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The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 103

February 1991

More setbacks for openness

Suharto's statement in his August 1990 address about human rights and the need for more openness has led nowhere. In the last quarter of 1990, things moved decisively in the opposite direction. The London Economist [15 December 1990], stung by its own dose of censorship, wrote grimly, under the heading, "The door slams": "The on-again, off-again liberalisation that Indonesia has been pursuing since the spring now seems decidedly off."

There has been a new wave of book and poetry bans and ominous warnings to publishing houses. Ironically, it has been left to Admiral Sudomo, who was for years commander of the army's infamous security command, to mollify troubled cultural workers and the media with empty promises.

The Kecoa tragedy

The tragedy that has befallen a comic opera has brought to a climax the censorship problem in Indonesia. *Opera Kecoa* (Cockroach Opera) portrays life among the poor of Jakarta, the prostitutes, street vendors and transvestites who are familiar to any visitor to the city, the butt of contempt and discrimination from the police and the municipal authorities who want to turn the city into a respectable metropolis. It tells the story of a transvestite victimised by injustice.

Kecoa is a production of *Teater Koma* whose play, *Suksesi*, was banned by the Jakarta police in October. Although the unspoken reason for *Suksesi*'s sad end was obvious, dealing as it does with a conflict involving the greedy and ambitious daughter of a king (no prizes for guessing who felt offended), the blow directed at *Kecoa* has more general implications for artistic freedom. As a sign of how things have deteriorated, *Kecoa* had three successful runs in the 1980s without any problems.

When it was about to start a run in November, producer N. Riantiarno was told hours before the first performance that the Jakarta police had refused a licence. A so-called *izin keramaian* – a permit for public events which attract crowds – is required for theatrical performances. Jakarta police chief, Major-General M.H. Ritonga said permission had been refused because the play was "not educational". "It highlights pornography, transvestites, prostitutes. What for?" he asked. [*Kompas*, 30 November 1990]

Coming so soon after the *Suksesi* closure, the Koma troupe was shattered and demoralised. Whereas Riantiarno had responded to the earlier clampdown by saying he would go on writing, come what may, his response to the *Kecoa*

tragedy was to say he would write nothing more for the time being and close down the theatre for two years.

The Kecoa affair, on top of the police order to the poet, Rendra, to exclude two poems from a poetry reading, provoked angry responses from many artists and writers. A large delegation of artists made a highly publicised visit to Parliament where MPs joined in criticising the police, only proving how powerless they are.

Protest against Gulf War

see back page


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Sudomo to the rescue

They next visited (retired) Admiral Sudomo, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, the one man in government who, since the August speech by Suharto, has spoken out in favour of less press censorship. For all his fine words however, Sudomo could not stop Information Minister Harmoko from cancelling *Monitor's* licence to publish or from halting the circulation of the *International Herald Tribune* and the Australian *Financial Review* for publishing an article that told a few home truths about the president's family. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 102]

Sudomo sympathised with his aggrieved guests; Rendra, he said, could recite the offending poems – which he did, there and then – and Koma Theatre could put on *Kecoa* (though nothing has happened since to suggest that this is so). Then the discussion turned to more serious matters:



how to devise a system of assessment and permit-granting, a code of ethics for the performing arts. Why not, said some of those present, have a 'SIUPP' (the licence required by all newspapers) for the performing arts to protect artists and groups against arbitrary police action, just as newspapers feel protected (!) when they get their licence to publish? In an unpredictable climate, artists would enjoy more certainty than hitherto, they argued.

Sudomo was ready with a blueprint: theatrical shows will be assessed in advance by the department of education and culture, assisted by the local arts council; once an event gets the go-ahead, a police permit will be issued. [*Tempo*, 22 December 1990] Whether or not Sudomo is in a position to bring this system into being, it can only mark a setback for the arts in Indonesia.

Japan visit cancelled

But the *Kecoa* affair has had further repercussions because Koma had a long-standing invitation to send the show to Japan at the invitation of the ASEAN Cultural Centre of the Japanese Foundation. Final preparations were under way to perform in Tokyo, Fukuoka, Osaka and Maebashi from 22 February to 7 March 1991 but the Foundation was awaiting approval from the State Secretariat in Jakarta. When the deadline arrived, the Foundation announced that the trip could not proceed as time for final preparations had run out.

Reeling from this new blow, Riantiarno rushed to Sudomo who again made reassuring noises. "Go to Japan," he told him. The State Secretariat was not responsible for issuing permits for overseas visits, he said. Responsibility lies with the Department of Education and Culture (which has been strenuously denied) and the Foreign Ministry. The State Secretariat, he told Riantiarno, had only become involved because the Japanese Foundation, through the Japanese embassy, had asked the Indonesian government to fund the trip and deduct the costs from Japan's economic aid packet for 1991.

The response from the Japanese Foundation was one of astonishment. "There is no truth whatever in that," said its Jakarta representative. The deputy Japanese ambassador met Sudomo to insist that no such request had ever been made. A denial also came from the ASEAN Cultural Centre's office in Japan. Anyone invited to Japan always has all the expenses covered by us, they insisted.

"I'm totally confused. Who do I turn to now?" said Riantiarno. The answer may not be pleasant for him to hear, wrote *Tempo* [5 January 1991]. The fact is that *Kecoa* cannot go to Japan. "Having been banned at home, how could it possibly be allowed to go abroad?"

The ugliest side of this tragedy is that it has left the arts world in a state of confusion. Sudomo has kept mum since his absurd claim about funding proved to be pure fabrication. The State Secretariat has kept mum throughout. Koma has closed down in despair. And freedom of expression in Indonesia is worth nothing, as the following developments prove. Indeed there has been a crescendo of bans on books and reminders about the regulations for publishing houses.

Recent bans

* The West Java government has banned a poem it says is 'unethical'. The social and political directorate of the provincial government excluded the poem, *Berdarah* (Bleeding) by Sutardji Calzoum Bachry from a list of poems to be read in a recitation contest in Bandung. Contest committee chairman Danny said the authorities found part of the poem 'unethical'. [*Jakarta Post*, 18 December 1990]

* The public prosecutor's office in Surakarta, Central Java, has announced the suspension of distribution of four books. All four are press clippings compilations by P. Bambang Siswoyo: *The Lampung Case* and *The Banning of Two Books*; *The Petition of 50, of 21 and of 58*; *Political Openness*; and *The National Leadership Succession*.

For the compiler, this was the umpteenth time his clippings compilations on political themes have been banned. All the contents were from the press. "So, why are my books banned?" he asked.

The public prosecutor's office said the publishers had contravened the regulations by advertising the books in a Jakarta weekly before submitting them for examination by the authorities. [*Kompas*, 24 December 1990]

13 books under investigation

Books and printed matter which need to be investigated by the Attorney General's Office are on the increase. Over the past month, more than 13 books have been investigated. One being examined is *Atheis* by Achdiat K. Mihadja.

Others include *Sastra Hindia Belanda* [Literature of the Dutch Indies], *Siti Nurbaya*, *Dendang*, *Sukrena Gadis Bali*

[Sukrena, Bali Girl]. "They are being studied to see whether they will disrupt public order. There are 10 criteria for banning books," said Attorney General's head of public relations, H. Soeprijadi SH. [*Jawa Pos* 15 December 1990]

Were the contents contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution? Were they contrary to the Broad Guidelines of State Policy? Did they diminish or insult the status of the President and Vice President? Did they contain elements of inter-ethnic conflict? Were they pornographic? Did they deal with Marxist, Leninist, and communist thought? The other criteria were not given.

Atheis has been reprinted several times and was first published in 1949. Even so, it had to be re-investigated, said Soeprijadi. "Every reprinting contains additions. The investigation determines whether the additions are dangerous or not".

Soeprijadi also reminded publishers [*Kompas*, 2 January 1991] that they are required to submit all books to the Attorney-General's Office within 48 hours of publication according to Law No. 4/PNPS/1963 which covers the publication of books, bulletins, pamphlets, posters or other documents intended for circulation.

More military in Press Council

A marked shift in favour of the military has occurred in the composition of the Press Council, the body whose advice is sought when the ministry of information intends to revoke a newspaper's licence to publish.

Several civilian media people who served on the Council in 1987-1990 have been replaced for the three-year period commencing December 1990. The new members include army men who already hold crucial posts in public relations and in government. The list of new faces is formidable: Brig.General Nurhadi Purwosaputro, spokesperson of the armed forces; (retired) Brig.General Sugeng Widjaya who is now chair of the journalists' association, PWI (formerly also spokesperson of the armed forces); Brig.General Sukarno, deputy attorney-general for intelligence (a key post in the executive department which controls the censorship of books and other publications); Colonel Handjojo Nitimihardjo, director of the national news agency, Antara; (retired) Vice-Admiral Emir Mangawenang, secretary-general of the ministry of information; and (retired) Brig.General Hari Sugiman, director-general for social and political affairs at the Department of the Interior, one of the most influential posts for political control in the entire executive machinery.

Non-military media people who have lost their seats include B.M. Diah, editor and proprietor of *Merdeka* who retired because of age, and Sinek Maryono from PWI, Solo. The most telling appointment is the replacement of Muslim leader, Abdurrachman Wahid by Nurcholis Madjid. In the recent uproar in the Muslim community over a public poll in the popular weekly, *Monitor* (which placed the Prophet Mohammad eleventh in readers' preferences), leading to a government decision to revoke its licence to publish, Madjid fully supported the ban while Wahid argued strongly and publicly against it.

The Council's executive board which is consulted on bans is chaired as before by Jacob Oetama, editor of *Kompas*. He not only accepted the government's decision to ban *Monitor*, a publication owned by Gramedia of which he is director, but voluntarily returned the publishing licence of another of his weeklies, *Senang*, when sentiments began to run high against it for publishing a visual impression of the

CENSORSHIP

Prophet.

The Press Council has two commissions, one of which deals with ideology – ensuring that the media is loyal to the state ideology of Pancasila. [*Tempo*, 1 December 1990] ☆

Enforcing discipline

In an interview on the 41st anniversary of the Jakarta military command, Major-General Kentot Harseno, who took over as commander on 10 August 1990, said he wanted to create a safe, orderly and disciplined capital, in preparation for Visit Indonesia Year 1991.

"Some of my measures and policies will certainly not be popular but I am not looking for popularity. I want to enforce public discipline in practical ways."

The announcement came shortly after it was announced that the Jakarta military command would "back up" the police in the conduct of its duties. The army has started enforcing discipline by punishing pedestrians who cross the road or wait for buses at the 'wrong' place. They are forced to do physical exercises such as push-ups, on the spot. The army will also assume powers to make arrests, alongside the police.

This drive for discipline, for turning Jakarta into a clean, well-behaved, modern metropolis, is prompted by the same mentality that led the Jakarta police to ban *Opera Keco*, which puts the spotlight on the city's 'riff-raff'.

The operation has been condemned by the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute who describes the army's enforcement of discipline on the streets as being in contravention of the Criminal Procedures Code (KUHP).

Inspecting the operation, Major-Gen. Kentot Harseno said the measures to enforce discipline would be intensified, and backed up by much harsher sanctions than hitherto.



Free trade union makes headway

The newly formed *Serikat Buruh Merdeka Setiakawan*, the Solidarity Free Trade Union, held its first congress on 15 and 16 December 1990 in Jakarta, a month after the official launch. Attended by delegates from seventeen provinces, the congress announced the establishment of thirteen chapters and said the SBMS already has 30,000 to 40,000 members. [For background to this important development, see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 102, December 1990.]

According to *AFP* [18 December], the congress elected its supreme executive council with H.J.C. Princen, the well-known human rights activist, as general chairperson. It agreed to carry out a recruitment drive for new members and set itself the task of handling labour disputes. The chapters include unions in government-run companies, in the transport, energy, oil, gas and mining sectors as well as in manufacturing, trade and services. Princen said its aim was to defend workers' interests by improving their conditions to meet the standards set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). *AFP* also quoted the union's general secretary, Saut Aritonang, as saying it would stay in close contact with the ILO and other international labour groups if the government moved to prevent SBMS members from handling disputes.

According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, Saut Aritonang is a former member of the government-run federation, the SPSI, who left the organisation "after falling out with the government over the union's transition from a federation of unions to a unitary organisation in 1985. Last May, he organised a protest march of 700 workers to the parliament in Jakarta, after which he was questioned by the security forces and later released." [*FEER*, 6 December 1990]

International support

On the phone from Jakarta in late January, Princen told TAPOL that messages of support for the SBMS have been received from the ILO, from the main US union, AFL/CIO and from the FNV in the Netherlands.

A long-standing supporter of the restoration of human rights in Indonesia, Stan Newens, a Labour Member of the European Parliament, has written to the SBMS, expressing delight and congratulations. "The formation of the first free trade union in any society is an event of great importance, and I wish you well in your endeavours."

The right to organise

In a statement addressed to trade unions, human rights organisations and solidarity groups on 28 December 1990, TAPOL said:

The emergence of the Solidarity Free Trade Union is important for several reasons. It is the first challenge to the oppressive corporatist model of *wadah tunggal* which allows only a single organisation in any sector of society. The corporatist model has acted for years as the straitjacket making it impossible to have independent, democratic mass



A booming electronic manufacturing industry paying meagre salaries to its workers.

organisations in Indonesia. Just as important is the fact that SBMS, an initiative by human rights activists and former SPSI trade unionists, is the first genuine attempt since 1965 to set up a trade union that can become truly representative of the workers. SBMS chair, Poncke Princen said, at a meeting between the union's board and several Indonesian MPs:

"... Our existence is not dependent on the taste, preferences and recognition of the government, but on recognition by the workers. Recognition by the government is just a formality but recognition by the workers will be the legitimate basis of our existence. Our main aim is not to win acceptance by and be registered at the Department of Labour; it is to register ourselves in the hearts of the workers. Our organisation is theirs and it is with them that we want to register ourselves" ★

STOP PRESS

More arrests in East Timor

Constancio Pinto, a teacher at Sao Jose school in Dili, was arrested in Dili on 25 January and taken for interrogation to the army chief of intelligence, Lt.Colonel Gatot Purwanto. Two other people were arrested at about the same time in Maliana; one has been named as Marcus.

