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The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 88

August 1988

# Parliamentarians take action for East Timor

Parliamentarians from the UK, Australia and Japan have agreed to launch a new organisation, **Parliamentarians for East Timor** to coordinate and promote activities in support of a just solution to the problem of East Timor in as many countries as possible.

The decision came at the end of a three-day visit to Lisbon from 25-28 June by Lord Avebury, chair of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group in the UK, Tony Lamb, Member of the House of Representatives and convenor of the Parliamentary East Timor Forum, Canberra, and Eda Satsuki, member of the Japanese Diet and secretary of the Japanese Forum of Parliamentarians to think about East Timor.

During the visit, the three parliamentarians held discussions with members of the East Timor community, with representatives of the East Timor Convergence, Jose Ramos Horta of Fretilin and Dr. Moises do Amaral of UDT, and with Mario Soares, the President of Portugal, the Deputy Foreign Minister, the Speaker of the Portuguese Parliament and nine members of the Parliamentary Commission on East Timor.

In a statement, the parliamentarians said they had heard again "recent evidence of killings, torture, disappearance and rape. Contrary to the view expressed by some governments, human rights violations are still very serious. Foreign visitors get a distorted picture through the use of careful stage management."

They announced a number of initiatives including the publication of an account of the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor, an approach to the UN Secretary-General regarding consultations with the people of East Timor as required by General Assembly resolution 37/30 of November 1982, a petition to the UN Decolonisation Committee in August this year, a new request to the Indonesian authorities to allow parliamentarians to investigate human rights violations in East Timor, as well as representations to non-aligned countries to oppose Indonesia's bid to become president of the non-aligned movement.

In conclusion, the parliamentarians said: "We are convinced that the realisation of a just solution for the question of East Timor, based on the principle of self-determination, is essential not only for the sake of the people of East Timor themselves, but for the whole of mankind. If acts of aggression are condoned and the transfer of territory by military force is acceptable, world peace can never be assured." ★

## President Soares speaks out in Manila

Mario Soares, the President of Portugal, used a visit to Manila, where he attended a conference of states recently restored to democracy, to declare yet again that "Portugal continues to fight internationally for the inalienable right of the martyred people of East Timor to their independence." He also attacked Indonesia for halting the decolonisation process in East Timor.

Making such a statement in the heartland of ASEAN was particularly galling to Jakarta. Ali Alatas accused Soares of "distorting history" and complained that he had made use of such a forum to make statements about East Timor [Jakarta Post, 8 June].

Commenting on the Alatas' response, President Soares called it "a good sign" because it shows that Indonesia is sensitive to what others say. [Expresso, Lisbon, 10 June] ★

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# Carrascalao wants East Timor opened up

A statement by Mario Carrascalao, governor of East Timor, that he has asked President Suharto to declare East Timor an "open province" [Jakarta Post, 20 June 1988] in order to accelerate the pace of development, has drawn attention to the fact that entry into East Timor is only possible with a 'clearance document' from the security authorities. Carrascalao later made it clear that he was not suggesting opening East Timor up to foreigners [Suara Pembaruan, 24 June 1988]. Even so, one newspaper suggested that the idea would help "to neutralise critics on international forums" [Kompas, 28 June], no doubt with an eye particularly on Indonesia's bid to occupy the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement, after the meeting of the foreign ministers of the Movement in Cyprus in September.

The first to comment on Carrascalao's suggestion was Minister of the Interior, General Rudini who said that as far as his Department was concerned, "there is no problem though it all depends on the judgment of the armed forces" [Kompas, 21 June]. But Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who has said on numerous occasions that foreign visitors wishing to carry out investigations would not be welcome, now claimed that it was only "physical constraints" such as lack of transportation that obstructed foreign visits" [Jakarta Post, 24 June].

The next to comment was Admiral Sudomo, Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security, who contradicted Ali Alatas by saying that "the necessary infrastructure of roads and other facilities already exist ... so there is no problem". General Try Sutrisno, armed forces commander-in-chief, actually denied that East Timor was closed. "The region is open just like other provinces but because it is a young province, it still requires attention." [Kompas, 29 June] Apparently, he thinks that because he can go in and out of East Timor as he pleases, this means that it is open to everyone else!

But this appearance of consensus was spiked by General Murdani, Minister of Defence, who more than anyone knows the situation in East Timor. In his words, any proposal to open up East Timor "needs careful consideration.... If the governor thinks the time has come, his idea can be discussed with the armed forces commander-in-chief." But he added that "if anything happens", the governor should not then hold the armed forces responsible [Kompas, 28 June]. This forced Carrascalao to retreat, saying that East Timor could not be opened up if the security forces then "abandon us" [Tempo, 2 July 1988].

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## Indonesians are stealing our jobs

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So what is it that prompted Carrascalao to call for an opening up? An interview reveals that his main worry is that the style of development in East Timor is depriving East Timorese of jobs and causing unemployment. This is the result of the huge influx of Indonesians into the territory, yet paradoxically, his proposal, if accepted, would only accelerate this influx. So what is he after?

"To say that East Timor is closed is a mere formality. Many people from outside do come in because they have



The almost-completed official residence of Governor Carrascalao. The cost: Rp. 359,400,000. Jakarta Post, 20 May 1988

the right connections. Many petty traders come, especially from East Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi and Buton. They don't create jobs. On the contrary, they 'snatch' jobs from the local inhabitants. On the one hand, it is good to close the province to protect East Timorese who are not yet ready to compete with people from outside. But if it continues, the crisis will become unmanageable."

So, who does he think should be encouraged to come?

"Private capital that creates jobs.... There is some private capital in East Timor at present but they don't invest capital. They only chase profits by working on government projects; then they take their profits and run, investing nothing, so there is no job creation. They even bring their own stone-carriers with them."

But would not opening up East Timor mean more small traders coming in and snatching jobs from the Timorese?

"Yes, but with East Timor closed, prices can be three or four times higher than in Jakarta. If it were opened up, there would be competition and... everyone, including the Timorese, would get a share."

So, when should it be opened up?

"Now, provided close collaboration with the armed forces is preserved. Let it not happen that because the provincial government feels ready, the security forces abandon us. If this collaboration were to be abandoned, it would mean that the situation is not yet ready." [Tempo, 2 July 1988]

So, Carrascalao knows he cannot move an inch as long as the security problem lasts. Despite all the fuss about opening up, it is clear that nothing will change.

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## Unemployment on the increase

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Official statistics showing a sharp increase in the number of unemployed people in East Timor have been criticised by Governor Carrascalao as understating the



extent of the problem. The statistics show that there were 7,616 people without jobs in 1986-87, of whom less than one per cent were found placements. The previous year, 4,590 were without jobs, of whom nearly 30 per cent were found placements.

But according to Carrascalao, the real figure is far higher. "Government administration at lower levels in

## EAST TIMOR

the villages is not functioning, with the result that the majority of people without jobs have not been registered" [Kompas, 29 June]. ☆

# Human rights abuses in 1985 and 1986

Information about abuses perpetrated in East Timor takes months and even years to reach the outside world. There is a total blackout of news from the territory; all information about arrests, torture, disappearances and extra-judicial killings is sent out by sources that must be treated as "clandestine". Though the names of the informants are known, they may not be identified.

In February 1985, the UN Commission on Human Rights, which had for years been considering East Timor under its 1503 (confidential) procedure, decided to remove East Timor from its agenda. The reason given was that the Indonesian Government had reported that the human rights situation had improved and that it was willing to collaborate with humanitarian organisations.

The Indonesian Government has never furnished any information about the number of people arrested, save in one single matter: it has been very eager to provide detailed lists of people who were tried in Dili in 1985, 1986 and early 1987. As we have shown [TAPOL Bulletin, No 86, April 1988], these were show-trials staged quite deliberately to deceive the international community (including the Human Rights Commission) into believing that all people detained in East Timor were enjoying due process of the law.



Photo by Elaine Briere

Yet even as this deception was being perpetrated, human rights violations continued unabated. The communications blackout means that only now is it possible to compile and analyse what was really going on in 1985 and 1986. With the territory still closed to

independent observation, we will probably have to wait until 1990 to know what is happening there at present.

The Lisbon-based organisation, Peace is Possible in East Timor, has painstakingly compiled and analysed information that has reached Lisbon in the last year or so about violations during 1985 and 1986. It has published a list of 439 names of people arrested, tortured, injured, raped, executed or reported to have disappeared during those years. A number of names represent incidents in which several persons or a large group of people were subjected to the abuse in question though only a single name is available. Taking these group cases into account, Peace is Possible concludes that the list represents 1,024 victims.

It would be unrealistic to assume that the list is anything like complete. Take for instance the list of persons brought to trial, which was furnished by the Indonesian authorities. This included 198 prisoners. Of these, 46 names had been received from "clandestine" sources. Thus, these sources provided information regarding only one in four of the people who turned out to have been in detention and brought to trial in Dili. If this ratio is any guide, it would mean that in 1985 and 1986, there were likely to have been around 4,000 victims, not 1,024 as the list suggests.

The Peace is Possible list is very detailed. It includes the sex and age of the victim, the date of the occurrence, the army unit responsible, the locality and the treatment. 95 are listed simply as having been arrested, 245 suffered torture and mal-treatment. A total of 28 women, more than half the women on the list, were raped. 52 persons were murdered and 24 disappeared. The International Red Cross (ICRC) has had access only to the 46 persons on the list who were tried; all the rest have been beyond the reach of ICRC protection.

As Peace is Possible recognises, it is quite understandable for humanitarian and even human rights organisations to require more recent and more precise information for the purposes of action. But such requirements can never be met as long as there is a total blackout on news from East Timor. The degree of violence still being sustained in 1985 and 1986, after ten years of occupation, means that it is neither occasional nor fortuitous. There is a generalised state of violence that threatens the existence of an entire people.

### Depo Provera widely used in East Timor

Depo Provera, the controversial contraceptive injection, is the most widely-used contraception in East Timor's state-run birth control programme. More than half of the couples participating in the family planning programme in East Timor in 1986 were using this injection.

This fact emerges from documents provided by the Indonesian Family Planning Association in response to inquiries by the International Planned Parenthood

Association after a European meeting of Family Planning Associations in London in 1986 heard complaints about birth control in East Timor.

Indonesia's high-profile family planning programme is officially justified in terms of the high population density in some parts of the country, notably in Java which, with only 6.4 per cent of the land territory, has more than 60 per cent of the population. Such considerations are groundless in East Timor where population density has always been low and where nearly one third of the population have died as the result of war, disease, famine and atrocities that have plagued East Timor since it was invaded in December 1975.

## Programme condemned in the US

In March 1987, the US Catholic Bishops' Conference drew attention to reports of forced birth control in East Timor and said that "given the great loss of life that has already taken place among a largely Catholic people, this Indonesian policy takes on the character of genocide". In a letter to Secretary of State George Schultz in July 1987, forty US senators were concerned that "Indonesia's World Bank-funded population control programme in East Timor is coercive.... Given the sharp reduction of East Timor's population over the past eleven years and the fact that the territory was underpopulated prior to the Indonesian invasion, what is the justification for population control programmes there?"

In its reply to the IPPF, the Indonesian Family Planning Association gave nothing away about abuses and coercion, but it provided figures showing that, even though population density in East Timor is 30 persons per square kilometre as compared with 700 per square kilometre in Java, the family planning programme is far more intensively practised in East Timor than in Indonesia as a whole. The figures supplied to the IPPF show that in East Timor:

- \* the government spends more than twice the amount it spends in Indonesia as a whole per couple of fertile age;
- \* it spends five times the amount it spends in Indonesia per couple using birth control;
- \* there is a higher proportion of family planning personnel to the number of fertile couples - 73 per cent in East Timor as compared to 53 per cent in Indonesia;
- \* far fewer meetings (only a quarter of the number in

Indonesia) for public information on family planning are held in East Timor, fewer visits (only two-sevenths) are made to community leaders and far fewer visits to homes (only one-fifteenth).

