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Lampung villagers massacred

Dozens of people were killed in Central Lampung, Sumatra when armed troops surrounded the hamlet of Talangsari-III, opened fire on the villagers and set fire to their homes.

The government has imposed a clampdown on information, and closed the area to outsiders making it impossible to assess the true extent of the tragedy. The hamlet was still sealed off at the end of February, three weeks after the massacre. [*Tempo*, 4 March 1989] The government said that 27 villagers were killed, including Anwar, a Muslim activist, also known as Warsidi.

Asiaweek's correspondent appears to have been the only journalist to succeed in getting close to the village. A couple of weeks after the tragedy, she wrote:

This week Talangsari lay in ruins. A child's foot poked out from under the ashes of what was once a house. This and eleven other piles of ashes and scorched beams were nearly all that remained of the hamlet of 300 people. [Asiaweek, 24 February 1989]

Detainees tortured

According to an account of the massacre received in London from a reliable source in Indonesia, the massacre was part of an operation by the army to quell unrest in the province of Lampung. Para-commandos of the army's elite corps, *Kopassus*, under the command of Captain Sutiman, were used in the operation.

Early in January, according to our source, several people, most of them young men who had been holding religious gatherings in their homes (*usroh*), were arrested. They were badly tortured by Captain Sutiman and his men:

They were forced to take off their clothes and after this, Sutiman brutally tortured ustad Fahrudin (not his real name), pulling out his pubic hair and burning his penis with lighted cigarettes. (Others) had their fingers broken by Sutiman. Mursyid, a 27-year old pupil of Fahrudin, was ordered to swallow a handful of hot peppers. When he refused to do so, Sutiman grabbed the peppers and rubbed them in his face.

After hearing about these brutalities, their colleagues decided to retaliate. On 3 February, they ambushed Sutiman's car on his way back from operations in Lampung and took him hostage. The next day, they wrote to the military authorities, offering to release Sutiman in exchange for their detained colleagues. Three days later, "troops attacked the

place where Sutiman was being held, firing at random regardless of the presence of innocent people". At the time of the attack, nothing had yet happened to Sutiman but, "since the attack continued relentlessly, the youths had no option but to kill Sutiman and resist the troops who were attacking them". According to this account, 57 people were killed and 32 were gravely wounded.

Talangsari hamlet had a population of about 300 and all accounts agree that not a soul was left after the massacre. This is why some sources put the death-toll as high as 300. But it is also clear that many succeeded in escaping into the surrounding countryside.

The Talangsari disaster had a traumatic effect throughout the district. Shops in the sub-district capital, Metro, were closed for several days and army security around government offices was very tight. Inhabitants in other villages fled their homes, fearing that more battles might occur. Troops were known to be combing the region in search of more 'Anwar followers' and various estimates of the number of

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arrests were mentioned in the press. According to *Lampung Post* [24 February], a hundred people had been arrested.

The military authorities in Lampung say that a number of people were arrested, of whom "about 20" will be tried. One is said to be Fadillah, alleged to have attacked remote army and police posts. [*Merdeka*, 3 March]


The army have extended their search for 'instigators' to Central and East Java. Among those arrested is a former *usroh* prisoner from Karanganyar named Sugiman, known also as Yulianto. [Sugiman was tried in 1986 and given a sentence of ten years. Later the sentence was reduced to seven years on appeal. The Supreme Court reconsidered the case in March 1988 and decided to quash the sentence, recognising that *usroh* was not on the list of banned organisations. This unexpected verdict did not lead to the release of any other convicted *usroh* prisoners.]

Two people arrested in East Java by the army, using *Bakorstanasda* powers, are alleged to have been followers of Warsidi. One, identified as Yani, 26 years, is said to have confessed to stabbing and beating Captain Sutiman. He and the other detainee, Dul Jalal, 30 years, both come from Trenggalek, East Java but were living in Lampung. They returned home after the Talangsari massacre. Assistant for Intelligence of *Bakorstanasda* said they had been "intensely interrogated" for information about Lampung. A third person, Im alias Sup, 35 years, was arrested in Malang by the police and handed over to *Bakorstanasda* for investigation. [*Merdeka*, 7 March and *Jawa Post*, 10 March]

Government cover-up

According to the official version, made public on 9 February by Major-General Sunardi, military commander of South Sumatra, acting as regional chairman of the new security agency, *Bakorstanas(da)*, after an unsuccessful attempt to summon the leader of a 'deviant' Muslim group for consultations, a group of officials, among them Captain Sutiman, drove to the hamlet but were greeted with poisoned arrows, made of cycle spikes. They beat a hasty retreat leaving the badly wounded Sutiman behind. On the next day, by which time Sutiman was dead, troops were sent to retrieve his body. In the face of a renewed attack, "a close-range battle was unavoidable". [*Kompas*, 10 February]

But according to one of the first reports in the



Jakarta press, Major-General Sunardi was reported as saying that troops entered the village "to rescue an army captain held hostage by the rebels on the previous day. Captain Sutiman was later murdered by the group, said General Sunardi." [*Jakarta Post*, 10 February] Other press reports said either that Sutiman was wounded or that he was dead when the attack occurred. There was no further reference to Sutiman having been taken hostage.

The first army pronouncements about the affair named a group that was organising religious activities in Lampung as *Komando Mujahideen Fisabilillah*. This organisation is also mentioned in the account received independently from Indonesia. After first describing the group as a 'deviant' religious sect using religion 'as a mask', the army changed their tune. Defence Department spokesman, Brigadier-General Nurhadi, now said that Anwar's group had 'hijacked' (*mencatut*) the name of Islam. It should now be called 'gerombolan pengacau keamanan Warsidi' (Warsidi's security disruptor gang) or GPK-Warsidi. 'GPK' is a term reserved for rebel movements and has, until now, been used only for the OPM in West Papua and Fretilin in East Timor.

The army has ignored calls from lawyers for an independent inquiry into the massacre. These have come from Anwar Haryono, a member of the Institute for Legal Justice and the Petition-of-50 dissident group, the Legal Aid Institute, the Institute for Human Rights and from Adnan Buyung Nasution, now in Holland, who addressed his appeal to the International Commission of Jurists.■

Lampung shaken by social unrest

The revolt in Talangsari has occurred against the background of growing social unrest and land disputes throughout Lampung. Lampung was the first region outside Java colonised by the Dutch earlier this century with poor Javanese peasants. By 1941 the transmigrants already outnumbered the native population, having reached 174,000. The population of Lampung is now around seven million. Although the government several years ago proclaimed Lampung to be over-populated and closed to transmigration, the population is still rising by more than 5% a year. Lampung is the prime example of a transmigration region that is now in a state of crisis because of pressures on land and attempts by speculators to profit from the labours of the transmigrants.

Since 1981, transmigrants in the area have been

under pressure to make way for reforestation after the region was pronounced a conservation area. People suspect however that reforestation is just an excuse to clear the land for speculators from Jakarta. According to *Tempo* [25 February 1989], thousands of families were moved to North Lampung in the mid 1980s, leaving another 10,000 families still to be moved. The programme came to a halt for lack of funds but efforts to move them were resumed in 1987. The families fought back, removing stakes put round their land by forestry officials. Ministers have gone out of their way to deny that the Talangsari affair is in any way connected with this long-running dispute.

House-burning in Gunung Balak

The most recent expulsion, the event which became

the catalyst for organised resistance, was the case of a thousand families in Gunung Balak, also in Way Jepara, who were ordered to abandon their coffee and clove plantations. When the villagers refused to move, local officials moved in and burnt down their homes. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 91, February 1989.]

Talangsari is located in the vicinity of Gunung Balak, a fertile region where small-holdings of coffee and rubber trees are now flourishing. It was formerly part of the village of Labuhan Ratu IV but last year was transferred to the Rajabasalama village. It was their new village chief who started reporting to the local military command that 'deviant' religious activities were taking place.

The Suharto connection

Although many Jakarta papers have drawn attention to the deepening land crisis in Lampung, none of them report that one of the private companies granted permission to implement the reforestation scheme is PT Citra Lamtoro-gung, owned by Siti Hadiati Rukmana (also known as Tutut), President Suharto's oldest daughter. Peasants in conflict with this company, under continual pressure from the local military command to move, were arrested and tortured but they still refused to move. In 1984, they sought advice from NGOs in Jakarta but the NGOs were later warned by the security agency, Kopkamtib not to take up their case.

Another company in conflict with local inhabitants is Mitsugoro, a joint venture between Kosgoro, an army-led company, and Mitsubishi of Japan. 2,400 hectares of land belonging to 120 transmigrants were taken over by the Mitsugoro. The transmigrants took their complaint to court but lost the case.

Ex-prisoners

A number of transmigrants in Central Lampung are former political prisoners who were arrested and held without trial as communist suspects in 1965. Many of these ex-tapol transmigrants were resettled in Labuhan Ratu IV village which is also known as Desa Pancasila. *Tempo* [25 February 1989] reports that the

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Transmigrants in Gunung Balak who have been ordered to move off their land. [Tempo, 18 February 1989]

children of these ex-prisoners have had difficulty finding work because they do not have a 'clean environment'. In January, 140 people who had just been appointed as elementary school teachers or school-cleaners were dismissed on the grounds that their 'environment was not clean'. [*Kompas*, 14 January and *Tempo*, 21 January] These frustrations have added to the discontent fuelled by the land disputes.

Although these facts are well known, the security authorities have played down suggestions that the events in Talangsari are linked to the 'latent communist danger'. This suggests that the government wants to avoid any hint that Muslims and leftwingers may be working together with people defending their land rights.■

A people's revolt

From our correspondent in Jakarta

Both BAKIN (the Intelligence Coordination Agency) and the commander of the armed forces have tried to play down the bloody events in Way Jepara, Central Lampung, and to hide the true facts.

Sukadana and Talangsari in Way Jepara are transmigration areas that were covered in virgin forest when they were first settled. After years of sweat and toil, disease and hunger, the newcomers created a prosperous region. But once their trees were about to produce the harvest they had worked so hard for, they were ordered to get out and move on to barren land. The bureaucrats used a thousand and one reasons to justify the expulsion of the transmigrants.

It was not the first time such a thing had happened. The transmigrants had been told to move a number of times before, after their land, as if by magic, had been declared the property of civilian or military officials. This is also happening in Kalimantan but there, the transmigrants have responded by packing up and returning to Java.

In Lampung, land thefts have occurred on a massive scale. In some regions, thousands of hectares have

now been converted into palm-oil and sugar plantations owned by members of the Suharto family.

Years of unrest

For years, the people in the area have resisted this evil system. At first, they submitted complaints and protests to the authorities, but to no avail. After years of being ignored, they began to organise. There were lectures and sermons to cultivate a political awareness, as well as physical training for a large number of people.

