


acfoa

DEVELOPMENT DOSSIER 1



EAST TIMOR TODAY

ACFOA DEVELOPMENT DOSSIER 1

Editor this issue: *Pat Walsh*

Layout and design: *Gay Woods and Pat Walsh*

Original drawings: *Chris Murphy*

Typesetting: *Alpha Typesetting & Art Service, Canberra*

Printing and circulation: *ACFOA*

Development Dossier incorporates *Development News Digest* which has now ceased publication.

Development Dossier is published four times a year and provides an in-depth treatment of one topic or theme per issue to make up a document of ready reference value.

The dossier is directed at voluntary aid agencies, Parliamentarians, people in government, universities, schools and members of development action and community groups.

Opinions expressed in DD are not necessarily those of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid or its member agencies.

P.O. Box 1562

Canberra City, ACT 2601

Phone: (062) 47 4822

Registered for posting as a Periodical — Category B

ISSN 0155-0489

Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Editorial | 3 |
| East Timor at a glance | 5 |
| A brief chronological history of East Timor | 6 |
| ACFOA policy on East Timor 1975-1979 | 7 |
| The NGO's and East Timor | 8 |
| The United Nations and East Timor | 15 |
| The Politics of Aid to East Timor | 16 |
| East Timor: How many have died? | 22 |
| Timorese Family Reunions: Politics before people | 26 |
| Children without parents | 31 |
| Timorese Refugees in Portugal: A Community in Mourning | 32 |
| Australian Military Aid to Indonesia | 37 |
| An Indonesian Perspective on East Timor | 41 |
| Interview with Jim Dunn: The East Timor issue today | 43 |
| East Timor: a multi-media survey 1975-1980 | 47 |

Notes on Contributors

Jim Dunn is Chairman of the Human Rights Council of Australia . . . **Helen Hill** is doing research at the Centre for Continuing Education in Canberra . . . **Jill Jolliffe** is the Lisbon correspondent for the London Guardian . . . **Brendan O'Dwyer** is Extension Officer for the Centre of Continuing Education in Canberra . . . **Mark Raper** is the Director of the Asian Bureau Australia in Melbourne . . . **Richard Tanter** is lecturing in Politics at the Swinburne College of Advanced Education in Melbourne . . . **Bill Tully** is a librarian at the Australian National Library in Canberra . . . **Pat Walsh** works with Action for World Development in Melbourne.

Glossary of Terms

ACFOA — Australian Council for Overseas Aid
APODETI — Popular Democratic Association of Timorese
CRS — Catholic Relief Services
DRET — Democratic Republic of East Timor
FRETILIN — Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
ICRC — International Committee of the Red Cross
IDEC — International Disaster Emergencies Committee
IRC — Indonesian Red Cross
NGO — Non-Government Organisation
RAFT — Campaign to Reunite in Australia the Families of Timorese
UDT — Timorese Democratic Union



COMMUNITY AID ABROAD
156 GEORGE STREET,
FITZROY, 3065

Editorial

by Pat Walsh

Because East Timor is only rarely mentioned in the Australian media, many wrongly assume it is no longer an issue that requires attention. Nothing could be further from the truth.

This first edition of *Development Dossier* aims to correct this false impression by identifying and back-grounding some of the problems affecting the East Timorese people inside and outside East Timor. It is particularly directed to all who subscribe to the sacredness of human rights. Even a cursory reading of this Dossier will show that the situation of the Timorese demands that action for justice must be escalated not wound down.

This Dossier will be scrutinised, and rightly so, for unhealthy bias, error and omission. The conspicuous omission is the lack of an in-depth coverage of the key issue, namely, the military and political situation inside Timor today. Indonesia's systematic exclusion of independent observers from East Timor, which in itself suggests that an abnormal situation prevails there which Indonesia prefers the world did not know about, is responsible for this. The evidence that is available, however, strongly suggests that the situation is far from resolved, that the Timorese continue to offer significant military and attitudinal resistance to the Indonesian occupation. As a recent Church report expressed it: "The people are not co-operative, not reconciliatory". Overseas Timorese concur and continue to press the case for the right of self-determination of Timor where, unlike Zimbabwe, it has never been exercised.

The bias in this Dossier is readily detectable. Its perspective is that of the East Timorese people. Their needs and aspirations are the principal reference point even though this means the exclusion of other reference points based on less worthy considerations.

The needs of the East Timorese are clearly peace, justice and economic development. The reality is one-sixth to one-third of the population dead or missing, massive dis-

placement of the people, the destruction of the economy, abuses of human rights, separation of families, a severely traumatised and demoralised people, and aid hand-outs.

It is indisputable that the cause of this profound destabilisation of East Timor has been the violence of Indonesia's forced integration. As the International Red Cross put it after their July 1979 survey: "military operations" are responsible for the displacement of people and their Biafra like condition. Plainly the East Timorese have not benefited from integration. It has meant oppression not liberation, misery not hope. As a letter sent from Timor in April this year put it: "A discontent which is difficult to explain now reigns in Timor . . . we are oppressed to the very tips of the hair on our heads". Indonesia is not only in breach of international law and morality and the will of the Timorese; it has also, in plain language, made a terrible mess of things in Timor. It follows logically and inescapably that it should withdraw from the Territory for the sake of the Timorese.

From this perspective it is simply not enough to reduce the East Timor, internationally, to an aid problem. Nor is it enough for the ICRC inside Timor to dispense material aid without justice.

For its part the Catholic Relief Services program is highly ambiguous. The fact that CRS aid is coming through Indonesian channels and is being used for the maintenance of structures of oppression places the Timorese in a terrible dilemma. The aid is accepted with mixed feelings, for whilst survival dictates they must have it, at the same time it comes to them, on the ground, from the Indonesians whom they see as the murderers of their families and the destroyers of their ways and legitimate aspirations. As has been said in another context: "The sour fact is that much of what goes for aid is like a handshake with death. The death of freedom, of dignity, of self-respect and, ultimately, of the right to live".

Many will agree that the key to

Timorese dignity and happiness is a properly supervised act of self-determination, the pre-requisite for which is Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor. But they will reject the proposition as sheer idealism arguing that the Indonesian occupation makes it unrealisable. Overlooking its strenuous efforts to secure the release of the American hostages from Iran, the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan and Vietnam from Kampuchea, the Australian Government, for example, considers — for its own pragmatic reasons — that efforts to achieve self-determination for East Timor are "pointless (and) incapable for practical implementation".



Such a stance subverts the widely applied principle of diplomatic and other non-violent activity as a means of realising change. It also flies in the face of history which clearly demonstrates, in the case of Indonesia itself and elsewhere, that international pressure for change does work.

There can be little doubt that Indonesia would be forced to reconsider its position if serious political and other forms of pressure were brought to bear. Are the 62 countries who voted against Indonesia at the UN doing more than putting their hands up for a vote once a year? What are the possibilities of more assertive action on the part of other Governments, the world aid agencies, the international Christian community — in particular the Vatican — not to mention the many concerned individuals and organisations in the West and within Indonesia itself?

The right of the East Timorese to self-determination must remain the basic quest for it holds the key to the many problems affecting the Timorese addressed in this Dossier. In the meantime the struggle to reunite families and redress the other sub-issues must be writ-large on the agenda of the world's conscience. To these ends, it is to be hoped that the contents of this Dossier will be given the widest possible circulation and popularisation.


EAST TIMOR

Atauro Is.
Maumeta



GEOGRAPHY

Timor is a rugged, crocodile-shaped island of great beauty situated 350 miles NW of Darwin across the Timor Sea. It is the largest of the Lesser Sunda islands. East Timor comprises the eastern half of Timor, plus the off-shore islands of Atauro and Jaco and the enclave of Oecusse in West Timor. It is comparable in size and population to Fiji. The 150 mi length of East Timor is dominated by tumbled mountains rising in places to 10,000 ft. The drier north coast is lined by swamps and cliffs, while the southern coast consists of an undulating plain which extends inland. The vegetation varies between savannah and rainforest. The climate is tropical with the usual hot, dry season with temperatures constant at 80-90°F and the monsoon when the rivers flood and the roads are unusable. Only one harvest is possible on the north coast, where the dry season is the longest in South-East Asia, but the November-June wet season on the south makes two harvests possible there. Erosion and deforestation are significant problems.



THE ECONOMY

East Timor, though potentially rich, has never been developed and consequently the country and the bulk of the people are poor. Pre-1975, most of the people survived on subsistence agriculture supplemented by food-gathering and hunting (deer, pig). Corn and rice were the staple crops, but tapioca, potatoes, peppers and pumpkins were also grown plus some citrus and tropical fruits. Slash and burn techniques were common and the soil was prepared with digging sticks or by trampling with water buffalo.

A small export and retail sector existed alongside this peasant economy. Coffee, and some rubber and tobacco were grown and exported. The Chinese and a small number of Portuguese dominated this sector. Only 200-300 shops were in the hands of the Timorese. The Portuguese 'escudo' served as the unit of currency. To a large proportion of the population the yearly tax was a crippling burden and the many who could not pay were forced to work it off, generally on the roads.

Generally speaking, agricultural production was extremely low despite its potential and industry virtually non-existent, contributing to a chronic trade imbalance.

East Timor at a glance

THE PEOPLE

The population in 1974 before the civil war and Indonesian invasion was approximately 680,000. A large proportion of these were concentrated in a band from either side of Dili, the capital, to the south coast, contrasting with the sparsely-populated eastern region. All but 16,000 of these were indigenous Timorese, the latter group consisting mainly of Chinese (10,000) and Portuguese. Most of the people were animist but there were also some 200,000 Roman Catholics and small groups of Protestants, Muslims and Confucianists. East Timor has been a racial meeting-point populated by successive waves of migrants, predominantly Malay and Melanesian. These migrations occurred many centuries ago so that a distinct Timorese culture existed well before European colonisation.

Portuguese, Arab, Chinese and African elements, in varying proportions and with varying impacts, have been added since.

Traditional Timor was divided into small kingdoms ruled by tribal chiefs or liurai. Of the 30 dialects spoken in Timor, Tetum is the most widely used. Viability is not necessarily dependent on size; some 30 UN member-states have populations of less than one million.



A Brief Chronological History of East Timor

| | | | |
|----------------|--|-----------------|---|
| 1520 | Portuguese traders arrive in Timor. | 1976, Sept. | 1400 refugees evacuated from West Timor to Portugal. |
| 1702 | Fifty years of rebellion against Portuguese rule. | 1976, Nov. 17 | UN General Assembly (61-18) rejects Indonesian takeover of Timor. |
| 1904 | Dutch and Portuguese Governments finalise boundaries between East and West Timor. | 1976, Nov. 19 | Reports that widespread fighting continues in East Timor, that Fretilin controls 85 per cent of the territory, that 60,000 people have died. |
| 1912 | Large-scale rebellion against Portuguese rule. | 1977, March | US Congressional Hearings hear allegations of Indonesian atrocities in East Timor from Jim Dunn. |
| 1926 | Salazar assumes power in Portugal. | 1977, April | Timorese in Australia nominate 2668 relatives for admission from East Timor. |
| 1941 | Australian troops despatched to neutral Timor to fight the Japanese. | 1977, Sept. | Xavier do Amaral replaced as President of DRET |
| 1949 | Indonesia (including West Timor) wins independence from the Netherlands. | 1977, Dec. 1 | UN General Assembly (68-20) calls on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. |
| 1974, April | Military coup in Lisbon against Caetano regime; decolonisation process commenced; ASDT (later Fretilin), UDT and Apodeti parties form in East Timor. | 1978, Jan. | Australia extends de facto recognition to Indonesia's takeover of East Timor. |
| 1974, Sept. | Whitlam tells Suharto independent East Timor unviable and threat to regional security but should decide its own future. | 1978, May | Reports of intensified fighting. |
| 1975, Jan. | UDT and Fretilin enter into a pro-independence coalition. | 1978, Sept. | Foreign Ambassadors, shocked by visit to East Timor, call for urgent humanitarian aid. |
| 1975, August | UDT coup and civil war resulting in some 3000 deaths, the displacement of refugees to Australia and West Timor, and Fretilin victory. | 1978, Dec. 3 | Fretilin radio link with outside world ceases. |
| 1975, Sept. | International Red Cross and ACFOA work in Timor. | 1978, Dec. 6 | UN General Assembly asserts East Timor's right to self-determination. |
| 1975, October | Five Australian newsmen killed at Balibo during Indonesian incursions into East Timor. | 1978, Dec. 31 | Death of Nicolau Lobato, President of DRET. |
| 1975, Nov. 28 | Fretilin declares independence and proclaims the Democratic Republic of East Timor. | 1978, Xmas | First and only visit of Australian immigration team to Dili. |
| 1975, Dec. 6 | Ford and Kissinger complete visit to Jakarta. | 1979, Jan. | 99 Timorese arrive in Australia from East Timor. |
| 1975, Dec. 7 | Full-scale Indonesian invasion launched. | 1979, Sept. | Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Cuba supports right to independence of East Timor. |
| 1975, Dec. 12 | UN General Assembly (69-11) calls on Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor. Australia supports the resolution. US abstains. | 1979, Oct. | ICRC says humanitarian situation in East Timor "as bad as Biafra". ICRC and CRS commence 6-month emergency programs. Australian journalist, Peter Rodgers, smuggles out rare photos of suffering East Timorese. |
| 1976, Jan. | UN Special Representative, Winspeare Guicciardi, is frustrated in his attempts to visit Fretilin-controlled areas of East Timor. | 1979, Nov. | UN General Assembly asserts East Timor's right to self-determination. Australian aid agencies and Australian Red Cross launch separate appeals for East Timor. |
| 1976, April | Australia presses for ICRC to be re-admitted to Timor. | 1980, Jan-April | Diplomatic and some military resistance to Indonesia continues. Family reunion program stalls. ICRC and CRS programs extended. |
| 1976, May-July | Indonesian-conducted 'process of integration' of East Timor as 27th province of Indonesia is rejected by both Australia and US. | | |

ACFOA Policy On East Timor 1975-1979

I Aid to East Timor

- Aug 1975 Council calls for Australian Government (AG) to provide aid to East Timor (ET).
- Oct 1975 ACFOA Timor Task Force visits ET.
- Oct 1975 Timor Relief Appeal begun. \$160,000 raised
- Nov 1975 ACFOA barge arrives Dili. Indonesian invasion in December halts further shipments.
- Dec 1975 Executive calls for ICRC and other agencies to be admitted to ET.
- Apr 1976 Executive calls for ICRC and other agencies to be admitted to ET.
- Oct 1976 Executive calls for aid agencies to be admitted to ET.
- Feb 1977 Executive calls for UN, ICRC and other aid agencies to be admitted to ET.
- Sep 1977 Council calls for aid agencies to be admitted to ET.
- Jul 1979 Executive adopts AWD report *Aid and East Timor*.
- Oct 1979 Council calls on AG to increase support to ICRC in ET, and to seek to broaden ICRC programme to include prisons, family reunion, tracing, and Geneva conventions. Calls for international assessment of situation in ET. Refers crisis in ET to IDEC.

II Independence and right to self-determination of East Timor

- Aug 1975 Council calls on AG to uphold "principle of independence of choice of people of Portuguese East Timor" and to oppose external interference.
- Dec 1975 Executive condemns Indonesian invasion; calls on AG to do likewise and to support UN efforts to uphold principle of independence.
- Jul 1976 Executive calls on AG to reject Indonesian process of integration. States military aggression in defiance of UN charter and resolutions.
- Oct 1976 Executive deplores continued Indonesian military intervention and resulting suffering. Calls on AG to support ET right to self-determination at UN. Calls on Portuguese Government to continue withholding recognition of integration.
- Oct 1978 Council supports UN resolution of Nov 1977. Calls on AG not to grant 'de iure' recognition to takeover. Rejects military invasion as way of claiming new territory.
- Oct 1979 Council directs Executive to publicise ET situation in Australia. Calls on AG to cancel President Suharto's visit until human rights restored in ET.

III Military Aid to Indonesia

- Dec 1975 Executive commends AG for suspending delivery of two Nomads to Indonesia. Calls for suspension of all military aid

until Indonesia withdraws from ET.

- Oct 1976 Executive calls on AG to cease any military aid to Indonesia usable in ET.

IV Family Reunions

- Oct 1976 Executive calls on Indonesia to allow free reunion of ET families in place of their choice.
- Jun 1976 Executive supports Timorese Association for Permanent Residence. Sends delegation to Foreign Affairs re family reunions.
- Oct 1976 Council criticises AG for performance on family reunions.
- Oct 1979 Council calls for AG Immigration Team to visit Dili and for AG to allow rest of 2668 nominated in 1977 to come.

V Refugees

- Dec 1975 Executive calls on AG to help establish neutral zone in ET for refugees and relief distribution, and to bring refugees to Australia.
- Feb 1977 Executive hears report from Jim Dunn of visit to camps in Portugal.
- Oct 1978 Council calls on AG to grant "refugee status" to Timorese in Portugal and admit them to Australia. Calls on AG to relax criteria covering admission from ET because of war there. Calls on AG to pressurise Indonesia to permit free emigration from ET.

VI Miscellaneous

- Aug 1975 Council calls on AG to re-open Consulate in Dili.
- Oct 1976 Executive calls on AG to allow reasonable communication between ET and outside world.

VII Commission of Enquiry into East Timor

- Jun 1977 Executive establishes three-person enquiry into East Timor situation, especially aid and refugees.
- Sep 1977 Council advised Commission to comprise John Traill QC, Joyce Shewcroft, Major-General Paul Cullen (later replaced by Prof. Ken Rivett).
- Feb 1978 Executive requests interim report.
- Aug 1978 Executive approval for Commission to visit Darwin/Indonesia.
- Oct 1978 Council requests final report and recommendations by end of 1978.
- Mar 1979 Executive requires report within one month.
- Jul 1979 Executive establishes July 31, 1979 as report deadline.
- Oct 1979 Council requests Commission chairman to return documents to ACFOA for it to produce report.
- Apr 1980 Final Commission report under discussion between ACFOA Timor sub-committee and Commissioners.

The NGO's and East Timor

by Helen Hill

Contrary to the expectations of some critics, Australian Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) – with only one or two exceptions – have not at any stage reduced East Timor to a simple aid problem. This article traces the unique, sometimes passionate, involvement of the NGOs in the broad struggle of the East Timorese for justice and proposes that the basis for this is not just geography but a 'correspondence of values'.

First contact and support

Indonesian troops have now been occupying the town of Dili for over four years and the whole territory of East Timor has been out of bounds for that time for all but a few specially selected journalists and international aid personnel. Most of the member agencies of ACFOA have been frustrated in their attempts to get aid programmes going under Indonesian rule; a stark contrast to their high hopes during the period immediately before the Indonesian invasion. Not surprisingly this inability to get aid into East Timor has led member agencies to take an increasingly critical stand towards both the Indonesian and Australian governments. There are those who would argue that this critical stance is the reason for the Indonesian government not allowing any of the aid agencies into the disputed territory. Before explaining why I think this view is wrong I shall spend some time looking at *why* so many of the voluntary aid agencies in Australia have taken a stand on East Timor which is so strongly opposed to that of the government and which has brought them into such opposition to the government of Indonesia.

It is not generally realised how far back the involvement of some of ACFOA's member agencies in the Timor question goes. For example in 1968 the National Union of Australian University Students (now the Australian Union of Students) commissioned a report on Portuguese Timor which was published in its

newspaper *National U* on July 22 1968. At that time scarcely anyone in Australia knew that the Portuguese colony of Timor existed. Among those who did know of Timor were a group of former Australian commandos who had fought there during the second world war, the survivors of the 2/2 and 2/4 independent companies. In 1971 they planned a return visit which eventuated in 1973. They visited again the mountainous country where in 1942-43 they had fought a guerilla war against the Japanese for 18 months with the support of Timorese while the Portuguese administration had officially remained neutral. Many of those former Australian commandos formed some firm friendships with Timorese during that return visit and some of them were later to become active in Australia in trying to ensure a better future for their wartime allies.

In the early 1970s Portugal's African colonies were somewhat better known in Australia than the one on our doorstep. Both Liberal and Labor governments had supported UN resolutions calling on Portugal to allow self-determination for its colonies and the student and church wings of the anti-apartheid movement had given support to the World Council of Churches' Programme to Combat Racism which included financial grants to the anti-colonial movements FRELIMO in Mozambique and RAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. At this time also ACFOA was beginning to place a great deal of emphasis on 'Development Education', which for many of the agencies meant a fundamental re-examination of what they were doing both in the


overseas aid field and within Australia. It caused some of them to see their work in Australia informing public opinion as being as important as supporting projects overseas. It made them look more closely at the causes of poverty and not just its effects and caused some members to question who aid was being sent to and for what. For example values which began to be more strongly emphasised were self-reliance, local control, appropriate technology and peoples participation in development planning including the participation of women. Capital intensive projects heavily reliant on continued foreign funding were criticised. Within Australia to some people it meant adopting alternative lifestyles, for others change of the formal education system, for most involved in ACFOA it meant campaigning politically in support of people oppressed by racism, colonialism, or sexism in addition to giving material assistance. The time when many of these ideas came together for the first time was the January 1973 ACFOA Development Education Conference.

I well remember being present at that conference. During it we heard the news of the death of Amilcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. For many participants it was the first time they had heard of him, yet with the assistance of a number of African students a good discussion of Portuguese Colonialism took place. However I don't recall any discussion of Portuguese Timor; that had to wait a few months until May 15 when an article appeared on the front page of the *Australian Financial Review* alleging

that Australian companies BHP and TAA could be breaking UN resolutions, which the Australian government had supported, by being economically involved in a Portuguese colony, Timor. The same article pointed out that TAA was flying Portuguese troops to Dili. Some days later a number of ACFOA member agencies, in particular Action for World Development and World University Service, issued statements calling for the cutting of all economic ties with the Portuguese colony of East Timor. The issue of Portuguese colonialism came more prominently to the fore later that year when the visit of a 40-member delegation from the Portuguese Export Promotion Board was scheduled. Following strong condemnation of the tour by some Catholic Bishops the Australian government forbade the Department of Overseas Trade to have any dealings with the delegation but did not cancel the tour.

Inside Timor the underground group of Timorese opposed to Portuguese rule heard news of all these events on Radio Australia but did not have any contacts in Australia as they were too afraid of the power of the Portuguese secret police and of being deported to another colony which was the penalty for involvement in politics. Thus before any of them had met a single Timorese and before any political parties had been formed in East Timor, a number of NGOs had a position in support of independence, or at least self-determination, for the East Timorese. Indonesia's policy, enunciated in April 1972 by Adam Malik, was that if there was a liberation movement in Portuguese Timor Indonesia would support it, if the indigenous people wished this.