Ten days earlier, Chico Dias Ximenes, an official on the staff of the governor's office was arrested. Sources say these arrests may be connected with documents captured during a recent armed clash between the army and Falintil.

Killings in Aceh condemned

There is strong evidence of pressure on the Jakarta regime for its murderous policy in Aceh which has left hundreds, if not thousands, dead, and many people in detention where torture has been widespread. The government will try to counteract protest by conducting trials which were due to start in January. However, every effort should be made to force those responsible for the killings to account for their crimes.

Official policy

In an interview with the Jakarta weekly *Tempo* [17 November 1990], Major-General Pramono, military commander of North Sumatra said many people had been killed in Aceh and that killings were occurring there every day. In his own words – which have not since been retracted – the military commander made it clear that killing people suspected of being rebels was official policy. He said:

I have told the people the important thing is, if you see a GPK, you should kill him. There's no need to investigate. Just shoot him or knife him. People are forced to do this or that and if they don't want to, they are shot or get their throats slit. So I have instructed people to carry weapons, machetes or whatever. If you see a GPK, just kill him. [Tempo, 17 November 1990]

[NB: 'GPK' stands for 'Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan' or 'security disruptor gangs', the term officially used for *Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*, the Free Aceh Movement.]



Major-General Djoko Pramono
Commander of North Sumatra

Asia Watch statement

On 27 December 1990, the New York-based Asia Watch issued a lengthy statement on Aceh, along with a chronology of abuses nearly 20 pages long. In the words of Asia Watch:

The abuses have been sparked by actions of an armed opposition group, the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front, more commonly known as Aceh Merdeka or the Free Aceh Movement, and a heavy-handed response from the Indonesian military. The regional military commander, Major General H.R. Pramono, boasted in July 1990 that the movement would be crushed by December. As of late November 1990, however, it was very much alive, and abuses were continuing.

The combined death toll on both sides is estimated to be

as high as 1,000 with perhaps more killed by summary execution than by actual armed clashes; both sides have been responsible for atrocities. (The figure of 1,000 comes from an army doctor quoted in a November 25, 1990 Reuters report.) Mass arrests of those suspected of supporting the movement have led almost invariably to torture and frequently to the disappearance of those detained. The regional military commander says informing families of arrests is "impractical." Although bodies with gunshot or stab wounds continue to be found by roads, along rivers or in plantations in Aceh, no official inquests or investigations are conducted, and the military often refuses to allow the bodies to be buried in accordance with Islamic practices. There appear to be no procedures in place for conducting objective autopsies. International human rights organizations are not allowed officially to conduct fact-finding missions in Indonesia, let alone in Aceh, and humanitarian organizations cannot provide services in the area. Information is tightly controlled by the government.

Asia Watch discusses at length the Free Aceh Movement and concludes:

For all its organizational weaknesses, Aceh Merdeka has apparently succeeded in tapping deeply felt resentment against the Indonesian government, a feeling exacerbated by the perceived economic exploitation of the area by Western or Jakarta-based interests. If military abuses continue unabated, that resentment will only increase.

Following a well-documented survey of human rights violations, Asia Watch makes the following demands (abbreviated here for reasons of space) calling on the Indonesian government to:

1. issue a full and detailed list of all those arrested, detained and released since mid-1989 in connection with the violence in Aceh, and make these lists available in designated places so that the families of prisoners and missing persons can consult it.
2. thoroughly investigate all reports of summary executions and torture and make a public commitment to prosecute those responsible.
3. implement the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code (KUHP) with respect to arrest and detention procedures and the rights of suspects.
4. appoint an independent team of doctors to conduct thorough autopsies on all bodies of those who appear to have died unnatural deaths.
5. allow international human rights and humanitarian organizations access to Aceh to visit prisons and conduct independent autopsies or other forensic investigations as

needed.

6. strictly monitor the activities of civil patrols, ensuring participation is not forced, that the patrols are not encouraged to engage in arrests or the use of force against civilians.

7. discipline any member of the security forces, including commanding officers, who urge citizens to take the law into their own hands or exhort others to violence.

8. ensure that all those arrested have immediate access to lawyers as guaranteed by the Criminal Procedure Code.

9. lift all restrictions, formal or informal, on the flow of information to and from and about Aceh.

TAPOL condemns Aceh massacre

In a statement on 18 December 1990, TAPOL strongly condemned this latest wave of killings by the Suharto regime. It called on governments and people everywhere to exert pressure on the Suharto government to put a stop to the slaughter. It called on human rights organisations in Indonesia and abroad to send observers to Aceh. Western governments should send officials to Aceh to assess the scale of the massacre, it said. An appeal was also made to the European Parliament to adopt an emergency resolution calling for an end to the slaughter.

Finally, said TAPOL: "Those responsible for the killings must be brought to justice. Since this cannot be done in Indonesia, an International Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity should be convened to investigate the abuses in Aceh and hold the Suharto regime responsible for its campaign of death and mass intimidation."

TAPOL called on solidarity organisations throughout the world to call on their own governments to exert pressure on Jakarta to halt the atrocities in Aceh and to allow independence investigations to take place.

British government "deeply concerned"

Replying to a letter from TAPOL, the Earl of Caithness, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, said the British Government was "deeply concerned at the allegations of widespread killings and torture." Although officials from the British embassy in Jakarta visited Aceh periodically in 1990, would continue to do so and the embassy was

exchanging information with EC partners, the letter said, "It is exceedingly difficult to obtain accurate information about events in Aceh. We have already drawn our concern to the attention of the Indonesian authorities and will continue to take suitable opportunities to do so."

Referring to the statement by Pramono calling on people to "kill GPK", the letter said it understood "that Pramono has been reprimanded for his comments. The army commander has publicly criticised 'aggressive and violent' army tactics in dealing with social problems. This is believed to allude to Aceh."

Despite these assurances, there is no evidence that the licence to kill pronounced by Pramono has been revoked. Pramono's public pronouncement has evidently been a serious embarrassment to the regime and to those, like the British government, who support Indonesia. If, as the British government says, it is "exceedingly difficult to obtain accurate information", the need for an independent inquiry is all the more urgent.

Government's response

In early January, the governor of Aceh, Ibrahim Hasan, claimed in Jakarta that military operations in Aceh had been "successfully concluded" and "security had been restored".

Two weeks later, Air Vice Marshall Teddy Rusdi, assistant for policy and planning to the armed forces commander, summoned journalists to describe Asia Watch's charges as "completely baseless". "I don't know why they are talking about thousands killed by the armed forces. We are talking about only 20 or 30 killed," he said, alleging that "the rebels were mostly responsible for the deaths of civilians". [Reuters and BBC World Service, 15 January 1991.] Since Indonesia faces no perceived threat from outside the country, the armed forces could concentrate on dealing with internal threats, in Aceh, Irian Jaya (West Papua) and East Timor. "Our policy is to win people over from their sympathies with the guerrillas through propaganda and psychological warfare. I give you my word, the military is not going to use its rifles."

Clearly such assurances can satisfy no-one. The Aceh atrocities are certain to be raised at the February-March 1991 meeting of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva and at the European Parliament. ★

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Other members of the group have received heavy sentences: Moh. Achwan life imprisonment, Abdul Kadir Ali al Habsyi a younger brother of the defendant, 20 years, Achmad Muladawila, 20 years, and Abdul Kadir Baraja 15 years.

Hussein al Habsyi maintained his defiant stance and created a stir in court when he loudly protested against the charges of the public prosecutor. "I am disgusted", he shouted, "I do not even know whether the prosecutor is a major and the judge a colonel!" The defendant was removed from the courtroom while Prosecutor Syakranie continued to read the charges and demanded a death sentence as the defendant had not shown any remorse for his deeds and in fact defied the court procedures.

In the next court session, Hussein insisted on his innocence and stated that neither the prosecutor nor the witnesses could give evidence to prove his involvement in the bombings. His defence plea was a mixture of sermon and an attack on the nature of his trial. His statement

included quotations from the Qur'an, the sonnets of Shakespeare, and from Western political scientists. Hussein declared that he was ready to be executed and would not make an appeal or ask for clemency.



Hussein Al Habsyi on his prayer mat, facing the judges

Petition to reverse death sentence

A petition is circulating in a number of cities in Indonesia to call on the Indonesian government not to proceed with the execution of Azhar bin Mohammad Safar, sentenced to death in 1982.

Appeal to Supreme Court turned down

Azhar bin Mohammad Safar, 46 years, was found guilty of being a member of the so-called Imron Group which was allegedly involved in an attack on a police station in Cicendo, West Java and the hijack of a Garuda aircraft, 'Woyla', in 1981.

Azhar himself, not one of the hijackers, was sentenced to death by the South Jakarta district court in 1982. The first to be sentenced to death in this case was Imron, the alleged leader of the group, who was executed on 28 March 1983. Azhar's appeal to the High Court was turned down in September 1985 and an appeal to the Supreme Court was also turned down. On 8 November 1988, Azhar was told his appeal for presidential clemency had also been rejected.

His execution, scheduled for 14 December 1988, was postponed just ten hours before he was to be put to death, following his last minute appeal for a judicial review of his case by the Supreme Court. This final bid to the Supreme Court has now been rejected and the decision upholding the death penalty has been passed to the Bandung District Court and the Jakarta Attorney-General's Office which will be in charge of Azhar's execution.

The 'Woyla', on an internal flight, landed in Bangkok under instructions of the hijackers. It was subsequently stormed by Indonesian elite units under the command of General Benny Murdani, then chief of army intelligence and two years later, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, acting on instructions from General Yoga Soegomo, chief of BAKIN (intelligence coordination agency). Three of the five hijackers and two crew members were killed during the assault; the other two hijackers, captured alive, have never been accounted for; they were dead before they left

Bangkok.

The heavy-handed raid was acclaimed by both the CIA and the MI6 as a successful example in the fight to combat terrorism. [Letters of congratulations are reproduced in the autobiography of Yoga Soegomo, published last year.]

Link with Iran?

A press report of the rejection of Azhar's last appeal to the Supreme Court claims that Imron's group was planning to assist the Iranian Government by hijacking the airplane on which the Iraqi minister of oil was travelling; the alleged intention, it is now being said, was to exchange him for an Iranian minister then being held hostage by the Iraq. This is the first mention ever of an Iran-Iraq link.

Petition to revoke the death sentence

In a petition dated 11 January 1991, human rights workers, students, lawyers and NGO activists have appealed strongly to the government not to go ahead with the execution of Azhar because the death penalty does not comply with the principles of humanity. Moreover the concept of Indonesian law is based on educating offenders, not on revenge.

The petitioners recalled President Suharto's meeting with Nelson Mandela last autumn when he called for the repeal of the emergency laws in South Africa and for the immediate release of all political prisoners there.

The petition calls for a review of Azhar's death sentence, for the creation of genuine political openings for the political aspirations of the people, for the repeal of the Anti-Subversion Law and the immediate release of all political prisoners. ★

The Al Habsyi trial

Another 'heavy' Muslim case is the trial of Husein bin Ali al Habsyi, accused of leading several terrorist and subversive actions. The defendant is the last to be put on trial from the so-called Malang group; the others were tried and sentenced in 1986.

Death sentence demanded

Hussein al Habsyi, a blind lay preacher, has long been known for his strong Muslim convictions and defiance of the Pancasila, the Indonesian state doctrine. During the first trial session in mid November, he refused to take the defendant's chair and instead sat on the floor on a *sajadah*, a prayer mat. The charges against Husein are grave; he is charged as the leader of a group who blew up several stupas round the Borobudur monument, bombed two churches in Malang and masterminded the tragic grenade explosion on a bus travelling to Bali. The other alleged leader of the group, Ibrahim alias Djawad, is still on the run

and has reportedly fled to Iran. All these incidents occurred in late 1984 and early 1985. Husein evaded arrest until 17 November 1989 when he was captured in Garut, West Java.

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For more background information on the Malang trials, read:

Indonesia: Muslims on trial £4.00
available from TAPOL

Impressions from a visit to Indonesia

In November I spent several weeks in Indonesia meeting groups and individuals who are preparing, each in their own way, for the post-Suharto era. The diversity of groups, developing their own political practice and tradition, will provide the basis for a free and democratic Indonesia.

East Timor

An interesting development is the emergence of East Timor as a political issue for the present generation of student, human rights and political activists. East Timor has always been a complex and muddled issue for the older dissidents. The older anti-Suharto generation used a variety of justifications to support annexation. It was either that "East Timor is an ABRI project but they made a mess of it", implying that if they were in power, they would have done it better. Or: "For strategic reasons we will not raise the East Timor issue", avoiding confrontation with ABRI and putting the issue on ice. Much worse are the nationalistic, anti-Suharto groups who insist that ABRI should clamp down harder on the Timorese. Very few see East Timor as an Indonesian colony; still worse, hardly anyone from the older generation has put East Timor high on their list of priorities. The issue remained buried in silence, to be mentioned only when someone from abroad asked questions.

In the transitional generation of oppositionists of the sixties and seventies, the understanding about East Timor has been more fundamental and far-reaching. Generally speaking, they accept that the East Timorese have the right to determine their political destiny, and are eager to follow events in East Timor. But it seems there is a gentleman's agreement to deal with East Timor only when Suharto is removed or steps down.

There is a quantum leap to the position of many young activists. The defence pleas of Ammarsyah and Beathor Suryadi, publicly raised the East Timor issue. East Timor is regarded as a place where human rights are trampled underfoot. Many new activists do not regard the unitary state of Indonesia as sacred. The struggle for democracy and for human rights is regarded as more important than rigid views about nation states.

