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TAPOL

The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 99

June 1990

Massive military operation in East Timor

The Fretilin office in Darwin believes that the Indonesian army launched a new offensive in East Timor in mid-March. Its sources claim that 40,000 troops are involved, plus 6,000 East Timorese conscripts, in the *Hansip* militia, and two helicopter squadrons. The objective is thought to be to capture the Fretilin leadership ahead of a visit to East Timor of a parliamentary mission from Portugal which is scheduled for September. [*Fretilin Press Release*, 1 May 1990]

An Australian journalist who visited East Timor two months earlier reported that the day after Murdani gave his lecture to civil and military government officials in Dili on 3 February, thousands of troops flooded into Dili. He quoted a foreign visitor as saying: "Long columns of troops marched into town in formation and two warships suddenly appeared and unloaded hundreds more troops. People were really frightened of what was going to happen. They were scared to death." [*Sunday Herald*, 11 March 1990]



Massacres in the south-west

These apprehensions were well-founded as it is now being reported that massacres have occurred in several villages in the south-western districts of Ainaro and Bobonaro. ACFOA (Australian Council for Overseas Aid) in Melbourne reported on 11 May that a traveller intending to go to this area was told that military clearance would be needed. [Until now, western districts have been less subject to travel restrictions than eastern districts where the armed resistance is thought to be based.]

In East Timor this traveller was told that a series of massacres had occurred in the village of Lour, south-west of Ainaro. About a hundred people, in groups of a dozen or so, had been slaughtered, including women and children, since Easter. The massacres are the work of a new battalion, known as Unit 712, from Menado which arrived in Bobonaro a month earlier. Local people were reported as saying these troops were "terribly bad". Another village, near Oeda, had been burnt to the ground.

The massacres took place following an incident when three Indonesian soldiers had their throats cut on Good Friday, 13 April.

The traveller who managed to journey around the area said he came across about three hundred foot soldiers from Unit 741, 10 kms from Zumalai, which is just south of Lour. [The numbering, commencing with 7, means the troops are from Wirabuana Military Command, which covers the whole of Sulawesi.] *

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
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Murdani speaks his mind

Two weeks after East Timorese students stunned the authorities in Dili by staging a demonstration and forcing the US ambassador to enter into a dialogue, Minister for Defence and Security General Benny Murdani addressed a meeting of all the senior military and non-military personnel in East Timor. He spoke to an audience of four hundred officials on 3 February, including all departmental chiefs, district heads, army officers, members of the 'provincial' and local assemblies, as well as religious and informal leaders.

A tape of Murdani's speech has been smuggled abroad. An English translation of the full text is shortly to be published by *Indonesia Publications*.

General Murdani, whose military career is more closely tied to the violent subjugation of East Timor than anyone else in the Indonesian army, was clearly intent on re-imposing his control of the situation, using a combination of his strike-force and intelligence experience. At the outset of his speech which



was at least ninety minutes long, he reminded his audience that "because of the nature of my work, I know which of you were good UDT and which were bad UDT. I also know which of you were Fretilin who subsequently became good and which were formerly not good. And I also know which of you were genuine Apodeti members and which only pretended to be Apodeti members."

He argued vehemently without explaining why, that the islands of the entire archipelago, stretching 5,000 kms from east to west and 1,600 kms from north to south, have no option but to be part of the Indonesian state. Pouring scorn on people who fancy themselves as East Timorese patriots, he said: "There is no such thing as a Timorese patriot, there is only an Indonesian patriot. There is no such thing as an East Timorese nation, there is only an Indonesian nation." His message to the Timorese was that they must concentrate on 'nation-building', claiming that Indonesia's history as a nation goes back 1,100 (sic) years.

"In the past, there were some small states that wanted to stand on their own and without hesitation, the Indonesian government took steps to stop that. All the forces at our disposal were used to prevent the creation of small states." He went on:

If you try to make your own state and the movement is strong, sufficiently strong, it will be crushed by ABRI (the armed forces). There have been bigger rebellions... than the small number calling themselves Fretilin or whoever their sympathisers are here. We will crush them all! I repeat, we will crush them all!

He acknowledged that East Timor occupies a special position as the centre of attention in some countries and at the UN; if an Indonesian official or foreign dignitary goes to East Timor, it "will certainly become quite a big problem". He then turned his venom on recent demonstrations, in Taci Tolu, at the time of the Papal Mass last October, and in Dili, when the US ambassador John Monjo was there on 17 January. Speaking about the Monjo visit, he treated the demonstrators as a gang of youngsters frustrated by the lack of jobs who "were not ashamed to go yelling, in front of an ambassador, asking for work.... Aren't the parents of the youngsters who demonstrated and who pretend not to know that their children took part in the demonstration ashamed? Covering your faces so as not to see it?"

Murdani's recurring theme at this point was that true Indonesian patriots should be ashamed to admit to foreigners that social problems exist and to turn to them for help.

Clearly implying that the audience he was addressing included many whose children were among the demonstrators, Murdani said they should be ashamed to be on the government's payroll while also criticising the government. All Indonesians, without exception, he claimed, would have nothing but pity for those who think that by "moaning in front of foreigners, they can get what they want".

He spoke contemptuously of East Timor's history, claiming that "far more people have died" in other "civil wars" in Indonesia than died in East Timor. He reminded his audience that there were only two political parties and Golkar in East Timor. "It is no longer possible to channel your aspirations through Fretilin, or Apodeti, or UDT. They don't exist any more. There is no such thing as UDT, no such thing as Apodeti, no such thing as Fretilin."

It may be that the tape smuggled abroad does not include the whole speech. From clandestine sources inside East Timor it is understood that Murdani also announced that a military unit called '*merpati putih*' [white dove] had started operating in East Timor. *



Gadjah Mada seminar called off

A team of social scientists from Gadjah Mada University Yogyakarta has produced a highly controversial report about social relationships in East Timor. The report is the result of a one-month study undertaken earlier this year in three sub-districts of Ainaro and Ermera. [Both districts are west of Dili.]

A seminar that was to have been held in Dili on 19 April to consider the team's findings was 'postponed indefinitely' at the last minute, but only after some highlights of the report had been published in *Kompas* on 17 April. It appears that instead of holding a public seminar, a closed session took place, attended by senior army officers, at which the team was asked to exclude sections or references in their report. Certainly, the document is less than complimentary about the army's role in East Timor and gives a very disturbing picture of the relationship between Timorese people and the authorities. According to an Australian journalist, the closed-door session was attended by Lt-General Harsudiono Hartas, deputy army chief-of-staff for political and social affairs, and Major-General Sintong Panjaitan, commander of the Udayana Military Command which covers the military district of East Timor. [*Sunday Herald*, 29 April 1990]

The trauma of war

One of the central themes in the report of the Gadjah Mada University team is that society is still in a trauma. Another is the continuance of a 'war situation', and a 'war economy' controlled by a welter of regulations and 'monopolistic/monopsonistic' practices. A third theme is the discredited standing of the Indonesian administration in the eyes of the population and their non-cooperative attitude towards anything emanating from government sources. A fourth theme is the role of the church as protector of the people.


There are hints in many places of the huge loss of life since 1975 though it is erroneously inferred that this happened during a 'civil war'. It is not unlikely that the writers of the report know more about what happened before and after the Indonesian invasion in 1975 but have said as little as possible so as not to provide a pretext for the document be proscribed. [In the event, it was, anyhow!]

The Team which undertook the investigation is not new to East Timor. It made its first visit in 1981, followed by another in 1989. Hence it was in a position to offer comparisons. The team was headed by Dr Mubyarto, director of Gadjah Mada's Rural Development Research Centre. The study this time was funded by Bank Indonesia, the central bank, which has an interest in looking at the potential for investment in locally-based projects.

The Gadjah Mada team visited the sub-districts of Hatolia, Railako and Maubisse in the districts of Ermera and Ainaro where conditions can be presumed to be more 'normal' than in the east. Ermera is one of the main coffee-producing regions. It is from Ainaro that reports are now being received of massacres [see separate item], though not in the same sub-districts as those visited by Mubyarto and his team.

Integration 'not seen as the end of decolonisation'

The very first paragraph of Chapter 1 argues that



Young East Timorese demonstrating in Dili, during the visit of the US ambassador, John Monjo, in January this year. [Photo: Pretilin]

It is not easy to develop an economy and a community which only 14 years ago was still in the clutches of colonialism and which has, to this day, not recovered from the trauma of "war".... Because of the traumas of the past, the regional government confronts an extremely difficult situation.

Although there have been striking physical changes since the Team made its first visit nearly a decade ago, especially the creation of a road network, the Team observes that "physical progress has failed to solve the social, economic and political problems resulting from the process of integration which caused quite heavy loss of life". [p. 4]

Regarding the process of decolonisation which involved a 'civil war' with many casualties, the team points out: "Whereas the Indonesian Government considers that integration has resolved the matter of decolonisation, East Timorese society does not see it in that light." [p. 7] The rapid changes caused a 'culture shock' for the East Timorese who previously had no associations with Indonesia and its anti-colonial struggle; they were all of a sudden forced to learn Indonesian language and history, to study Pancasila and learn by heart the names of Indonesian heroes and heroines.

The Catholic church also suffered a 'culture shock'. From enjoying equal status with the Portuguese administration, integration resulted in it being placed under the government. From being the sole patron of the people, it now had to confront local civilian and military officials with resources and political clout far exceeding that of the church. "The competition between the Catholic Church and the Indonesian government is at the heart of the problem" in East Timor.

As patron, the Catholic church holds sway over one important resource, the mass of people, but it has no funds; the government has plenty of funds and other

resources such as coercive powers but does not 'possess' the people. [p. 9]

The newcomers

One of the most sensitive sections of the report looks at the impact of 'newcomers' [pendatang], the outsiders or Indonesians. East Timor has been inundated with settler families moving in from all parts of Indonesia since the decision to 'open up' the territory. (These are not part of a government-funded transmigration programme.) "Local government officials are very alarmed at this situation which, besides creating new social problems, can also be the seed for retarding political stability." [p. 104] There is growing antipathy towards Buginese and Makasarese settlers who are seen as new exploiters in the way of economic activities by local people. There is also deep resentment towards the influx of prostitutes from Java. The Team reports that some people take out their resentment by acts of violence against these women.

East Timorese have coined a new term for the 'foreigners' (a word which the team uses, in quotes). They are called the "Battalion 702" who go to work at 7 am, do nothing of benefit for anyone (but themselves) and go home at 2 pm.

The Timorese are suspicious of Indonesian journalists; they regard foreign journalists as more objective and less likely to trot out the official 'version'. Distrust of 'newcomers' has turned children

against the schools; teachers complain of bad behaviour, lack of interest, children running in and out of classrooms while lessons are in progress, widespread truancy and physical assaults on teachers. One group of junior and senior high school pupils in Gleno told the Team:

Why should we go to school if, after finishing, we can't get jobs for which we were trained. All offices are now closed to us. An official (newcomer) who becomes head of a department bring in his friends or at least, people from the same region. [p. 107]

A section which discusses the credibility of local officials points out that in the early 1980s there was profound criticism, with people constantly comparing conditions under Indonesia with those under Portugal. The level of service had deteriorated and there was widespread corruption. Now, too, people resent having to do community (ie. unpaid) work (gotong-royong) for projects when they know that funds for the work have been embezzled.