Another set of concerns which arose out of the emphasis on *Development Education* was increased discussion of the development strategy being pursued by the Suharto government in Indonesia. This is the strategy which Herb Feith, in an article in a special issue of *Development News Digest* devoted to Indonesia in May 1973 referred to as the 'World Bank style of development' with its assumptions that wealth in the cities would 'trickle-down' to the rural areas. Particularly those who had worked in Indonesia seemed to doubt that this strategy was appropriate and there were other worries about Indonesia too. In 1973 Amnesty International published extensive documentation showing



that Indonesia had more political prisoners than any other country in the world and when former Indonesian political prisoner Carmel Budiardjo visited Australia in early 1974 some information was leaked to her that the Australian army had been training Indonesian officers in interrogation techniques at Woodside in South Australia. This became the subject of an ABC *Four Corners* programme which the Minister did not deny, saying it was 'for tactical purposes only' and sparking off a huge debate about Australian relations with Indonesia not only in the aid agencies but in political parties, churches, trade unions and the media. This debate was still raging when the Armed Forces Movement coup in Portugal overthrew the Caetano regime and brought the promise of change to East Timor.

Fretilin expectations

The first political party to be formed in Portuguese Timor following the coup was the Social Democratic Association. A number of its members had been in the clandestine anti-colonial movement including Jose Ramos Horta, who made a visit to Jakarta in mid-1974 with the intention of gaining support for the independence of East Timor from the Indonesian government. The letter he received from Adam Malik promising that 'whoever will govern in Timor in the future after independence, can be assured that the Government of Indonesia will always strive to maintain good relations, friendship and co-operation for the benefit of both countries' is well known. He hoped to obtain a similar one from Australian authorities.

On his first visit to the southern states of Australia Ramos Horta went first to the office of Action for World Development to thank them for the statements AWD had made in 1973 against Portuguese colonialism

and to try to enlist further support for Timorese independence. Because of the way things were going in Africa ASDT, which later became FRETILIN, envisaged trying to get support from Indonesia and Australia to help them gain independence from Portugal, not, as has turned out to be the case, asking Portugal for assistance in gaining independence from Indonesia. The model of the European groups in solidarity with the liberation movements in the Portuguese African colonies was very much in the minds of the FRETILIN leaders in those early days. These movements, particularly in Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Britain and often with financial assistance from Social Democratic governments and Churches, had provided extensive medical, educational, and agricultural assistance to the movements which were, by 1974 administering large areas of territory which they had liberated militarily from the Portuguese. When it was discovered that the left in Australia had no such experience FRETILIN turned to some of the voluntary aid agencies in ACFOA.

Given 400 years of Portuguese neglect the needs of East Timor for development aid were pressing. In early 1975 most people in FRETILIN believed that independence could come about in a peaceful manner, the main needs being to reform agriculture, increase educational provision massively, decolonise the administrative structure, begin some small industries related to primary products produced in Timor e.g. coffee processing, and take over from the Portuguese the leases for oil exploration which had been let to Australian, US and French companies. They expected the Portuguese to complete some major capital works e.g. road building and bridge repair before finally leaving. The FRETILIN leaders envisaged Timorese students coming to Australia for higher and technical training, instead of studying in Portugal and on Ramos Horta's first visit to Canberra he sought advice on how to lobby the Australian government for scholarships.

FRETILIN was not the only party in East Timor to send delegations to Australia and Indonesia. The UDT, a party which initially wished to stay with Portugal but which later opted for independence also sent members to Australia where they made contact with the RSL and some of the former commandos who had fought the Japanese in Timor during

the Second World War. APODETI, the party which was for integration with Indonesia also had its contacts in Australia.

Enter Indonesia

By late 1974 interest was mounting in various circles in East Timor. The meeting in Jogjakarta in September 1974 at which President Suharto and Prime Minister Whitlam agreed that 'an independent Timor would be an unviable state and a potential threat to the region' certainly galvanised a few people into action, in Australia as well as in Timor. In Sydney a Campaign for an Independent East Timor was formed with support coming mainly from the Trade Unions and the Peace Movement. It planned to send a delegation to East Timor in 1975. In Melbourne Action for World Development held meetings with like minded organisations on East Timor and the Australian Union of Students sent Grant Evans to Timor to write and take photos for a booklet on the subject.

One day in mid-February 1975 the front pages of all the dailies in Australia had lead stories announcing that Indonesia was about to launch an armed invasion of Portuguese Timor. While the origin of these headlines is somewhat obscure they changed the nature of the debate about East Timor. Support for the

ing for ways to practically give help to the process of decolonisation in East Timor and to ensure that the Timorese could exercise the right to self-determination which most of them believed in. As time went by the only way to do this was by working with FRETILIN.

The Fretilin Programme

John Birch, NSW Committee member of Community Aid Abroad who accompanied the Trade Union and Student delegation to East Timor in March 1975, told an interviewer for the Sydney University students newspaper *Honi Soit* in April 1975:

"FRETILIN is the party that is extending its interests and its influence into the outer villages and into the mountains. The other parties are staying very much in the main centres. FRETILIN is the party which has gone out to spread itself right out over the island and the party which, I think, is closest to the aspirations of the Timorese people . . . They certainly see agriculture as their main problem — the need to expand agricultural production. They see education as being a problem and FRETILIN has begun adult literacy programmes using Paulo Freire's methods in the villages of Baucau. At present they see their main problem as to obtain their independence, their national

courage self-reliance.

I think what impressed members of Action for World Development and CAA about FRETILIN was that its members were not simply content to put reliance in political power by campaigning for the elections which the Portuguese were organising, in addition they seemed to be making a start on some of the tasks, e.g. organising co-operatives, setting up adult literacy classes which would be required to transform the economy from a colonial one. In many ways FRETILIN embodied those values which these particular agencies strove for. Their requests were modest, their aspirations were for an economy based on agriculture, use of appropriate technology, meeting basic needs, 'conscientisation' type educational projects, preventive medicine and rural health care, a tourist industry based on local resources and opposition to domination of the economy by foreign multi-nationals. As East Timor was a small country with a population of only 650,000 people, with a reasonable level of foreign exchange from coffee and oil, many of the people in Australian voluntary aid agencies saw a bright future for it, so long as its independence and security could be guaranteed.

It would be wrong however to suggest that most of the ACFOA member agencies were pro-FRETILIN; they were not. Most took no political stand at all in relation to East Timor until after August 6, 1975 when the UDT launched a coup against the Portuguese administration sparking off a civil war in which FRETILIN was victorious. The 1975 ACFOA Annual Council, meeting just 17 days after the coup, when refugees were streaming into Darwin, carried a resolution calling on the Australian government to express its support for the principle of 'independence of choice' for the people of East Timor, and opposition to external influence on the territory. In addition the government was requested to offer facilities to mediate in the conflict, to re-establish its consulate in Dili and, on the restoration of normality, to provide development assistance. This was the first public statement by ACFOA on the question of self-determination for East Timor. It was supported by all those present with the exception of the Australian Red Cross Society. While falling short of FRETILIN's policy of independence it was not welcomed by the Australian gov-

Support for the independence of East Timor ceased to be just a question of supporting an independence movement struggling against Portuguese colonialism; it became an issue in Australian-Indonesian relations . . . Australian policy was on the way to a major clash with Australian public opinion.

independence of East Timor ceased to be just a question of supporting an independence movement struggling against Portuguese colonialism; it became an issue in Australian-Indonesian relations. The following day, as I interviewed a representative of the Australian Foreign Affairs Department in Dili, I sensed that Australian policy was on the way to a major clash with Australian public opinion. The government's aim was to help give legitimacy to anything the Indonesians may wish to do in Timor, while at the same time trying to deter them from doing it too violently. The NGOs, on the other hand, including many ACFOA member agencies, were increasingly look-

sovereignty."

I well remember some discussions in Timor between John and some of the members of FRETILIN's agricultural committee. They hoped to import tractors to pull ploughs and bring under cultivation some of the vast uncultivated lands. John Birch pointed to the large number of buffaloes which were wading around in the paddy fields stirring up the wet soil, and suggested that if they were harnessed to ploughs this would avoid the need to import tractors and save a great deal of fuel which would also need to be imported. They seemed quite impressed by this suggestion and tried to work out other innovations which would en-

ernment and none of the requests were carried out.


Aid Agencies in Timor, 1975

The first aid agency into East Timor after the civil war was not an ACFOA member but a newly created organisation calling itself ASIAT, Australian Society for InterCountry Aid – Timor. Sydney pediatrician John Whitehall, who founded ASIAT together with Michael Darby, managed to land on the beach in Dili by means of a fishing boat chartered by Channel 9 journalist Gerald Stone and press magnate Kerry Packer. Gerald Stone has described in *The Bulletin* September 8, 1975 some of the difficulties they had avoiding the transport blockade which the Australian government was trying to impose in Darwin. Although some of the ACFOA member agencies were at first a little wary of ASIAT, partly for its unorthodox methods and also because its founder, Michael Darby, was best known for his right wing politics, FRETILIN was full of praise for its medical work and later some of its doctors co-operated with FRETILIN in training health workers.

The day after Dr Whitehall began work in the Dili hospital a delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross arrived to carry out emergency treatment of war victims, set up a tracing service for people to find relatives lost in the war and to visit prisoners of war being held by FRETILIN troops. On September 26 at a consultation in Melbourne convened by ACFOA on 'Timor and Australian NGO's' representatives of both ASIAT and ICRC reported on their activities. In addition the meeting heard a report from a Parliamentary delegation consisting of Ken Fry and Senators Arthur Gietzelt and Neville Bonner who had been into Timor since the coup and civil war. All reported that there had been much less killing than was believed, that the territory was in a relatively peaceful state and that FRETILIN-held prisoners were being treated in a reasonable manner, pending the return of the Portuguese administration to bring them to trial. ASIAT was carrying out some long-term pediatric health care work as the emergency receded.

The consultation urged ACFOA to set up a 'Task force' on East Timor and this was done at the October 3 executive meeting. The first action of the Task Force was to

appoint an investigating team to go immediately to East Timor to survey both the urgent and the long-term needs of the territory and to make recommendations as to the possible role of Australian voluntary agencies. The team consisted of Mark Raper of the Jesuits' Asian Bureau Australia, John Mavor of the Australian Council of Churches, Neill O'Sullivan of CAA and Jim Dunn, a former Australian Consul in Portuguese Timor. The four flew into Dili on October 16 and travelled extensively throughout East Timor over the next couple of weeks, meeting a great variety of people including the FRETILIN central committee, the Timorese Women's Organisation, the Economic Commission headed by the country's only trained economist Dr Jose Gonzalves, the Catholic Bishop Jose Ribeiro and the Portuguese Governor Lemon Pires (who by that time had retreated to the offshore island of Atauro).



The main conclusions reached by the team were that "the two greatest humanitarian needs at that time were the restoration of peace in the vicinity of the Indonesian border and the urgent need to reduce the threat of widespread bloodshed that would result from a full-scale attack on East Timor." They recommended long-term assistance to agriculture, health care and education and drew up a 'shopping list' for immediate dispatch including goods such as grain, milk powder, medical supplies, caustic soda (for soap manufacture), textiles to be made into clothing by members of the Womens Organisation, seeds for immediate planting and petrol to enable the distribution of these goods to regional centres. In addition they requested three Australian technicians in the fields of general agriculture, animal husbandry and diesel engineering to volunteer for two-year assignments. The team also agreed to make efforts

to find a market for that year's crop of coffee. Their report included a detailed assessment of the political situation in East Timor and a study of FRETILIN's policies in the areas of agriculture, health, education and the long-term economic development of the territory.

Three members of the team presented their report at a second ACFOA Timor consultation on October 30. The fourth member, Jim Dunn, stayed in Timor monitoring the political situation there. A Timor Relief Appeal was launched that day by a number of agencies. However the needs of the Timorese were being overshadowed at that time by another disturbing event, the disappearance of two television teams from Australia somewhere near the border with Indonesian Timor. At the launching of the Timor Relief appeal Mark Raper told an *Age* reporter that he had heard Francisco Lopez da Cruz of the UDT speaking on Radio Kupang from within Indonesian territory, telling the Timorese listeners 'We killed the Australian communist journalists and we'll kill any others that come along'. A tape of this broadcast was given to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs but so far they have never publicly acknowledged Indonesia's responsibility for the deaths. Indeed this event has had a major effect on the attitude of all journalists to the Indonesian and Australian governments. Not only are journalists aggrieved that their colleagues were shot in cold blood under Indonesian orders but the fact that they could never report this in daily newspapers due to the Australian government's D notice system has angered them considerably. For as Laurie Oakes wrote in the February 1978 issue of the Australian Journalists Association paper, *The Journalist*: "Indonesian messages were intercepted by the Defence Signals Division (now the Defence Signals Directorate) within hours of the attack on Balibo. The messages reported that the newsmen had been killed by Indonesian troops and their bodies burnt."

Timor Relief Appeal

The Timor Relief Appeal backed by the Australian Council of Churches, Australian Catholic Relief, Austcare, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign and Community Aid Abroad raised about \$160,000. On November 12 a barge, the *Alanna Fay*, left Darwin loaded with the

goods which the investigating team had requested. There was however some problem with the fuel for distribution. The Australian government was arguing that to export petrol to East Timor at that time could be construed by the Indonesian government as military support for FRETILIN, so they did not allow the full amount to be taken. Mark Raper and CAA member Bob Richards accompanied the *Alanna Fay* and on arrival in Dili met up with the members of the independent foundation which had been set up to oversee emergency relief. This consisted of a representative of the FRETILIN Economic Commission, a representative of the Bishop of Dili together with a representative of ACFOA. Australian journalist Jill Jolliffe described in *DND* No. 15 how she accompanied a consignment of rice to Maubisse in an ancient truck.

"As the truck swung into the village square our hearts sunk — we were greeted by about one thousand whooping Maubisse people and our concern for an orderly distribution looked ill-fated. It was however, merely a typically passionate Timor welcome and the machinery of local government was swiftly activated. Members of the regional sub-committee (mainly young school teachers) set up desks at various points around the square and called names from revised census lists . . . Villagers came up to the scales bearing plastic bags, blankets, and even battered straw hats to collect their kilo of rice. Afterwards they performed lovely spontaneous Maubisse songs and dances in the square, celebrating the coming of the rice."

In her book, *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism*, Jill describes how also at Maubisse the ground had already been dug to plant the seed which arrived as part of the ACFOA consignment and how the Womens Organisation was running a creche and an aged infirmarian running a 'medical school' in the evenings at which he imparted his knowledge of health care. This was a period in which members of the ACFOA agencies worked closely with the FRETILIN administration and also with Church leaders, nuns and priests in East Timor, for the Catholic Church was very strong in the territory. When the *Alanna Fay* left Dili it had on board a cargo of coffee which FRETILIN had managed to process and sell to a Sydney buyer for \$40,000. The money was deposit-

ed in an account in the Darwin branch of the Commonwealth Bank to be used to import food and other necessities as required by the Timorese administration.

All visitors to East Timor at this time commented on the enthusiastic, if inexperienced, way in which FRETILIN was tackling the development problems of the territory, how they did not appear to be using aid as a political weapon nor to be concerned only with feeding their

Indonesia severs the links

As is well known the Indonesian army launched its military attack on Dili in the early hours of December 7. In Darwin a number of journalists and aid people heard the voice of Alarico Fernandes, secretary of FRETILIN coming across the Red Cross Radio:

"The situation in Dili is worsening. Indonesian forces are executing

Unfortunately for the Timorese that request (for aid) has not to this day been able to be responded to. But the aid agencies have not stopped trying in their aim to do what they think will enable the Timorese people to achieve self-determination and development.

own members. Neil O'Sullivan of CAA went as far as saying in an interview on his return from Timor that he thought FRETILIN's development policies in East Timor had a greater chance of success than those of any other country in South East Asia. But general enthusiasm for the events in East Timor by some Australian voluntary agencies was tempered by fear for the worsening political situation. On 28 November FRETILIN gave up waiting for the Portuguese to return and negotiate and independence was declared unilaterally. The International Committee of the Red Cross was still trying to get a guarantee of respect for their neutrality from the Indonesian Government. When the ICRC team had arrived in August they had received such a guarantee from both the parties to the civil war, FRETILIN and UDT. In November the ICRC decided that guarantees were necessary from four parties, FRETILIN, UDT, APODETI and Indonesia. FRETILIN was the only party from which they could get such a guarantee. The UDT and APODETI representatives could not be contacted, and Indonesia refused. Without a recognised neutral zone from which to operate in the case of a war they would have to evacuate. According to Jill Jolliffe, who was in East Timor at the time, the absence of a neutral zone was the determining factor which made most Australians in Timor, who were mainly journalists and aid workers, decide to leave on December 2. Only one Australian journalist, Roger East, stayed behind in order to report events to the outside world.

people, all children and Chinese. Request immediate aid. They took civilian refugees from Churches and executed them. FRETILIN forces are still fighting and controlling two-thirds of Dili. Enemy forces are still supported by warships and war planes. An urgent evacuation of women and children is badly needed. We are running out of food and medicine. Please give us assistance as quickly as possible. Our position will be pointed as soon as we get your reply."

Unfortunately for the Timorese that request has not to this day been able to be responded to. But the aid agencies have not stopped trying in their aim to do what they think will enable the Timorese people to achieve self-determination and development.

On the evening of December 7 in Melbourne 300 people packed a small hall and listened to David Scott of CAA, one of the last Australians in Timor, accuse the Australian Government of conniving with the Indonesian Government to make sure all foreign observers were out of Timor before the invasion. He also accused them of criminal neglect for failing to try and negotiate a neutral zone for ICRC. An Australia-East Timor Association was formed with Bill Roberts of AWD as President. \$1000 was raised that night to help send David Scott to the UN to lobby in support of Timorese independence.

At an ACFOA executive meeting just one week after the full-scale Indonesian invasion of East Timor the ACFOA executive called on the Australian Government to help

establish a neutral zone for refugees and relief distribution in East Timor, to call on all parties to observe the Geneva conventions, to insist that the International Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to return to East Timor immediately and to offer facilities to enable refugees to be brought to Australia. No reaction to these requests was forthcoming from the Australian Government. The frustration of the aid agencies in not being able to continue their work in East Timor was expressed in the second resolution of the executive:

"Recognising the obstruction of aid programmes to East Timor through Indonesian intransigence, the Executive of ACFOA commends the Australian Government's action in suspending the delivery of two Nomad aircraft to Indonesia. We call for the further suspension of all military aid to Indonesia until such time as Indonesia has ceased its present intervention in East Timor."

This was the first time ACFOA had called for the suspension of military aid to any country. The resolution was supported by all but two executive members and received considerable press coverage.

Support continued

The period of close working together with FRETILIN and other Timorese by the aid agencies meant a great deal of frustration, anger and sorrow for those involved when they could no longer communicate with their colleagues inside East Timor. Work on behalf of the East Timorese after the invasion took a number of

The period of close working together with FRETILIN and other Timorese by the aid agencies meant a great deal of frustration, anger and sorrow for those involved when they could no longer communicate with their colleagues inside East Timor.

forms. For several months when there was the possibility that the blockade might be lifted there were plans to send shiploads of aid to various ports of East Timor. Groups planning to send ships ranged from the Catholic Bishops to a group of Trade Unions. Two boats attempted to leave from Darwin but were prevented from doing so by the Australian navy. Another area of activity was that of human rights lobbying. This arose from Jim Dunn's visit to Portugal in January 1977

where he interviewed Timorese refugees in camps in Lisbon. Two striking aspects of his findings were, firstly the extremely violent events of the invasion which he reconstructed with the help of eye-witnesses, and second the appalling conditions in which Timorese were living in Portugal. Not officially refugees because of their Portuguese citizenship many of these people had applied to be reunited with family members in Australia. A number of ACFOA agencies have taken up this question of family reunions as a way of helping the Timorese community.

Others have taken up the international legal aspect e.g. the International Commission of Jurists Australian branch. John Dowd, of the NSW branch has been raising the issue in a number of international fora including the UN General Assembly. The events in Timor have also caused ACFOA itself to look more closely at Australia's military aid. In its submission to the Harries Committee ACFOA included a large section on military aid and still has the policy that military aid to Indonesia should be withdrawn as long as military activities are going on in East Timor.

The voluntary agencies have continued to press for the return of the International Committee of the Red Cross to East Timor, to carry out all aspects of its work as in August 1975. The Australian Government effectively dropped this demand from its policy when it gave financial aid to the Indonesian Red Cross in October 1976. ACFOA's most significant action in this campaign was the publication in July 1979 of the

report *Aid and East Timor* which gave evidence of aid given through Indonesian Red Cross of being misused and which increased the pressure on the Indonesian Government to allow ICRC to return.

Another avenue of work in support of the Timorese which the voluntary agencies have taken up and which is extensively documented in this dossier is the work with the Timorese community in Australia. They see their most pressing need as family reunions. Through its sup-

port of the Timorese Committee for Permanent Residence in Melbourne by paying the salary of its organiser, Joao Goncalves, ACFOA and some of its agencies have become involved with helping Timorese circumvent the legal and bureaucratic difficulties entailed in bringing out relatives from Portugal or Timor. It is interesting to note that many of these Timorese were not FRETILIN supporters in Timor, but are nonetheless resolutely opposed to the Indonesian invasion. One of them, Fr Francisco Fernandes from Perth has recently been to the United Nations to take part in the debate before the general assembly.

ACFOA, along with other organisations such as the Campaign for an Independent East Timor, Trade Unions, the Labor Party and other political bodies has consistently campaigned against the Australian recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. This action, while some people may regard it as out of place for an aid agency is seen by all who support it as a logical outcome of the earlier work in East Timor of ACFOA and its member agencies. For example it was during the ACFOA Summer School in Hobart in January 1978 that the government announced its de facto recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. The conference was interrupted while all but 10 of the 400 participants took part in a protest rally organised by the local East Timor committee in central Hobart. The participants of the Summer School sent a telegram to Malcolm Fraser, signed by almost all of them pointing out their disagreement with this policy. One of the arguments given by the government for recognising Indonesian control was always that it would facilitate the entry of emergency relief aid. Aid agencies are dubious about this argument as they have seen no sign on the part of the Indonesian Government to co-operate with even the International Red Cross and until the whole of the territory is opened up to outside observers, journalists as well as aid workers, they will not be satisfied that they can work properly in East Timor as voluntary agencies should, giving the people inside the territory ultimate control over how aid is distributed and which aid is to come in. As long as Indonesia maintains its claims over East Timor it is most unlikely to let the Timorese run their own aid programmes and to collaborate directly with the donors in Australia. There is some difference of

opinion among the agencies on this, some are content to try and work through channels in Indonesia e.g. with their counter part organisations in that country such as Churches. Others see this as acceding to the Indonesian Government's view that East Timor is part of Indonesia and would prefer to work directly with the Timorese and therefore hope to send their own representatives to Timor. But at the present moment all agencies, regardless of what they have said on East Timor, have been excluded.

Support broadly-based and united

An interesting question on the political aspect is, to what extent do the statements of the leaders of the aid agencies represent the views of the members and public opinion in general in Australia? Community Aid Abroad, which has a more developed structure of membership than most agencies, commissioned a study of its own working in 1977 by Louise Arnold of the Melbourne University

radical group and for a time published extremist propaganda, including a good deal attacking the Suharto regime". If he was referring to the Timor issue it could hardly be said that most of those supporting self-determination for East Timor within ACFOA were on the left. For example Major General Cullen, an executive member of ACFOA, put his views strongly in the October 1977 issue of the *Pacific Defence Reporter*;

"Is it not an attribute of right wing patriots to wish for Independence and Peace — just as much as left wing patriots. After all the world recognises that the Act of Free Choice was not in the past independently supervised by the United Nations, indeed no real test of Timorese wishes appears to have taken place, and therefore the right of Indonesia to impose its rule on East Timor is neither final nor recognised as such by the majority of members of the United Nations."