In several encounters with this generation of activists, we had fruitful discussions. The way they have integrated East Timor into their thinking is encouraging. Basic information on East Timor circulates and books and reports published by *Tapol*, *Amnesty International* and *Asia Watch* are widely read. Discussions about East Timor were therefore about matters like the present state of armed resistance and the underground network in the cities. Activists are eager to circulate material on the struggle in East Timor to a wider public. It is very apparent that the enduring and dedicated struggle of the East Timorese is a source of inspiration for a growing number of people in Indonesia. The difficulties in campaigning about East Timor in the cities of Java should not be overlooked. There are no political platforms on which to raise this issue. But from my observations and contacts, there is good reason to believe that gradually, through a slow political process, East Timor will emerge as

an important issue in the struggle for democracy. As some people said to me: "Indonesia can never become a democracy until it solves the East Timor problem, until East Timor has exercised its right to self-determination".

And once people acquire knowledge and political understanding about East Timor, the next step forward, understanding other disputed areas like West Papua, Maluku or Aceh will follow.

The ex-tapols

There is an atmosphere of change in Indonesia. A lot of certainties and holy shrines are being toppled and replaced by new movements, new ideas, new individuals. President Suharto shuffles and reshuffles the pack and the outcome is uncertain. He might even fall victim to his own reshuffling.

But in the midst of all these changes, one huge group of people remain in almost exactly the same situation, the 1.7 million – or is it 1.4 million? or 1.9 million? the government figure often changes – *ex-tapols* (former *tahanan politik* or ex political prisoners. Since their release in the late seventies, all kinds of restrictions and controls have been imposed upon them. These are the victims of more than a quarter of a century of discrimination.

Ten years since the last untied tapols were released, hardly anything has changed; some restrictions/regulations have been replaced by others and the *ex-tapols* still have no rights at all, only a loadful of duties. With few exceptions who told me, "We have nothing to lose," and try to develop a life as a citizen with rights and duties, the majority still live in miserable socio-economic conditions. Many remain dependent on the grace and charity of friends and relatives. Those who manage to acquire a job lack the security and guarantees, however flimsy, of other citizens. Keeping a job is difficult as the spectre of anti-communism is arbitrarily used to dismiss *ex-tapols*, referred to as 'ET', over and over again. Local district military officers or bureaucrats take advantage of their skills to do all kinds of odd jobs, free of charge.

To raise their voice in protest will only worsen things, provoking retaliation by the authorities. Because of their status as ETs, which is marked clearly for all to see on their identity cards, it is hardly possible for them to function properly in society. Indonesia under Suharto has created a new underclass.

By contrast with the growing interest in East Timor, the plight of the ETs has, in the last decade, lost its momentum. With the exception of one or two charitable bodies which work quietly, far from the limelight, to help the ETs and their families, the issue has been lost sight of by all the political groups with whom I came in contact. ☆

Liem Soei Liong

Death in the Forest

We summarise here a rare account, from the political weekly Tempo, of the devastating impact upon tribal people of the invasion of their forest land by forest concessionaires and transmigrants. It is frightening to note that although about 75 per cent of the tribe are reported to have died over the last decade, it is only now that anything, to our knowledge, has been reported in the press. While in the Tempo article, the reporter reflects concern for the tribal people, he is unable to understand that a lifestyle that is 'normal' for Javanese newcomers is totally foreign to people who have inhabited the forests for centuries.

Members of the Kubu tribe who live some distance to the north of Tebingtinggi, South Sumatra are dying fast. The village head of Tebingtinggi Kelumpang, sub-district Rawas Ilir believes that during October and November this year a hundred members of the tribe may have died.

According to records kept by the Social Affairs Service, the tribe which had about 12,000 members in 1979 has now dwindled to 2,642.

An official said that whereas two years ago, tribe members could be found in the area close to Tebingtinggi, they have all now disappeared into the forest of Aer Hitam which can only be reached by bus from Kubuklinggau, capital of the sub-district of Musirawas, and then a 75 km walk through the forest and across rivers.

The Social Affairs programme of setting up settlement sites for the Kubu tribe has clearly failed. One site where a hundred families were re-settled, was found to have only ten Kubu families left when the district chief, Nang Ali Solichin visited the site on 6 December. The remainder of the site was occupied by families from Java even though conditions there are not as favourable as at transmigration sites. Whereas transmigrants are given facilities free for one or two years, the tribes-people get free facilities for only six months. The tribes-people also cannot adapt to the form of agriculture promoted at these sites. Only the transmigrants can adjust to the 'normal' life-style. Even 'trivial' (sic) things like wearing clothes are out of the question for them.

Although the Social Affairs Department chief is reported as "frankly admitting" his concern about this situation, he is quoted as saying he does not understand why the tribes-people are dying off. But Tempo quotes a member of the tribe, Maropah, as saying that forest concessionaires have invaded their land massively since the 1970s. According to figures compiled by Tempo, of the 1,2 million hectares of protected and productive forest in the district of Tebingtinggi, 636,000 or more than half, have already been cleared. Another 40,000 hectares have been occupied by transmigrants. In addition, 120,000 hectares are covered by rubber plantations and 27,750 hectares are used to grow rice. In less than two decades, only a third of the forest land in the region is left.

The forests which provided a habitat for the tribes-people and their source of food have hugely diminished in size. Wild animals like boars, deer and monkeys have also been driven out, leaving only cats and dogs. But the Kubu people



do not, by tradition, eat such animals. Recently they have started eating rice, having lost their own traditional staple food, but because they are unable to find enough rattan to sell in the market – rattan stands are also disappearing fast – they cannot earn enough money to buy rice. Some officials claim that the Kubu people have now resorted to cannibalism but one official strongly denied this, saying that they have no history of cannibalism.

The district chief, Nang Ali Solichin is reported as "not remaining quiet" at reports of the high death rate. This month, he went into the interior in search of information from the tribes-people themselves. "This situation must not be allowed to continue; the truth should not be concealed." He said that the task of saving the Kubu tribe was just as urgent as saving the elephants in Lampung. [Summarised from Tempo. Date: 15 December 1990.] ★

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Mecky Salosa on trial

Leading OPM guerrilla Mecky Salosa who was handed over to the Indonesian authorities by PNG in July 1990, is now on trial in Jayapura, West Papua. He is charged with subversion and could face the death penalty.

The trial started on Tuesday, 8 January at the Jayapura district court, but as Mecky Salosa appeared in court without a defence lawyer, the trial was postponed until 14 January. The prosecutor did not read out the indictment.

According to a report in *Kompas*, the defendant sat calmly in court while eight key witnesses sat listening to the proceedings. Asked by the presiding judge whether he wished to have a defence lawyer, he said: "Yes, but would you find me one, please."

Salosa is accused of influencing others to join the OPM to go into the bush and fight against the Indonesian government; of abusing and inciting people; and of undermining development in the Indonesian-PNG border region. He is also accused of involvement in the attack on Arso IV transmigration site in Jayapura district, in which 14 transmigrants were killed.

Kompas says items seized from the accused included 12 'loops' bullets, an English-language Bible, two mauser rifles, a 'kiroop' weapon and a 'loops' rifle magazine, but fails to mention that it was PNG, not Indonesia that did the seizing. [*Kompas* 10 January 1991]

Before the trial was announced, Salosa is reported to have been tortured. The *Times of PNG* quoted reports received from an OPM contact which said Mr Salosa had "very sore cheeks and several teeth had fallen out due to heavy bashing and being starved. Nails from both his fingers and toes were pulled out." This was denied by a PNG Border Administration official who said it contradicted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)'s recent report that Salosa's condition is okay. [*Times of PNG*, 15 November, 1990].


Indonesian army pursues non-existent fugitive

The Indonesian authorities say they are searching for Swiss pilot Theo Frey, who they suspect of smuggling ammunition into West Papua for the OPM. A spokesman at the Attorney General's office said Theo Frey landed his Cessna plane in Merauke on July 27, 1990. The plane was carrying ammunition, cameras and documents on the OPM, according to the Indonesian *Antara* News Service, quoting the official. "We are still searching for him and trying to prevent him from leaving the country..." said the spokesman. [*Reuter* January 7, 1991]

According to the Indonesian daily *Jawa Pos*'s version, the spokesman, Soeprijadi, said five bullets had been found in the aircraft – [hardly a 'supply'].

Soeprijadi said the case dossier and incriminating evidence was turned over to the Irian Jaya High Prosecutor by the Trikora Regional Command on December 28. The Irian Jaya High Prosecutor has appealed to the public to give information concerning the 'fugitive's whereabouts. If not found, Frey would be tried *in absentia*, he said. [*Jawa Pos* 8 January, 1991].

Meanwhile, back in St Gallen, Switzerland, the 'fugitive'



PNG Times 22 November 1990

poured scorn on the Indonesian accusations. The former mission pilot, now OPM representative in Switzerland, explained to Associated Press he could not possibly have delivered ammunition to the OPM as he had not been out of Switzerland for a year and a half.

Frey says he would willingly stand trial for smuggling if the trial was fair, and if he had the opportunity to expose human rights abuses in West Papua. [*Werdenberg u. Obertogenburger*, 15 January, 1991]

Establishing 'outside support'?

So what is Indonesia playing at? The military cannot have forgotten that Theo Frey did indeed fly a plane into West Papua from Australia, but in July 1989, not 1990. They know – and indeed it was reported in the Indonesian press – that he was arrested shortly afterwards, for illegal entry at the Papua New Guinea border and sentenced to two months hard labour.

Frey himself thinks that the reports about him are being used to justify renewed military action against the OPM in the Merauke region.

It is also likely that by playing up the ammunition delivery issue, the Indonesian authorities are intending to give credence to the claim that the OPM is supported from outside the country. "It may well be that Theodor happens to be a Swiss; all of this is being investigated by the Jayapura High Prosecution," said Soeprijadi, implying there may be something more sinister about Frey than merely being Swiss. This attempt to show that the OPM enjoys outside support is in line with moves from the top of the Indonesian armed forces to try to prove that there are the external connections with liberation movements in East Timor and Aceh.

Border collaboration arouses ire

Increased co-operation between ABRI and the PNG Defence Forces [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 102] has not met with approval in all quarters. In December last year, Sir Pita Lus, MP for Maprik, was reported to be furious over arrangements for joint military exercises and civic programmes with Indonesia. He said he feared Indonesia would use the opportunity to spy on PNG and study the terrain for ulterior motives and said he would not allow such programmes to be conducted in Maprik. [*Post Courier* 14 December, 1990]

An angry *Courier* reader wrote: "Almost 90% of the Melanesians in Papua New Guinea support our brothers' struggle for independence. It is simply unjustified when we support the Kanaks in New Caledonia and the East Timorese, yet do not support the Melanesians in West Papua." [28 November 1990]

WEST PAPUA

Meanwhile, more co-operation is on the cards: PNG's police minister announced in December that senior PNG police officers would be sent to Indonesia for training in Indonesian police command colleges on the invitation of ABRI commander General Try Sutrisno, who was visiting PNG. [*Post Courier* 17 December, 1990] Deputy prime minister Ted Diro, is widely believed to have held a secret meeting with Indonesian Defence Minister General Benny Murdani in Singapore late last year, although this has been denied by PNG prime minister, Rabbi Namaliu.

* * *

The six hostages held hostage in November by OPM guerrillas at in PNG [see *Tapol Bulletin* no. 103] were released unharmed after 12 days. ★

EAST TIMOR

Timor oil accord sparks row in Jakarta


The Timor Gap Treaty has sparked a bitter controversy in Indonesia. The row completely overlooked the illegality of the robbers' pact between Indonesia and Australia to share the spoils of Indonesia's violent annexation of East Timor, but it did draw attention to the phenomenal importance both parties attach to the oil reserves hidden beneath the Timor Sea. The prospect that the controversy might delay ratification led both Jakarta and Canberra to act quickly to end the dispute. As Parliament was about to vote on ratification, Australia's Mining Minister, Alan Griffiths, flew into Jakarta and used every opportunity to praise the agreement.

The oil-rich seabed largely explains Jakarta's motivation in annexing East Timor. Some geologists believe that these oil reserves are at least the equivalent of oil reserves in the Middle East. Australian companies were aware of this potential back in 1975 and considered that the Suharto regime was the best one to do business with; hence Australia's support for Jakarta's annexation plans so early on in the dispute. For Indonesia too, the desire to grab this oil must have been a major, if not the prime, consideration in its decision to move against Fretilin and the people of East Timor.

Call for postponement swept aside

The row broke out when the Treaty was submitted to the Indonesian Parliament for ratification. The former Rector of Gadjah Mada University, Dr Herman Johannes, a leading physicist who has all along been an outspoken critic of the Treaty, argued that Australia will enjoy far more benefit from the accord than Indonesia. He said the only 'fair' share-out of the proceeds would be 50:50 throughout the region. It is ludicrous, he argued, for Indonesia to be allowed a mere 1.6 per cent of the profits from the most southerly Zone C, probably the richest part of the oil-field. The 90 percent share allotted to Indonesia from the northerly Zone B was no compensation as it was doubtful whether this zone contained any oil at all.

He was particularly critical that the two sides had agreed to set aside for 40 years their dispute over the sea border



between Australia and East Timor. Our geologists, he said, believe that the stretch is a continuous continental shelf; under the 1982 Law of the Sea Treaty, the border should be equidistant from both countries and resources shared 50:50. Hence, ratification should be postponed 2 or 3 years, to await Australia's ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty when its terms will become applicable to the Timor Sea.

