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The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

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April 1988

Show trials in East Timor exposed

Cristiano Costa, an East Timorese who escaped from East Timor last October, has exposed the trials held in East Timor since 1984 as a cynical trick by the Indonesian government to create the impression that no political prisoners are held there without trial.

In a lengthy interview with TAPOL (see page 2), he described how prisoners were told that they would never be released unless they agreed to go on trial. Those who agreed were required to sign false confessions to provide the necessary 'process-verbale' to enable a trial to be staged. Costa himself and many others refused to sign. This in fact led to their early release, while those who were falsely tried were given sentences of several years.

Cristiano Costa arrived in Lisbon at the end of February this year, having passed through Indonesia, Hong Kong and Macau. He immediately went to Geneva where he made a statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights on 8 March.

in Dili, Comarca and Becora.) This conceals the fact that most people arrested for political reasons are held - and often brutally maltreated - in district and sub-district military commands, and may never be brought to Dili for so-called trials. ☆



STOP PRESS

Lieutenant-General Sugiarto, whose appointment as Minister for Transmigration was announced on 21 March. Turn to page eleven.

Deceiving the world

From Costa's interview, it emerges that preparations for the trials commenced early in 1984 just when the International Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed to resume visits to prisons. As Costa shows, the trials were a travesty of justice, deliberately staged to give Indonesia a better image in the world. It is now much easier to understand why so many lists of tried prisoners were 'leaked' to the outside world, providing Amnesty and others with plenty of information about the names of people tried and the verdicts, though nothing ever emerged about the trials themselves. Nor was Amnesty or the International Commission of Jurists given permission to attend a trial.

Costa's account also highlights the cynical hollowness of the prisoner releases that have occurred in Dili since last August. According to a recent announcement, fifty-two convicted prisoners were given 'conditional releases' in Dili in February this year. This followed releases of twenty-four prisoners in August 1987, twenty in October and eighteen in December, all of whom had served between two and six years. Indonesia now claims that only eleven convicted prisoners are still being held in Dili [Antara, 19 February 1988].

The same report claims that Dili Prison is the sole prison for the country, with a second prison now under construction in Maliana. (There are in fact two prisons

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Timorese refugee talks about the trials

Cristiano Costa lived with his parents in Baucau until the town was invaded by Indonesian troops two days after Dili was captured. He fled to the mountains and spent the following years in the bush. From 1979 until October 1987, he lived in Indonesian-occupied Baucau, often in detention or in danger of arrest. In October 1987, he escaped from Indonesia while on a visit to Jakarta. After a short stay in Macau, he reached Lisbon in late February and went to Geneva to testify before the UN Human Rights Commission on 8 March. He was interviewed by TAPOL while in Geneva.



Cristiano Costa relaxing at the Palais des Nations, Geneva

Can you explain the circumstances of your arrest in 1983?

Some months before my arrest, negotiations had been held between the Indonesian government and Fretilin guerrillas. The negotiations and the ceasefire that followed did not lead to an agreement and the whole process worked in Fretilin's favour.

In Fretilin's favour?

Yes, because during the ceasefire, the guerrillas were able to use the greater freedom to enter the towns in order to strengthen their links with the towns occupied by Indonesia. This made it possible for a counter-attack to be launched by Fretilin guerrillas in the towns. The counter-attack, which resulted in many casualties on the Indonesian side, took place on the night of 8 August 1983 in Kraras region, a village near the district capital of Vikeke.

The attack was launched by Timorese in the Indonesian militia, armed by the Indonesians, who had remained loyal to Fretilin. They had been with the Indonesians for a long time. The attack did not take the form of a battle with firearms. It was a 'cold attack' (serangan dingin), killing the Indonesian soldiers with knives, clubs and other implements. They seized many Indonesian weapons and ammunition and fled into the bush to join up with Fretilin. In terms of casualties, this was the most serious incident for Indonesia since the beginning of the war. Seventeen Indonesian soldiers were killed in Krakas and others were killed elsewhere too. The dead Indonesian were burned by the guerrillas; later their remains were buried by the Indonesians in Baucau Heroes' Cemetery.

The Indonesians then rounded up many people in the towns including me. They suspected me of sympathising with Fretilin. I was arrested at 8 pm on 18 August 1983 in Baucau, my home-town. I was living with my parents. I didn't have a job at the time, I was just doing odd

jobs, helping my parents on the land and running a small kiosk. My parents are poor peasants.