While the most vocal support for the independence of East Timor has come from FRETILIN supporters,

It could hardly be said that most of those supporting self-determination for East Timor within ACFOA were on the left.

Social Work Department. She found that 76 per cent of CAA members and supporters agreed that "the East Timorese have an inalienable right to self-determination and independence and must be permitted to exercise this right freely"; 74 per cent agreed that "unless Australia protests against Indonesian atrocities in East Timor, it can be seen as a nation without honour, principle, or courage." The percentages of national committee members and staff agreeing with these statements were even higher.

Political scientist Nancy Viviani, in the 1976 study "Australians and the Timor Issue" published in *Australian Outlook*, makes the observation that the groups opposed to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor "illustrated one of the enduring features of Australian opinion on Indonesian issues. They could not be charged with party bias or support . . . and indeed the group represented a powerful alliance of those of right, left and centre persuasion in Australian politics." Professor H.W. Arndt has claimed in an article in the December 1979 issue of *Quadrant* that ACFOA was at one time "captured by a left-wing

and those on the left, some of these have occasionally been surprised to find themselves joined in calls for Timorese self-determination by men with impeccable Liberal Party credentials, such as Richard Alston, (current ACFOA Chairman and President of the Victorian Liberal Party), John Dowd, (of the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists and NSW Liberal State MP) and Michael Hodgman, (Tasmanian Federal Liberal backbencher). Even further from the label 'left' are those advocates of Timorese independence associated with ASIAT and with the journal *Free Market* such as Michael Darby, John Whitehall and Bill Bancroft.

Another important aspect of public opinion on the Timor issue, which Nancy Viviani points to, is that it has been more united on this issue than on any other concerned with Indonesia. The six groupings which she identifies are being part of this opinion, the Churches, the aid organisations, university people, the Trade Unions, journalists, and sections of the Labor Party she claims have intensified their co-operation on the Timor issue as the dispute progressed. I agree with this and I think

that ACFOA has reached a whole new public and come to the notice of a number of audiences it would not have, had it not become involved in the Timor issue. For example increased co-operation between aid agencies and journalists has resulted to a large degree from contacts made at the time of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor or immediately before. The death of the six journalists and the fact that journalists as well as aid agencies are excluded from East Timor has given some journalists a new sense of identity with the aid agencies and more working relationships have evolved in relation to other parts of the world as well.

Finally Nancy Viviani also makes the point that opposition in the case of Timor is confined to the Indonesian Government and does not generally spill over into anti-Indonesian hostility. She points out that a distinction between the government and people of Indonesia is often clearly drawn by these groups and that no-one has suggested cutting off aid to Indonesia (apart from military aid). She also points out that it is motivated predominantly by concern for the rights of the Timorese people, not opposition to the Suharto regime. I think this is a much more accurate view than that of Professor Arndt who sees Australian opposition to the Indonesian Government's actions as some sort of racist anti-Indonesianism. Many of the people in the Trade Union movement who are active in support of the East Timorese will point out that it was those same Unions and in some cases those same individuals who supported the Indonesian struggle for independence against the Dutch.

It is as well to remember some of these events now as members of ACFOA agencies work out new strategies for their involvement with the Timorese people. For as Jim Dunn wrote in *The Bulletin* in January 1980:

"Is it really enough that we should confine ourselves to a Band-Aid operation and forget the events of the past. It seems to me that this approach to the Timor problem is too negative and that, in the long-term it will not help our relations with Indonesia. Obviously the Indonesian authorities would like us to stop talking about the situation in East Timor. An obliging silence would earn their gratitude, but would it earn their respect?" ○



The United Nations and East Timor

ON 21 NOVEMBER 1979, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING RESOLUTION (34/40) ON EAST TIMOR:

'The General Assembly

Recognising the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

Bearing in mind the part of the Political Declaration adopted by the Sixth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Havana from 3 to 9 September 1979, relating to East Timor.

Having examined the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territory.

Having heard the statements by the representatives of Portugal, as the administering Power, and of Indonesia.

Having also heard the statements by the petitioners, including the representative of the Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independent.

1. **Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).**
2. **Declares that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine their own future, under the auspices of the United Nations;**
3. **Expresses its deepest concern at the suffering of the people of East Timor as a result of the situation now prevailing in the Territory;**
4. **Calls upon all parties concerned to facilitate the entry into the Territory of international relief aid in order to alleviate the suffering of the people of East Timor;**
5. **Requests the United Nations Children's Fund and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to render, within their respective fields of competence, all possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the children and those seeking to leave for another country for purposes of family reunion;**
6. **Requests the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the present resolution and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;**
7. **Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fifth session, the item entitled 'Question of East Timor'.**

Voting on the resolution was as follows: For 62; Against 31; Abstentions 45.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Byelorussia Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Portugal, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Ukraine, USSR, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Vietnam, Zambia.

Against: Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Columbia, Egypt, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Maldives, New Zealand, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Uruguay, Yemen, Zaire.

Abstaining: Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Romania, Samoa, Spain, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

Absent: Bulgaria, Comoros, Democratic Kampuchea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, German Democratic Republic, Libya, Malta, Mauritius, Poland, Solomon Islands, Somalia.

The Politics Of Aid To East Timor

by Pat Walsh

The queue of aid organisations waiting to help in stricken East Timor is a long one. But only two have been allowed in — the International Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services of the United States. This article offers an account and evaluation of their programmes. It concludes that ICRC has been severely compromised in its East Timor programme and that CRS is playing a 'subservient role' to the US and Indonesian governments.

ACFOA reported in July 1979 that East Timor was in the grip of a crisis of devastating proportions. Drawing on information originating inside East Timor, but unable to visit the territory to make its own assessment, ACFOA alleged a mounting death-toll due to continuing war, malnutrition and disease, and a massive displacement of people into problem-ridden, Indonesian controlled camps. The Indonesian Red Cross, the only permissible channel for overseas aid, was clearly not coping — despite Indonesian government assertions to the contrary — and aid intended to relieve the suffering was being misappropriated. Clearly a new and large-scale aid programme was required to avert further disaster.

The ACFOA report was not the first time such a statement of concern had been issued. Fretilin, the United Nations, International Red Cross, the Australian and American governments, and ACFOA itself had made repeated calls since 1976 for aid agencies to be admitted to East Timor. In September 1978 a number of foreign ambassadors, including those of Australia and the USA, visited East Timor and, appalled at what they saw, called for immediate international assistance.

Indonesia, still not in firm enough military control of the situation and wishing to convey the impression that all was 'normal' in Timor, rejected these appeals and insisted that it would accept aid only from sources which recognised its sovereignty over East Timor and which agreed to channel funds through the Indonesian Red Cross, the sole implementer of aid in the territory (with the exception of the small programme run by the local Catholic Church). Some

governments complied with these conditions. For example, two barge-loads of materials were sent from Darwin to Dili late 1978-early 1979 by the Australian government on these terms, but World Vision who contributed to one of these consignments was forbidden even to hand over its goods in Dili. No foreign agencies were to be admitted, whatever the cost in lives and health to the Timorese.

Late in 1979, however, the Indonesian government moderated its hard-line and costly policy and two international aid agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Catholic Relief Services of the United States (CRS) were permitted to begin work in East Timor. Now that these agencies have been in Timor over six months and will continue their programmes for a further period — in the case of ICRC another six months, and for CRS much longer — it is time some account and evaluation of their work was attempted.

The International Red Cross in East Timor

The ICRC was finally re-admitted to East Timor in 1979, over three years after the Indonesian invasion in December 1975 had forced it to abandon the full range of works it had established there after the civil war earlier that year. ICRC surveys in April and July 1979 confirmed the worst fears carried in earlier reports. ICRC officials found that "tens of thousands of people displaced by military operations were facing starvation unless aid was brought to them rapidly, a situation aggravated by the

absence of any medical service". Abandoning the low-keyed language normally employed in ICRC reports, officials declared the situation facing them was "as bad as Biafra and potentially as serious as Kampuchea". Photographs of hungry children taken in October at Laga by the Australian reporter Peter Rodgers and smuggled out of Indonesia for publication in Australia and abroad graphically confirmed these analogies.

In conjunction with Indonesian Red Cross, ICRC began a relief operation on October 19, 1979 directed at the 60,000 "most destitute" in eight centres. The programme did not, however, begin simultaneously, in these places. Natorbora, for example, did not begin receiving assistance until November 15 and two months elapsed before the programme got under way in Luro. The eight mountain villages were Hatolia, Uatulari, Dilor, Fatubessi, Laclubar, Matarbura, Iliomar and Luro most of which "contain people who have been chased from their homes in other parts of the island". The food and medical conditions of these people was "extremely alarming" and the condition of some 20,000 of these, some of whom were suffering from marasmus and would probably die, was "calamitous". The ICRC medical co-ordinator, Dr Pascal Grelletty, stated that "he had rarely been so distressed by what he had seen".

Logistics of ICRC Programme

The ICRC estimated its six-month rescue operation would require some 4200 tons of basic food-stuffs, 60,000 blankets, and quant-

ies of soap and medicine. At the insistence of the Indonesian government, however, aid donated in kind to this programme had to go via Jakarta, not direct to Dili. This incredible condition was later partially modified when it became known that emergency aid for Timor donated by Australia had been left sitting on the docks in Jakarta for some six weeks due to a bureaucratic tangle. Once in Dili, aid was moved to three storage centres at Baucau, Ainaro and Maubisse. Transport to the inaccessible interior was mainly by helicopter and accounted for 49 per cent of the \$7 million programme. Three ICRC personnel (a doctor, nurse and relief specialist) worked with some 34 Indonesian Red Cross people who included, by late January 1980, nine Indonesian doctors and 11 Indonesian male nurses all of whom resided in the villages.

To keep track of food distributions and medical treatment a system of coloured cards was introduced. About a third of the 60,000 receiving weekly rations (yellow card), were issued with a blue card entitling them to extra food because of their extremely under-nourished condition while some 500 who were seriously ill and needed daily medical attention held a red card.

The budget for the six-month operation has been completely covered and was provided mainly by Western governments and Red Cross societies. The Australian government allocated some \$3 million and extended tax deductibility to a public appeal launched by the Australian Red Cross on November 7, 1979. The same privilege was denied a separate Australian joint agency appeal which was launched three weeks later.

Evaluation of ICRC Programme

All reports indicate the people are slowly responding to the IRC-ICRC programme. Officials estimated in late January that 5-10 people a month die in each village where they work, compared with 30-40 before. New sites are being considered for Red Cross attention once it is satisfied the standard of health and nutrition in the original centres has reached a suitable level.

Nevertheless progress remains painfully slow. On his return from a three-day visit to Timor in December, two months after the programme's commencement, the Secretary-General of Australian Red Cross, Mr

Leon Stubbings, reported that the people were being kept "just above starvation" by the Red Cross and that many thousands would fall victim to starvation and disease if the Red Cross was to end its relief programme in the area. The recent announcement that the ICRC will stay in Timor for a further six months after April 15, the expiry date of its first programme, is further acknowledgment of the continuing gravity of the situation.

Serious limitations of ICRC Programme

The Red Cross programme leaves much to be desired for it is seriously limited in a number of ways. On the ground the operation is mainly an Indonesian Red Cross (IRC) exercise. Consistent with its earlier policy of excluding foreigners from East Timor, the Indonesian Government has allowed ICRC personnel only minimum involvement. The programme clearly depends on the quality and autonomy of the now 190 IRC personnel in the various centres. It is too much to expect that Dr Pascal Grellety and Yvonne, his nurse-wife, the only two ICRC officials full-time in Timor and both based in Dili, could personally supervise the day-to-day relief operation across a number of relatively inaccessible centres. Allowance has been made for this and a number of agreements have been struck covering the independent auditing of accounts and access by the ICRC relief delegate (Jakarta-based Mr Cedric Neukomm) to local IRC records.

Nevertheless reports continue to circulate that some aid, chiefly rice — according to refugees arriving in Lis-

bon, is being diverted for sale by the Indonesian military who, as the administrators of East Timor, control the Indonesian Red Cross. In this light calls by US Congressmen (including Lester Wolff of New York who led a Congressional Team on a brief visit to Timor in January this year), for more foreign aid personnel to be admitted to Timor make good sense from the point of view of both the donors and the recipients of aid. It is doubtful, however, whether the Indonesian Government will agree

for the exclusion of foreigners is closely tied up with its wish to control the flow of information to the outside world and to be seen by the East Timorese as their prime benefactor and source of humanitarian aid.

Of much greater importance, however, are the limitations in the scope of the Red Cross programme. The agreement between ICRC and IRC signed in Jakarta on June 19, 1979 speaks only of food and medical care for newly displaced persons in a small number of centres. Why the Red Cross have been restricted to only eight centres is not clear.

ICRC compromise

What is clear, however, is that other traditional ICRC works such as prison visitation, tracing of missing persons, monitoring of Geneva conventions and family reunions have been conspicuously excluded from this particular operation. By contrast all these services were included in the ICRC programme some four years earlier in 1975 when under the Fretilin administration ICRC carried out the full range of its activities.

Indeed it seems that during the years 1976-79 the ICRC refused to re-enter Timor unless the Indonesian Government agreed to allow it to meet all its obligations. For example, an ICRC telex to Chris Santos, Fretilin's representative in Australia, reported in August 1977: "ICRC still negotiating with Indonesian Government, and Indocross for return to Timor. As ICRC conditions are not yet approved we have to postpone this project". The following year *The Age* reported on May 8, 1978:

Other traditional ICRC works such as prison visitation, tracing of missing persons, monitoring of Geneva conventions and family reunions have been conspicuously excluded from this operation.

bon, is being diverted for sale by the Indonesian military who, as the administrators of East Timor, control the Indonesian Red Cross. In this light calls by US Congressmen (including Lester Wolff of New York who led a Congressional Team on a brief visit to Timor in January this year), for more foreign aid personnel to be admitted to Timor make good sense from the point of view of both the donors and the recipients of aid. It is doubtful, however, whether the Indonesian Government will agree

"Indonesia has refused to allow the ICRC to resume the humanitarian work it was doing in East Timor before the Indonesian occupation . . . informed sources who have followed closely the negotiations between the ICRC and the Indonesian authorities on this sensitive subject say Jakarta has made it clear that resumption by the ICRC of its traditional works of visiting prisoners and extending assistance to the civilian population is out of the question". As there is every evidence that the full range of

ICRC services is required in Timor today, one is forced to conclude that the ICRC was left with little choice but to finally capitulate to Indonesian demands and resume its operation in East Timor on a strictly limited compromise basis.

The ICRC is being kept out of a number of areas of desperate need. Letters and reports from Timor have constantly referred to political prisons there, though their precise number and details about the numbers of detainees and their condition are not available. One report has spoken of three prisons in each of the 12 administration centres outside Dili and four in Dili, in all some 40 prisons. Many allegations of torture have been made. Henry Kamm of the *New York Times* was told of four "concentration camps" or political prisons — two in Dili, one in Baucau and one near Maliana (28.1.80). He was told the prisoners were kept incommunicado. Amnesty Inter-

recently written to President Suharto calling on him to help in allowing the International Red Cross to investigate these matters. The ICRC is well aware of these reports and its direct assistance has been sought in these areas on a number of occasions in recent years. Its current policy is not to get involved and to recommend that action be taken through other channels. As the ICRC wrote on October 5, 1979: "It is our impression that diplomatic pressure exerted on the Indonesian authorities, or a campaign to alert the international community may be of help to the concerned Timorese, but it is equally possible that these efforts may backfire on them".

The issues of free emigration from Timor and the enforced separation of Timorese families have been treated elsewhere in this issue of *Development Dossier*. Less than half of the small number of family members agreed on for reunion in Australia have been allowed leave East Timor.

As there is every evidence that the full range of ICRC services is required in Timor today, one is forced to conclude that the ICRC was left with little choice but to finally capitulate to Indonesian demands and resume its operation in East Timor on a strictly limited compromise basis.

national, which along with the International Commission of Jurists has been refused permission to visit Timor, recently claimed "several hundred prisoners . . . were underfed and held in dangerous conditions. It had received persistent reports of prisoners being beaten or tortured" (*The Australian* May 5, 1980). But when the ICRC was told of the existence of these prisons in October 1979, it could only reply, "Unfortunately the agreement which was negotiated by the ICRC does not provide for prison visits. We had met with considerable reluctance on this point".

There are also frequent reports of executions without trial and missing persons. Those executed without trial range from Fretilin leaders to civilian families, including it seems resistance fighters who surrendered under the Presidential Amnesty in 1977. Many have simply 'disappeared'. There are still many Timorese in Australia who do not know the whereabouts of close relatives or indeed whether they are dead or alive. Amnesty International has

The Jakarta-based ICRC relief delegate, Cedric Neukomm, is fully aware of this scandalous situation and acknowledges ICRC's traditional responsibilities in the matter. However, according to the Secretary-General of Australian Red Cross, Mr Leon Stubbings, who has discussed the matter with the ICRC, the ICRC is not involved "as the issue is considered too political". Mr Stubbings has pointed out to his colleagues, however, that "the ICRC is needed for the family reunion programme".

He might have added that the ICRC is also needed in the other human rights areas mentioned above. The appalling condition of the destitute the ICRC went into Timor to work for six months ago may well have justified a compromise at that point. But given that the ICRC has now established an effective modus operandi in Timor and is to stay another six months, it is time its programme was expanded to embrace others in Timor whose suffering is of a different kind but whose claims on its resources are no less compelling and real.

The American Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in East Timor

The CRS programme is by far the bigger of the two operations in terms of money, outreach, numbers of people assisted and duration.

The CRS programme has three stages: Sept-Dec 1979; Jan-April 1980; and May-Oct and beyond.

Stage I: Sept-Dec 1979

The CRS programme started as a six-month emergency exercise in September 1979 and focussed on reaching 240,000 of the most needy, malnourished people in the 150 resettlement sites and people in some other villages. The CRS Director in Jakarta at the time, Frank Carlin, an ex-US marine, said the general condition and degree of malnutrition was the worse he had encountered in 14 years experience.

CRS concentrated on emergency food aid, distributing five million kgs of CSM (high-protein corn-soya mix — because the people are mainly corn eaters) and 2 million kgs of rice. Average rations were 5.5 kgs per person a month, but in more critical areas 10-12 kgs per person were distributed with special emphasis on children under 10. Seeds, medical aid, clothing, soap and transport were also provided. 450 metric tons of corn and rice seed were distributed in time for planting.

Two mobile medical teams made up of Indonesian doctors (recruited from Diponegoro University in Semarang by Dr Suroyo a former Brigadier-General) and Indonesian nurses who were former army orderlies, worked in a number of villages until January. Doctors arriving at Laga in December (where Peter Rodgers took his photographs in October) found a medical post devoid of staff, furniture and medicine. They had to begin from scratch and organise everything themselves. Using a one-time medication regime devised by the Red Cross, they treated 6231 patients in three weeks averaging 293 a day. 1035 patients were seen for a second time averaging 52 a day. The main diseases treated were malaria, intestinal worms, enteritis, upper and lower respiratory tract diseases, malnutrition, and skin and eye diseases. People there were completely dependent on CRS food and, the doctors noted, there was a tendency for them to have diarrhoea after eating it. Two battalions of Indonesian troops quar-

tered some distance from the town were supplied with their own water, food and medicine in their own camps.

About half of the CRS budget was spent on transportation. CRS operates a fleet of 32 trucks in East Timor, has chartered two large helicopters (from NUH, an Indonesian firm) and five ships. As Dili has an off-loading capacity of only 250 tons a day, CRS has used two 1000-ton capacity barges with tugs to take food and supplies directly from the ships before they reach port. Major distribution points for relief supplies are established outside Dili at Laga (north-east coast), Beaco (south-east coast) and Betaro (southwest coast). Pack horses were also used to distribute materials in mountainous areas.

Stage II: Jan-April 1980

In late December 1979, Patrick Hopkin, the acting-Director of CRS in Indonesia, wrote: "I can reaffirm that tremendous unmet needs for assistance still remain in many parts of East Timor". More food and increased medical care were singled out as the two most critical and immediate needs of the population. Some improvements had occurred but CRS identified these months preceding the harvest as critical for food and distributed another five million kgs. of food aid concentrating on 134,000 people "in very critical need of assistance". This group comprised 120,000 from stage one and "14,000 newly identified people not yet reached by CRS and ICRC". Medical care was also critical. Malaria is rampant in many areas and a large portion of the population suffered from upper respiratory and skin diseases, vitamin deficiencies, intestinal parasites etc. An additional 6-8 Indonesian-staffed, mobile medical teams were put into the field. Water buffalo (virtually all of which have been killed during the war), simple agricultural equipment and seeds were also identified as immediate needs.

Stage III: May-Oct 1980 and beyond

From May to October CRS plans to undertake a Food for Work programme to develop the local infrastructure such as roads and irrigation and help in reforestation efforts, while at the same time meeting continuing food needs.

The FFW programme will operate in seven (out of the total of 13) needy kabupatens — administrative

districts — where 50 per cent of the average 10,000 families will have at least one family member enrolled on a project. A ration of 50 kgs will be provided to each worker — based on a family of five members. An agricultural development programme is also planned in one area of each of the seven districts. Eight medical teams will operate during this period. The expected total cost is \$US1.5 million. This overall project will form the first stage of an anticipated three-year rehabilitation programme worth some \$US10 million.

Evaluation of CRS Programme

No on the spot, independent assessment of the CRS programme is possible as, unlike Kampuchea, trained observers are not allowed into Timor for such a purpose. Reports indicate, however, that technically the programme has been vigorously and efficiently conducted (with one or two notable exceptions in the medical aid area) and that, though the revival of the people is slow and much remains to be done, many lives have been saved.

The CRS programme is not a church operation, nor is it essentially the operation of a voluntary, independent agency. CRS is working as a sub-contractor to the US Government implementing a government-to-government programme on governmental terms.

In other respects, however, the CRS programme is highly ambiguous. At first glance it would appear to be a "Catholic effort" as one journalist has described it, an a-political Church contribution based on Christian principles.

CRS: Instrument of US Foreign Policy

All the available evidence suggests, however, that this is not so. The CRS programme in East Timor is not a church operation, nor is it essentially the operation of a voluntary, independent agency. CRS is working as a sub-contractor to the US Government implementing a government-to-government programme on governmental terms. The programme is essentially an exercise in American foreign policy the purpose of which is to secure and complete the Indonesian takeover of an unwilling East Timor.

Indonesia — a strategically located, Muslim, anti-communist, oil-producing OPEC nation with the fifth largest population in the world — has assumed new importance for US foreign policy following the US defeat in Vietnam in 1975. It is not surprising then, that the US, from the time of Ford and Kissinger's visit to Jakarta only days before the invasion in 1975, has consistently provided key diplomatic and military support for the Indonesian takeover of Timor, despite its declared commitment to human rights.