Local officials were certainly not unaware of what was going on but they avoided reporting these developments to their superiors in Jakarta, realising that it was all the result of their own transgressions. Moreover, many people in Jakarta are involved in the seizure of thousands of hectares of land whose commercial value had soared because of the sweat of the transmigrants. It is reckoned that the roads, irrigation canals and bridges they have built are worth three thousand million rupiahs. No wonder the

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men of greed wanted to get their hands on it.

A defeat for the armed forces

Your correspondent in Jakarta has reason to believe that the person leading this revolt is a skilled tactician. The rebel forces were not crushed, nor did any of the army provocations succeed because, well in advance of the attack, many local people had left the area.

From intelligence sources, it is clear that:

- * The leaders of the revolt realised that they did not have the capacity to fight off a major attack by regular troops because their movement was more in the nature of raising political awareness.

- * Before the attack was launched, they evacuated the inhabitants to a safe area, taking special care to protect the women and children, the elderly and people involved in production. Besides, they had to avoid being provoked by the army, such as, for instance, someone getting killed so that this could be blamed on the rebels.

- * The movement was split up into three fronts:

1. the nucleus which withdrew to the forest and

dispersed,

2. reserve forces which launched attacks on police and army posts, and

3. a small force of people given the task of goading the enemy into attacking its defence position. This was a kind of suicide force.

The army unit that launched the attack did not have enough troops to hunt down or destroy the nucleus which had retreated. As a result, it was unable to annihilate the rebel forces. Although government officials have tried to play down the extent of the rebellion, an intensive territorial operation has since been under way. Troops were sent out to comb the entire region. An intensive intelligence operation has also been launched. The harbours of Merak and Bakauheni, the entry points into Lampung and Java, are being closely watched, as well as inter-provincial traffic throughout Sumatra.

Claims that the rebels are behaving recklessly and killing off local people are untrue. The army's own intelligence has discovered that the local people enthusiastically, if silently, support the rebellion. By the middle of February, only 10 per cent of the rebel forces had been murdered or captured.■

Playing down the issues

As we go to press, there is news of a serious incident in Dompu on the island of Sumbawa, Nusatenggara (NTT) described by some as "a clash between the army and Muslims". H.C Prinsen, chair of the Institute of Defence of Human Rights, said that eleven people were killed. Many people were arrested, in Dompu as well as in Den Pasar, the capital of Bali.

The incident happened at the beginning of March but nothing appeared in the press at the time because editors had been told by phone not to report anything though no-one knew what it was that should not be reported. On 20 March, *Kompas* added to the mystery with a front-page report of a visit to Bima, the capital of Sumbawa, by Major-General Sintong Panjaitan, military commander of NTT and quoting him as saying that security there "is no worse than anywhere else". In Dompu, the district chief, Colonel Moh. Jacob would not be drawn, except to say that "if there were one or two excesses, this was not unusual and they could be resolved by persuasion, in the family spirit".


On 22 March, the *Indonesian Observer* ran an editorial which began by saying that the incident "was serious enough to warrant the authorities making phone calls to the news media to put a lid on it." With the authorities at such pains to play down a serious incident - following the events in Lampung - the impression is gaining ground that the military is facing crises in several parts of the country.

In the same vein, ministers are trying to play down the significance of growing student protest, most of it in support of people unjustly treated by local authorities, particularly on land issues. No action has yet been taken to clamp down on the students. Home Affairs Minister, General Rudini has even gone on record as saying the students "are within their rights to protest".

Six months ago, President Suharto took the unusual step of hiving off the Agraria Directorate from Rudini's Ministry and setting up a Land Affairs Agency within the State Secretariat, directly under

his own control. This suggested at the time that land was becoming the central issue in Indonesian politics. Equally central is the question of who copes with the disputes. Rudini clearly resents Suharto's move to undermine his department's role. To add to the confusion, the army's new security agency, Bakorstanas has all the powers it needs to deal with "threats to stability", leaving Rudini's apparatus on the sidelines.

Although Suharto seems to have strengthen his own position by taking control of the key question of land, the regime has become more vulnerable to conflicts between military commanders, provincial governors and the various central agencies over how to deal with the growing crisis. Kedung Ombo, Lampung and now Sumbawa may be the beginning of a spiral of events leading to some major changes though it would be foolhardy to predict that the forces of democracy will emerge any the stronger.■



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Land dispute in Kedung Ombo

Peasant resistance to expulsion from their land which has been expropriated for the Kedung Ombo dam has now become the focus of attention in Indonesia, arousing solidarity actions and exposing splits within the regime on how to deal with these 'recalcitrant' villagers. For the background to the present crisis, please see TAPOL Bulletin No. 91, February 1989.

The water is rising fast at Kedung Ombo. Yet the peasants living within the reservoir area of this World Bank funded dam in Central Java are still refusing to move out. According to latest press reports, there are 1,786 families who still reject the government alternatives of cash compensation, transmigration or local resettlement. The inadequate compensation levels offer no opportunity to buy alternative land and the families have no wish to transmigrate. Only 25 families have moved to Kayen, the local resettlement option intended to accommodate 400 families. There is no water, no road to the nearest markets, and the 1000 square meters of land per family is not enough to support them.

There is growing concern for the health and safety of the families who are refusing to move. Many, forced out of their villages, have carried their demolished homes and belongings to higher ground. As one villager put it, the people refuse to get into trucks provided by the authorities as they cannot be sure where they will be taken.

Emergency aid for children barred

One of those showing concern is Romo Mangunwijaya, a Catholic priest renowned for social work among the poor. He was refused access to the villagers by the military who have now sealed off the area. The priest, who wants to administer spiritual and material aid to the estimated 3,500 children living in Kedung Ombo, managed to visit people inside by avoiding the military checkpoints. He launched a public appeal for donations and applied for permission to live among the families for two or three months.

Although Romo Mangun's efforts were called 'noble' by Interior Minister Rudini, permission was refused by the Central Java Governor, Major-General Ismail. Governor Ismail has admitted that Romo Mangun's aims are humanitarian but that the government has "already been acting in a most humanitarian way". [*Merdeka*, 2 March] Governor Ismail has the support of Major-General Soepardjo Roestam, Minister-Coordinator for People's Welfare and former governor of Central Java. "People who refuse to move should not be helped," he said, after meeting the President. [*Kompas*, 17 March]

The Kedung Ombo crisis is being widely reported in the press. The controversy between ministers has been sharpened by Romo Mangun's initiative. He describes his plans for social solidarity as 'putting *Pancasila* into practice'. By not allowing him in, the government is alienating those sympathetic to the Kedung Ombo villagers.

Growing support

Support for the villagers from outside the area is growing. On February 6, the students' "Solidarity Group for the Victims of Development in Kedung Ombo" staged three major demonstrations. More than a hundred students from Diponegoro University delivered a letter of protest to the regional assembly



Some of the children in Kedung Ombo whose homes have been inundated by the slowly-rising dam water. [Tempo, 18 March 1989]

in Semarang. In Jakarta, another group of more than a hundred students from Jakarta and Bogor staged a sit-in at the Ministry of Home Affairs, while a third group of students from Surabaya, Solo, Salatiga, Semarang and Jogjakarta walked to the dam and demonstrated in Kedung Cumpleng, a village in the reservoir area.

On the same day letters of protest signed by 961 people were sent to the President, the Central Java governor and several ministers. The signatories included students from 45 higher education institutions in Java and Lombok, artists, social workers, lecturers and pastors. They demanded that the filling of the dam be stopped until the evacuation had been completed fairly, that the compensation be increased and based on consultation with the people, that the government take action against officials who were committing malpractice in the performance of their duties and that an independent development control body be formed. The letter said: "We fear that unless the dispute is settled satisfactorily there will be unrest and mistrust among the people who will be suspicious of development, which could shake the stability of the country". [*Neraca Hak-Azasi* - a stenciled student brochure - Vol. 4]

After the protests on 6 February, some newspapers were issued later than usual because of "technical faults", meaning that they had probably received phone-calls instructing them to drop reports about the protests. However one or two slipped through the net. *Kedaulatan Rakyat* [7 February] ran a story on the demonstration at Kedung Ombo when students protested with banners and placards, shouting slogans in support of the villagers. They were only allowed into the village after lengthy discussions with Lieutenant-Colonel Drajat, the Boyolali district military commander. The protest passed off peacefully and the military were thanked by the students. However,

when they returned to Salatiga, they heard that several students were being sought by army intelligence, six of whom were waiting in the headquarters of the solidarity group. The students were accused of holding meetings without permission. Some of the

students left Salatiga promptly.

The sit-in at the Ministry of Home Affairs was only reported by one Indonesian paper, but was also picked up by AFP. Over 100 students sat holding banners and placards for more than five hours surrounded by a security force of about 200. Their demand to speak to the Minister was refused and eventually five students agreed to meet the Secretary General of the Ministry instead. ■

World Bank record exposed

In TAPOL Bulletin No. 91, we reported that one of the only endeavours by the World Bank to investigate the crisis in Kedung Ombo was to send a consultant to the area in May 1988; the results were never made public. TAPOL now has a leaked copy of the consultant's report which analyses land resettlement problems in four World Bank-funded projects. The Report, "A Review of Land Acquisition and Resettlement under Four World Bank Financed Projects" was written in June 1988 by World Bank consultant, David Butcher.

Turning a blind eye

Although the World Bank first became involved in the Kedung Ombo project in 1984, the report reveals that "not until 1987 did the dissatisfaction of a significant number of people with the acquisition process become known to the Bank" [p.48]. A chronology of intimidation and harassment since 1984 prepared by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH), was handed to a Bank official in Jakarta, but as the "Minister of Public Works wrote to say everyone had been compensated and had departed the area, the matter was not taken up and the land acquisition was not supervised" [p.18].

In the section entitled "Solution to the Problems", Butcher suggests that "the Bank could consider withholding loan disbursement pending a satisfactory resolution of the problem, perhaps *inter alia* insisting on a delay in impoundment". His preferred recommendation was clearly more in line with the Bank's intentions: "The Bank might be better advised to inform the GOI [Government of Indonesia] of its dissatisfaction with the situation, and seek agreement in principle for a far-reaching review of land acquisition and resettlement policy across the board, which would ensure more satisfactory outcomes for future projects. The Bank in exchange would have to (continue to) turn a blind eye to the fate of the remaining 791 (sic) households who have yet to accept compensation" [p.55].

The 'last card'

The report also reveals that 90% of the Kedung Ombo oustees were expected to transmigrate and that the local resettlement village of Kayen was to be kept as a "last card", to be played when the transmigration option is revived at the time of inundation [p.55]. The compensation levels set by the government are shown in the report to be inadequate because "the replacement land costs more than the people's compensation can purchase" [p.60]. The Satya Wacana Christian University team monitoring land acquisition were not trusted by the Kedung Ombo villagers.