Dr Johannes' testimony to parliamentary spelling out his objections struck a nationalist cord, and many MPs, who usually rubber-stamp government proposals, started questioning the Treaty. Things came to such a pass that Foreign Minister Ali Alatas sent two senior officials to Yogyakarta to persuade Dr Johannes to cool it. But the highly-respected academic made no concessions, saying he could not understand why the government was so unwilling

continued on page 27

15 years of Indonesian rule

15 years after the Indonesian invasion on 7 December 1975, East Timor displays all the hallmarks of a colonised territory: a strong military presence, a colonial administration and massive population control. On the other hand, there are many forms of resistance, creating immense difficulties for the military authorities in Jakarta and giving headaches to Indonesian diplomats.

The style and emphasis of Indonesian colonial rule may change from time to time, but one thing never changes: East Timor is an army project. In 1976 Suharto illegally incorporated East Timor as Indonesia's 27th province but the contrast with the islands of Indonesia is striking. The military presence in East Timor is patently obvious. Emphasis on security makes life very difficult for the East Timorese.

Brief military history

As with many military adventures, the architects of the invasion, generals Benny Murdani, Ali Murtopo, Panggabean and Suharto, expected to wrap up East Timor in a few days, but the huge Indonesian invasion only seized control of the capital Dili and other towns while the countryside remained in the hands of *Fretilin*. Together with the guerrilla forces, the majority of the population fled into the mountains. It took time for the Indonesian army to lick their wounds and rebuild their weapons arsenal. In September 1977, the army under its new commander, General Yusuf, started his *extermination and annihilation campaign*. The main aim was to destroy the backbone of the resistance and force the population into the lowland areas. Aerial bombardment and massive troop movements encircled the centres of the resistance in the mountains.



General Yusuf inspecting troops in East Timor in 1978

This savage campaign which lasted till March 1979 had a devastating effect; tens of thousands were killed and the agricultural system was destroyed, causing widespread famine and disease. The East Timorese were forced to leave their shelters and came under the control of the Indonesians. The Indonesian army continued its policy of exterminating the guerrilla forces while herding the population in resettlement camps. Although it inflicted a terrible blow on *Fretilin*, the resistance reorganised itself, re-emerging in the 1980s under the leadership of Shanana Gusmao.

In the early 1980s, a different kind of military operation

was launched, drawing East Timorese into war operations. These included using East Timorese in army battalions or paramilitary units and using the *pagar betis* (fence of legs) strategy of conscripting large numbers of civilians to move ahead of Indonesian troops, encircling an area where guerrillas are thought to be hiding. As the noose tightens, the guerrillas are forced into the open and captured or shot. In May 1981 a nationwide fence of legs operation was launched; code-named *Operasi Keamanan* or Security Operation, military circles in Jakarta called this *perang terachir* or the final war. This operation also had a devastating effect on the population. Virtually all men aged 15 to 50 were forced to join, leaving their families without food and abandoning crops for many months. Although the army later admitted that the operation had failed to obliterate the guerrillas, the fence of legs operation was later used over and over again, though on a much smaller scale.

Later in the eighties, military strategy gradually shifted. Instead of using territorial troops (battalions from different parts of Indonesia), the army opted for counter-insurgency. In 1983-84, after the collapse of peace talks between Colonel Purwanto and *Falintil* commander Shanana Gusmao, the army launched its last 'old-style' offensive, using everything - warships, tanks, airplanes, mortars, cannons and large numbers of territorial troops.

From 1986-87, the switch to counter-insurgency which Benny Murdani describes as 'territorial guerrilla warfare' became apparent. Elite troops with special training in counter-insurgency warfare are used instead of territorial troops. A smaller number of troops are used in well-planned operations lasting for a fixed period of time. It involves a wide dispersal of forces, functioning in small units. In 1988 a larger scale counter-insurgency attack was launched. Since 1989, this has become the main strategy, being constantly refined and nowadays using Timorese counter-insurgency troops to fight East Timorese guerrillas.

At every stage of the war, *Falintil* has adopted strategies to correspond to the changes in the Indonesian strategy. The latest strategy has created difficulties for the guerrillas; the heightened mobility of army units keeps the resistance constantly on the move. Larger battles rarely occur as both sides operate in small units. These days, guerrilla ambushes involve a maximum of ten well-prepared guerrillas.

Parallel population control

The different periods of the war and military strategy has affected the army's strategy for controlling the population. Social scientists from Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta in a report last year about conditions in East Timor noted what they called a continuance of a war situation with society still living in a trauma.

The way the population has been controlled reflects the

different stages of the war. In the early period, the Indonesians only controlled the towns while the population stayed with the resistance. Only after the military campaign of 1977–1979 did the population come under Indonesian control. These years of war brought terrible devastation: a third of the population was killed directly or indirectly because of the war while an estimated 80% of the population were uprooted. The distraught population were herded into *daerah pemukiman* or resettlement areas, some 145 of which were set up. The hastily created camps had on average 2,000 people; the sites were chosen at random, mostly where food production was hardly possible.

The key aim was to separate the population from the guerrillas, but they failed to for several reasons: having been set up in a haphazard fashion, they were easily penetrated by the reorganised guerrilla forces. Conditions were so deplorable that inhabitants either choose to defect and join the resistance or become part of the underground network in the camps. The army was compelled to rethink the population policy and, in line with the new military strategy of involving Timorese in the war, new camps were created, situated along new asphalt roads, built by the Indonesian army to serve several purposes. Army strategists realised that security would be better served if people coming from the same village were regrouped together. The new sites were better chosen and in some instances it became possible for the population to start growing food again by tending small vegetable plots.

Limited transmigration

In the mid eighties some *desa teladan* or model villages were developed as 'showcases', by East Timorese and transmigrants from East Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta and Bali. This model was intended to herald the start of large-scale transmigration of Javanese and Balinese to East Timor but for a variety of reasons, the scheme collapsed: most Javanese and Balinese, having heard about the grave situation in East Timor, were not attracted to go there; the East Timorese, having suffered badly at the hands of the Indonesians and lost land and property, did not take kindly to the newcomers. At the same time transmigration became a target of criticism from inside and outside the country and the Jakarta authorities had to put a brake on the programme.

But there has been large-scale spontaneous migration of Indonesians into East Timor. Petty traders from East Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Buton have found their way to East Timor. Together with civil servants, they account for an estimated 35,000 Indonesians. East Timorese are bitter about this influx. It is deeply offensive to see newcomers nudging their way in, gaining control of the administration, running the schools, shops and market-places and causing urban populations to soar. Indonesians from all walks of life, soldiers, teachers, construction workers, cobblers, street hawkers and tailors, have moved in, transforming life in towns like Dili, Baucau, Lospalos, Viqueque, Manatuto, Ermera, Ainaro and Liquisa. Unemployment has risen while those who get jobs are mostly Indonesians.

In the late eighties, a third wave of population upheaval occurred, allowing groups of people to return and rebuild their abandoned villages. The authorities realised that the original village sites were the best places to live and produce food. Moreover, having villages scattered in the interior would serve a security objective. At the same time, an effort was made to develop a plantation economy by requiring people to grow cash crops like coconuts, kapok

EAST TIMOR



Photo by Elaine Brière

and boost the yield of the famous Timor coffee. This new population policy reflected the two-pronged strategy; the counter-insurgency method of using elite forces, while the East Timor Wiradharma military command initiated a 'smiling policy', *Operasi Senyum*. As early as 1986 Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, Wiradharma military commander, said the best way to cope with armed resistance was to improve the living standards of the people. The territorial soldiers were instructed to set up 'model gardens' in the new villages, build fish ponds and so on. The present commander, Brigadier-General Rudy Warouw, has revived this approach but it is hardly likely to improve overall conditions.

In 1989, the security requirements of the Pope's visit led to special operations commanded by Colonel Prabowo which earned him a terrible reputation for brutality. Nor could 'smiling' be said to be characteristic of Colonel Mulyadi's term as commander of the Wiradharma command up to the end of 1989.

With all its chops and changes, Indonesia's strategy of population control remains integral to the overall military strategy of *hankamrata*, the concept of territorial management and territorial warfare. The new villages may be an improvement on the earlier resettlement camps but they are integral to the military strategy of control. Nor has freedom of movement be restored. The security approach of the Indonesian army continues to be the dominant factor.

The East Timorese are as ever unwilling to cooperate in anything emanating from the Indonesians. Deep distrust of the Indonesian military persists while the arrogant topdown approach of the average Indonesian soldier can only widen the cleavage.

The colonial administration

After much high-level confusion in Jakarta following a call by Governor Mario Carrascalao for the region to be 'opened up', it was decided at the end of 1988 to grant East Timor equal status with Indonesian provinces, thus acknowledging the former special status of East Timor. Two years on, East Timor has retained most of its special features, the only difference being a small trickle of tourists (1,190 in 1989, and 1,223 in 1990). The main feature is still the military

structure. Until December 1989, it was run as a special military command, *Komando Operasi Keamanan Timor Timur (Koopskam TimTim)*, Operational Security Command for East Timor, but now it has a different name *Komando Pelaksanaan Ketertiban Operasi Timor Timur (Kolaskop TimTim)* or Command for Implementing Order in East Timor. Till 1989, the special command existed side by side with the East Timor military command, operating under a different command structure, subordinated to army headquarters in Jakarta, not to the regional military command in Bali. With *Kolaskop*, both commands seem to be fused under one military commander who concurrently holds both command positions. This special command structure has top priority and possesses all the most advanced and best-equipped material and personnel.



Falintil guerillas in 1983

From top to bottom, the civilian provincial administration is integrated into the military and police structure. For instance, the districts are governed by bodies called *tripida*, or triple regional leadership composed of the local military commander, the local police chief and the district head. The two uniformed chiefs are Indonesians while the district chief is usually a Timorese. On top of this, the Timorese district chief usually functions in tandem with an army intelligence officer who handles administrative duties while keeping a close watch on the Timorese official. Any Timorese in a position of leadership, including Governor Carrascalao, has an Indonesian military minder. The governor's only power is to implement decisions taken in Jakarta; the same applies to lower-level officials.

Occasionally, when policy disputes occur in Jakarta, Governor Carrascalao can exert some influence, using the narrow margins allowed him. He was able to raise the 'opening-up' issue in 1988, which led to heated controversy between the army and the foreign affairs department. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas wanted the territory to be opened up because Indonesia was the target of international criticism due to lack of access to East Timor. Indonesian diplomats argued that they could not plausibly defend the East Timor issue if nothing changed. They argued that outsiders should be allowed to enter East Timor; they may even be persuaded to believe that everything was fine.

The military argued strongly against it, for security and economic reasons. The army feared that things on the security front could get out of control – which indeed hap-

pened. Since 1988, the East Timorese youth have utilised the slight opening of East Timor to their advantage. Several visits from outsiders have become rallying points to express opposition to Indonesian rule. The economic motive for the army's objection was fear of losing its monopolistic grip over the East Timor economy. All economic activity in East Timor, the coffee trade, the department stores, road construction and development projects like school and office buildings and imports and exports, are directly run or controlled by the army. An economic opening, Governor Carrascalao hoped, would allow a free market to develop.

President Suharto took the side of Alatas and Carrascalao and gave the green light to the opening up on 29 December 1988. So far, this has achieved virtually nothing economically. Foreign investors have shown no interest in investing in East Timor, nor are Indonesian entrepreneurs queuing up to invest in East Timor. So far, the military have managed to keep their stranglehold over the economy.

On the security front, General Benny Murdani, the Minister of Defence, admitted that when Indonesian or foreign officials go to East Timor, it "will certainly become quite a big problem". Addressing Timorese officials in February 1990, Murdani warned that the armed forces would crush the resistance movement. Notwithstanding this threat, the 'smiling policy' seems to have prevailed, at least until the last quarter of 1990.

The opening up of East Timor has remained a controversial issue and has brought no improvement or relaxation in East Timor. The military have responded to unrest with heavy-handed repression, despite the presence of foreigners. *New York Times* correspondent Steve Erlanger on 21 October 1990, in an article entitled "East Timor, reopened by the Indonesians, remains a sad and terrifying place", reported that Asian and Pacific diplomats just back from a visit to East Timor "were stunned by the mood prevailing in Dili".

The church in East Timor

As with everything else these last fifteen years, the Catholic church has also undergone a transformation. The mass conversion of Timorese has meant that the population sees the church as a protection against Indonesian atrocities. Jakarta expects the church to support government programmes and refrain from getting involved in politics. Yet, the church cannot close its eyes to social and political problems resulting from the Indonesian annexation. The church faces a daily dilemma: if it is seen as protecting the government's interests, the people will distance themselves, but if it sides with the people, it lands in difficulties with the government. In a situation where no political channels exist, where people cannot express their political aspirations, the church is often used as an outlet. The Papal Mass in October 1989 and the mass to celebrate the 50th birthday anniversary of the Diocese of Dili in September 1990, turned into mass demonstrations for independence.

The church sways, at times having a kind of 'cease-fire' with the army, at times antagonistic towards the government as when Bishop Belo wrote to the UN Secretary-General in February 1989 asking for a referendum. A recent outburst from Rear Admiral Sudibyo Rahardjo, chief of general staff of the armed forces, gave a clear indication of another difficult period for the church. In January 1991, he accused the church of being behind a rash of demonstrations opposing Jakarta's rule. Recalling the demonstration during the Pope's visit, he said: "They were teenage boys, all from a

Catholic school. I'm sorry to say it but the church is behind this. The Catholic Church is the best organised force in the world and very well financed". This could herald a clampdown on church activities or an 'invitation' to some priests to depart. Little is known about the strength of liberation theology in East Timor but both Timorese and foreign priests are dissatisfied with being expected to mobilise people in support of government programmes.

Shanana Gusmao has spoken sympathetically about the role of the church. In his recent interview with Robert Domm, he cautioned the clergy not to go too far against the Indonesians. "The clergy plays an indirect but very committed role, in the sense that actions of the Church have strengthened the popular, patriotic consciousness and helped the people see that we are the Maubere people and have nothing in common with the Indonesians. The Church has not spoken out openly; the clergy have not acted in a public or indiscreet way, but with intelligence in order to continue to be on the peoples' side".