The governmental character of the CRS operation has been clear from the outset when Adam Malik, the former Indonesian Foreign Minister, announced the programme after discussions in Jakarta early in 1979 with the CRS Executive Director, Bishop Edwin Broderick of New York. Later that year in September, senior CRS officials, including Fr Robert Charlebois, the CRS-US Government liaison officer, accompanied US Ambassador Masters and US AID officials on a survey of the resettlement sites where CRS was to concentrate its relief efforts. It is not CRS itself (that is the Catholic Church) or proceeds from an appeal to the

American people which are financing the programme. The bulk of the aid is coming from the US Government one of the Indonesian Government's strongest supporters and its principal supplier of arms. Of the \$US7.2 million spent by CRS in Timor up to December 1979, \$US6,969,662 was a direct contribution (in funds and commodities) from the US Government. And US AID has already announced it intends to support any further requests it receives from CRS in the future.

This strong link with the US Government is a standard feature of CRS' general operation. CRS is financially dependent on the US Government for survival and others of its overseas programmes have mirrored US foreign policy in the past. In 1962 it drew 82 per cent of its budget from the US Government and its Executive Director, at the time, Bishop Edward Swannstrom, was well-known for his enthusiasm

for promoting US national interests abroad. In 1978, \$179 million of its \$257 million budget came from the Government. And the US Episcopal Conference whose executives are ultimately responsible for CRS privately admit it is a 'runaway agency' which has failed to consult on important issues such as foreign politics.

The governmental character of the programme is also apparent from the Indonesian end. Though US Congressmen have called for an increase in foreign personnel, none of the 92 people working on the programme in East Timor are foreigners. The American CRS director is only permitted to visit from Jakarta at intervals. Furthermore, CRS is working through the Indonesian Government in East Timor, not the local church or any other agency. As the Secretary-General of Australian Red Cross observed after his visit to Timor in December 1979: "The Services (CRS) are working through government channels, therefore they did not have to set up a separate structure as did the Red Cross".

CRS co-operation with the US and Indonesian governments has extended even to the point of adopting without question their distorted analysis of the situation in East Timor. The version of events in East Timor which CRS is circulating to other agencies around the world is as follows: "The withdrawal of the Portuguese in 1975 from East Timor and the subsequent incorporation of the area into Indonesia led to a civil war which displaced much of the population. Population is now estimated at 660,000. In 1977, due to the Government's general amnesty, the people began to return from the hills to seek assistance . . . Poor crops in 1978 and even drier 1978/79 growing season caused a major decrease in local food supplies". The account goes on to imply that the suffering CRS has responded to is the result of the general poverty of the Lesser Sundas.

This account of the reasons for the crisis in East Timor is a transparent falsification of the facts. They are well enough known to need only summary repetition here: the civil war preceded the 'incorporation'; Indonesia forcibly annexed East Timor by military invasion, it did not simply 'incorporate' it; this invasion — not the civil war — displaced 'much of the population'; the population now is at least 100,000, perhaps in excess of 200,000 short of 660,000; according to the 63-year-

old Catholic priest Fr Leoneto do Rego who lived in the mountains of Timor until late 1978 it was Indonesian military activity which caused a major decrease in food supplies and consequent widespread starvation and disease and forced people down from the hills in search of relief; East Timor, as Indonesia itself, is a poor country because it has been economically mismanaged in the past. To make no mention of the Indonesian invasion and its attendant horrors, to blame the tragic condition of hundreds of thousands of people on their own in-fighting, and finally to suggest that the Indonesian Government's role has been a benevolent one, is nothing less than a sycophantic mockery of the truth and deserves the strongest possible condemnation.

The resettlement sites

However it is the nature of the *resettlement sites*, which are the focus of the CRS relief efforts, that reveals most clearly the ambiguity of this exercise.

CRS is concentrating its efforts on 150 'resettlement sites'. As the US Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Holbrooke, reported in December 1979: "We understand that CRS has reached over 75 per cent of the resettlement areas and that it is anticipated that 100 per cent will be reached by the end of December". These sites accommodate over

come of East Timorese environment, economy or demography. War is clearly the catalyst".

Neither are people free to move about or work as they would choose. They are confined to these centres. A February 1980 Indonesian church report states: "The bigger part of the people are still concentrated in population centres. They are not free to go far from the centres. Farming opportunities are restricted to the immediate neighbourhood of the population centres . . . the central districts provide good farming opportunities that, unfortunately, are not fully exploited". The Jakarta-based correspondent for the *London Observer*, Brian Eads, has also reported: "They are now confined to 'resettlement villages', each with its squad of Indonesian troops" (23 March 1980).

This re-structuring of East Timorese society is to be permanent. The US Embassy in Jakarta reported in September 1979: "It is difficult to distinguish how many people have been moved into the resettlement villages by the Government of Indonesia and how many of them have come into them on their own. The point is the people are now in these villages and the Government of Indonesia plans for them to remain there". This permanence is underlined by the special budgetary allowance the Indonesian Government has made for them. The opening of schools in these sites and the 'transmigrasi' of Indonesian peasants from

To involve one's organisation in this way is, at least objectively speaking, to make a direct contribution to the Indonesian subjugation of the East Timorese.

300,000 people, that is, well over half the population. They are new constructs and they represent the first stages of an Indonesian re-structuring of East Timorese society. Many have been forced into these centres by war-induced starvation and the need to survive or by military command. People have not by and large returned to their own villages or life-style. For Elizabeth Traube, a Harvard-trained anthropologist who lived in East Timor for over two years until late 1974, these sites "clearly represent a break with long-term, traditional resettlement patterns, which were adapted to traditional means of subsistence". She stresses that today's conditions "are not the natural out-

other parts of the archipelago (East Timor has now been officially designated a transmigration centre) will further advance the Indonesianisation process the centres are designed to promote.

These centres, then, are both the products of Indonesia's military subjugation of Timor and the means of furthering that process. If people have been forced into them by one means or another, if they are not free to resume their traditional life-style and means of support, and if their confinement in them means they are short of food, it is clear they have been established for reasons other than the good of the people.

Their real purpose is twofold: it is to control the people and, in the

words of an Indonesian parliamentarian, "to separate the people from the terrorists" (that is, Fretilin). As a specialist in Timorese agriculture told the *New York Times* journalist Henry Kamm during his visit to Timor in January this year: "the plan had been drawn largely for strategic reasons, placing the population where the Indonesian army can control it". He went on to say that he approved "of the political objective of keeping the people out of the reach of Fretilin remnants".

By curbing Fretilin access to the people and vice-versa, this well-known and widely used counter-insurgency strategy is intended, on the one hand, to curtail the nationalists' sphere of influence and deny them the intelligence, morale, material support and recruits which are their life-blood, and, on the other, to permit the Indonesian military free access to the hearts and minds of the people. As the Jakarta-based correspondent for the *London Observer* expressed it: "teachers (are being) shipped in from Indonesia, with the officially stated aim of 'washing their brains' of Fretilin's nationalist ideology" (March 1980).

To make a long-term commitment to such sites and to work uncritically within them through Indonesian Government channels and with the full support of the US Government, as CRS is doing, has clear political and strategic consequences. There can be no doubt that to involve one's organisation in this way is, at least objectively speaking, to make a direct contribution to the Indonesian subjugation of the East Timorese. It is to ignore the just aspirations for independence of a determined and courageous people and to take the side of the more powerful protagonist in an on-going struggle.

The exercise is also suspect as an aid and development programme. The sites are inherently contradictory for they cannot serve as centres of development and self-sufficiency when their main purpose is to control the population and thereby deny them freedom of movement and work. In fact as the agricultural specialist interviewed by Kamm commented: "the resettlement project will make East Timor permanently dependent on food imports".

Finally, it should be noted that CRS is no stranger to the counter-insurgency, population control function of the 'strategic centre'. In 1967 and again in 1976 sections of the US press accused CRS of working as an instrument of US

foreign policy by helping the US military effort in South Vietnam. A number of specific charges were made and included the allegation that the US military "built CRS into its refugee programme" which involved forcing large numbers of civilians out of their villages and farms into refugee camps for reasons of military strategy. These camps were then supplied by CRS. The CRS Vietnam operation at the time was directed by Father Robert Charlebois. Charlebois now handles negotiations between CRS and the US Government for government funding of CRS projects and accompanied senior US government officials on a tour of resettlement sites in East Timor late last year.

Exclusion of other agencies

Only two foreign aid agencies have been admitted to East Timor and both are currently conducting their programmes there on objectionable Indonesian Government terms. All other agencies have been excluded despite the fact that some have money specifically earmarked for East Timor and acknowledge their responsibilities to the territory. In recent months many have made requests to visit and/or work in Timor, only to be turned down by the Indonesian Government. These include UNICEF, the Indonesian Council of Churches and Indonesian Bishops Conference, the Australian Council of Churches, Austcare, Australian Catholic Relief, the Freedom from Hunger Campaign (Australia), and Oxfam London.

ICRC and CRS have both said there are tremendous unmet needs in East Timor and no danger of duplication were other agencies to come. The United Nations and several US Congressmen have called for international agencies to be allowed in.

More importantly the situation itself seems to require the expertise and resources of additional agencies. On May 1, 1980 *The Age* carried an earlier report from the *London Observer* based on interviews conducted in Jakarta which said in part: "Progress has been made, 'They are not dying like they were when we arrived five months ago', said one relief worker. The observation is relative. People continue to die from acute malnutrition and vitamin deficiency. But neither the CRS nor the ICRC teams are allowed sufficient access to make meaningful assessments of how far their emer-

gency aid has cut death rates. Perhaps the most telling observation came from an official who had recently visited Cambodia. By the criteria of distended bellies, intestinal disease and brachial parameter — the measurement of the upper arm — the East Timorese are in a worse state than the Khmers".

Church sources confirm this general picture. They reported in February that though "general conditions are improving the process is extremely slow and that as long as military operations continue the rehabilitation process will be badly hampered". In the opinion of these sources big food supplies imported by CRS and ICRC have been insufficient and a full-scale food programme will be required about June once the limited returns from the corn harvest have been consumed. A number of starvation areas have been identified mainly in the eastern districts: Lospalos, Laga, Quelicai, Venilale, Uatolari, Uatocarbau, Hatolia, Maubara. Elsewhere for various reasons individual families are not getting enough food. The number of people involved may run into the thousands. The Church assessment adds that shortage of food and inadequate diet have caused physical weakness and have lessened resistance. As a result malaria, TB, cold/flu, typhoid, fever, diarrhoea, infections, rheumatism are taking a big toll. Though there is an acute and urgent need for housing, priority must still be given to food and agricultural equipment. Orphans and unaccompanied children, it concludes, remain a serious problem.

Appeal to the agencies

The Indonesian Government has rejected out of hand offers of help from a broad range of aid agencies concerned about the situation in East Timor. Is this to be the last word?

The first responsibility of aid agencies around the world is to the people of East Timor. At the very least these agencies must seek to visit East Timor and undertake a fresh assessment of the people's needs and the suitability of existing programmes. They must know, however, that only a vigorous and united effort will achieve this.

But their responsibilities go further. At the same time they must raise with their colleagues — ICRC and CRS — the nature of their current programmes in East Timor and question the propriety of giving aid without justice. ○

East Timor : how many people have died?

East Timorese believe between 100,000 and 300,000 people have died in East Timor in the last four years. Recent official Indonesian population figures for the territory appear to support these claims. This article is a summary of the February 1980 issue of *Timor Information Service*, which concluded that between 133,000 and 217,000 people (that is, between one fifth and one third of the population) are unaccounted for in East Timor. Detailed sourcing is provided in the original material. This summary was produced by T.I.S.

Since the first days of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975, there has been a steady flow of information indicating a large and increasing death toll in the territory. Less than one year after the invasion, church sources in Dili estimated that the number of people killed may have reached 100,000. By the latter half of 1979, Timorese church sources were saying in private conversation that at least 100,000 and perhaps as many as 200,000–300,000 East Timorese have died since the invasion began.

These estimates are not based on population counts. They arise from observations of people who have lived in East Timor during four years of war. The estimates are supported by the many reports from other Timorese (both Fretilin and non-Fretilin) of widespread killing in the early period of the invasion. The findings of an International Red Cross (ICRC) survey in July 1979 and Australian journalist Peter Rodgers in October, back up the 1979 ACFOA report "Aid and East Timor" which showed that a large proportion of East Timor's population was in an emergency situation and many had died of disease and starvation in the countryside and in Indonesian controlled 'refugee' or 'resettlement' camps.

Reports by East Timorese on the number of deaths in their country were given credence in October 1979 when Peter Rodgers calculated that the population had declined by about 100,000. Rodger's estimates were based on official population figures released by the Indonesian-

controlled Provincial government in Dili. In fact, Rodgers appears to have underestimated the number of deaths these figures may indicate.

How many people are missing?

The official Indonesian figures supplied to Rodgers in October 1979 put East Timor's population at 522,433. The exact population of East Timor before the invasion is not known but according to official Portuguese and East Timor church figures, it was in the range of 663,000–700,000 in 1975. The short civil war in East Timor during August/September 1975 effectively caused a 7,000 decrease in population (4,000 refugees who never returned and up to 3,000 deaths — see discussion below). If we subtract this number from the 1975 population figures, we are left with a population in East Timor, after the civil war but before the invasion, of 656,000–693,000.

Comparing those figures with the 523,000 figure supplied to Peter Rodgers, the population in 1979 appears to be about 133,000–170,000 less than it was in 1975 before the invasion. However, there are three obvious reasons why we cannot conclude that this is the number of people who have died since the invasion:

- It is not clear how accurate the Indonesian population estimate actually is. In June 1979, a Timorese source was provided with some official figures which, when

totalled, put the population at 523,000, almost the same as that given to Rodgers in October. The June figures, provided on a district by district basis were almost all "rounded-off" to the nearest thousand and, more questionably, eight of the districts were shown to have a population of exactly 30,000 (see map). If the figures supplied to Rodgers were these same June figures, there must be some doubt about their accuracy.

- A population census by Indonesian authorities would include only those East Timorese directly accessible to the Indonesian government. When Rodgers was provided with the population figures, he was also told by Indonesian military officials that there were 300-600 "Fretilin members" in the Eastern part of the territory. Given the Indonesian government's record over the last four years of drastically understating the number of Timorese outside their control, there would certainly be many more than 300-600 people not included in the population count. Until it is known how many East Timorese were *not* counted, it is impossible to determine from these official figures how many people have died.
- Subtracting the 1979 figure from the 1975 population figure to determine the number of missing East Timorese takes no account of births since 1975. In the 1950s and 60s, East Timor's population grew at a rate of 1.7 per cent per

year. If life in East Timor during the period 1975-79 had been close to normal, the population should have increased to about 700,000-740,000. Against this figure, the 1979 Indonesian population figures would indicate that 177,000-217,000 people were missing. However, there is no doubt that conditions in East Timor during 1975-79 were far from 'normal' but information on the effects of killings, starvation and disease on birth rates etc. is not available. Therefore, while it is currently impossible to quantify, 'population growth' after 1975 has to be taken into consideration.

What then, do the 1979 population figures show?

We have seen that there may be some doubt about the accuracy of the Indonesian government's 1979 population figure for East Timor (approx. 523,000). Whether or not it is accurate, if it is compared with the pre-invasion 1975 population level, it leaves 133,000-170,000 East Timorese unaccounted for. Although we are not able to quantify 'population growth' after 1975, it is not unreasonable to suggest that the actual number of 'missing' East Timorese is *at least* 133,000-170,000 and could be as high as 177,000-217,000. However, until we know how many East Timorese remain outside Indonesian control (and hence not counted in Indonesian population surveys), we cannot deduce from these figures

alone, how many East Timorese have actually died since the invasion.

Why are Peter Rodgers' calculations an underestimate?

How is it possible to conclude that the number of people missing may be twice that calculated by Rodgers, given that we have used the same Indonesian population figure? The reasons are simple:

Firstly, Rodgers relies exclusively on Portuguese government figures for his 1975 population level. However, there is evidence that these figures underestimate the actual population because some Timorese avoided the Portuguese census counts in order to evade colonial taxes. For this reason, we have given the 1975 population as a range between the Portuguese figure (663,000) and Catholic Church estimates (700,000).

Secondly, Rodgers appears to give credence to reports that there may be as many as 25,000 East Timorese in West Timor, where they fled during the 1975 civil war. Rodgers has not seen these refugees, nor have there been any consistent first-hand accounts of their presence in West Timor since 1976. According to well-placed East Timorese, West Timorese and Jakarta church sources, most if not all refugees who went to West Timor in 1975 have returned to East Timor (with the exception of 1400 who went to Portugal in late 1976). Until the presence of East Timorese in West Timor is confirmed, Rodgers' use of them in calculations about population must remain doubtful

and, for this reason, we have excluded them from our estimates.

The third reason why Rodgers' calculations are probably an underestimate is that he does not, as we have done here, take into account any 'population growth' after 1975.

More recent Indonesian population figures. Are they credible?

Even though Rodgers' estimate of 100,000 deaths may be an underestimate, it is a shocking figure in any language. Not surprisingly, the Indonesian government has sought to prove Rodgers' calculations wrong, and has subsequently issued three new sets of population figures in as many months.

In November 1979, an Indonesian armed forces newspaper disputed Rodgers' report and claimed that East Timor's population was really 612,017. A month later, the East Timor military commander stated that the population was 592,603. Then, in January 1980, US Congressmen visiting East Timor were presented with a set of figures allegedly showing the population to be 598,603 (in fact, the figures provided totalled 589,782).


Why these three sets of figures are different from one another and so different from the figure of 523,000 supplied to Rodgers in late October 1979 as "the results of a survey that has just been carried out", remains unexplained. These recent figures are even more suspect when reports from East Timor in-

EAST TIMOR

ADMINISTRATIVE AREAS & POPULATION

This map compares three sets of population figures for each administrative district:-

- 30,000 - June 1979 official Indonesian figures.
- (42,600) - 1975 estimate (from Portuguese figures.)
- (46,000) - 1979 'projection' (" " ")



NOTE: These figures show only the 'order of magnitude' of the difference between the 1979 Indonesian figures and the pre-invasion 1975 and 'expected' 1979 population. Changes in the district boundaries of Suai, Ainaro and Manufahi, doubt about the accuracy of the June 1979 figure and lack of knowledge about 'population growth' since 1975 all render accurate comparison impossible.

dicate that the flow of East Timorese into Indonesian controlled areas has "slowed to a trickle" since April 1979. There have been no reports indicating the movement of 60,000—80,000 Timorese into Indonesian controlled areas since April '79, let alone since October 1979.

While these new sets of Indonesian population figures appear to be contrived, they still of course, leave enormous numbers of East Timorese unaccounted for.

How many deaths caused by the 1975 civil war?

Since Rodgers' October report, even the Australian government appears to accept the fact that large numbers of Timorese have died. However, at least one of its members, Michael MacKellar, has attempted to lay a significant part of the blame on the 1975 civil war. There is no reliable evidence to support such a claim.

The civil war began in mid-August 1975 and had all but ended within three weeks with occasional clashes occurring until the end of September 1975. According to ACFOA and ICRC estimates at the time, the number of deaths caused by fighting in the 1975 civil war was 1,500—3,000. Approximately 2,600 people fled to Australia at the height of the civil war. Of the thousands of people who crossed the border into West Timor at the same time, all but 1,400 who went to Portugal in 1976, appear to have returned to East Timor. So, the actual known decrease in East Timor's population, directly attributable to the 1975 civil war is only 7,000.

The only military activity in East Timor between late September and December 7, 1975 occurred in the border areas. These events involved incursions by Indonesian troops into,

and naval and aerial bombardment of, East Timorese territory. The actual number of casualties sustained by both East Timorese military and civilians at that time was relatively low.

It has also been argued that the widespread starvation and disease seen in East Timor was a direct result of the civil war. It is true that the civil war did cause disruption of food supplies in some areas of East Timor, but according to the ACFOA team which visited the territory in October 1975 (after the civil war), the situation had not reached famine proportions and, in most areas, the 'subsistence economy' had proved war resistant.

By late November 1975, after almost three months of humanitarian aid programmes conducted by the ICRC, ASIAT and later, eight member agencies of ACFOA, the ICRC chief delegate, Andre Pasquier reported that there had been no cases of serious illness through starvation and "nobody in East Timor (was) starving to death".

Indonesian invasion responsible for many deaths

There seems little doubt that an enormous number of East Timorese have died since 1975. As we have seen, East Timorese living in the territory believe between 100,000 to 300,000 may have died in the last four years. Their claims appear to be supported by official Indonesian population figures released in Dili in late October 1979. These latter figures, while they cannot tell us exactly how many people have actually died, do indicate that at least 133,000—170,000 and perhaps as many as 177,000—217,000 remain unaccounted for. This represents between one fifth and one third of East Timor's population.

If the 1975 civil war can account for only a relatively small number of deaths, what is the reason for such a big number of deaths since then? People who have lived in East Timor for the past four years are in no doubt:

Since December 7, 1975, a wide spectrum of East Timorese have reported systematic killings, the 'wiping of villages off the map' and destruction of crops during Indonesian military operations in East Timor. Their reports have been publicised, but not widely or consistently in Australian and international media for East Timor has been, and essentially remains, closed to independent observers.

The Indonesian government refused to allow international relief organisations into East Timor for the first 3¼ years of its occupation of the territory. The destitute condition of East Timorese in Indonesian 'refugee' or 'resettlement' camps was known to Western governments almost one year before the ICRC and Catholic Relief Services were permitted to begin a relief operation. There seems little doubt that the starvation and disease seen in East Timor by the ICRC and CRS in 1979, was not caused by the civil war. It occurred after the Indonesian invasion and would have been exacerbated by the conscious exclusion of an international relief operation.

There is little point in arguing whether or not the Indonesian government *intended* to cause the death of a large number of Timorese to effect the integration of East Timor into Indonesia. There seems little doubt that the actions of the Indonesian military, as an invading and occupying force, *has* caused a large number of deaths and it is for this reason that East Timorese still do not accept the Indonesian presence in East Timor. ○

The Human Toll of a World at War

In November, just before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Center for Defense Information, a nonprofit research organization with headquarters on Capitol Hill, published a survey of the world's current armed conflicts. It counted 37 such major and minor wars, involving more than 8 million soldiers and paramilitary fighters. "The total loss of lives in these conflicts is unknown," the center reported, "but rough estimates run between 1 and 5 million killed." The following were rated as the eight most violent wars:

| Conflict | Number of Deaths | Year Started |
|------------------------------|----------------------|--------------|
| 1. Cambodia | 500,000 to 4 million | 1970 |
| 2. Afghanistan | 100,000 to 250,000 | 1978 |
| 3. East Timor | 100,000 or more | 1975 |
| 4. Lebanon | 50,000 or more | 1975 |
| 5. Sino-Vietnamese war | 30,000 or more | 1979 |
| 6. Philippine guerrilla wars | 30,000 or more | 1972 |
| 7. Guatemala | 22,000 or more | 1967 |
| 8. Rhodesia | 20,000 or more | 1972 |

Washington Post, Jan 1980

Maria is a refugee from East Timor and now lives in Australia with her children. Her husband is not allowed to leave East Timor to join her. He has never seen their youngest child. Many other Timorese in Australia are separated from their families in this way.



R.A.F.T.

