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## The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 94

August 1989

# New wave of arrests in East Timor

Since April this year, many people have been arrested in Dili, Baucau, Venilale, Manatuto, Ainaro and other places. There are also reports of dozens of people being summarily executed in Baucau and elsewhere.

According to a clandestine document dated 15 April 1989, twenty people were shot dead between 12 - 15 March by troops under the command of Colonel Prabowo, son-in-law of President Suharto. The killings took place in Bere-Coli, Baucau and all those put to death were from the locality. They were accused of having contact with Falintil, the armed resistance, which is active in the vicinity of Baucau.

The arrests in Baucau commenced on 5 May. Within a month forty persons had been detained and were being held at a new detention centre at Baucau airport. Those arrested were reportedly suspected of supporting Bishop Belo's plebiscite letter to the UN and/or of engaging in clandestine activities in support of the resistance.

So far, we have received several lists which include altogether more than a hundred names of people held since mid-April. According to one report, a hundred students were arrested in Dili on 13 and 14 May though only one name is available. On 29 May, students at the University of East Timor (Untim) wrote protesting against the Dili arrests, following which seven more students, whose names are not available, were arrested. All the detainees are being held at army detention and interrogation centres, not in prisons to which the International Red Cross has access.

One list of 25 names, which was compiled by Bishop Belo, head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, says at the beginning: 'Colonel Bimo, chief of intelligence of Koopskam (the special security command for East Timor) has confirmed that the following prisoners and detainees have been taken into custody in the interests of the Pope's security,' a reference to the planned visit of Pop John Paul in October this year.

### Arrests in Bali and Jakarta

On 14 June, Elias Pereira Moniz, a Timorese student at Udayana University, Bali was arrested, following the interrogation of people arrested in Baucau and Dili. This arrest prompted eight Timorese, most of them still studying at Udayana University, to flee from Bali to Jakarta to escape arrest. In Jakarta, one of the students, Miguel Amaral Guterres, disappeared. Another, Lucas da Costa, a former Udayana student was arrested in Jakarta on 16 June. Lucas da Costa is still under detention at an unknown location, while Miguel Guterres is still unaccounted for.

### Human Rights Institute steps in

The Jakarta-based Institute for the Defence of Human Rights has, for the first time, publicly expressed concern about the human rights situation in East Timor. In a letter to General Try Soetrisno, commander-in-chief of the Indonesian Armed Forces on 15 June 1989, the Institute said it had been informed that "at the beginning, in the middle and at the end of May, hundreds of people had been arrested and there had even been executions of people without trial. They were detained on suspicion of supporting Bishop Belo's letter to the United Nations. These actions are not only in conflict with basic human rights but also infringe the provisions of the Constitution and the Criminal Procedures Code (KUHP)." If these reports were true, the letter continued, General Try Soetrisno should investigate the activities of those responsible.

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# Massive military and security operations in East Timor

*In a meeting in June with Jose Guterres, who is on the staff of the Information Office of Fretilin (GIF) in Lisbon, TAPOL was given a detailed account of the military operations now under way in East Timor.*

Since November 1988, the number of Indonesian troops in East Timor has increased to an estimated 32 battalions (more than 25,000 troops) and military operations have continued without interruption, during the rainy as well as the dry seasons. The current wave of operations commenced on 4 November, a few days after President Suharto made a one-day visit to Dili. Troops that had come to Timor to handle security before and during the visit stayed on to take part in the current operations. According to a Fretilin communique in May this year, these 32 battalions are supported by tanks, heavy artillery, helicopters, OV-10 Bronco fighter-planes and bombers while in the coastal regions of Viqueque, Los Palos and Zumalai, infantry troops are supported by naval vessels.

The armed resistance, Falintil, has two types of units, concentrated forces (formerly known as shock brigades) and guerrilla detachments. The latter carry out reconnaissance duties and are not armed, often wearing Indonesian army uniforms or other disguises to mingle with the population in Indonesian-occupied areas. The concentrated forces are engaged in operations against Indonesian units, taking care never to launch an operation without being sure of benefits such as capturing weapons or ammunition.

In an interview with *AMPO*, the Japan-Asia Quarterly Review (Volume 20, No. 3), Guterres said that the concentrated forces consist of two companies, each

made up of four platoons consisting of three sections. In the border area near West Timor, "we have 5 units of concentrated troops and besides this, we have our guerrilla detachments. The size and position of (our) forces in an area varies because they often follow the movements of Indonesian troops. After all, the war in East Timor is a guerrilla war, not a conventional war. We have more forces in the eastern and central regions and so fighting is heavier there." Guterres told TAPOL that there are between 3,500 and 4,000 armed guerrillas, bearing a variety of weapons, mostly bought or captured from Indonesian troops.

## Wearing down the guerrillas

Indonesian strategy has changed, from concentrating their troops in certain areas and launching sweeps against guerrilla units, to a strategy known in counter-insurgency parlance as '*nomadizacão*' or nomadization, a strategy used by the colonial Portuguese army in the former Portuguese African colonies. In Indonesia, the strategy is known as *benteng stelsel*, or 'fortress' strategy, first employed by the Dutch colonial army to subdue the people of Aceh at the end of the 19th century.

In places where guerrillas are known to exist, the army establishes a huge circle or fortress of army posts to seal off the area. Inside this fortress, they establish an inner circle of bases consisting of combined Indonesian troops and East Timorese paramilitary units composed of *ratih* (trained people), *hansip* (civil defence) and *wanra* (people's defence), known collectively as *saka* or 'security units'. Primarily, the manpower is recruited from the local population. The units inside are required to settle down in the area of operations and may remain there for months at a stretch, living like guerrillas. They are expected to practise guerrilla tactics against the resistance, with small groups being sent to hunt guerrillas. Indonesian soldiers inside the fortresses camouflage themselves by for instance not using soap which creates a distinctive body odour and avoiding other identifiable signs and smells. They consist of '*nanggala*' (para-commandos) as well as infantry.

## 'Total people's defence'

This strategy is a classic example of the Indonesian army's doctrine of *hankamrata*, or total people's defence which means mobilising the local population against the enemy. Its chances of success are clearly limited in a situation where there is widespread local sympathy for the resistance. The strategy is very costly financially and in manpower and its use suggests a desperate bid in Jakarta to end resistance in East Timor, if possible in time for the Pope's visit in October. According to Bishop Belo, the Indonesian armed forces plan to launch a 'grand, final' campaign in July this year to crush the resistance and in particular to capture Xanana.



Jose Guterres in Japan



One of the most devastating consequences of the strategy is that men from the resettlements have been obliged to abandon their families for long periods, with disastrous effects on food cultivation. This explains why reports are now coming out of severe food shortages in some parts of East Timor.

There are two main objectives, to capture guerrillas or keep them constantly on the move by preventing guerrillas from settling anywhere, thus causing exhaustion. When guerrillas are spotted, operations are launched; in some cases, the resistance has sustained losses but their ability to disperse and escape from encirclement is considerable. The operations require extensive use of military aircraft - helicopters to airlift reinforcements when assaults on guerrilla positions are planned, and ground-attack aircraft to attack and bomb identified guerrilla bases.

Falintil forces avoid open engagements with army units inside the circles, attacking army supply lines outside or supply bases farther off, which keep the troops inside the fortresses supplied with food and other requirements. This is where the Indonesian army is suffering its heaviest casualties. In both Dili and Baucau, it is believed, two or three soldiers are being buried every day. According to Fretilin sources, the Indonesians lost 37 troops in a single opera-



*Kopassus troops*

tion last January in Laline, near Lacluta.

Although official visitors to Dili report no sign of military activity, Pat Walsh of ACFOA, Australia, visited Dili in May and reported that on Sunday, the first day of his visit, Dili looked calm and peaceful with not an Indonesian soldier in sight. But on Monday morning, the place was transformed. Army helicopters were bringing in troop reinforcements, a unit of soldiers was seen doing physical exercises, and six truckloads of troops armed with automatic weapons were spotted speeding out of the city. Walsh was told by a bystander that the trucks were off to Maubisse "where some people are not happy about things".

#### **Bogus clandestine organisations**

The Indonesian army is also engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the cities, concentrating on trying to penetrate the clandestine organisations. Several discrete clandestine groups operate, in order to limit the damage of exposure of any one group.

Now, army intelligence has started creating its own 'clandestine' networks, to trap genuine activists. The recent arrests, especially in Dili and Baucau, may be the result of successful penetrations.

Colonel Prabowo, President Suharto's son-in-law, is in charge of operations against the clandestine network. As commander of Battalion 328, he has his hq in Comoro-Dili, with one company in Dili and one in Baucau. His Dili-based company is in Tacil-Tolu, the place which has been selected as the site for the Mass to be conducted by Pope John-Paul when he visits East Timor in October. [This choice is widely opposed in East Timor because of its long association with Indonesian atrocities.]

This is Prabowo's second tour of duty in East Timor, the first being when he was a member of the unit which tracked down and murdered Fretilin leader, Nicolau Lobato, in December 1978.

Prabowo arrived in East Timor last November and soon started renewing his former close relations with members of Apodeti, the party which favoured integration with Indonesia. This appears to be aimed partly at mitigating Apodeti frustrations at having lost out to former UDT members in the share of jobs in the local administration. Apodeti people have been recruited into his bogus clandestine networks. But battalion 328 troops are also used in operations against guerrillas in the bush, when necessary.

#### **Prabowo's special mission**

It is becoming increasingly clear that Prabowo has been dispatched to East Timor on a special mission from Suharto to crush the resistance and capture its leadership. Documents from the underground say that Prabowo and his troops will not depart from East Timor until this mission has been fulfilled. The deadline is October, when the Pope is due to visit East Timor. It appears too that Indonesia wants to delay the visit of the Portuguese parliamentary mission, originally scheduled for July, until October or later.

Until about a year ago, Prabowo was deputy commander of the 81st Brigade, a special unit of combined forces including *kopassus* (para-commando) which is Prabowo's original unit. The 81st Brigade, Suharto's personal bodyguard, stands outside the army structure and is said by some to be the only army unit on which Suharto can fully rely. Prabowo has now left



*Colonel Prabowo*



Kopassus to join Kujang, the strike-force of the Siliwangi Division in the IIIrd Regional Military Command in West Java. The battalion he commands in East Timor is from Siliwangi.

A tour of duty in East Timor is essential for a military career and will almost certainly ensure his promotion to brigadier-general. In Prabowo's case, serving in Timor may be even more necessary as he is not popular with senior army officers. One thing is certain: never before have the activities of a middle-ranking officer serving in East Timor been highlighted as now, with hardly a mention of the Korem commander.

If Prabowo succeeds in doing what the armed forces under General Murdani failed to achieve in nearly

fourteen years, this would be a major scoop for the Suharto dynasty.

#### Kooskam

Kooskam, the special operational command for security in East Timor, has not yet been disbanded. Newly-arrived refugees in Lisbon refer to Kooskam as being in the forefront of the arrest and interrogation of suspects. They say the command is due to move to Baucau and there are other reports that it may be disbanded in October. Kooskam is also responsible for issuing permits for travel outside East Timor and granting permits to the International Red Cross and other agencies sending missions around the country. The new commander of Korem in East Timor is Lieutenant-Colonel Rudi Warof, a Christian officer from Manado. \*

## Reactions to Bishop Belo's UN letter

The letter Bishop Belo sent to the UN Secretary-General, asking him to intervene in the decolonisation process in East Timor in a normal and democratic way through a referendum [see lead story in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 93] was bound to trigger reactions in Indonesia.

Foreign Minister Alatas remarked that the Bishop had turned the clock back while Minister of Defence General Murdani, the architect of the East Timor invasion, showed his irritation as a fellow Catholic: "I am disappointed to know that one of the leaders of my church has spoken out in this manner. He only became an Indonesian citizen a few years ago. Do not expect that religious leaders are automatically clever politicians; some are stupid (blo'on, Ind.) like him". (*Suara Karya*, 26 May 1989).

The grey-haired Admiral Sudomo, Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, thought it was possible that the Bishop had been "subject to political infiltration, if indeed he wrote a letter like that". (*Waspada*, 18 May 1989). General Try Soetrismo, armed forces Commander-in-Chief thought it necessary to warn the Bishop without specifying what he meant. He claimed that the question of East Timor "has already been solved" and dismissed the Bishop's letter as the expression of a personal opinion which would be of no consequence.

Belo's letter, in effect a denunciation of Indonesian colonialism, is tantamount to a cardinal sin. Considering the gravity of the act, the remarks of Indonesian officials have been relatively mild. Combined with the remarks of people like Governor Carrascalao and the statement of the East Timorese DPRD (provincial assembly), it is apparent that the line being pursued is to isolate Bishop Belo. He is being portrayed like a voice in the wilderness.

#### Anti-Belo protest turns into support rally

In Dili, there were moves soon after it became known that the Bishop had written to the UN, to organise a demonstration of protest. Former Apodeti supporters were recruited to denounce the Bishop in front of his office. However, when the fifty or so protesters congregated on 30 May, they were soon outnumbered by thousands of Timorese who gathered to express support for the Bishop. When Belo came out, he


invited the people to join him in prayer, then explained why he had sent the letter, to loud cheers of support. Needless to say, this spontaneous mass rally in Dili went unreported in the Indonesian press. \*

#### VATICAN AMBASSADOR ISOLATES BELO

Echoing the views of senior Indonesian figures, Cardinal Canalini, the Pope's ambassador in Jakarta, declared that Bishop Belo's approach to the UN was done on his own responsibility and the Catholic Church was not involved.