These figures show that Indonesia devotes more money and personnel to family planning in East Timor than elsewhere but spends far less effort to spreading information on the basis of which people might be expected to join the programme of their own free will.

The contraceptives used further reinforce the impression that there is a high degree of coercion in East Timor:

- \* In 1986, 57 per cent of current users were using the Depo Provera injection, 29 per cent were using the Pill and 10 per cent were using IUDs.

Not satisfied with the information supplied by the Indonesian family planning body, the IPPF has made further inquiries. ☆

## Inter-Parliamentary Union resolution

We have recently obtained a copy of the resolution regarding East Timor, adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union at its conference in Bangkok last October. East Timor is mentioned as part of a composite resolution on pressing for implementation of UN resolution 1514 on granting independence to colonial countries. One of the many introductory points of the resolution is:

"Considering that the situation in East Timor gives rise to concern,"

Point 46 of the substantive part of the resolution follows this concern through, and reads:

"Invites the parties concerned by the East Timor question to work together with the United Nations Secretary-General to find, as soon as possible, a solution in the interest of the population of that territory, according to the principle of self-determination."

The composite resolution was adopted by 791 votes to 122, with 207 abstentions. ☆



# Ex-prisoners as social pariahs

The wave of persecution against former political prisoners and alleged members or sympathisers of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) has recently further intensified.

The current campaign against the 'latent danger of the PKI' appears to have been prompted by claims of several retired generals, including the former red-beret commander, Sarwo Edhie, alleging PKI infiltration at the most senior levels of state power. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 87, June 1988]. Such statements continue to appear, along with numerous anti-communist articles and reports, in *Jayakarta*, the newspaper formerly owned by the Jakarta Military Command and now controlled by retired army officers. Other newspapers have joined in. The campaign is directed against Vice-President Sudharmono and several of his closest aides but it has also led to new measures against former political prisoners.

The newspaper campaign went too far in the view of the government but, instead of closing the paper down, there are signs that *Jayakarta*'s owners will be forced to sell out, most likely to functionaries of FKPP, the organisation for sons and daughters of retirees and members of the armed forces, an organisation of growing political and economic importance.

The *Jayakarta* campaign led Admiral Sudomo, the newly-appointed Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, to proclaim that unsubstantiated charges about PKI infiltration should not be bandied about in the press but should be reported "in the proper way" to Kopkamtib. Sudomo who, before 1983 was himself commander of Kopkamtib, hastened to add that all B-Category ex-prisoners (who could not be tried for lack of evidence but were detained for many years) were under close scrutiny by the security forces. Anyone suspicious of former prisoners should report them immediately, he said [Kompas, 29 April].


Then in June, Sudomo announced that the security forces will re-examine the records of over half a million former political detainees. "The entire list will be re-checked, to see where they are now, what work they are doing and what their present attitudes are." He alleged there were signs of PKI remnants trying to make a comeback by writing and publishing books, infiltrating organisations, and becoming village heads or businessmen [Kompas, 4 June]. Sudomo was evidently determined to take the initiative of the latest anti-communist frenzy into his own hands and show that the security forces, which now seem to be under his overall supervision, are as anti-communist as the likes of Sarwo Edhie.

Although Sudomo's figure of half a million is a nation-wide figure, the military commander of East Java claimed, two months earlier, that in his province alone, there are nearly half a million communist suspects who must report to the security forces, including 57 A-Category people, 4,455 B-Category people, 22,117 C-Category people and a further 419,575 people who do not apparently have a category but who are nevertheless required to report [Surabaya Post, 30 April].

Rumours of PKI infiltration in the administration and the armed forces prompted Benny Murdani and Sudomo to describe such accusations as an insult. The present administration, they both insist, is "clean". But Sudomo admits that "about 175,000 former PKI members" are still employed by the government in low-ranking "non-strategic" positions. They will soon be sent into early

retirement and replaced by new civil servants.

From independent sources it would appear that the current wave of persecution pre-dates the Sarwo Edhie outbursts. According to reports reaching TAPOL, the security forces in some parts of the country made their first moves against former prisoners several months ago when a number of former A-Category prisoners, who were tried and sentenced in the early 1970s and were released in the past few years, were subjected daily to long and gruelling interrogation. In some places, interrogations began as long ago as mid-March and went on daily for several weeks.



*Tempo*, 16 July 1988

Many former prisoners also face the burden of tighter "compulsory reporting" (walap, or wajib lapor) requirements. Since General Rudini, the Home Minister, instructed governors to "update the files of the ex-tapols", zealous civil servants all over the country have made life a misery for ex-prisoners. Monitoring ex-tapols starts at the lowest level in the neighbourhood and residents' associations (RT/RW) in urban wards and rural villages. This is done at least monthly, while the security bodies register them every three months. [Jawa Pos, 18 June 1988]

Besides Categories A and B, there is the numerically much larger Category C, hundreds of thousands of whom spent several years in detention after 1965. According to a Jakarta weekly, Presidential Decree No 28 of 1975 divided the C-category into three: C1 are those allegedly 'involved' in the Madiun affair of 1948, C2 are those who were 'ordinary' members of mass organisations banned in 1965 for allegedly being PKI affiliates, and C3 are those "sympathetic to the PKI" but with no clear (sic) role in the 1965 events. C1 people had to be discharged (and indeed large numbers were imprisoned) while C2 and C3 people were allowed to remain in their jobs "under guidance and supervision". [Editor, 13 June, quoted in Indonesia News Service, No 114, July 4 1988]. In recent years, thousands of C2 and C3 people have been discharged or ordered to take early retirement. Now Sudomo is talking about getting rid of 175,000 more people in these categories. →



But there is also an F-File frequently being mentioned in the current anti-communist wave. General Rudini says this is a list of people active underground. He claims that the file disappeared, allegedly destroyed by the PKI, but security forces in the regions "are beginning to re-examine the file". [Editor, 13 June]

TAPOL fears that the current persecution of PKI suspects, including the inexcusable re-interrogation of people who have already served long sentences, may be the prelude to arrests of people allegedly working for years in illegality. For sure, there will be many spin-offs of the current anti-PKI campaign.

### New rip-offs

As if ex-tapols were not facing enough problems, the new wave of "alertness" provides the chance for lower civil servants at neighbourhood or village level to extort cash when they turn up to report. It is a public secret that many who managed to build a new life have been the victims of extortion for many years. Now, extortion rates have gone up since civil servants have not received a pay-rise for three years. However unjust the system may be, ex-tapol families would never dare to file a complaint.

Another spin-off is that anti-communist rhetoric gives highly-placed civil servants an excuse to sack "unfriendly" or "uncooperative" officials. It can also be used to incriminate rivals. A new hunting season has indeed started. Accusations against important figures in society has become part of the game. One that reached the headlines was the accusation against Nico Daryanto, the Secretary-General of the PDI, that his stepfather was sacked from the army for involvement in the 1965 affair, giving him an "unclean environment" (tidak bersih lingkungan).

Pamphlets circulating in Jakarta accuse Minister of Energy Ginandjar Kartasasmita and Abdurrachman Wahid, chairman of NU, of being part of a "PKI-Moscow gang", together with Vice-President Sudharmono and Attorney General Sukarton.

There is even a 'teori pengembosan' or theory of deflation, claiming that Suharto is behind all this because he wants to make Sudharmono and others more dependent on himself. It is as if a Frankenstein has been let loose, whose creator is unknown. But it has fallen to Sudomo to bring things under control and tame the monster. Otherwise things could get out of hand.

### Up-dating ex-prisoner archives

Shortly after Sudomo's announcement, General Rudini, announced that instructions have been sent to all regional and local government offices to update all their data on former members of the PKI. All this data has been computerised and was handed over in 1979 by the regional and local military commands to the parallel local administrations. Rudini says many people may have changed their names or professions so it is time for the data to be scrutinised again [Kompas, 19 June]

The next day, the East Java's head of social and political affairs said a joint team of the army, the police, the public prosecutor and other authorities would examine all the data on ex-prisoners. He said some people had tried to hide their tracks, some had secretly moved and some had died.

Whilst newspapers have been full of malicious, anti-communist venom, there is a conspicuous absence of protest from the churches or from NGOs like the Legal Aid Institute. However, a few articles have appeared in the press criticising the system to check that people have a 'clean political environment'. One article from Kompas, was published in the last TAPOL Bulletin. Another warns against "using extremist methods to fight extremism". Punishing people for having an 'unclean' environment means penalising people not for anything they have done but simply because of their blood or marital ties. It means making people incriminate themselves in violation of their rights. The writer ridicules the concept of 'clean' and 'unclean' families by taking the example of General Parman, a victim of the September 30 1965 kidnappings [alleged by the government to have been perpetrated by communists]. Parman was the brother of Sakirman, a member of the PKI politbureau. Should Parman be classified as 'unclean' or should Sakirman be classified as 'clean'? [Kompas, 27 April]

## Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

"The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing Western norms and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial. Although it focuses on events in Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently unstable and are invariably held together by oppression."

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin, Editor, Muslimmedia

## Indonesia: Muslims on trial



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# Pramoedya's latest book banned

A centrepiece in the present wave of anti-communist fervour is the banning of *Rumah Kaca* (The Glasshouse) by Pramoedya Ananta Toer. This is the fourth in a quartet of books, all written while Pramoedya was a political prisoner in the Buru Island labour camp. The first three, *Bumi Manusia* (This Earth of Mankind), *Anak Semua Bangsa* (A Child of All Nations) and *Jejak Langkah* (Footsteps) have all been banned, along with another of Pramoedya's books, *Sang Pemula* (The Initiator).

Announcing the ban on 9 June, Sukarton Marmosudjono, the Attorney-General (one of the targets of the 'hawkish' anti-communist campaign against the government), alleged that communist doctrine had been 'slipped in'. Media reports of Sukarton's press conference quote him as making a number of preposterous charges against the book: "Creating public unrest and motivating former Indonesian Communist Party members who have been released to form an illegal movement." Or: "Clearly revealing Marx's labour theory as well as continuing Leninist themes." Or: "Poisoning the minds of the public and disrupting public order." Or: "Diluting religious teaching." In support of the latter claim, Sukarton quoted dialogue from the book in which someone said: "Why be sentimental about death? Is it only because, from infancy, we have been fed with stories about devils and angels, heaven and earth?"

The ban requires anyone storing, distributing or knowing about the distribution of the book to surrender the copies or report to the nearest public prosecutor or police.

Admiral Sudomo, one-time commander of the all-powerful security command, Kopkamtib and now Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, was at Sukarton's

side when he announced the ban, and claimed: "We adhere to democratic thought and no-one needs a permit to write something. Only after the work is published can we take measures, such as this present ban." [Kompas, 10 June] But according to one journalist who was present, Sukarton said his office was considering introducing a regulation that would require a former member of the PKI to have a permit before s/he could write anything [Merdeka, 10 June].

Sudomo also said: "We are still thinking about possible legal action against the author" [Jakarta Post, 10 June].