The East Timorese don't believe official pronouncements that the Portuguese colonial era was a time of 'darkness' whereas the Indonesian era is one of 'light'. [p.114]

Plans by the Interior Ministry to make a film comparing East Timor under Portugal with the situation under Indonesia have run into local opposition. There are several reasons for this, writes the Team, but it primarily reflects a rejection of the symbols of Indonesian development which proclaim physical advances while doing nothing to correct the underlying mistakes.

THE INDONESIAN OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR 1974-1989 A CHRONOLOGY

John Taylor — Foreword by Peter Carey

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 and East Timor's subsequent 'incorporation' into the Indonesian Republic constitutes one of the gravest violations of international law in post-war history. The destruction wrought in East Timor can be compared to that in Afghanistan, Tibet and Pol Pot's Cambodia. Appalling suffering and social dislocation have been imposed.

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The ineffectiveness of local government and the role of ABRI

The sudden withdrawal of the Portuguese administrative apparatus and its replacement by a new administration dedicated to physical advancement has created a dichotomy between "native and newcomer", reinforced by the fact that more education has not led to greater job opportunities.

Even those Timorese who work in the administration feel deeply disappointed. In Portuguese times, local administrators played a key role but today things are very different because the external factor is so overpowering. This is expressed particularly in what the Team calls an "overdose of military presence" not only in the physical sense of army personnel but in their dominating role. The Team records that in their 1981 report they drew attention to the feeling that the local government was a mere appanage of central government. Today, nothing has changed. Most serious of all is the feeling that East Timor is being 'milked' by powerful economic interests from Java. [p. 116]

Faced with this "overdose of ABRI", people have little respect for the army; even among the Timorese elite there is a feeling of "hatred" because they (the army) are seen as the source of the economic stalemate in East Timor. [p. 118]

The researchers make a strong plea for the ABRI presence to be reduced, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. The allocation of central government funds is the cause of disrespect for the government because these moneys do not reach their destination.

A clear indication of this is the strong shift away from military "rebellion" towards civil dissatisfaction and a negative attitude among school-pupils and young people working in the bureaucracy. [p. 118]

In face of their exploitation by private monopolies [this is clearly a reference to army-owned businesses like Denok], people see the government as the source of their difficulties and feel that they are now "being colonised" through new forms and structures. Local government allows these monopolies to exist and even draws the cooperatives into the system.

The role of the church

Under the Portuguese, the church was recognised as a social force which provided protection to the community against abuses by the government. The bishop was an officially-appointed government advisor.

Today the government expects the church to support government programmes while remaining politically neutral and refraining from becoming involved in practice politics. Yet, the church cannot close its eyes to the social and political problems resulting from integration.

The church faces a dilemma: if it is seen as only protecting the government's interests, the mass of people will distance itself from the church, but if it sides with the people, it lands itself in difficulties with the government. In a situation where official political channels for people to express their aspirations no longer function, the church has been forced take the side of the people without going into opposition to the government.

The Team argues that many priests in East Timor are advocates of liberation theology and are simply not satisfied with a role to mobilise people in support of government programmes. They want to voice the aspirations of their congregation. "Many priests who met the Team felt that the government cannot understand this." [p. 121] As a result, priests have come out with statements that shocked the government, like Bishop Belo's letter (to the UN secretary-general). The government sees the church as its competitor. Officials cannot understand why people eagerly participate in a project to build a church but refuse to take part in building a bridge.

Catholic youngsters are also unhappy at not being allowed to have Catholic youth organisations. The only youth organisation in East Timor is a branch of KNPI (the Indonesian national youth congress) whose leadership is dominated by civil servants. [p. 122]

Ending the war situation

The Team makes a strong plea in its recommendations for measures to "bring to an end the war situation". It welcomes the decision to disband Koopskam, the special command for security in East Timor, adding that this should be followed by the staged reduction of military personnel and their replacement by the police. It suggests that the church should be given an advisory role in governmental affairs.

Another of its recommendations calls for the regional administration to be given powers to set up a structure of village government that conforms with local customs. It recommends that all monopolistic practices should be ended, especially in coffee trading. It also suggests that land abandoned by

Colonel Latief seeks reduction of sentence

Infantry Colonel Latief, who is serving a life sentence for his part in the plot to kidnap army generals in October 1965, is reported to have submitted a request to President Suharto to commute his sentence from life to a fixed period of years. Latief is serving his sentence in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

The application for commutation was made two years

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An Indonesian soldier in East Timor, proudly displaying his weapon to a tourist. [Photo: Jan-Eric Forsberg]

owners who have left the country should be distributed to peasants in need of land. But undoubtedly its most controversial recommendation concerns the abandonment of the resettlement programme (an integral part of the government's anti-guerrilla strategy).

Considering the close bond between villagers in East Timor and their land and customs, it is recommended that the resettlement programme should be halted. The people in the resettlements should be allowed to return to their original villages so that they can till their own land and live in accordance with their own customs. [p. 129] *

[Editor's note: This summary covers only part of the report. More than 70 pages were missing from the copy in our possession.]

ago.

Latief told a visiting journalist that he had based the application, which he submitted himself, not through a lawyer, on a new regulation in 1987, giving the president powers to alter life sentences. He said that some thirty other prisoners with life sentences had had their sentences commuted to twenty years on the basis of an earlier regulation which allow commutation to take place after the first five years of serving their sentence. In Indonesia, a life sentence really means life, with no possibility of remission. *

Labour Shadow Minister attacks Timor Gap Treaty

Ann Clwyd MP, Labour Opposition Shadow Minister for Overseas Development, was interviewed on Australian radio for the ABC's morning news bulletin on 9 May.

Introduction by Michael Dodd, ABC

The British Labour Opposition has hit out at its fraternal colleagues in the Hawke Government over its treaty with Indonesia to exploit the oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap, a treaty awaiting ratification by the Australian Parliament.

British Labour's Shadow Minister for Overseas Development, Ann Clwyd, has joined those who claim the oil and gas belong to the people of East Timor and that neither Australia nor Indonesia have any rights to it. Ann Clwyd made her comments while taking part in a demonstration outside Australia House in London.

Several dozen protestors sang and held placards outside the High Commission in a bid to draw international attention to the treaty which they said undermined East Timor's struggle for independence which has continued since the Indonesian invasion of 1975. The demonstrators called on Australian parliamentarians to refuse to ratify what they described as 'an unholy pact' to exploit resources which should rightfully be used by the East Timorese, if and when they achieve their independence.

The demonstration was organised by TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign based in Britain. Ms Clwyd endorsed the campaign's claim that, by ratifying the Treaty, Australia would be sharing the spoils of one of the century's most brutal wars.

Clwyd: As I understand it in the past, Indonesia has been criticised by Australia for annexing East Timor. Indeed, in past meetings of the Decolonisation Committee at the United Nations which I went to last August, Australia has been represented. So obviously, there is a body of opinion in Australia which is concerned about the rights of East Timor and whether Indonesia has the right at all to sign a treaty of this kind when the national rights of East Timor appear to have been ignored.

Dodd: Is there any other way to exploit the oil and natural gas between Australia and Indonesia without signing a treaty like this one?

Clwyd: I think the situation in East Timor should be examined to see whether it is in Indonesia's power to sign any treaty on behalf of East Timor. It was annexed by force, as everybody knows. A third of the population was killed and, why should East Timor be Indonesia's 27th colony? Does Australia in fact support taking over countries in this way without those countries' agreement?

Dodd: As a Labour Party politician, why do you believe it is that the people in the Australian Labour Party and Government don't agree with you?



Labour MPs Anne Clwyd and Alice Mahon at the Australian High Commission, urge Australian MPs not to ratify the Treaty. [Photo: TAPOL]

Clwyd: Well, I don't know whether that would be true of all of them in the same way as I wouldn't like to always speak for the whole of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom on a particular issue. Certainly a lot of my Labour colleagues have joined Parliamentarians for East Timor and now we have parliamentarians in many countries who are arguing the rights of East Timor and want the United Nations Decolonisation Committee and Secretary General of the UN to look again at the situation.

It was taken over by force and the UN, given that it has a code of conduct for the decolonisation of countries, should be critical of its own performance as far as East Timor is concerned. *

[Editor's Note: Neil Kinnock, Leader of the Labour Opposition, has expressed categorical support for East Timor's right to self-determination. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 96, December 1989, page 17]

Continued from page 17.

Jakarta Post [19 March 1990] reported that Indonesian armed forces officials "were still evaluating the aircraft", *Kompas* on the previous day reported that Indonesia has already decided to follow Malaysia's lead in purchasing Tornados.

British Aerospace which helped build the Army Institute of Technology in Malang, East Java, at a cost of £3 million, also has an industrial cooperation programme with Indonesia's aerospace industry, IPTN, whereby Indonesian students study at a UK university, followed by vocational training with BAe. [*CAAT Newsletter*, No 102, April 1990]

Rush to ratify Timor Gap Treaty

The Australian Government is in a great hurry to ratify the Timor Gap Treaty. This Treaty shares out the oil and gas reserves in the seabed off the coast of East Timor and is clearly illegal as it is based on Indonesia's unlawful claim to have integrated the territory. [For an analysis of the Treaty, see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 97, February 1990.]

The newly-elected Australian parliament assembled for the first time on 8 May and discussion of ratification began the very next day. The Australian Labour Party which still has a majority, albeit less than before, has the full backing of the main opposition Liberal Party. It is doubtful whether any ALP MPs will vote against the Treaty, for fear of losing their party's endorsement, even though several dozen have in the past committed themselves to supporting East Timor's right to self-determination by signing up as members of *Parliamentarians for East Timor*. The only party likely to oppose the Treaty is the Australian Democrats, with eight members in the Senate.

International law experts condemn the Treaty

Dr Vaughan Lowe of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge University, an expert in international law, and two other jurists, Susan Marks and Robert McCorquodale, have prepared an opinion on the legality of the Treaty, at the request of Lord Avebury of Parliamentarians for East Timor.

tarians for East Timor.

They describe it as an attempt by Indonesia to reap the fruits of its invasion of East Timor "in flagrant violation of international law". The Treaty is invalid because Indonesia lacks legal title to the area containing the resources. "It is a fundamental principle of international law that an unlawful use of force cannot confer title to territory." This principle was reaffirmed in a major UN General Assembly resolution, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, adopted in 1970 with the consent of all UN members, including Australia.

The Australian statement that "there is no binding obligation not to recognise the acquisition of territory acquired by force" is incompatible with this authoritative statement of international law.

The jurists also argue that the Treaty is incompatible with the right to self-determination; this right has been violated not only by Indonesia but also by Australia. The Treaty "would arguably place (Australia) in breach of the duty not to impede the realisation of self-determination, which is a corollary of the right to self-determination itself".