In an interview with *Jakarta Post*, he suggested that although Belo is head of the diocese of East Timor, his letter does not reflect the aspirations either of the Church or the people of East Timor. He said that East Timor is a 'political issue', that bishops are concerned with pastoral affairs while political issues should be dealt with on the international forum. [*Jakarta Post*, 14 June 1989]

Canalini apparently believes that whereas cardinals like himself can make a political statement on behalf of the Church and people of East Timor, the head of the diocese is not entitled to do so.





# Two embassies refuse to help asylum seekers

In June, three embassies in Jakarta, the Swedish, Japanese and Vatican embassies, all refused to give refuge to six East Timorese students who were on the run and in grave danger of arrest by the security authorities. Five of them, Fernando de Araujo, Avelino Coelho da Silva, Agapito Cardoso, Carlos da Silva Lopes and Marciano Garcia da Silva, along with Lucas da Costa and Miguel Amaral Guterres, had fled from Bali to Jakarta after a fellow student, Elias Pereira Moniz, was arrested in Bali on 14 June. In Jakarta, Miguel Amaral Guterres, disappeared and is still not accounted for. Then on 15 June, Lucas da Costa was arrested, causing the remaining five plus another student at a university in Jakarta, Joao dos Reis, to have grave fears for their own safety.

Moniz' arrest is believed to be connected with mass arrests in Baucau and Dili since April (see separate item) when names of contacts in Indonesia were forced out of detainees during interrogation and torture.

On Friday 16 June, they went to the Swedish Embassy to ask for refuge. They were refused help, and warned that if they did not leave the premises, the security forces would be summoned to remove them. According to sources in Jakarta who were in contact with the students at the time, they were so afraid of what might befall them that they were not prepared to delay their embassy attempt by a single day. At the first opportunity on Monday morning, 19 June, the six went to the Vatican and Japanese embassies, succeeded in gaining entry and asked to be allowed to stay in order to get asylum abroad.

Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, then began to make statements accusing the six of being ill-informed. He claimed they were not in any danger, thus making it easy for the embassies to refuse to protect the students and avoid damaging their bilateral relations with Jakarta.

## Siding with Indonesia

The Vatican ambassador, Cardinal Francesco Canali, saw the incident as yet another potentially embarrassing obstacle in Vatican/Indonesian relations, following the appeal to the UN last February by Bishop Belo for a plebiscite to be held on East Timor's future, and coming four months before the Pope's highly controversial visit to Indonesia and East Timor.

On 20 June, Francisco Lopes da Cruz, former deputy governor of East Timor and now a member of Suharto's Supreme Advisory Council, went to the Vatican embassy at the behest of Ali Alatas and succeeded in persuading the four students to leave. Although a Vatican embassy official was quoted as saying that the students were 'afraid of torture and that they might be arrested' [Reuters, 20 June], Canali later asserted, "We did not feel they needed asylum." [Merdeka 22 June, quoting AFP], thus accepting Indonesian claims and rejecting the students' fears. He chose to ignore a complaint Bishop Belo had made about repression in East Timor in his Pastoral Letter of 5 December 1988 [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 91, February 1989, p 13] as well as information he had received



'Welcome to Dili' is the message for new arrivals at Dili Airport, in Indonesian of course.  
Photo: Jakarta Post

directly from Bishop Belo in February, reporting a number of extra-judicial killings, maltreatment and arrests in East Timor. The Vatican has, by this act of betrayal, shown callous disregard for the sufferings of the East Timorese people.

The Japanese Government treated the students just as callously. It was under strong pressure in Tokyo from the Diet Forum for East Timor and the Free East Timor Japan Coalition. However, it rigidly stuck by its policy of refusing asylum to anyone not on Japanese territory, even though the two students at the embassy were undeniably on Japanese territory.

By acted speedily to end the embassy attempts with the support of the governments concerned, Indonesia was able to pre-empt a move by Portugal to provide the students with Portuguese passports which would have enabled them to leave the country. As soon as the students entered the two embassies, Lisbon asked the Dutch government to seek clarification about the students' intentions but things moved too fast for this to have any effect.

Following their removal from the embassies, the six students were taken to the homes of two East Timorese in Jakarta, Francisco Lopes da Cruz and Salvador Ximenes Soares.



**A cover-up**

Only one Jakarta newspaper, *Jakarta Post*, came anywhere near to revealing the reason for the students' bid for asylum. On 22 June, the paper reported that the students were suspected of 'involvement in subversive activity', having set up an underground network and taken moves against Timor's integration with Indonesia. It also reported, quite correctly, that the students had sought refuge because they were alarmed by Lucas da Costa's detention.

The security authorities did not allow this to go unchallenged, as it conflicted with the official line that there were no grounds for them to fear persecution. On 24 June, all Jakarta newspapers, including *Jakarta Post*, quoted Armed Forces spokesman, Brigadier-General Nurhadi as denying that the students were blacklisted or suspected of subversion. All Timorese students studying in Indonesian univer-

sities, he said, 'were carefully screened' before being given government scholarships. He claimed that the students who had now left the embassies 'will not be interrogated' though they 'will be asked about their asylum bid.' But it is a 'sensitive issue', he said, 'so we must move slowly'. He also denied that anyone had been arrested in East Timor. [*Jakarta Post* and *Merdeka*, 24 June] Not a single newspaper in Jakarta has challenged this blatant lie.

Thus have Japan's and the Vatican's consciences been salved, while the six students now remain in Jakarta, at the mercy of the security forces. Lopes da Cruz told the press that the four students at his home were 'too exhausted and overwhelmed by fear' to meet journalists. [*Kompas*, 23 June] Japanese Foreign Ministry officials in Tokyo insisted that their embassy had made no commitment to keep in contact with the students it had expelled, to check on their safety. [*Japan East Timor Memo*, No 6, July 1989] \*

## The 1986 embassy asylum attempt

*In October 1986, four East Timorese students sought asylum at the Dutch embassy in Jakarta. The attempt failed because the Dutch ambassador collaborated with the Indonesian authorities and forced the four to leave after promising that they would get Portuguese passports. The full facts of how the students were tricked by Dutch embassy officials have been revealed to TAPOL by Abilio Sereno, one of the four. He left Jakarta illegally earlier this year and is now living in Lisbon. This is his story.*

A short while before we decided to seek refuge in the Dutch embassy, a clandestine group which had been channelling information from East Timor to the world outside was exposed and the following three members were arrested.

On 3 September 1986, Antonino Goncalves, 34, from



Abilio Sereno

Atsabe, was arrested at Atma Jaya Catholic University and held for a month and eight days. On 16 September, Joao Freitas da Camara, 29, from Zumalai-Suai, was arrested at his residence in Central Jakarta and held for 25 days. On 17 September, Francisco Fernandes da Silva, from Viqueque, was arrested and held for 24 days. All three were blindfolded before being driven to their place of detention and then treated like common criminals and made to do forced labour.

On 11 October, the three were released, after being obliged to sign interrogation reports denying that they had been maltreated under detention. They were warned not to tell anyone what had happened to them.

Following their release, they were harassed by secret agents using surveillance equipment, who trailed them on their way to school and on their way home, watching their every step.

Then on 17 October, an agent, Arnoldus Koli Mali, advised the students to 'take a holiday' in Dili. He offered them free tickets for the trip and also made the same offer to Abilio Oliveira Sereno

### At the Dutch embassy

Fearing that this attempt to persuade us to return to Dili would lead to our elimination, we decided to seek refuge in the Dutch embassy. We entered the Dutch embassy at 10 am on 20 October, but from the start, embassy officials did everything possible to persuade us to leave. On 21 October in the middle of the night, we were woken and told that the ambassador wanted see us. When we met him, he told us that we must leave the embassy; if we did not leave 'voluntarily', he would call the police to have us evicted. He warned us that he would accuse us of entering the embassy to commit a robbery.

We had meanwhile been told that the embassy was preparing Portuguese passports for us to leave for

Lisbon and that Holland and Indonesia had agreed that these Portuguese passports could be issued to enable us to leave country. But we did not want to leave the embassy until the passports had been issued and we could leave under Dutch protection.

The next morning, four Indonesians, Dr Gerard Bonang, Himawan Djaja Endra, John Tinggogoy and someone whose name I don't know came and told us that the police were preparing to come and remove us from the embassy by force. We then realised that we had no choice but to leave with these four Indonesians.

#### **Dutch embassy betrayal**

After leaving the embassy, we were constantly harassed, and felt very insecure. People we did not know kept phoning us and asking where we went to church, who we went to visit, and so on.

During the first few weeks after leaving the embassy, we tried to visit the embassy a number of times but were refused entry. Later, we were able to meet Dutch embassy officials but only at Erasmus House, a Dutch cultural centre.

On 24 November, Pieter van der Donck, head of Portuguese affairs at the Dutch embassy, told us that Portugal had issued our passports and tickets. However, he said, if the passports were given to us, this would make our presence in Indonesia illegal (because Portuguese passport-holders are not allowed to visit Indonesia) which meant that we could be arrested. If this happened, the embassy would do nothing to help us. So, even though the passports were ready, he refused to give them to us. This just shows how the Dutch did everything possible to help the Indonesians prevent us from leaving. van der Donck even advised us to stop trying to leave and to return to our studies.

All this time, we had no incomes but the embassy gave us no support at all. They did not even help us to buy medicine or pay for medical treatment when we fell ill. Nor did the International Red Cross want to help; they were afraid they would be expelled from Indonesia thus jeopardising their work in East Timor.

#### **Bribing my way out**

Faced with such a predicament, our Portuguese lawyer, Loff Barreto, suggested that we apply for Indonesian passports and exit permits and leave the country in this way. It was difficult for us to accept this because it meant agreeing to abandon our right to Portuguese citizenship and to accept being Indonesians. Nor was it clear that the Indonesian authorities would give us passports and allow us to leave.

In the end, I decided to leave Indonesia illegally but could not convince my three colleagues to join me because they refuse to accept Indonesian passports. The only way I could do this was by bribing officials to give me an Indonesian passport and exit permit. As my three friends refused to do this, I decided to leave on my own. It cost me 6 million rupiahs (about \$2,200) to buy my Indonesian passport and a ticket to Macao.

I left Jakarta at 6.30 am on 31 January 1989, and arrived in Macao via Hong Kong at 4.30 pm that day. I immediately phoned Loff Barreto who contacted the Portuguese government. Within days, arrangements had been made for me to travel to Lisbon and I arrived in Lisbon on 14 February.

\* \* \* \*

## **EAST TIMOR**

### **Abilio Sereno's background**

After being with Fretilin in the bush, Abilio was one of those instructed to surrender in 1979 and go into Indonesian-occupied East Timor. He had not fought with arms but was involved in political work as a political assistant. He continued to do this, clandestinely.

### **SERENO ON RECENT ASYLUM ATTEMPT**

I am shocked by what has happened. After the recent events in China, when many embassies were willing to give refuge to students fleeing from the authorities, neither Sweden, the Vatican nor Japan were willing to help these six East Timorese students. The world has forgotten East Timor. Most governments in the world are only worried about their economic interests.

The Vatican has shown itself to be totally unconcerned with humanitarian principles. Only recently, the Vatican was trying to persuade our resistance fighters to surrender to the Indonesians. The Vatican is unwilling to side with the cause of justice; they side only with the forces of evil.

As for Japan, the country with the largest investments in Indonesia, it is more interested in economic affairs than in human rights.

Nor should we forget that our comrades also tried to get refuge in the Swedish embassy, but the embassy told them to leave, as if they were thieves trying to gain illegal entry. This amazes me. This is a violation of international law. Sweden always claims to uphold the principles of human rights and international law, yet this is nothing but lip-service. When the six faced such danger, Sweden behaved just like the Vatican and Japan.

I call upon the international community to condemn the Vatican and the governments of Japan and Sweden in the strongest terms.

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tinely, in Dili. After re-establishing himself in society, he was given permission in 1981 to go to Java to study.

*The education given us by Indonesia is intended to erase our Timorese identity and support the idea that we are all Indonesians. But I can assure you, most Timorese studying in Indonesia retain strong nationalist feelings and oppose integration.*

In August last year, he and Joao Comara met European Parliament members Jansen van Raay for 10 minutes and Beate Weber for half an hour at Hotel Indonesia, just before they left for the airport. They told them about conditions in Timor, about the feelings of Timorese students and gave them copies of a

statement but were disappointed that the MEPs did not use this in Strasbourg.

Sereno studied business management at the Faculty of Economics of the Catholic Atma Jaya University in Jakarta.

It is standard practice for the rectors and lecturers of all universities and academies where East Timorese students study to be approached by army intelligence and told to keep an eye on Timorese students. They have to eavesdrop on their conversations with Indonesians and among themselves. They must report on their studies and whether they are for or against integration. Even chauffeurs and people who run food stalls in the vicinity are told to spy on the Timorese students. \*

## Mass graves near Viqueque

Two lists of East Timorese buried in mass graves in places near the town of Viqueque have been sent to TAPOL by a private individual who visited a number of areas in the eastern part of East Timor, in May this year. The lists were given to him by a person whose name cannot at present be divulged.