The consultant reported that the villagers had been denied LBH legal aid since 1987 when the Deputy Governor (of Central Java) told the people not to have contact with outsiders because they were connected with the PKI. Yet in a recent BBC World Service interview, the Bank's Jakarta Director, Attila Sonmez, stated that "there was due process available to the landowners in case they are dissatisfied with the level of compensation to challenge it in court and have it

revised". [Development '89, 15 March 1989]

Another kind of stigma is discussed in the Butcher report. It cites the LBH claim that the villagers were threatened with the "OT" (member of an illegal organisation) label if they refused the compensation and concludes that, once branded, they were unlikely to move: "To remain where they are means a form of security, to move means uncertainty of survival, and victimisation by strangers" [p.52]. Butcher also doubts the potential for alternative employment around the dam until the environmental problems of river pollution and soil erosion are addressed.


The report concludes that the oustees of three of the projects including Kedung Ombo who have accepted compensation are worse off than they were before and therefore "have in effect personally subsidised these projects" [p.72].

The consultant recommends that "the Bank should give serious consideration to including the costs of land acquisition (and of course resettlement), in the next loan for a project in Indonesia". If it had been following its own guidelines, the Bank would have already been doing this for eight years. According to



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Occasional Reports no. 10 contains the
Open Letter to the World Bank and the
full correspondence between Tapol and
the World Bank.



the Bank's Operational Manual Statement no.2.33 of 1980, "The cost of the resettlement component, as a necessary and integral part of the total project, should be included in the total project cost".

Open letter to the Bank

The failure of the Bank to live up to the standards it sets itself is one of the issues taken up in an open letter from TAPOL addressed to the World Bank. So far, other signatories are: IMBAS (Initiative for Human Rights in ASEAN States), the Dutch Indonesia Committee, JATAN (the Japan Tropical Forest Action Group), IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs) and Friends of the Earth Japan. After criticising the Bank's record in all aspects of the Kedung Ombo project, the letter says that the Bank:

- failed to ensure that workable resettlement arrangements were agreed before the completion of loan negotiations,
- failed to inform itself of the real situation at Kedung Ombo and failed to act on the LBH information,
- was secretive regarding the results of its own investigations,
- failed to exert pressure on the Indonesian Government during development to ensure that they provided sufficient compensation and replacement land,
- failed to do so even after the dam gates had been closed.

The letter concludes: "It is imperative that the Bank face its responsibilities towards the people who are disadvantaged by its development projects generally, but it should also act *now* to remedy the desperate situation in Kedung Ombo".

World Bank on the defensive

TAPOL has been engaged in a long correspondence with the Bank. It is clear that the publicity surrounding the Kedung Ombo project both within the country and abroad (items on both the BBC and the

Dutch World Service, articles and a letter in the London *Guardian*, the *Guardian Weekly* and now the Open Letter) has put the Bank on the defensive.

Various staff at the Bank have failed to respond to TAPOL's questions and comments. A telex sent on February 10 states: "The Bank has been following up with government on the resettlement issues". TAPOL's reply criticised the Bank's persistence in relying on its contacts with the government instead of making efforts to examine independently what the victims want. TAPOL stressed the need to approach the resettlement problem with the help of an independent body. The Bank's response was merely an extension of the previous telex: "We are continuing to follow up closely with government on the need to ensure safety and shelter of families and are reviewing with the government alternative employment and income-earning opportunities for those families who now wish to remain in the local area instead of resettling elsewhere."



Romo
Mangunwijaya

Yet, the government has refused to renegotiate on anything. We know from the Butcher Report and countless examples throughout Indonesia that wage labour employment as a substitute for land ownership only leads to impoverishment. TAPOL has repeatedly insisted that the Bank must press the Indonesian government to listen to and answer the peasants' just demands. Consultation has been conspicuous by its absence since the beginning of the project. Now it is the only just way out.■

[The Open Letter and the full correspondence between TAPOL and the World Bank is available to readers in *Occasional Reports No. 10.*]

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government/PT SAM idea will force the peasants to become wage-labourers, depriving them of control over their resources and reducing income potential.

Lawyers intimidated

The LBH, representing the farmers since February 1987, have not escaped government intimidation. In November 1988, two LBH representatives and four of

their clients were summoned to the local military command, then taken to the police station in Garut and accused of holding a subversive meeting and gathering the masses. The LBH members were released after a few hours but the farmers were held for two days. Meanwhile, the LBH insist that the letter refusing land rights to the peasants from the district chief, sent so long after the peasants' request, violated government regulations and that the question was anyway outside his authority.

Peasant protest and women's solidarity in Badega

Hundreds of families are being thrown off land they have worked since the 1940s so that a private company can establish a tea plantation. The 579 families grew food crops in the Badega area of West Java until the company, PT Surya Andaka Mustik (PT SAM) was given rights over the land by the government. The farmers protested by pulling up stakes marking the plantation area and pulling up tea seedlings in order to plant their own crops. As a result thirteen farmers including one woman are now in jail; five have been classified as ringleaders and eight as accessories. They face criminal charges.

Women demonstrate in Parliament

The Women's Group for Badega Solidarity, an organisation of housewives and students from several institutes of higher education, have launched a well-organised campaign to publicise the fate of the Badega families and demand that they are treated fairly. Such action by a women's group who significantly refer to themselves as *perempuan* (women) rather than the more genteel *wanita* (equivalent of 'lady') is unprecedented in Indonesia.

On January 21, fifteen members of the group demanded to speak to the Chairman of Parliament, Kharis Suhud in Jakarta. They entered the DPR building, saying they were going to the library, then demanded to see the leader of the House. Not to be fobbed off with a deputy, they sat on the steps in front of the House, giving out leaflets and stickers to House members and journalists, until five were granted an interview with Kharis Suhud. The women's accusations of incompetence against the regional assembly in West Java were countered by a 'be patient' plea from Suhud. [*Jakarta Post*, 21 January 1989]

The Badega land dispute had been simmering for

some time. The peasants who are represented by the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) have been attempting to gain government recognition of their ownership rights since 1984, two years before PT SAM were granted the rights. Their claim was based on government regulations which state that farmers are given priority for the possession of neglected plantation land if they have been working it continuously. The land, originally owned by a Dutch company, was abandoned during the Japanese occupation, then leased to another company who collected rents from the peasants; it reverted to the state in 1980.

In January 1985 the district chief replied to their request by refusing to recognise their rights, saying that plantation land must not change its function. In any case, they were told, the land was already in the process of being leased to PT SAM. More requests were sent by the peasants to the Interior and Agriculture Ministries, the West Java Governor and the District Chief. In July 1986 the land was acquired by PT SAM. Since then the company has been attempting to persuade the farmers to leave, promising them jobs at the tea plantation at Rp 600 per day.

Defending land is 'a criminal offense'

The thirteen now facing criminal charges were arrested in September 1988. In October, a team of fifty officials from the Agriculture Ministry, the local government, and members of the police and the military carried out a combined operation to erect a permanent fence and force the people off their land. The area of land worked by the families covered 498,416 hectares; they have received a risible 70 hectares from the authorities as replacement which means each family will get only 0.12 hectares. The

continued on page 7

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No 3, February 1989

DOWN TO EARTH

A NEWS SERVICE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN INDONESIA

TOWARDS A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE FOR INDONESIA

It is now twenty five years since the "Smallholder Commission" reported its report "Our Common Future" which called for a radical restructuring of the world economy to meet environmental challenges. To meet this threat, the United Nations' World Commission on Environment and Development, as it is more correctly termed, advocated the concept of 'sustainable development' by which development is made to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.

The Commission's importance lies in its demonstration of the immediate link between the problems of poverty, environmental degradation and the over-exploitation of natural resources. In combating poverty, securing environmental protection and achieving sustainable growth, the Commission has opened a new era in the development of a world where human rights and the principles of equity and social justice. The measures advocated by the Commission include:

- ordering land security for rural people, both through reviving land tenure legislation and through land reform
- supporting local people to give them a decisive voice in formulating policies about resource development in their area
- protecting the rights of vulnerable rural groups
- increasing the institutional capacity of developing countries to deal with local and environmental issues and integrate them into economic policy making
- protecting threatened habitats and species through improved resource use and the maintenance of protected areas.

Indonesia is a perfect example of a country where these basic pre-conditions for achieving 'sustainable development' are lacking. Rural populations are denied any voice in decision-making and the Government is pursuing an accelerated policy of economic liberalisation. In Indonesia, land today presents a point where the pressures on land in meeting profound rural struggles and in the continuing the process of land grabbing, with its rich city dwellers are purchasing agricultural land at profitable prices.

Land grabs have caused a rising rate of displacement and reduced the Government's determination to proceed with its Transmigration Programme, despite clear evidence that it has been a source of rural poverty and jeopardised environmental protection in the outer islands. By increasing the numbers of 'transmigrants' (transmigrants) moving the Government has maintained population pressure on land.

With constant fear of falling, as a result of world economic and improved energy efficiency in industry, Indonesia

Journalism a high risk profession

Two journalists have died in North Sumatra after being beaten up in separate incidents because of news items published by their newspapers. These deaths, along with other acts of violence against journalists, reveal that journalism is becoming a high-risk profession in Indonesia with little if any protection from the authorities.



Saud Batubara was found dead in Paya Pasir village, Medan last October. An autopsy revealed that he had died of stab wounds in the neck. Shortly before his death he wrote an article about a syndicate involved in baby-trafficking. In particular, he investigated the case of a woman who had agreed to sell her new-born baby because she was unable to pay hospital fees but later tried to annul the agreement and retrieve her child. When she took her dispute with the racketeers to the police, the police took the side of the racketeers and forced her to sign over the baby in exchange for cash. This was the letter later given to Saud Batubara which he used to report the scandal in *Sinar Indonesia Baru*, a newspaper published in Medan. *Tempo* reports that although the baby racket case is under police investigation, the police are not yet linking Saud's murder to that case.

Azhar Adam, a journalist working for the Medan newspaper *Sinar Pembangunan*, died last August after being beaten up by an official at the Medan office of the Traffic Department. Following the incident, the victim went to the police to report but after arriving home, he started vomiting blood. He died twenty days later in hospital. The official responsible for his death was tried but was acquitted; the court was not convinced that Azhar Adam had died as a result of being beaten up although his wife insisted that he had been in a state of shock ever since.

Two other journalists who have been beaten up in North Sumatra are Ismanto who writes for the Medan daily, *Waspada*, and Yoesdi Noer, who writes for *Bukit Barisan*.

Ismanto was set upon not for anything he wrote or for anything that appeared in the paper he works for. Another paper in the *Waspada* group, *Dunia Wanita*, had exposed a racket operating from the Rudi Pirngadi general hospital in Medan illegally taking blood from donors and selling it for transfusions. The

article warned that such racketeering was extremely dangerous as well as being illegal. The chief racketeer is actually quoted by *Tempo* as saying he knew that Ismanto did not work for *Dunia Wanita* but he was the only journalist from the *Waspada*-group around in the Pirngadi hospital.