The daily *Jayakarta*, which has spearheaded the current anti-communist venom, making claims about top-level infiltration, has also spotted a serious anomaly in the restrictions on ex-tapol activity. Whereas they are prohibited from entering government service or the armed forces, from working in 'vital' enterprises and engaging in work that could influence the public at large, there is no prohibition against them running a publishing business. The director of Hasta Mitra, the company which has published all Pramoedya's recent books, is an ex-tapol, like Pramoedya himself. "Publishing has a wide impact, including press publishing and the publication of books." [See "Press coverage of the communist danger" in Kompas, 15 June 1988.]

Meanwhile, in Jogjakarta, a student identified only by his initials, BS, was arrested because he was discovered selling copies of *Rumah Kaca*, as well as other banned books by Pramoedya. He was also found to have lottery tickets on him. He was said to be selling the books "on the quiet" to people attending a performance of a play called "Tahanan" (The Prisoner) and later said that he did not know that the book had been banned and was only do it to earn a bit of money [Kedaulatan Rakyat, 11 June].

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## Pramoedya answers former Pedoman editor

A few weeks before his book was banned, Pramoedya Ananta Toer responded angrily to an attack on him in *Suara Pembaruan*, made by Rosihan Anwar, former editor of *Pedoman*, the daily that was several times suspended during the Sukarno era and was closed down for good under Suharto in 1971. Pramoedya's reply was published in *Suara Pembaruan* on 21 May.

One might have expected a journalist like Rosihan Anwar to respect people's freedom of expression and opinion but, like so many somewhat liberally-minded Indonesian intellectuals, his anti-communism subsumes everything else. The essence of his article was an attempt to belittle the significance of the Freedom-to-Write Award to Pramoedya announced by the PEN American Centre in April this year.

He described first how papers like *Pedoman*, during its polemics in the early 1960s with leftwing newspapers, always needed to be alert about the (alleged) PKI links of people whose writings they responded to. "It was necessary to examine whether they were not trying to sweep away the tracks of their past so as to be able to appear with a new image."



A demonstration outside the Indonesian embassy in London in 1981. The writer, Salman Rushdie joined the protest.



He accepted that it was within PEN's rights to give an award to anyone they thought came within their criteria. "PEN is not an organisation of communist writers. It is international in scope and is widely respected. The Indonesian writer who received the award with the prize money of \$3,000 is entitled to feel delighted, as long as he does not utilise the award to create a new image for himself." Rosihan then went on to accuse Pramoedya of using his Lentera column in Bintang Timur in the early 1960s "to pulverise and butcher" writers who opposed the PKI, and to propagate the views of Lekra which was a stooge-organisation of the PKI". [Suara Pembaruan, 29 April 1988]

## Pramoedya's reply

In his reply, Pramoedya recalled first how Rosihan, on a visit to Buru Island with General Sumitro in 1973 (where Pramoedya was being held as an untried political prisoner), referred to him as 'tragic'. "The situation did not allow me to ask him: was my being tragic a part of the national tragedy or specific to myself as someone with no ground to stand on." He went on:

"The words 'pulverise' and 'butcher' imply criminal acts. None other than Haji Rosihan Anwar himself, as a senior journalist, knows that the articles in Lentera were part of normal polemics in which anyone could participate, including himself and Hamka. If they suggested criminal acts..., why did he not complain to the authorities? Wasn't my address well known? I have never fled with a Dutch convoy or suchlike."

Pramoedya recalled that the main purpose of the Lentera articles was to clean up Indonesian literature from plagiarism. "What's wrong with that? As a senior journalist with a brilliant memory, H. Rosihan Anwar surely remembers that Hamka's plagiarism was an issue in the press for three months, a record in the history of the Indonesian press.... Strangely, Hamka himself never

complained of being 'pulverised' or 'butchered'. He even once wrote in a West Sumatran paper that it was all the fuss about plagiarism that had helped to sell his books. Almost a quarter of a century has passed and all this cannot be dragged up just like that. H. Rosihan Anwar can easily get all the clippings he needs."

[The following sentence in Pramoedya's original letter was not included in the text published by Suara Pembaruan. It read: "For the time being, I cannot do this because my home and everything in it, including my entire library and documentation, is still under seizure by those in power, and have not been returned to me."]

Pramoedya also attacked Rosihan for using the word 'stooge' about a certain political party. "Are not all parties created by groups of people with ideals, regardless of whether that party is right or wrong, a failure or a victor? Not by groups of criminals without consciences? I am certain Haji Rosihan Anwar is not a stooge in the eyes of people from other parties because he too has noble ideas."

About sweeping away the tracks of the past, Pramoedya said: "As far as I'm concerned there is nothing in my past that I need to sweep away. Haji Rosihan Anwar's shoes do not fit me at all. And I'm sure he read my letter to President Suharto replying to his letter of 10 November 1973. My letter was published in some newspapers at the time. I shall quote from it for him: 'I entered the world and leave behind footsteps of my journey which can be judged by anyone.'" [Suara Pembaruan, 21 May]

## New threats to the press

Following the publication of Pramoedya's letter, President Suharto summoned the Minister of Information and instructed him "to put firmly in order all those publications where communist or marxist writings have crawled in" [Kompas, 2 June]. The Minister, Harmoko, said after meeting the President, that the mass media would have to increase vigilance against ideas spread by PKI remnants. Asked whether he could mention names of papers, Harmoko gave one example but only 'off the record'. Evidently, the example was Suara Pembaruan, (the paper which took the place of Sinar Harapan, months after it was banned in October 1986), for publishing Pramoedya's letter. ☆

## STOP PRESS

### Transmigration threat to West Papuan highlands

Indonesia has announced plans to open up transmigration sites in the district of Jayawijaya, which includes the central highlands, the most densely populated region of West Papua. This contradicts a claim made recently by the World Bank that "there are no plans to settle migrants in the densely-populated highlands where the majority of Irianese (sic) live".

In the more fertile areas of the highlands, the tribal peoples live from garden cultivation, pig-rearing and sago. There has been strong resistance in the highlands to the Indonesian presence for many years. The invasion of the region by Javanese settlers is certain to cause widespread resentment and disruption.

Survival International has called on the Indonesian Government to halt this programme and has launched an Urgent Action appeal in support of this call.

## TAPOL Occasional Reports Series

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With Lord Avebury, chair, Parliamentary Human Rights Group and Carmel Budiardjo, TAPOL Organising Secretary.

No. 2 Joint Statement by Union of Democratic Timorese and Fretilin, March 1986

No. 3 Reactions from Indonesia to Transmigration Campaign

Indonesian press clippings reacting to the campaign by Survival International and TAPOL.

No. 4 TAPOL Statement on East Timor to the UN Committee of 24, August 1986

No. 5 The 1987 Indonesian Election in East Timor  
An analysis written by TAPOL.

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No. 7 July 1987 Statement on the Joint Decision of the Chairman of the Supreme Court and Minister of Justice.  
By Ikadin, the Indonesian Lawyers' Association.

No. 8 World Bank maintains support for Transmigration  
Survival International and TAPOL write to World Bank, 22 January 1988.

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# The second coming of Admiral Sudomo

It was something of a surprise when in March this year, Admiral Sudomo, one of General Suharto's longest-serving supporters, was named Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs. According to the gossip, the 63-year old Admiral wanted to take things easy and retire, but Suharto had other plans. As a constant figure in the General's inner core, Sudomo has survived many storms. Over the years, he has grown ever closer to the 'bapak' of the Republic.

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## Suharto's inner core

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Ever since Suharto took charge, a few hand-picked men have stood by his side. The inner core has changed over time. Some generals like Ali Murtopo and Sudjono Humardani have died while others, like Suryo or Alamsyah, have been replaced by younger men. At first, his inner core consisted primarily of officers from Diponegoro, the Central Java division led by Suharto in the fifties. Gradually, others were recruited, during the early sixties Mandala campaign to annex West Papua and the campaign to confront Malaysia. As overall Mandala commander, Suharto had many officers under him some of whom, like Benny Murdani and Sudomo, he drew into his team.

Many find it puzzling that Sudomo was appointed naval commander of the Mandala campaign in 1961. On his very first voyage as a ship's captain, he crashed his vessel into a quayside. Sudomo is unique among Suharto's inner core as the only officer outside the army to have held so many major decision-making positions. All other naval and air force officers have remained obscure figures.

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## The Aru Sea disaster

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But first, what of Sudomo's naval career? On the night of 15 January 1962, three Indonesian torpedo boats (MTBs) were heading towards Kaimana in West Papua with instructions to land one hundred commandos on the Dutch-held territory. On board the Matjan Tutul was Deputy Naval Chief, Commodore Jos Sudarso in command, while Sudomo was commanding another vessel and in overall command of the operation. As they neared the West Papuan coast, the MTBs were spotted by the Dutch frigate, Kortenaer. After a brief skirmish, the Matjan Tutul was hit and sank in twenty minutes. The other two vessels under Sudomo's command turned and fled, leaving dozens of Indonesian seamen struggling in the water. Jos Sudarso died and was proclaimed a national hero while Sudomo had to defend himself against charges of cowardice. The Dutch rescued 54 Indonesian survivors while the dead, including Sudarso, were buried by the Dutch in Kaimana. Sudomo has always defended himself, saying his mission was to land commandos, not to engage in a naval battle.

The shame of this debacle made Sudomo's position as director of naval operations untenable. He was soon shifted to Inkopal, the navy's central purchasing board, in charge of keeping the force supplied with basic

foodstuffs. But Sudomo's career took another sharp turn when he was caught red-handed in a corruption scandal. Had he been a civilian, he would certainly have been tried in court, but instead, he was promoted to a senior post at the Shipping Ministry. Here, too, Sudomo concocted all kinds of bureaucratic schemes which provided plenty of scope for bribery and corruption.



Sudomo remained in the civilian sector for many years, enriching himself. He has become one of Indonesia's most affluent officers and a well-known socialite. His home in Jakarta is one of the most luxurious, with marble stairs and an indoor swimming-pool. Since his marriage broke up, he has been talked about as Indonesia's most sought-after bachelor.

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## Purging the navy

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Sudomo's first Herculean task after Suharto's seizure of power was when, as chief-of-staff of the navy from 1969 till 1973, he was charged with purging the ranks of naval and marine officers of leftists and Sukarnoists. He did this with such enthusiasm, seeing off more than 1,500 officers, that a joke circulated at the time that if someone did not stop him soon, Indonesia would end up with a fleet of vessels but no-one to operate them.

Sudomo used the purge to settle old scores, but his primary duty was to cleanse the navy of its anti New Order reputation and its nostalgia for Sukarno. To Suharto both the navy and the marine corps were security threats. To this day, many retired officers still bear deep grudges against Sudomo for the ruthless way he cut short their naval careers.



## His Kopkamtib career

After having cleaned up the navy, Sudomo was appointed chief-of-staff of Kopkamtib, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. This appointment came on 20 January 1974, a few days after an anti-Japanese student demonstration in Jakarta brought into the open the fierce rivalry between General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto's closest associates, and General Sumitro, then deputy-commander of the armed forces and commander of Kopkamtib. As Kopkamtib chief-of-staff, Sudomo was in a good position to keep an eye on Sumitro until his dismissal a few months later. It was this job that earned Sudomo the nickname, 'Suharto's watchdog'.

For the first few years after 1965, Suharto had kept Kopkamtib under his personal command and it was only in the early 1970s, as he became increasingly pre-occupied with state affairs, that he entrusted the commandship to the deputy-commander of the armed forces. But after Sumitro was ousted, Suharto took back commandship of Kopkamtib. Sudomo stayed on as chief-of-staff and was effectively in charge of security operations. For the next eight years, Sudomo's name became synonymous with Kopkamtib. He was responsible for the political prisoners, for press censorship, for the arrest and persecution of Muslim activists and, yes, even for the anti-corruption campaign.