One of the mass graves is located in Cassesse, near Viqueque; the list consists of 36 names of

people murdered by Indonesian troops of Battalion 501 and buried on 13 September 1983. The other grave is situated in Tahu-Wen, north of Viqueque, with a list of 29 names of people, also murdered by troops of Battalion 501, who were buried on 17 September 1983.

There is an urgent need for this information to be the subject of an independent inquiry.

### HUMAN RIGHTS

## Ujung Pandang student leader on trial

A student leader, Juliadi, has been on trial in Ujung Pandang, accused of inciting students to demonstrate during protests in the city against a police regulation obliging motorcyclists to wear helmets. At least five people were killed on 31 October 1987 when troops opened fire on thousands of students and others who were out on the streets in protest. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 84, December 1987]

Juliadi was chair of the Students' Consultative Board of the Engineering Faculty of the Muslim University in Ujung Pandang. The prosecution has called for a one-year sentence.

The only reports of the trial, as far as we know, have appeared in a regional newspaper, *Fajar*. In his defence plea 'Nopember Berdarah, Moral Force Mahasiswa' (Bloody November, the Students' Moral Force), Juliadi rejected the charge that his involvement in the drafting of a document addressed to the South Sulawesi regional assembly amounted to inciting the students to protest. As the accused read out his statement, university students who filled the court enthusiastically applauded many of his remarks. Nor was he the only person who drafted the document, he said, so why was he now the only person on trial? [*Fajar*, 19 May, quoted in *Indonesia News Service*, No 185, June 21, 1989]

At the previous hearing, Juliadi's defence team called for his acquittal and immediate release. They argued that the demonstration in Ujung Pandang on 31 October 1987 was not incited by the accused, who became involved only after hearing that students were demonstrating outside his university in Ujung Pandang. Realising that there had already been loss of life, Juliadi and others went out to calm the stu-

dents down and urge them to channel their protests to the regional assembly. At the assembly building, they were met by a member who told them to return on Monday with their demands. In preparation for this second visit, Juliadi and others drafted the document which was now being used to accuse him of incitement. When they visited the assembly as requested, the document which expressed the aspirations of the students, was read out. [*Fajar*, 24 April, in *INS*, No 176, 19 May 1989]

The court's verdict was expected some time in June. We have not seen press reports about any other hearings of this trial. \*



Anti-helmet demonstrators in action in Ujung Pandang on 31 October 1987. [Photo: *Tempo*, 14 November 1987]



# On trial to set an example

It has become clear to students in Jogjakarta that the trials against the two Bambang (see *Tapol Bulletin*, no. 93) are being used by the authorities to set an example and put a halt to the rapid growth of student study groups. Bambang Isti Nugroho is an active member of a study group while Bambang Subono is only marginally involved. Hence they represent the two extremes of study-group activists, yet both are on trial for subversion.

## Terrorising a study group

Bambang Isti Nugroho as coordinator of the KSSPY (Kelompok Studi Sosial Palagan Jogjakarta) study group, is being tried because of some general remarks he made about the present situation. As argued by *Mimbar Demokrasi*, (Forum for Democracy), a bulletin published by students in Jogja, remarks made by community leaders or even current or former high officials, are far more critical than Isti's remarks. If Public Prosecutor Ritonga S.H. pushed his argument to its logical conclusion, Wirogunan Prison would be chock full with subversion suspects. (*Mimbar Demokrasi*, June 1989).

The prosecution and the military intelligence are determined to destroy the KSSPY study group. At an early stage, in July last year, a young Muslim student named Anharuddin, also connected with the study group, was detained and put under extreme pressure to testify against Isti Nugroho or be put on trial for being an 'Islam Komunis'. All he was required to say was that Nugroho is a communist cadre. On 4 August 1988, Anharuddin was released, but the military intelligence and the prosecution were not satisfied with this one witness.

During court sessions on 25 and 30 May the prosecution brought 4 other witnesses to court, two of them, Panji Patah and Ignasius Untoro, as founder-members of the Palagan study group. Again the intention was to have the witnesses testify against Nugroho but it was not entirely successful. Both founder members admitted having disagreements with the defendant on certain matters, such as deciding who to invite as speakers from outside and what kind of topics should be discussed. Both witnesses were in a bad state, in particular Panji Patah, who could not walk without the help of two attendants. Another


witness, Sumadya Widada, now working at the same university as the defendant, also testified that he disagreed with Nugroho on many occasions and on one occasion heard the defendant say that the present government was not democratic. Sumadya also referred to another Palagan study group member, Bonar Tigor Naipospos (said at the time to be on the run), who described the government as undemocratic and militaristic. [Tigor was arrested in Jakarta on 21 June and taken to Jogjakarta for interrogation.]

As in the earlier sessions, the atmosphere in the courtroom was lively. The public gallery was filled mainly with students who yelled and cheered every time the defendant or his LBH defence team started arguing with the prosecutor. Chief Judge Zulkifli Lubis S.H. at one point threatened to close the court and transfer the trial to Jakarta.

## Bambang Subono, no right to differ

Bambang Subono who is being tried at the same time in a different courtroom, faces different charges. Initially arrested for possessing and selling Pramoe-dya Ananta Toer's books, he is now also accused of holding 'improper' views on the events of 1 October 1965, the moment when General Suharto grabbed power. The prosecutor said that, on one occasion, he expressed the view that the 'G30S Affair' was simply an internal conflict within the Indonesian armed forces, a view held, in differing versions, by most Indonesianists abroad who have studied those events. The official version is that the Indonesian Communist Party was responsible for the murder of the six generals. Bambang Subono said in his opening statement that he had merely raised a question about the views of Professor Wertheim, an academic in the Netherlands who has written frequently on the matter.

An attempt by the prosecution to incriminate Bambang for selling Pramoe-dya's books failed completely. A Catholic priest, Dr. J.A.T. Weitjens, admitted buying *Rumah Kaca*, a novel by Pramoe-dya, from the defendant. But this was several days before the Attorney General Sukarton banned the book. When Chief Judge Djajusman asked the priest: "Why were you attracted to this book?", he replied: "Has this anything to do with the Bambang case?" When the judge said there



'Subversive!' cries the prosecutor. 'For being critical!' replies the defence. The scales weigh up 'justice' and 'career', as the two Bambang look on.

*Mimbar Demokrasi*, June 1989





was a connection, the witness replied: "I am not prepared to answer the question". He denied knowing anything about the defendant's views or knowing about the existence of the Palagan study group: "I only heard about it from the prosecutor, during my interrogation". Another witness, also a Catholic priest, Romo Setyakarjana, denied receiving books from the defendant and admitted reading a photocopy from a colleague.

The two trials are still in progress.

While the authorities hope that the trials will serve to intimidate study group activists, students in Jogjakarta have used them to consolidate their movement and mobilise more support from students.

#### Study group activist arrested

A student named Bonar Tigor Nalpospos, frequently mentioned in the Bambang trials as being 'still on the run', was arrested in Jakarta on 21 June and taken to Jogjakarta for interrogation. He is understood to be a founding member of the Palaga Group which is at the centre of Isti Nugroho's trial.

(Sources: *Pelita* 23 May 1989; *Surabaya Pos* 5 May

## LETTERS OF CONCERN

Thirty-one Australians, including academics, book editors and human rights activists, have signed an appeal to the Indonesian authorities to drop all the charges against the two Bambang, who "were doing no more than providing a forum for discussion of developments in Indonesian society, art and culture". They also call on the recently established Australia Indonesia Institute to affirm that it will be difficult to achieve its aim of cultural and intellectual interchange "if there is a possibility that participation in a discussion on literature between Australians and Indonesians can later be used as the basis of charges of subversion against any Indonesian who took part".

In West Berlin, the dissident Indonesian organisation, *Gerakan demi hak-hak azasi dan demokrasi* (Movement for Basic Rights and Democracy) urged Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher to demand that Indonesia withdraw all charges and release the two defendants.

# Discrimination against ex-tapols condemned

Responding to a press report that there are 8,597 people in Jakarta whose identity cards (KTP) bear the special code 'ET' (for 'ex-tapol') which was published in *Merdeka* on 1 March 1989, the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights in Jakarta wrote to the Governor of Jakarta on the same day calling this an act of discrimination against former prisoners because it subjects them to special treatment.

The Institute's chair, HJC Princen wrote: "Data provided by the Laksusda (regional executive officer of the special security command, formerly Kopkamtib, now Baskorstanas) is in effect a trial for those in question, a verdict that has been passed without any process in a court of law." He drew attention to Articles 1 to 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and expressed the hope that members of the Jakarta legislative assembly would question the Laksusda and the Jakarta administration on this violation of human rights and infringement of the Constitution which guarantees freedom for Indonesian citizens.

Although the letter was circulated to the press, it was not published by anyone. Princen is a 'banned person' whose utterances may not be quoted in the press.

#### Special ET travel documents

An example of the special treatment mentioned by Princen is the requirement for ex-tapols to obtain a travel permit if they wish to make a journey from their home town. Along with a copy of Princen's letter, TAPOL has also received a copy of a travel permit (*surat izin bepergian*) issued on 14 March 1988 to a woman whose KTP bears the ET code. The permit specifies that the holder is permitted to visit members of her family for 15 days, that on arrival at her destination, she must report to the local administrative office and after returning home, must again report to the issuing office to return the permit. If the permit is not used within three months, it will expire.

#### 'Clean environment'

Meanwhile, members of parliament have called on the security authorities to issue a definitive statement of what is meant by '*bersih lingkungan*' (clean environ-

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ment). [No-one in parliament, it appears, has asked for this obnoxious form of discrimination to be ended.] Parliament's Commission II felt that the use of this term is a source of great public anxiety. According to one member, 'clean environment' has an impact on the promotion prospects of government employees. [Jawa Pos, 6 July 1989]

Although officials of Bakorstanas and its predecessor, Kopkamtib, repeatedly insist that 'bersih lingkungan' is not an official term and has, as it were, appeared from nowhere, the discrimination to



Admiral Sudomo

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which so many people have been subjected is based on Kopkamtib instructions issued in 1982 regarding 'assessment of environment' during the screening of persons being considered for government employment. Admiral Sudomo, now Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs and former Kopkamtib commander spelled out what this meant last November [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 90, December 1988, page 15].

TAPOL has now obtained a copy of an announcement by the West Sumatra Education Office from 1988 which lists the registration numbers of applicants for jobs in the civil service who have passed Screening Tests. The Announcement, No. 11.635/106.1.2/C-1988, concludes with the following statement:

*All applicants who have passed are required to possess a Certificate of Clean Environment [Surat Keterangan Bersih Lingkungan] which should, if possible, be handed in when filling in the Clearance Test Questionnaire or at the latest when supplying additional information as specified in our previous announcement.*

Bakorstanas has now promised to issue criteria regarding the 'classification of individuals', apparently to replace the 1982 instructions. [Jawa Pos, 7 July 1989] ★

# No release although sentence has expired

Two PKI prisoners whose sentences expired nearly two years ago are still in prison despite attempts to secure their release. Rewang, now 61 years old, who until 1965 was first secretary of the PKI's Central Java provincial committee, was due for release in January 1988 but he is still in Cipinang Prison. No-one has answered appeals from his family for him to be allowed home. The other prisoner, Marto Suwandi, 61 years old, who was also sentenced to life, and whose sentence was later also commuted to 20 years, is still in prison even though he was due for release in 1987.

Rewang was arrested in July 1968 along with many PKI leaders who tried to establish a base for continued activity against the Suharto regime in Blitar, East Java. He was tried in 1971 and given a life sentence in December 1971. The Jakarta High Court confirmed the sentence in 1975. He then lodged another appeal but it took 10 years for the Supreme

Court to hear it. In 1985, his sentence was commuted from life to twenty years. It was only then, when his sentence had been finally confirmed, 18 years after his arrest, that his entitlement to remission began to take effect. Hence, he was denied the right to remission for ten years, which might have shortened his sentence by thirty months. In other words, he was penalised for appealing. It was only after 1985, in August 1986 and August 1987 that he was granted two three-month remissions.

However unjust this was, still worse was to come. When January 1988 came round, he was not released and no-one has yet explained why. His defence lawyer at the 1971 trial was Albert Hasibuan, now active in Golkar and a member of Parliament. It ought not to be too difficult for him to get to the bottom of this shocking injustice and secure Rewang's immediate release. ★

# On trial for insulting the President

A person named Endi Purnomo is on trial in Tegal District Court for insulting the President. Under Article 134 of the Criminal Code, he faces a sentence of up to six years.

As described in the weekly, *Editor* [20 May 1989], the accused succeeded in convincing a university in Tegal, *Universitas Panca Sakti*, to allow him to lecture to the students, claiming that he was a researcher from a university in Banjarmasin. A lecturer in criminal law at the Tegal university told the court that she introduced the guest speaker to her class of students and left the room for ten minutes. On her

return, the class 'had become tumultuous', with the speaker denouncing the President and his wealth and accusing him of hypocrisy by urging the people to live modestly while he himself lives extravagantly. As she entered the class, he was about to explain what he meant by saying that Suharto is dictatorial, but she intervened: "The discussion has gone astray and is dangerous."