A NEW NATION-WIDE COMMUNITY
CAMPAIGN TO RE-UNITE IN AUSTRALIA
THE FAMILIES OF TIMORESE.

The continuing failure to reunite Timorese families after five years of separation is scandalous and intolerable.

RAFT desperately needs the help of concerned Australian families, individuals, churches, schools and community organisations to work together out of simple humanity for these unfortunate people.

The immediate aims of this campaign are:

- to bring from East Timor for family reunion in Australia
 1. the rest of the 625 on the agreed list,
 2. the parents of unattached children already in Australia,
 3. cases deserving special consideration such as the widowed parents of adult children already in Australia, and
- to bring from Portugal those Timorese refugees who wish to immigrate to Australia.

ONLY SOME 2000 PEOPLE ARE INVOLVED, A TINY FRACTION OF THE 80,000 MIGRANTS WHO WILL SETTLE IN AUSTRALIA THIS YEAR.

How RAFT will work.

On receipt of your enrolment, RAFT will supply you with three items: a background booklet, a dossier on *one* case, and suggestions for action. You will be asked to adopt the case of just one family and to follow it through until reunion or resettlement is achieved.

For further information write to:

Christine Dix, RAFT, 183 Gertrude Street, Fitzroy, Victoria 3065, Australia.

Timorese Family Reunions

POLITICS BEFORE PEOPLE

by Pat Walsh

This article surveys attempts made since 1975 to reunite Timorese families split up between Australia and East Timor.

Of the 625 agreed on for reunion in Australia, only 295 – less than half, have come.

The article looks at the political reasons for this and suggests that, after nearly five years of delays and heartbreak, it is time for the Australian Government (which is awarded 4/10 for its performance to date) to assert itself and for the International Red Cross and UN to look to their acknowledged responsibilities in the matter.

Separations

Australia became the first country of asylum for the first time in its history in 1975 when 2581 Timorese were evacuated to Darwin from East Timor between August and November of that year. The majority of these people left East Timor in August and September when the civil war between UDT and Fretilin was at its height, and were ferried to Darwin by boat and plane. The hi-jack by 37 Timorese of an RAAF Caribou from Baucau on Timor's north-east coast indicates the atmosphere of panic which prevailed at the time. Many were elderly people, women (some of whom were pregnant) and children (some without their parents). Of this whole group many were Chinese-Timorese and some were indigenous Timorese who had worked as servants in Timor. Some (mostly Portuguese nationals) went on to Portugal. But most chose to stay. 1850 were distributed between Darwin and migrant hostels around Australia and given temporary resident visas until December 31, 1975 by which time it was hoped the situation in Timor would be clearer and long-term decisions about the future could be made. Some were under the impression they would soon return to Timor for reunion with their families once the civil war was over. Such hopes were quickly dashed by the Indonesian invasion and sealing-off of their country in December 1975.

They had no choice but to stay. They were granted permanent residence in Australia from May 1976 and are now concentrated in Darwin, Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth.

Reports of the war coupled with the loneliness and insecurity of exile heightened the refugees' fears for their families and the matter of family reunions was quickly broached.

First attempts at reunion

The first attempt at family reunification was made in late 1975/early 1976. According to the Timorese welfare officer in Melbourne, Mr Joao Goncalves, some Timorese in Australia were issued at this time with authority forms from the Australian Immigration Department which would permit family members in West Timor and East Timor to come to Australia without being subject to the normal migration requirements. These forms, which were valid until June 1976, were ignored by the Indonesian authorities. Hearing of the failures at the Timor end, Timorese in Australia attempted to have the June 30 deadline extended. They were not able to achieve this.

By this time, however, the issue of Timorese family reunion was the subject of frequent comment in the Federal Parliament. In October 1976, during discussions in Jakarta, Mr

Fraser and President Suharto agreed that officials of both countries should meet to resolve the problem. At least 11 meetings were to occur before an 'in principle' agreement on reunions was announced five months later in March 1977. This agreement stated that arrangements were proceeding for a visit to Dili by Australian officials "to take place as early as circumstances permit". Timorese in Australia were invited to nominate relatives for reunion and were informed that the acceptable categories for reunion were: "spouses, minor dependent children and parents of Australian citizens; and relatives who have employment skills and experience recognised and in demand in Australia".

They were given three weeks to lodge their nominations "so that the operation can proceed as quickly as possible". By the closing date on 22 April 1977, 2668 relatives had been nominated for admission to Australia. At the same time, the Timorese asked the Australian Government to take two precautions against possible abuse of information on relatives supplied to the Indonesian authorities in Timor. They requested that an international welfare agency such as the International Red Cross (ICRC) be invited to supervise the reunion program, and secondly that a member of the Timorese community in Australia be permitted to accompany the Australian Immigration team to Timor to act as an interpreter. Both proposals were rejected

by the Australian Government on the grounds that they would jeopardise the Australian-Indonesian agreement on reunions.

Disappointments

The note of optimism about a speedy resolution of the problem struck by the Government at this time proved to be a hollow one indeed. Despite the urgency of the matter and frequent reports that the Team's visit to Timor was 'imminent', nothing of significance was to happen for a further 14 months. No team went to Dili, and no families were reunited. Even the extension of de facto recognition by the Australian Government of Indonesia's takeover of Timor announced on January 20, 1978 failed to achieve Indonesian co-operation, despite the fact that it was advanced by Mr Peacock as one reason for recognition.

A further blow to the hopes of the waiting Timorese was the eventual disclosure that less than a quarter of the relatives nominated in April 1977 would be accepted for admission to Australia. A figure of 625 was apparently arrived at by both Governments in July 1978 "after protracted negotiations." Press reports, however, were making reference to an agreed list of 'about 600' names some time before this date. Though at least 625 out of 2668 are eligible to come, frequent media mention has now fixed this number of 600 in the public mind as the literal figure both distorting public expectations in regard to this group and eliminating from consideration the claims of the remaining 2000 nominees.

Presumably Indonesian reluctance to allow all the 2668 to leave Timor was a factor in the reduction for it has been reported on a number of occasions that they do not wish to be embarrassed by the exodus of large numbers of people from Timor. Indeed in its own press statements until the end of 1978 the Indonesian Government continually referred to the family reunion program as a repatriation exercise and avoided reference to reunions outside Timor in Australia. The Timorese themselves, both in Australia and Timor, did not see it that way. Only a handful of Timorese have actually returned to East Timor and, with one or two exceptions, these were religious sisters. Timorese in Timor have act-

ively discouraged relatives from returning. One parent wrote in late 1977:


"Tell my son that for nothing on this earth should he return to Timor. As soon as I possibly can, I shall leave here; but I would rather die without seeing him again than to know that he had returned to this hell".

It should be noted, however, that the Australian Government did give some indication on June 2, 1977 after receipt of the 2668 nominations that not all would satisfy the admission criteria. It was also clear that the Australian Government in deference to Indonesian sensitivities though in complete disregard of the reality inside Timor, was treating the reunion of families as a 'migration exercise' not as the intake of refugees from a war situation.

First reunions

Following a visit to Jakarta early in July 1978 by the then Immigration Minister, Mr Michael MacKellar, a high level meeting between Indonesian and Australian officials was decided on for July 25-26,

1978 — 14 months after the nominations had been called for in a hurry the previous April. After that meeting the Australian Government announced "that the procedures accepted by both sides will enable the processing and movement of the people involved by Christmas" and that "Indonesian and Australian officials will visit Indonesia (Dili) . . . at about the end of October" for selection interviews. Well-founded Timorese scepticism about which Christmas was meant appeared to be confirmed when October passed without the team's departure followed by another Christmas spent in lonely separation from loved ones. A visit to Australia in December 1978 by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr Mochtar, indicated, however, that at last some action could soon be expected. Following their discussions, Mr Peacock announced on December 15 that "agreement had been reached for an early visit by an Australian immigration team to East Timor to interview an initial group for reunion with other relatives in Australia. It was also agreed" according to a letter from the Acting Foreign Minister at the time, Mr Ian Sinclair, "that the remaining eligible nominees would be



TELEGRAMS 'IMMIGRATION' CANBERRA
TELEPHONE 73 0412

Department of Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs

CANBERRA, A.C.T. 2606

25 OCT 1978

OUR REF:


YOUR REF:

Dear ,

I am pleased to be able to inform you that at talks held in Jakarta with the Indonesian authorities recently, the following persons you have nominated were included on the list of people in the categories agreed between the two governments:

The Indonesian Government has agreed to try to locate your nominees in Timor and, should they wish to migrate to Australia, to invite them to attend an interview with an Australian Immigration Officer and for a medical examination in Dili later this year.

Yours sincerely,


N.C.J. HOFFMANN
for Secretary

Without this letter, no family reunion. Even with it, the odds are very poor.

processed under normal immigration procedures as quickly as possible".

A three-man Immigration team, led by Mr Norman Hoffmann, arrived in Dili on Christmas Day 1978. There was no matching visit of an Indonesian immigration team to Australia at the same time, though an exchange of teams had previously been agreed to in principle. The visit would not have been warranted as no Timorese in Australia wished to return to an Indonesian-controlled Timor. Following the Hoffmann-team visit to Dili, 99 Timorese arrived in Australia in mid-January 1979 for tearful reunions with their families.

They were the first Timorese to have come from East Timor since the last half of 1975. They were also the last to come in this official, public manner, direct from Dili with their fares wholly paid by the Australian Government.

Since January 1979, a further 196 people on the agreed list have come to Australia for reunion with their families. That is, three years after the official lodging of nominations and five years after their separation, less than half of the agreed family reunions, i.e. 295 out of 625, have occurred. It is to be noted, however, that an estimated 100 other Timorese not on the agreed list have been admitted to Australia from Timor over these years either on the basis of special consideration or because they have met the occupational and other criteria governing normal admittance.

Discrimination and corruption

With few exceptions, all those who have come from Timor, whether on the agreed list or not, have been Chinese-Timorese, a fact the Australian Government acknowledges. Only one or two mixed or indigenous Timorese have been allowed to leave. And with few exceptions, all have had to pay substantial bribes to Indonesian officials or private citizens in both Dili and Jakarta to obtain the necessary exit permits. Money for these payments, which vary between \$A1500 and 3000 per head, has been sent from Australia by relatives or raised by the sale of property in Timor. For example, one woman who arrived in Australia in 1975 with two of her children, leaving behind her husband and six children, has already paid \$6000 (in bribes, air-fares Dili-Jakarta, and accommodation in Jakarta) to bring

PEMERINTAH PROPINSI DAERAH TINGKAT I
TIMOR TIMUR

SURAT IZIN BEPERGIAN


Nomor: /SIB/ 978

DIBERIKAN IZIN BEPERGIAN KEPADA :

- 1. Nama :
- 2. Tempat dan tanggal lahir :
- 3. Jenis kelamin :
- 4. Nikah / belum : BELUM
- 5. Pekerjaan : TURUT ORANG TUA
- 6. Tempat tinggal : DILI / TIMOR TIMUR
- 7. Maksud bepergian : MENENGOK FAMILI
- 8. Tempat berangkat : DILI / TIMOR TIMUR
- 9. Tempat tujuan : JAKARTA
- 10. Kendaraan : PESAWAT UDARA
- 11. Tanggal berangkat : KESEMPATAN PERTAMA
- 12. Tanggal kembali : SETELAH 14 HARI DITEMPAT
- 13. Biaya perjalanan : DITANGGUNG SENDIRI

Catatan :

MEMBAWA PERLENGKAPAN KEPERLUAN SEHARI-HARI.



This exit permit cost \$500. Its signatories are the senior Indonesian Intelligence Officers in East Timor.

her husband and three of the children. She will need at least another \$5,000 to bring the other three children who are still in East Timor.

To obviate these twin injustices of discrimination and corruption, Timorese in Australia have repeatedly called on the Australian Government to send an Immigration team

back to Timor to process all eligible nominees on the spot and bring them direct to Australia. In response the Australian Government has been content to make cautious representations through diplomatic channels and appears to accept that nothing more can be done.

On the matter of bribery, for

example, Mr Macphee the current Minister for Immigration has said: *"I am aware of allegations which have been made in this regard and this matter has been raised with the Indonesian authorities. I understand that it has been investigated, but you will appreciate that effective action to eliminate this problem can only be taken by the Indonesian authorities"*. (Jan 3, 1980)

A similar attitude of acquiescence is expressed by the Foreign Minister, Mr Peacock, in his reply to a request to send an immigration team to Dili: *"this possibility has been raised in discussion with the Indonesians but . . . there has been no substantive reaction — the question of entry to East Timor is, of course, one for the Indonesian authorities to decide"*. (March 20, 1980) This means, in effect, that the Australian Government accepts it can do nothing for those on the agreed list until they present themselves at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

The situation now

The Timorese in Australia now generally believe that the Indonesian authorities have decided to shut the door on any further departures from Timor — that is, not to honour their side of the 'in principle agreement' any longer. The Australian Government denies this. In reply to a question in the Senate on April 1, 1980 Senator Carrick said: *"The program is continuing, although slowly. Four Timorese on the agreed list have arrived in Australia in the last six weeks. Eight others are currently in Jakarta awaiting issue of Indonesian exit permits"*.

The implication in this reply that the figures supplied show the program has not ended is fallacious. It does not address the crucial question of whether people are at this point allowed to leave East Timor. Nor does it allow that the only way out of Jakarta for these people at the moment is by subterfuge. Timorese who have negotiated the first leg of the long journey from Dili to Jakarta and been issued there with visas to enter Australia by the Australian embassy are being denied exit permits by the Indonesian authorities — a fact which the Australian Government has elsewhere acknowledged. Those who arrived here recently have got around this only by forging Indonesian passports and travelling on them to Singapore (which does not require visas of

Indonesian citizens) whence they have made their way to Australia.

These people, in one sense, have been the lucky ones. For the majority of those affected — perhaps especially the 20 wives whose husbands are still in Timor — the future looks bleak indeed.

It may well be their only hope for reunion is the direct and strong intervention of an influential third party — for example the United Nations, or the International Red Cross, or a less pusillanimous Australian Government. What chance is there of this?

United Nations

The Timorese have called on the UN to intervene several times. The UN in fact passed a resolution on November 21, 1979 as follows:

"The General Assembly requests the United Nations Children's Fund and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to render, within their respective fields of competence, all possible assistance to the people of East Timor, particularly the children and those seeking to leave for another country for purposes of family reunion . . ." (emphasis added) The writer is not aware of any activity to date on the part of these two bodies in response to this request.

International Red Cross

The agreement drawn up between the International Red Cross (ICRC) and the Indonesian Red

ICRC itself would not intervene. The reply added, however, that since Portugal had no diplomatic links with Indonesia ICRC would try to act as an intermediary with Indonesia for those applicants who might be accepted by Portugal. This has been done, and it would appear has some chance of success. Some light has been thrown on ICRC's puzzling reluctance to offer the same service to the family reunion program between Timor and Australia by the Secretary-General of Australian Red Cross, Mr Leon Stubbings. He reported on January 10, 1980 after discussions with ICRC during a visit to Timor that the ICRC is at present not involved in the family reunion program "as the issue is considered too political". Given the present state of the program and the fact that the ICRC operation in East Timor has been extended for another six months, it may well be time for the ICRC to revise its position and seek to broaden its program inside East Timor to include some more of its traditional works, including family reunions.

The Australian Government

As one would expect, the Australian Government defends its record on family reunions. It argues in its official statements and correspondence that it has done "everything possible in the most difficult circumstances" (Macphee) to reunite Timorese families. It points to its record of admitting 1800 refugees from Timor in mid-1975, paying for their initial settlement, and providing

The Timorese in Australia now generally believe that the Indonesian authorities have decided to shut the door on any further departures from Timor — that is, not to honour their side of the 'in principle agreement' any longer.

Cross on June 19, 1979 covering their current joint operation in East Timor refers only to a food and medical relief operation. No mention is made of the other traditional ICRC works, one of which is family reunions. ICRC's attention was drawn to the problem of family reunions in a document directed to them in September 1979 by Action for World Development. The Director of Operations in Geneva replied on October 5, 1979 that Australia should tackle this problem with Indonesia through diplomatic channels, implying that

welfare assistance. It claims that its efforts have been responsible for the admission of another 400 people from East Timor since then. The Timorese are sternly reminded by the Minister for Immigration that "Australia's ability to absorb new settlers is not unlimited" (a position the Northern Territory Administration with its new drive to populate the North clearly rejects). The Timorese are even chastised for their alleged "criticism (in the press) . . . of efforts being made by the Australian authorities to help them, their relatives and

countrymen" (Macphee). No account is taken of Australia's wartime debt to the Timorese, the horrors inflicted on them during recent times, and the special obligations Australia has to them as a neighbour.

Both Mr Peacock and Mr Macphee do concede, however, that "the program has not proceeded as quickly as we would have liked".

Indonesian obstructions

The principal responsibility for the slow pace of the program and its present stalemate rests with the Indonesian Government and, in particular, its military. They would like, of course, to repair their bad image by repatriating Timorese from Australia to Timor, but as there are no applicants this is not possible.

Australian Foreign Affairs officials give three reasons for Indonesia's reluctance to allow departures from Timor. One, they are concerned that the exodus of a big number of people would reflect badly on their administration; two, they fear that new arrivals from Timor will talk about their experiences since the Indonesian invasion adding to anti-Indonesian sentiment in Australia; and three, they do not wish to add to the growing expatriate community of Timorese in Australia who, they fear, may eventually engage in anti-Indonesian activity similar to the Moluccans in Holland.

Australian officials say they have continually tried to calm Indonesian apprehensions about Timorese 'story-telling' and hypothetical political activity by pointing out there is no evidence to support their fears and that in fact they have more to lose by reneging on their undertaking to reunite families for this will only generate greater antipathy. Privately, however, these officials are far from optimistic about the completion of the reunion program. They believe that some of those on the agreed list who have lived through the Indonesian invasion and been eye-witnesses to particular events or who have been members of UDT or Fretilin may never be reunited with their families in Australia.

It is plausible that the Indonesian method employed to date of allowing Timorese to leave only in ones and twos is intended to enable them to buy time until greater control has been established in Timor and outside visitors can be more freely admitted to offset refugee criticisms. How long this will be is not known;

but reports of continued fighting suggest it could be a long time. It is probable that the slow release of family members and intermittent cut-offs of the program are also being used to guarantee the co-operation of the people involved both inside and outside Timor. Certainly Timorese in Australia are reluctant to criticise Indonesia for fear of jeopardising the program or bringing harm to a relative inside Timor. Australian Government officials reinforce this attitude by repeatedly warning Timorese not to criticise or engage in public activity. In this sense the Timorese in Timor are hostages (or to use the

This is reflected on the practical plane by the attitudes of Immigration officials in Canberra who consider their role is a limited one; that they are merely the mechanics in the exercise and that real power lies with the Department of Foreign Affairs which has set the parameters and controls the negotiations according to the constraints of foreign policy. These dictate that Australia's trading, political and defence relations with Indonesia are the priority and that nothing must be done to erode this relationship. It follows then that Australia will remain low-key on family reunions and attempt to see

... less than 50 per cent of those eligible have come from Timor. In addition the program now appears to have broken down, and Australian officials are privately admitting it may never be completed. That is a failure in anybody's book and no cause for self-congratulation on the part of the Australian Government.

Timorese term 'political prisoners') for their detention is being used to extract concessions out of and exercise control over other Timorese.

Indonesian reluctance to allow an Australian immigration team to return to Timor appears to stem from two factors. They fear that the prolonged presence of such a team would attract mass applications to leave. There have been many reports now that some 15,000-18,000 Timorese filled the streets of Dili last year asking to leave when it became known that ICRC was prepared to act on behalf of Portuguese nationals. The Indonesians wish to avoid such a demonstration of dissidence before officials of a Government whom they wish to convince about the normality of life in East Timor. Secondly, the Indonesians seem not to fully trust the Australian Government on Timor. For example, Mr Norman Hoffmann, the Canberra official who led the only immigration team so far to have visited Timor, reported that during his brief stay in December 1978 he had the feeling the Indonesians did not believe he was an Immigration official.

Good relations with Indonesia the priority

The Australian Government's reaction to Indonesian manoeuvres on family reunions is governed above all by foreign policy considerations.

that others, including the Timorese, do likewise. It will continue to work quietly behind the scenes for the reunion program because it is in its domestic political interest to do so. New procedures will be diplomatically suggested to the Indonesian bureaucracy for their consideration; Mr Peacock will discreetly raise the matter with Dr Mochtar from time to time; it will be mentioned during routine talks with the Indonesian ambassador in Canberra; even an extra-low profile attempt at back-door negotiations courtesy of a private citizen will be tried. But nothing remotely akin to Australia's public statements and activity on behalf of the US hostages in Teheran can be expected. For as a senior official in the Immigration Department, L.W.B. Engledow, has put it recently: "there is little more we can do without risking a deterioration in our relations with that country" (Indonesia).

There have been five years to test the effectiveness of this approach. In that time less than 50 per cent of those eligible have come from Timor. In addition the program now appears to have broken down. And Australian officials are privately admitting it may never be completed. That is a failure in anybody's book and no cause for self-congratulation on the part of the Australian Government. If the Australian Government is not prepared to concede this and do more who is left to safeguard the human rights and futures of the separated Timorese families? ○



TINA, KIM, JULIA, CLEONICE: CHILDREN WITHOUT PARENTS. *The International Year of the Child did nothing for them.*

Children Without Parents

There are some 50-60 Timorese minors in Australia who are classified as 'isolated or unattached children'. They fled to Australia in the confusion of mid-1975 leaving their parents behind in Timor. They are now cared for by other Timorese around Australia. An Education Department consultant has commented that despite this care, however, "loss of loved ones by death and/or separation has been the greatest trauma and is a constant source of continuing anxiety as the possibility of family reunion becomes more remote". News about the situation in East Timor and the irregularity and brevity of letters from relatives only add to this anxiety.

Their parents are not on the agreed list of 625. Apart from the few who, in 1975-76, were issued with Letters of Authority to enter Australia, or promises thereof, the only hope of reunion for most of them is to return to East Timor. Understandably neither parents nor children want this. Because of the suffering in Timor their plea is for reunion in Australia.

Australian Government policy does not permit minors to sponsor immigrants (though the waiving of this policy in 1975-76 clearly implies there is nothing immutable about it). Nor will the Immigration Department offer a second chance to those children who in the confusion of 1975 failed to nominate their parents. Further some who did nominate in 1975-76 were denied 'promissory letters' because the Department mistakenly assumed that their absence from home at the time of their evacuation from Timor meant they had been 'adopted out'.

Kim Teng, for example, was 11 years old when he arrived in Australia as a refugee in September 1975, accompanied by an aunt with whom he now lives. The aunt learned later her husband had been killed during the Indonesian invasion. Kim left behind his parents and four

younger brothers and sisters. He was in Dili at the time of the evacuation where he had been sent to attend Chinese primary school. His parents lived in Manatuto.

Kim claims to have nominated his parents late in 1975. The Immigration Department, however, has no record of this nomination and states that his first nomination is dated November 1976. He has written several letters to immigration officials and the Minister pleading for his parents to be allowed to come. These and other representations have all been turned down. One letter of reply read as follows:

"Normal Immigration Policy permits the entry of working age parents provided that the sponsoring son or daughter has been in Australia for at least three years and that:

- (a) where the parents have three children at least one is in Australia;
- (b) where the parents have four or five children at least two are in Australia; and
- (c) where the parents have more than five children at least three must be in Australia.