Yoesdi Noer was beaten up by two police officers after being accused of handling stolen property when in fact he was collecting his own motorbike from a police lost property office.

Tempo lists other journalists who have been beaten up recently: a journalist of *Vista*, who was beaten up by the husband of the artist, Jenny Rachman; a *Merdeka* journalist in Kalimantan who was beaten up by a businessman; a *Pos Kota* journalist who was beaten up at the Central Jakarta District Court by the brother of a public prosecutor; and a journalist of the weekly, *Editor*, who was beaten up at Glugur Medan Hospital by a doctor. ■

[Source: *Tempo*, 4 March 1989]

Satanic Verses banned in Indonesia

The Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie has been banned in Indonesia by an edict of the Attorney-General issued in mid-March because the book "might disturb national stability". Before the ban was declared, there was already a partial ban on importing the book.

The Attorney-General warned anyone owning a copy or a photocopy of the book to turn it in or face up to a year in prison or a fine.

Several Muslim Councils have issued their own statements condemning the Rushdie book; the Aceh Council even supported Ayatollah Khomeini's call for the author to be done to death. ■

BULLETIN

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Women in clash with armed troops

Fifty peasant women protesting against the closure of an access road linking their village to the main road were confronted by armed troops when they tried to stop a wall being built to block up the road. Six of the women (*Kompas* later corrected this to seventeen) were badly injured when two army vehicles moving in reverse towards each other crushed the women in between. The troops then used tear-gas to disperse the women who showed no signs of wanting to move, even though their lives were seriously at risk from the continued movement of the trucks.

The disputed road is the only path linking their village, Susuk to the main thoroughfare in the city of Medan. It is their only route for bringing their products to market and its closure will force the villagers to take a long way round.

The villagers have lived in Susuk since 1949. They were persuaded to sell part of the land for the construction of the University of North Sumatra campus but they refused to sell the land where the road runs. The university has been trying since 1985 to close the road. An agreement was reached last November to narrow the road so that it was just wide enough for *becaks* and other three-wheeled carts to pass.

But the university authorities decided to block up the road anyway, claiming that it was a security risk. Despite strong protests, workmen were brought in to build a concrete wall. The fifty women staged a protest, shouting slogans, painting slogans on the wall and refusing to shift even when confronted by thirty armed troops.



The entrance to the road which is crucial to the women of Susuk. The slogans read: "Uphold justice and truth" and "Don't be power-crazy". [*Tempo*, 11 March 1989]

Following the incident, the women went to the Rector's office to protest. After meeting an official, they returned home to find that the wall had already been built, whereupon they resumed their protests and pulled down the concrete construction while it was still wet. The women are also to file a complaint against the military police. [*Kompas*, 4 and 14 March, and *Tempo*, 11 March 1989] ■

Sex education book banned

The Attorney-General has banned a book entitled *Adik Baru* or New Baby ('adik' means younger brother or sister) and has warned that anyone distributing, selling or possessing copies of the book is liable to be charged under Article 1 of Law No. 4/PNPS/1963, the anti-subversion law. The Attorney-General's ban said that the book 'borders on the pornographic'.

Adik Baru is a translation of a Swedish book entitled: *Peter, Ida und Minimum* which has been translated into many languages. It was published by PT Midas Surya Grafindo, and translated by Ing. Swanie Gunawan under the editorial control of Professor R. Conny Semiawan, a well-known educational specialist who was a member of the Executive Council of the International Society for the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect from 1983 to 1986.

The book went on sale earlier this year and led to cries of shame and offense in some newspapers because it contains illustrations of the male and female sex organs and explicit graphics about sexual intercourse. The book tells the story of a father whose wife is pregnant and of how he explains to his young son and daughter the process of reproduction and birth, to prepared them for the arrival of the new member of the family.

In a robust defence of the book, Wuri Sudjarmiko, a lecturer at Widya Mandala University, Surabaya, refutes claims that the book is titillating and a dangerous incitement to young children, or that it is

out of keeping with Indonesian attitudes towards sex. He argues that there are many books on sale at the bookshops and market stalls, freely available to anyone, including children, which depict sex more explicitly and in a very harmful way. No-one has ever suggested that such publications should be banned. [*Kompas*, 28 February 1989] ■

Pop singer's concerts banned

A number of concerts to be given by the popular rock singer, Iwan Fals, have been banned by the police. Many of the songs sung by Fals contain social criticism. The singer was planning to give a series of concerts in 100 cities throughout the country.

The first concert to be banned was to have taken place in Palembang on 10 March; permission had been granted by the local police but a few days before the concert, his manager was informed that the permit had been withdrawn on the orders of the Chief of Police in Jakarta. It is widely believed that the authorities in South Sumatra were afraid that support for the rebellion in nearby Lampung might have been expressed at the concert.

Other concerts Fals was due to give, in Padang, West Sumatra on 15 March, and later, in Medan, Lhokseumawa and Banda Aceh, have also been banned. [*Tempo*, 18 March 1989] ■

Looking back at SuperSemar

Twenty three years ago, on 11 March 1966, President Sukarno issued a letter of authorisation to General Suharto which became known as *Supersemar*, or *Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret*, the 11 March Instruction. Although the letter only authorised Suharto "to guarantee security and calm and the stability of Government...while securing the personal safety of (Sukarno)...and absolutely execute all (his) teachings", Suharto used it to take crucial political steps in contradiction to Sukarno's teachings.

In his autobiography (see separate item), Suharto is very defensive about this event, insisting that he assumed power by constitutional means, which is all the more the reason to look at the sequence of events connected with this letter.

* * * * *

Some political observers regard 11 March 1966 as the turning point, when Sukarno's *Orde Lama* (the Old Order) was replaced by Suharto's *Orde Baru* (the New Order). The following day, Suharto outlawed the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party, and one week later he ordered the arrest of 15 ministers in the Sukarno cabinet, including two deputy prime ministers.

Formally speaking this view may be correct but *de facto* Suharto had seized power much earlier. Already in October 1965, General Suharto had all the powers he needed to reverse the political situation by orchestrating the crackdown against the PKI and undermining Sukarno's control of events. He was commander of the army's strategic reserve command, Kostrad, commander of the all-powerful security command, Kopkamtib, commander of the army and chief-of-staff of Koti, the Supreme Command. What he now needed was Sukarno's formal authorisation to ban the already severely-battered Communist Party and to remove cabinet ministers loyal to Sukarno. *Supersemar* was the means by which he achieved this.

The events leading to Supersemar

Shortly before 11 March, it became known to generals loyal to Sukarno that the RPKAD, the para-commandos, was preparing to attack Istana Negara, the official residence of President Sukarno. Sukarno was advised to leave Jakarta for Bogor, some 60 kms away.

Three weeks earlier, on 21 February, President Sukarno had reshuffled his cabinet, infuriating Suharto's supporters by bringing in more Sukarno loyalists. General Nasution, who had escaped death on the night of 30 September, was replaced as Defence Minister by General Sarbini, a Sukarno loyalist. Other hard core anti-communists were replaced by Sukarno supporters. The only one to keep all his posts was General Suharto.

The cabinet changes provided the momentum for rightwing students organised in the Students Action Front, KAMI to step up their demonstrations in the cities, blocking traffic and making it virtually impossible for people to get to work. A close unity had been forged between the leaders of KAMI and the pro-Suharto officers, in particular in *Kostrad*.

In his autobiography, General Nasution,*) describes how he defied Sukarno, refusing to surrender his post at the Defence Department and preventing General Sarbini from taking over. Nasution told Sarbini: "It would be sinful for me to accept an unjust decision of the President just like that. I will

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Djakarta 66 is now being shown in cinemas throughout Indonesia. With the contents personally supervised by Suharto, it is part of his current obsession with writing his own history.

not give up the Ministry of Defence so easily".

In this period, General Nasution was instrumental in advising and supporting the action fronts of students, pupils and intellectuals. The deep-rooted antagonism between Nasution and Sukarno worked to Suharto's advantage. As the two men avoided each other, top-level communication took place only between Sukarno and Suharto and between Nasution and Suharto. Suharto stayed on good terms with both. Calls to oust Sukarno and ban the PKI were left to Nasution and the action fronts. As he chipped away at Sukarno's political base, Suharto projected an image of neutrality on these two crucial issues.

The action fronts had become increasingly shrill. Their *Tritura* or *Tri Tuntutan Rakyat*, the Three Demands of the People, called for the PKI to be banned, the cabinet to be 'retooled' and prices to be lowered. *Tritura* was almost certainly drafted by intelligence officers at *Kostrad*, who were coordinating



Drawing of Suharto by LURIE

the campaign against Sukarno.

On 25 February, the new Sukarno cabinet banned KAMI and all student gatherings. Far from reducing tensions, this led to even more demonstrations. Some government departments were attacked and Foreign Minister Subandrio, Sukarno's closest adviser, became a target. Although Subandrio was not a communist, his closeness to Sukarno and his position as head of BPI, the state intelligence body, made him a target for Kostrad intelligence. Another spin-off from the KAMI ban was that it split the territorial commanders. Those loyal to Sukarno would have to halt the student protests. The inevitable happened. Although KAMI was banned, most commanders allowed the demonstrations to continue. Things were leading to a showdown.

General Nasution and those loyal to him remained at army HQ 24 hours a day as the students stepped up their actions, crippling city life and the economy. Sukarno regarded the demonstrations as a kind of declaration of war and ordered the University of Indonesia in Jakarta to close. This merely fanned the flames and the demonstrations spread to other cities.

The Palace encircled

On 10 March, General Sabur, Sukarno's adjutant and commander of the Cakrabirawa regiment, the Palace guard, reported that army troops were concentrated outside the palace, ready to attack. Other officers alerted the President about this and advised him to leave for Bogor, which he did.

In his autobiography, Nasution refers to an encounter with General Alamsyah from Suharto's staff. Nasution was annoyed that the army had failed to arrest Subandrio and other cabinet ministers who were defying the military. Alamsyah told Nasution that in the army's view, several important commanders were still loyal to the President while others were wavering. However, said Alamsyah, Suharto had drawn up instructions for Subandrio's arrest. Some ministers were being so harassed by the students and the army that they were advised to stay at the palace overnight. In Bogor, Sukarno needed assurances about palace security before returning to Jakarta to preside over the cabinet meeting scheduled for 11 March. He got these assurances from General Amir Mahmud, the Jakarta military commander, and returned to Jakarta on the morning of 11 March.

Nasution quotes Slamet Bratanata, the Minister for

Mining, who explained what happened at the meeting:

One item on the agenda was the Cabinet's pledge of loyalty to the President. But it could not proceed because of an incident. Colonel Sumirat, police adjutant to the President, went back and forth, handing a slip of paper to General Amir Machmud, then commander of the Jakarta military command, who (for reasons not clear) had been asked by President Sukarno to attend the meeting. Three times Sumirat approached Amir Machmud, giving him a piece of paper. Each time Amir Mahmud put the note under his agenda.