It is evident from the *Editor* report that it was the UPS Rector who handed Endi Purnomo over to the security authorities. ★



# Five-year search for two 'disappeared' sons

A small trader from Cianjur, West Java, has spent the last five years appealing to the Indonesian authorities to help him trace the whereabouts of his two sons who were arrested by the police in Pakanbaru, West Sumatra. Dudu Abdullah has written to military, police and civilian agencies, to Parliament and to the Vice-President's special complaints box, to find out what happened to Nano Permana 30, and Soni Iskandar, 28, but to no avail.

The only proof that either of the two men was arrested is a warrant issued by the Pakanbaru chief of police on 18 August 1984 stating that Soni Iskandar was arrested on 16 August 1984 on suspicion of involvement in 'criminal activities of a political nature'. When Dudu Abdullah heard about his son's arrest, he told his older son, Nano, to visit his brother in Pakanbaru. Nano left Cianjur on 10 September 1984 but he too was arrested when he went to the police station to see his brother.

Dudu Abdullah believes that Soni was arrested because he was in possession of a taped recording of a speech by the Muslim preacher, Abdul Qadir Jailani. In mid-1984, three well-known preachers, Abdul Qadir Jailani, A.M. Fatwa and Mawardi Nur, who are all now serving long prison sentences, visited Pakanbaru and gave lectures. Nano, formerly a student at Bandung

Islamic University, was a member of the organising committee and recorded the lectures. Dudu Abdullah believes that Soni took the tape to Pakanbaru and may have played them frequently, until he was arrested by the police.

"If my two sons have done anything wrong because they had copies of the tapes, I would accept that they should be punished. The question for me is that they have never been tried, and I don't know where they are now," said Dudu Abdullah. [*Tempo*, 20 May 1989]

## UN investigation

The disappearance of Dudu Abdullah's two sons was formally raised earlier this year with the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances, a special committee of the UN's Centre for Human Rights in Geneva. The Working Group considered the case at its session in April and has asked the Indonesian Government for clarification about the whereabouts of the two men.

This procedure has rarely, if ever, been used in the case of disappearances in Indonesia. It is even more effective if the complaint is presented to the Working Group within six months of the disappearance, in which case, emergency proceedings applied. ★

# Badega 13 acquitted on appeal

The thirteen Badega villagers earlier sentenced to 7-16 months in jail for stealing state land, damaging marker posts and pulling up tea seedlings belonging to a plantation company, have been acquitted on appeal. The thirteen represent some 2,500 villagers who had been farming neglected land for over forty years. Their application for ownership rights was turned down and the land was leased to a private plantation company PT SAM. [see *TAPOL Bulletin* Nos. 92 & 93] The Badega villagers have gained the support of a women's solidarity group who protested to House Speaker in January, and student protestors

who organised a 63km protest march to Garut, where the trial was held.

The three appeal judges who acquitted the 13 said that the district court should not have tried the case because it was still being processed by the Home Affairs Ministry. While awaiting the decision of the Ministry, the farmers must be allowed to occupy and cultivate the land. According to the judges, it was for the villagers themselves to decide whether or not they wanted to surrender the land. [*Jakarta Post* 6 July 1989] ★

## Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

*This publication is now available in Bahasa Indonesia. A German translation is also in preparation.*

128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p.  
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# Prayer-meeting group on trial

An undisclosed number of Muslims are on trial in Sumenep, Madura, for allegedly having produced an 'illegal' pamphlet, the contents of which are considered to be subversive.

The group consists of virtually all people who regularly attended weekly prayer-meetings to discuss 'ilmu tauhid', belief in One God. One of their number, Farid Majid, has already been tried and sentenced to four years. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 90, December 1988]

One person on trial is Kamil Mujib, 45 years. The prosecutor has called for a 6-year sentence. The indictment alleges that teachings at the prayer-meeting had so enthused the participants that they drafted two leaflets, one of which was entitled: 'Wake up before it's too late!' The leaflets were sent to many PO boxes, and when a lecturer at the Islamic Academy in Pamekasan and other officials received copies, they reported this to the security forces.

Kamil Mujib's defence lawyers argued that the indictment presented no evidence that any action he had taken was directed to overthrowing the lawful government. Those attending the prayer-meetings had criticised government policy, a right that should be enjoyed by every citizen. They also denounced as unconstitutional the anti-subversion law being used and called for it to be repealed.

The prosecutor said the defence lawyers had a very shallow understanding of the law. It was not necessary to prove that someone had incited feelings of



*Farid Majid on trial last year.*

hatred and splits; it was enough to prove, as in this case, that the accused was aiming to do this even though nothing had actually been achieved. Kamil Majid committed an act of subversion by joining the prayer-group leading to a conspiracy to draft the 'illegal' leaflets. [*Panji Masyarakat*, 10 July 1989] ★

## LAMPUNG

# Coffee-growers terrorised in Lampung

In a campaign to evict thousands of families from their homes and their small coffee plantations, local officials supported by police and army personnel have burnt down hundreds of houses in the district of Pulau Pangung in Lampung, located close to the southern tip of Sumatra. Besides burning down houses, officials have felled coffee bushes, burnt coffee already harvested, destroyed stores of rice and other foodstuffs, smashed vehicles and extorted money from the inhabitants.

Details of the destruction wrought during March, April and May this year are contained in a report by a team sent to the area by the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta to investigate complaints by the people of Pulau Pangung. Copies of the report were released to the domestic and foreign press in Jakarta in the first week of July and were given wide coverage in newspapers in some western countries.

### Background to the terror

In the 1950s and 1960s, Pulau Pangung became one of the most popular areas for thousands of families in Java, hoping to improve their standard of living. Most people moving in were spontaneous transmigrants who obtained permission to clear the forests and settle. Though efforts to plant clove trees were unsuccessful, coffee flourished and the newcomers turned Pulau Pangung into a profitable coffee-growing region

covering thousands of hectares of land. By growing rice, bananas and sweet potato for their own needs and selling their coffee, the local people became quite well off; many families own their own vehicles to transport the coffee to points market, though local roads are little more than mud-tracks.

In 1977, forestry officials began entering the area to carry out reforestation, slashing down the coffee bushes and other crops. They said that the area had been accorded 'protected forest' status and all the families must now move out. Resistance to this intrusion led the people to send a letter of complaint to Parliament in January 1981. Things eased after that, but on 15 January 1988 all the inhabitants were summoned to a meeting and told by forestry and transmigration officials that they must leave the area. They could either transmigrate to Riau, to work at a PIR (nucleus/smallholders) plantation, or go elsewhere to set up home anew with their own money. There was no question of anyone receiving compensation. But only those aged 20 - 35 years could join the PIR project. Moreover, the offer applied only to newcomers from Java, not to the original inhabitants, added to which, some officials offered bribes to encourage people to leave, fuelling suspicion that the officials would be the ones to benefit.

Less than a quarter of the families bothered to register for the new scheme. According to one report,



## LAMPUNG

only 575 out of the 2,376 families living in the area agreed to move. [Jakarta Post, 2 January 1989]

### November burnings

In November 1988, local sub-district chiefs assisted by security forces moved into an area called Datar Setujuh Satu, and started burning down people's houses. In many cases, the inhabitants had only one or two days' notice, giving them no time to remove their belongings. From 19 November till 7 December 1988, altogether 476 houses were burnt down in more than a dozen hamlets and villages. According to press reports at the time, the officials were acting on the instructions of the military commander of South Sumatra, Major-General Poedjono Pranoto. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 91, February 1989]

The destruction was wanton and spiteful. Stocks of rice and coffee were spilt and other belongings, like hand-driven coffee-mills and household chattels, were smashed. Sub-district chiefs had hired dozens of local inhabitants, paying them Rp. 2,500, a day to join in the pillage.

After bitter complaints to the local military command and the Lampung regional assembly and an outcry in the national press, the burnings stopped. Determined not to quit the area, at least until the next coffee crop was harvested in April, the homeless families built themselves huts in remote, inaccessible areas. The suspicion grew that the officials wanted to evict them before April so that they would be able to harvest the crop themselves. The local people also noticed that reforestation did not take place in areas


that had not been planted with coffee and that coffee bushes were only being felled at the outer edges of the huge area under coffee; it appeared unlikely that the officials would clear-fell all the many thousands of hectares under coffee cultivation.

### Two months of wilful destruction

On 11 March, the burnings started again. The LBH report lists the date and place of nearly fifty incidents up to the end of May, when hundreds of people's homes were burnt down or wantonly destroyed. Most of the burnings happened during the first month. In many instances, demands were made for cash and when this was not forthcoming, or less than the amount asked for was handed over, people were told to hand over their identity cards. Some demands for money were accompanied by threats that people would be branded as 'mujahiddin'. Vehicles were smashed, stocks of food were thrown onto the ground and poisonous weeds were mixed in with stocks of rice. In one incident on 13 April, the sub-district chief waylaid a man transporting about two tons of coffee and threw his nineteen sacks into the river. In some places, makeshift huts, built after the earlier burnings, were smashed and burnt. On 28 April, dozens of sacks full of rice or coffee were burnt. Elsewhere on the same day, officials confiscated nearly half a million rupiahs from a home in Sukamulya, and for several days thereafter, hundreds of thousands of rupiahs were taken from other inhabitants in the same area.

On 17 May, sub-district chiefs attended a meeting with all local police chiefs and village heads from throughout Pulau Pangung and took three decisions: anyone still remaining in the area would be arrested and handcuffed, and no-one would be released without a payment of Rp. 50,000; all vehicles still in private ownership would be confiscated. It was also decided to keep seven hundred pairs of hand-cuffs ready for use.

The last incident documented in the LBH report took place on 28 May. ★





# Kedung Ombo: the forgotten families

The situation at the Kedung Ombo dam, the World Bank-funded dam in Central Java, has deteriorated. Conditions for the families stranded in the dam are becoming more desperate. In the past four months eight people have drowned [Wawasan 6 June 1989]. Poverty-stricken families are surrounded by water. They are not getting enough to eat, their land is submerged and they cannot earn money elsewhere to buy food as they are stranded on "islands" created by the dam.

Optimism generated by the Government's promise in May of replacement land near the dam for the oustee families has also faded fast. Less than half the people who refused to move from the dam area qualify for the new offer. Only those 600 families who owned land in areas now inundated by the dam and refused to collect their compensation from the local court will be allowed to take up the government's offer.

According to the Solidarity Group for the Kedung Ombo Dam Victims (KSKPKO), only in one of the three districts affected by the dam, Boyolali, have farmers been offered acceptable replacement land. In Sragen and Grobongan, the people are still being victimised by the authorities. When Catholic priest and social worker, Romo Mangun, and a group of students tried to give boats to stranded villagers in Sragen district, they were turned back by the authorities because they had not gone through the "proper channels". A report from Indonesia reveals the true reason: the donated boats threatened a profitable transport monopoly enjoyed by a local military officer, who was taking advantage of the villagers' isolation for personal profit. Romo Mangun's boats have since been confiscated. KSKPKO is demanding that the filling of the reservoir be stopped until the problems are resolved. [Jakarta Post 2 July 1989]

## Punished for complying with government demands

An estimated 800 families - those who owned no land and those landowners who collected their compensation under pressure - will get nothing. It is ironic that those families who obeyed the government by collecting their compensation, however unwillingly, are now being left out in the cold. The more militant families who resisted the pressure, once labelled as "remnants of the communist party" by President Suharto, have now been hailed as "heroes of development" by the governor of Central Java.

The government seems to be saying that the families who remain in the dam after collecting their compensation have no right to expect anything else from the government. But they stayed in their makeshift homes in the dam because their compensation was nowhere near sufficient to buy replacement land nearby. The people are therefore being punished for a situation beyond their control.

## Land acquisition by hook and by crook

The World Bank has known for some time that the system of compensation in Indonesia is far from satisfactory. A report commissioned for the World Bank leaked to TAPOL reveals that:

*there is little, or no consultation with the owners on rates of compensation and in many cases the (exprop-*



*A woman cares for her grandchild, not sure whether her house will have to be moved again, as the waters rise in Kedung Ombo.*

*riation) committee does not even see the owners, who are not of course represented on the Committee, except by their Lurah, who is a government appointee [p.16]...The rates are supposed to be based on current prevailing values, but are frequently out of date [p.16]...In rural areas people say they receive the full amount written on the list, but that the area of their property often shows up as less than they think it is. If the area as measured is challenged, the committee will...ask to see the boundary marks of the property. Of course no one has official boundary marks, nor do they have official plot measurement by the Cadastral Service so they are not in a strong position to dispute. [A review of land acquisition and resettlement under four World Bank financed projects in Indonesia, June 1988 p.18].*

The consultant's report also quotes a document passed to the Bank by the Legal Aid Institute, according to which people received threats that they would be branded "OT"s (belonging to banned organisations) if they did not accept the compensation offered, that OTs would be transmigrated to the island of Buru in Maluku, that their OT "contamination rating" would be increased so that they could be imprisoned, or might be victims of the *misterius* - the "unknown" vigilantes (of 1983) [p.49].