The Treaty also conflicts with one or possible several peremptory norms (a norm from which no derogation is permitted). Prohibition on the use of force is a peremptory norm. It is widely accepted that the right to self-determination is also a peremptory norm.

The jurists believe that Indonesia could properly be regarded as a belligerent occupant of East Timor, as Israel is regarded as a belligerent occupant of the West Bank. They finally discuss the possible procedures for challenging the validity of the Treaty, through the International Court of Justice in The Hague, either by Portugal or based on a UN General Assembly resolution asking the Court for an advisory opinion.

Editor's Note: Readers wishing to have a copy of this four-page document should write to TAPOL.

Protests in Canberra and London

A quarter-page advertisement containing an open letter to Prime Minister Bob Hawke appeared in a number of Australian newspapers on 8 May. The letter has hundreds of signatories from Australia, including well-known novelist, Patrick White, film-maker Philip Adams and TV personality, Max Gillies, and a number of East Timorese refugees. Among the signatories from overseas are many Japanese activists, TAPOL, the Frankfurt-based S.E. Asian Institute, IMBAS, and the London-based Australian journalist, John Pilger.

The Indonesian human rights activist, H.J.C. Princen is also a signatory.

The letter describes the Treaty as a division of stolen property between Indonesia and Australia. "Instead of proceeding with the conclusion of the Treaty, we ask you to use your influence with the Suharto regime to facilitate an orderly decolonisation of East Timor under UN supervision so that the exploitation of East Timor's resources may take place

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
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in collaboration with the rightful owners of those resources, should the people of East Timor so desire."

London protest

On the same day, in London, the National Peace Council, the Croydon Peace Council, Liberation, the NFIP Women's London Group, the Aboriginal Land Rights Support Group, the Christian Movement for Peace and TAPOL, held a protest outside the Australian High Commission. Ann Clwyd and Alice Mahon, Labour Party MPs were also present. The main slogan was *Daylight Robbery!* The co-sponsoring organisations also sent a letter of protest to Prime Minister Bob Hawke, appealing to him not to proceed with ratification of the Treaty and calling on Australian parliamentarians not to ratify it. *



One of the many protestors outside Australia House in London on 8 May, calling the Timor Gap Treaty by its real name. [Photo: TAPOL]

Pacific countries under pressure

Indonesian diplomats were on hand to prevent parliamentarians from Asia, the Pacific, the Caribbean and the European Parliament from adopting a resolution condemning Indonesia's illegal occupation of East Timor at a meeting in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in March. Previous meetings of the APC-EEC forum have adopted resolutions on East Timor but this time, Indonesia exerted intense pressure on many Pacific and Asian MPs as well as on the host government to avoid the embarrassment of being condemned at a meeting so near to home.

An AFP report spoke of 'intense pressure' on the PNG government and quoted a German MEP from the Green Party, Wilfried Telkampfer, the sponsor of one of the resolutions tabled, as saying he had agreed to postpone the vote out of respect for the wishes of Papua New Guinea "which is being pressured by the Indonesian Government". [Indonesian Observer, 23 March 1990] AFP also reported that British diplomats as well as Indonesian diplomats came to the meeting on the third and final day to lobby in the corridors against any resolution on East Timor.

Four different groups of MEPs had tabled resolutions on East Timor. The resolution tabled by Portuguese socialist MEP, Maria Belo, also condemned the Treaty signed between Australia and Indonesia to jointly exploit oil off the Timor coast, in violation of international law. The draft resolutions were withdrawn only on the understanding that the matter would be taken up again at the next ACP-EEC meeting in Rome.

The decision to leave the drafting of the final report of the conference to Fiji ensured that the

clash over East Timor would not be aired in the report; Fiji depends to a considerable extent on weapons supplies from Indonesia.

Australia backs anti-East Timor lobby

The Australian Government also threw its weight behind the Indonesian lobby. It produced a Backgrounder entitled "Australia rejects Portuguese criticism of Timor Gap Treaty" which was circulated to all delegates, along with a Memorandum on East Timor prepared by the Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby.

Canberra thinks it can avoid condoning the brutal way in which Indonesia seized control of East Timor by asserting that conclusion of the Treaty "does not signify Australia's approval of Indonesia's original acquisition of the territory of East Timor". The document also claims that "Australia's *de jure* recognition of Indonesia's acquisition of East Timor has enabled Australia to pursue its concerns for the human rights and economic development of the people of East Timor".

For an indication of how Australia pursues these concerns, it is instructive to examine a speech by Australia's ambassador to Jakarta, Philip Flood, at the National Press Club in Canberra on 12 April. He criticised Australian journalists for taking an interest only in humanitarian questions in East Timor, often on the basis of "unsubstantiated facts". He had nothing but praise for Indonesia's efforts to bring progress to East Timor, after four hundred years of Portuguese

Continued on page 24.

East Timor conference in Oporto

A four-day conference on East Timor in Oporto, Portugal from 28 April to 2 May was attended by academics, human rights activists, journalists and Portuguese MPs from all the major political parties plus representatives of East Timorese political organisations. The conference was convened by the University of Porto as a follow-up of a working conference on East Timor held last year.

Many topics were discussed: the responsibilities of Portugal and the international community, the Timor Gap Treaty, the role of the church in East Timor, current developments in East Timor, organising lobbying and solidarity for East Timor, prospects of change in Indonesia, the Portuguese parliamentary visit to East Timor, how to improve the conditions of the Timorese refugees in Portugal and the preservation of Timorese culture.

International character

With visitors from the UK, Australia, USA and Holland, the conference discussed the role of the international community regarding East Timor. Sasha Stepan from Monash University presented a paper on the Timor Gap Treaty which was a hot issue throughout the conference. The former Bishop of New York, Paul Moore, described his experiences during a brief visit to East Timor and the South Bank Polytechnic lecturer, John Taylor, and Liem Soei Liong from TAPOL discussed scenarios of change in East Timor and Indonesia. Pedro Pinto Leite, an expert on international law, drew a comparison between the Western Sahara and East Timor.

Timorese participation


Abilio Araujo, speaking for the East Timorese National Convergence, described new developments in the structure of the East Timorese resistance. Xanana Gusmao, widely acknowledged as leader of the national resistance, has called for national unity. Araujo told the conference that Xanana has expressed a wish to rejoin Fretilin, correcting his decision last year to leave the movement.

At the closing session, attended by many politicians and senior officials, both leaders of the Convergence, Abilio Araujo and Paolo Pires of the UDT, spoke of the necessity for the Portuguese government to continue to support the East Timorese cause.

Very important was the active participation of many young East Timorese in the conference. A new development emerged during the debates with the younger and older generations of Timorese participating actively. Jose Ramos Horta, the former Fretilin envoy at the UN, presented an interesting document on international developments which contained a series of proposals to professionalise and institutionalise lobby-work at the UN and in major capitals like Washington and Tokyo.

The Portuguese

Prof. Antonio Barbedo de Magelhaes, the organiser of the conference, delivered the opening and closing speeches. As a long-time supporter of independence for East Timor, he used emotion and wisdom to appeal to the Portuguese government and the international



Antonio Barbedo de Magelhaes speaking at the opening session of the Oporto conference. [Photo: TAPOL]

community. In gratitude, the Portuguese Parliament later expressed appreciation to Prof. de Magelhaes. Some interesting initiatives were launched: the idea of establishing a foundation to support and develop the culture of the East Timorese, a body to help young refugees with their schooling. There were many ideas for new initiatives on the international political arena. The conference enjoyed the active participation of Portuguese MPs from all the major parties who made useful contributions.

The closing session was also attended by Ramalho Eanes, the former Portuguese President, Rui Quartin Santos from the Foreign Ministry, the official responsible for East Timor affairs, and Antonio Souza Lara, chair of the special parliamentary commission on East Timor.

East Timor enjoys widespread political support in Portugal; the conference was an important effort to convert this huge political goodwill into new initiatives and diplomatic steps. Considering the attention to the conference from the general public and the excellent press coverage, it is most likely that the Oporto initiative will become a tradition.

More about the conference in the next issue. *

Civilians killed in army operations

There has been a spate of attacks on Indonesian soldiers and police in Aceh in the past few months, indicating that operations by the Free Aceh Movement are on the increase. Also, a number of civilians have been shot dead by troops out on operations against the Movement.

Several attacks have been reported in the Indonesian press, possibly only a fraction of the incidents. Early in April, an attack on a police station in Arun, North Aceh, resulted in a police officer being shot dead; the station was severely damaged by fire. Since nothing was stolen, *Tempo* sources discounted claims that the attack was criminal. A month earlier, a retired army sergeant-major was shot dead in nearby Lhoksukon [*Tempo* 14 April].

Combing the highways

One report identifies several groups of people who have been shot dead by troops, after failing to stop when ordered to do so. A young couple were killed, allegedly for failing to stop when told; the parents were informed of their deaths by an officer from the district military command. No explanation was given, except to say that they had died after an 'accident'. The parents were given Rp 100,000 (about £30) in compensation. Regarding five people shot dead on 16 April, army officers simply said that the victims had failed to obey an order to stop.

Operations against the Free Aceh Movement have been under way since late last year. It is now clear that troops are patrolling the roads, checking up on anyone travelling and asking for identity cards. The streets of Lhokseumawe, normally a busy town at all hours of the day and night, were deserted by early evening because so many people had been shot dead [*Tempo*, 28 April].

Another journal reports the shooting of a public

works official from Java, while travelling to a meeting. The driver did not stop when told to do so because he thought the men flagging him down were robbers. [*Editor*, 21 April]

The *Far Eastern Economic Review* [3 May 1990] believes that there have been at least a dozen deaths and ten arrests. It said that six security officers and one police informant have been shot dead in the past three months. In mid-April, the army acknowledged that five civilians had been "accidentally" shot dead during operations against the Free Aceh Movement.

Media rebuked for 'not checking the facts'

Armed forces commander-in-chief, General Try Soetrisno, has warned two Jakarta weeklies, *Tempo* and *Editor*, for publishing reports which he classified as "subversive". He told them, in a public rebuke, that they must "check the facts" before going into print about events in Aceh. (The reports in both journals are surprisingly well documented, with some of the information based on named senior army sources. General Try denied that any civilians had been killed, but added: "If there were victims on the civilian side, that was something that could not be avoided." [*Jakarta Post*, 8 May])

Growing concern about the unrest in Aceh has led to senior military and civilian authorities vying with each other to play things down. The governor of Aceh, Moh. Ibrahim Hasan, told the media to write reassuring reports that conditions in Aceh are stable, a sure sign that something is wrong. The military commander, Major-General Djoko Pranoto, described recent incidents as "criminal acts" by the Free Aceh Movement, admitting that the actions were directed against members of the armed forces.

To further confuse things, armed forces commander-in-chief, General Try Soetrisno insists the armed

US embassy helped Suharto's 1965 death squads

Top US diplomats at the US embassy in Jakarta in 1965 when the Indonesian army was massacring members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) now admit they supplied lists of communist leaders to the Indonesian army to help them conduct the crackdown.