In 1978, he became commander of Kopkamtib and concurrently deputy-commander of the armed forces. The commander, General Jusuf, lacked a power base in the armed forces and was at a disadvantage, being a non-Javanese in the overwhelmingly Javanese general staff. Yusuf spent most of his time touring the barracks and boosting morale while Sudomo took over most of the real responsibilities in the general staff. In theory, he was

answerable to Yusuf, but his Kopkamtib position gave him direct access to Suharto as well as access downwards to the army command structure since all divisional and local commanders exercise special powers as Kopkamtib officers or Laksusda.

Sudomo looks back fondly on this period. It was, he says, 'nicer' being Kopkamtib commander than being a minister because 'you have power'. He relished the fact that the job gave him plenty of experience in closing down newspapers, and dealing with the Holy War Command, the Imron case and other Muslim incidents, all of which, as he says himself, led to the 1985 laws on social organisations and political parties. In Sudomo's words, Kopkamtib's operational philosophy was 'power for persuasion and persuasion for power', mixing easily with all strata of society. [Jawa Pos, 11 March 1988, quoted in INS, No 84]. In fact, he was admitting that military intelligence had been engaged for years in monitoring and penetrating Muslim ranks.

## Taking on labour

In 1983, Sudomo was asked to step down from the power pinnacle he enjoyed so much, to take on the job of placing the fast-growing working class under the Pancasila yoke. Under his management, the Labour Ministry refined the principle of what became known as 'Pancasila industrial relations'. The whole idea of adversarial action by workers was to be ruled out, and replaced by the idea of workers, management and the government behaving like 'one big family'. Typical of his disdain for workers' rights is the following statement regarding the right to strike:

Going on strike is certainly allowed by law, but many people do not read the full text of this law which, by the way, is not operational because the measures necessary for its implementation have not yet been introduced. Moreover, one must have

## TAPOL again petitions the UN Decolonisation Committee

For the third year running, TAPOL will submit a petition to the UN Decolonisation Committee when it meets in New York in August this year. The petition first analyses the background to Governor Carrascalao's recent plea for East Timor to be opened up. It then analyses in detail the structure of local government, revealing the extent to which local administration is subordinated to the military command structure at every level of government.

It describes how every East Timorese who occupies a position of leadership is accompanied by a 'pendamping' (literally, 'one who accompanies'), a military officer whose duty is to watch and control 'his' Timorese official. The petition also reveals for the first time that in East Timor, babinsa officers, the village-level officers stationed in every village, are all red-beret soldiers from Kopassus, not soldiers from the territorial division. As explained to TAPOL recently by an authoritative source, this is because Koopskam, the special security command in charge of East Timor, needs babinsas in East Timor to concentrate primarily on intelligence and control of a hostile population and this can only be assured if they are taken from Indonesia's elite para-commando unit.

The full text of the TAPOL petition is available as Occasional Reports No 9.

Statement on EAST TIMOR  
to the UN Committee of 24  
August 1988



occasional reports no. 9

*tapol* The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign  
111 Northwood Road Thornhill Heath Surrey CR4 3HW

Copies of Occasional Reports are available from TAPOL, price 80 pence a copy, including postage. Extra copies cost 30 pence each.

Occasional Reports No 9, TAPOL's submission to the 1988 meeting of the UN Decolonisation Committee, focusses on the militarised structure of the Indonesian administration in East Timor and the tight system of control which this imposes on the people.



permission to strike. And for sure, I will not give permission to strike because, in my opinion, going on strike means applying principles of liberal thinking while we are already in the period of Pancasila Industrial Relations. [Berita Buana, 21 December 1984]

As Minister of Labour, he introduced new regulations on the role of the trade unions, and set up a tripartite system (labour, management and local officials) for controlling labour disputes. To prevent disputes from spilling over into strikes, he set up a 'task force' with military involvement, ready when necessary to take action against the workers.

He also further tamed the FBSI, the only officially-recognised trade union federation, and succeeded in removing its leader, Agus Sudono, who was too much of a street-fighter with a following of his own to be amenable to regime control.

But such 'dull' ministerial responsibilities were clearly not to his liking. Shortly before Suharto announced his new cabinet in March, Sudomo was complaining about years of "crowing without troops". What he wanted again was real power. At first sight, his appointment as Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs seemed to remove him still further from power. His predecessors in the position had been little more than decorations. But within weeks, Sudomo was showing remarkable confidence in his new job.

One thing to his advantage is that this time round, Suharto is giving more authority to his minister-coordinators. But primarily it is the character of Sudomo himself that determines what he will make of his new post. As Minister-Coordinator, he takes overall charge of a number of crucial ministries, including the home affairs and justice ministries and the attorney-general's office, and foreign affairs. But in terms of top-level centres of power, Sudomo also functions as a middle-force between the two super-power centres, Murdani and Sudharmono.

Murdani has placed many of the men he trusts in vital

positions in the general staff and lower down in the army hierarchy, while Sudharmono, now vice-president, has strengthened his hold over several ministries and over the bureaucracy. In other words, both men have their own power bases which could conceivably pose problems for Suharto. Sudomo has the special attraction for Suharto of being totally loyal but lacking his own power base. In order not to get squeezed between the two super-powers, Suharto appears to have given Sudomo a central position, with vast powers that have until now been reserved for a Kopkamtib commander.

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### Back in the Kopkamtib saddle?

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At the time of the cabinet changes in March, it was announced that Kopkamtib would be overhauled. To this day, the new format remains a mystery. General Murdani, now Minister of Defence and Security, is still Kopkamtib commander but appears to be more interested in other things. There is not much sign of Try Sutrisno, the new armed forces commander-in-chief, getting the job, lacking experience in intelligence and security operations. But without waiting for any formal appointment, Sudomo is behaving as if he were back in his old job, defining strategies on how to run the latest campaign against former political prisoners and how to handle the current wave of student unrest. For reasons unexplained, he was at the Attorney-General's side when the latter announced the ban on Pramodya's latest book. Suharto's old watchdog is back in power and no-one doubts that he is thoroughly enjoying himself.



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## ARMS SALES

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# Update on British arms deals with Indonesia

\* Plessey Defence Systems of Christchurch, Kent have won a contract to supply a command and control information system called Generics to Indonesia. The system is designed to give military commanders the latest in situation management capability, with up-to-the-minute information on both friendly and hostile forces in the air, on sea or on land, integrated for rapid assessment. Indonesia is Plessey's first customer for the system. [Jakarta Post, 24 May 1988]

The Generics information system could well be used by Indonesian troops operating in East Timor or West Papua, helping them to keep track of elusive and highly mobile guerrilla forces.

\* GKL, a London-based company has been involved for several years in refurbishing the 160 armed personnel carriers (APCs) - Saladins, Saracens and Ferrets - which the UK supplied to Indonesia some fifteen to twenty years ago. GKL is refitting these counter-insurgency vehicles with new guns, equipping them with more up-to-date equipment for present-day use and generally overhauling them. These APCs were used by the Indonesian

armed forces to quell student demonstrations during the 1970s and are thought to be in constant use in East Timor.

\* British Aerospace, the UK company with the most extensive arms deals with Indonesia, is just completing the construction of an Army College of Technology in East Java. The College, worth nearly £3 million, is the first ever built by BAe anywhere in the world. It will provide a 27-month course to ninety students giving them the necessary background to operate and maintain the Rapier air-defence missile defence system being supplied to Indonesian by BAe.

The construction of this College "came together tremendously quickly," said a senior BAe official. "This was because a strong trust had been built up between BAe and the Indonesian army."

The course management has been sub-contracted to Bell Educational Trust in Cambridge, and it is expected that the Indonesian army will be able to take over the whole of the college training in five or six years' time. [BAe News, March 1988]



# IGGI almost doubles its aid to Indonesia

The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia this year agreed to grant the ailing Indonesian economy a record \$5.7 billion, which is nearly eighty per cent higher than the \$3.15 billion granted last year. Japan alone accounts for \$2.3 billion of this total.

In addition to project aid, which is tied to projects agreed between the donor country or agency and Indonesia, and programme aid, which is untied and available for use over a five-year period, the IGGI this year decided to grant \$2.4 billion in a new form of aid known as 'special aid' which provides especially favourable terms of convertibility into rupiahs. This aid is a reserve of foreign currency that can be drawn on by Indonesia within a year and sold on the foreign exchange market to finance imports. The rupiah proceeds will be used to cover the rupiah costs of government projects. This huge chunk of aid will therefore help to reduce Indonesia's balance of payments deficit and finance the government's budget deficit.

\$600 million of this special aid (from Japan) is included in the total of \$4.01 billion which was announced as IGGI's allocation for this year, but most of the special aid is described as being 'outside the IGGI scheme' [Jakarta Post, 17 June]. IGGI aid this year therefore consists of \$4.01 billion plus \$1.7 billion 'special aid' which, for reasons as yet unclear, is described as being 'outside the IGGI scheme'.

The breakdown of the \$4.01 billion portion of IGGI aid is as follows:

## Bilateral aid

Australia	\$	37.6	million
Austria	\$	8.16	million
Canada	\$	39.47	million
France	\$	179.41	million
West Germany	\$	105.99	million
Italy	\$	66.66	million
Japan	\$	1,400.00	million
Netherlands	\$	92.97	million
New Zealand	\$	2.44	million
Spain	\$	30.00	million
Switzerland	\$	15.77	million
UK	\$	109.22	million
USA	\$	90.00	million

## Multilateral aid

World Bank	\$	1,200.00	million
Asian Development Bank	\$	550.00	million
UN Development Programme	\$	32.00	million
UNFPA	\$	7.00	million
World Food Programme	\$	10.00	million
IFAD	\$	15.00	million
EEC	\$	18.04	million
UNICEF	\$	6.00	million

The breakdown of the special aid (part inside and part outside the IGGI scheme) is as follows:

Japan	\$	1,700.00	million
France	\$	39.96	million



West Germany	\$	22.92	million
Netherlands	\$	84.29	million
USA	\$	67.00	million
World Bank	\$	300.00	million
Asian Development Bank	\$	150.00	million

Sources: Kompas, 16 June and Jakarta Post, 17 June 1988.

A number of IGGI countries have agreed to give part or all of their aid this year in the form of an outright gift. These include Australia and Canada (100 per cent gift), the Netherlands (60 per cent) and the USA (57 per cent) [Tempo, 25 June].

## More aid from the UK

The UK decision to make a new aid commitment this year certainly came as something of a surprise. Only days before the IGGI met in Holland, the British Secretary of State for Energy, Cecil Parkinson, on a visit to Jakarta, was showing impatience with Indonesia because it had failed to take up the lion's share of the £140 million in soft loans granted to Indonesia in June 1986. So far, only two projects worth about £20 million each have been initiated. The outstanding credit of £100

million is due to expire in September this year, unless the Thatcher Government agrees to allow an extension [Jakarta Post, 9 June, and Financial Times, 10 June].

Yet the UK agreed on an extra commitment this year of \$100 million. The Financial Times [30 June] quoted a British aid official as saying: "We just have to hang in there". It added that the new allocation was "a measured decision by the UK, part goodwill, part commercial necessity (because) it is well aware that any recovery in the Indonesian economy could open up a vast market for major infrastructure projects".

Among the British companies hoping to cash in on the credits made available by the British taxpayer are British Petroleum for a proposed oil refinery ("despite the over-capacity in the region", adds Financial Times), Trafalgar House which is negotiating involvement in construction of a toll-road scheme worth £400 million, and British Aerospace which is anticipating a deal for its latest military aircraft, the Hawk 200.