The practice of officials deducting amounts from the compensation payable to oustees is also mentioned in the consultant's report. There is no reason to believe that these practices have diminished over the past



year. If anything, they are likely to have become more widespread as the conflict has intensified.

## Abandoned by the Bank?

The Bank's failure to address these problems is further evidence that human rights are not one of the Bank's main concerns. In May, TAPOL wrote to the Bank saying: "It is not enough to respond to the demands of only 600 families...Only when all families have been adequately compensated can the dispute over compensation and resettlement at Kedung Ombo be considered resolved." On June 13 a further letter was faxed to Bank President Barber Conable, calling on him to clarify the actions taken by the Bank on behalf of the families who did not qualify for the land offer. A reply assured TAPOL that "the detailed resettlement plan being developed for the displaced families is directed at the total affected population".

But this contradicts a report received by TAPOL from Jakarta that the World Bank is not intending to take any action to ensure that the 800 families can stay near the dam. Instead it is preparing to launch an intensive campaign to persuade as many families as possible to transmigrate to Sumatra - an option the Kedung Ombo villagers have rejected all along. The Bank admits too, that the compensation collected by the families is not enough to buy land near the dam.

Suharto threw his full weight behind the transmigration option in a speech at Muko-Muko, a transmigration site in Sumatra where some Kedung Ombo oustees have been moved. Opening an irrigation project at the site, he delivered a speech hitting hard at those families remaining in the dam and reiterating that they should move to Muko-Muko.



*With their school under water, children have lessons out in the open, with volunteers as teachers.*

## Bank predicts increase in involuntary resettlement

Speaking at a seminar on resettlement in Jakarta, Deputy Director of the World Bank, V. Rajagopalan said that the need for involuntary resettlement will increase by about 50% in the year 2000 due to rapid worldwide urbanization. With thinly veiled reference to Kedung Ombo he said:

*Involuntary resettlement is a difficult topic, which has not been handled with the care and sensitivity that it merits. Too often, it has been an add-on, an after-thought, in the planning of a major project.* [Jakarta Post, 20 June, 1989] \*

# Above-average death rate among transmigrants

The annual death rate for transmigrants is as high as 10-20 per thousand, far higher than the national average. This startling admission, which amounts to a reconfirmation that the transmigration programme has failed at the most basic human level, comes from a top transmigration official, head of Mobilization and Guidance, Eko Sarwoko. Only two months ago the findings of a French consultant claiming that 80% of transmigration sites had failed to improve the standard of living of transmigrants, were dismissed by Minister of Transmigration, Lieutenant-General Soegiarto as too narrow. Sarwoko admitted that the level of health in transmigration areas is lower than the national level if health is measured by the mortality rate. [Suara Karya 29 May, 1989].

Despite such damning evidence, the transmigration programme blunders on, with 550,000 families to be resettled within the next five years. According to a report in the *Jakarta Post*, 4.5 million hectares of land will be set aside for residential areas and "support projects" to accommodate these families. Djatiyanto, director-general for resettlement, assured the press: "We need not worry about land area. We still have vast areas of land outside Java". [3 June, 1989]

## Colonisation

During a World Bank funded seminar on transmigration, Soegiarto denied that Indonesia's transmigration programme aimed to "colonize" receiving areas; it was better described as "an effort to Indonesianize all islands". [Jakarta Post 20 June, 1989]

As far as West Papua and East Timor are concerned

there is not much to choose between "colonization" and "Indonesianization"; their peoples reject the Indonesian presence in their countries. For tribal peoples all over the archipelago whose lands are requisitioned for transmigration, the prospect of Indonesianization is no less attractive. It means denying their traditional way of life as hunter-gatherers or swidden agriculturalists, wearing "proper" Indonesian clothes, abandoning their long-houses in the interior to live in "healthy" Indonesian-built houses on easily accessible government resettlement sites. In transmigration areas, the theory is that the displaced local peoples will learn better agricultural methods and a "normal" way of life from the transmigrants' example.

Speaking at Muko-Muko, the transmigration site set aside for the Kedung Ombo oustees, Suharto denied that transmigration displaced "natives" as there was enough land in the resettlement areas. He stressed that the fear of displacement will not necessarily occur "if the natives understand the resettlement programme and if they see the issue in the light of national interests".

## Bank predicts increase in involuntary resettlement

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# Who plans the families?

On June 8 President Suharto collected his population award from the UN in New York. Secretary General of the UN, Javier Peres de Cuellar presented him with a medal and a cheque for \$12,500 for his "strong support" to the family programme in Indonesia.

That Suharto should be awarded any prize for population is bad enough, given the regime's propensity to massacre communist sympathisers, East Timorese, West Papuans or any group which opposes it. But that it should come from the UN, which does not recognise Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, is even worse. The predominantly Catholic East Timorese reject birth control on religious grounds. Their desire to rebuild the population rather than to limit it is understandable, given the loss of a third of their number at the hands of Suharto's military since 1975.

## Incentives and coercion

But it is not only in East Timor that birth control is imposed upon an unwilling population. An observation of 15 health clinics in Jakarta revealed that staff "persuaded and even half-forced mothers who have not participated in the family planning programme to participate immediately, without giving any explanation of any sort". [Report to the 5th International Women and Health Meeting in Costa Rica 1987]

In a recent *Newsweek* interview Suharto denied any coercion in Indonesia's family planning programme.

*Our emphasis has been on voluntary family planning...We have a "reward system" under which individuals and community groups get cash and other awards by meeting goals of lowered population rates. Rural families who consistently practise family planning are given grants and technical assistance to increase their agricultural output. [Newsweek, June 26, 1989].*

Like the USAID, the World Bank, the UN Fund for Population Activities (which chose Suharto for this year's award) and other population control agencies who finance Indonesia's birth control programme, Suharto ignores the fact that voluntary participation cannot coexist with his "reward system" which leaves little genuine choice for the desperately poor. Population control in Indonesia is based on targets, where officials must register a set number of new 'acceptors'. "The implementation of the programme does not include any consideration for the women who have to take all the risks. It only has one goal, to attain the target set by the government". [Women and Health Meeting report quoted above]

The "success" of Indonesia's family planning has been achieved, not through more equitable distribution of food, housing and health care - which brings down the birth rate of its own accord - but by a top-down system of targets and incentives. Here "top" includes the complex of (mostly US-dominated) multi-lateral development banks, population control agencies, members of the government and powerful pharmaceutical companies in whose interest it is that population control is undertaken on such a wide scale in the third world. [see Sumati Nair, *Imperialism and the Control of Women's Fertility*, published by The Campaign Against Long-Acting Hormonal Contraceptives, London and Amsterdam 1989]



Suyono Haryono, head of the Family Planning Agency, with victims of his 'incentives' programme.

## "Effective" contraception

It is not difficult to understand the relationship between population control as a target-based programme and the type of contraceptive promoted. Condoms and the pill are falling out of favour with the family planning agency (BKKBN) because the effect depends on the decision of the individual, whereas IUDs and implants which can only be inserted and removed by trained medical staff are considered effective. "Effective" is synonymous with "low user control". The long-acting hormonal contraceptive implant Norplant, lasting five years, is termed an "MKE" (*metode kontrasepsi efektif*) along with IUDs and sterilization.

In Padang Pariaman district, West Sumatra, condoms and the pill are being phased out. According to the local BKKBN head, MKEs will be promoted, as they can only be used with the help of doctor, and are "easier to supervise". [Tempo July 1, 1989]. Masri Singarimbun at the Centre for Population Research at Gadjah Madah University sees the fact that the pill is the most popular form of contraception as a "great challenge for the programme". [Kompas June 5, 1989]

## Side-effects played down

"Experts" rarely mention disadvantages associated with the contraceptives themselves. Possible side-effects associated with hormonal contraceptives such as Norplant - high incidence of menstrual disruption, nausea, headaches, depression - are played down. Problems discussed are far more likely to be related to human failings. Thus the pill is not effective because "most women forget to take it before they go to bed", says one official. [Tempo July 1, 1989] According to North Jakarta area BKKBN chief, the tendency to use the pill and injectable contraception (such as Depo-Provera lasting 2-3 months), in preference to IUDs, causes problems "because these methods require continuity and close supervision" which "is difficult to apply to people in the lower class because they are always moving from place to place". [Kompas June 5, 1989]



## POPULATION CONTROL

Officials occasionally admit that there are problems on the BKKBN side too. There is only 1 family planning official for about 3,000 acceptors, many them under-qualified [*Kompas* June 5, 1989]. Researcher Singarimbun described as pressing the drop-out rate of over three million in 1986/7 (BKKBN figures). He called for improved service and information.

### Good grounds to suspect "anti-tetanus" injections

A recently-arrived refugee from East Timor has confirmed that there were good grounds for suspecting that "anti-tetanus" injections given to school-girls in Dili were really injectable contraceptives [see *TAPOL Bulletin* Nos 92 and 93, April and June, 1989]. Whilst acknowledging that neonatal anti-tetanus injections could be scientifically argued, Antonio Araujo, a former health worker and teacher in East Timor, asked: "How can we believe this is what the medics were doing? No babies in East Timor receive any immunisation for anything, so why the sudden precaution about the future babies of young girls who are still at school?"

People believed that the injections were injectable contraceptives which would have been given to the girls on a regular basis if the programme had not been halted because of the outcry. Although there is no hard evidence to prove this, the suspicion aroused is proof of the widespread distrust of birth control mechanisms in East Timor, highlighting the strength of opposition to the Indonesian-controlled birth control programme in East Timor. [Interview with Antonio Araujo, June 1989]

### Aid - part of the conspiracy

The World Bank and other agencies involved in population control encourage Indonesia's shift towards the latest in contraceptive technology. USAID and the Bank have provided loans to enable Indonesia to purchase Norplant direct from the manufacturer at commercial prices. The World Health Organisation has lent credibility to Norplant by endorsing it as "suitable for use in Family Planning programmes" when the same report states that "there has been insufficient time for large-scale, long term studies of rare adverse effects." [Nair p.105] Indonesian women, who represent three-quarters of Norplant's estimated 200,000 acceptors (1988 figures) are therefore being used as guinea pigs. USAID and World Bank loans translate into profits for Norplant, selling at full price a drug which is at the trial stage.

### Campaign against Suharto Population Award

In April, TAPOL wrote to Dr Mario Paya-Palencia, Chair of the UN Population Award Committee, urging it to rescind its decision to give the award to Suharto. "Birth control is an integral part of Indonesian strategy to consolidate its annexation of West Papua and its unlawful occupation of East Timor."

*How can faith in the UN and its condemnation of the Indonesian occupation of East Timor survive this grossly insensitive and ill-considered decision..?*

Copies were sent to Peres de Cuellar and Dr Nafis Sudik, Director of the UN Population Fund. TAPOL also wrote to the World Bank, condemning its involvement in financing population control in Indonesia and


urging it to withdraw support for the programme. The Bank denied that it finances family planning East Timor, apart from constructing BKKBN buildings, but defended the programme in East Timor. Whilst admitting that "there may have been isolated cases of overzealousness on behalf of the family planning workers when the programme started" the Bank had "been given to believe" this was no longer the case, after assurances from the Government and the BKKBN.

The Bank also claims that the Population Project does not finance the provision of contraceptives, omitting to mention that it provided a loan for the purchase of Norplant.

Other organisations who protested about the Award include the Women's Global Network on Reproductive Rights, YWCA Japan, Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, Action des Chrétiens pour l'Abolition de la Torture, Association de Solidarité avec Timor Orientale, Comité Français pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme, Droits de l'Homme et Solidarité, Ligue du Droit des Femmes, Médecins du Monde, Pacific Asia Resource Centre, United Nations Association of Great Britain, and IMBAS in West Germany.

In a press release issued to coincide with the award ceremony, US Congressman Tony Hall said "It is the height of irony that for the United Nations to give Suharto an award for population control when Indonesia's 'population control' in East Timor includes warfare and disruption of food production. The United Nations should be questioning Suharto, not giving him an award". [see *Indonesian News Service* July 19, 1989]

Meanwhile the flow of aid continues: the Indonesian government is currently discussing \$20 million assistance in grant aid from USAID for population control and a grant of \$16 million from the UNFPA [*Kompas* 25 May, 1989 quoted in *Indonesian News Service* No 188, June 30, 1989]



*Continued from page 1.*

In further letters to Try Soetrisno on 23 and 30 June, the Institute submitted names of people arrested in East Timor. None of the letters has been answered, nor have they been reported in the Indonesian press. In any case, its chair, HJC Princen is a 'banned person' whose statements may not be mentioned by the media.

Princen has also made available a list of names of people executed since March as well as a list of 78 people arrested since April.



# Aceh, a special region

Aceh, the most western tip of the archipelago now known as Indonesia and the northern part of Sumatra, has always been different. Historically it was the first point of contact for influences from mainland Asia, Hinduism and Buddhism through Indian traders in the 7th century, and Islam which arrived in the 13th century. In the 16th century, the Portuguese, then the Dutch and the English, also landed first in Aceh. The Acehnese, a fiercely independent and proud people, have always fitted uncomfortably into the Indonesian Republic. Recent events suggest that tensions there are worsening, causing major problems for Jakarta.