Integration, an Indonesian myth

After 15 years of 'integration', it can be concluded that the Indonesians have failed in every field. Animosity and contempt towards Indonesians have deepened, the attempt to win the hearts and minds of the young Timorese has been counter-productive. Teachers complain of bad behaviour and lack of interest of the schools. The youth have carried forward the banner of struggle from the older generation, developing new forms of resistance. However impressive on paper, development programmes have not benefitted the Timorese. It is the Indonesian army who is

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A Timorese resettlement village

reaping the harvest while the average Timorese sees the army as the cause of the economic crisis. Allocation of government funds usually fail to reach their proper destination, because of corruption. One volatile issue is land. The uprooting of the population has left huge tracts of land empty and untended. To claim ownership, Timorese need to produce title deeds which most do not possess. Many newcomers from Indonesia are buying up land, creating deep resentment. In the meantime the Timorese fear persecution and repression. They are not able to live according to their own customs and traditions. Lack of basic needs – food and health care in particular – makes living in East Timor like living a hell. The only just solution is for the East Timorese to be able to determine their own fate and political destiny.

★

Underground leaders on the clandestine movement

On a visit to Jakarta last November, Liem Soei Liong of TAPOL interviewed three activists in the East Timorese clandestine movement. The three men are identified here only by initials.

'MKR' from the Mambai tribe, was 11 years old in 1975. His father was a coffee plantation official in Ermera, under the Portuguese. When war broke out, MKR knew little about politics:

The first thing was that we were forced to learn Indonesian and other things unrelated to our own history. In time, we started wondering why the war had started and why people were holding out in the bush to defend our people to the death against the Indonesian army. Everything was in stark contrast to the 12 months before the war started in 1975. We realised that something terrible had happened. We were a people living under great oppression, defending our aspirations against the Indonesian army which was suppressing our aspirations.

I went to secondary school (SMA) in Kupang, then to university in Jakarta. At college, I met older people with a better understanding of politics; some had fought in the bush. I learnt many things from them and wanted to become involved.

'FF' was studying at Francisco Xavier School at the time of the Indonesian invasion. He became involved with Fretilin

in August 1975 and joined the school-pupils organisation, Unetim.

When Fretilin took control of East Timor and set up a de facto administration, I was sent to organise people in villages and towns in preparation for the coming difficulties. I attended the independence proclamation on 28 November 1975. When the invasion occurred, I fled to Ailieu with Fretilin leaders, then to Same and Kablake. I was in Quelicai for more than a year and then went east, to Viqueque-Ossu where I mobilised the masses to face the Indonesians.

In July 1979, I was at the Matebian base when Indonesia began its mass extermination campaign. In November, we were forced to let the population surrender, while I escaped to another region. There were many difficulties there but we began to learn how to organise the masses and prepare for underground work.

On 15 July 1979, I was arrested with four friends by the Indonesians and brought to Dili. In 1980, I became active in the underground movement.

'ML' was just finishing school in 1975 and left Dili with

Fretilin when Indonesia invaded.

I helped gather information and politicise society. I stayed in the mountains till 1979. After Indonesia's campaign to encircle and annihilate Fretilin, we realised that the balance of forces was very unfavourable so we surrendered, but this was not the end of the struggle. We surrendered in order to continue the war in the towns. That was our task.

How many East Timorese men and women are studying in Indonesia at present?

[MKR] I would say about a thousand, studying at various universities in Bali and Java – in Malang, Bandung, Surabaya, Yogyakarta, Salatiga, Solo, Jakarta and Kupang, as well as in Kalimantan.

What control do the Indonesians exert on you?

[FF] The intelligence closely watch young East Timorese and people in general. They realise that it is the younger generation who will carry the struggle forward until we achieve independence. Experience since 1975 shows that our young men and women are the ones who have died in the struggle – thousands have been exiled to prison camps.

When the underground was set up in 1980, many who took part were from the younger generation. At the time of the rebellion on 10 June 1980, many young people took part, were arrested and exiled. This showed the Indonesians that the main force involved in the struggle was the youth. Facilities given to our youth by the Indonesians have not meant that Indonesia has persuaded the youth of East Timor to turn their backs on the struggle.

Ever since 1980, young East Timorese wherever they are in Indonesia are involved in the underground according to their specific circumstances and abilities. The underground is under the leadership of our supreme command.



Wounded East Timorese youngsters after demonstration

In the past few years, the Indonesians arrested many students and schoolpupils. But it was harmful to Indonesia's foreign policy; they realised that they could not afford a confrontational approach so they devised a new mechanism – controlling all letters and communications, censoring all letters from abroad and controlling our communications with East Timor.

When any of us goes on vacation to East Timor, they follow us to find out what we plan to do there. They know that our student organisation here is focused on the struggle of our people in East Timor so they have developed a special system of control.

But we know that any day, the Indonesians could become more confrontational. In 1989, when demonstrations took place in Dili, when our youth raised their voices to call for independence for East Timor, the military did not themselves handle the situation probably because they were concerned about the impact on their diplomatic moves. Negotiations were under way about the visit of the Portuguese parliamentary mission to East Timor; this prevented Indonesia from taking a confrontational position. But in October 1990, they failed to reach agreement and the visit was postponed. So they began to adopt a more aggressive, confrontational stance; many young people were arrested, some were murdered, some tortured. The aim was to trace the location of leadership of the underground.

They watch the East Timorese youth in Indonesia all the time. A time may come when they will become more confrontational if the underground endangers their international position. But at present, they must weigh up the international repercussions of their actions.

There are a number of East Timorese youth groups functioning in Indonesia. Does this reflect any split?

No. Indeed, there are many organisations but they are all working towards the same goal.

The three fronts in the struggle

Up to the late 1970s, the emphasis was on armed struggle. FF said just now that since then, there has been a shift towards political struggle in the towns. Does this mean that the armed struggle is no longer so important? How should we assess the two forms of struggle?

[FF] Up to 1979 or 1980, all activities were concentrated in the bases. But we began to realise that in physical terms, we could not face up to the might of the Indonesian army which has a constant supply of weapons. So our leadership instructed us to be active in the towns. But this does not mean ignoring or give up the military struggle.

Three fronts were opened up, the military front, the underground political or clandestine front and the diplomatic front which had existed since 1975. But a clandestine front was needed to maintain links between the military front and the diplomatic front. From 1978 onwards, when the situation was still very critical, it was very hard to organise this link, primarily because we were always being watched. In 1978, 1979 and 1980, we concentrated on keeping open the lines of communication between the armed struggle in the bush and abroad.

But in 1980, we began to organise mass actions and on 10 June, there was a rebellion and many friends were killed or exiled. We began to recognise the role of the underground

struggle in linking the diplomatic front to the military front. But at all times, the leadership of the struggle is in the hands of the military front. The military front had mandated diplomatic representatives abroad to tell the outside world that the struggle in East Timor was continuing. How could this be done? By creating an underground front.

The underground front has two tasks, to create a mechanism to link the diplomatic front with the military front and to organise the masses, to convince our people that those who fought from 1975 till 1980 were still fighting for the people's aspirations.

Since 1980, awareness has heightened. Although, the Indonesians have succeeded in aiming blows at the clandestine movement and have destroyed much of it, we have not been defeated. Why? Because murder and exile only reinforces our nationalism and draws everyone into the underground in East Timor.

There are various underground organisations because the situation differs from place to place. Jakarta is not the same as Bali, Bali is not the same as East Timor. Each underground organisation must fix its own criteria to prevent our activities from being destroyed by the Indonesians. They all pursue a single aim, freedom and liberation for the people of East Timor. A number of clandestine groups and students organisations have come into existence; one is called **Renetil**, another is known as **Rejutim**. There are others as well, which have not yet become as well-known as these two.

But although our movement has made significant progress, this doesn't mean that the military struggle is no longer important. The leadership is in the hands of the military front. The underground and the diplomatic front get their global orientation from the commander.

We can say that in East Timor there is now an urban guerrilla movement – we call it the urbanisation of the guerrillas. But it operates under the supreme commander.

Recently, we have begun to restructure our movement because all young East Timorese men and women are becoming involved. We realise that if there were a challenge, the army would take action. Our focus at present is to devise a new strategy to cope with the Indonesians.

The second point is that in Indonesia a number of opposition groups are operating. The Indonesians call them separatist movements but we don't see them like this. They are pressing for the right to self-determination. Indonesia consists of 26 provinces but they are not united. There are plenty of prospects for the creation of other states. We have known about this type of struggle in Indonesia since the 1960s when we in East Timor had contact with them.

Jakarta's aim, to crush the guerrillas

Some journalists who recently visited East Timor have noted a reduction in the level of armed conflict and a reduction in the number of Indonesian troops. They say ABRI could defeat the guerrillas but refrain from doing so because they need East Timor as a training ground. What do you say to this?

[FF] This is something we have thought about. Indonesia is a large military power supported by the USA and other countries. It's wrong to say Indonesia doesn't want to crush the guerrillas. Ever since 1975, their aim has been to crush the guerrillas because they know that the guerrillas disrupt stability and obstruct development in East Timor. So, why doesn't Indonesia crush the guerrillas? Maybe what the journalists say, that Indonesia needs East Timor as a

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training ground and a project for other countries is part of the answer. But there's more to it than that.

Indonesia has a powerful army yet it has been unable to destroy the guerrillas. Look at what happened in 1976, 1977 and 1978 when Indonesia conducted a massive campaign. Then in 1981 and 1982, they mobilised the entire population to crush the guerrillas, but failed. In 1983, there were negotiations between our commander, Xanana Gusmao and the regional commander, Colonel Purwanto. Indonesia hoped through these negotiations to convince Xanana to surrender, but this did not happen.



East Timorese students seeking refuge in Motael Church

The negotiations were very beneficial for Fretilin because all our people could see that a well-organised struggle was still going on. The Indonesians have tried hard to crush the guerrillas but the emergence of urban guerrillas has made this even more difficult. Then there are problems in Indonesia itself. Indonesia cannot possibly deploy all its armed forces in East Timor. This would mean ignoring the challenge in Sumatra, and not fighting the OPM.

Another point is that their campaign needs substantial economic backing, but this is not easy for Indonesia at present. There is a correlation between Indonesia's inability to crush the guerrillas and difficulties within Indonesia. Perhaps it's true to say that in 1979, Indonesia was more able to handle the guerrillas, but since 1980 it has been much more difficult for them to do this.

When Indonesia started to colonise East Timor, they recognised that winning over the older generation was impossible and tried to win over the youth, setting up many schools, spreading the Pancasila. But they have failed to turn Timorese youngsters into 'good Indonesians'. Why?

[MKR] There are many reasons. Let's look first at history. As compared with various parts of Indonesia, East Timor before the arrival of the Portuguese had hardly any contact with the empires that existed in the rest of the archipelago; at most, links were confined to trade. There is no evidence that the pre-Portuguese kingdoms in East Timor paid tribute to the kingdoms of Sriwijaya or Majapahit. So, even before the Portuguese era, there were differences.

The second thing is that East Timor was colonised by the Portuguese while Indonesia was colonised by the Dutch. There are many differences between them though they both came from western Europe. The Dutch, like the English and

the Germans, were not inclined to carry out a policy of assimilation, in contrast with the Spanish, the Portuguese and the Italians who were quick to assimilate. This is what happened in Latin America and also in East Timor. The Portuguese culture absorbed by the Timorese was initially imposed by force but eventually it happened by peaceful means, by assimilation, by inter-marriage between Portuguese men and Timorese women.

Another factor is religion. Before the Dutch reached Indonesia, outside religions – Hinduism and Islam – had taken root. But things were different in East Timor. Each tribe had its own traditional beliefs and these were the religions that came into contact with Catholicism from Portugal.

So during 500 years of Portuguese colonialism, a quite distinct society emerged which helped mold the character of our people. Yet, this process (of peaceful assimilation) did not always prevail. The Timorese people rebelled against the Portuguese throughout the colonial era, from the moment the Portuguese set foot in our country. This has bred a high level of militancy among the Timorese. There were many battles, waged without any help from outside; often these rebellions were suicidal. This hardened our people, made them very tough, never wanting to surrender.

After the political changes in Portugal, East Timorese students who had been studying in Portugal where they had made contact with students from other parts of the world, returned home. They waged a very effective campaign, dealing with concrete issues. Within a year, their campaign was very successful; the effects are still felt today. They succeeded in arousing a nationalist, patriotic fervour among the East Timorese people, particularly in the ranks of Fretilin. This was done by people like Carvarinho, Vicente Reis and others.

When Indonesia came, it became apparent that Indonesian colonialism was very primitive as compared with Portuguese colonialism. The Indonesians were not as skilful as the Portuguese so it wasn't difficult for our people to understand what was going on, even illiterate people who had never been to school. No-one needed to be told, there was no need for any campaigning. The facts were there for all to see. The soldiers sent to East Timor behaved very brutally, caring nothing about human rights or existing regulations. All this happened when things worldwide were changing – there was a global shift towards emancipation, many nations were fighting for liberation. So the Timorese were very quick to reject what the Indonesians did. This is true also for our youth. Their lessons in school about Indonesian history were empty phrases. Such efforts can never succeed unless the East Timorese give up their yearning to liberate themselves – only then will Indonesia get its way.

Indonesia faces challenges to its rule not only in East Timor but also in West Papua and Aceh. Do you see your solution being linked in any way with pressure on Indonesia to become a federation or perhaps even splitting up into several states?

[FF] Some people believe that if East Timor were to win independence, this would set a precedent for other people. But my first point is this: when Indonesia proclaimed independence in 1945, it claimed only the territory under Dutch control, which excludes East Timor.