Kathy Kadane, in *The Washington Post* [21 May 1990], interviewed top embassy officials, including the then ambassador, Marshall Green, Robert Martens, of the embassy's political section, and Martens' boss, Edward Masters, head of the political section.

Martens, an experienced analyst of communist affairs, told Kadane he headed an embassy group of State Department and CIA officials who had spent two years compiling the lists. He said people named in the lists were captured in overwhelming numbers. "It's a big part of the reason the PKI has never come back."

"I know we had a lot more information [about the PKI] than the Indonesians themselves," former ambassador Marshall Green was quoted as saying.

"They probably killed a lot of people and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not bad.

There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment," said Martens.

Another official, Howard Federpiel, Indonesian expert at the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research at the time, was equally callous. "No-one cared, so long as they were communists; that they were being butchered."

The report identifies Adam Malik as the one who received the lists and passed them to the army. His aide, Tirta Kantjana Adhyatman, interviewed by Kadane in Jakarta, said he received lists of thousands of names from Martens which he gave to Malik who turned them over to Suharto's headquarters.

US embassy officials then carefully recorded the subsequent destruction of the PKI, checking off names of captured and assassinated PKI leaders, tracking the dismantling of the party apparatus.

[*Editor's Note:* This devastating report reached us just as we were going to press. We shall give the matter more detailed attention in our next issue.]

forces are not the targets. "Groundless" reports that Free Aceh members had killed two army sergeants were damaging, as they "could make the world wonder what kind of a country Indonesia was if people launched attacks on the armed forces". [*Jakarta Post*, 11 May 1990]

A threat to key industrial plants

A statement by the commander of the Aceh district command, Colonel Sofian is somewhat franker about the threat to security in Aceh. While repeating warnings about "groundless reports", he said that security was vital because the area contains five major industries including the liquefied gas refinery in Arun. "We don't want to take any risks since there are many vital projects and many foreign nationals work here. The slightest disturbance would have a

national impact." He admitted that the army is conducting military operations including searches at certain places. He apologised "to any innocent victims who had fallen victim to the security operations." [*Jakarta Post*, 14 May 1990]

The regional army chief earlier announced that troops of the special elite strike force, *Kopassus* have been sent to Aceh "to hunt down Free Aceh forces". [*Indonesian Observer*, 23 April] This is perhaps the clearest indication of the seriousness of the situation, which territorial troops are apparently not capable of handling. *

[For a background article and more about actions against the Free Aceh Movement last year, see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 94, August 1989.]

CENSORSHIP

Journalists in trouble

There have been several recent reminders of the way in which press censorship operates in Indonesia. The armed forces commander-in-chief, General Try Sutrisno recently warned the press against reporting recent security operations in Aceh [see separate item]. Earlier he used the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the armed forces daily, *Angkatan Bersenjata*, to tell the press not to publish reports "which would discourage public participation in development programmes". Anything that could "disturb national unity and discourage discipline" should be kept out of the press. [*Jakarta Post*, 17 March 1990]


The problem was well summed up by Drs Ali Muchtar Hutasuhut, Rector of the Jakarta Institute for Social and Political Sciences (formerly the School for Journalism) who said that the press in Indonesia is plagued by fear because it is accountable not under the law but to the powers that be. Newspapers are haunted by the threat of losing their publishing permit; there is always the danger of getting a phone-call from the authorities, he said. Press freedom is even more essential today, now that the economy is being de-regulated. Anyone should be allowed to publish a newspaper, if they so wish.

He made a particular point about the way trials are reported in the press. All too often, trial reports are accusatory and the case for the defence is rarely put. [*Pelita*, 10 February 1990]

Journalists take the rap

Increasingly, it is the journalist who is penalised if a publication is called to account for a report to which the authorities take exception. The fear to which Hutasuhut refers is often so great that even before the authorities have acted, a journalist is sacked in order to avoid the ultimate sanction of losing the license to publish.

Two senior journalists of *Media Indonesia*, a relatively new Jakarta daily, were sacked in connection with an article that implied a comparison between Pharaoh and President Suharto. Although the paper's editor acknowledged that the article contained nothing offensive, the title, *Pharaoh and Suharto* was enough to cause offence.



The article was written by a deputy executive-editor, and commented on a statement by the president calling on the rice purchasing agency, Bulog, to buy up rice because the dry season was likely to be longer than usual, with harmful effects on the harvest. The article drew on the biblical story about Joseph who advised Pharaoh to buy up stocks during seven good years, to prepare for seven lean years.

The day following publication of the article, the writer, Elman Saragih Siadari was dismissed because the title was open to "all kinds of interpretations". The offending article was withdrawn and the paper published an apology to Suharto. But it was not till a day later that the editor-in-chief received "a stern, final warning" from the Information Department.

A second journalist, Jasso Winarto, drama and film critic, who had nothing whatsoever to do with the article except that he "knew that it would be published" was also sacked.

The editor-in-chief, Teuku Yousli Syah, said he had

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decided it was best to act without waiting for a warning. "I was acting in accord with paragraph 4 of the Code of Ethics." This states that if a news report is not accurate, it must be corrected or withdrawn.

"If I hadn't dismissed them, I would certainly have been sacked myself". There was a sense of relief that speedy action had saved the paper from being outlawed. Other journalists were immediately appointed to replace the two sacked men. [*Tempo*, 7 April 1990]

Expelled from the PWI

Another kind of sanction has befallen Rusli Desa, editor-in-chief of the Banjarmasin newspaper, *Gawi Manuntung*, who is also a former member of Parliament for Golkar. He has been expelled from the journalists' association, PWI for writing a document which exposed the methods used by the governor of South Kalimantan to protect a network of corruption, from which he himself has profited. The document was attached to a complaint submitted by a colleague to the official complaints P.O. Box of the Vice-President. Although this complaints mechanism is supposed to be confidential, the identity of the sender was revealed and he

was summoned for questioning.

Under interrogation by the public prosecutor, Rusli Desa's identity was revealed so he too was summoned and subsequently admitted in writing that he had written the document. The local PWI branch then announced his expulsion. "If I have no appeal against this decision," he said, "it will be the end of my career as a journalist." [*Tempo*, 28 April 1990]

Under new regulations, all press cards are issued by the PWI whose task is not to protect journalists but to control and penalise them on behalf of the regime.

Dismissal

A journalist of the Central Java daily, *Wawasan* was dismissed on the instructions of the officer in charge of information at the provincial military command because the newspaper had published a report about an incident in Pekalongan involving attacks on Chinese shops. *Wawasan* was the only newspaper to publish anything about the incident.

The report which was written by Aunur Rochim was interpreted by the information officer as likely to provoke racial or religious tensions. The reprimand from the military command was given as the reason in the editor's letter of dismissal. [*Monitor*, No. 4, 1990]*

RED DRIVE

No change for 'PKI suspects'

The announcement in February this year that 50,000 former 'communist political prisoners' will be allowed to vote in the 1992 general elections only served to focus attention yet again on the system of discrimination which still profoundly affects the status of millions of alleged communist suspects in Indonesia.

Although initially it sounded as though the regime was prepared to lift at least one restriction on the civil rights of these persecuted people, it soon became apparent that enfranchising these suspects would be subject to a number of political and ideological criteria.

According to several statements by regime officials, the number of people still treated as 'ex-tapols' and hence suspect communists or communist sympathisers is around 1.4 million. They consist of people classified in the late 1960s as Category A - those tried for alleged involvement in the events of 1965 - who total 814 (this is one figure on which all sources appear to agree); Category B - those alleged to have been sympathetic and who spent many years in prison without trial - who apparently number 37,760; or Category C, who are less 'guilty' than Category B and who spent a far shorter period in detention. Category C also includes hundreds of thousands who were never detained but are nevertheless broadly referred to as 'ex-tapols'.

A presidential decree in 1985 (No 63/85) made it possible for Category C people to participate in the 1987 elections but excluded all Category B people. The 1985 regulation is now to be amended so as to allow the 50,000 or so excluded in 1987 to vote but not until they have been screened (yet again) and deemed fit to vote. As Interior Minister, (retired) General Rudini said, the government will carefully evaluate all people [allegedly] involved in the 1965 events before restor-



Tapols reading out a pledge of loyalty which they were required to sign before being released. But they will remain 'suspects' till their dying day.

ing their right to vote. [*Jakarta Post*, 8 February 1990] Five criteria have been spelt out by Hari Sugiman, Director-General for Social and Political Affairs at the Interior Ministry:

- always displaying loyalty towards the Indonesian nation, state and government,
- never spreading Marxist teachings in all its forms and manifestations,
- never engaging in activities that could disrupt security and political stability,
- compliance with security and stability regulations

of Bakorstanas, the army's security agency, and - compliance with all the laws in force. [Tempo, 17 February 1990]

He added that people deemed fit to vote in one election could be disenfranchised next time round. In other words, the concession has nothing to do with lifting the system of 'guidance and surveillance' from the lives of these people.

According to Sugiman, people would have to show that they had abandoned their communist ideology. Although they would no longer be required to report regularly to the local military authorities, these people would still have to attend indoctrination sessions, to do compulsory 'community work' and to apply for permission in order to travel away from their place of residence. [Kompas, 5 February 1990]

Provincial governors will set up screening teams to check on all 'ex-tapols' and submit lists of those allowed to vote and those not allowed to vote, to the Interior Ministry in Jakarta. The final say on who may or may not vote will be in the hands of a central team, to be set up in September this year, consisting of all the security and military intelligence agencies, along with the attorney-general's office, the police and the Interior Ministry.

All this automatically excludes anyone who was sentenced for alleged 1965 involvement and who

RED DRIVE

received a sentence of more than five years (which includes virtually every single convicted tapol).

Welcome from Legal Aid Institute

The new regulation about the right to vote means that, on the pretext of restoring a civil right, the authorities have given themselves justification to initiate yet another bout of re-registration and screening of Indonesia's long-suffering victims of institutionalised political persecution.

It is therefore surprising that Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara, director of the national foundation of legal aid institutes (YLBHI), found it possible to welcome the move as paving the way to more democratic and open political conditions in the country. He saw it as in some way related to the political changes in Eastern Europe and said that greater openness would deprive groups in Indonesia like the former communist party from being able to manipulate ideology and ignorance. He also expressed confidence "in the resilience of the Pancasila ideology to create democratic and fair social conditions as the most solid foundation to repel the threat of communism". [Suara Pembaruan, 7 February]

New 'bersih diri' regulation

The government has announced a new regulation on screening employees and applicants for jobs in the vast state sector. The regulation has been promised for more than a year, in response to widespread disquiet at the effect of the regulations in force about 'bersih diri' and 'bersih lingkungan'. The former - 'clean self' - means that the individual was never a member or sympathiser of the many organisations banned when Suharto came to power in 1965. The latter - 'clean environment' - means that the person's family (in-laws as well as blood relatives, to the third generation) is 'clean' of political undesirables.