... Although you have been in Australia for more than three years your application cannot be accepted because your parents have five children and only one of the five, yourself, is in Australia". (30.8.79)

It seems they could come if they had only two other children besides Kim . . .

Kim's parents are now in Jakarta. They arrived there in June 1979, nine months ago, on the first stage of an attempt to get to Australia. The Australian Government continues to refuse to admit them. Meanwhile the pressure on Kim continues to grow, perhaps, some adult Timorese fear, until breaking point.

Timorese Refugees In Portugal

A COMMUNITY IN MOURNING

by Jill Jolliffe in Portugal and Pat Walsh

ACFOA and a number of its member agencies have taken an active interest in the plight of the Timorese refugees now in Portugal virtually since the time of their arrival there late in 1976. It was at the initiative of the NGO's that Mr Jim Dunn visited the camps there January 5-23, 1977. His report on that visit did much to publicise their situation in Australia. ACR made \$20,000 available in 1977 to help meet the expenses of the refugees' immigration procedures, health assistance and child welfare. Action for World Development has compiled and circulated reports. And ACFOA has called on the Australian Government on a number of occasions to classify this small group as refugees and admit them to Australia on humanitarian grounds. The following account traces the origins, movements and problems of these forgotten refugees from the time of their displacement in 1975 to the present day, and reiterates their case for admission to Australia.

The two majority parties of the day, UDT and Fretilin, fought a short, sharp civil war in East Timor in August/September 1975. Many thousands of civilians — men, women and children, sought refuge from this conflict by moving first to the eastern border area of East Timor then across into Indonesian Timor as the fighting moved in that direction. At the conclusion of this war in September 1975 they were joined by several hundred defeated UDT troops, bringing the total number of refugees in Indonesian Timor to an estimated 20,000. Some stayed in the border zone but the majority assembled in camps set up by the Indonesian authorities at Atambua.

Twelve months in Indonesian Timor

Early in the civil war, the RAAF and two Portuguese vessels had ferried some 2500 refugees to Darwin. But as the civil war ran its course and

escape routes by sea and air were cut off, Indonesian Timor provided the only sanctuary. UDT elements in particular expected Indonesia would shelter them because it was anti-Fretilin. Furthermore they expected their stay in Indonesian Timor would be brief as there was a feeling that Portugal would re-assert its authority and enable them to return. They were to be disappointed on both counts. Portugal did not restore its administration and Fretilin ran the territory as its de facto government. And the initial welcome extended to the refugees by the Indonesians soon turned cold when the refugees refused to co-operate with Indonesia's plans for 'integration' — plans that became all too ominous and explicit with the Indonesian invasion of East Timor three months after the refugees' arrival in West Timor. This refusal to co-operate cost the refugees dearly as the following account of their time in West Timor demonstrates.

The Indonesian authorities in

West Timor allowed the defeated UDT troops access to Indonesian Timor only on condition that they signed a petition to President Suharto appealing for integration with Indonesia — a course they reluctantly took. Within 48 hours they were disarmed and stripped of any personal items of value. Otherwise the refugees were generally well treated and provided with facilities and abundant food supplies (though refugees allege there was significant misappropriation of food supplies by Indonesian officials who sold it to local Indonesians and poorly fed Indonesian troops). This was the situation from September 1975 to March 1976.

Hard times at Atambua

In March 1976, however, the attitude of the Indonesian authorities to the refugees took an abrupt change for the worst. This was pre-

capitated by the refusal of the vast majority of the refugees to take part in a pro-Indonesia rally before Adam Malik, then Indonesian Foreign Minister, carrying Indonesian flags and requesting integration. The refugees were told that since East Timor was now part of Indonesia they were no longer 'refugees' and as such not entitled to special assistance. Six months of grinding hardship followed, so severe that a leading refugee from those times now in Australia did not hesitate to call it a 'holocaust' for his people. Food supplies were reduced, then completely cut off. To buy food, people had to sell belongings and carry out hard labour in ricefields and on construction jobs. The small returns these realised were not enough to buy adequate food. Many died. There were few medical facilities and the hospital was not available to the refugees. They were usually asked to pay from their meagre funds for services such as injections. The Catholic Bishop of Atambua and some of the Indonesian Timorese sympathised with their suffering and helped but the military was 'omnipotent' and alone had effective authority. Camps were supervised by armed guards and the Timorese were not allowed to move freely. This contributed to the general atmosphere of powerlessness as it was very difficult to hold meetings or make contact with the outside world. Efforts to contact Australia to arrange for immigration there failed. Their detention continued long after conditions in Dili and other centres in East Timor were said to be secure.

At the end of March the priests at Atambua were told by the Indonesian authorities their Bishop in Dili wished to see them. No such request had been made but their three-week visit to Dili, where they were horrified by what they saw and heard of the Indonesian invasion, was a turning point in their search for security. They returned to Atambua convinced there was no future for their people under Indonesia, either in West Timor or in Indonesian-controlled East Timor.

Escape to Portugal

Nevertheless the refugees claim they would not have been allowed to leave Indonesian Timor were it not for the intervention of the Portuguese Commission led by General Morais-e-Silva and the Netherlands Embassy in Jakarta. The Dutch Ambassador agreed to assist in their

evacuation after receiving a hand-carried letter forwarded by the refugees in May 1976 in which they appealed to him for help as Portugal's acting representative (Portugal broke off diplomatic relations with Indonesia after the 1975 invasion).

Their 12 month experience has persuaded them that all Atambua and Dili could offer them and their families was continued suffering and insecurity. Attempts to get to Australia had failed. Portugal offered the only realistic, though they hoped temporary, alternative.

The Portuguese Government intervened initially to secure the release of 23 Portuguese soldiers who were imprisoned in Atambua by the Indonesians after being brought there as prisoners by the UDT forces. They were used as a political bargaining point by both the Portuguese and the Indonesian Governments. The Indonesian Government agreed to sanction the evacuation of the refugees after General Morais-e-Silva argued that they too were Portuguese citizens and should be extended the same rights as the Portuguese soldiers.

The agreement, however, did not prevent the Indonesian authorities from circulating rumours amongst the refugees that if they applied for evacuation they would be killed. In fact two days before the Dutch Ambassador visited Atambua to finalise the evacuation arrangements, 7000 Timorese were forced to move back into East Timor denying them the opportunity to go to Portugal. They reportedly suffered badly in the harsh conditions at Batugade their destination in East Timor.

Of the estimated 5000 who, despite intimidation, asked to go to Portugal, only those who happened to be at Atambua between June and October 1976 were permitted to leave. This included a small number of Timorese and Chinese (approximately 25) who had paid bribes to travel from Dili to Atambua after the Indonesian invasion. This group of 1400 (the exact figure was 1392 according to the Commissariat for Evacuees of the UNHCR) travelled to Portugal in several contingents during September-October. Some were transported direct to Lisbon by the Portuguese airforce. Others went by boat from Atapupu to Kupang, took planes to Bali, and were then taken to Lisbon by Garuda Indonesian airways.

The priests' request to stay behind to continue their work was turned down with the warning that their safety could not be guaranteed if they remained behind. 700 Portuguese passports were also issued at that time for close relatives of the refu-

gees to be flown to Portugal. Most of these people were in Dili, and have not been allowed to leave. Most of those who either chose not to leave, or were not allowed to, eventually returned to East Timor in one way or another.

Those who did go to Portugal did not want to leave their country. But their 12 month experience had persuaded them that all Atambua and Dili could offer them and their families was continued suffering and insecurity. Attempts to get to Australia had failed. Portugal offered the only realistic, though they hoped temporary, alternative. And so they went into exile 20,000 miles from Timor and Australia, gratefully, but nevertheless under duress as refugees.

The situation in Portugal today

Today, five years after civil war and then invasion caused them to flee their homeland, most of Portugal's 1600 East Timorese still live in refugee camps on the outskirts of Lisbon. The refugees are scattered over eight different centres, all run by Portuguese Red Cross. The main concentration is at Balteiro camp, 200 kms from Lisbon, where several hundred Timorese live alongside refugees from Angola and Mozambique. The Red Cross provides free food and housing for the unemployed, and has recently built new houses within the camp for those who have work and can pay rent — a minority. The rest live in shanty houses. A river polluted by refuse from the camp runs nearby.

Most of them have no future — at least not in Portugal which rates as one of Europe's poorest countries. Inflation and unemployment are rampant, the cost of living high.



The Quinta do Balteiro camp illustrates the primitive conditions in which 1600 Timorese refugees are living in Portugal.

Some 500,000 'returnees' who fled to Portugal from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau when independence came to these former colonies, have placed added strains on the depressed Portuguese economy and because of their better job qualifications they often outbid the Timorese for scarce jobs.

Afflicted by the suffering of their families in Indonesian-occupied Timor, and living in impoverished social conditions with only bleak prospects ahead of them in Portugal, they are sustained by two things: the hope that the Australian Government will allow them to live and work in Australia, and a highly-developed community structure which keeps traditional values alive and ensures every refugee is cared for.

who have not lost friends or relatives under the Indonesian occupation. Some letters simply list deaths and dates. A person interviewed recently, from a coffee-growing village in the central mountain district, received a letter from friends telling her she was the last surviving member of her family. Huddling with thousands of others in the dark coffee plantations — in fear of the Indonesian army, but out of reach of food supplies — the whole family had died of starvation.

Life in the refugee camps

In this context, the task of keeping alive the spirit of this mourning community is a full-time one. The Timorese Refugee Commission (CRTP) operates from Balteiro camp

receiving adequate relief aid, to issuing press releases about the war in Timor.

The Commission also subsidises Lisbon's only Timorese restaurant, a wholly refugee venture launched on a loan from Caritas, but which has since run into misfortune, including a large robbery from the premises, and is threatened with closure for lack of financial backing. The Commission gives high priority to supporting young people to stay in school — community leaders regard education as an important weapon in the struggle to survive. All hope, despite the ravages of the country under the Indonesian occupation, they will one day return to an independent East Timor. They have a perspective of training the youth for future national leadership. There is concern about the breakdown of traditional values. Many young people are unemployed, and finding it difficult to cope with an urbanised society drastically different from their own. The Timorese are a crime-free community, but family problems are increasing — pregnant daughters and runaway children are a new problem. In some cases tribal courts still judge family disputes, but for young people traditional values are less meaningful today.

Although most refugees agree that life in Lisbon is privileged compared to the ordeal of their families in East Timor, their hopes for the future do not focus on Portugal in economic or cultural terms. The Timorese do not

Afflicted by the suffering of their families in Indonesian-occupied Timor, and living in impoverished social conditions with only bleak prospects ahead of them in Portugal, they are sustained by two things: the hope that the Australian Government will allow them to live and work in Australia, and a highly-developed community structure . . .

Most East Timorese receive regular news of the war in Timor, from family letters (usually censored, but some escape the censor) and from the regular stream of new arrivals who have bribed their way out of East Timor. There are few people

under the leadership of Father Apolonario Guterres. Its tasks range from repairing family quarrels, finding work for the many unemployed, organising traditional festivals, ensuring that the most needy refugees (usually single parent families) are

Timorese refugees' plea to be admitted to Australia

Eastern Timor, for the people of that beautiful land, is today a lost Paradise. Peace, rest, tranquility belong to the past. War, hatred and uncertainty have deprived our lovely homeland of all the necessities of life. Now it is a deserted island, abandoned, isolated, solitary. Now, when jet planes, telecommunication and technological power have eliminated distance and isolation.

So, today the people of Timor are doing all in their power, by every means at their disposal to immigrate because the land of their birth is no longer their Paradise.

Invoking the humanitarian principles of Pancasila which the Republic of Indonesia scrupulously adopts as a norm of life, we ask her to respect the life and physical integrity of our brothers as well as the will of those who wish to immigrate.

As for those who are now in Australia we can only offer them our congratulations for having settled down so well in the community of that blessed land while we express our sincere gratitude to the Australians for the friendly welcome and generous hospitality given to our brothers. This generosity has extended even as far as the Timor refugees in Portugal by means of the substantial donation sent to the Service of Catholic Migration and destined in a special way to pay the expenses of the immigration procedures, health assistance and child welfare.

As for the 1,600 Timor people now resident in Portugal, no one can count on security for the future. All live at the expense of the Portuguese Government. With half a million coming from the ex-Overseas Colonies the Government is just powerless to cope with the problem of unemployment. For this reason we, about a year ago, appealed to the Australian Government to open their door to us. Our first appeal was made by means of a letter published by the illustrious journalist Cameron Forbes in "THE AGE" of November 1976 and again through the honoured members of the Australian Government who visited us and recalled the happy comradeship and spirit of solidarity shown by our people during the Second World War.

Our desired goal is AUSTRALIA which shelters the greatest community of Timor people now exiled from their native land. It is our preference among many nations not only because of its geographical affinities but especially because of the exemplary treatment afforded to our brethren already settled down there. These we hope and pray will take care of new arrivals and, in a short time, from their own experience guide and direct them towards a perfect integration. We lament to have to say that of the 1,600 petitions for immigration to Australia, up to today, only a little more than 200 persons who happen to have relations there, were granted. This number constitutes 1/8 of the total. Considering that 7/8 of the refugees do not have the requisites necessary for immigration we now appeal directly to the Christian Families of Australia to take the responsibility with AUSTRALIAN IMMIGRATION for the entrance of Timorese families.

The Timor family is profoundly christian and united.

There are families who need to educate their children and all desire to reconstruct their way of life. This will only be possible if they are economically independent. This ambition can only be realised through immigration to Australia.

So, we leave this our appeal to the consideration of the Christian Families of Australia and we thank in anticipation all those among the thousands of Christian families in whose generous hearts this appeal will find an echo.

(Signed) Father Francisco Maria Fernandes
PRESIDENT OF THE COMMISSION OF TIMOR REFUGEES IN PORTUGAL
25 March, 1978.

regard Portuguese culture as their own. It is alien and far removed from what they have known. They think of themselves as Timorese and only as Portuguese in the technical sense.

Let us come to Australia

The over-riding ambition of most of them is to come to Australia to join the Timorese here who now form the biggest community of Timorese outside East Timor. This has been their aspiration from the beginning. The journalist Cameron Forbes reported in November 1976:

"In tent after tent people who are asked simply what they wanted to do say, simply, 'go to Australia'".

This was their wish even in Atambua but circumstances then left them no choice but to go to Portugal.

Their reasons for wanting to come to Australia can be summarised as follows:

- 1) reunion with families and friends — many have relatives among the 3000 or so Timorese already in Australia and of course value the extended family very highly.
- 2) better prospects for employment and a new life — they know Timorese are well-accepted and can find factory work easily here.
- 3) Australia's geographic and climatic affinity to Timor.
- 4) A general wish to live not very far from Timor with a view to re-

establishing contact with friends and relatives when access to the territory is eventually permitted by Indonesia. Timor is only 350 miles from Darwin, a short plane trip.

- 5) a sense of comradeship and feeling that we owe them something because of collaboration in the Second World War against Japan. To quote Fr Francisco Fernandes, Chairman of the Refugees in Portugal, speaking in May 1978:

"It is natural to want to go there. Not just because it is close to Timor . . . but because we have been friends and neighbours in the past. During the war against the Japanese, we helped Australia, especially in the fighting. Thousands of Timorese

died. Now we are in a difficult situation and we are asking for Australia to help us".

Australian Government response

What has been the Australian Government's response to this case for admission?

To date the Government has rejected the Timorese argument for special consideration.

According to an Australian Government "Green Paper" on immigration and refugee policy, "Australia recognises that people can be in a *refugee-type situation* and merit sympathetic consideration although their status has not been officially recognised by the UNHCR (Chap. 5, page 39, emphasis added). It has not, however, extended this "sympathetic consideration" to the Timorese or accepted that it has an obligation to them as refugees. Along with the UN, and Portugal itself, Australia does not classify them as refugees, preferring instead the term "quasi-refugees" or "evacuees". Under the UN charter on refugees, a person cannot be a refugee in his or her own country. Thus the Timorese — who are legally Portuguese citizens — cannot be refugees in Portugal, although by any human standard they are clearly refugees and their experience testifies to this. They certainly think of themselves as such.

Second, the Australian Government has applied selective criteria admitting only those with immediate family in Australia or professional job qualifications. The former Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Michael MacKellar, explained it as follows in a letter of 26.4.1977:

daughters and brothers or sisters of Australian residents or applicants where special circumstances are evident. They will be exempted from the normal occupational criteria provided they are able otherwise to meet the remaining migrant requirements; or

c) applicants able to meet the normal personal and occupational criteria.

The normal health and character requirements must be met and visas will be granted only to persons intending permanent settlement in Australia".

It should be noted that section b) of this quotation which permits the sponsorship of brothers/sisters and adult sons/daughters or applicants where special circumstances are evident, represents a relaxation of the normal criteria. This relaxation was terminated in February 1979 because the Immigration Department considered it had "fulfilled its purpose".

To date about 500 out of the original 1400 who came from West Timor in 1976 have been settled in Australia on the basis of these criteria.

Other refugees have moved out of the camp after finding work or gone as emigrant workers to other parts of Europe. Refugee numbers rose back to the original 1976 total last year with the arrival of around 650 Timorese-Chinese who paid bribes to Indonesian officials to be allowed leave Timor. Some of these new arrivals are eligible for Australia because they have family here, and are merely waiting for applications to be processed.

There still remains, however, a hard core of several hundred East Timorese who want to come to Australia but are not eligible.

Alberto, for example, although a white-collar worker all his life first in Dili and now in Lisbon, last year did a bricklayer's course to try and qualify himself for Australia. He is still awaiting acceptance. Rejection on this basis, however, would not seem to take into account the fact that unemployment amongst the Timorese already in Australia is virtually non-existent, despite the state of the labour market, and the fact that few Timorese with good qualifications have managed to find employment here consistent with their skills and previous experience.

The Lypinto family have four children of their own, and custody of two teenage children orphaned by the war. Mr Lypinto is diabetic and cannot work, and each winter seems colder than the last in their poorly-heated hut. He receives a pension of around \$70 a month, and his wife does embroidery to supplement their income. The eight of them live in a hut ten by seven metres divided into four rooms. They have no running water and the electricity supply from the main camp generator often fails. Mr and Mrs Lypinto have many cousins in Australia, but this does not alter their situation — in Australia's eyes they are neither refugees nor eligible to enter Australia as ordinary immigrants.

The Australian Government has rejected the Timorese case for admission to Australia. It has chosen to ignore the reality of their refugee status and the claims that Timorese have on us by reason of our historical and geographical links. It has opted to do things by the book.

In view of the conditions under which they now live and the relatively small numbers involved, it is high time all these unfortunate people were offered the chance to immigrate to Australia.

"I have decided that admission of East Timorese in Portugal may be approved if they are:

- a) nominated immediate family members of Australian residents, i.e. spouses, dependent children, parents and fiancé(s);*
- b) nominated non-dependent sons or*

The immigration dice are loaded against the Timorese being accepted as ordinary immigrants. Coming from underdeveloped East Timor, very few have the skills or qualifications generally sought after in modern, industrial Australia. Some are attempting to acquire these skills.

The largest community of East Timorese outside Timor is now located in Australia and so it is understandable that the majority of the Timorese in Portugal should wish to come here. In view of their long-standing aspirations which they have clung to with little encouragement, and the terrible reality of their refugee experience from 1975 until today, and in view of the conditions under which they now live and the relatively small numbers involved, it is high time all these unfortunate people were offered the chance to immigrate.

Australian Military Aid To Indonesia

by Richard Tanter

The Australian Government recently announced that it will expand its military assistance programme to Indonesia, currently running at about \$7 million a year, with an additional gift of six Nomad Searchmaster reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft worth a total of \$10 million.

The aircraft, which follow 12 other Nomads either given or sold to Indonesia by Australia in recent years, are intended for use in countering smuggling and illegal fishing, and to this end have been fitted with sophisticated electronics equipment and all weather radar.

The reconnaissance and surveillance capacities of the aircraft are potentially of more direct military significance to the Indonesian navy and airforce. A most important part of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor has been a highly successful physical and information blockade of the territory, which has prevented the outside world from ascertaining the truth of conflicting claims about the on-going war there, and has also prevented aid and church organisations from sending much needed food and medical supplies. The Nomad aircraft and other parts of the Australian military aid programmes such as patrol boats boosted the Indonesian capacity to maintain such a blockade, whether or not they were actually used in East Timor itself.

The provision of military aid to a neighbouring country is one of the most direct expressions of alliance and shared goals to be found in international society. Indonesia receives large amounts of military aid from the United States and Australia, and spends large amounts of its foreign exchange on arms purchases. The Australian military aid, while small in relation to the total Indonesian military expenditure, is a palpable symbol of our Government's support for the uses to which Indonesia's military capacity is put.

Since 1974, Indonesia has been the largest recipient of Australian military aid after Papua-Niugini and the 1978-79 estimated expenditure was \$6,900,000.

The expanded, regular programme to Indonesia was established, in a rather *ad hoc* way with the 1972 offer by the McMahon Government of 16 ex-RAAF Avon Sabre fighter aircraft. In succeeding years the programme underwent rationalisation and has now taken on the common pattern built around a number of core projects which continue for several years. Such projects currently include a maritime patrol project (aircraft, patrol boats and advisors), a joint topographical and geological mapping project, provision of field communications equipment and helicopters, a long-standing co-operative military research programme, joint exercises and training facilities. In addition a regular intelligence exchange programme operates.

Maritime Patrol Project

The largest single item in the current Indonesian programme is the Maritime Patrol project involving the provision of Nomad aircraft, 16m. De Havilland patrol boats, refurbished ex-RAN Attack Class patrol boats and an RAN advisory team. This project typifies the nature and difficulties of the aid relationship in policy terms.

Since 1973 12 Nomad aircraft have been donated or sold to the Indonesian naval forces (and the recent announcement will take the total to 18). Manufactured by the Government Aircraft Factory, the Nomad N22B Searchmaster was specially developed for reconnaissance and surveillance work to Indonesian requirements. The electronic surveillance equipment provided other than weather radar is not known, but after

a government-sponsored bid to support De Havilland sales it was claimed that "the new surveillance version of the Nomad, known as the Searchmaster and costing \$900,000, is better equipped with radar than any plane in the RAAF. It is fitted with a Canadian-built Litton LSR-2 ground and sea surveillance radar which can pick up objects over a radius of 100 nautical miles." (Week-end Australian June 17-18, 1978)

Ex-RAN Attack Class patrol boats of 146 ton displacement have been refitted and handed over to the Indonesian Navy in recent years. De Havilland Carpentaria 16m. patrol boats complete the equipment provided in this programme. The patrol boats (at least the 16m. craft) are handed over without armament, but are readily fitted out with a variety of weapons.

The stated intention of this project is to provide the Indonesian

Navy with facilities to combat international and domestic inter-island smuggling. Undoubtedly this goal has been enhanced, but more importantly, the naval and air surveillance capacity thus provided by this Australian equipment has very substantially added to the ability of the Indonesian armed forces to carry out its invasion of East Timor and to maintain an active counter-insurgency campaign in West Irian.

