seventy-five away each night, in two lots. Later this became less and they only took away seventy-five prisoners every Saturday night.

Lasut visited the area, along with another journalist, without informing the military but encountered the same difficulties in getting at the truth. They were aware all the time that local army officers quickly learnt of their presence in a village. What they did discover was that a civil guard named Mami, who had been the original source of Princen's disclosure had been kidnapped and had since disappeared. He quoted Catholic and Muslim leaders in the area who were willing to point the location of the graves to an investigating team.

For three weeks in March 1969, the Jakarta press displayed an insatiable interest in the Purwodadi Affair but this was snuffed out and silence about the killings has prevailed ever since.

The reproduction of the two Purwodadi articles is the most important contribution in the book to an understanding of how the army has successfully prevented any investigation of the mass crimes committed in Indonesia since 1965. Michael van Langenberg analyses the close link between the killings and Suharto's dramatic seizure of power. Kenneth Young gives a penetrating analysis of the role of local political conflicts prior to October 1965 in

helping to ignite the killings. There are several studies by the Gajah Mada Centre of Village Studies which investigated the mounting political antagonism sparked by PKI pressure to implement the 1960 agrarian reform law in places which later became arenas for some of the worst mass killings. But the studies stop short of investigating what happened to the PKI activists once the killings began.

The most glaring omission in the Cribb collection is that there is nothing more than a passing reference to the role of the US in aiding and abetting the massacres, documented in the cable traffic between the US embassy in Jakarta and the State Department. But, as Cribb says, this is only a first attempt, not the final statement. The book is essential reading for a deeper understanding of the crimes for which Suharto and his cohorts have yet to be forced to account. World leaders like Helmut Kohl, the latest to welcome Suharto, should be reminded in no uncertain terms that they are embracing a murderer and there is plenty in this volume to provide the ammunition for such a charge. ★



During Suharto's five-day state visit to Germany at the beginning of July, many hundreds of people took part in protest demonstrations in Bonn and Berlin, including Moluccans, West Papuans, Indonesians and Germans. Many issues were raised. There were calls for an end to economic aid to Indonesia, for the right of self-determination for people who have been colonised by Indonesia, against the plunder of the rain-forests, and for Suharto to be called to account for the one million who died in 1965/66. During their meetings with him, the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, and President Richard von Weizsäcker raised the question of human rights violations with Suharto.

Travel ban on Petition-of-50 still stands

Endless discussion about the travel ban on members of the Petition-of-50 group has not resulted in the ban being lifted but it has focused attention on a document that was highly critical of President Suharto.

The Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, Sudomo, has told members of the Petition-of-50 group that the government will not lift the travel ban preventing them from going abroad unless they make a formal, written apology to President Suharto. Sudomo told them their 1980 Petition was an 'insult' to the President. He has not explained why the government has refrained from charging them in court; many cases have been brought against a variety of people during the 1980s for 'insulting' the President. In response to suggestions that the government lay formal charges against members of the Petition-of-50 group, Sudomo has said it was up to them to go to court if they want to challenge the legitimacy of the travel ban.


The six-point Petition-of-50 drawn up on 5 May 1980 and presented soon afterwards to Parliament, was strongly critical of two speeches delivered earlier that year by President Suharto. Among the many criticisms, it argued that Suharto apparently regarded himself as the personification of the Pancasila because any remarks that were critical of him were branded as being anti-Pancasila. The group includes several former ministers, politicians and members of the armed forces. The most prominent of its members is Lieutenant-General (retired) Ali Sadikin, formerly governor of Jakarta.

Since the Petition was signed, the signatories have been denied bank credit and other business facilities; have been excluded from certain social events and until recently, could not be quoted in the media.

Condemned to civil death

In the past few months however, far from lacking publicity, everything involving the group has become a media event. They had a much publicised meeting with Sudomo, attended also by domestic and foreign journalists, but Sudomo was unmoved by their demand for an end to what they term their condemnation to civil death. Sudomo said nothing could change until they apologised to the president and invited them to take their complaints to Parliament. This led to much publicised preparations for the meeting with MPs. Before the MPs met the petitioners, however, they trooped along to see Sudomo and were told in no uncertain terms that nothing could change the government's insistence on an apology before the travel ban could be lifted.

In such circumstances, the meeting between Ali Sadikin and other petitioners with Parliament was not likely to change the travel ban. Yet there was some frank talking by certain MPs about the state of the nation. During the discussion, which took place in the presence of many reporters and observers, a woman MP of the armed forces group, Police Colonel Rukmini, said that like the Petition group, Parliament has been analysing whether the political and economic systems were in accordance with the constitution. The House Commission of which she is a member had discussed why reforms proposed by the House in the past often ended in failure". [Jakarta Post, 5/7/1991]



Lieutenant-General Ali Sadikin, a prominent figure in the Petition-of-50 group.

The next step appears to be an attempt, mediated by the chair of Parliament, Kharis Suhud, to arrange a meeting between the petitioners and Suharto himself. There is little likelihood that such a meeting will take place, given their refusal to apologise. Yet talk of such a meeting keeps the issue in the public eye.

This long-running saga which seems to be leading nowhere may have a deeper political significance. With the question of the presidential succession so much on everybody's minds, there are people in the armed forces who want to focus attention on a document that is highly critical of Suharto, while members of the P-50-group clearly enjoy being part of the game. ★

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