Since 1987, a number of people in high places in Golkar or in regional government have been found to be wanting in the *bersih lingkungan* test. The bickering has more to do with political cat-fighting, but the widely-reported cases forced the security authorities to look again at the regulation and now they have come up with a new one.

No relief for the 1.4 million

The persecution and ostracisation of Indonesia's 1.4 million communist suspects will not end though there may now be less pressure on their offspring and relatives. Whether this is true depends on implementation and on the variations that frequently occur from place to place.

The new regulation, Keppres [Presidential Decision] No 16, 1990, replaces the term 'screening' with its Indonesian equivalent, 'penelitian khusus'. Although the text of the regulation and its implementary code are not yet available, a report in *Tempo* gives a fairly full account of its contents.

It regulates the screening of all civil servants, members of the armed forces, employees of state companies, regional companies and state officials, so as to identify their involvement in the so-called 'G30S/PKI', ie, in the banned organisations. The


Interior Minister, General Rudini, has stressed however that the screening process "affects the whole of society. It applies to every one of us", he said.

Examination of the political affiliations of a person's family will now apply only for those wishing to join the armed forces.

Each department or enterprise will have its own special screening unit whose operations will be regulated by the national stability agency of the armed forces, *Bakorstanas*. The armed forces commander-in-chief, as chairman of *Bakorstanas*, will issue a code of screening but General Try Sutrisno said time would still be needed to produce this code.

However, as *Tempo* reports, if screening discovers that a civil servant or government employee is found to have been a member of or sympathetic to the PKI, the head of department will send the findings to *Bakorstanas* to fix that person's classification. [Tempo, 12 May 1990]

In other words, millions of people already at work in the huge state sector will continue to be subjected to screening and possible dismissal.



Inertia of the Law of Slowness

Ex political prisoners seldom speak out in public. They are a group of citizens with many obligations and no rights. One of the few ex prisoners to speak up is Yusuf Isak, ex journalist and now director of Hasta Mitra, which publishes Pramodya Ananta Toer's works. During the visit of IGGI chair Jan Pronk, Yusuf gave an interview to *NRC-Handelsblad* [12 April 1990].

Yusuf Isak was in jail for more than ten years until his release in 1979. He was never charged or tried. After his release Yusuf was not allowed to return to journalism, he could not become civil servant or enter military service. With every job application, he had to show his identity card marked with the initials ET, for 'ex tapol'. In the interview, he gave his opinion about Pronk's efforts to rescue the lives of those in the death row, explained why Suharto keeps the ET issue alive and had a few things to say about IGGI aid.

"What you perhaps forget is that Suharto wouldn't be Suharto any more if he gave in to the demands (to commute the death sentences, Tapol). The men sentenced to death will not be spared, despite the many protests. This government has no intention whatsoever of solving the question of the political prisoners. It serves as a powerful means of pressure which they apparently still need."

"Please understand that this is one of the very few third world countries where the superpowers do not stand face to face. Both the US and the communist countries support Suharto. The tragedy of our tiny opposition is our isolation. One can only be politically active at a national or provincial level, not in the villages. The government knows how difficult it is to control the peasants. What can we do?"

"It is so strange. When we were put in prison, they told us it was for our own benefit, to protect us from the anger of the people. But when we finally were released, we were received with friendship by the outside world. The book by Buru prisoner, Pramodya Ananta Toer became a bestseller. Yes, later, the book was banned but apparently the public want to read 'This Earth of Mankind'."



Yusuf Isak sees the criticism of Jan Pronk as a rather gratuitous gesture; on one hand, he is dismayed about the fate of those on death row but on the other hand, he is ready to provide billions of dollars of aid.

"This aid is quite something. I am not like President Sukarno who said: 'Go to hell with your aid'. No, I think it is OK. But those billions are keeping this government in the saddle. Do you have to make political demands as a donor country? And if one does and Suharto really gives in, then you should understand that this will mean the end of this government! Do you really want this?"

"Our problem of ex-political prisoners and the ones sentenced to death cannot be analysed according to logic. We live in stagnation. Nobody can move an inch. Everybody in the power structure is afraid of being accused of having leftist sympathies. Maybe you can call it the inertia of the Law of Slowness. We tapols are like canned fruit. One opens it whenever guests arrive. It is always there. It is the optimum of stagnation and absolutely tasteless. But it is oh so handy to have it there in the larder." *

Prisoner remains in prison after sentence has expired

A communist political prisoner, Rewang, who was due for release in 1988 is still in prison despite efforts by his wife to bring him home.

Rewang al Parto was arrested in July 1968 in South Blitar, along with many other communist leaders who had gone into hiding, including those now awaiting implementation of their death sentences.

He was first secretary of the communist party's Central Java provincial committee and was tried by a special court in Semarang in 1971 and given a life sentence which was upheld on appeal in 1975. Subsequently however his life sentence was commuted to twenty years but the sentence was counted from the date of its confirmation, not from the time when he was arrested or even the year of his trial. The time taken by the appeals procedures meant an extra ten

years in prison. In other words, he was being penalised for appealing against his sentence.

By the mid-1980s, it was general understood that, with remission, he was due for release in January 1988. However, he was not released and remains in Jakarta's Cipinang Prison, to this day.

Following a request for clarification from the Vice-President's official Complaints PO Box, the family was recently informed that, on the basis of a statement from the Prisons Directorate of the Ministry of Justice, his release has been postponed. The decision not to release him was taken by the chief military prosecutor in Jakarta as long ago as August 1987.

This is typical of the "due process" enjoyed by political prisoners in Indonesia. *

Jan Pronk and Toshiki Kaifu visit Indonesia

The visit of Dutch Development Cooperation Minister, Jan Pronk and the Japanese Prime Minister, Toshiki Kaifu to Indonesia, came 17 years after Pronk, in the same capacity and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka visited Indonesia. Those visits became the catalyst for the January 1974 student unrest. This time the impact was different.

Events prior to the visits

Jan Pronk visited Indonesia as chair of IGGI, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, a position held *ex officio* by the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation. Before the visit, events in Indonesia had created tension in Dutch-Indonesian relations. In February, four long-term political prisoners were executed and another six were reportedly to be executed in March. An unprecedented wave of protests swept Holland, in Parliament, in public rallies and the media. In an unprecedented move, Pronk suspended part of a special aid program, the first time sanctions were used against Indonesia for its record on human rights.

Officially the link between aid and human rights has been an integral part of Dutch government policy since the mid seventies, but implementation has been selective. Demands in parliament that the government abandon the policy of silent diplomacy persuaded Pronk to take more positive action. His decision to suspend some of the aid was widely supported in parliament, not only by his own party, the PvdA (Dutch Labour Party) but by parties from right to left.

One difficulty in linking human rights to economic sanctions is the question of ministerial responsibility. Human rights falls within the competence of the Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek, now serving a third term, who has always been an advocate of silent diplomacy. As a result the Pronk initiative caused a rift in the cabinet. The Dutch cabinet is a coalition between the CDA (Christian Democrats), van den Broek's party, and PvdA. Less than a year old, it cannot afford a major split.

New execution crisis

In March, after an announcement that the clemency plea of Asep Suryaman, a death-row prisoner, had been turned down, van den Broek urged the Indonesian Government not to go ahead while Pronk refrained from saying anything. The weekend before his departure, he reiterated his support for linking aid to human rights.

His itinerary in Indonesia included meetings with human rights activists. Pronk had many expectations to fulfil; human rights groups in Indonesia expected him to be categorical on these matters with the Indonesian authorities. As he left Holland, a group of Indonesians started a hunger strike in one of the squares in the centre of Amsterdam.

The atmosphere in Jakarta

In Jakarta interest in Pronk's visit was intense. Seldom had a foreign visitor been given such wide press coverage. All aspects were discussed, the executions, the linkage between human rights and aid,



Indonesians who went on hunger strike as Minister Pronk departed for Indonesia. [Photo: Berita Tanpa Sensor]

the prospects of IGGI aid and Pronk as the man of economic sanctions. For the government, Pronk's stand had come as something of a shock. The previous three Dutch ministers who chaired IGGI, de Koning, Schoo and Bukman, were middle-of-the-road politicians who saw IGGI as a financial consortium with no interest in social or human rights. Leading technocrats like Finance Minister J.B. Sumarlin, Planning Bureau chief Saleh Afiff and State Secretary Mardiono, voiced concern at the possibility of aid cuts.

A few days before Pronk's arrival, the weekly *Editor* devoted its lead story to the executions and the Pronk visit. Hardliners started spreading hints that if Pronk was planning to transform IGGI into a human rights forum, it should move to Washington, the seat of the World Bank. From all sides the Pronk visit did not pass unnoticed.

His visit in 1973 as IGGI chairman was marked by many incidents. Student protestors demonstrated against Indonesia's increasing dependence on foreign aid. History repeated itself in 1990. Human rights activists in Yogya and Jakarta greeted Pronk with banners linking IGGI aid to human rights abuses. A student delegation delivered a statement to the Dutch embassy in Jakarta, expressing dissatisfaction with the IGGI and the harmful effects of economic aid. Pronk received several statements about human rights abuses including one from LPHAM, the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights, INFIGHT, the Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights and from the Front Komunikasi Mahasiswa Yogya, a broad student front in Central Java.

The executions and human rights in general were discussed in meetings with some Indonesian ministers.

With Justice Minister Maj. General Ismael Saleh, one of those responsible for the executions, Pronk also raised the question of the heavy sentences for Bandung students who had merely protested against General Rudini's visit to their campus and the Yogya students who received seven and eight years for selling books by Pramodya Ananta Toer and holding discussions. The ministers agreed to disagree. With Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Pronk raised the executions and received the standard answer, that human rights are determined by the social, political, economic and cultural values of separate countries.

Throughout his visit, media attention was intense, in Holland as well as in Indonesia. On economic matters he praised Indonesia's handling of aid funds, while indicating that special aid would probably decline due to Indonesia's improved economic performance. He was favourably impressed by improvements in health and education but criticised the debt service ratio of 40% and said Indonesia should avoid getting deeper into debt. Besides visiting development projects, he went to the slums of North Jakarta where he refused to talk to people selected by officials but instead asked a garbage worker about his wages.

Indonesian ministers appeared determined to make the best out of Pronk's visit. Foreign Minister Alatas tried to assure everyone that it was not the intention of the Dutch to link aid to human rights, still less with the executions. None of the generals said anything about foreigners 'meddling in our internal affairs'. It was as if Suharto had instructed everyone to adopt a softly-softly approach; this must have come as a relief to the technocrats.

The Indonesian media, sensing perhaps that the political climate is changing, wrote quite favourably about Pronk. After his morning stroll in the slums, *Kompas* commented on 11 April that Pronk represents a new humanist trend in the industrial world. Frankness, openness, concern about global affairs like pollution, social justice, democracy and the inequality of wealth in the world today seemed to be the hallmark. *Editor*, which a week earlier was reprimanded by the Information Department for its coverage of Pronk and the executions, carried an interview with him on 14 April, in which he stressed the universality of human rights.