## The death of two soldiers

On 30 May First Lieutenant Zakarya, 45, and Lance-Corporal M. Gade, 32, were ambushed in the woods near the tiny hamlet, Desa Neuheun Meunasah Pulo Siblah, Tiro sub-district, Pidie district, while returning home by motorbike from a meeting. The soldiers were shot with a Lee Enfield rifle, then struck with a *rencong*, an Acehnese dagger. Zakarya was commander of the Tiro Koramil, the military sub-district command, while M. Gade served as an NCO. According to *Serambi Indonesia*, a local newspaper, Gade died instantly but Zakarya survived the initial attack, only to be killed by his own pistol which had been grabbed by his unknown assailant(s). All their weapons disappeared.

Reporting in the Indonesian press was minimal. The weekly, *Editor*, published a feature on Aceh, placing the attack on the two soldiers in the broader context of present-day Aceh. No other papers reported the incident, suggesting that there was a warning against any further mention.

## Free Aceh Movement

Tiro is the birthplace of Teuku Hasan di Tiro, who set up the National Liberation Front of Aceh/Sumatra, known as GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement), and proclaimed Aceh/Sumatra independence in 1976. In the last few years, there has been little news about GAM, but the shooting of the two soldiers has again drawn attention to unrest in Aceh.

M. Gade was said by *Editor* to be known as 'the hunter' (origin, English) with a special assignment to hunt down GAM members, so there was reason enough for him to be on GAM's hitlist. In April, after a long search, he tracked down Zainuddin Pakeh, a GAM military commander, and killed him with a single shot from his M16 semi-automatic rifle. This happened in Tiro sub-district where Aceh Merdeka was proclaimed in 1976 and which has remained one of the strongholds of the movement. Some leaders like Daud Paneuk and Dr. Zaini have sought asylum abroad while others were captured or gave themselves up, like Tengku Thayer Thayer who is now a functionary of Golkar, the state party.

It is difficult to make a proper assessment of the strength of the movement. When asked, Acehnese shrug their shoulders and reply: "I don't know." The strong Muslim identity of the Acehnese is often cited as being the reason why GAM allegedly lacks popularity because it is a non-Islamic, nationalist movement. However, Acehnese have always seen themselves as different and are by nature suspicious of anything



from the *pusat*, the centre, meaning Jakarta. This would tend to boost the popularity of GAM.

## A string of incidents

In April last year, angry youngsters attacked the Darul Alam Police Station in East Aceh and burnt it down, reportedly because officers brought prostitutes there. Also in April, the Civil Registration Office in Lhokseumawe was attacked by youngsters, accusing officials of corruption.

The authorities have tried to discredit GAM by linking it with the drugs trade but so far these efforts have achieved little. Last October, Muchtar bin Gadong was found to be carrying 45 kg of ganja on his motorbike. At his trial, he was accused of being a commander of the GAM.

Hasan di Tiro campaigns actively abroad and recently announced a new anti-Suharto front. He also claims to represent the *World Mathabah*, an organisation based in Tripoli struggling against imperialism, racism, zionism and fascism. Mathabah, he says, is based on Islamic principles as well as universal solidarity with all genuine liberation movements, irrespective of religion, race or geography. [*O Diario*, 24 March 1989].

## The tradition of resistance


The history of Aceh is a long and glorious one. The Acehnese sultanate was once the most powerful in the region and in the 16th and 17th centuries was almost permanently at war with sultans in Malacca and with



the Portuguese. During the reign of Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-1636), Aceh controlled parts of the mainland including Johore, Pahang, Kedah and Perak. It was during this period that a distinct Acehnese culture came into being, with strong Muslim values becoming intertwined with Acehnese social structure. The Acehnese proudly call Aceh "*Serambi Mekah*", the gateway to Mecca. The Acehnese are a distinct people, influenced by their contact with Arabs, Indians and Portuguese. Banda Aceh, the capital, is nearer Singapore, Rangoon, Pnom Penh and Colombo than Jakarta.

While many parts of the archipelago were colonised by the Dutch, Aceh remained a stumbling block. In 1903 after 30 years of war, the Dutch managed to more or less pacify Aceh but the resistance never really died down. In 1945-49 when the Dutch fought to restore their rule, Aceh was the one place where they did not even try. After Indonesian independence, an Muslim-based rebellion fought the Republic for more than a decade and only after receiving special status did the Acehnese agree to be a province of Indonesia. Daud Beureuh, who died last year, was the leader of the rebellion but both Sukarno and Suharto treated him with respect. He was one of the very few in the archipelago who dared address President Suharto as *saudara*, meaning brother, rather than the deferential *bapak*. Rulers in Jakarta are aware of the delicacy of their relationship with Aceh and have avoided strict government control as in other provinces. It was the last bastion of PPP, formerly a Muslim party federation, while the government party Golkar always suffered heavy defeats. In 1982 Aceh was the only province to send a majority of non-Golkar MPs to the national parliament. The PPP won convincingly with 58 percent of the votes, while Golkar received 37 percent.

Only after the PPP was forced to abandon its Muslim character in 1986 and accept the Pancasila state ideology did Golkar manage to creep forward. The 1987 elections in Aceh became a matter of honour for the Jakarta rulers and all the top brass were sent to Aceh to help the Golkar electoral campaign. Golkar campaigning means basically promising the people



Ibrahim Hassan,  
governor of Aceh.

direct material gains, sometimes development projects, presidential aid or departmental special assistance. Ibrahim Hassan, the newly appointed governor of Aceh and a devout Muslim, managed to convince many Muslims to switch to Golkar. Every Friday, for many months, Hassan visited mosques to demonstrate his concern for the people, giving after-prayer pep talks in favour of Golkar. The Golkar victory in the 1987 elections was marginal. Of the ten Aceh seats, Golkar won 5, PPP 4 and the small PDI 1 seat. PPP retained its majority in the three northern districts, Aceh Besar, Pidie and Aceh Utara.

The Golkar victory in Aceh led some Aceh watchers to drawing hasty conclusions about the rapid pace of 'Indonesianisation'. But it seems that Golkar's empty election promises are now causing a backlash. One important reason for the dissatisfaction is that the Arun natural gas reserves have made Jakarta the leading LNG world exporter. Two huge fertiliser plants, Pupuk Asean and Pupuk Iskandar Muda, and a Kraft paper factory (partly owned by Bob Hasan, see page ...) have given Jakarta huge revenues. Aceh is also a leading producer of natural rubber, coffee, tobacco and pepper and the region possesses vast areas of tropical rainforest. With its 4 million people, Aceh enjoys little benefit from development projects designed by Jakarta. Jakarta is taking plenty and giving little, causing anger and frustration among many Acehnese. \*

## STUDENT ACTIVIST ARRESTED

Bonar Tigor Naipospos, a student who has been sought by the authorities since the arrest of Bambang Sudono and Bambang Isti Nugroho last June, was arrested in Jakarta in June and taken immediately to Jogjakarta to face interrogation for alleged involvement in subversive activities.

In a report about his arrest [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 21 June 1989], Bonar Tigor is described as an active member of a student group in Jogjakarta who frequently played a leading role in discussions. He is also said to have been responsible for the circulation of a number of 'banned' books. The report speaks as if the prosecutor has already composed his indictment, suggesting that the detainee, now being held at Wirogunan Prison, may soon be tried. He is said to have received the books for circulation from a former tapol, who was detained for many years in Buru, named only as Kasto.

The authorities claim that they succeeded in tracking down Bonar Tigor when he participated in several of the student actions that have taken place in Jakarta. \*

## MURDANI ON CHINA

Asked for his views about China's crackdown on the pro-democracy movement and whether this should affect Indonesia's decision to restore diplomatic relations with Beijing, General Murdani, Minister of Defence, said: "We don't know much about what really happened there although some television viewers in Hong Kong saw scenes of demonstrations and shootings.... Like us, here, we sometimes do things that others can't understand."

As he saw it, demonstrations had been going on for a month with no agreement among the leaders on how to tackle them. In the end, the armed forces stepped in. "Some people call this murder but for others, this is seen as a matter of policy." For 'policy', Murdani used *kebijaksanaan*, a word which in Indonesian also conveys meaning of 'wisdom'. [*Merdeka*, 12 July 1989]

"We have a very good warning system," Murdani said on another occasion, "and we need not commit the atrocities the PLA did." Asked what the government would do if confronted by chaos, he said the armed forces would declare a state of emergency and ban all meetings and political activities. But we would prefer to look for warning signs. "Don't be influenced by what happened in Beijing. That's not something we ever mean to do." [*Jakarta Post*, 22 July 1989] \*



# Bob Hasan, king of the jungle

*In the tropical forests of Indonesia it is not Tarzan who is king but Bob Hasan. Over the years his wealth and power have steadily increased, with the full backing of his long-time patron, President Suharto. One cabinet minister said recently: "Bob Hasan is a political institution", reason enough to sketch a profile of this forestry tycoon.*

## The non-migas sector


When oil prices started to tumble, it became increasingly difficult for the Suharto government to finance its development projects and pay the salaries of its huge bureaucracy. Since 1983, it has become crucial to boost the non-migas (the non oil and natural gas) sector to prevent a decline in state revenue. The policy of import-substitution (ISI) had to be abandoned in favour of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). The IMF and the World Bank have pushed Indonesia in this direction to the dismay of more nationalistic economists. While EOI means greater cooperation with the World Bank and the IMF, more nationalistic economists like Habibie, Indonesian's high-tech czar, Soehartoyo and Soehoed, senior industry department officials, and Ginandjar Kartasmita, the minister for energy, favour ISI-style growth, following the Japanese model.

To promote EOI, measures were needed to remove obstacles like an inefficient and corrupt customs service, and a corrupt and top-heavy bureaucracy. Since 1984, the Suharto government has been forced by the World Bank to proceed with 'de-bureaucratization' (abandoning unnecessary licenses) and deregulation, liberalising the economy in order to boost the non-migas sector. In the booming seventies, when oil prices were high, migas accounted for 70 per cent of exports. Gradually, with government support, the non-migas sector has improved in absolute and relative terms. World market prices of nickel and copper rose, earning more revenue for the state; exports of agricultural products have also risen. But the lion's share of non-migas revenue has come from forestry with exports totalling \$ 2.3 billion in 1988.

## The making of a king

The one responsible for the upsurge in wood and wood product exports is Bob Hasan. He stands astride a massive array of business cartels dealing with forest concessions, wood logging, saw mills, wood panel manufacturers, furniture industry, rattan furniture and handicrafts. This monopoly position can only be explained by his long association with President Suharto. Bob Hasan, born as Thee Kian Seng, an Indonesian Chinese, was adopted as a child by Colonel Gatot Subroto, the first military commander of Central Java. In the mid-fifties, Suharto became the third commander of the same Diponegoro Division. Both Bob and Suharto look upon Gatot Subroto as their mentor, the man who taught them many basic facts of life. Gatot groomed Bob Hasan to become an entrepreneur for the Division. It is a tradition in the Indonesian army for commanders take care of their troops with handouts to supplement their meagre salary. Hence, divisions control business enterprises to earn the extra cash, a task usually given to businessmen of Chinese descent.

This was the case with Bob Hasan though he enjoyed one great advantage: he grew up in military circles and was regarded as one of them. Other



*Bob Hasan and army chief-of-staff General Edi Sudrajat, at a rattan workshop belonging to the army cooperative, Puskopad. (Jakarta Post, 12 July 1989.*

business managers of the military have been kept at arms' length, there only to rake in the money for the military. When Suharto became commander of Diponegoro, Bob Hasan was drawn into a small network of officers like Suryo and Sudjono Humardani, who later emerged as Suharto's inner core. This small group, better known as *Finek* (financial and economic affairs), was responsible for the extra earnings of the command.

This was when Suharto assigned his *Finek* to run a contraband trade with Singapore, bartering Javanese sugar for rice from Thailand. The operation grew so huge that army chief-of-staff, General Nasution, decided to step in and punish the culprits. Suharto was sacked as divisional commander and Nasution was planning to take him to court. But Suharto turned for support to General Gatot Subroto, by then army deputy chief-of-staff. Instead of being dishonourably dismissed from the army, Suharto was 'sent back to school' in Bandung, the army staff and command school. He continued his military career while Bob Hasan moved to Jakarta to manage Suharto's business interests.

In his autobiography, Suharto makes no attempt to conceal his smuggling, giving the story a twist to justify the operation:

*As war administrator, I felt I had the authority to take an emergency decision to barter sugar for rice, in the interests of the people. I sent Bob Hasan to Singapore to arrange this barter, insisting that only after the rice had arrived in Semarang should the sugar be delivered. I was afraid that if the sugar was*



*delivered first and the rice failed to arrive, I could be blamed, even hanged. Later, there were repercussions. While on an SSKAD course, I was accused of being a large-scale corruptor who was enriching myself from the proceeds of bartering sugar. (Autobiography, page 85).*

When Suharto became Mandala commander, leading the West New Guinea and later the Malaysia campaigns, Bob Hasan benefitted enormously and laid the first cornerstone of his business empire. When Suharto became president, Bob Hasan was assigned to take care of their respective family fortunes, with Suharto's eldest son, Sigit Haryoyudanto, becoming Hasan's business partner in companies like P.T. Nusamba which manufactures tinplate, a company involved in off-shore drilling and a car assembly plant. Bob Hasan also became Indonesia's major shipping tycoon but it was timber that was to become his major asset.