### Why so much support for Indonesia?

The Indonesian Government, supported by most of the Indonesian press, has welcomed this year's IGGI aid commitment as proof of renewed international confidence in the Indonesian economy. There has been hardly any criticism, apart from some rather muted worries that a country already so heavily in debt should set about resolving its problem by relying on yet more external borrowing. According to one daily, IGGI aid to Indonesia is now larger than that given by aid consortiums to any other country [Kompas, 17 June 1988].

According to the World Bank's 1988 Report on Indonesia, Indonesia's total disbursed debt had reached \$41.28 billion by the end of 1987. Servicing the debt now requires almost 40 per cent of foreign exchange earnings, whereas 52.8 per cent of the state's routine expenditure has to be used to repay creditors and pay interest charges.

But more than \$17 billion of foreign aid committed before 1988 is undisbursed, making one wonder why yet more aid is considered to be necessary, when so much has not yet been taken up.

The fact is that many economic projects are not able to proceed because of the lack of rupiahs to finance domestic costs, which is partly because so much state

revenue has to be set aside to service debt repayments. This explains why so much of this year's aid commitment is given in the form of 'special assistance' aid. But this alone does not explain why IGGI countries have decided to be so generous to Indonesia.

### All-out Japanese support

Certainly a major factor is Tokyo's decision to give Indonesia \$2.3 billion this year, which is 87 per cent higher than Japan's aid commitment last year. More than ever now, it is Japan that is calling the tune in Indonesia and in the IGGI. More than a third of Indonesia's bilateral external debt is owed to Japan. It is significant that the Japanese decision was announced a couple of weeks before the IGGI meeting, giving the signal to other member-states to pull out all the stops to help. West European countries in particular seem determined to preserve their stake in the Indonesian economy, particularly in the face of growing competition from Japan.

Much enthusiasm has been expressed by IMF and World Bank spokesmen and western economics ministers over Indonesia's repeated pledge that it does not want to alleviate its debt servicing burden by seeking to re-schedule its debt payments. Even so, Indonesia made strenuous efforts to convince Japan to agree to 'restructure' its obligations towards that country. After all, as many economists have stressed, one crucial factor causing Indonesia's debt service ratio to rise so dramatically is the strength of the Japanese yen against the dollar. To compensate for what has become known as the 'yendaka' factor, Indonesia wanted Japan either to convert part of its past debts into grants, or to give part of this year's commitment in the form of a grant, or to allow Indonesia to repay Japan not at the current dollar-yen exchange rate but at the rate that was valid when the credit was received, when the dollar was a much stronger currency. Japan firmly rejected all three proposals and the Japanese ambassador in Jakarta did not conceal his annoyance when, even after the \$2.3 billion allocation had been announced, Indonesia's Finance Minister, J.B. Sumarlin, again publicly urged Japan to consider one of these alternatives.

According to a statement by Widjojo Nitisastra, who negotiated the aid package from Japan on Suharto's behalf, Japan's aid commitment for 1988 is precisely the same as the amount that Indonesia must pay Japan this year to service its debt [Kompas, 2 June]. Japan seems to be 'giving' Indonesia with one hand what it will take back with the other, so why not just cancel the debt? Clearly such a straightforward solution would not enhance Japan's grip on the Indonesian economy.

Japan is by far the largest investor in Indonesia. Its investments in sectors other than the oil, gas and financial sectors since 1967 have reached \$5.8 billion, followed by Hongkong (with \$2.01 billion), West Germany (\$1.81 billion), the US (£1.24 billion) and the Netherlands (\$1.13). Its lead in the oil/gas and financial sectors is even more striking, with a total of \$9 billion, as compared with its closest rival, the US, at \$4 billion [Jakarta Post, 11 June 1988].



"It's all so confusing. Should I be happy or sad?" Tempo, 25 June 1988.



## Switching to export orientation

But the Japanese factor is only part of the story. There have been important shifts in Indonesian economic policy in the past year or so. The fall in the price of oil has forced Indonesia to focus more heavily on promoting non-oil exports to reverse its ever worsening balance of payments deficit. De-regulatory measures have been introduced, promoting the interests of exporters. Under strong pressure from the World Bank, there has been a shift away from import substitution, towards export orientation. This is very welcome to industrial nations which are keen to penetrate the Indonesian market with their own products and strongly oppose the whole idea of import substitution.

A second shift has been in favour of foreign capital investment. For many years, the government has kept certain industries off-limits to foreign investors, laid down stringent rules to secure majority Indonesian participation in companies set up with foreign capital, and limited the role of foreign personnel. These protective measures are fast disintegrating. A package of measures last December removed the ban on foreign companies in Indonesia handling exports, and recently, the Capital Investment Board announced that foreign investors are no longer bound by a minimum of one million dollars for an investment project. This is particularly welcome to potential investors from Asia's newly-industrialised countries (NICs) who now need to find investment havens off-shore because of rising labour costs at home and, in the case of South Korea, growing labour unrest.

The re-adjustments introduced in the past year or so are precisely what the international financial community has been wanting for many years. The aid committed this year is by way of a reward for compliance and a means of pressing for yet more re-adjustments, as is abundantly clear from statements emanating from the IGGI meeting. Dutch Minister for Overseas Cooperation, Piet Bukman,

said that aid will continue to be needed by Indonesia "until stable growth has been restored", while the final statement stressed that Indonesia will need more help from the international donor community to carry out further re-adjustments, to improve the climate for investment and to enhance the orientation towards exports [Kompas, 17 June].

The massive emphasis on balance of payments support means that the industrial nations also want to prop up Indonesia's currency reserves, thus avoiding a further devaluation of the rupiah or runs on foreign exchange that have been so harmful to foreign investors in Indonesia in the past few years.

Above all, this year's aid commitments have greatly reinforced Indonesia's dependence on foreign aid and investment, putting a stop to the nationalism and protectionism which marked Indonesian economic policy throughout the period of the oil boom.

What no-one mentions in all this is that Indonesia's authoritarian regime and Suharto's track record as one of the world's longest-ruling dictators leads foreign investors and financiers to believe that their growing interests in Indonesia are likely to enjoy military protection for some time to come. Political security has now combined with economic circumstances that have forced Jakarta to comply with investors demands, making Indonesia one of the most attractive countries in the Third World to investors from both east and west.



The Japanese Prime Minister, Noboru Takeshita. He gave nothing away, despite pleas for help from President Suharto.

# Will the real HMI stand up?

Ever since the 16th Congress of the HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Students Association) two years ago in Padang, the organisation has been split in two. The source of the conflict was whether to accept the State doctrine of Pancasila as the sole principle or to stick to the HMI's original ideals.

Since then, the rift has widened, as became apparent when the two wings held congresses which showed how far apart they were. The 'official' wing has gradually adjusted itself to its new role as a Pancasila organisation, flirting with Golkar, the government party, to win official favour. It was even being suggested, as the 17th Congress drew near, that it be re-named the Indonesian Students Union, removing 'Islam' from its title. The other wing, known as Majelis Penyelamat Organisation (MPO) or Council to Safeguard the Organisation, has stuck to its Islamic principles.

The MPO Congress in Kaliurang, Jogjakarta, took place without disturbance. Everything proceeding according to plan. There were 150 delegates from thirteen branches. It was decided to stick to the principle laid down when the HMI was founded in 1947. The only 'flaw' was the lack of a permit. In a country where even the most

innocuous social gathering needs official permission, it was quite risky to hold such a large meeting without police approval. The resigning chairman, Eggie Sudjana, said they had taken a calculated risk: "If we had applied for a permit, would they have given us one?" [Tempo, 14 July 1988.] For the next two years, the MPO will be chaired by Tamsil Linrung from Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi.

By contrast the 'official' Congress in Lhokseumawe, Aceh, was in turmoil from start to finish and had to go on for an extra two days to finish its agenda. Virtually every speaker was shouted down. Despite government backing, the chairman, Saleh Khalid had difficulty getting endorsement for his end-of-term report. During his two years in office, he had reshuffled the board twice because of internal frictions.

Although the 'official' wing can claim to represent the majority of members, it has been greatly weakened by rifts and personal ambitions. The HMI, traditionally Indonesia's largest student federation, is fast losing influence on the campuses. The adoption of Pancasila is clearly at the root of the trouble. ★



# A new generation of student protest

*After years of silence, Indonesian students are beginning to show their muscle again. For the first twelve years of Suharto's rule, the student movement was an integral part of political processes, at first supporting the military takeover, then later coming out in opposition to the military government. Since 1978, the movement has been muzzled. Now, after nearly a decade, students appear to be finding new ways to show their anger at the lack of democracy, the low standards of education and exorbitant tuition fees.*

## Earlier generations of student protest

Without organised student action in 1965-66, General Suharto would have had more difficulty consolidating his seizure of power. The alliance struck between the armed forces and the Student Action Front (KAMI) help Suharto win support from a sizable section of the middle class, while student demonstrations helped to paralyse life in the big cities. Always a shrewd strategist, Suharto was able to create the impression that the armed forces were not responsible for the turmoil in the streets. The three demands voiced by KAMI which had been drafted by army intelligence - replacing Sukarno's ministers, cutting prices and banning the Communist Party - played a key role in discrediting the then president, loosening his grip on power, very much to Suharto's advantage.

*Harian KAMI*, the movement's daily paper served as an effective rallying point for students and intellectuals, though once KAMI had served its purpose and the paper started criticising the monster it had helped create, the government quickly moved to ban it for good.

Not much is left of the largely right-wing, anti-communist KAMI generation. Some of its leading lights became disillusioned and lost interest in politics. Some of these, now in their early forties, are warning today's generation of student activists against doing anything. In the end, they say with some justification, the students will only be used by the generals again. Over the years, student protest has been dogged by interference from warring army factions.

Other disillusioned 1966 activists have found a place in non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Some have acknowledged their lamentable role in helping one of the longest surviving military regimes to win power, and now recognise that, with the destruction of the PKI, the trade unions and other leftwing organisations, Indonesia is bereft of a countervailing force. As one KAMI old-timer said recently: "We are left with a nation of ducks (*manusia bebek*), with a follow-my-leader mentality."

Another group of KAMI activists are now *mapan*, or 'arrivee'. Cosmas Batubara, formerly a Catholic student leader, is Minister of Labour, while Sofyan Wanandi, also a Catholic student leader, runs PT Truba, the holding company of all military corporations. Fahmi Idris, another former activist turned 'fat cat', runs a number of enterprises. But the successful ones are few in number and must be aware of the fate that could befall them if their loyalty to Suharto shows signs of slipping. They have Abdul Gafur as an example, discarded by Suharto in the latest cabinet reshuffle, after years of devoted service.

In another category stands Sarwono Kusumaatmaja, General Secretary of Golkar and now a cabinet minister. He represents those who decided from the start to "work within the system". There are many highly-placed civil



An anti-communist KAMI demonstration on the streets of Jakarta in early 1966.

servants and professors in this category, not necessarily at one in their hearts with militarism but survivalists by nature.

## The Malari movement

The student movements of the seventies generated far less accommodationism than did KAMI. An important difference is that, whereas the KAMI leaders believed that a coalition with the armed forces would restore democracy, later activists had no such illusions.

The student unrest that climaxed in 1974 is known as *Malari*, the 15 January Catastrophe. As in the sixties, the demands were not confined to student affairs but dealt with national political issues. These were a true reflection of the situation at the time.

Suharto and his technocrats were busy attracting foreign investment while relying on massive foreign aid from the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) chaired by the Dutch government. Japanese corporations were taking advantage of this open-door policy, flooding the cities with consumer goods, promoted by flashy ads.