A crucial (and continuing) part of the Indonesian strategy in the invasion of East Timor was the establishment and maintenance of a blockade around the whole island of Timor, to prevent the movement of news and information, medical and military supplies, food or people into East Timor except under Indonesian control. The Indonesian air and naval surveillance capacity together with the Indonesian Government's refusal to guarantee non-combatant status to barges loaded with medical supplies from Australian church and aid groups, led to the Australian Government's refusal to allow the barges to sail.

Although the Australian Government has received assurances that Australian-supplied war material will not be used in operations in East Timor, there have been no opportunities to verify this claim. Moreover, as a number of observers have pointed out, the militarily significant consequence of the Australian co-operation is that the new surveillance and interception equipment increases the overall archipelagic military capacity of the Indonesian armed forces, and releases equipment supplied by other sources for use in the East Timor war.

Sioux Helicopters

Similar considerations apply to the transfer of Sioux helicopters, worth an estimated \$2 million in 1978-79. Presumably formerly in service with Australian forces, these aircraft increase the mobility of Indonesian armed forces. This project is linked to the simultaneous expansion of Indonesia's helicopter forces in other directions. In recent years Bell helicopters have been ordered or purchased from the USA, and licensed production of two European military helicopters has been commenced: the Messerschmitt-Bohm-Bolkow MBB 105 and the larger Aerospatiale Puma.

The development of more mobile military force is considered a necessity given the tactical requirements of counter-insurgency operations in

the mountainous territory of West Irian, and the encirclement and annihilation tactics used by the invasion forces in East Timor.

Sabre Aircraft

In 1973, 16 ex-RAAF Avon Sabre fighters were handed over to the Indonesian Air Force, and since that time Australian training and support staff have remained at Iswahyudi Air Base in Java. (The *Defence Report, 1975* stated that the RAAF Sabre Advisory Unit was disbanded in February 1975, (p.12) but large amounts of money continue to be spent on this project.) The costs of this advisory team have been surprisingly high. In some ways, this project is a legacy of the early phase of the defence co-operation programme in which political expediency outweighed technical rationality, in which surplus and obsolete equipment was commonly supplied.

These aircraft have not seen combat service in Indonesia, and have been of limited use to the recipients. However, the aircraft have undoubtedly been a stepping stone for training and planning purposes in the recent expansion of the Indonesian Air Force with more modern equipment.

Field Communication Project

This project commenced in 1972 with a grant of 500 field transceivers; indeed between 1972 and 1975 1,261 field transceivers were turned over. The current stage of the project has provided decentralised repair facilities for field radio transceivers. Clearly, this project contributes to the capacity of Indonesian military forces in their operation in West Irian and East Timor.

Training programmes

Since 1971, at least 890 Indonesian servicemen have received training in a wide variety of courses, in Australian military establishments. Although small-scale officer training commenced in 1962 no specific appropriation was made until 1972.

The actual numbers have fluctuated a great deal, but in the past two years, proposed expenditure has settled at \$150,000. Courses attended in the past have included full-length Duntroon officer training, staff courses for senior officers at the

Queenscliff Australian Staff College, the Canungra School of Military Intelligence, flying and ground crew training, and others.

The training of foreign personnel is a key part of all military assistance programmes and is a long-standing part of Australia's programme with Indonesia. But in recent years, bitter criticism has been mounted against such programmes.

In the first instance, the Indonesian Government has given no assurances that those of its servicemen who have trained in Australia, or who have been trained by Australian advisory teams in Indonesia, will not be used in the invasion of East Timor, or in counter-insurgency operations in West Irian, or in incursions on the territory of Papua-Niugini. Indeed, the Indonesian Government could not give such assurances, since these trainees would later rejoin their units, and in the "normal" course of events, be sent with them to East Timor on tours of duty there. In fact, it is more likely that *Australian trained personnel* would be involved in the war, since they would have been selected for training on the basis of their future leadership prospects, and hence would more than likely be placed with the rather small part of the Indonesian military which is actually capable of difficult combat operations of the type required in East Timor rather than the normal and sedate activities of village control by surveillance in Java and elsewhere. This aspect of Australia's defence co-operation programme with Indonesia undoubtedly constitutes a powerful indirect form of support for Indonesia's aggression against foreign countries in the region.

Claims were made in 1974 that the training of Indonesian officers in intelligence work included training in hostile interrogation.

The commanding officer at the Woodside, S.A., Army Intelligence Centre in May 1974 confirmed that a number of Indonesians had been and were continuing to be trained in interrogation techniques, and the Minister representing the Minister of Defence in the Senate confirmed the essence of the claim in July 1974.

The courses have now been transferred to the Army School of Military Intelligence at Canungra. The courses symbolise the Australian Government's willingness to co-operate with representatives of a government who utilise an unknown

array of advanced and basic torture techniques against citizens of their own country and others, as part of the day to day functioning of the military's role in that country. Witnesses amongst Timorese refugees reaching Australia and Portugal have reliably reported that Indonesian Army intelligence officers have frequently tortured East Timorese civilians in the course of hostile interrogations in Timor.

Survey and Mapping project

Since 1970, Australian Army, Air Force, and Navy have co-operated with Indonesian civilian and military units in a series of large and complex topographical mapping and surveying projects commencing in Kalimantan, extending to South Sumatra and from 1976 to the present in West Irian.

The importance of the Australian contribution of advanced technology to the West Irian project is clear. Traditional methods of surveying would have been quite inadequate for the extremely difficult terrains of West Irian.

The nominal aim of the West Irian topographical survey, together with a parallel civil aid geological and gravity survey (to be conducted over a period of 10 years at an estimated cost of \$6.2 million), is to enhance "planning for national development". In a strict sense this is true: the two surveys will make possible the penetration of remote areas by government administrators, business enterprises and so forth. They will also greatly assist in the location and exploitation of mineral deposits.

Yet it is important to understand that the goal of "national development" is not an agreed goal in West Irian. Indeed, one authority has shown that the Free Papua Movement (OPM) has its roots in widespread village-based opposition to the *particular* form of economic development which is being imposed by the central (in fact, largely Javanese) Indonesian government authorities on the reluctant West Irianese (Nonie Sharp *The Rule of the Sword*, 1977).

The two surveys will provide indispensable tools for the activities of Indonesian armed forces in their persisting and bitter campaign to break the broad-based power of the OPM. Only the Australian high technology surveying facilities will give the result Indonesian counter-insurgency operations require: accurate and detailed maps and precision



aerial photography in extremely rugged, unfamiliar and hostile territory.

Hence there can be little surprise that West Papuan guerilla fighters have claimed that the Australian project is providing direct military assistance to the central government's ability to bomb and strafe villages, their populations and crops. Spokesmen for the OPM threatened the Australian military personnel and equipment involved, and subsequently claimed responsibility for the crash of an RAAF helicopter in which one person was killed. The Prime Minister in response claimed that the mapping project was "entirely peaceable". In fact, this technically true answer may be beside the point, since more detailed and accurate information has established that Indonesian Air Force aircraft have attacked villages in areas where Australian personnel had previously worked.

Beyond the question of the political desirability of co-operation in such savage repression of Indonesia's own citizens, it is important to understand that the project, certainly in the eyes of the Indonesian

military authorities, has two, inter-related goals. In the context of West Papuan society, the form of economic development proposed (and imposed) by Jakarta, for which the two surveys are necessary, is in itself the prime cause for the opposition, sometimes in military form, which the mapping will assist the authorities to attempt to destroy. Only in the most short-sighted of policy considerations is the mapping "entirely peaceable".

Research and Development

A small but continuing item of expenditure that has received surprisingly little public consideration is an apparently long-standing programme of co-operation between the Indonesian and Australian military research and development sections. According to the *Defence Report, 1974* this dates back to 1974. Indonesian State Radio, however, claims it began in 1970 and has given this statement of its purpose:

"Since 1970, Indonesia and Australia have co-operated in defence research and development mainly in

upgrading the skills of . . . personnel in finding rockets which are suitable for the Indonesian armed forces".

This was reported in the context of proposals by Indonesia and Singapore to utilise expertise from the Weapons Research Establishment to assist missile development. Little is known about past and continuing aspects of this project, but it is particularly important given Indonesia's purchase of weapons using extremely sophisticated missiles:

Korean Tacoma-class patrol boats using Aerospatiale Exocet missiles, and the US Northrop F-5E Tiger II and British Aerospace Hawk HS 1182 ground attack aircraft.

This Australian project constitutes direct encouragement to this regional tendency to expand the number and sophistication of weapons.

Joint exercises

Since 1972, at least six joint naval

and air exercises have been conducted with Indonesia. Although early in 1977 Indonesia declined an Australian invitation for naval exercises because of differences in views about the Indian Ocean, in November that year the exercise Southern Cross II was held in the Coral Sea with two Indonesian destroyer escorts, three Australian large ships, a submarine, patrol craft and RAAF aircraft. At least one other exercise has been held since that time. ○

Some ACFOA Recommendations on Australian Military Aid

1. Military aid policy should be seen in terms of overall foreign policy which should be directed at the peaceful encouragement of change towards more equitable distribution of resources, less political repression and denial of human rights and a lowering of the rate of military expansion in the area.
2. Some criteria which should govern the allocation of military aid by Australia are:
 - the external defence needs of the recipient country;
 - the risk of increased militarisation of the economy, administrative apparatus and foreign policy of the recipient country;
 - the human rights record of the recipient country.
3. Military aid projects should be separated out from civil aid programmes and subjected to the above criteria.
4. The link between military aid and Australian domestic production should be prevented.
5. The Government should work to reduce the level of armaments to the region and outlaw the use of inhumane weapons.

(From the ACFOA submission to the Harries enquiry on Australia's relations with the Third World, Nov. 1978).



EAST TIMOR our nearest neighbour in need

The East Timor Relief Appeal is working for three concerns: 1) to bring relief to the suffering of East Timor, 2) to reunite separated families, and 3) to assist Timorese refugees in Portugal.

The Appeal is sponsored by Australian Catholic Relief, Australian Council of Churches, Austcare, Community Aid Abroad, Freedom from Hunger Campaign, Save the Children Fund, and St Vincent de Paul.

Donations may be sent to East Timor Relief Appeal, GPO Box 9900 in any capital city.

An Indonesian Perspective On East Timor

Abdurrahman Wahid visited Melbourne in March and was interviewed by Mark Raper seeking his views on East Timor. Wahid was born in Jombang in 1940, educated in a *pesantren* (Islamic live-in educational institution) and then in Cairo and Bagdad. He is the Director of Pesantren Ciganjur near Jakarta, first secretary of the Executive Board of Nahdatul Ulama and a columnist of *Kompas* and *Tempo*. He has emerged in recent years as a leading Muslim intellectual concerned with development issues and is courageously critical of the Indonesian government on many points.

Pak Wahid, as an Indonesian, how do you look at the issue of East Timor?

Generally in regard to East Timor, I feel we should now try to find solutions to problems rather than just concentrating on what the problems are. Firstly it is very important that our accounts of East Timor be accurate. Recently I received a publication from India which said that the war in East Timor is still continuing. Now we know that the issue has been resolved militarily yet some groups still talk about resistance as if to imply that this is still in question. The army now has control. There have indeed been great sacrifices and losses by the people there and there is resentment by East Timorese of the Indonesian army, but it is not useful to speak as if it is not now resolved. The second problem is, how to accommodate those who don't agree with Indonesia, and this is our problem. It's about this problem that we must really work towards finding solutions. And this is not your problem, it is ours. The task is social integration in East Timor, we have to try. With the military power there some of the people have fled, some stay. Some have given into whatever resettlement program will now be made. Well, how will the Indonesians accommodate to their need, their spirit and their identity? While the fact is that the Indonesian army is there and it is declared an Indonesian province, East Timor has problems that are at least not less than those of the immediate surrounding islands and regions.

So much has happened over the last five years and a reversal of this you say, certainly any immediate reversal, is highly improbable. Yet people like you have been able to

take a critical stand on a number of issues within Indonesia. What are the ways in which you are able, within Indonesia, to speak to an issue like this one?

That's impossible now because the articles I write on Timor are returned to me by all of the mass media, even 'Tempo', and believe me, I wrote hundreds of articles just appealing that we should hear the other case, the other side. Secondly, I think that to criticise the government in this context is useless. The important thing is to propose more constructive actions. So that is why that kind of unobjective use of the media, as in the report from India, is detrimental to us, it just does not help. At the same time as that Indian report came, the Intelligence approached me with a summary of their report. Since they knew I was critical, they presumed I agreed with that line, they had written it down summarised on a piece of paper and showed it to me. They said, 'Do you still agree with this position, yes or no?' You see they do not understand criticism, they do not understand that I tried to find a middle way, not just to criticise.

Now the approach that I would like to follow is a cultural one. How can we promote the cultural identity of the East Timorese person? That is important and it is political. It should be done through the development of the East Timorese language and through the traditions of the people so that they can still maintain something East Timorese and not be engulfed by the Indonesianisation. Then in the future there would still be the possibility of them to decide for themselves what they want because now, as things are, decision-making is not in their hands, but we must look to the future.

You see in Australia you have Greek people living in Melbourne and they are still Greek. That is the meaning of integration. In Indonesia these people can still be, in culture and language, East Timorese, though their nationality can be Indonesian.

The role of the schools then is very important?

Yes it must be an educational program according to East Timorese needs, not according to Indonesian needs. I am afraid that the bringing of television programs to Timor now and the opening up of a television station is to go in the opposite direction. I fear for this program of nationalising East Timor, so we should run a program of defending, of fostering and of counter-balancing.

Is there an attempt to spread Islam in East Timor? I heard that there was a fear of that.

Well I don't think so. There is one fundamentalist group that may have about 10 to 12 students but it is something that they are doing, not only in East Timor but everywhere; they have a missionary attitude. The resurgence of Islamic activity though is more in Kupang in West Timor. They had a conference on Islamic education there last year.


While we may acknowledge that East Timor is now claimed to be a province of Indonesia and that a greater responsibility therefore lies on Indonesian people to see that this integration is not done in a way that damages the culture of the people or their right of choice, do you have any advice for us in Australia? Is there a role that we can play?

Yes I think there are important things that you can do. You can aid the East Timorese to set up their own programs because Jakarta will not provide that. From Jakarta they will come with books in Indonesian language, the national language, written by non-Timorese, they will not account enough for Timorese culture, but you can assist them. You can assist by publishing books for them and help open up schools there and promote cultural activities as well. This is the main thing to be done.

But we have no access at all.

You can work through national organisations there. Of course the army will be suspicious at first but they must allow you to do that, otherwise it will be cultural genocide. I am confident in this opinion. It does not apply to East Timor only but it applies to Aceh, it applies also to the people of West Irian and what's important in those places is that there are Muslims, but they are nonetheless cornered and they are being forced to submit, whereas in East Timor there is the Church and you can assist the Church to protect the culture of the people. If the Church feels it's dangerous to go alone I will be glad if they want to work together because this is a national concern, it is the concern of every Indonesian. My own society, a human rights society, would be glad to do something to assist in this. We have already tried to make some first steps by collecting information about East Timor.

This will be the coming of age for Indonesians: when we can solve problems like this one of the Timorese people in a satisfactory way. It applies also to those animistic people and alienated communities who are scattered around within the outer islands. The government tries to force them all to follow the path of modernisation, but within Indonesia we have the responsibility to look to their rights.



I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
I
O
N
A
L

The East Timor Issue Today

An Interview with Jim Dunn, by Brendan C'Dwyer

The Indonesian occupation of East Timor has meant demonstrably only massive trauma and suffering for Australia's tiny near neighbour. Nevertheless, according to a recent statement by the Australian Foreign Minister, efforts to achieve the right of self-determination for the East Timorese are "pointless . . . (and) incapable of practical implementation for the real benefit of the Timorese people". The following interview shows that a significant number of governments, human rights organisations, concerned individuals and, most importantly, the Timorese themselves, believe just the contrary — that far from being a "sterile political debate" it is precisely the exercise of their right to self-determination which holds the key to the happiness and peace of the Timorese people.

Jim Dunn was Australia's consul in East Timor, 1962-1964. He re-visited the territory in 1975 and has written and spoken extensively on the subject.

Jim Dunn, what is the situation in East Timor today?

Well of course not much information is coming into the Australian press about the situation right now and the Timorese are obviously facing greater difficulty in getting information out. But I've had some information from letters received by Timorese in Australia and from Portugal, where there seems to be more activity and interest in the subject at this time. And from these it seems the military struggle is continuing and, although I've been rather sceptical and guarded in the past towards reports about the military resistance, it seems there's a fairly extensive amount of fighting in the eastern part of the territory between say Venilale and Tutuala in that central mountain area. There are also persistent reports that fighting is continuing elsewhere. One report suggests there's fighting going on all over East Timor but I find this hard to accept even allowing for Indonesian inefficiency and the bitter-

There could be several thousand Timorese hiding away, very bitter, but nevertheless committed enough and armed well enough to create an environment of insecurity in many parts of the territory . . .


ness and hostility of the Timorese towards the Indonesians.

What do you know about the nature of the Indonesian administration and army control?

The overall military command, the Nusatenggara Command, is conducted from Bali, under Brigadier-General Kalbuadi. Timor itself is divided into some 13 military districts. I don't know how many troops are there but there has been one hard report of two battalions near the town of Laga on the north-east coast, a place I know fairly well. To have two battalions in that one particular area which does not have much merit otherwise — it's away from the main centres — suggests there are considerable military establishments around the countryside. There have also been reports in the last six months of continuing air activity, but exactly where it's taking place and whether there's bombing or machine-gunning etc. we don't know.

But these are indications that there is still a good deal of resistance.

Yes. It is also interesting to note that there was an article in the Age a few days ago from the Observer correspondent in Jakarta who said there are about 300 armed resisters left. I don't know where the author got the information but what is interesting about it is that



that was the figure Mario Carrascalao gave the US Congressional Sub-Committee in March 1977 and we well know there was very intense fighting after that. This kind of figure is very difficult to assess but maybe there is a hard core of 300 and perhaps beyond that there could be several thousand Timorese hiding away, very bitter, but nevertheless committed enough and armed well enough to create an environment of insecurity in many parts of the territory.

We have had disturbing reports only recently from Amnesty International that a number of the Fretilin leadership have been executed.

Yes. I'm awaiting that report. It's a statement rather than a report and it refers to a letter written to President Suharto by Amnesty. The statement says it seems 22 Fretilin leaders were executed after they had surrendered on the terms of the amnesty announced by President Suharto.

When was that?

In 1977 — they surrendered and were executed some time later. The statement also refers to a number of prison camps. It's not the first one this year. There've been several reports of prison camps. Henry Kamm of the *New York Times* referred to four prison camps and as we know last year Father do Rego, the Portuguese priest who left Timor in 1979, referred to a number of prison camps. I think the Amnesty statement speaks of one in particular at Comarco which is just to the west of Dili. They also speak of several hundred Timorese detained for political reasons.

So most of the information you are relying on is coming from relatives of people in Timor, through letters sent to them in Portugal or Australia.

Yes, most comes from relatives via perhaps foreigners who are fortunate enough to make an occasional visit and take a letter out with them. I don't know how often this is happening but certainly some are coming out that way and of course Indonesian church sources are another source. I must make the point that although the International Red Cross and US Catholic Relief Services are

operating in East Timor, the actual foreign presence is not only tiny but in some cases quite occasional. I understand that one American CRS official is allowed make occasional visits but there is no non-Indonesian permanent CRS presence there. Even in the case of ICRC only one foreign official, a doctor, has been there all along, but only one — the rest stationed there are Indonesians. One limitation in this situation is that the Indonesian Red Cross is controlled by the army. So not much information is coming out that way and in any case the ICRC is very careful not to become a source of information about political matters.

You've followed the situation very closely in the past few years and the situation has been one of immense dislocation of the people. What would you think the situation is now, what would the standard of living be, what sort of problems would the people be facing?

The way I see it from reports coming out is that the Indonesians, partly for security reasons and partly because of the dislocation, have herded the bulk of the Timorese into a number of resettlement centres based on the 'strategic hamlet' concept. In these centres, again for security reasons, they're not really free to leave or come and go. And of course it's convenient from a distribution of medical and food supplies point of view to have them in these centres — though, incidentally, these supplies seem to be still far from adequate. What this has done to the people is that, based on the few pieces of information that have come out, it has absolutely destroyed the

. . . the actual food production in East Timor remains at an all-time low simply because the resettlement centres don't provide the essential community basis for agriculture. It has just disrupted it.

economy, even made it worse than it was before simply because people have been taken away from their traditional farming areas. Whereas before they were farming in the interior and under the Fretilin organisation, if we can believe people like Father do Rego, they really had some structure going and farming would indeed have been fairly effective in providing a basic food supply if they hadn't been under constant pressure from Indonesian military forces. I think the actual food production in East Timor remains at an all-time low simply because the resettlement centres don't provide the essential community village basis for agriculture. It has just disrupted it. The other impression one gains is that the population is largely terribly demoralised as one would expect — so many people have been killed, the occupying Indonesian authorities still tend to be rough and brutal, though not nearly as bad as they were, but there's no way that the Timorese feel other than prisoners in their own country. I think in these circumstances the actual food producing economy has fallen to an all-time low. The money-producing crops like coffee appear to have been taken over, at least indirectly, by the Indonesian military. There are a couple of areas where attempts are being made to stimulate agriculture such as in the Maliana district but once again it seems this development is largely under Indonesian control. The Timorese don't see it as being of particular benefit to them other than to produce some food.

It seems then there is a very real subjection of the people by the Indonesian authorities who are very much in control.

One gets that impression even though there have been attempts by some Indonesians to open it up and to win the hearts and minds of the Timorese. The fact is, however, they've tended to concentrate on the town areas and on simply supplying food and medicine to the Timorese. It's very interesting the way this whole situation has been presented internationally. Though in a sense it has naturally gone that way, in many cases it has been deliberately channelled in such a way that the Timor problem, and I think many officials in the US and Australia have said this, is now only a matter of medical relief and food and this deliberately ignores the very important psychological factors about which nobody wants to talk and about which there has been no serious investigation.

What do you mean by psychological factors?

How the Timorese feel about their situation, how they feel about the Indonesians, what they see about their future, and of course what is being done to really rehabilitate the economy of East Timor and to establish a workable political structure.

However, the situation seems not to be forgotten if one is to judge by the newspaper reporting in the United States at the moment.