The question of whether Indonesia becomes a federation



Indonesian soldiers, normal street scene in Dili

or not may be valid but this is an internal affair and has nothing to do with us. Any state structure can undergo transformation. Indonesia today faces many contradictions, especially between the younger and the older generations. We realise that it is very difficult to expect Indonesia to let go of East Timor, partly because, as you suggest, this could set a precedent. But people in Indonesia should realise that independence for East Timor is something that cannot be stopped. Indonesia will continue to face enormous difficulties because the boundaries of our underground struggle will continue to expand. Perhaps the time will come, in ten or twenty years, when we will try to coordinate our actions with the opposition in Indonesia if Jakarta still insists on keeping hold on East Timor.

We know how difficult it is for us to defeat Indonesia militarily but nor can Indonesia defeat us militarily. And because of our diplomatic struggle, Indonesia will remain a focus of the world community, in Europe, the USA and in the Pacific. The diplomatic struggle will be very arduous and tough for Jakarta. If Indonesia continues to stick stubbornly to its position on East Timor, it may be that our solution will be determined by internal Indonesian factors.

Messages to the world

What is your message to the outside world?

First, to countries prompted by economic factors and other national interests and do not understand what we have gone through or refuse to acknowledge the righteousness of our aspirations. They should realise that we are only struggling for our basic right, for the application of international norms in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

To solidarity organisations, we express deepest gratitude; please intensify your work and devise new forms of struggle. Don't forget that by helping us achieve independence, you are also helping to improve things globally.

To NGOs like Amnesty International and Asia Watch, we say: please try harder to find effective ways of convincing the world that human rights violations do take place in East Timor. This is not just a matter of murder, torture and maltreatment; they should explain also why these violations occur – because our people want freedom.

To our East Timorese countrymen abroad, we say: preserve unity and think of how each of you can become involved. Achieving independence depends first and foremost on our own personal efforts. Take part in the struggle, passively or actively. Don't pursue separate political or religious objectives. What we need now is independence. When we have achieved that, both Fretilin and UDT have said they want a multi-party democracy. ☆

Killings and arrests continue

Several killings and disappearances, and many arrests are reported to have occurred in East Timor in the last three months of 1990, according to a report from human rights circles in Jakarta.

Killings and disappearances

Two students who fled to Lospalos from Dili on 22 October, in the wake of attacks by the security forces on schools and subsequent clashes, are reported to have been killed immediately after being arrested. They are **Francisco Oliveira**, murdered on 23 October and **Marcos Monteiro**, murdered on 24 October 1990.

The whereabouts of two other students, **Mateus Jeronimo** and **Carciliano Oliveira**, who fled from Dili to Lospalos on the same day, are not known.

Another person reported to have been shot dead by troops is **Constantino Kubileki**, who had been fighting with the guerrillas. Kubileki was planning to surrender with three colleagues and approached Indonesian troops to discuss their surrender. When Kubileki was killed, the other three fled back into the bush. This incident occurred in October in Makadiki village, Uatolari sub-district, Viqueque, an area where guerrilla units are known to be active.

Four other killings occurred earlier in the year, all in the district of Viqueque. The victims have been named as **Francisco Cesaltino**, 20 years, a peasant from Loihuno, Viqueque, murdered on 20 April by troops of Battalion 408 in Fatudo; **Candido da Silva**, 25, a peasant from Klalerek Mutin, Viqueque, murdered on 29 April by troops of Battalion 408; **Raul da Silva**, 21, occupation unknown, from Ossorua, Ossu sub-district, murdered on 31.5.1990 in Ossu, Lequimeta sub-district; **Afonso da Silva**, 23, occupation unknown, also from Ossorua, Ossu sub-district.

Arrests

By far the largest number of arrests recorded occurred in the district of Liquica, to the west of Dili, along the north coast. There were four waves of arrests, during which no fewer than 45 people were taken into custody.

On 12 November, at least 22 persons were arrested in Liquica, all of whom are suspected of being in contact with the armed resistance. Four of the detainees, **Filomeno Oliveira**, **Gregorio dos Santos**, head of the agricultural affairs department, district of Liquica, **Carlito dos Santos**, head of Mudika Church, Liquica, and **Jorge Goncalves**, have since been transferred to Comarca-Balide Prison, Dili. The others who include **Antonio Alves**, former village head in Bazartete (a sub-district of Liquica), **Alberto Pereira** and **Jaime**, officials of the information department of the Liquica administration, and **Amadeu dos Santos**, former education department head at the same administration, were still being held at the *kodim* (army headquarters) in Liquica.

A number of arrests also took place in Leorema village, Bazartete sub-district from 23 to 29 November. They include **Jacinto** from Mategou village, Liquica district, a member of the Liquica second-level assembly, DPRD-II.

Seven others were arrested, all on 19 November, in the village of Fahi-Lebo, sub-district of Bazartete, followed on 25 November by five more arrests in Fatunero village in Bazartete sub-district. One of these five, **Estevao Lobato**,

sustained a broken leg when he was struck by a soldier.

Independently of this information, it was reported from Dili late last year that International Red Cross officials were denied permission to visit Liquica and check on reports about prisoners being held there.



Photo: Jan-Erik Forsberg

Flamboyant Hotel, Baucau

The document also includes the names of two armed resistance fighters being held at Flamboyant Hotel, Baucau. They are: **Domingos Pinto**, a Fretilin guerrilla captured in the bush, now being held by Special Task Force 86 of Kopassus (the para-commando red-berets) commanded by Zeki Anwar; and **Olegario**, a Fretilin group commander, captured in the bush and now being held in Hotel Flamboyant. (He may already have been released.)

Hotel Flamboyant, a Portuguese hotel in Baucau, was used for many years after 1975 for interrogation and became notorious as a torture centre. It was renovated and restored for use as a hotel after East Timor was opened to tourists. An English tourist who visited Baucau in mid 1990 and stayed at the hotel, discovered that buildings on the far side of the courtyard are still used as detention cells. He was told that children from a nearby orphanage occasionally come to the hotel to see if a parent is being held there.

During an incident in Ossuluga kampung, Baucau district, two youths were shot at by troops of Battalion 301. They fled to Baucau and reported the incident to local officials.

Background

There are suggestions that the military in East Timor, after trying for months to project a 'softly, softly' image, have changes tactics again. Press reports reveal not only that abuses have worsened but, to quote the BBC (29 October), the army's more relaxed policy "now appears to have been completely abandoned in an attempt to stamp out growing unrest", while Australian AP said Indonesia had increased troops numbers in Dili and were conducting intense search operations. [Sydney Morning Herald, 30 October 1990] ✧

Shanana speaks, Part II

The following is a continuation of the interview of Shanana Gusmao, commander of Falintil, given to the Australian, Robert Domm, when he visited the guerrilla leader in the bush in September last year. The first part of this interview was published in TAPOL Bulletin, No 103, December 1990.

Time is on our side

What is your analysis of the situation in East Timor today? Has it changed significantly recently?

Our struggle is very difficult. Three or four years ago, we were still worrying about what would happen 'after Falintil has been exterminated' but now we see the extermination of Falintil as the price demanded by our country. It is cause for great pleasure and boundless pride in Falintil that our sacrifices have created the basis for a truly national resistance, making it what it is today, an indestructible force.

Internally, the situation is unparalleled and we make no attempt to conceal our pride in saying this. The things we hoped for at the start of this phase have become a brilliant reality, albeit at the cost of many lives of compatriots who have fallen for the country. The confidence we have always had in the Maubere people's inexhaustible willingness to make sacrifices has been proven beyond doubt, giving us absolute faith in the need to win total victory.

Globally, we know time is on our side, not on the side of the generals. Militarily, we in Falintil are convinced we have done our duty; we are more prepared than ever, politically, psychologically and morally, to accept our own extermination, knowing full well that this will not bring the war to an end. The Maubere people will go on fighting and will never surrender, whichever way the winds of history blow. After fifteen years, our people have shown that they have never been discouraged; they know that the war will not end quickly, as long as Jakarta sticks stubbornly to its opinion. This factor best reflects the internal resilience of Maubere resistance.

Maubere traditions are sacred

A new generation of East Timorese has grown up under pressure from Indonesia to forget their own history and 'become Indonesians'. How successful has this been?

Jakarta has always underestimated the strength of Maubere nationalism. In my opinion, the 'hearts and minds policy' relies on the influence that Mario Carrascalao can allegedly exert on the Maubere people. However, this policy, which was Carrascalao's idea, has failed to impress the older generation for the simple reason that the gulf between the two outlooks is far too wide to be bridged by the illusion of material goods.

Mario Carrascalao and Jakarta regard the Maubere people as inhabitants of a territory, on whom to bestow the benefits of 'civilisation'. As they see it, there is no nation, only inhabitants who are reduced to a statistical phenomenon. The political objective is to find the most effective way of healing the wounds of war in the hope that in time, public opinion will change.

But they have not reckoned with the personality of the

Maubere people, the many facets of the Maubere identity (which they have tried to exploit). In a word, they have never taken account of the Maubere soul. The people of East Timor are not at a point where they will use their traditions and folklore to promote tourism, nor do they want to invoke their traditions to recall the legends of their ancestors. The people of East Timor still regard their traditions and customs as something sacred. It is in their traditions and customs that their unique way of seeing things, their way of being, resides. The Maubere people judge themselves by the concept of honour, they are a



proud people who hold material possessions in contempt. The Maubere people work hard but never to get rich; everything they earn from their labour is regarded as a way of bringing their concepts to bear on reality, simply a way to immortalise their traditions and customs. Their existentialist traditions tie them inextricably to mother earth. Their customs are impregnated with real-life experience and with the spirituality that inspires their lives.

Any policy aimed at alienating the superstructure of Maubere thinking and behaviour is doomed to failure while causing a rupture between their concept of mother earth

and, in its wider political context, their concept of the Maubere motherland. This concept of the motherland has been reinforced and consolidated by the invasion, the war and the military occupation.

Material benefits offered by the forces of occupation have been rejected out of hand by the Maubere people who see them as an attempt to compensate for the sacrifices which they decided to make; they were rejected precisely for that reason. Moreover, they regard these benefits as demeaning the values of Maubere consciousness. They look upon material goods as necessities of everyday life, not as the purpose of life; their time on mother earth is a passing phase during which they must prepare themselves for an existence alongside their ancestors. Hence, honour and pride are never expressed through ownership of a house of bricks or a coffee plantation but through the number of cattle they can slaughter for a traditional ceremony, such as a funeral, when the deceased person takes with him or her the bulk of the wealth which, in Timorese eyes, consists of things like *mortens*, *belaks*, *suriks*, *tais* and so on.

In my humble opinion, this is where the real confrontation takes place, a confrontation that turns into political confrontation.

Schooling, which during the Portuguese colonial era was passive, has never held the Maubere people back, for they have always kept their traditions alive. The educational system so hurriedly foisted on the people in the past few years has been unable to destroy the Maubere soul; on the contrary, it has only led to alienation.

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The younger generation can be divided in two: those who, as children, saw the horrors of war, the bitterness, the sufferings, death, atrocities, grew up during the war and, crucially, took part in the resistance. It is difficult for children to forget a father who was slaughtered or a mother who has been ill-treated. It is difficult for children not to be upset about atrocities committed all round them. Inevitably, deep down, a deep hatred wells up against foreigners who have come to kill our people, to outrage and oppress them, with the children being the direct or indirect victims. The other group are those born later; although they did not personally experience the horrors of war, they are well aware of all the injustices and crimes. They naturally take up the struggle because they have absorbed and carry forward the aspirations of their people.

The kinds of struggle pursued by young Mauberes are the inevitable consequence of the continuing war, a genuine manifestation of Maubere nationalism; these young people are the indisputable confirmation of the indestructibility of the Maubere soul. A people will never be reduced to ashes if they are conscious of themselves, they will never be alienated from their own values if they know themselves. The new generation has carried forward that which we from the very beginning sought to unite, to safeguard and consolidate, the *Maubere people and Motherland*. ☆

SOLIDARITY NEWS

AKSI

The new Australian solidarity organisation – AKSI (Action in Solidarity with Indonesia) – held its inaugural workshop in Sydney on December 1, 1990. The aims were:

- 1) to forge links with other groups with similar aims and objectives in Australia;
- 2) to share information concerning the current situation of human rights and other recent socio-political developments in Indonesia;
- 3) to come up with ideas for action to protest human rights violations in Indonesia and Australia's implicit role in this process.

The workshop focussed on human rights in five topics: students, the environment, peasants, workers and self-determination. Motions were carried to support the newly formed union, SBSM; to support a memorandum to be released by the Australian Rainforest Action Groups, calling on the Australian government to ban tropical timber imports immediately; to call on the Indonesian government to release all students, religious and political prisoners currently jailed on trumped-up charges; to monitor the activities of Australian government agencies which are involved in the assistance of rural development programmes in Java and Eastern Indonesia; to call on human rights groups in Indonesia and Australia to respect West Papuan demands for self-determination and to call on the Australian government to give recognition to West Papuans in Australia as refugees.

Endorsements of the AKSI motions, expressions of support etc should be sent to AKSI, PO Box K717, Haymarket, NSW 2000, Australia. Fax: (61) (06) 287 1160. Tel: (61) (02) 660 8391. Email address: peg:awood

Task Force Indonesia

Task Force Indonesia (TFI), set up in October 1990, is "an international network of persons and groups engaged in critical monitoring, research and advocacy on a broad range of policy issues facing contemporary Indonesia." Based at Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland, the new activist organisation aims to bring together persons and groups concerned with Indonesian issues – political, human rights, economic, environmental, social and cultural – into contact through a concerted recruiting effort and the use of modern technology. TFI has set up a number of autonomous issue-related working groups on such issues as East Timor, Aceh, women, transmigration, tribal peoples, poverty, the environment.