There were words of welcome even from Indonesia's rubber-stamp parliament (DPR). John Naro, DPR vice-chairman, said the government should open itself to criticism especially if it was "constructive". At the beginning of his visit Pronk had struck hard at the DPR. A DPR mission which visited the Dutch parliament in February had heard harsh criticism from all the political parties about the DPR's inaction regarding human rights, including the imminent threat of executions. Pronk was clearly annoyed when it emerged that the delegation to Holland has not reported its discussion with Dutch parliamentarians. He was surprised to hear that MPs had said the executions were a matter for jurists and expressed disbelief when told that Indonesian MPs knew nothing about a World Bank study on poverty in Indonesia. It was not the custom, he was told, for Parliament to discuss such reports.

No water-tight guarantees


Meetings with representatives of human rights organisations proceeded as planned; the groups gave the Dutch minister petitions, confronting him with clear examples of human rights abuses. The Institute for the Defence of Human Rights (LPHAM) said that the Indonesian people are not allowed to comment on

increasing violence by the government. IGGI aid benefits the government of Indonesia as it allows the authorities to collaborate closely with big business and to violate human rights with impunity. LPHAM director Princen called on Minister Pronk to link aid with respect for human rights.

On 13 April Pronk went to the office of INFIGHT, the Indonesian Front for the Defense of Human Rights, where he was handed a 30-page document. The hard-hitting document addresses the question of human rights in a general sense [see separate item]. During the meeting which lasted for several hours, Pronk was introduced to victims of repression who told him about their sufferings. Pronk promised to circulate the petition and other documents from these groups to IGGI member states.

Earlier that day, at Tugu station in Yogya, Pronk was met by a few hundred student demonstrators who called for a halt to IGGI aid until real democratic reforms have taken place. The students carried banners in three languages, Dutch, English and Indonesian, saying: "We want human rights to be respected", "In Yogya, Bandung, Jakarta several innocent students are in prison" and "We want democracy to be respected". The demonstrators handed over an Open Letter and had a ten-minute discussion with the IGGI chair.

From the outset, Pronk's priority was to prevent the six executions. On 9 April, he said he was sure that the suspension of aid had helped postpone the killings although he had not been given a firm guarantee by the government that the executions were definitely off. A day later Pronk announced a new international initiative to prevent the Indonesian government from implementing the death sentences. EC countries and other states would be involved. So far no details are available but Pronk gave an assurance that the pressure on the Indonesian government will be stepped up. Initially Pronk said he would disclose more details about his diplomatic demarche but disappointed many by failing to do so.



The latest in the TAPOL Occasional Reports series contains a detailed report of the visit of Minister Jan Pronk to Indonesia in April 1990, with documents presented to him by Indonesian human rights NGOs. Price: £0.80, including postage.

On his return home, Pronk went straight to the ten hunger-strikers and told them that although he had not been given a water-tight guarantee that the executions would not go ahead, he believed that the Indonesian authorities are listening carefully to the voice of the Dutch public. The hunger strikers decided to end their strike but pledged to continue their efforts and demands on future occasions in a different way.

The conflict with v.d. Broek

Pronk's approach is clearly opposed by Foreign Minister Hans v.d. Broek who prefers silent diplomacy and thinks it is enough to issue a statement of regret when Indonesian political prisoners are executed. He is even convinced that human rights violations in Indonesia are not structural and is satisfied with making bland statements.

A week after returning from Indonesia, Pronk had another row with his cabinet colleague at a 4-hour debate behind closed doors in the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission. The Foreign Minister wields more clout in the government, but in parliament, Pronk's views enjoy greater support. Pronk has handed over his initiative to the Prime Minister and is no doubt aware that more political support is needed from the other European allies to curb the Suharto government.


Kaifu's visit

Kaifu's visit was brief, Indonesia being one of several South Asian countries on his itinerary. Seventeen years ago, during Prime Minister Tanaka's visit, the anger of Indonesian students was directed at Japanese symbols of multinational corporations like Toyota, Honda and Suzuki. Japanese advertising boards and neonlights had started to dominate the skyline of Indonesian cities. Today, Japanese investments in Indonesia far exceed other industrial nations and Japanese ODA (overseas development aid) to Indonesia is by far the largest.

As with Pronk, human rights organisations like INFIGHT and LPHAM made serious efforts to have a meeting with Kaifu but the Japanese made it clear there would be no discussions about human rights. The Kaifu visit was a formal state visit and no important issues like the environment or the concentration of Japanese investments in the capital, creating structural disparities, were raised.

Efforts to meet Kaifu

INFIGHT made a number of unsuccessful attempts to meet the Japanese prime minister. Similarly, Poncke Princen from LPHAM was refused. The ambassador, Michihiko Kunihiro stated bluntly that dissenting voices from Indonesian NGOs would not affect the



Japanese government. After all, he said, aid cooperation is between governments, not with private entities. INFIGHT made a final effort, faxing a letter to Ms Takako Doi, the leader of the opposition Socialist Party to ask her to raise the matter in the Japanese Diet. This effort failed but it was widely reported and served its purpose. The Japanese embassy was only prepared to accept statements from the groups.

The only incident during Kaifu's brief visit was a demo in front of the new Sogo department store where demonstrators calling themselves the 'Anti Japanese investment group' carried banners complaining about Japanese aid. Poetry was read for the occasion:

*What is Japan doing here ?
Japan gives aid
And we have to pay it back.
The aid is used to build roads
So that Japan can expand its production of cars.
Where do the profits go to
If not to Japan?*

*

More deals with UK arms firms under way

Indonesia has signed a new arms deal with UK-based Ferranti, Britain's second-largest military electronics company. The deal covers the purchase of laser rangefinders for Hawk combat aircraft supplied to Indonesia in the past few years by British Aerospace. [*Engineer*, 1 March 1990]

The London-based Campaign Against Arms Trade has also revealed that Plymouth's Devonport Dockyard is currently refurbishing at least one ex-Royal Navy frigate for sale to an overseas navy approved by the Minister of Defence and rumoured to be Indonesia. The deal, worth £12 million, could involve converting vessels back to gun-carrying warships. The MoD and

the Dockyard refused to comment on the report, saying it was a matter of commercial confidence. [*CAAT Newsletter*, No 101, February 1990 and *Western Morning News*, 9 December 1989]

Another major deal that would be worth far more than either of the above involves the purchase of several Tornado aircraft, manufactured in Britain by Panavia, a consortium involving British, West German and Italian companies. Two Tornado aircraft were on display at the Halim Perdanakusuma air-field near Jakarta in March, with Air Vice-Marshal Wilson of the RAF pushing hard for a deal, backed by Britain's ambassador to Indonesia, Kelvin White. Although

Continued on page 6.

IGGI special aid props up the economy

On 12 and 13 June, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia will meet in The Hague. This year's meeting will attract more attention than usual, not least because of the position of its new chairman, Jan Pronk (see page 15). IGGI aid is paramount for the Indonesian government. Cuts in IGGI aid could have dramatic consequences for the annual budget.

It is forecast that Indonesia will receive roughly the same amount this year as in 1989 (\$4.3 billion), but the breakdown is expected to change radically. Since 1988 Indonesia, has received three types of aid: the more conventional project aid (tied to approved projects), programme aid (untied and available for use over a five-year period) and special aid.

Special aid and the lean years

Special aid was designed to extricate Indonesia from the difficulties it had balancing the annual budget. Special aid finances the budget deficit and covers the rupiah costs of government projects. It is immediately convertible into rupiahs at favourable terms.

The years from 1985 to 1987 were particularly difficult for Indonesia. The rate of the dollar declined against the Japanese yen whereas a substantial part of Indonesia's debts must be repaid in yen. The price of oil plummeted from \$25 a barrel to around \$10 in mid-1986, playing havoc with Indonesia's budget. The debt service ratio (DSR, the ratio of debt repayments to export earnings) rose to almost 40 per cent. The IMF 1988 report showed that about 80 per cent of the increase in Indonesia's debt had been caused by these developments. Widjoyo, Indonesia's economic supremo and Suharto's favourite economic advisor, went to Tokyo to find a solution to these problems.

The then IGGI chairman, Piet Bukman was very sympathetic, with the result that in 1988, Indonesia received significantly more aid from IGGI and from Japan. IGGI aid rose from \$3.2 billion to \$4.1 billion, well in excess of the \$3.6 billion proposed by the World Bank. In addition, Japan supplied an extra \$1.7 billion outside IGGI in the form of special aid. In 1989 Indonesia was still facing the same difficulties due to the strengthening yen. IGGI raised that year's amount to \$4.3 billion. Hence during the Bukman chairmanship from 1987-1989, IGGI aid almost doubled as compared with 1986. It is likely that the Pronk years will reverse this trend.

The recent crash in the Tokyo stock market, the depreciation of the yen and Indonesia's buoyant trade figures tend to encourage the conclusion among western donors that aid to Indonesia should be curtailed, especially as they are eager to switch funds over to Eastern Europe. In particular, special aid is likely to be cut; major donors like the World Bank and Japan agree that by 1992, special aid will have been phased out.

Changing export patterns

Indonesia has been able to anticipate these developments. According to the 1989 World Bank report on Indonesia, growing exports and improved revenues from income tax mean that Indonesia will be able to dispense with special aid.

The 1990/1991 budget only mentions two types of



aid, programme aid and project aid. Special aid has been incorporated into the former which is 160 per cent higher than the previous year (2,885.3 billion rupiahs or \$1.58 billion). The target figure for project aid in 1990/1991 is 80 per cent of the previous year (8,404.2 billion rupiahs or \$4.59 billion). Programme aid, \$ 1.58 billion, according to reliable sources, consists entirely of special aid. But Indonesian technocrats have now come to the conclusion that this figure is unrealistically high and they only expect to get \$1.2 billion in special aid, \$700 million from the Japanese, and \$500 million from the other IGGI donors. If this is correct, it will mean a cut of one-third in special aid as compared with last year. The shortfall will be met by higher export earnings.

The restructuring of the Indonesian economy has brought major changes. The macro economic figures have never looked so good. The Asian Development Bank recently estimated that Indonesia's economic growth in 1989 was 6.5% per cent. Reliance on oil and gas earnings has fallen as non-oil exports have grown dramatically. Strong industrial growth has meant that earnings from manufactures have outstripped earnings from agricultural products. Last year, manufacturing output accounted for 80 per cent of non-oil export earnings. Based on projections, by the end of

the fifth Five Year Plan in 1994, the debt service ratio will drop to 25 per cent while economic growth will remain at around 7% per cent. This better than expected performance is the result of a combination of huge foreign investments from Asian countries and the successful expansion of Indonesian conglomerates.

Nothing in it for the poor

But these impressive economic indicators have not helped the poor. The latest *World Development Report* from the World Bank classifies Indonesia among the

IGGI AND HUMAN RIGHTS

poor countries. Per capita income is still below \$500, the lowest in the ASEAN region; 40 per cent of Indonesians still live at or below subsistence level. At the other end of the scale, Indonesia's richest families are wallowing in money. Thirty-two IGGI conferences have done nothing to help the poor; the western donors who meet every year in IGGI aid have only promoted uneven development. *

Other voices from Indonesia

INFIGHT

The newly-established Indonesian Front for the Defence of Human Rights, or INFIGHT, produced an impressive document which for the chairman of IGGI, Jan Pronk. The 30-page English-language document, entitled "Other Voices from Indonesia", sets out to inform the Dutch minister of "the conditions of the target group of aid... and how far [this aid] has been detrimental to the people".