Obviously getting impatient, Sumirat finally handed another piece of paper to Foreign Minister Subandrio who was sitting next to the President. Subandrio immediately showed Sumirat's note to the President following which there was a whispered conversation between the President and the four Vice-Premiers. After Dr. Leimena was asked to chair the meeting, President Sukarno flew to his palace in Bogor together with Subandrio and Chaerul Saleh. Because of the confusion around the Palace, Dr. Leimena closed the cabinet meeting without anyone signing the prepared loyalty statement. [Nasution page 389]

The signing of Supersemar

It was in this atmosphere of intimidation that President Sukarno and his two vice-premiers fled to Bogor by helicopter. They were soon followed by a second helicopter bringing three generals, General Amir Mahmud, the one who had declined to pass on Colonel Sumirat's notes to the President, General Mohammad Yusuf, minister for industry and General Basuki Rachmat, commander of the East Java Division.

It has never been explained why these three generals were the ones who went to Bogor to meet the President. One thing is clear: Sukarno had reason to regard them all as trustworthy and sympathetic. Their own version is that they wanted to tell the President not to feel alienated or discarded by the army. Amir Mahmud has revealed [see *Antara*, 10 March 1971] that before leaving for Bogor, they met General Suharto who had not attended the cabinet meeting as he was in bed with a sore throat. According to Amir Mahmud, Suharto asked them to tell the President "that we can save Pancasila and the '45 Constitution if we have the complete confidence of the President". [*Antara*, 10 March 1971]

In Bogor, according to Amir Mahmud, when the President asked Amir Mahmud what should now be done, he replied: "It's easy. Hand things over (*serahkan saja*) to Pak Harto and everything will be alright." [*ibid*] Then, a letter from Sukarno to Suharto was drafted by several people present. The draft was typed out by General Sabur and given to President Sukarno. After reading the document, the President, looking confused, showed it to Amir Mahmud who said: "It's fine Pak, Bismillah", to which Sukarno replied: "Bismillah irrahmanirahim" and signed the letter.

This is the document that later became known as the Supersemar. It later transpired that the President did not realise the full import of the document, but by signing this letter, he had signed his own political death-warrant. On the way home, Amir Mahmud told his colleagues that the document meant that Sukarno had signed over power to Suharto. It was with this piece of paper that the 'ailing' General Suharto banned the PKI the next day and later ordered the arrest of 15 cabinet ministers.

The importance of Supersemar

Why, if Suharto was virtually already in power, did he need the Supersemar as his ultimate weapon? The point is that, although he had already taken over,

Suharto wanted to avoid any clashes with air force, army or navy units still loyal to the President. On hearing that Suharto had banned the PKI, Sukarno tried to reverse things by issuing an announcement on 16 March, based on discussions with his four deputy prime ministers and armed forces chiefs, complaining about "a wrong attitude" towards the President. In response on the next day, "Suharto's forces seized control of the radio, all newspapers and the telephone, cable and telex services; they cut off Indonesia from the outside world... The next day, (18 March) Suharto attacked on every front open to him. He went to the Palace and increased his pressure on Sukarno to purge his cabinet while Sarwo Edhie's troops surrounded the compound and blocked approaching streets with barbed wire." [Brian May, *The Indonesian Tragedy*, page 142.] This was the point at which Sukarno finally lost the battle with Suharto.

The strategic importance of the PKI ban

The banning of the PKI was a strategic issue. The Communist Party had by now been virtually wiped out; practically the entire leadership had been killed and the majority of its surviving cadres were imprisoned or in hiding, posing no political threat. The ban destroyed the cornerstone of Sukarno's political concept of coalition between the three major forces, Nationalist, Religious and Communist, the *Nasakom* concept. This is why Sukarno so stubbornly refused to ban the PKI. A section of Suharto's own autobiography is devoted to this. Suharto reports Sukarno as telling him, prior to the Supersemar: "Har, people regard me as a world leader. I have proclaimed the Nasakom concept to the four corners of the earth. Now I have to ban the PKI. Where should I hide my face?" Sukarno was not prepared to give in, even when Suharto said: "If it is only for external consumption, you can use me as a bumper. I will ban the PKI, not you. But for domestic purposes, you should support me."

When this failed, Sukarno had to be dealt with by less persuasive means. In the end, he was tricked into the Supersemar trap.

Sukarno's political demise

Sukarno certainly did not realise the impact of the document he had signed nor could he have envisaged how Suharto would use it. His attempt to countermand Suharto's action foundered when Suharto used his troops to impose his will on the President. Alas for

Sukarno, the Supersemar machinery had already gone into action. Suharto, backed by many army officers, students and academics, pressed ahead, bypassing Sukarno more and more. In this post-Supersemar period, Suharto gradually assumed control of political affairs, ignoring Sukarno who spent the remaining years of his life living under house arrest at the home of his Japanese wife Dewi, where he died in total isolation in June 1970.



In the last few years, younger Indonesians have shown renewed interest in Sukarno. Politically, Suharto realises that he can benefit from a reappraisal of his predecessor. Sukarno's adulation can help his own image. Suharto wants to make sure that Indonesian history records the change of power from Sukarno to Suharto as having been done in a constitutional way. In his autobiography, Suharto portrays himself in the those early post-1965 days as a man of moderation and wisdom. As he puts it: "I was pressed in those days of political conflict to step forward. There were politicians who were getting impatient regarding the change of leadership. They even urged me to take power, just like that. My reply was that it would be better for me to retreat. Those ways are not correct. To grab power through military means will not provide the necessary stability. I am not prepared to leave a political testament that, in Indonesia, the power struggle was resolved by military force...." Unfortunately for Suharto, not everyone, even in the armed forces, agrees.■

*) See *Masa Kebangkitan Orde Baru (The Birth of the New Order)*, Volume VI of General A.H. Nasution's autobiography, *Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas (Responding to the Call of Duty)*, published in 1987.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

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The mystery of Suharto's autobiography

The publication of President Suharto's autobiography, scheduled to appear February, has been postponed indefinitely. Reliable sources in Jakarta reveal that the powerful General Moerdiono, the State Secretary, a position similar to the Chief of Staff of the White House, has advised the President not to allow the book to appear in its present form. In January excerpts were reproduced in the press. After some astonishment from friend and foe alike, a controversy broke out. His candid admission that thousands of 'mysterious killings' in 1983-84 were the work of the government created a stir among army officers, particularly loyal officers like General Benny Murdani, then armed forces commander, who at the time vehemently denied any government role in the killings. A Dutch newspaper now quotes him as saying: "I had to lie and lie and now he writes this" (*NRC Handelsblad* 9 March 1989).

Sources now say that influential generals feel offended by a number of Suharto's frank statements and have demanded 'corrections'. Hence General Moerdiono's advice to the President to act speedily.


No options

One option would be to publish the book, omitting the offending paragraph about the killings. [See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 91] However in January, a limited number of copies were distributed to editors, to help launch the book in February by quoting lengthy extracts. Not only the national press but also foreign publications quoted at length from these advance copies. Indeed it was an interesting phenomena: Suharto, one of the world's longest surviving rulers, publishing his memoirs while still in power. If the book were now to appear without the controversial paragraph, the damage would be very serious indeed.

Another point of contention appears to be his portrayal of Sukarno. In order to back his claim that he took power by constitutional means, he portrays Sukarno in a positive light, while showing himself to

be respectful but firm towards 'the old man'. Others in the regime regard Sukarno in a very different light, insisting on portraying him as having sided with the PKI and the events of 1 October 1965.

So it seems that Suharto's wish to determine how he goes down in history has backfired. ■



The front cover of a book that has failed to appear as scheduled.

Indonesia under fire at the UN in Geneva

Indonesia faced renewed criticism at the 1989 session of the UN Human Rights Commission regarding East Timor and former political prisoners. (For East Timor, see report on page 19)

Call on UN to investigate political persecution

In a statement about discrimination against former political prisoners, Jusfiq Hadjar called for a bold new initiative by the Human Rights Commission this year "to protect millions of people in Indonesia from a vicious and prolonged system of discrimination". The system had not been modified with the passage of time, he said. "On the contrary, the government has devised new ways of keeping up the pressure on these persecuted people by broadening the net to include members of their extended families."

Since the introduction of a Kopkamtib instruction in 1982, the concept of 'bersih lingkungan' or 'clean environment' has become a major factor in vetting job applicants, as well as purging political parties, the journalist profession, state and local assemblies and

much else besides. After citing some recent examples of the continuing purge, Hadjar said:

For close on quarter of a century, millions of people in Indonesia have been the victims of persecution and discrimination. These people, never found guilty of any crime in a court of law, have no hope of rehabilitation and the restoration of their civil rights. Unless the international human rights community takes action on their behalf, they and their offspring will live out the rest of their days as social outcasts. We therefore call upon the UN Commission of Human Rights:

1. To appoint a special rapporteur to investigate the systematic discrimination against these victims of political persecution in Indonesia.
2. To call upon the Indonesian Government to rehabilitate all those who are suspected of alleged involvement in organisations that were banned in 1965 and to revoke all regulations which in any way infringe their civil rights. ■

Journalists test the new regulations

Three journalists have recently visited East Timor, taking advantage of the Indonesian government's decision at the end of 1988 "to treat East Timor like other Indonesian provinces". This has enabled journalists to travel more widely in East Timor but it has not made it any easier for them to discover real conditions and seek the opinions of East Timorese people.

Shadowed by security personnel

Martin Cohn of the *Toronto Star* was not able to shake off security personnel: "When I asked to travel to remote villages in the province (sic), the government insisted on an escort of armed soldiers, plainclothes security officers and other officers. At some interviews, four notepads recorded the ensuing conversation: my own, plus those of the information officer, protocol officer and intelligence agent. It took a special plea to persuade my eight minders to stay behind during the visit to Venilale's orphanage. Still, a man identified to me as a government informer shadowed me and photographed anyone willing to be interviewed."

The orphanage Cohn visited in Venilale, south-east of Dili, is run by the Catholic Church and houses 150 children whose parents who are fighting in the bush. Although by day, soldiers bring rice and cookies, by night as the orphans sleep, "the officers send their troops back bearing automatic weapons. They encircle the orphanage and lie in wait, hidden in the bushes. The soldiers suspect armed guerrillas waging a bitter battle for independence may venture in from their jungle hideouts to look in on the children. The army regularly interrogates any nurses who treat the orphans, looking for scraps of information about their parents' whereabouts. Now the village's four nurses refuse to come near the orphanage. So the children go sick - suffering fevers, infections, intestinal diseases and malnutrition."

Cohn reported the remarks of Father Locatelli who runs the orphanage: "People are still scarred by the war, still afraid of the soldiers - because a war is a war. The officers are okay but the simple soldiers can be rough - that's the way they are. They just follow orders quickly, without much concern for the impact on local people."