For further information about TFI contact: John A. MacDougall, Coordinator, Task Force Indonesia. 7538, Newberry Lane, Lanham-Seabrook, Maryland 20706, USA. Tel: 301-552-3251 Fax: 301-552-4465 Email: apakabar (Peacenet) or 72436.3621 (Compuserve)



Odd words from Carrascalao

It's our oil, says Mario

Mario Carrascalao, the governor of East Timor, who has loyally served the country which has wrought such death and destruction on the people of East Timor, has been coming out with some rather odd statements recently. Take for instance his lament that the East Timorese seem to be losing out from the deal concluded between Indonesia and Australia for the exploitation of the huge off-shore oil reserves south of East Timor.

For years, while the deal was under negotiation, he was silent but when it came up for ratification by the Indonesian Parliament he began to complain. It is important, he said, for the aspirations of the East Timorese people to be reflected in the agreement. He had to admit that he was not consulted about the deal as it was a matter for central government but he felt that he had been confronted with a *fait accompli*.

"It would be unfair and politically unwise for the aspirations of the East Timorese not to be catered for, and still worse if all we were left was to be able to smell (the oil) from afar. What we want, he said, is for the base camp to be located somewhere where our unemployed workers could participate. [*Suara Karya*, 11 September 1990]

A month later, he was even blunter, fearing that the oil companies would base their operations in Kupang, West Timor, not in East Timor.

"I can't agree with this because, if there is anything we contributed by integration with Indonesia, it is this oil. It is our right. If we were not integrated, it would be our right. That is part of our territorial waters." [*Northern Territory News*, 12 October 1990]


But Carrascalao has, perhaps unwittingly, drawn attention to a very important piece of history. Was it not, after all, oil that persuaded Jakarta to stake a claim for East Timor? Australian petroleum companies certainly knew the immense value of the reserves hidden under the Timor Sea and already in 1975, saw the benefits of doing a deal with Indonesia rather than with the Portuguese or the Timorese.

No Portuguese mission, please!

Carrascalao's second foray onto the arena of international relations was to proclaim that the East Timorese do not want a visit by a group of Portuguese parliamentarians. And why should the East Timorese be so strongly against an event for which they have been waiting for years? According to Carrascalao, because "it would bring back the civil war that the people of East Timor have forgotten".

"If the visit really goes ahead there will be rioting in Dili because some people will exploit it to organise demonstrations", giving the MPs the impression that anti-Indonesian sentiments in the province (sic) were still strong. "I say categorically that all the information and reports spread by the foreign media about the East Timorese being anti-Indonesian are not true." [*Jakarta Post*, 31 December 1990]

Carrascalao's words were a godsend for Jakarta if not uttered at Jakarta's behest. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas was quick to respond, saying he fully understood the reason for the governor's remarks. It would be communicated toPortu-



Mario Carrascalao, getting desperate ?

gal so that they know that "the East Timorese people themselves were opposed to the visit". [*Straits Times*, 1 January 1991]

The on-again, off-again mission

For months, Ali Alatas has been grappling with a tricky diplomatic problem – how to prevent the Portuguese MPs from visiting East Timor without exposing Indonesia to any blame for the cancellation of the visit. After plans for the mission to visit East Timor in 1990 had to be abandoned because delay meant that the rainy season made the visit impractical, agreement was reached between Indonesian and Portuguese diplomats in New York that a team of UN officials would go to East Timor as an advance party to prepare the way for the visit.

But things were thrown into confusion when Alatas told a press conference in Jakarta on 24 October that UN officials would accompany the Portuguese MPs because they could not be trusted to produce an objective report of their findings. Now, it seems, Jakarta is saying that the MPs will not be allowed to go to East Timor unless UN officials go with them. It has yet to be seen whether this is Lisbon's interpretation. With the MP's mission thrown into such confusion, how convenient for Jakarta to be able to tell Lisbon that the MPs are not wanted in East Timor because Carrascalao, of all people, has said so.

Australian MPs to visit East Timor

While negotiations drag on about the Portuguese visit, Jakarta and Canberra have reached agreement for seven Australian parliamentarians to visit East Timor during the first week of February. It is hardly a coincidence that this is during the early part of the six-week session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. On its agenda is the resolution of the Human Rights Sub-Commission adopted at its session last August, calling on the Commission to consider the situation in East Timor. Indonesia, attending the Commission for the first time this year as a member, will be working desperately hard to undermine any moves to censure it over East Timor, and a favourable report from 'objective' Australian MPs will come in very handy.

The seven MPs include four from the Australian Labour Party, two from the Liberal Party and one from the National Party. Heading the team will be Leo McLeay, Speaker of the House of Representatives. ★

Another look at 1965

A leading Jakarta weekly has taken a fresh look at the events of October 1965. It published startling new revelations about CIA information that generals would be killed.

The Jakarta weekly, *Tempo* [6 October 1990] has published a series of articles with new insights into the events of October 1965. Unusually for any Indonesian publication, it argues that much is still unknown about what really happened. Although it is said that 'time heals all wounds', the journal believes that time could also unearth a lot of secrets.

The role of Adam Malik

One article is based largely on CIA assessments of the political conflicts in Indonesia prior to and following 1 October 1965. One CIA document dated 30 December 1964 discussed possible scenarios should President Sukarno die. The armed forces (ABRI) was determined to prevent the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) from taking power. The CIA believed there was little chance that ABRI would be able to seize power in the event of Sukarno dying soon, and says it planned to collaborate with a civilian who managed to come forward. The most likely person was thought to be Adam Malik, then the minister of foreign trade and well-known for his anti-communist views.

But the CIA recognised that as long as Sukarno remained president, the PKI would grow in strength; if Sukarno stayed alive for another five years, the chances of the PKI taking power were high.

The name of Adam Malik crops up in another of the *Tempo* articles. This considers the revelation by Kathy

Kadane in *The Washington Post* [23 May 1990] that US embassy official, Robert Martens, who collected five thousand names of communists and passed them on to the Indonesians, shared his names with Kim Adhyatman, the personal aide of Adam Malik. Although retired army intelligence officers like Sutopo Yuwono and Yoga Sugomo have denied that these names were of any significance in the army's crackdown against the PKI, *Tempo* now quotes Adhyatman as saying that Martens *did* have important information not known to the army, for instance the list of members of D.N. Aidit's *Biro Khusus*, the body which maintained Aidit's links with what were believed to be sympathetic army officers.

Adhyatman always gave any new names he got from Martens to Adam Malik who was 'very anti-PKI.' He goes on to say that Adam Malik's link with the army 'was very close indeed. He met General Yani [then the army commander] once or twice a week.'

Another CIA document makes it clear that the CIA already knew in September 1965 that plans to murder Indonesian generals were afoot. On 14 September, Brig.General Parman, the army's intelligence chief, (himself among the six who were murdered on 1 October) told General Yani of the plan. Yani reported this to Sukarno giving him a list of the generals who were targeted. The list included all the six who were killed, plus General Nasution who escaped, and another three generals, Suharto, Mursyid and Sukendro. Yani had been told the attacks would occur on 18 September but when nothing happened, he gave no further credence to the report. [This raises the question why the three were removed from the list. The explanation regarding Sukendro is probably straightforward; he was abroad on the day it happened. Mursyid played no further part after the murders, unlike Suharto who was unquestionably ready to take action against the plotters. Many who read *Tempo's* account will be wondering why Suharto's name was removed from the list.]

Another document quoted at some length by *Tempo* was written by Edward E. Masters, chief politics officer at the embassy, who later became the US ambassador in Jakarta. In the document written three weeks after 1 October, Masters is quoted as saying: "Luckily, some key generals escaped and one of them, Suharto, was ready to fight back and he had the troops to do so." Only too true, except that Suharto did not escape; no-one tried to kidnap him. Masters also wrote that, after the events of 1 October, it would have been best for the army had the PKI staged an open revolt as this would have given the army the chance to crush it. A campaign to pulverise the PKI, if successful, would, according to Masters, completely paralyse the communists. This is indeed what happened, says *Tempo*. Masses of people attacked the PKI, tearing it to pieces. By January 1966, the CIA was able to report to Washington that the PKI had ceased to exist.

No. 4 - 5, January - June 1990

SETIAKAWAN

A Call for International Solidarity on Indonesian Tropical Forest Issues

REVEALING
MODERN GENOCIDE
ON PAPUA LAND

SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION
OF ASIA'S AMAZON

World Bandits Set Foot
in Irian Jaya



This packed issue of the journal of Skephi (NGO Network for Forest Conservation in Indonesia), a hefty 96-page issue, can be obtained from TAPOL. £3.00 plus £1.00 post & packing (UK or surface worldwide) or £3.00 (air).

More on the massacres

Another of *Tempo's* articles produces evidence of the unbridled campaign of slaughter unleashed against communist suspects in Indonesia from October 1965. Bitter social conflicts had broken out in 1965, with anti-communists mustering their forces as the PKI showed its muscle. In particular, the struggle by the PKI and its peasants' union, BTI to take unilateral actions to implement land reform decreed by law, led anti-communists to intensify their preparations for a showdown.

Militants from Muslim and nationalist organisations sought mystical powers to protect themselves in dealing with the PKI. Everyone was 'getting ready for combat'. In Bandung, nature-lovers were given military training by the RPKAD (para-commandos) who also trained young non-communists (sic) in Solo, especially after 1 October.

Tempo then gives details of many killings that followed the failure of the 1 October plot, in which communist suspects were the victims of revenge. (Such information has never before, to our knowledge, been openly divulged in the Indonesian media.)

* In Pupuan Village, Tabanan, Bali, PKI members were drive to the edge of a hole then beaten or struck down. Elsewhere, people who were still alive were carried with their hands and feet tied, the way pigs are carried.

* In Central and East Java, violence proved unavoidable. Some youths returning from a demonstration to welcome the RPKAD in Solo on 22 October 1965, were set upon by members of the *Pemuda Rakyat* (leftwing youth organisation); 28 members of nationalist and Muslim organisations died. On hearing this, non-communist groups went into action and arrested tens of thousands of PKI people. At the time, it was estimated that 60% of the 450,000 inhabitants of Solo were PKI members. "About a thousand were shot dead because they tried to escape," said Djoko Sediono, commander of the 'Blue Jackets' operations corps. There was no slitting of throats in Solo, as happened

in East Java. Some took the law into their own hands, but only in remote villages, beyond the army's reach.'

'Our task was not to murder PKI detainees... but to capture them and hand them over to the Interrogation Team,' said Mucharom, deputy commander of the 'Blue Jackets'. Another source said that a number of PKI captives 'were shot on orders from higher up'. He said they were 'loaned' [*dibon*] from their place of detention on the pretext that they were being moved.

* In Yogyakarta, no fewer than 30,000 were arrested, though only about half were communists. (Retired) Colonel Mus Subagyo, former commander of Yogya military police said 'it was the army that cleaned up (sic) the PKI'.

* In Medan, North Sumatra, where social conflict had been particularly intense, organised Muslim youngsters attacked a PKI centre in Kampung Kolam, 15 kilometres from Medan. During a series of assaults, no fewer than 5,000 PKI people were murdered. The bodies were thrown in the river. 'For six months, no-one wanted to eat fish from the river because they often found human fingers inside the fish.'

* Revulsion was the response of a civil guard in Pasuruan, East Java who witnessed mass killings of PKI people. Every night, dozens of PKI prisoners were '*dibon*' from the detention centres and taken to Kedung Gambir, south Pasuruan or to a disused Japanese airfield in Raci where they were slaughtered, 'By five pm, Pasuruan was as quiet as a graveyard. People were too sickened to go out.' The proprietor of a factory in Pasuruan, a member of the Muslim party, Masyumi, tried to protect two employees from being killed because they were thought to be PKI members. He told them to climb a tree; the next morning, he took them to the village office and told them to become members of another party.

* In Wonosobo, Central Java, a former local Nahdatul Ulama branch chairman, now 67 years old, was also disgusted by the whole thing. He said a PKI member sought protection from him on 5 October 1965. 'I wanted the PKI to be banned but I didn't want their people to be killed. That was anarchy, leading to chaos.'

'Ex-PKI screened for the right to vote

The Head of the Social and Political Affairs Department of the Central Java administration, Colonel Misnadi, announced in November that about 300,000 former PKI prisoners were being screened to determine whether they would be allowed to vote at the 1992 general elections. However, the security apparatus still needed to maintain vigilance against untoward developments, said the colonel.

The public was called upon to watch out for groups which surreptitiously try to find cracks through which to infiltrate the community. Some groups, he said, try to influence the community by making a pretence of defending the people or defending human rights, but their real motive was to cause unrest. A month later, Colonel Misnadi announced that 291,000 former PKI prisoners would be allowed to vote in 1992, after being subjected to stringent investigations. "Those who have been given the right to vote have a well-established awareness of citizenship," he said.

A total of 9,000 would not be allowed to vote because they were still being given guidance.

Still prohibited from going abroad

A prohibition on ex-members of the PKI to travel abroad is still in force. The immigration authorities will not consider passport applications from ex PKI members unless they wish to travel for specified reasons and have a recommendation from the provincial social and political affairs department, said the head of Surabaya's Immigration Office. An example was given of a passport application from somebody in Mojokerto. Cleverly (sic), the applicant attached a 'good-conduct' certificate from the local police to the effect that the applicant had not been a member of a banned organisation.

But the application form raised suspicions because the applicant's identity card number had not been entered by the police. After further investigation, the applicant [identified in the news item as 'TS', 62 years old; his street and city was added, for good measure] was found to have been a former PKI member.

The 6th NFIP Conference

For the second time, TAPOL sent an observer to the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific, in Aotearoa in November. About 130 people from 28 countries discussed a number of burning issues in the Pacific area. For TAPOL, West Papua and East Timor were top priorities. For the first time, the South Moluccas was also on the NFIP agenda.

The NFIP movement has, since the start, been a movement with different interests. The many issues – nuclearisation, militarisation, colonisation, land rights, destruction of the environment, liberation struggles and many other issues are dealt with at one and the same time. This has always been the strength of the NFIP movement, the ability to synthesize all the movements in the area, each pursuing similar or different issues for a better world. But this heterogeneity has brought problems in establishing priorities and focal points. Attending an NFIP conference is an enriching experience, an opportunity to hear diverse country reports from dedicated activists in the region.