*Malari* peaked with the visits of Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation and IGGI chair, and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Many saw Pronk as "capitalism with a gentle face" while Tanaka was the "Gordon Gekko of the seventies". The demonstration for Pronk was friendly, but Tanaka's 'welcome' turned into a huge anti-Japanese rally where Japanese cars, motorbikes and billboards were destroyed. While the students showed no preference as between the Pronk model and the Tanaka model, condemning both as a sell-out, generals at the top did have clear preferences. Suharto's closest aides in his personal staff, ASPRI, were part of the Japanese lobby while General Sumitro, then deputy-

## STUDENT PROTESTS

commander of the armed forces and commander of the powerful Kopkamtib, was seen as leaning towards the western option.

Suharto kept his options open, recognising the need for both. A violent clash between the two cliques of generals exploded in the streets on 15 January 1974. General Ali Murtopo of the ASPRI wing orchestrated rioting and looting which led to the gutting of a four-storey shopping-centre. Although few doubted that Murtopo's notorious Opsus outfit was responsible, the students were blamed. The movement was crushed and many activists were arrested, while Sumitro and his group were fired.

Few Malari figures became accommodationists and most have retained their reforming zeal, working in NGOs. An exception is Theo Sambuaga who won a position in the official youth body, KNPI and is now creeping up the Golkar ladder.

Although Malari failed to build bridges with the urban poor and the emerging working class, its demands enjoyed great popularity. But the impression lives on that Malari was used by pro-western generals to take a swipe at the Japanese lobby. This was reinforced by Suharto's decision, after Malari, to disband ASPRI, a shrewd move to replace poor achievers like General Suryo. It gave him a chance to reshuffle his inner core while giving the impression that he was meeting the students' demands.

### The 1977/78 movement

By 1977, the economic situation in Indonesia had changed. While it was reaping the benefits of the oil boom, the state oil company, Pertamina had collapsed through corruption and mismanagement, only to be rescued by the IMF. Suharto, now firmly in power for more than a decade, was showing his true colours as a despotic tyrant, centralising power in the hands of a small clique, accumulating wealth and building the foundations of a hugely wealthy extended First Family.



From a 1978 student pamphlet: "Return the armed forces to their proper function."

Although only three years had elapsed, the 77/78 movement differed markedly from Malari. For the first time, the students were clearly anti-militarist, and openly criticised Suharto and his family, even raising demands for his resignation. For Suharto and the army, this was going too far. Student leaders on many campuses were rounded up, many to face trial and heavy sentences.

Unlike the KAMI movement a decade earlier which was run by extra-campus organisations such as Catholic and Muslim student organisations, the 1974 and 1978 movements were organised by campus-based student councils (DM) and student senates (SM). Another feature in the seventies was the role of the student press. Campus periodicals, leaflets and brochures were produced which have since become invaluable historical documents, containing analyses that are as valid today as they ever were, especially regarding the nature of military rule.

Although some 1978 leaders later sought survival through collaboration, few have found a place in Golkar or the bureaucracy, as their attacks on the First Family proved unforgivable.



From a 1978 student pamphlet: "The younger generation on trial."

### Curbing student protest

The two upsurges, coming in such close proximity, convinced the regime that it was now time to strike at the very foundation of student protest, once and for all. Even before the latter movement peaked, the Education Department issued Regulation 028 prohibiting students from taking part in active politics and demonstrations. The ruling was ignored but a much greater blow was struck when Education Minister, Daud Yusuf, issued Regulation 0156 for "normalisation" of campus life, known as the NKK. The DMs and SMs were disbanded and replaced by new organisations that were part of the university bureaucratic structure. In addition, strict rules were introduced regarding study timetables, to ensure that students would have no time "to busy themselves with extra-campus affairs".

With their best leaders in prison, their councils banned and all student meetings now needing permits, the students were effectively depoliticised, so much so that it has taken the best part of a decade for student action to re-emerge.





A student demonstration in Ujung Pandang, November 1987.

In November last year, many students and other young people in Ujung Pandang took to the streets in protest against a new ruling requiring motor-cyclists to wear helmets. The security forces responded with an iron fist and fourteen people were left dead. Although Ujung Pandang did not set the pattern for other protests, it was a clear sign that tempers on the campuses were near boiling point.

To put the current wave of unrest into perspective, it should be explained that since the early 1970s, the students have regarded themselves not as a political force but as a moral force focussing on protest. The weakness of such a stand is that continuity cannot be guaranteed as no political programme is formulated. However, a 'purely moral' movement has the advantage of being able to avoid political compromises.

Like other third world countries, Indonesia is today a country of the young. Half the population is under 21 years old, with urbanisation the big attraction for rural youth. Although the number of schools has increased, tertiary institutions cannot absorb all the school-leavers wishing to continue their education. Job opportunities have failed to keep up. A university degree or even a PhD is no longer a guarantee of employment. Problems facing students have mounted: the prospects of unemployment, high tuition fees, incompetent lecturers, overcrowded classrooms and, exacerbating the tensions, no channels for students to express their discontent.

With tens of thousands failing to get places in the much-coveted state universities, private universities have mushroomed, and they charge very high fees. Some are run like businesses, with parents having to haggle over entrance fees which can be as high as \$7,500, not to mention tuition fees. It is now becoming cheaper for the very rich to send their offspring to universities in California or Melbourne.

In the current stifling political atmosphere, student demands are focussed on campus issues. In the last ten months or so, demonstrations have taken place in Nommensen University, Medan; the National University (Unas), Jakarta; the arts academy, STK Wilwatika in Jogjakarta; the Muslim state institute, IAIN Antasari in Banjarmasin; Diponegoro University, Semarang; the Accountancy and Banking Academy, Semarang; the teachers' college, IKIP-Veteran in Semarang; Satya Wacana Christian University, Salatiga; the Muhamaddiyah Universities in Surakarta and Magelang; and the

Indonesian Islamic University in Jogjakarta. The scale of protest has varied; some have remained within campus boundaries while others have made the national headlines.

One of the more remote examples comes from Banjarmasin where students, angered by a big increase in fees, tried in vain to speak to the Rector. A campus demonstration failed to get a hearing with the authorities, whereupon seven hundred students marched to the Rector's home and banged on his door. Not until the police chief intervened, urging the Rector to speak to the students, did tempers cool, such was the arrogance of the university leadership.

At IKIP-Veteran in Semarang, students succeeded in preventing the appointment of two new deputy rectors who were unwelcome because they were also head and deputy-head of the college foundation.

A long battle is taking place in Jakarta's National University (Unas), one of the oldest private universities. Three students have been suspended in a struggle to remove the 80-year-old Sutan Takdir Alisyahbana, a respected writer and philosopher with no flair for university management. The students have also called for more openness about prestige projects that are being financed at the expense of basic study facilities. Two hundred students have to cram into tiny lecture rooms while fourth and fifth year students are employed to teach second and third years. But the Rector has refused to listen to the students.

Things escalated in May when campus para-militaries in Menwa, the student regiment, beat up an activist. The situation remains deadlocked while the Rector declared: "The task of students is to study and study; no need to interfere in the running of the university." [Panji Masyarakat, 1-10 June 1988]

At present, actions remain isolated, the 1978 measures having fragmented the campuses. The student press, which in those days helped spread news of actions, turning local issues into national ones, was all outlawed and must now start again from scratch. But there have been signs of solidarity. After the Ujung Pandang killings, Bandung students went to Parliament to protest.

Major-General Setyana, Central Java's military commander, well aware of the danger of growing student protest, summoned the heads of all tertiary institutions in the province to warn them to be vigilant. He claimed that students from outside Central Java were visiting the campuses to exchange experiences. "These visits could lead to an escalation," he said [Tempo, 14 May].

It fell to a former minister of religious affairs, Professor Mukti Ali, now Rector of the State Islamic University, IAIN, to speak out last year for the restoration of democratic rights. "The time has come for student representative bodies to be restored so that students can speak out. Students should not be silent, for silence is obnoxious," Kompas, 27 February 1987].

Needless to say, many highly-placed officials and former student activists disagree with such liberal views. Golkar Secretary-General Sarwono, for one, has warned that if student action escalates, military groups will exploit them. Another, Yuwono Sudarsono, now a lecturer, who failed, with Jusuf Wanandi, to win a place on the UN human rights sub-commission in Geneva earlier this year, alleges that "if activism gets out of hand, young officers could team up with the students and form a reform movement within the army. That is the real threat that the students present." [FEER, 11 February 1988]. In the same article, an unnamed government official called the students "red-diaper babies", the offspring of communists killed in the 1965 anti-communist massacre, who are now propelled by feelings of revenge.

But what do the student activists themselves think? Petrus Barus, a suspended Unas student has spoken up against financial swindles at the university, comparing them to ripoffs in the local market. Others decry the student organs that have replaced the DMs and SMs which are described as simply an extension of the university management. A student at the Semarang Teachers Training College who himself chairs one of these government-sponsored organs, believes that their lack of effectiveness has prompted students to turn to direct action. "All student representative bodies are defunct, not only here but everywhere," [Tempo, 14 May 1988].

Bandung students, traditionally in the vanguard of the student movement, have been true to their reputation. A group named Satgas, or Kesatuan Tugas (United Task Force) was set up last year. (The choice of name is unfortunate as Satgas is also the name of special army

intelligence units.) The student Satgas hopes to rekindle past traditions, forge links with students elsewhere and circulate its publications widely. "We have no connection with any political group or opposition figures. We are only students interested in taking critical action to show the government we care about what they are doing. We are against NKK. We are against limitations on freedom." [FEER, 11 February 1988]

It is too soon to predict where present developments will lead, nor should comparisons be made with student actions in South Korea or Burma. There is still no focus on national issues; Indonesian student activists must still consolidate themselves around the most important issue on campus, to oppose the dictatorial and anti-democratic NKK regulation. ☆

## RED DRIVE

# When your name is on a list

"This was the most terrible thing that could possibly have happened. It was as if they had murdered me," said the grey-haired writer, lamenting his fate. He spoke in a soft, unemotional voice, picking his words carefully. "I am not entitled to anything, not even my pension."

The cause of the calamity was a letter he received from the Department of Education and Culture on 24 May notifying him that he had been dishonorably dismissed as senior lecturer at the Faculty of Communications, Pajajaran University, Bandung. This automatically meant he could no longer teach either at the Police Academy or at the Infantry's Centre of Education in Bandung.

The dismissal followed a charge that he had once been a member of the outlawed organisation, Lekra, the League of People's Culture, an organisation associated with the PKI. "I have no idea how my name ever came to be on Lekra's list," he told Tempo.

Let us call this father of four Sukresna. He joined the staff of Unpad in 1969. His dismissal notice was retrospective from 1 September last year. "This means that I must pay back the wages I have received for the last seven months."

He realised that his name had once been connected with Lekra but thought that it had all been cleared up. "I reported myself and asked to be screened. This all happened in 1965 and 1966, through the military commands, Koramil and Kodim, through the Police and the local government. Everything was cleared up and I was allowed to resume my studies." He graduated in communications studies in 1969.

On the invitation of the Russian Writers Union, he once visited Moscow, and visited North Korea and China. On these trips, he travelled with the Jogjakarta writer, W.S. Rendra. He was amazed because he was constantly identified as the editor of Syntes a, the journal of the pro-PKI students' organisation, CGMI. "This is how the PKI dragged people down," he said.


In 1965, two short novels of his, Api and Si Rangka, were banned because of the Lekra charge. He had no chance to challenge this, so he continued to be regarded as a Lekra writer. Who now has plotted his downfall?