#### Bob Hasan's monopoly

Next to Brazil, Indonesia has the second largest tropical forest area, meaning that the economic potential of Indonesian forestry is enormous. After the switch to EOI, Bob Hasan gradually became the main actor in the forestry business. He now chairs all the organisations involved with forestry - MPI, the Indonesian Forestry Community, APKINDO, the Indonesian Plywood/Woodpanel Association, ASMINDO, the Indonesian Furniture and Handicraft Association, ISA, the Indonesian Sawmillers and Wood Product Manufacturers Association and APHI, the Indonesian Loggers Association. On top of this, he chairs two sports associations, positions normally reserved for generals. As Bob Hasan is a mere civilian, this shows just how powerful he is.


His chairmanship of APKINDO is the best example of his global power. Indonesia with its huge quantity of wood has become the largest plywood producer in the world with 70% of the world market. APKINDO can best be described as a cartel like OPEC and, considering its huge share of the world market, can dictate prices by controlling the stock. Due to the ban on log exports in 1980, many logging companies (mostly saw mills) were forced, in accordance with government plans, to move into downstream industries like plywood manufacturing, chipboard, mouldings and furniture. At present APKINDO has 108 members, the exact number of plywood mills. They are divided into seven JMBs (joint marketing boards) with Bob Hasan setting the quota for each JMB, which is then subdivided between the individual plywood manufacturers. Thanks to its monopolistic position, Apkindo can set export prices and is solely empowered to issue export licenses to plywood manufacturers. Companies who violate APKINDO's rules are heavily penalised and some mills have even had their licences suspended. According to APKINDO figures, plywood output and exports have steadily grown:

	Production m3 million	Exports m3 million	Exports \$ billion
1983	2.94	2.02	0.48
1984	3.82	3.02	0.66
1985	4.98	3.78	0.81
1986	5.32	4.62	1.10
1987	6.75	5.95	1.89
1988	-	6.89	2.31

Source : APKINDO in *FEER*, 6 April 1989

Japan is the major importer of plywood with a value

of \$584 million, followed by the US and Canada with \$378 million and China with \$339 million. Next comes continental Europe with \$199 and Britain and Eire with a value of \$123 million (1988 figures).



Bob Hasan's power can also be gauged from the battle he waged with Japanese plywood manufacturers regarding the high tariff of 15% Japan imposed on plywood imports from Indonesia. Hasan aggressively dumped huge quantities of plywood on the Japanese market and late last year, APKINDO established its own trading houses in Tokyo and Osaka. At present, everything seems to be going Bob Hasan's and Indonesia's way, with Hasan hoping to extend the practice to rattan furniture (the export of unprocessed rattan is now banned) where Indonesia supplies 80 per cent of the world's needs. Similarly he has targeted sawn timber for the APKINDO system although Indonesia only controls 30 per cent of the world trade.

#### The centralisation of power

It is striking that a man with such ambitions should run his many enterprises in such a dictatorial and heavy handed way. Although big and thriving, APKINDO has a "management system akin to a sidewalk vendor", said a top forestry ministry official. "Hasan accepts no consultation. He thinks he is doing the right thing, but he is one man, he can make mistakes". [*FEER*, 6 April 1989]. Indeed the heavy handed APKINDO system is already showing flaws and weaknesses; there are widespread under-the-counter discounts to traders in Singapore and Hongkong, exporters of high quality timber are being forced to downgrade production in order to meet the quota of low-grade plywood, and above all, there is gross neglect of reforestation, although fees are collected for the purpose.

Most serious is the fact that a single person holds such a decisive sway over Indonesia's tropical forests. While concern over forest destruction is a major global issue, Bob Hasan regards rainforests as a commodity. As long as Suharto is in power Bob Hasan is relatively secure and beyond criticism. But like Ibnu Sutowo, head of the state oil company Pertamina who came a cropper in the mid-seventies, Bob Hasan could also stumble at the peak of his power. As chairman of MPI, the Indonesian Forestry Community, he is hitting hard at the growing conservationist movement. His simple message is: forests should be exploited for the welfare of society and timber exports should be a major foreign exchange earner. In a lecture Hasan portrayed conservationists as "a movement supported and financed by our competitors, because they feel threatened by our expanding exports". [*Berita Hutan*, no 16, January, February 1989]

Along with growing pressure in Indonesia, international pressure must be stepped up to save Indonesia's rainforests from men like Hasan. \*

# Taking on the conservationists



Members of the forest conservation organisation, Skephi, outside Parliament. Their banner reads: 'Destruction of tropical forests is not an illusion.'

Indonesia and Malaysia have agreed to fight the "negative campaign" launched by conservationist groups against the import of tropical timber into Europe. The European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for a gradual ban on the import of tropical hardwood in May this year, after lobbying from Friends of the Earth's Rainforest Campaign.

Mistakenly attributing the campaign to Greenpeace, Forestry Minister Hasjmul Harahap said they know nothing about forestry in Indonesia. Bob Hasan [see separate article], head of just about everything in the Indonesian forestry business, has declared that the "conservationist groups" are a front for competing businesses who want to see the decline of timber imports from Indonesia.

At times like these, the government counters foreign criticism by citing its forestry regulations - the ban on the export of raw logs in force since 1985, the Selective Cutting system which is supposed to ensure forest regeneration, the levy paid by timber concessionaires to finance reforestation and the development of timber estates. But theory is rather different from practice. Timber concessionaires often operate in remote areas, unshackled by government regulations and many do not implement selective cutting or wait the required 35 years before they start logging again.

Reforestation so far has also been a debacle and the

small amount of reforestation that has been carried out has been a dismal failure: timber estates planted on a monocultural basis are infested with disease and elsewhere seedlings perish through lack of care.

## International campaign

The gravity of the situation prompted the Asia-Pacific Peoples' Environment Network to launch an international campaign to save Indonesia's tropical forests. A report by APPEN cites an article in *Editor* (July 2, 1988) which puts annual deforestation at 900,000 hectares and holds "rapacious logging practices, transmigration programmes, jungle clearance to plant rubber, cocoa and palm oil, gold mining operations and foreign exploitation" and fires responsible.

According to Hira Jhamtani in the *Jakarta Post* [23 June 1989] the only way to sustain tropical wood "is the development of the political will to solve the problems, now and in the future." Far from showing any such political will, the Indonesian and Malaysian forestry ministers now plan a campaign through the mass media in ASEAN countries to convince people that the principles of exploitation conservation are being applied. In this way, he said, even a taxi-driver who comes across a foreigner "posing as a tourist but really investigating forest destruction" will know what to say. [See *Suara Karya*, 28 June 1989].

## Terrorised for a golf-course

Farmers who resisted being thrown off their land to make way for a golf course have been intimidated by armed officials because they refused to accept Rp 30/m<sup>2</sup> compensation. Shots were fired, injuring two farmers. They were then strung up by their belts, beaten repeatedly and burned with cigarettes. [*Lestari Alamku*, July 21, 1989]. (*Lestari Alamku*, Nature Conservation, replaces *Berita Hutan*, News of the Forest, which was banned earlier this year.)

The dispute arose when head of Cimacan village in

Pacet sub-district, near Cibodas National Park in West Java, rented out land which had been worked by the farmers for decades, to real-estate company PT Bandung Asri Mulya.

Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs Admiral Sudomo, President of the Indonesian Golf Union, said the land transfer did not break any law, but *Kompas* [July 25] reported that Interior Minister General Rudini ordered work on the golf course to stop until the dispute had been resolved.



# Student protestors roughed up

Although the present wave of student protests has been relatively peaceful, some nasty incidents occurred when the police decided to step in. In Jakarta and Bandung, it was the police who used brute force, a new phenomenon in Indonesia. In the past, the military have usually dealt with student unrest, but since the notorious *Kopkamtib*, the state security body consisting of *Laksusda*, the regional military units, was disbanded, the police force has had more responsibility for law and order. Though new to the job, the police are learning fast; the bloody incidents in Jakarta and Bandung show that the police can be just as brutal as the army.

## The bloody Senayan incident

On 8 1989 an estimated 75 students from 16 universities and academies launched the third phase of their campaign to protest against the 25 per cent rise in electricity prices announced by the government in April. Calling themselves the *Students Committee to Lower Electricity Tariffs*, the students carried banners saying 'Development for whom?' and 'Yet again the common people are the victims'. Before arriving at the Parliament building, the police stopped the march, insisting that the students take a police truck which they had laid on for the students. The students refused, as a march would draw more public attention. Uniformed and plain-clothed policemen far outnumbered the protesting students. After two hours discussion without reaching agreement, the police started using force. Students were violently kicked and punched and were grabbed and thrown into the trucks. Practically all the demonstrators were taken into custody at the city's main police station.

The same evening about a hundred students demonstrated for the release of their colleagues, but two of the demonstrators were arrested and dragged into the police-station by plain-clothed policemen, and accused of circulating a pamphlet called: *Bloody Senayan*, 8 June 1989. The 77 detainees were intensively interrogated; some were maltreated and beaten up.

The next day, 63 were released, one by one, but police spokesman, Major Djoko Santoso said that 14 would be held for further interrogation. Some of the released students approached the Legal Aid Institute, LBH, in order to sue the police for holding students for more than 24 hours without warrant, in violation of the criminal procedures code. 61 of those released had been held for between 26 and 32 hours. Moreover the families of the 14 still detained, received no warrants as they had been handed personally to the 14. After ten days of interrogation, 12 were released; two days later the remaining two, Nuku Sulaiman and Primus Interpares Wawo, were also released. All were required to sign a document promising not to sue the police.

Police spokesman Lt.Col. A. Latief Rabar has since announced that the 14 students will be tried for "disrupting public order" and "inciting public disobedience to the government's electricity tariff policy".

## The 12 April Merdeka incident

On 12 April, students in Bandung organised in the *Badan Koordinasi Mahasiswa Se-Bandung* (Bandung Student Coordinating Body), marched to the city hall to meet the mayor, their third action in the Kacapiring case, a land eviction case in the West Java capital.



One of the earlier student protests against the electricity price increases, which passed off peacefully.

This time, the mayor refused to meet whole group and insisted on receiving only a delegation. When the students refused, the situation became tense, due also to the presence of plain-clothed policemen.

The students decided to make their protest by unfurling banners across the street, Jalan Merdeka, virtually blocking off traffic. In no time the place was full of anti-riot squads, the mobile brigade and plain-clothed intelligence who started hitting at the students. The students scattered. They were chased and clubbed on the head with batons; many sustained broken arms, were bitten by police-dogs or overcome by tear gas. Twenty-seven were badly injured, of whom 12 were concussed.

There were 36 arrests, 33 students and 3 Kacapiring tenants. On the same evening, a crowd of about 3,000 students marched to the police headquarters opposite the city hall. About 300 metres away, the huge gathering mass was confronted by an anti-riot squad. The students demanded that the Siliwangi (West Java division) military commander release all the detainees, apologise for the events earlier that day, pay damages and pay for medical treatment for the students.

The students remained on the streets until 9 pm, taking the opportunity to open their fast together, as it was Ramadhan. The authorities promised to release the students the next morning. All but five, from the Bandung Institute for Technology, were released as promised. The other five were released later. \*





# West Papuan flag-raisers on trial

The trial of Dr. Tom Wainggai and his Japanese wife, Teruko, both arrested at the 14th December 1988 flag-raising incident in Jayapura, began in April. The Wainggais, their daughter and many others, were beaten up and arrested by Indonesian troops after a crowd of 70-100 Papuans took down the Indonesian flag and hoisted the West Papuan flag in Jayapura last December [see *TAPOL Bulletin* Nos. 92 & 93].

About 2,000 people, most of them students, tried to attend the public sessions. At the third session on May 29, the fifty who were allowed in to watch the proceedings, were accompanied by seventy intelligence personnel. The others stayed outside the court and asked for the trial to be relayed to them through a loud speaker. After several public sessions, the government decided to avoid the evident popular support for the prisoners by moving the court, without prior notice, to a military area. It is not known whether the prisoners have lawyers to assist them in their defence. There has been no report of the trial in the Indonesian press.

## Women abused

On June 1, the couple was transferred, along with 35 other detainees, from Abepura Prison to a military prison near Waena, between Abepura and Sentani. Visits from family and friends are forbidden. There are no facilities at the prison for the four women

detainees, all four of whom have reportedly been abused.

Mrs Wainggai, who speaks little Indonesian, was not provided with an interpreter at her trial. She spoke Japanese throughout and her husband translated for her. Nothing is known about the charges and neither the flag-raising incident itself nor the trials have been reported in the Indonesian press.

## Pastors detained

Among the 37 still detained are seven pastors, including four from the Pentecostal Church. The seven pastors are Melkianus Numberi, Marthinus Marani, Aminadap Oropa, Alex Wamea, Ones Waromi, Robbi S. Fonataba and Luther Karubara.

On the 28th May, the Wainggai family met for a Sunday service in Abepura Prison chapel. This was the first time the family had been together since December 14th. A few days later Dr and Mrs Wainggai were moved and are now out of reach of their family.