Cohn was told about military operations the previous month near the technical school and farm run by Locatelli. "When the soldiers arrive in the fields, the farmers leave," he said. [*Toronto Star*, 5 February 1989]

Army has not lessened its grip

Juliet Rix of the London *Guardian* writes that although the opening "has eased travel restrictions...this does not mean that the army has lessened its grip." A travel permit is no longer needed although she said that potential travellers to Dili from West Timor are told that they need travel permits. "Details of foreigners' passports are meticulously noted on arrival and Indonesian identity cards which most Timorese now have are constantly checked." The military in East Timor are very reluctant to leave any foreigner alone. "Casual callers and potential guides often turn out to be members of the forces."

She spoke of military check-points every twelve



An Indonesian warship in Dili harbour.

miles. "Many Timorese are afraid to speak to foreigners for fear of subsequent interrogation which may still involve physical as well as mental abuse." [*The Guardian*, 22 February]

Criteria for visits to Indonesia

East Timor solidarity groups meeting in Copenhagen in February 1989 adopted the following decision about visits to East Timor:

Considering that Indonesia has no legal right to be in East Timor, any visit to the country should be able to proceed without interference from the Indonesian authorities; considering also that, even though Indonesia says that East Timor is "opening up", the government will not allow anyone to enter who opposes the principle of occupation;

we therefore have immediate reservations about any visits which do not fulfil the following conditions:

- a. free movement throughout the whole of East Timor,
- b. unsupervised free access to all Timorese,
- c. visitors should be able to choose their own independent interpreters and advisers,
- d. visitors should be able to stay in East Timor for as long as they need,
- e. no limit on the number of persons in the group,
- f. recognition that East Timorese are under strong pressure not to speak out for fear of retaliation by the Indonesian authorities.

Five areas still closed in January

A Japanese journalist who visited East Timor at the beginning of January was told that because of continuing armed clashes between rebel forces and the military, five areas had not been opened up 'for

security reasons' and he could only visit by helicopter. Although in one place he visited, he was told by officials that there was no more fighting, a resident told him that there were several clashes in July and November and several people were killed.

The journalist wanted to witness the 'opening up' of East Timor in Dili on 1 January. But "one couldn't feel

a mood of welcome from the people, so it was disappointment. I asked everyone I met, 'What will change with the opening?' But the only answer I got was from a few who can afford expensive air fares: 'I'm happy that the troublesome procedures for getting travel permits will not be necessary.' But for the vast majority of poor Timorese, things will not change for some time, and even though they knew the news, the vast majority said they 'did not know' what it had to do with them." [*Yomiuri Shimbun*, 14 January 1989]■

British MPs visit East Timor

Seven British parliamentarians, four Tory and three Labour, visited East Timor on 7-8 March. They were in Indonesia on the invitation of the Indonesian Parliament.

TAPOL has learnt from Labour MP, Ann Clwyd that the first day in East Timor was spent meeting Governor Mario Carrascalao and visiting Becora Prison where they met four prisoners. Although a meeting with Bishop Belo was included on their programme, the MPs were told that he was not available to see them. This is unusual as the Bishop normally meets virtually all foreign visitors. This made it impossible for the MPs to hear for themselves the views of the Bishop about treatment of detainees, following his forthright statement on the question last December.

One prisoner they met was Alexi Guterres, who acted as a go-between for a meeting with the Fretilin leadership. In a discussion attended only by three MPs and an interpreter from the British Embassy, Guterres told them he had been badly beaten and tortured on two occasions, from 24-26 October 1986 and from 9-12 November 1987. He was later tried and given a sentence of 12 years, later reduced to 7 years.

Request to visit Baucau turned down

A request by the MPs to visit Baucau was turned down because "no helicopter was available". Ann Clwyd later protested about this at a meeting with Defence Minister General Benny Murdani.



A game of volley-ball in an area controlled by Fretilin. A scene that visitors from abroad cannot enjoy.

The only event on the MPs' second day was a trip out of Dili to attend the installation of a district chief. "There was no time for sight-seeing and we did not meet a single ordinary East Timorese so had no chance to speak to anyone about conditions in general," Ann Clwyd told TAPOL.

We hope to interview Ann Clwyd about her visit for the next issue.■

West Papua: The Obliteration of a People



tapol

West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

Published by: Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

West Papua, formerly Dutch West New Guinea, has been an Indonesian colony since 1963. The changeover took place during a period of severe repression, under Indonesian military occupation, yet it received formal United Nations approval.

Since then, the West Papuan people have suffered racial discrimination, arrest and detention, torture, massacres, disappearances and extra-judicial killings. A liberation movement has taken root. Many thousands have been killed as the result of military operations to suppress this movement.

West Papua has become a centre for transmigration, Indonesia's vast resettlement programme. West Papua's copper, petroleum and timber have contributed substantially to Indonesia's revenues and foreign exchange earnings.

Publication date: December 1988
160 pages including 7 pages of photos
Price: £3.50, plus postage
ISBN 0 9506751 5 6

Regulating 'openness'

Although East Timor has now been given the same administrative status as an Indonesian province, the military authorities are anxious to ensure that this does not result in outsiders, particularly foreigners, wandering around unchecked. As for the Timorese, the new regulations do not seem to mean that travel will become any easier.

Foreign visitors 'advised' to report

Interior Minister, General Rudini set the tone with a statement 'advising' foreigners wishing to visit the interior of East Timor to consult the local military commander "for safety reasons". Insisting that there is no problem at all, Rudini admitted that "a number of armed rebels are still roaming the mountainous areas... If a foreigner is held at gun-point, that will be a problem." [*Jakarta Post*, 7 February 1989]

It then became clear that persons wishing to visit East Timor still need a permit from the police of the province of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), in Den Pasar, causing Governor Mario Carrascalao to complain that the authorities are in breach of presidential decision making East Timor 'the same as other provinces'. In addition, he said, police posts existed at the border between East Timor and NTT, giving the impression that East Timor is not the same at all. "If I want to go to West Java or East Java, I don't have to report to a police post..." [*Suara Pembaruan*, 16 February 1989]

New controls for East Timorese

Until the end of 1988, under East Timor's status as a 'special region', freedom of movement for the Timorese was hampered by the need to possess a travel permit or *surat jalan*. For those wishing to travel between sub-districts, permits were issued by the local military authorities with signed authorisation from a number of local authorities.

Now, all East Timorese are being issued with new

identity cards or *Kartu Tanda Penduduk* (KTP). Formerly KTPs were issued by village heads, with the approval of the local military officer or *babinsa* and counter-signed by senior officers. The system was described to TAPOL by a former village head in an interview in Lisbon last year. Anyone not possessing a KTP could not get a job, open a shop, obtain a driving licence or enrol at a school. [See TAPOL's statement to the UN Decolonisation Committee in August 1988, published as *Occasional Reports No. 9*]

It now appears that the KTP system is being overhauled, with responsibility being shifted to the local administrative officials, the district and sub-district chiefs. The significance of this change for the East Timorese remains to be seen.

Surat jalan still needed

It is claimed by some officials that the new-style KTPs will take the place of the *surat jalan* (SIJ). Yet, the East Timor chief-of-police, Colonel Rusman Hadi, when asked whether SIJs would be needed, "replied cautiously that a decision will be taken that, possibly in some regions, SIJs will be needed. Elsewhere the KTP will be sufficient. The SIJs will be issued by the village head or the local chief of police. 'Using a KTP to travel has been in force for some time, and SIJs will be restricted to only a few areas,' he said, without mentioning any of the areas." [*Suara Pembaruan*, 23 January 1989] ■

Solidarity groups meet in Copenhagen

East Timor solidarity groups in Europe held their ninth international gathering in Copenhagen on 11-12 February, hosted by IWGIA, the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. The meeting was attended by 14 organisations from Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Also present for the second time was a representative of the Japanese Free East Timor Coalition.

Abilio Araujo's report

Attending for the East Timor National Convergence, Abilio Araujo of Fretilin gave an assessment of the situation in East Timor and abroad. He reported that:

* Indonesian operations against the Timorese have continued with losses on both sides. Indonesian strategy combines military operations with smaller target manoeuvres, but they have failed to achieve their objective of destroying the leadership.

* Political and cultural resistance has increased over the past year. The Saint Anthony Movement is a mass religious movement opposed to both the Indonesians and the Catholic Church hierarchy.



Abilio Araujo, Fretilin, addressing the solidarity groups in Copenhagen.

* Communications are enabling publications to reach the country from outside.

* The National Convergence of UDT and Fretilin has entered a new stage with official discussions with the Portuguese Foreign Minister, as part of a strategy to find a diplomatic solution.

* Fretilin leader, Xanana, wrote to the Portuguese Parliament recently stating his willingness to meet any Portuguese MPs travelling to East Timor to discuss Fretilin's Peace Plan.

Abilio Araujo also brought embroidered emblems and badges made by the women of the East Timor resistance, as gifts to the participating organisations.

The conference analysed the situation in East Timor while developing concrete action plans for the coming months. The main conclusion was, in spite of assertions to the contrary, that there has been no improvement in human rights in East Timor. The meeting was told that an estimated 2000 Timorese people were killed during 1988 while 3000 were arrested arbitrarily in Dili prior to the visit of General Suharto to Dili. It noted the reaction of Bishop Ximenes Belo of East Timor on 5 December: "We oppose this barbaric system and condemn the lying propaganda, according to which human rights violations do not exist in East Timor".

After analysing changes in Indonesian policy towards East Timor, the meeting formulated minimal conditions regarding visits to East Timor

before this year's IGGI meeting in June, to petition the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York in August, and raise the issue of East Timor at a Peace Conference to be held in The Hague in June 1989 on the initiative of Nicaragua. The meeting welcomed the European Parliament resolution on East Timor (Doc. 82-143/88) adopted September 1988, the strongest resolution on East Timor in recent years which was a resounding defeat for Indonesia's 1988 diplomatic offensive. It also discussed the possibility of arranging a hearing on East Timor in Strasbourg after the European Parliament elections in June 1989 and requesting the European Commission to file a progress report on the situation in East Timor.

The meeting also welcomed the principled diplomatic initiative being taken in Portugal to implement Article 297 of the Constitution to "promote and guarantee the right to the independence of East Timor". The conference favoured realisation of a plan for an international conference of MPs on East Timor and hoped this would take place in Lisbon in 1989.

The European delegates were impressed by the rapid rise and consolidation of the Free East Timor Coalition in Japan and will support internationally its work of trying to lobby and influence public opinion and Japanese Government policy on East Timor.

The conference also decided to send a letter to Amnesty International criticising its recent statements on human rights in East Timor. A copy of this statement can be obtained from IWGIA, Fiolstraede 10, Dk-1171, Copenhagen K, Denmark.