In an 11-point introduction, it points out that the human rights situation has worsened, the right to organisation and freedom of expression continue to deteriorate, whereas prospects for democracy are obstructed by the prominent role of the military in political affairs. The "dual function which is said to be temporary shows no signs of being terminated and instead is being strengthened." It condemns the use of the death penalty which it describes as a "political show of force", as well as the anti-subversion law.

The main part of the document consists of brief accounts of the major land disputes submitted by the victims themselves, papers from the Women's Solidarity Group, from SKEPHI, the forest conservation network, and from the Indonesian Student Forum of Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Yogyakarta and Surabaya.

"Sheer brutality"

INFIGHT argues that it is "sheer brutality" to go on extending aid without considering the impact on the majority of the people. After producing figures about the level of poverty (80% of people below the poverty line), the use of child labour (2.5 million each year), unemployment at 66% of the labour force, the number of children who do not go to school, infant mortality which is the highest in ASEAN (87/1000) and nearly 90% of people who do not have access to state drinking water, it points out that "the pattern of development supported by IGGI has uprooted millions of people. Kedung Ombo, Cimacan, Pulau Panggung, Badega, Sugapa and others are just a few examples of marginalisation of people in Indonesia." Finally, it accuses IGGI of being responsible for the pauperisation process now under way in Indonesia.


Open letter from the Yogyakarta Students Communications Forum

Dear Mr Pronk,
Welcome to Indonesia, a country burdened by foreign debt. Your visit to Indonesia has been anxiously awaited. IGGI funds are often thought of as a cure

for Indonesia's ills but Indonesia's dependence on development loans is dangerous; as our debt increases, our hope of solving the terrible problem of poverty in this country dwindles.

We appreciate IGGI's effort in helping Indonesia. But IGGI funds come with interest and political strings attached. We know that the education we receive will not prepare us to face the problem of the ever-increasing national debt. Education in Indonesia teaches us to be silent and obey the authorities. We are not permitted to discuss the issue of national debt, let alone various other issues. Visit Indonesia's prisons and you will meet people whose only crime was to address politically 'sensitive' issues.

It seems to us that part of the hidden cost of the foreign debt is human dignity and human rights. ➔



Injustice, Persecution, Eviction:
A Human Rights Update on Indonesia and East Timor,
March 1990

ASIA WATCH
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New York, NY 10017
USA

Price \$ 9.00 plus postage

IGGI AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Millions of peasants must be silent while being relocated for the sake of 'stability'. Go and speak to the former residents of the area around Kedung Ombo who are now suffering for the sake of development policies. And if you have time, talk to people in Cimacan, Badega, Blangguan-Situbondo, Pulau Panggung/Lampung, Majalengka. These examples illustrate how development money can be used by the authorities to suppress human rights and democracy. You have stated publicly that the problem of the debt service ratio needs to be addressed, and you hope that In-

donesia will become less dependent on the IGGI in the future. We support this position fully.

We also demand that the IGGI:

1. Delays the delivery of IGGI funds until Indonesia [introduces] real democratic reforms.
2. Compels the Indonesian government not to let the foreign debt become a greater burden on the Indonesian people.
3. Recalls IGGI funds if they are used in programmes that abuse human rights.

Yogyakarta, 13 April 1990.

*

LAND DISPUTES

Villagers against the air force

March 22 saw another major protest over land in Jakarta, when eight buses packed with about 500 men, women and children from 7 villages in Ligung sub-district, Majalengka, arrived outside the Department of Home Affairs. At first they were refused entry and told by security guards to go home, but after threatening to sit down in the street and hold up traffic, they were finally allowed in.

Home Affairs Minister (retired) General Rudini who they demanded to see, was not available and a small delegation was invited to meet a lower-ranking official. This failed to satisfy the crowd and they were still refusing to leave the compound when night fell. Only after four farmers had run Rudini to earth at home, and secured his promise to investigate the dispute, did the villagers agree to return home.

The families claim ownership of 1,043 hectares of land currently in the possession of the Indonesian Air Force. They resent paying high rents to the Air Force for the use of their own land, but face reprisals if they fail to pay up. Farmers have been beaten, tortured and detained over the decades and last year five were tortured until they vomited blood and fell unconscious. [See Majalengka farmers' contribution to *Other Voices from Indonesia*: Some Notes for the 33rd Session of IGGI, Jakarta, April 13, 1990]


The Majalengka dispute goes back to the 1940s when the Japanese occupation forces seized the land for an air-base. In 1950, the Indonesian Air Force moved in. Subsequent attempts by the Majalengka farmers to regain their land met with no success, and in 1986 the Air Force was given title to the land. "We have been fighting for our land for forty years. In the Dutch era we were colonised, in the Japanese occupation we were colonised. We still haven't enjoyed independence", the farmers protested.

The Air Force say they have proof that the farmers sold the land to the Japanese, which the farmers deny. A Japanese embassy official, Masaru Antatsu, also seemed to contradict this claim when quizzed by student supporters of the farmers, about the land transfer during the occupation. There was no buying or selling of land, he said, only compensation. Clearly wishing to avoid embroiling Japan in a sensitive war-time issue, he said Japan had compensated for all such cases by paying war reparations; if the people did not get their share, it was Indonesia's internal

affair and nothing to do with Japan.

The Majalengka families suffered another set-back when a mission sent by Rudini, which included staff from the military national stability agency, Bakorstanas, declared that the land belonged to the Air Force, not the farmers. The decision prompted the return of six farmers to Jakarta to protest, but to no avail. Minister Rudini merely said, if they felt the decision was unjust, they should go to court. The farmers are considering this, although the fact that no such cases have been won in the past can offer little encouragement. They can also expect a long-drawn-out process, such as is currently being endured by the Cimacan farmers who have taken golf-course developers, PT BAM, to court [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 98].

Nevertheless, the Majalengka farmers are determined not to give up. They brought their case to the attention of IGGI chair, Jan Pronk, during his meeting with the Indonesian Front for the Defense of Human Rights when they said: "Whatever bars our step, we have made up our minds to keep on with our struggle until the land is back in our hands". *



Tempo, 30 December 1989.

Kedung Ombo: the forgotten families

If any official from the World Bank or the Indonesian government was hoping that the Kedung Ombo dispute had faded away, they were gravely mistaken. On April 19, 350-400 men, women and children from Miri and Sumberlawang in Sragen district arrived at the House of Representatives (DPR) in Jakarta to protest against their unfair treatment. They are among the 5,399 families whose land was submerged by the World Bank-funded Kedung Ombo dam in Central Java. The huge multipurpose dam achieved international notoriety in January 1989, when flooding started before the people had moved out [see past issues of *TAPOL Bulletin* for background].

Over one year later, an estimated 724 families still remain in the dam area, living in makeshift villages they have built on higher ground around the edges of their flooded land. Over 200 families living in Kemusu, Boyolali district have persisted in refusing government-set compensation while another 529 mostly from Sragen district were forced to accept compensation. It was members of the community from Sragen who protested in Jakarta.

The Jakarta protest

The protestors, who chartered six buses to travel the long journey to Jakarta, met DPR members outside the DPR building so that all could participate in the discussion. They submitted a statement, requesting an investigation of the compensation issue at Kedung Ombo. Their demands included a raise in compensation from Rp 250-730/m² to Rp 13,750/m², the value of the land determined by the government for taxation purposes; they also demanded that no further taxation be levied on land already flooded. It is no clear why farmers are still taxed on land for which they have received compensation and thus can no longer be said to belong to them?

Central Java Governor Lt-Gen. Ismail rebuked the Kedung Ombo villagers for not first taking their complaint to the local authorities, saying this proved that protest had been organised by "certain parties". The villagers' reluctance to approach anything less than the DPR is not hard to imagine, given all the distrust and fear of the local authorities. The protestors were taking risks just to leave their villages. They were forced to leave their homes furtively at night to avoid security men watching the area. Some villagers were detained while trying to join the protestors, and according to *Kompas* [April 21, 1990], one man was threatened with a burning match, then held overnight by the military. Fearing reprisals, the protestors asked DPR members for letters to guarantee their safety, before they returned home.

In Jakarta the families spoke of intimidation by the land acquisition team, who forced them to accept the meagre compensation set by the government. People who refused to accept, said villagers, were threatened with being labelled PKI or G30S. The Sragen district secretary told families:

Remember 1965, whoever opposes the government and whoever does not want to receive this compensation should sign this document and the money will be deposited in court.



One of the many Kedung Ombo victims talking emotionally about the tragedy of eviction, outside parliament in Jakarta.

The Miri sub-district head read out the anti-subversion law and threatened to sack villagers who were government employees, if they refused to accept compensation. [*Pikiran Rakyat* April 24, 1990]

Students high profile

Over 60 students from several universities from the Kedung Ombo Project Victims Solidarity Group (KSKP-KO) accompanied the farming families to Jakarta. Their statement fully supported the villagers' demands and condemned the "suppressive" means by which the authorities had appropriated their land.

In Yogyakarta a meditation and poetry-reading was held by Gadjah Mada students after the Jakarta protest, in solidarity with the people of Kedung Ombo and those involved in other land disputes. Romo Mangun, the social worker and priest who raised public sympathy and funds for the Kedung Ombo children, said the Jakarta visit showed that the Indonesian people had become more critical.

World Bank visit

Ironically, a few weeks before the protest, a top World Bank official visited the dam and expressed satisfaction with the resettlement plan. This conclusion of Anthony P Cole, Head of the Agricultural Division, shows how out of touch the Bank is with the people most affected by their project. But Kedung Ombo is still sensitive enough with the Bank (Cole said he had received many letters, some negative, about the dam) to warrant such a top-level visit.

Farmers representing 285 families have approached the Legal Aid Foundation (LBH) office in Semarang for assistance. Semarang LBH is prepared to take the matter to court if government policy does not change. The government has no legal basis to turn an inhabited area into a giant dam, since there was no agreement on compensation. If the government wanted to use the area, replacement farm land should have been prepared. The areas prepared were not suitable for farming, said an LBH lawyer, as the land was difficult to convert into rice fields.

Boyolali district chief, Lt.Col Hasbi, claims land in

the new site is far better than the land originally owned by the farmers. He has repeatedly denied that compensation levels were unfair and recently alleged that the local government had already carried out "too much consultation" with the Kedung Ombo people about compensation. [*Kompas* April 10, 1990]

One reason why the families are reluctant to move to Kedung Rejo or Kedung Mulyo is the uncertain status of the land they would occupy there. After suffering so much during the Kedung Ombo dispute they have no wish to resettle only to be moved on again, so want land certificates first.