Fifteen years on, the well-tested NFIP movement has shown that it is a viable movement that will continue for as long as necessary.

The Aotearoa conference

In many ways the latest conference was quite distinct from earlier ones, in particular the Manila conference three years ago. Firstly, the balance between the two core issues – the nuclear free issue and the independence issue as expressed in the movement's name. In Manila, during the workshops and the special themes, the conference organisers succeeded in creating a balance between the two issues.

In practice, the two issues are a source of friction between NFIP participants because of the difference in emphasis and focus. In the Poworenga (the name of the Maori marae, the site of the conference) workshop themes, the emphasis shifted decisively away from denuclearisation and focused on matters like political and economic independence, land rights, militarisation and the grave question of the Johnston Atoll chemical dumping, Bougainville, Fiji, West Papua and East Timor. It is still too early to tell, but the end of the cold war may explain why the nuclear issue has become less prominent.

But at the same time, an artificial division was created between indigenous and non-indigenous issues. This created unnecessary frictions and tensions. It has to be assumed that anyone attending the NFIP conference should adhere to the NFIP Charter, irrespective of their ethnic background. Judging from the spirit of the conference, future NFIP conferences will hopefully put an end to this division.

As with any conference, other flaws could be mentioned, but many of the unresolved matters will hopefully be tackled in the more frequent regional meetings. Many of the issues could not be resolved in a few days of conference, fundamental issues such as guidelines if indigenous people are being oppressed by their own elite, complicated issues like Bougainville's right to self-determination, the increas-

ing development of capitalism/free-trade zones in the Pacific area, and militarisation (including military coups) in the Pacific region. In the spirit of the NFIP movement it is to be hoped that a lot of research and input will give the NFIP movement the proper tools and guidelines to function in an internationalist way.

The Indonesian colonies

The conference welcomed the inclusion of the South Moluccas into Region 2 (later, endorsed in a resolution) and therefore will create a new forum for the South Moluccans to promote their right to self-determination and to present the history of the region in an objective way. The West Papuan delegation forwarded a strong resolution in which they urged the NFIP member organisations to pressure their respective governments to grant asylum to West Papuan refugees and activists; to grant scholarships to West Papuans and to respond positively to calls for West Papua's promotion to observer status within the Melanesian Spearhead Group and the South Pacific Forum. Two resolutions on East Timor were endorsed at the conference – an urgent resolution on the fate and imprisonment of young East Timorese independence fighters, and a resolution reconfirming the commitment of NFIP members to actively promote the independence struggle of East Timor; to disseminate information on the issue; to hold annual protests on 7 December, the day of the Indonesian invasion and to find financial support for the Timorese struggle. Needless to say all three regions are equally seen by the NFIP members as Indonesian colonies in the Pacific region. In the discussion on the situation in Fiji, Indonesia's encroachment through military supplies to Rabuka were seen as a grave danger and part of the process of militarisation in the region. The participants left the conference, the Gulf crisis in full swing, with a determination to improve the work and coordination of the NFIP. ★

Indonesia Conference is good news!

Peacenet's reg.indonesia conference accessible on all APC partner electronic mail networks, is a project of TFI and Indonesia Publications. It is a cheap and easy way of keeping up to date with the latest news on Indonesia, East Timor and West Papua and provides an international forum for solidarity groups, academics, students and other Indonesia-watchers.

Military blocks farmers' protest

Seventy peasants from Cianjur district in West Java were stopped on their way to Jakarta, on December 20, to protest against the seizure of their land by the state forestry company, Perhutani. Together with ten students accompanying them and their lawyer from the Bandung Legal Aid Institute (LBH), they were 'escorted' back to Cianjur by security men. The students, ten peasants and the lawyer were then taken in for questioning. During the interrogation, the detainees were beaten. They were later released.

The peasants, from Cimaewahgirang in Cikalongkulon subdistrict, were on the way to Parliament in Jakarta to protest the loss of 400 hectares of land they have cultivated since 1944. In 1967 the farmers made payments to the local land reform committee which entitled them to a 'Letter-C' document, confirming them as the lawful cultivators of the land. Perhutani has refused to acknowledge the peoples' rights and has claimed the land for a social forestry programme.

According to forestry conservation NGO SKEPHI, 'The social forestry programme widely advocated by the Department of Forestry on behalf of the government, along with

Perhutani, does not in fact promote the people's interests. Development in the forestry sector is directed towards the exploitation of the forest lands rather than promoting the social and cultural needs of the local community. It is clear from a number of field studies that the forestry authorities frequently ignore traditional communal forestry ownership. In other words, the social forestry programme so far is run by business operating as an extension of the government.'

LBH open letter

In an open letter to Armed Forces Commander Gen. Try Sutrisno, LBH Chairman Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara and Secretary Achmad Santoso, called for the security officers who harassed the farmers to be punished. They also demanded security for the farmers, voicing their concern that the military would continue to intimidate the farmers. "Stopping the bus and maltreating the farmers was illegal," said the letter dated 21 December.

[Sources: *Jakarta Post*, December 24 & 27, 1990, *Media Indonesia* 21 December 1990, SKEPHI statement, 21 December 1990] ★

Yogya students oppose Visit Indonesia Year

Visit Indonesia Year 1991 will only favour investors and suppress the poor, said students from Yogyakarta and villagers from Parang Tritis in Central Java protesting against the programme. The protesters, who assembled on Yogyakarta's Jalan Malioboro in the morning of December 29, marched to the city hall after distributing leaflets and copies of statements to the public.

A woman student and a leader of the villagers read out statements expressing concern over the inappropriate development of Parang Tritis, a tourist resort on the south coast of the province. Speaking for the student group *Simpatis*, the student said tourism related projects had affected local inhabitants. "They have incurred losses through the land acquisition process." She said that the students were concerned at the fate of the Parang Tritis residents who had gradually been edged out by tourism. "The Parang Tritis residents are becoming vagabonds in their own town. They were born here, but they no longer possess land." [Source: *Jakarta Post*, 31 December 1990]

Women's Rights Protest

About 30 women – students from several universities in Yogyakarta, Central Java, and housewives – demonstrated at the Yogya local Assembly (DPRD) in December. The women, grouped under the Yogyakarta Women's Discussion Forum wanted to remind the Assembly that they should not forget women's rights.

With red ribbons tied around their heads, the protestors carried posters saying "Give Women Back Their Rights"

"Stop Exploitation of Women", "Increase the Wages of Women Workers", entered the DPRD grounds where they waited to meet the Chairman and his staff. While waiting they sang songs and held poetry readings, attracting the attention of passers by who packed the pavements on Jalan Malioboro. The DPRD members eventually received the women and told them they accepted their suggestions in principle, but that they involved matters beyond the DPRD's authority. [Source: *Jawa Pos*, December 24, 1990] ★

West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

The first two editions of this book appeared in 1983 and 1984. This third edition, published in response to continuing demand, has been substantially revised and updated, with new data on military operations, an appendix on the murder of the well-known West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap, and recent information about the exploitation of West Papua's natural resources.

Published by Tapol, the
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West Papua:
The
Obliteration
of a People



Arms sales to Indonesia must stop

On 21 November 1990, British Aerospace took out a full-page advertisement in one of Jakarta's leading dailies, *Suara Pembaruan*. Under the headline, Spear Head, Britain's leading arms manufacturer, describes the features of its Hawk ground-attack aircraft (20 are now operational in Indonesia), the Rapier, the "well-tested defence system against low-flying aircraft" also now being deployed in Indonesia, the Harrier jet, capable of vertical take-off and landing, the Landrover which is "particularly suitable for rough terrain", and the Sea Skua, a "hi-tech guided missile".

Such high profile advertising in a widely-read daily newspaper is usually intended to excite the general public's interest in advance of a deal, and there have been hints of a forthcoming deal. The London *Sunday Times* [September 30 1990] reported that "British Aerospace is close to winning a deal worth several hundred million pounds from Indonesia for its Hawk jet in the latest of a spate of orders".

In March 1990, the same company flew two Tornados of the Interdictor Strike type to Jakarta, under the auspices of the British embassy, in a bid to win a huge order for this "all-weather strike aircraft". This is the second time this bomber has been displayed in Indonesia in two years. The Tornado which is spreading so much death and devastation in Iraq is manufactured by Panavia, a company jointly owned by German, Italian and British arms manufacturers.

Since 1978 - when the slaughter in East Timor was reaching a climax - the UK has become a leading arms supplier to Indonesia. Besides the two squadrons of Hawks, Britain has supplied £340 million worth of Rapier air defence missiles, three 'tribal class' frigates, seawolf missile launchers, and Saladin, Saracen and Ferret armoured cars.

continuation from page 11

to allow time for a proper investigation of the off-shore region, or accept the findings of experienced Indonesian geologists.

The Iraq-Kuwait spectre

As it happens, the controversy raged in the wake of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait after a dispute over Baghdad's objection to Kuwaiti exploitation of oil resources claimed by Iraq. Using the analogy, some officials warned that any delay in ratification might lead Australian companies to end their moratorium on exploiting Timor oil, with unpredictable consequences. Alatas warned that a protracted conflict over the oil could threaten peace and security in the region. Such scare-mongering was designed to increase the pressure on MPs.

Darwin Forum calls for suspension

A few weeks earlier, a forum in Darwin unanimously called for the suspension of the Treaty "until the conflict in East Timor is resolved and the East Timorese people exercise their right of self-determination acknowledged by the UN". It called on the Australian government to support efforts at the UN to ensure the resolution of the conflict instead of



Full page British Aerospace ad in an Indonesian newspaper.

The chief supplier is British Aerospace, which built the army's Institute of Technology in Malang East Java, at a cost of £3 million and has a wide-ranging programme of cooperation with Indonesia's aerospace company, IPTN.

Pressure on the British government

We call on our readers in the UK to write to your MP. Ask her/him to urge the government to halt arms sales to Indonesia. The major industrial countries refused to halt arms sales to Iraq, bolstering a regime that violated human rights with impunity and decided to trample underfoot the rights of a neighbouring country. Saddam Hussein was entitled to think: "If Suharto could get away with grabbing East Timor, why shouldn't I do the same?"

Stop all arms sales to Indonesia without delay!

putting public resources into the exploitation of the petroleum potential of the Timor Gap.

Evans' 'blazing trail'

In a written statement to the Forum, Senator Evans described the Treaty as a "trail blazing agreement". In an oblique reference to events in the Middle East, he said it challenged the idea that drawn-out border disputes of strategic importance will ultimately lead to armed conflict.

Senator Evans rejected the view that the Treaty is an impediment to an independent East Timor.

"The fact is that by 1979, when negotiations on the Treaty commenced, there was no realistic prospect that East Timor would become an independent entity. That is still the case and would continue to be the case in the absence of the Treaty. Since 1979, successive Australian governments have taken the view that, whatever the unhappy (sic) circumstances of Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor, that incorporation should be recognised on a *de jure* basis."

This statement ignores the fact that Australia's *de facto* and *de jure* recognition were the essential preliminaries to negotiations about the oil.

Stop the Gulf War and hold referenda in West Papua and East Timor

On January 14, the eve of the Gulf War, a new Committee against the War in the Gulf, which includes human rights, student and Muslim groups, issued a statement strongly opposing the war. The statement also made a call for referenda in East Timor and West Papua, the first time such a demand has been made publicly in Indonesia.

On 21 January, hundreds of protestors called for an end to the war in demonstrations outside the US embassy and the Bank of America.

A Call for the End to War

Since the end of the Second World War, a tiny group of people in control of the American government and economy have, in defence of their own economic and political interests, regularly dragged their people into war. This has happened despite opposition from the American people themselves and the American people's own desire for peace. We continue to hold the belief that the American people love peace. They do not want history to repeat itself: every generation of American people suffer the bitter effects of war.

Those using war to protect their own economic and political interests always endeavour to make their reasons sound beautiful: we hear the terms World Policeman or Defenders of Democracy. Yet, history shows that such words are no more than slogans: they always cover up a policy of double standards. We, the countries of the third world, have so often felt just how these people have operated to destabilise our security, political, cultural, and economic life. Our natural resources are ravished, while we remain poverty stricken; our so-called independent and active foreign policies are twisted and turned into policies in support of their interests; their cultural values which our own irresponsible leaders allow to be imposed to rob our people of their moral heritage and their values of human solidarity; and several Third World countries have felt directly the oppression of direct military aggression. Even when this tiny group has not ordered direct aggression they are often playing behind the scenes, giving or selling military equipment to our governments on the one hand while trying to pit one against the other on the other hand.

Even the most stupid person understands that war is always against the interest of the people. It is always the ordinary people that suffer the most loss of life. Human and natural resources, which would be better used to solve problems of human welfare, are wasted. The environment and eco-system is damaged, also raising the possibility of affecting the climate or bringing on a green-house effect.

For these reasons, the ANTI GULF WAR COMMITTEE call for the comprehensive resolution of the Gulf Crisis, through the following means:

1. The withdrawal of the multi-national and Iraqi forces from their respective areas of aggression;



Demonstration in front of the US embassy in Jakarta

2. So that such a crisis as the Gulf Crisis, which in its essence stems from and is itself a violation and rejection of human rights, is not repeated again, then other similar cases and problems should also be resolved. Such cases include: the case of the Palestinian people, the East Timor people, the West Papuan people, the South African people, the Cambodian people, the Panamanian people, the Northern Ireland people, the Filipino people and so on. These peoples should be allowed to resolve their situations through referenda.

3. There should be a referendum as soon as possible in Kuwait.

4. The control of the waters of the Gulf should be left in the hands of the peoples of the Gulf themselves.

5. All those who have suffered as a result of this crisis should be compensated. ★

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