The next conference will take place in January 1990, either in Spain or the UK. ■


Actions in 1989

It discussed coordination to strengthen *Parliamentarians for East Timor* (PET), lobby governments

UDT leader in Lisbon dies

The leader of the UDT in Lisbon, Dr. Moises do Amaral, died suddenly of a heart attack on 15 February. Dr do Amaral was a fervent Timorese nationalist who supported resistance to Indonesian rule in East Timor and took a leading part in setting up the East Timor National Convergence in March 1986.

His funeral on 16 February was attended by many hundreds of people from all sections of the East Timorese community and turned into an occasion for the expression of strong solidarity between the UDT and Fretilin. Many Portuguese politicians and activists were also present to pay their last tribute to a well-respected East Timorese leader. ■



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TAPOL Occasional Reports Series

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Copies from TAPOL, 50 pence a copy (80 pence including postage).

Birth control scare in Dili

There is renewed fear in East Timor that women are being subjected to forced sterilisation. The first hint came with a statement by Haryono Suyono, head of the Family Planning Agency (BKKBN), denying that compulsion was being used by his Agency in East Timor. [STT, 1-7 Dec 1988]

The denial was apparently in response to suspicions aroused when all the girls but none of the boys at high schools in Dili were given injections, and were told they were anti-tetanus injections. The matter was given a brief public airing when the Dili-based newspaper, *Suara Timor Timur* reported that three schoolgirls visited the paper's office in December and said they had been given allegedly anti-tetanus injections which led to a 'misunderstanding' that they were being sterilised. [STT, 26 Jan - 1 Feb, 1989]

The matter was taken no further by the paper but Governor Mario Carrascalao spoke about the issue during an interview with *Matra*, a monthly journal for business executives. Asked why he recently spoke angrily to doctors and medical personnel, he said:

They recently carried out an injection programme in the State SMA I and II and SMEA schools [upper secondary schools]. Only the women were injected and they were told they were anti-tetanus injections. Okay. So I asked: 'Why only the women?' I was told: 'To ensure that if they get married later on and become pregnant, their children will not fall ill.'

So I told them that birth control in East Timor is a very sensitive issue. Up to now we have kept a low

profile, not using all kinds of things. But now the issue has blown up, about the BKKBN asking the health authorities to carry out a programme of injections said to be for anti-tetanus but in fact for sterilisation. The birth control programme is a national programme, but a national programme for regions where conditions are normal....

Then the story spread overseas, that Indonesia is carrying out sterilisation in East Timor in order to exterminate the East Timorese. So I said: 'You gentlemen have provided material which can be used by people abroad to condemn the Indonesian government. [Matra, January 1989]

Although Carrascalao was hoping to undo the damage done by this injection programme, the effect is just the opposite. Few people are likely to believe the explanation about anti-tetanus injections. This is possibly the clearest evidence that forced sterilisation is indeed being carried out in East Timor. ■

UN 'Population Award' for Suharto
Indonesia's President, General Suharto, whose regime came to power in the wake of massacres which left an estimated one million people dead and whose invasion of East Timor brought death and destruction to a third of the population, is to receive the UN's 1989 Population Award. Suharto will travel to New York to receive the Award on 8 June.

Former Dili official speaks out

As in previous years, an East Timorese refugee this year addressed the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, just four months after leaving Dili.

Testifying about the human rights situation in East Timor was Joao Maria do Reis who, until he left Dili in October 1988, was employed by the Department of Information in the provincial administration. The Department is headed by a Timorese but 95% of the officials are Indonesian. They control foreign visits, choose places to be visited as well as the people who may speak to foreign visitors.

Although he was privileged as a civil servant, he said: "I chose to leave my country because I did not feel at ease under foreign occupation and also in order to escape from persecution from which no Timorese is ever safe."

He was arrested three times, in December 1975 in October 1976 and in December 1980 when he was falsely accused of taking part in an attack on Dili's TV centre. On each occasion he was tortured.

He testified about the following case which occurred in 1988:

Three students from Cribas, one of whom was my



The heads of two Timorese killed by Indonesian troops in October 1988.

cousin, Domingos Alves, were forced by Red Berets to go into the bush... to contact the resistance. They carried with them a document... in case they were

Raising the flag in Jayapura

By Evelien van den Broek, West Papua Volksfront

On 14 December last year, 66 Papuans, including men, women, teenagers and old people, marched to the Mandala Sports Stadium in Jayapura and pulled down the Indonesian flag. In its place, they raised the West Papuan flag, the *Sampari* or Morning Star, together with the flag of Papua New Guinea. Indonesian troops rushed in, arrested most of the demonstrators and drove them away in vans. This is the first time that such a large group of people has been engaged in such a demonstrative act of defiance.

During their detention, the women were stripped naked and harassed by soldiers. At the end of December, 33 of the detainees were released. In January, the *West Papua Volksfront* (People's Front) in Holland received reports that ten of the detainees were killed. According to the Papua New Guinea press, six people were due to be tried in Jayapura at the beginning of February, while another seven were also reported to be awaiting trial. [*Times of Papua New Guinea*, 26/I - 1/II, 1989] No reports about these trials have appeared in the Indonesian press and the flag-raising event was not reported either.

In solidarity, more than sixty Papuans and Dutch sympathisers marched on 9 February from the International Court of Justice in The Hague to the Indonesian Embassy where they hoisted the *Sampari*. For almost three hours, the street in front of the Embassy was occupied by people waving *Sampari* and Vanuatu flags, singing West Papuan songs and shouting anti-Indonesian and pro-OPM slogans.

Flag-raising, a symbol of resistance

Since the beginning of the Indonesian occupation, raising the *Sampari* flag has been used as a demonstration of West Papuan nationalism and resistance. West Papuans are well aware of the risks involved, but in a country where it is forbidden to have your



West Papua's Morning Star unfurled outside the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague on 9 February.


own political party and where freedom of expression is non-existent, people seek ways of letting the world know about their plight. These are some of the best-known cases:

* On 4 August 1980, six women from the village of Orma raised the *Sampari* flag in the forecourt of the provincial governor's office. They were all arrested on the spot and suffered maltreatment and rape during their detention. One of the women gave birth to a son while in detention. Several years after their arrest, they were tried and given prison sentences. They served their sentences in Wamena in the Baliem Valley, making contact with their families difficult.

* In July 1980, a flag-raising protest took place in

continuation from page 19

intercepted by any Indonesian battalion. The first day they were found by the 125 battalion which, ignoring the document, separated Domingos from the other two and proceeded to torture him, using a knife. When they heard his screams, the other two tried to escape. One was shot but the other managed to reach the village and informed Domingos' relatives. Domingos' father protested to the Red Berets but only after three days did he manage to get authorisation to go to the place where it had happened. He found the body of his son. His head had been severed from the body and sexual organs cut off and stuffed in the mouth. Back at the village he received orders not to divulge what had happened. It was an Indonesian that reported all this to me, and later I got confirmation from relatives. ■



Sentani, west of Jayapura, where the airport is located and where there is a heavy concentration of troops. The troops were asleep at the time. When they woke up and discovered what had happened, they rushed to Abepura and opened fire on defenceless civilians. Five people were shot dead, three were wounded and fifteen were arrested.

* On 3 July 1982, nine students of Cendrawasih University pulled down the Indonesian flag in front of the provincial assembly building in Jayapura. They raised the Sampari flag and read out a proclamation of the state of West Papua. They were all arrested immediately and later tried. Four of the students received ten-year sentences, three received seven-year sentences and the others were given four-year sentences. The four with longer sentences were moved to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya, East Java to serve out their sentences far from home and their families.

* In February 1984, a man raised the Sampari flag in Jayapura. He was shot dead on the spot.

WEST PAPUA

The men and women who hoist the Sampari flag are peace-loving people who want an end to Indonesian oppression and the violation of human rights. They try in this way to give expression to their nationalist sentiments and the right of the West Papuan people to self-determination.

Flag-raising may seem to be an innocent outlet for Papuan aspirations, but in face of the harsh reactions of the Indonesian authorities, they have become courageous acts of resistance to foreign domination.

Thousands of tribal people threatened by Scott Paper

If Scott goes ahead with its investment in West Papua, 15,000 tribal people will lose traditional rights over land in the forests of the Digul River watershed which has supported their hunter-gatherer way of life for thousands of years. The Auyu, Marind, Mandobo and Yahray tribes all own sago stands in Scott's 790,000 hectare concession area, in Merauke province, West Papua. They also harvest other forest products including the leaves and bark of the *kayu putih* tree which are sold to make medicinal oils.

The paper giant claims that 6,000 jobs will be created by the eucalyptus wood chipping and pulp processing venture but these are likely to go to transmigrants from Java, not to local tribespeople. Besides, the Indonesian government will feel more obliged to help its Javanese subjects already in West Papua, who are enduring hardships on transmigration sites. Astra, the Indonesian partner in Scott-Astra Cellulosa, expressed the hope that transmigrants would be employed (*Tempo*, 4 February 1989) although another source said as many indigenous people as possible would be absorbed. With Indonesia's attitude towards tribal unmistakably one of superiority, it is not hard to guess who Astra will prefer to employ.

Tempo explains that the enterprise has already become 'a national project' in Indonesia's strategy to generate revenue from the non-oil and gas sector. Such is the importance attached to the venture that the concession area has been sealed off by the military and the government has announced that opposition to the project will be regarded as 'anti-nationalist' behaviour.

Indonesian NGOs speak out

Nevertheless, Indonesian NGOs have voice opposition. A press statement issued by ten NGOs in December demanded more access to information on the project and consideration of alternatives which would be less destructive to the environment of the people of Digul. As a result, on January 5, NGOs were invited to a meeting by Emil Salim, the Population and Environ-



West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea, with a visitor from Port Moresby, shortly after their arrival in PNG in 1984.

ment Minister attended by forestry, industry and population and environment officials, members of the Irian Jaya planning board and Scott Paper representatives. Scott presented plans for an environmental impact assessment and, at the insistence of the NGOs, undertook to carry out a social impact assessment based on terms of reference decided by the NGOs.

It is unlikely that after spending millions of dollars on the impact analysis and test plots, Scott will pack up and go home. On the contrary, it is widely feared that the company will start clearing large areas in preparation for eucalyptus plantations before the assessments have been concluded.

Barry Kotek, managing director of Scott, and Ivan Trubacek, Manager of World Wide Fibre Strategy, made a tour of the concession site in December, meeting with the regional government. They then returned to Jakarta and met Salim. Paul Wolfowitz, US

ambassador was reportedly also at the meeting - an indication of the importance attached to the deal by Washington.

International concern

The Scott project has attracted attention from campaigners worldwide including Friends of the Earth, Pollution Probe and Survival International. After writing several letters, TAPOL finally received a reply from Scott - a standard letter assuring us that "in completing the environmental and sociological

assessments, we will be working with local special interest groups and the government, as well as the officials and peoples of Irian Jaya". But the damage has already been done. Scott's concession was confirmed and the pulp mill permit approved before anybody thought of talking to 'the peoples of Irian Jaya'.