I am quite impressed with this reporting in the US on East Timor. It has been much greater than in Australia and in fact many of the reports in the Australian press have come from American sources. American interest has been stimulated by a number of factors. One is the reports coming out, particularly the Peter Rodgers report, but also other reports of the grim famine situation in East Timor last year between August and November, that subsequently led to some Congressional interest in the problem. In January 1980 there was a visit to Timor by a US Delegation of the sub-committee on International Organisations — practically no attention was given to this visit in Australia, yet the delegation on its return did make some quite positive recommendations. It didn't go into

The US has been very inconsistent in the human rights area. It was, after all, President Carter who made human rights a central component of US foreign policy . . . it is just not good enough to be constantly hammering the Russians and ignoring such serious abuses as East Timor.

the politics of it but it spoke of the obvious need for greater humanitarian relief and, what is really important, of the need for a greater foreign presence on the ground to keep an eye on the distribution of relief from foreign sources and to assess the needs. The other factor has been the Afghanistan issue which has been a major issue in the US. It has made some people look at what happened in East Timor — almost in some ways at the extreme of the spectrum. Here is an economically weak and strategically unimportant country which has been raped, as they would see it, in a manner similar to Afghanistan, and where the loss of life in per capita terms is more serious. But even more seriously to the Americans information has been coming out, and remember that Jack Anderson ran three

or four articles last year, showing US complicity with Indonesia's move to seize East Timor. And this does worry a lot of people in the US, who are concerned that the Administration is overdoing the Afghanistan issue in stark contrast to the role it played in East Timor when it not only did nothing to stop Indonesia going in or to urge withdrawal but really — and this is where there has been continuity between the Ford and Carter administrations — has actually discouraged other countries from taking an active interest in what has happened in East Timor and has persistently downplayed the seriousness of the humanitarian situation and of course has suggested that the Timorese have died because of the civil war and not because of the Indonesian invasion and such like.

What kind of impact is this heightened interest in the media having on Congress?

Some congressmen have had a long-standing concern — Donald Fraser, for example, though he is no longer in Congress. Tom Harkin and a number of others have been looking at Indonesia's human rights record and of course East Timor came into focus in that context. Many of these people feel the US has been very inconsistent in the human rights area. It was after all President Carter who made human rights a central component of US foreign policy. But as they see it, it is just not good enough to be constantly hammering the Russians and ignoring such serious abuses as East Timor. There have been a couple of Congressional Hearings at which people like Professor Ben Anderson of Cornell University — a leading American specialist on Indonesian affairs, very strongly criticised the Indonesians over East Timor. There have been a number of Hearings at which other people have given testimony. The International League of Human Rights a very important organisation — not only in the US but internationally — only recently took up the East Timor affair and it has now made three important contributions, one in the UN General Assembly, and two in the Congressional Hearings drawing attention to the serious situation in East Timor. As a result of these contributions and the *New York Times* reports of Henry Kamm and James Markham (the *New York Times* man in Portugal) Congressional interest certainly heightened in late February and March. In March an important event took place which received to my knowledge no publicity in this country. Some 18 American Congressmen sent a petition to President Carter urging the President to review US policy towards Indonesia over East Timor. These Congressmen also circulated a very strong resolution — and if you bear in mind that the Americans have tacitly accepted the de facto situation in East Timor for some time — this actually called for the Indonesians to permit an act of free self-determination in East Timor. I think it was a major step. The resolution also called for more relief. Very specifically this shows how the Australian press has weakened on the subject because to my knowledge this wasn't reported. The resolution drew attention to the fact that the Indonesians were obstructing the emigration of those Timorese who wanted to leave the country. I don't know where that Resolution has gone but I'm fairly certain at least 50 Congressmen have signed it.

That is in really striking contrast to the level of activity in Australia.

It is indeed. There was a statement by the Minister representing the Foreign Minister in the Senate, Senator Carrick, on April 23 which set down very clearly that Australia saw no advantage in any further discussion of

the humanitarian situation in East Timor. He referred to it as a sterile debate. But certainly in the US a number of organisations have raised it and where the American administration is vulnerable is that it has been pressing very strongly the situation in the Soviet Union and in particular the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. It is very difficult not to draw a parallel between that intervention and the intervention of the Indonesians in East Timor. Equally the reports of the atrocities and brutalities in East Timor are at least as soundly based as those coming out of Afghanistan which are almost eagerly welcomed.

Is there any concern being expressed in Third World countries, the non-aligned bloc for example?

The African countries still strongly support the Timorese and you may recall another resolution was passed at the UN last November — with 62 votes for and strong support from Africa and Latin America as well. Where there is an interesting possibility of shift as I see it is in the Russian position because of her involvement in Afghanistan and because of the very careful Soviet policy to try and keep in with the Indonesians. Last year something very curious occurred in the UN. Although the Russians voted for the resolution in support of East Timor's self-determination, Eastern European countries did not — they abstained. It might well be that the Soviet Union because of its intervention in Afghanistan will see some advantage in shifting its position but of course this could cause other shifts in other directions. China has also weakened its support for Fretilin as such but of course that is something that might well be distinct from supporting the right of self-determination for East Timor.

Another interesting change has taken place in Portugal. Although there was a swing last year to a conservative administration the new government appears to have committed itself to greater activity on East Timor and earlier this year a four-man commission was set up to co-ordinate efforts on East Timor between the two centres of government in Portugal, the Revolutionary Council and the Government itself. Recently there was a suggestion that the Portuguese might be moving towards recognising East Timor as part of Indonesia. This was very strongly denied by one of the leading members of the Council who said there was no question of Portugal even contemplating accepting East Timor as part of Indonesia at this stage. But they are planning to have some sort of contacts which is understandable and obviously necessary from a humanitarian point of view. Nevertheless Portugal could be more active and I think Portugal is a key country — its a much more respected country in the world now than it was before 1974 — and Portugal's stand will have quite a strong effect in Latin America, in African countries and in Western Europe.

Do you think any of this activity is likely to have any impact on Indonesian policy? Is there any likelihood of change within Indonesia?

I have this fear that external pressure will not have much effect unless the US and the Netherlands have a drastic change of heart and pressure comes from the major contributors to the aid consortium (the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia). Unfortunately Afghanistan has taken some of the attention away from East Timor, although in some Western countries in a curious way it has brought East Timor back because to keep the balance they want to look at that one. Probably

the hope is a pretty forlorn one for the Timorese unless something happens within Indonesia itself and that's something we can't predict. There have been several shifts recently. Not a great deal is known about political thinking in key areas of the military leadership in Jakarta. It is possible there could be change. But what it would mean for East Timor it's hard to say. While the armed struggle continues there will be some attention. For myself I have

Within the Government there's a tendency to look at the question of self-determination in very crude terms . . . If there's no (military) struggle it does not mean that the human rights situation has changed. But in practice there tends to be a focus on military resistance.

always had an anxiety about this, that is if the armed struggle finishes then the world will forget about it and even in Australia, particularly within the Government, there is a tendency to look at the question of self-determination in those very crude terms. It's a bit like saying that once the Germans had actually suppressed all resistance in the Netherlands they could have called it part of Greater Germany. If there's no struggle, it does not mean that the human rights situation has changed. But in practice there tends to be a focus on military resistance.

Well at this very late stage what should Australian Government policy be? What kind of action should Australia take?

I'd still like to see Australia become more involved in actions relating to the humanitarian situation and not just the question of providing food and medicine. It's quite obvious that as it is a neighbouring territory the question of whether the Timorese have been able to exercise their right to self-determination is a basically important one to us. The fact still remains that our sincerity, our integrity in these sorts of issues, on which we've taken a strong stand in the United Nations for many years under Labor and Liberal Governments, is really tested in a situation like that of East Timor. So far of course our record has been a pretty grim one. Might I add there has been international activity in some other areas and one area of interest is the Interparliamentary Union. East Timor has been discussed there during the past 12 months on at least two occasions and there have been two resolutions reaffirming the right to self-determination of the Timorese, in a sense reflecting the spirit of the UN General Assembly resolutions. It's interesting to note that at the last one the Soviet Delegation abstained as far as I can make out, which maybe indicates the change I was talking about earlier.

This debate then will continue in the parliaments of the world?

Yes, this is a reminder that it's in the Parliaments that this sort of basic issue of human rights will continue to be discussed for a long time. Certainly in the Australian Parliament, there's no doubt in my mind that the East Timor issue will continue to be raised vigorously from time to time by representatives on both sides of the House.

East Timor: a multi-media survey 1975-1980

This select list of material on East Timor has been prepared by W. Tully of the Australian National Library, Canberra. It is not exhaustive. The most comprehensive listing published to date (containing some 2500 entries) is SHERLOCK, Kevin *A Bibliography of Timor, including East and West Timor and the Island of Roti* (Canberra, ANU 1980).

A. MONOGRAPHS AND PAMPHLETS

- ACTION FOR WORLD DEVELOPMENT *East Timor: Refugees and Family Reunion* (1978). Attempts and failures to reunite Timorese families 1975-78 (available TIS).
- ANDERSON, Prof. Benedict *Human Rights in Indonesia and in East Timor* (New York, Feb. 1980). Text of submission to US Congressional Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. (Available TIS).
- BLACHER, Tamara *Resettlement of Unattached Refugee Children in Victoria, 1975-79: Placement Alternatives* Includes report on special problems of Timorese children separated from parents. (Available TIS)
- ARAUJO, Abilio *Timorese Elites*. Transl. J.M. Alberto (Canberra, 1975). A study of the revolutionary role of the East Timorese leadership.
- BORJA DA COSTA, Francisco *Revolutionary Poems in the Struggle Against Colonialism: Timorese National Verse*. Edited Jill Jolliffe, transl. James Fox and Mary Ireland. (Sydney, Wild & Woolley, 1976)
- CHOMSKY, Noam *East Timor and the Western Democracies* (May 1979). Available TIS.
- CHOMSKY, Noam and Edward S. Herman *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism* (Vol. 1 of *The Political Economy of Human Rights*) Boston, South End Press, 1979. pp. 129-204 deal with East Timor.
- ACFOA *Aid and East Timor* (Canberra July 1979). Available TIS.
- DUNN, J.S. *East Timor - from Portuguese Colonialism to Indonesian Incorporation* Legislative Research Service, Parliamentary Library (Canberra Sept. 1977). Mr Dunn was Australian Consul in Dili 1962-64 and revisited Timor in 1975. Available TIS.
- — — *Notes on the Current Situation in East Timor* (1977). Available TIS.
- — —, *East Timor: Notes on the Humanitarian Situation* (Sept. 1979). Available TIS.
- FRANKE, Richard *East Timor: the Hidden War* (New York 1976)
- FRENEY, Denis *Timor: Freedom caught between the Powers* (Nottingham, Spokesman Books, 1975)
- FRETILIN Department of External Relations *East Timor: Indonesia's Vietnam* (Maputo 1977).
- HILL, Helen *The Timor Story* (Timor Information Service, Melbourne 1976). The above three pamphlets are basic introductions to the crisis in East Timor from the anti-Indonesian point of view.
- INDONESIA Department of Foreign Affairs *Decolonisation in East Timor* (Jakarta March 1977). Presents the official Indonesian viewpoint on the invasion of East Timor. Critically reviewed in *Timor Information Service* 24 (April 1978).
- INDONESIA Department of Information *Newspaper Articles on East Timor* (Jakarta 1977). Three Indonesian journalists' impressions of East Timor in July 1976. English. Critically reviewed in *East Timor Report* 4 (May 1978).
- JOLLIFFE, Jill *East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism* (Queensland Uni. Press 1978). The first substantial English language book on the events in East Timor up to December 1975. Ms Jolliffe visited Timor twice in 1975. Appended to the text are APODETI, FRETILIN and UDT party programmes and statements.
- JONES, Elaine *East Timor* (1976). Brief backgrounder on Timorese culture prepared by Victorian Education Department consultant to assist teachers dealing with Timorese students. Available TIS.
- KOHEN, Arnold and John Taylor *An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor* (London, Tapol 1979). A survey of events inside East Timor and international reactions to them, 1975-1979. Available TIS.
- METZNER, Joachim K. *Man and Environment in Eastern Timor: a geoecological analysis of the Baucau-Viqueque area as a possible basis for regional planning* (ANU Development Studies Centre, Canberra 1977)
- NICHTERLEIN, Sue *The Struggle for East Timor* (Part I 1978; Part II 1979). Part I tells the story of East Timor from 1974-1975; Part 2 brings it to the end of 1976 based on US, Australian and Indonesian press reports. Available TIS.
- NICOL, Bill *Timor: The Stillborn Nation* (Melbourne Vista, 1978). The author visited Timor. Sees the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement as central to the rise of Fretilin.
- SOEKANTO (compiler) *Integrasi: Kebulatan Takad Rakyat Timor Timur* (Jakarta 1976). A glossy Indonesian apologia for the integration of ET. Critically reviewed by George Miller in *Asian Studies Association of Australia Review* March/April 1978.
- SUTER, Dr Keith *West Irian, East Timor and Indonesia* (London Sept 1979). Report No. 42 of the London-based Minority Rights Group written by the Human Rights officer of the UN Association of Australia.

B. PERIODICALS

(1) Fretilin solidarity groups

EAST TIMOR NEWS published by the East Timor News Agency, 4th Floor, 232 Castlereagh St, Sydney 2000.

EAST TIMOR AND PACIFIC REPORT (formerly East Timor Report) published by CIET (ACT), PO Box 514, Manuka ACT 2603.

TIMOR INFORMATION SERVICE (TIS), 1st Floor, 183 Gertrude St, Fitzroy 3065. TIS also runs a *Subscription Service* which provides on request full articles, speeches and documents pertaining to Timor.

(2) Official publications

a. Indonesian

INDONESIAN EMBASSY NEWSLETTER published by Embassy of Indonesia Information Service, 8 Darwin Ave, Yarralumla ACT 2600.

b. Australian

PARLIAMENTARY HANSARD published by Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra. Since 1974 there has been a considerable amount of time devoted in the House of Representatives and Senate to East Timor in questions, debate, and ministerial statements. Includes useful material from other sources also.

c. United Nations

Decolonisation published by the Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonisation (New York). Number 7 (Aug 1977) is a special issue on East Timor succinctly gathering together UN data on all aspects of ET from 1950 to the present.

UN Monthly Chronicle (New York). Issues with material on East Timor are v. 13 no. 1 (Jan 1976); v. 13 no. 5 (May 1976); v. 14 no. 1 (Jan 1977); v. 14 no. 11 (Dec 1977).

d. United States

US Congressional Record (Washington DC).

Human Rights in East Timor and the question of the use of US equipment by the Indonesian Armed Forces. Congressional Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs hearings. 95th Congress, First Session, 23 March 1977.

Human Rights in East Timor. Sub-Committee hearings. 95th Congress, First session, 28 June, 19 July 1977.

Famine Relief in East Timor. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs hearings. 96th Congress, first session, 4 December 1979. Available TIS.

Human Rights in Indonesia and East Timor. Sub-Committee hearings. 96th Congress, first session, 6 Feb. 1980. Available TIS.

C. PERIODICAL ARTICLES

BUTLER, Eric D. *What is happening in East Timor* (Intelligence Survey, Melbourne, v. 26 no. 2 Feb. 1976). The leader of the League of Rights, although critical of the Fraser Government's ET policy, argues that an Indonesian-controlled island is preferable to a 'Cuba on our doorstep'.

CHOMSKY, Noam *The plight of East Timor* (Australian Quarterly, v. 51, no. 1, March 1979). Statement to the UN General Assembly Nov. 1978.

ARNDT, H.W. *Timor: Vendetta Against Indonesia* Quadrant, Dec. 1979.

— — — Reprinted with amendments as *The Propaganda War over East Timor*, The Bulletin, Dec 18, 1979. Available TIS.

CULLEN, Paul A. *Australia's Policy on Timor* (Pacific Defence Reporter, Sydney, October 1977). Major-General Cullen, President of the UN Association of Australia and Chairman of Austcare sees Australia as 'appeasing' Indonesia and warns against the logic of this for Australia's future security.

DIRDJASUSANTO, A *A visit to East Timor* (Social Survey, Melbourne Feb. 1980). An Indonesian Jesuit priest's visit to ET mid-1979 re aid and religious needs of the people.

DUNN, J.S. *The Timor Affair in International Perspective* (World Review, Qld, October 1978).

DUNN, J.S. *The Case Against Indonesia*, The Bulletin, Jan 15, 1980. The author's reply to H.W. Arndt.

HILL, Helen *Australia and Portuguese Timor: between Principles and Pragmatism*, pp. 336-357 of *The First 1000 Days of Labour* Vol. 1, compiled by Roger Scott and Jim Richardson (Canberra College of Advanced Education, Canberra 1975)

— — —, *The Timorese Betrayal* (Dissent, Melbourne No. 35/36 1977) deals with Australian betrayal of Timor, not the reverse as the title suggests.

HOADLEY, J.S. *East Timor: civil war — causes and consequences* (Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore 1976).

HOADLEY, J.S. *Indonesia's annexation of East Timor: political, administrative and developmental initiatives* (Southeast Asian Affairs, Singapore 1977). Views of a New Zealand academic who appears to accept the Indonesian presence as inevitable and sees conflict arising between East Timorese and Indonesian administrators in the East Timorese Government.

KOHEN, Arnold S. *The cruel case of Indonesia* (Nation, New York, no. 18 Nov. 1977). Condemns US support of Indonesia and calls for a more principled stand by the Carter administration on human rights for the Timorese.

KROEF, Justus M. van der *Indonesia and East Timor: the politics of phased annexation* (Solidarity, Manila, Sept/Dec 1976). Sees Indonesia's perception of ET as regional threat as decisive factor in decision to invade.

MORRIS, C *Transcript of ABC radio interview 6 April 1977*. Morris is a 2/2 Company Australian commando who served in Timor from Sept 1942 to Jan 1943. Available TIS.

RANCK, S. *No changes overnight* (New Guinea and Australia, the Pacific and South East Asia, vol. 10 May/June 1975). Ranck, a social geographer at Macquarie University, succinctly sketches the land, its population, politics, education and culture based on a number of field trips to the interior of Timor in 1974-5 and interviews with members of the fledgling Timorese political parties.

SUTER, Keith D. *The conquest of East Timor* (Contemporary Review, London, March 1978). Self-interest rather than principle determines the fate of small countries.

TANTER, Richard *The military situation in East Timor* (Dissent, Melbourne May 1977).

VIVIANI, Nancy *Australians and the Timor Issue* (Australian Outlook, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1976)

WADDINGHAM, John *Timor: Indonesian Power over Humanitarian Aid* (Arena, 53, 1979).

WHITEHALL, John *The Timor Tragedy* Ch.1-2, Free Market 1979. Ch.3, Free Market 1980.

YOUTH, John *Independence or death: the struggle in East Timor* (Black Liberator, London, v.2 no.4 1975-6). Places the ET struggle within the wider context of the black resistance to oppression.

D. MAPS

Kevin Sherlock (compiler of *A Bibliography of Timor* . . .) has compiled a 20-page gazetteer of place names with designations, administrative districts and longitudes/latitudes. Roneoed, 1977 imprint. Available author.

A black and white map based on an earlier Portuguese production and to the scale of 1:500,000 is available from the *Australia East Timor Association* 33 Smith St, Fitzroy Vic. 3065.

E. MUSIC

ARAUJO, Abilio and Estanislau Silva 45 RPM disc. Side one: *Foho Ramelau* (Mt Ramelau), side 2: *Kdadalak* (Streams). Accompanied by sheet with words of songs in Tetum and English. Available CIET, 4th Floor, 232 Castlereagh St, Sydney 2000.

HYMNS AND SONGS OF THE REVOLUTION OF MAUBERE PEOPLE. 33-1/3 RPM disc. Jointly produced in Portugal by Fretilin and Angin Timur. Eight songs. Translation into English on cover. Available as above.

LIU TINAN ATUS HAT . . . (After Four Hundred years . . .). 33-1/3 RPM disc. Fretilin production. Eleven songs. Produced in Portugal. Available as above.

LORO SA'E: Infantil E Misto. 45 RPM disc. Timorese songs and instrumental pieces produced by Timorese refugees in Portugal. (Cassette available TIS).

LORO DA'E (Rising Sun). 45 RPM disc. Four Timorese folk songs sung by Timorese refugee children in Portugal and produced by Portuguese Red Cross. (Cassette available TIS).

SIMPSON, Tony and friends *The Song of Timor and Which Side are You on Australia?* Words and music. Available Australia East Timor Association, 33 Smith St, Fitzroy 3065.

The National Library Oral History Project has a reel of Timorese music recorded on location by Jill Jolliffe in October 1975.

F. SPOKEN WORD

A speech made by *Xavier do Amaral* (17 Sept 1975), an interview with *Rogério Lobato* and a *Fretilin soldier* — recorded by Jill Jolliffe in ET — are stored in the National Library Music and Sound Recordings section, Canberra.

A tape of the *proclamation of the Democratic Republic of East Timor* on 29 Nov 1975 by *Xavier do Amaral*, *Nicolau* and *Rogério Lobato* — recorded by Jill

Jolliffe — is stored in the National Library's Oral History Project, Canberra.

Tapes and transcripts of *ABC Lateline and Broadband* radio programmes on East Timor are held (in part) by the National Library Oral History Project. Mark Aarons, compere of these programmes, also has some unbroadcast tapes on East Timor (ABC, GPO Box 487, Sydney 2001).

A tape of a *Timor Forum* held in Canberra on 18 March 1976 with H. Arndt, Greg Clark, Jim Dunn, Jill Jolliffe, Ernest Utrecht, John Whitehall and Chris Santos participating, is held by Joan Ansell, 8c Endeavour Gardens, 4 Launceston St, Lyons, 2605

Fretilin Radio Maubere broadcast tapes are held by Timor Information Service Melbourne and East Timor News, Sydney.

Tapes of *interviews* with Jim Dunn, Chris Santos, Adelina Tilman and others are held by Brisbane Media Resource Centre, GPO Box 2366, Brisbane 4001.

G. FILM AND THEATRE

EAST TIMOR: ONE MAN'S VIEW — half hour TV film made in East Timor by Richard Carleton in 1977. Screened on ABC TDT 7.30pm 21 Oct. 1977.

COMMUNITY IN MOURNING — ten minute TV film made in Portugal in 1980 depicting plight of Timorese refugees stranded there. Screened on ABC Weekend Magazine 16 March 1980.

ISLE OF FEAR, ISLE OF HOPE — 23 minute 16 mm colour film made in 1975 from footage shot in Timor before the invasion. Includes last message from Australian newsman Greg Shackleton. Available AETA, 33 Smith St, Fitzroy 3065.

KDADALAK (FOR THE CHILDREN OF TIMOR): a music-voice-montage production by Martin Wesley-Smith and Penney Tweedie. Has been shown in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne and Japan.

A video-cassette of *S. Ranck's slides/lecture* re his field work and interviews in Timor in 1974-5 is available at the Australian National University's Instructional Resources Unit, Canberra.

An 8 mm 50 min. film of the *Australian Commandos return to East Timor* in 1973 is held by the National Library Film Division, Canberra.

MEN OF TIMOR, a 40 min. film made in 1944 by Damian Parer. Deals with the Australian Commandos in ET during World War II is held at the Australian War Memorial Library, Canberra.

H. RESOURCE KIT

EAST TIMOR KIT: a satchel of key articles on ET produced by Timor Information Service, Melbourne.

I. THESES

HILL, Helen *Fretilin: the origins, ideologies and strategies of a nationalist movement in East Timor*. (MA Thesis, Monash University, May 1978).

RANCK, Stephen. *Recent Rural-Urban Immigration to Dili, Portuguese Timor — a focus on the use of Household, Kinship and social networks*. MA Thesis, Macquarie University, Adelaide.



It is an injustice to reduce East
Timor today to the status of
simple aid-problem.

COMMUNITY AID ABROAD
156 GEORGE STREET,
FITZROY. 3065