There is also the question of who will gain from the anticipated growth in the tourist industry around the dam. The Kedung Ombo families are likely to be the last to benefit: the local government has announced that about 100 ha of land in the dam's green belt has been reserved for development by outside investors.

Demak farmers stage a protest

The Kedung Ombo dam is under attack not only from its victims, whose land was flooded but also from its supposed beneficiaries, the farmers who depend on irrigation from the dam. When the dam authorities carried out an experiment which involved closing the dam gates, the flow of water to irrigate wet-rice fields was greatly reduced. The experiment is threatening 15,000 hectares of rice fields in the Demak district of Central Java. Already 5,000 ha in Grobongan and Demak districts have been affected. Hundreds of farmers from four villages in the Gajah

and Dempet sub-districts took drastic action to secure their water supply. They broke through the bank of a water channel near one of the dam gates and redirected the water to their villages. Governor Ismail claimed the farmers had no grounds for protest since the dam had not yet been officially opened. There was talk of prosecuting the farmers, but later reports suggest they will not be tried.

The rising water level is also taking its toll on people living around the edges of the dam and the authorities hope the high water will force more families to move out more quickly. Before the experiment began, Hasbi said the people had been warned the waters would rise: "So don't blame the government when your homes and yards get flooded", he said. [*Suara Merdeka* April 14, 1990]

What price dams?

The negative impact of this dam - and many others - invites the question: are such prestige projects really justified? After all, dams only function for a limited period, and if erosion control cannot attain the necessary efficiency, the life of a dam is greatly reduced. This has already happened at the nearby World Bank-funded Wonogiri dam.

Tens of thousands of people are disrupted by such projects. Whom do they really serve? So far, the Kedung Ombo dam has served nobody but the World Bank who will gain financially from the loan, the construction firms who built the dam and the officials who took a cut from the procurement deals. *

Eliezer Bonay passes away

On 14 March, Eliezer Jan Bonay, an eminent West Papuan freedom fighter, died after a long illness. Bonay lived in the Netherlands for the last few years of his life as a political refugee. After being forced to flee from his beloved homeland, he first stayed for a considerable time in Papua New Guinea and Sweden.

Eliezer Bonay held many positions during his active years. He was chair of PARNA, the National Party, the Papuan political party which called for independence for West Papua. He was party chairman at the crucial period when the UN talks regarding the future of Dutch New Guinea started. Like many other active Papuans, he cherished the hope that the Papuan people would be allowed to determine their own fate through a referendum.

After the handover of power from the UN to Indonesia May 1963, Bonay agreed under great pressure to become governor and served unwillingly in this post for 19 months. Later, he explained in an interview with TAPOL [see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 48, November 1981 and 49, January 1982] how he was a puppet of the Indonesian administration.

After his dismissal in 1965, Bonay was transferred to Jakarta but with no job. After a few years, he was allowed to return home and became politically active again. In June 1971 the army arrested him for subversion and he served a two-year sentence. After his release, Bonay was under constant surveillance and finally took the painful decision to leave his homeland and seek refuge in neighbouring PNG.

After a lengthy stay in PNG, Bonay was granted asylum in Sweden. He described in his TAPOL interviews how he had been promised asylum in Vanuatu but was forced by the UN representative in PNG to leave for Sweden instead, just days before he was

due to meet Walter Lini.

The West Papuan community have lost one of their finest leaders, a man who remained loyal to his principles until his dying day. *


West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

The first two editions of this book appeared in 1983 and 1984. This third edition, published in response to continuing demand, has been substantially revised and updated, with new data on military operations, an appendix on the murder of the well-known West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap, and recent information about the exploitation of West Papua's natural resources.

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More Petrus killings?

In sharp contrast with the 'clarifications' given about the Mysterious Killings (*Penembakan Misterius* or *Petrus*) a few years ago, the chief of police, General Drs Moch. Sanoesi, told a parliamentary commission recently that the violence being employed by the police against criminals does not signify the adoption of a new policy. Officers were compelled 'by force of circumstances' to employ violence against criminals who are themselves inclined to resort to force.

"Pent-up fear in the community because of the activities of criminals calls for a response. Conditions on the ground are not easy to understand for people sitting in an air-conditioned office, armed only with theories in their books of law." The chief-of-police was responding to questions about shooting incidents involving criminal suspects in recent months. [*Kompas*, 21 February 1990]

On the very same day, *Pos Kota* reported that a 27-year old man named Retono alias Nano who was thought to have carried out a hold-up, died in hospital from wounds inflicted when he was shot at by the police in Jembatan Lima, and *Jawa Pos* reported that Boyman, who was suspected of having staged a robbery, was tortured by two policemen in Jombang.

Investigations by *Monitor* have revealed that during the month of February there were at least ten shooting incidents by the police involving criminal suspects. The victims were ER alias Sengit (31 years) who was thought to have carried out a raid, SB (23) thought to have been involved in a robbery, Al (32) believed to have robbed someone in a bank, Cp (30), Rat (27), Jam (26) and War (28), all of them suspected of various criminal acts, IS (21) and another unnamed man, Man (25) allegedly involved in a theft, and an unidentified person who carried out a hold-up in Perintis Kemerdekaan Road, as well as Mu (25) thought to have robbed someone in Tangerang.

The chief-of-police was probably right to say that the situation confronted by the police out on the streets is difficult to understand if we just sit in our air-conditioned office reading law books. But what is

even more difficult to understand is the haste with which the police draw their firearms and shoot at 'suspects' most of whom are armed with nothing more than machetes, daggers or knives, or in some cases who were only trying to run away. When the police take action, are they not usually acting in groups of more than one or two officers? Are not our policemen given training in the art of self-defence, using their bare hands? Couldn't the police run after suspects who are trying to run away?

There are many more questions that come to mind about the so-called 'force of circumstances', whenever we read reports about people suspected of crimes being shot down by the police.

If we link the words of the chief-of-police about responding to the fear of criminals in society with an item in *Kompas* on 16 February reporting the discovery of a "tattooed corpse in Bekasi", and link it also to remarks made in the autobiography of the Head of State [this is a reference to President Suharto's admission that the death squads which operated in 1983-84 did so with his personal authorisation. See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 91, February 1989], it is, we think, extremely difficult for the chief-of-police to convince people that these recent shootings are not a continuation of the Operation to Stamp Out Criminality, better known as the Petrus Operation, which began in 1983.


In view of all this, it is clear that we are still far removed from upholding the right to life and from giving equal legal protection to all citizens, as stipulated in Articles 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 6 (1) and (4), 7, 9 (1) and 10 (1) of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as in Article 27 (1) of the 1945 Constitution. *

[Editor's Note: The above article is translated from *Monitor* No. 4, 1990. Although the publication was ordered to close down, several issues have come out since then.]

Indonesian embassy attacked

The anniversary of the RMS [Republik Maluku Selatan, or republic of the South Moluccas] is celebrated annually on 25 April by the Moluccan community in the Netherlands. This year, the fortieth anniversary, the demonstration was larger than usual.

A group of about 600 Moluccan youngsters from among the several thousand demonstrators split away from the main body and headed towards the Indonesian embassy. The embassy compound was heavily guarded by special police units and surrounded by crowd barriers. The police said afterwards that the young Moluccans went berserk when they saw the huge red-and-white Indonesian flag in front of the embassy. They broke through the barriers and came into confrontation with the police. Fierce fighting broke out and many bricks were thrown at the main embassy building as well as a nearby building belonging to the Swiss embassy. There was serious damage but after half an hour, the police regained control.



Two police vehicles were destroyed, several policemen were injured and ten demonstrators were arrested.

This the second time in a few months that an Indonesian embassy has been targeted by demonstrators. A few weeks earlier the Indonesian embassy in Paris was hit by fire bombs, after the announcement of more executions of political prisoners. *

Bandung student gets ten months

An expelled student of the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), Syahganda Nainggolan, has been sentenced to ten months for conducting a protest against the expulsion of other ITB students.

Syahganda made his protest last November by unfurling banners outside the Rector's office; he refused to move when ordered to by the Third Deputy Rector who controls student activity and by the campus security unit. Instead he set up a tent in the forecourt.

The accused asked the court to exclude his interrogation report from the evidence. He had been under duress during the interrogation and was not permitted to have a lawyer present even though this is required under the criminal procedures code.

The ITB Rector, Wiranto Arismundar, sought to convince the court that he felt 'offended' by the action of the accuse (although he was out of the country at the time of the incident). But he refused to give evidence in person; his evidence was submitted in writing, despite a protest by the accused and his defence team.

In their response to the prosecution's call for a two-year sentence because the accused had violated Article 160 making it an offence to incite others to oppose the ruling powers, the defence lawyers argued that it was ludicrous to claim that refusal to obey instructions from a Deputy Rector to move, was an act of incitement against the powers that be.

The ten-month sentence will commence from the time the accused was transferred to Kebonwaru Prison in Bandung. This means he may have to spend at least a year in prison because he probably spent the early period of his detention in army hands. [*Pikiran Rakyat*, 22 March, 18 and 25 April, 1990]

Students' sentences upheld

The 7-year sentence given to Bambang Subono and the 8-year sentence given to Bambang Isti Nugroho have been upheld on appeal to the high court and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court re-affirmed the lower court's decision that the two men were guilty of subversion because they had been discovered spreading communist, Marxist and Leninist ideology. These two Yogya men have now exhausted their appeals possibilities.

The Bandung High Court has also rejected appeals from the six ITB students who were given three-year and three-year three-month sentences for staging a walkout on 5 August, in protest against a lecture on campus by Interior Minister, General Rudini.

Continued from page 8.

neglect. After quoting government figures about the number of schools and hospitals Indonesia had built in East Timor in the past 15 years, ambassador Flood asserted that Australia's role now was to help Indonesia develop the territory economically. [*Kompas*, 14 April 1990] The ambassador's praise contrasts sharply with the Gadjah Mada research report, summarised elsewhere.

It is not difficult to predict that, as protest builds up against Canberra's robbers' pact with Indonesia to exploit East Timor's oil, the Australian Government will step up its efforts to extol Indonesia's achievements in East Timor. *

Street-sellers arrested

Hundreds of street vendors have been arrested in Jakarta's attempt to modernize its image. On the first day of the most recent clamp-down, police arrested over 100 sellers of cigarettes, newspapers, drinks and other items; their goods were confiscated and they were ordered to pay fines of Rp 3,500 or face three months in jail. The action, which drew criticism from many quarters, is part of the inaptly-named "Tomorrow is Full of Hope" programme for street vendors, sponsored by Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs and Security Sudomo [see *TAPOL Bulletin* 98].

By the third day of the clamp-down, there was confusion and anger among street-vendors, arrested on buses and in bus stations, who had been given to understand that the ban only covered the streets, not buses and bus shelters.

As LBH director Nursyahbani Katjasungkana insists, "the street vendor problem is not a legal problem but a socio-economic problem". This has been summed up in plain language by one seller arrested at Cililitan bus terminal: "I know street vending is banned, but if I don't sell, how can I feed my family?" [*Jakarta Post* 11 April 1990] *



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