Astra to continue regardless

Even if Scott withdraws, Astra says the project will go ahead. Scott's rival, Kleenex, is looking for an investment in West Papua. With another paper giant waiting in the wings, Astra's task of wooing a new partner should not prove difficult. ■

Transmigration and security

One of the sinister - and rarely mentioned - motives of the transmigration programme has again been confirmed by Defence Minister, General Murdani. Speaking at a Young Transmigrant Pioneer meeting, he said transmigration was not only concerned with population redistribution but was "related to the importance of territorial development which also means spreading out human resources as a defence and security potential". [Pelita, 14 January 1989]

Transmigration is explained in various ways, according to who is doing the explaining, and why. To international lending agencies it is presented as a programme for poverty relief and outer island development; those concerned for the welfare of local peoples in transmigration areas are told that the programme is designed to benefit locals as well as the Javanese transmigrants. Transmigration appeals to Indonesian nationalists who regard it as instrumental in the achievement of national unity. It should hardly be surprising therefore, that the Minister of Defence stresses its role in national security and defence.

But such statements are surprising and rare because the government has tended to play down this uncompromisingly *political* aspect of transmigration. Funding the deployment of a permanent Javanese *cordon sanitaire* along borders and in other 'trouble spots' would hardly be the most palatable way to describe what the World Bank and other international supporters are funding, even though this security motive is well known.



Transmigrants in Semarang, Central Java, setting out for their new homes.

Transmigration to keep its momentum

The present Transmigration Minister, Lieutenant-General Sugiarto, more cautious than his predecessor, has made some startling announcements recently. Despite the bad publicity and mounting criticism since the *Ecologist* critique of 1986, despite the World Bank's reservations about supporting the programme, Sugiarto has announced that the target for transmigration in the coming five year economic plan (1989-1994) will be 550,000 families. 370,000 of these will be *transmigran swakarsa* (self-financing) and only 180,000 families will be fully supported by the government. Evidently the idea is to keep numbers up and costs down. To accommodate these new arrivals, the government is to construct 275 new residential areas comprising 1,100 new transmigration sites, in Sumatra, Sulawesi, Kalimantan and West Papua. Construction on such a vast scale can only lead to the impoverishment of local communities and will inflict yet more damage on the already over-burdened environment.

Sugiarto's announcement represents a confirmation of the government's commitment to transmigration: around two million people will be resettled in new

sites when many transmigrants in existing sites are still in dire need of help. Disease, malnutrition, infertile soil, lack of roads and markets, inadequate housing and health care; these are some of the problems being faced by many transmigrants.

\$189 million more international aid

International support plays a major role. \$650 million has so far been provided by the World Bank and a new loan of \$150 million was negotiated in November 1988. The fact that the latest loan is to be channelled towards improving the existing sites and building road links indicates that the Bank has been feeling the pressure from the critics. But the general direction of the transmigration policy is not affected.

In addition, the UN World Food Programme has recently announced a new injection of \$39 million food aid for transmigrants in Sumatra.

These new funds will free government funds from these support responsibilities so that they can be directed towards the funding of new sites to ensure that transmigration keeps up its momentum. ■

IGGI aid and the budget

When President Suharto visited Tokyo in February to attend the funeral of Emperor Hirohito, the war criminal whose imperial army occupied Indonesia and exploited its people for three-and-a-half years, he made sure of utilising the 'solemn' occasion to persuade the Japanese Government to grant Indonesia even more economic assistance than last year. With still four months to go before the 1989 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), Suharto discussed this year's aid with both Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita and Barber Conable, President of the World Bank.

58.2% rise in revenue from external aid

Indonesia's reliance on foreign aid is now greater than ever. The 1989/1990 budget announced by Suharto in January provided for a 58.2% increase in revenue from foreign aid, which rose from 7,160 trillion rupiahs in 1988/1989 to 11,325 trillion rupiahs. Dependence on foreign aid for government investment, normally referred to as 'economic development', has increased from a massive 80% in the current financial year to 86% in 1989/1990. Indeed, it was thanks only to the huge increase in foreign aid announced at last


than \$1 billion, an all-time record.

So far, all that is known about 1989 is that the World Bank has agreed to provide credit worth \$350 million to boost private enterprise in Indonesia. The last credit negotiated by the Bank in 1988 was \$150 million for the transmigration programme. The Asian Development Bank has agreed to increase its credit to Indonesia from \$560 million to \$600 million in 1989.

'Bloodletting' debt servicing

The gravity of Indonesia's dependence on external credit was spelt out by former cabinet minister, Moh. Sadli who wrote about the "bloodletting amount of debt service payments" which is now by far the largest single item in state expenditure. "The inflow of new aid will probably about equal repayments of principal, and if interest is included, then there will be a net outflow." [*Jakarta Post*, 23 December 1988]

Indonesia's debt service ratio, the percentage of foreign currency earnings absorbed to service its foreign, now stands at over 36% ■



A rattan factory near Surabaya, East Java. The export of rattan furniture is part of the drive to compensate for falling foreign exchange earnings from oil.

year's IGGI meeting that Suharto was able this year to announce an expansionary budget, attempting to reverse the stagnation that has marked Indonesia's economy in previous years. IGGI aid rose last year to \$5.7 billion, which was nearly 80% higher than the \$3.15 billion provided in 1987. The chief source of this increase was Japan whose aid last year, at \$2.3 billion, was 87% higher than in the previous year. [See *TAPOL Bulletin No 88, August 1988*]

During his meeting with Takeshita, Suharto asked Japan to increase its 'special aid' from \$1.7 billion last year to \$1.9 billion this time round. Unlike project aid which is tied to specific projects, 'special aid' is convertible into rupiahs on the currency market. It is indeed likely that Indonesia will depend more than ever on Japanese economic assistance as other IGGI countries, and possibly also the multilateral agencies like the World Bank, may find it difficult to go on paying out more and more to Jakarta each year. Last year, World Bank loans to Indonesia amounted to more

IGGI member countries

Readers wishing to raise the question of Indonesia's human rights record with IGGI member governments should note that the following countries attend the annual meetings as members or observers:

Australia	Austria
Belgium	Denmark
Canada	France
West Germany	Italy
Japan	Netherlands
New Zealand	Spain
Switzerland	Sweden
United Kingdom	USA

This year's meeting will take place in June in Amsterdam.

TAPOL writes to Japanese Prime Minister

On 20 February, TAPOL wrote to Noboru Takeshita, the Japanese Prime Minister asking him to use the occasion of his forthcoming meeting with President Sukarno to raise the question of East Timor. It said that Indonesia was now the largest recipient of Japanese overseas aid, and went on: "We firmly believe that the massive aid which your Government grants to Indonesia should be made conditional on the cessation of human rights abuses in East Timor and the conduct of a genuine act of self-determination for the people of East Timor."

It also drew attention to Japan's increasing importance in the World Bank and the IMF. "We hope that the Japanese member on the (Bank's) Board of Directors will pay close attention to the Bank's own criteria regarding land rights for rural people... and ensure that the Bank pays due regard for social and environmental issues in Indonesia." ■

Student protest, a new generation

Students from a number of universities held an 'Anti-Violence' demonstration in Jogjakarta on 25 February. There were many posters proclaiming anger at the penetration of violence in all aspects of life. The students shouted slogans and listened to protest poetry read by the poet, Emha Ainun Najib.

"In the past few years, violence has become part of our environment. Violence has entered the core of our being. Violence is perpetrated against our body and soul. Anger and arbitrariness are the only response to differences of opinion and dissent," said one speaker.

There was a protest march from Lapangan Pancasila to the Gajah Mada University (UGM) campus at Bulaksumur. Security forces were conspicuous everywhere but the event passed off peacefully. [*Suara Merdeka*, 26 February and 1 March]

The UGM Rector, Professor Kusnadi Hardjasumantri later summoned students involved in the protest to warn them that any future action of this nature would result in firm measures against those responsible. He alleged that by taking their action outside the campus, the students "might invite disruption" as it can involve the "uncontrolled masses". He also chastised the students for not seeking permission or even informing the university authorities. One of the organisers said in response that they had deliberately not sought permission for what was intended to be a spontaneous action. "We felt it best not to inform the Rector. In any case, the student senates (officially-recognised campus bodies) would not have supported our action." [*Kompas*, 28 February]

Calls for campus freedom

The Jogjakarta action came after many calls in late 1988 for political freedoms to be restored in the campuses. Ten years ago, after student demonstrations in 1978, the government clamped down on student organisations by introducing a policy called 'Normalisation of Campus Life' (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus*).

The Education Minister, Fuad Hassan, judged in some circles to be a liberal, has had difficulty defending government policy against growing discontent among the students. On a visit to Jogjakarta to open an art exhibition last November, posters were suddenly unfurled at the meeting and a student representing the Jogjakarta Students Communication Forum rose to read out a statement calling for the restoration of campus autonomy. Although attempts were made by his staff to extricate the Minister by claiming he had to hurry back to Jakarta, he agreed to stay for a quarter of an hour to discuss the students' grievances. [*Kompas*, 21 November 1988]

Later the Department's chief of higher education, Soekadji Raneowihardjo, stepped in to justify NKK. In any case, it would not be easy to change the policy as "many relevant agencies" besides the Education Ministry were involved. [*Jakarta Post*, 16 December]

Sukadji later announced that the government has now agreed on a definitive interpretation of 'academic

freedom', warning in a letter to university chiefs that "misinterpretations must stop before things worsen". By government edict, academic freedom has nothing to do with students. It belongs only to academicians "who can exercise the right to conduct academic activities such as research and debates for purely academic purposes". [*Jakarta Post*, 16 December]

To put a stop to the growing demands for an end to NKK, Major-General Asmono (whose full title is 'Assistant for Social-Political Affairs of the Chief-of-Staff for Social-Political Affairs' or *Assospol Kasospol* for short) declared that a "tiny minority of students are creating a fuss about it" and were trying to "build their own potential and *a priori* to oppose the government". Student demonstrations and opposition to the government were "not only not relevant, they could also disrupt national stability in all fields", he said. [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 26 January 1989]

'Sospol' permits needed

Students wishing to undertake studies in society in order to write essays for degree courses must first apply to the social-political chief of the provincial government for permission. "The procedure for getting these permits is extremely complicated," said one student, during a lecture at a management course given by the Minister of Education. The Minister expressed "utter amazement" that this was necessary, even though he was told that special permits were required in virtually every part of the country. He asked to be given details from every university and institute. When he told the students that academic freedom meant that "everyone has the right to develop their scientific thought", students responded by saying that such 'freedoms' were obstructed by the difficulty of obtaining permits for investigative work. [*Kompas*, 30 January]

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