He thinks the trouble started four years ago. He had been ordered to leave his home which was being taken over for a local government project. But because the lecturers' homes in Cigadung were not yet ready for use, he moved in to a house on Jalan Sekeloa. The Dean of the Faculty gave him two weeks to leave, but Sukresna refused to move, asking first to be allowed to complete

various formalities. "Because of this, I came to be regarded as a rebel."

There were many repercussions, and the conflict with the Faculty went on for ages. Sukresna came out the loser. Two years later, he was investigated by the Inspector-General of the Department on the Lekra question. This time too, things were cleared up, but later on, he was again called to account, this time by the West Java special Kopkamtib officer (Laksusda). Again, he emerged unscathed. "I can only conclude that the letter I have now received from the Department of Education was sent at the prompting of the Faculty and has nothing to do with the Laksusda."

Sukresna's dismissal came as a great shock to H.B.



Jassin, the well-known literary critic and editor of Kisah, a journal which often publishes short stories by Kresna. "He's not a member of Lekra. He's not a communist," insists Jassin. Jassin regards Kresna as a writer who was attracted by socialist realism, who speaks out for justice and humanitarianism.

Some writers with views like this got taken on board by Lekra, consciously or unconsciously. It's hard luck for those who never became members but whose names appear to have been included on the skipper's list.

[Translated from Tempo, 16 July 1988.] ☆



# Timorese refugee on Indonesian operations in East Timor since 1975

*Cristiano Costa lived with his parents in Baucau until the town was invaded by Indonesian troops two days after Dili was invaded on 7 December 1975. He fled to the mountains and spent the next three years in the bush. From 1979 till 1987, he lived in Indonesian-occupied Baucau, often in detention or in danger of arrest. In October 1987, he escaped from Indonesia while on a visit to Jakarta. After a brief stay in Macao, he reached Lisbon in February this year and testified before the UN Human Rights Commission in March. This is the third and final part of an interview with him in Geneva. The first two parts appeared in TAPOL Bulletins No 86 and 87.*

**Were you able to help anyone escape?**

Yes, but there were soldiers ahead of us and more soldiers behind us so if we let anyone go, the soldiers behind could kill them. But some did escape.

**I had always imagined that during the fence-of-legs, Timorese were in the front line.**

No, soldiers were in the frontline, though not all that many. They were 'gerak cepat' (rapid-moving) troops. In the next line were Timorese, but with Indonesian soldiers as well. In the rear, there were only soldiers, combat troops.

As they closed in on Aitana, they knew many Fretilin people were trapped there, from many parts of the country. So as the troops closed in, the Timorese, the civilians, were told to go home, leaving only troops. My particular group, the ones who were armed, were not told to go home but were kept in the rear.

**How many of you were armed?**

There were four armed teams of Timorese as well as Timorese hansip (civil guards), and others called 'partizan', also bearing weapons. The other Timorese were not armed. They just came along, carrying food, shouting and yelling. Our team was called 'team loriku', that's the name of a bird.

**How did they select the ones to be armed?**

We were the ones who had been fighting in the bush so they knew we could handle weapons. Of course, they were suspicious of us, but they needed a lot of people for the operation.

When we surrendered in 1979, we were in the hands of Sahala Rajagukguk. He was commander of RTP (Regimen Team Pertempuran) 6. Later, he became commander of the Korem, the District Military Command in Dili. He knew all about us and decided that we should be armed. He was Korem commander at the time of the fence-of-legs.

**What about the logistics of the operation?**

The operation cost the Indonesians two billion rupiahs in addition to the regular wages and upkeep of the troops. It was regarded as a special project. Food was carried along in vehicles, and later, when there were no roads, it was dropped by helicopter. The Timorese had brought some food with them. Those of us in the special teams got our food from the military. I think the other Timorese were also supplied with some food, though it was far from enough, corn and things like that.

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## In custody during the 1982 election

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**What happened to you after that operation?**

I was based in Ostiko at the time, not in Baucau.



After resting for a while, I went home to my parents. Then a few weeks before the 1982 general election, many of us were sent to Tacitolu, a few kilometres west of Dili airfield and were held in custody.

**But a few months before, they had given you weapons.**

Yes, I never cease to wonder. We had been in Indonesian hands for a long time, they had armed us to take part in the fence-of-legs. Yet when election time came, they didn't trust us so we were detained.

**Who were the others?**

They were all people who had been fighting in the bush. People who had been in those special teams during the fence-of-legs. We were all detained in Tacitolu, as I recollect, 121 from Baucau. There were about a hundred from Vikeke and a lot more from Los Palos. Altogether 324 people were sent to Tacitolu from those three places. Maybe, people from other places were taken elsewhere. I don't know.

**At one moment, they seem to trust you and give you arms. The next moment, they suspect you and put you in jail. How do you explain that?**

With difficulty! They themselves create the conditions to make everyone hate them. Even people who want to support them find it difficult. They have such a bad attitude towards the Timorese. Whatever people do for the Indonesians, they continue to hate them, including those who are not in contact with Fretilin. The Indonesians are so inhuman.

**How long were you in Tacitolu?**

Three months. We weren't in prison but we weren't allowed outside the area. We weren't interrogated but they gave us indoctrination, penataran, about the





**What happened to the flag?**

One Indonesian project in Dili that was surely built to last is the Integration Monument. But a recent photo in *Kompas* reveals that the warrior on top has lost his red-and-white flag. Did someone climb up one night and remove it, or is it a sign of providence?

Pancasila or whatever. Every time we wanted to go anywhere, we had to get permission. Some were allowed to go and see their families in Dili but only for the day.

I supposed you'd call this 'quarantine', making sure we didn't influence anyone during the elections. They kept us there till about six weeks after the election.

**Do you know anything about the 1982 elections?**

No, we didn't see anything. They didn't want anyone around who might disturb things. I hear this happened elsewhere too, in West Papua for instance.

## Indonesia's most murderous officer

**What's your opinion of Sahala Rajagukguk?**

Of all the Indonesian officers who have served in East Timor, he's the worst murderer. During his term in East Timor, many people were murdered. Many Fretilin people who were captured at the time disappeared. I reckon that at least a hundred people disappeared during the time he was commander of RTP-6, from 1979 to 1980, and then Korem commander up to 1982. Some of the names of the disappeared were mentioned in a copy of TAPOL Bulletin that I saw - Leopoldo, Joaquim, Maria Goretti, Anni Baldera Wujo, Julia Inacio. About 80 per cent of the Fretilin guerrillas captured during his term were murdered.

**What about Colonel Purwanto, who replaced Sahala?**

I don't recollect hearing anything about him before he became commander. As far as I can remember, he took over

at the beginning of 1983, just before the negotiations with Xanana took place.

I think his intentions towards East Timor were good. He wanted to resolve the conflict by diplomacy, not by violence. His intentions were the reverse of Sahala's. but the problem was, there was no meeting-point between the two sides. So the whole thing collapsed. Both sides really made an effort to resolve the conflict.

## Doomed to failure

Indonesia's attempts to crush Fretilin and impose East Timor's integration by force cannot succeed. In 1975, they tried to impose integration by diplomacy with the Portuguese, but that failed. Then came their campaign to integrate East Timor in 1975 with Operasi Komodo, launched from West Timor under Benny Murdani's command. Then came Operasi Seroja, launched on 7 December 1975 to take control of Dili, Baucau and Los Palos, commanded by Dading Kalbuadi. Next came the operation to take control of the district towns, but this was unsuccessful too. Fretilin set up shock brigades to launch counter-attacks against Indonesian positions in the towns. Then the Indonesians launched a new strategy with Operasi Sapu Bersih, which succeeded in destroying virtually 90 per cent of Fretilin forces, with many being captured, surrendering or being killed.

With this operation, much of Indonesia's objective was achieved. Many people were arrested, many Fretilin members surrendered. There was virtually no resistance left. Then followed a wave of killings, under Sahala Rajagukguk. This was when Xanana emerged as the person who found the way forward in the bush. He and Mau Hunu, the only other Fretilin central committee member to survive Operasi Sapu Bersih, re-organised Fretilin. From 1 - 3 March 1981, during Sahala's time, they convened a conference in the central sector, in Bamilita, at the foot of Mount Maubai. Indonesia was very afraid of Fretilin's resurgence so they launched a new strategy with the fence-of-legs, their fourth operation, after all their previous operations had failed to smash the resistance. But this operation did not succeed either.

Then came operasi kikis in 1983. This followed the Fretilin offensive in Kraras which I spoke about earlier. Many people were arrested at the time, including me. They used about forty battalions in this operation. It continued throughout 1984 and into 1985. But this was yet another failure. Fretilin suffered virtually no losses but there were many Indonesian casualties. Fretilin's position became stronger than in 1982, with many more weapons, thanks to the militia who joined their ranks, bringing their weapons with them.

**Was it only militia from Krakas who joined Fretilin in 1983?**

More than two hundred armed militia in Krakas went into the bush along with almost everyone in Kraras. Other militia went into the bush from Buanura. From Uailili, a kampung a few kilometres to the south of Baucau, about ten hansip members fled to the bush, taking their weapons. Other went from Los Palos. This had been well coordinated during the ceasefire after the negotiations in March 1983. This was when Benny Murdani took over as armed forces commander-in-chief and soon switched back to the strategy of relying only on force. This was when the special command for East Timor known as Kooskam was set up, because East Timor is a special operations region.

The kikis operation was a continuation of the fence-of-legs, but this time, only military forces were deployed. The first commander of Kooskam was Brigadier-General Sugito. There were many arrests in the towns.

But by this time, Fretilin had become very experienced and was firmly established as a resistance movement. People say they have five or six hundred armed guerrillas. During the fence-of-legs, Indonesia captured 127 firearms. I know, because I was working with them at the time and saw the documents. But in 1983, Fretilin obtained an additional two hundred weapons, making them stronger than before. But I don't believe there are only five hundred armed guerrillas. From 1980 to 1983, I was able to follow the situation closely because I was working with Indonesian intelligence. I am certain there are more than five hundred armed guerrillas.

I am talking about armed personnel. Altogether there are at least a thousand guerrillas, of whom at least five hundred are armed. Five hundred sounds like a small number but for a country the size of East Timor, it's not small. A guerrilla movement with five hundred armed personnel, with rich experiences going back thirteen years, cannot be regarded as trivial. East Timor is a

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small country with a population of about 600,000 people. No-one, least of all the Indonesians, can afford to under-estimate such a movement.

**Finally could you say something about Fretilin's military strategy?**

There are two basic points. Firstly, waging mobile warfare, with guerrillas operating in small, mobile groups throughout the interior. This is combined with a system of tactical offensive which means that groups launch diversionary attacks against a number of Indonesian positions in different parts of the country, on this or that town, sometimes simultaneously. The guerrillas are extremely sparing with their firearms and ammunition; they only fire when they are sure of their target, of getting an Indonesian soldier and, if possible, capturing a weapon, several weapons and some ammunition. These tactics continually replenish Fretilin forces, while causing Indonesian casualties and creating a sense of insecurity on the enemy side. ✱

## WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES

# West Papuans expelled from Vanuatu

The government of Father Walter Lini has ordered all West Papuans who were living in Vanuatu to leave the country, alleging that they had been involved in a political conflict involving a former minister, Barak Sope. But Father Lini has made it clear, in a press statement, that his "Government's support for the independence of West Papua remains firm and is in no way affected by the recent events. The Vanuatu Government is the only government in the world which officially supports West Papuan independence."