The level of oppression in West Papua makes it impossible for people connected with the church to give the Wainggais and the other detainees any assistance or protection. It is to be hoped that there will be a call for an international investigation and that the International Red Cross which is now allowed to work in Irian Jaya will be able to visit the detainees.✱

# Scott Paper campaign grows

Scott Paper is facing continuing pressure to withdraw from its proposed \$653 million investment in a timber estate/pulp mill project in Merauke, West Papua. Bombarded by letters of protest from around the world, Scott has composed a standard letter addressed "Dear Scott consumer" in which the US paper giant tries to placate protestors, assuring them that only after "thorough environmental and sociological studies conducted by an independent consultant" will the project proceed. But Scott still has not promised to withdraw if local people oppose the project.

And there is good reason to oppose it. Scott claims that only about 160,000 ha. will be planted over a 16-year period and that most of the 850,000 ha. concession will be left in its natural state "to provide for the protection of the wetlands, buffers around villages, consideration of sacred grounds of the local people and other environmental and sociological needs." The fact is, there isn't likely to be any land in Scott's concession not owned by the indigenous Auyu tribal groups. All the land is owned and utilised in some way by this hunter-gatherer people and according to traditional law, ownership cannot be bought or sold. Scott's assurance that "sacred grounds" will be considered and that "those people who wish to continue their hunting and gathering ways can do so" is a token gesture; any land taken by the project will be land on which people depend.

Scott has set up its base camp near Bade on the Digul River. According to the company, a test tree

## West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

The first two editions of this book appeared in 1983 and 1984. This third edition, published in response to continuing demand, has been substantially revised and updated, with new data on military operations, an appendix on the murder of the well-known West Papuan anthropologist, Arnold Ap, and recent information about the exploitation of West Papua's natural resources.

Published by Tapol, the  
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West Papua:  
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of a People





farm of eucalyptus (about 60 ha.) is being developed as part of the impact study.

#### Australia gets in on the act

In true multinational style, Scott will not rely on Indonesia to provide all the project's needs. It looks as if Darwin has been chosen as the supply base to provide various technical needs for the project and social needs for its employees. This is a slight to the Indonesians who view the Scott project as part of its Irian Jaya Integrated Development Programme. Scott has said the project could "help bring schools and modern medical facilities" to local people - but evidently, if the company intends to build a hospital in Darwin, "modern medical facilities" provided for local people will not be good enough for Scott's staff. The project will follow the familiar multinational pattern where employees and their families are cushioned from the realities of the third world by building a "first world" refuge. The two worlds have little contact.

#### Indonesia's great white hope

Scott's \$653 million investment is the largest single foreign investment in Indonesia's industrial development to date. The paper and pulp industry is a development priority to boost the non-oil and gas sector. Over the next fifteen years, 57 new pulp projects are planned. Timber estates (1.5 million ha. over the next five years) will provide the timber to feed the mills.

This is bad good news for natural forests, the home and resource base for tribal groups and haven for countless species of animals and plants. Fast-growing species planted in timber estates - eucalyptus, pine, acacia - may feed the pulp mills more efficiently but bio-diversity will be lost and the rights of tribal people violated.

#### Dioxins

One reason Scott has decided to invest in Indonesia is that it will be able to transfer technology which is less acceptable in the US and Canada. Kraft pulp mills - the type that Scott plans for Merauke - are the focus of environmental campaigners because the chlorine bleaching process used produces highly dangerous dioxins. These are then released as effluent into the environment and traces have been found in the paper products themselves.

#### Health and safety violations in North America

Scott's far from spotless reputation in North America does not bode well for West Papua, where regulations are less stringent and enforcement unheard of until recently. Scott recently paid a \$450,000 fine to settle charges involving over 150 health and safety violations at its plant in Winslow, Maine. In Nova Scotia the practice of using herbicides containing dioxin to eliminate native species has led to a boycott of its products and elsewhere in Canada where Scott has large plantations, a study of pulp and paper workers, showed a heavy accumulation of PCB, a chemical used to used to make timber termite-proof. [*World Rain-forest Report* March-May, 1989]

IGGI

## More Western aid pours in

The 32nd meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in June, provided 7 per cent more aid than last year, a total of \$4,297.5 billion. The meeting in The Hague was attended by the 14 donor countries, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, UK, USA, Austria and Spain, with 4 multinational agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank and the UNDP. The Scandinavian countries also attended as observer nations.

The donor countries reduced their combined share by 2 per cent while the multinationals increased theirs by 17.8 per cent. As in 1988, Japan contributed the lion's share of bilateral aid with \$1,460 million, followed by France \$139.3 million, the UK \$96.3 million and the USA \$90 million. The World Bank committed \$1,350 million (last year, \$1,200 million) and the ADB, \$700 million (\$550 million). As in 1988, besides program and project aid, most aid was given as 'special assistance', which can be used to finance budgetary deficits or help reduce balance of payment deficits. Special assistance which amounted to \$2.4 billion last year, fell to \$1.85 billion and will gradually be phased out by 1992.

The 1989 World Bank annual report still reflects confidence in the Indonesian economy though it is more harshly critical than before. In particular more fundamental changes in the legal system and an overhaul of the civil service is needed to achieve the economic reforms needed, the Bank says. Echoing complaints from aid donors and foreign investors, the World Bank report lamented the level of corruption in the civil service, largely due to meagre salaries. The report also rebuked the public sector, the state companies in manufacturing, trading, banks and public




'How much more foreign debt can you carry?'

utilities, for being inefficient and corrupt. Reform and privatisation can ease the burden of the state budget and should be implemented soon.

The IMF report was concerned that Indonesia's outstanding foreign debt increased by \$19 billion to about \$50 billion 1985 to 1988, due mainly to the dollar's depreciation against other major currencies, in particular the Japanese yen and the German mark. It is estimated that 80 per cent of the increase was caused by the dollar depreciation. Indonesia's debt service has gone up to around \$6.9 billion.





Suharto, *Pikiran, Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya*, (Suharto: My Thoughts, Sayings and Deeds), An Autobiography as told to G. Dwipayana and Ramadhan K.H., published by PT Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta, 1989, 599 pp.

already constructed a family mausoleum... This is a Javanese form of communication. He would like to die as president and he would like to have a state funeral. How else can he compete with the funerals of Javanese sultans?" [*Inside Indonesia*, April 1989 p 18.

Some reviewers see the autobiography as proof that Suharto has lost his political touch, that a man known for his 'graciousness' who exudes a 'sense of inner calm and contentment' has now brought into question much of the received wisdom about him and his presidency. [David Jenkins in *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 July 1989]

#### Suharto's account of 1 October 1965

The problem with calls to re-assess Suharto is that few commentators have ever acknowledged the deviousness and brutality with which he seized power in 1965. The chapter devoted to 1 October 1965 shows him to be cool and collected, coping unfalteringly with events which, we are expected to believe, he knew nothing about in advance.

Everything Suharto records about his actions on that day confirms that he was prepared for what was about to happen. How could he, having just heard that several generals had been kidnapped, calmly drive himself at the crack of dawn, without escort, through the streets of Jakarta to his headquarters at the Strategic Army Reserve which, miraculously, had not been occupied by rebel troops? How was he so sure he was not a target and that the kidnap gangs were not still roaming the streets? This chapter provides much evidence that Suharto was prepared for everything on that day. It should be closely examined for leads about Suharto's own involvement in the kidnap and murder of six members of the army general staff.

#### Suharto, by Suharto

Many commentators have been shocked by the breathtaking arrogance of a man still in power setting out to tell his own life story. But herein lies perhaps the most important clue to this work. Many events in his life could, if properly examined, say volumes about the ambitions of power which this supposedly self-effacing, modest Javanese has pursued with single-minded determination for many years. Many events, if properly examined, would tear aside the deceptions that have helped Suharto avoid thorough examination of his past and present.

What was his role in the 26 July 1946 affair when associates of the radical politician, Tan Malaka, made an abortive attempt to oust the government of Sjahrir? [Chapter 7] What was he doing, having a clandestine meeting with the Communist Party (PKI) leader, Muso, only days before the leftwing movement was crushed by troops under Colonel (now retired general) Nasution? [Chapter 9] What was his relationship with the PKI, rapidly becoming the major political force in Central Java, when he occupied the position of Central Java military commander in the 1950s? [Chapter 15] Why does he allege that he knew for certain that the 1 October 1965 affair was organised by the PKI as soon as he heard that Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, a subordinate of his for many years, was in charge? [Chapter 18] These are sensitive

When this book failed to appear last December, it was put about that the draft, which had been given limited circulation, so angered close associates that Suharto was under pressure to revise certain passages. As it turns out, the final version of the book which was published in April incorporated none of the expected changes.

This tells us a lot about Suharto's view of his hold on power. Rightly or wrongly, he considers that his grip on power is solid enough for him not to care a damn about upsetting anyone. It suggests that he no longer feels the need to rely on the undivided loyalty of the armed forces. No-one doubts that anti-Suharto rumblings in the upper echelons of the armed forces have been growing. But nor is it doubted that Suharto has, since 1983, been building new structures - Golkar, his State Secretariat, and last but not least, his family empire - convinced that these will see him through the next presidential election in 1993. Whether his confidence is warranted only time can tell, but there is reason to believe this is what he thinks.

Does he mean what he says about perhaps standing down at the next presidential election in 1993? Hardly, for he portrays all presidential elections since 1965 as being a question of duty being thrust upon him. Perish the thought that anyone should say he ever promoted his own candidacy.

#### Suharto, the Sultan

For years now, Suharto has behaved like a sultan. He is surrounded by deferential bureaucrats, summoned to do his bidding, anxious to be the ones to convey to an eager public the words of wisdom passed down from on high about affairs of state. It should not come as a shock to read, in this autobiography, page after page of shameless, unrelieved obsession with his own sayings and deeds, the numerous claims he makes of single-handedly steering his regime wisely and correctly on all major issues for nearly a quarter of a century. Two of his closest associates, now dead, Generals Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardani, are treated with undisguised contempt, hardly the way to inspire present-day Suharto loyalists.

An Indonesian has observed: "If you consider Suharto's own psychological make-up, it would appear that he would like to be president for life. He has



questions for Suharto to which he must give his own answers, in the hope that Indonesian analysts and historians will continue to avoid seeking the truth about the man who has had the Indonesian state in his grip for nearly 25 years. Having given his own version of these events, other versions become subversive. Suharto has a great deal to hide about his past and he trusts only himself to tell his story in the way he wants history to record it.

### Suharto and the death squads

The most controversial chapter, the one which Suharto was under the greatest pressure to amend, is Chapter 69 where he confirms that "there was nothing mysterious at all" about the killing of thousands of alleged criminals in 1983-84. "We needed to have our own treatment by means of violence. Those who resisted had to be shot. Then some of the corpses were left lying around, just like that. This was for the purpose of shock treatment." Western governments, keen to justify their continuing support for this confessed mass murderer, have gone to great lengths to prove that this does not really mean what it appears to mean. [See box]

But what do the armed forces, held responsible for the death-squads, make of this embarrassing confession? They were the ones who insisted on calling their killers 'mysterious'. More specifically, what does General Murdani make of it, the one who as armed forces commander-in-chief and chief of Kopkamtib, told an unbelieving world at the time that corpses left lying around were the victims of gang warfare? When the autobiography came out, Murdani told a Dutch journalist: "I had to lie and lie and now he writes this." [NRC Handelsblad, 9 March 1989] Now, however, he treads more carefully.

Asked by a member of parliament to explain these glaring contradictions, Murdani said they were not contradictory at all. "Those mysterious crack-shot teams were created by Pangkopkamtib (ie. himself) to reduce crime." The problem was, he said, that the police were unable to cope. "We acted firmly, in that if (the criminal) resisted, I gave my men permission to shoot." Yet, he still insists that the corpses lying around were the victims of inter-gang warfare which flared up as the result of growing pressure on the

gangs to poach on each other's territory. [Suara Pembaruan, 12 July 1989]

Murdani has now confirmed that the 'mysterious' killers were acting on his orders. His remarks also show that he, for one, whose words still wield great authority in the armed forces, has no intention at present of contradicting Suharto's words. This would confirm that Suharto's attitude of not giving a damn about what others think is well founded. For the time being at least, publication of the autobiography appears not to have shaken his chances of remaining in power into the foreseeable future. \*

Carmel Budiardjo

## FOREIGN OFFICE COMES TO SUHARTO'S DEFENCE

The following letter, dated 26 June 1989, was received by Lord Avebury, chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group and TAPOL's Honorary President, from Lord Trefgarne, Minister of State at the Foreign Office:

*Thank you for your letter of 13 May. We have no argument with the translation enclosed with your letter. As I stated in my written answer, Suharto's autobiography seeks to justify the killings. I am also aware of repeated allegations that these killings were carried out by the Indonesian army. But I do not accept that the sentence you cite, "We had to have our own treatment" is sufficient to justify an unequivocal statement that President Suharto had admitted that the killings had been committed by persons acting under the orders of the State. The sentence is not so explicit. I would not wish to deny that one interpretation is the one you put on it; indeed, the implication in that sense is strong. But I do not accept that it amounts to conclusive evidence.*



Two Indonesian passers-by find the protesters' banners hard to take. Demonstrators from Survival International, TAPOL and other organisations kept vigil outside the Commonwealth Institute in London during the government-sponsored Asmat exhibition on 2 June 1989.

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