When the deportation order was served on 6 June, the OPM representative in Vanuatu, Rex Rumakiek, was in Australia, and has since been seeking to obtain permission to remain in Australia. Five other West Papuans in Port Vila are members of the Black Brothers band who, with their relatives, have been unable to leave because they have no place to go and no means to get anywhere. Because they were unable to comply with the deportation order, they were placed in detention on 14 June. Those arrested are Andi Ayamiseba, his younger brother William, Stevie Mambor, August Rumwaropen and Eti Ayamiseba. Others named on the deportation order are Andi Ayamiseba Senior, Leila Ayamiseba and her two daughters Isadora and Dolphina, band member Benny Bettay Tan, his wife and their two children Dickie and Jill, Mrs Rumwaropen and her daughters Leah, Ros and Petra, and William Ayamiseba's wife, Emily, a Solomon Islander.

The Black Brothers is a West Papuan pop group which was very popular in Indonesia right up to the time the whole group defected.

Andi Ayamiseba Senior holds a Dutch passport but the others hold only Dutch alien travel documents. The members of the Black Brothers band sought asylum in Holland after being forced to leave Papua New Guinea in 1980, under pressure from Jakarta.

In 1983, the then Vanuatu Immigration Minister, Barak Sope helped the group to enter and settle in Vanuatu as



his personal friends and business associates. They had no formal status as refugees. When a conflict flared up between Sope and Prime Minister Lini, they lost their protection. But having left the Netherlands, they had forfeited their right of residence in that country.

They are now seeking permission to enter Australia.

# Transmigration site attack clarified

*From several sources, TAPOL has been able to piece together a much fuller picture of the incident at an Arso transmigration site in March this year when a number of transmigrants were killed and many more were injured. We reported this incident in TAPOL Bulletin, No 87, June 1988. We publish the following as a comprehensive correction of that report:*

It was not in fact an attack from people outside the site. It was an attack on a group of transmigrants from Sulawesi by local transmigrants. The site in question includes one large rice-growing area where six thousand Javanese now live and work. In addition there is a PIR (nucleus estate) site where palm-oil trees were planted about seven years ago. Some inhabitants in the rice-growing area are from Sulawesi. They are not government-sponsored transmigrants but acquired the land they now occupy independently. They are spontaneous or 'swakarsa' transmigrants.

In addition, there are about five hundred Arso villagers on the site. In the early 1970s, following conflicts with Indonesian troops, the villagers fled to Papua New Guinea. They returned several years later to find that their villages had been destroyed. They were told to build themselves a new village and their sago stands were cut down. Their village became part of a transmigration site. They had no option but to agree to become local settlers on what had formerly been their own land. With their sago stands and other food supplies gone, they became totally dependent on what they could earn as PIR labourers.

The position of the Arso people on the site is inferior to the Sulawesi families living nearby, somewhat akin to coolie labour tending the plantation crops. In any case, economic conditions on the site are difficult because, even though palm-oil is now being produced, there is no factory to process the oil. Being at the bottom of the pile, Arso villagers have been particularly badly hit.

It was out of a sense of frustration at their loss of land, their impoverished circumstances and the way the newcomers from Sulawesi treated them that led to an outburst of fury, in the form of an attack by a number of Arso villagers armed with machetes.

Our sources insist that the OPM was not involved in any way. Indeed, following the attack, OPM fighters in the area made it clear that it was no part of their strategy to attack transmigrants. This reinforces the statement issued by Seth Rumkorem, the OPM leader who is now a refugee in Athens, insisting that none of the OPM actions he had been informed about recently was related to transmigrants. But his assessment that the incident was inspired by army intelligence is not substantiated, though it does appear that, once the incident had occurred and a number of transmigrants (eleven according to our sources) had been killed, the army used it as a pretext to launch operations against the OPM.

Later claims by OPM spokespersons alleging their own involvement and even speaking of a death toll exceeding 150 people are, we have been assured, quite without foundation. ★



A transmigration site in West Papua

## Bernard Narokobi appointed Justice Minister

Bernard Narokobi, the Papua New Guinean lawyer who has done so much to protect the rights of West Papuan refugees seeking asylum in PNG from persecution by the Indonesian authorities, has been named Minister of Justice in the new government just formed in Port Moresby by Rabbie Namaliu, leader of the Pangu Party.

The new government was formed after the government of Paias Wingti lost a confidence motion in Parliament. The government is a coalition of the Pangu Party, the Melanesian Alliance whose leader is Father John Momis, and the People's Action Party, led by Ted Diro, former commander of the PNG Defence Force who is known to be close to Indonesia's General Murdani. Michael Somare, the former leader of Pangu, who was Prime Minister when twelve West Papuans were deported to Indonesia in October 1985, has been named as Foreign Minister. John Giheno also of Pangu, has been appointed Minister of State to assist the Prime Minister. Giheno was the Foreign Minister who signed the deportation warrants of the twelve West Papuans.

TAPOL has written to the new Minister of Justice expressing the hope that the interest of the refugees will be safe in his hands.




# Swiss pilot exposes missionary activity in West Papua

Theodore Frey, the Swiss pilot who, together with his wife and daughter, made a very risky escape from West Papua in May this year, has strongly criticised Catholic missionary aviation services in West Papua for assisting the Indonesian military in their efforts to control and exterminate the native people of the territory.

The Frey family arrived in Nhulunbuy, the northernmost tip of Australia, aboard a Cessna plane with the fuel tank almost empty, having left Nabire without their passports, and in a desperate hurry [TAPOL Bulletin, No 87, June 1988]. Frey had been employed by Associated Mission Aviation (AMA), the Catholic aviation company.

## Open letter to the Pope


In an open letter to the Pope, Frey bitterly has attacked the Catholic missionaries in West Papua for their complicity in Indonesia's campaign of genocide of the people of West Papua. In particular, he complained that the role of the missionaries in West Papua is to penetrate places that have never been reached by outsiders. They then convince the Papuans who are still living a semi-nomadic existence to settle. "Missionaries are the only people suitable for this kind of activity since an undisclosed number of Indonesian civil servants and military personnel have gone into the bush, never to return."



Theodore Frey

The creation of permanent settlements inflicts untold ecological disaster on the tropical forest, the letter continues. A system of settlement that has existed for 40,000 years cannot be uprooted in a few years without causing an ecological catastrophe. "Tropical soil with a humus only 5 centimeters deep cannot tolerate clearance of the area. The topsoil is washed away and disappears, leaving the people without food and resources."

"Once a mission's permanent settlements have grown to a certain size, the Papuans are required to build an airstrip.... The Papuans are required to surrender part of their ancestral land and to do heavy labour, in



exchange for which their environment and life-style are destroyed and they become dependent upon a murderous system." The letter continues:

"Once people have settled round an airstrip, have been civilised and wear clothes, a military post is built. Mission pilots are obliged to fly the church-owned planes to transport all the material and personnel into the area in question. The priests who are in charge of radio communications coordinate the flights for the military and relay weather forecasts. In 1967, the number of flights for mission work was 82 per cent but in the past few years, this has dropped to well below 50 per cent."

The letter also comments on the mission's role in supporting transmigration. "The missionaries help the state to make contact with the indigenous people and later on, officials expropriate land or purchase it in exchange for a few worthless gifts. Subsequently, Mission aviation takes charge of the new transmigration camp as no roads exist, (and) is required to handle all military flights, since the camps have been built as defence villages, serving to protect vital installations such as the border, the copper-mine, oil fields or major towns."

Frey also revealed that AMA is planning to buy new, larger aircraft. "Although they know this will mean having to fly three times as many flights for the military, Bishop Munninkhof of Jayapura told me, in a private conversation: 'If we don't do it, others will.'"

## Documents show increased support for the military

While in The Hague in June to take part in a protest against the international meeting of western donor countries, the Frey family spoke to the Dutch press. They revealed that during the six months they spent in

West Papua, Frey had access to documents containing figures recording Mission flights over many years. He became aware of the extent to which mission aviation is utilised by the Indonesians, in particular the military.

Apart from AMA, the Catholic aviation company, the Protestants run Mission Aviation Fellowship (MAF) and the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) also run an aviation service. Together, they use about three hundred airstrips. Most are situated in regions accessible only by jungle footpaths, so the airstrips are the only link with the outside world. Indonesian officials are entirely dependent on Mission aircraft for keeping contact with posts set up close to the airstrips.

When he complained to the four Catholic bishops in West Papua about this abuse of Mission activity, he was told that if the Missions refused to make flights for the military, they would not be allowed to remain in West Papua. "Even if only 18 per cent of our flights are for the Mission, we are still helping the people," the bishops said. "If we were thrown out, we would not be able to do even this. We cannot accept that."

### Becoming an OPM suspect

As for Frey himself, he was compelled to fly many missions for the army, but when he declared on one occasion that he was not willing to undertake a flight the next morning for the military, he soon realised that he had become a suspect, a victim of the Indonesian view that "who is not with us is against us, and who is against us must be part of the OPM".

He became afraid for his life when he discovered that there had been an attempt to tamper with a plane he was about to fly. Soon after, he overheard two Indonesians plotting to get rid of him so he and his family took the decision to escape immediately to the 'free world', to Nhulunbuy in northern Australia.

After the family arrived back safely in Switzerland, the document he had studied about flight activity found its way to Europe and is now in the hands of the West Papuan People's Front which is based in the Netherlands. The Front has since studied the documents and found, among other things, a direct co-relation between periodic upsurges in the number of flights for the military and the intensification of military operations in 1969, 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1984. [De Waarheid, 18 June 1988.]

### What our readers can do

Theo Frey has asked us to request our readers to write to the three mission aviation companies in West Papua, urging them not allow the Indonesian military to use their aircraft. He believes that this would convince missionary associations that their reprehensible activities are being watched world-wide.

The three companies are:

Associated Mission Aviation  
Mission Aviation Fellowship  
Summer Institute of Linguistics

The addresses of all three are:  
Sentani,  
Irian Jaya,  
Indonesia

★

## West Papuan refugees in Warastone refuse to move

More than two hundred West Papuan refugees who are now living near Warastone beach, close to Vanimo, in West Sepik Province, have refused to move to East Awin which has been designated as the camp to accommodate all West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea.

These refugee families are from Blak and Serui. They were originally living in Blackwater camp but decided to leave the camp several years ago and set themselves up on the beach at Warastone. All the Blackwater camp refugees were airlifted to East Awin early in May. Several weeks later, the UN High Commission for Refugees representative in Port Moresby and the PNG Government asked the refugees in Warastone to move as well, but they have refused to do so. No efforts have been made to force them to move.

According to the UNHCR representative, they will continue to be treated as refugees until the government decides what to do. It is government policy not to allow any refugees to remain outside the camps specially designated for them. If this is applied in the case of the West Papuans in Warastone, it could result in their losing the food and other aid they have been receiving until now from the UNHCR. [Post Courier, 8 June 1988]

There are fears that the new Foreign Minister, Michael Somare, may decide to take action against them, once he has settled in to his new job. ★

## Villagers sue Conoco oil company

Villagers from twelve villages in the vicinity of Sorong, West Papua have initiated proceedings in court to sue Pertamina, the Indonesian state oil company, and Conoco, the US oil company, for destroying more than 900,000 sago trees. The destruction occurred when the companies were engaged in exploration for oil back in 1979. The amount of compensation being sought runs into billions of rupiahs.

Apart from a single item in Jakarta Post of 24 June 1988, which quotes Merdeka, and reports very briefly about the first court hearing, we have not seen any other press reports about this valliant attempt, the first of its kind as far as we know, by villagers to force companies to compensate them for the enormous damage inflicted on their sources of livelihood. ★

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