The torture

I was arrested by the military command in Baucau, Kodim-1628. They started interrogating me around midnight. The man in charge was Captain A. Haryanto, a Catholic, assisted by three soldiers. On that first night, I was not tortured. On the second night, they started torturing me and that was when I lost my front teeth. They held me on the ground, face down, and trampled so hard on my head that my two front teeth fell out and a third one was broken.

I refused to tell them anything, so on the third night, they used electric shock and threats of all kinds. I was subjected to some of the worst torture at the time.

What were they trying to find out?

You should understand that these soldiers are eager to be promoted, so whenever the occasion arises, they rush around arresting people, regardless of whether they're involved in anything. If they extract the names of others from the person they are holding, off they go to arrest a few more. I got caught because someone who mentioned my name.

They were trying to find out about Fretilin's links, but at the same time, they were thinking about their own promotion; the more people they arrest and get statements from, the better their chances of promotion.

Where is Haryanto now?

I saw him in 1987 in Vikeke. He had been promoted by that time, but when I saw him he was wearing civilian clothes, so I don't know whether he was a major or a lieutenant-colonel.

Transfer to Comarca

The interrogation and torture went on for fourteen days till 2 September, when twenty of us were taken to Comarca Prison, Dili, with our hands tied behind our backs. When we arrived at the prison, two rows of soldiers were waiting at the entrance; each one of them clubbed and beat us with iron rods as we entered the prison. They hit us on the head and back, and kicked us as well.

For the first 24 hours, we were not given any food or drink. The first food we got was in the evening of 3 September. But the food would not have been enough for a chicken. You may find this difficult to believe, but I got so little food during this time that for the first 36 days in Comarca, I never defecated. Some friends

didn't defecate for 40 days or more.

For the next seventeen months, nothing happened at all. No-one was interrogated. Then on 17 February 1985, I was again interrogated.

Who runs Comarca?

The prison is guarded by the military police but we were detainees of the Red Berets. In Baucau, we had been arrested by kodim, but after coming to Comarca, we were handed over to the Red Berets, the special troops known as 'nanggala', and guarded by the military police. Some of us were tried in court and sentenced, while others who refused to be tried were released.

When did you first hear about trials in East Timor?

As far as I know, the first trials took place in March or April 1984. The first people tried were those thought to be directly involved in Fretilin activity, who were all given long sentences. Many are now in prison in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

Did you know Dominggas, the woman who was also tried?

Yes, I remember when she and four colleagues, all men, were transferred from Dili kodim to Comarca. She was later tried and given five or six years, as I recollect. I know she was in Tangerang, Jakarta, but later came back to Dili, though I don't know whether she's still in prison.

The trials

How did the trial preparations begin?

A lot of us who had no process-verbaie were told that we were to be interrogated in preparation for a trial. In Baucau and in many other place, no process-verbaies had been produced during the interrogations, after we were rounded up indiscriminately. Despite the torture, I said nothing, so there was no written statement.

Before being brought to court, we were all re-interrogated, this time by the police though I should explain that everything had been fixed beforehand by the military. During these interrogations, they tried to force us to make false statements which would then be used for a trial.

Were you beaten during these interrogations?

No, not this time round, but they used psychological pressure and threats. I still refused to sign anything and I did not feel at all afraid. On the second and third day as well. I went on being interrogated for about a month. Not only me but many others as well. These interrogations went on for three or four months.

Did they present you with a written statement to sign?

Yes, they had something written down which we were

INTERVIEW

asked to sign. We were asked whether we wanted to be brought to trial. They kept saying that if we refused to go on trial, we would never be released. But I refused to sign. As I recollect, there were over a hundred of us being asked to agree to a trial.

They asked us over and over again, with the result that many agreed in the end to be tried. You should remember that before this, we weren't allowed any family visits. After that first Red Cross visit, our families were allowed to come to the prison to bring food, but they were not allowed to meet us. Supplies from home were extremely important, as you can imagine, because we were not getting enough food. The clothes we wore were all from our families.

Some of the prisoners who agreed to sign false statements were illiterate, people who knew nothing about politics. They had no idea what it meant to be tried, and they were people who had never had any contact with Fretilin. The Indonesians used their ignorance to stage the trials. Many of us refused from the start to have anything to do with this, so in the end we were released without being tried.

Were you yourself not tried, then?

No. I went through all the preparations but because I refused to sign anything, I was never brought to court.

Where did these interrogations take place?


In a building across the road from the court, the former home of a Portuguese football club. We were taken there every day from Comarca Prison for questioning.

By that time, some prisoners had already been tried but a lot of us had no process-verbaies. What they did was to force a prisoner from a particular region to make a statement implicating others from the same region. If someone agreed to sign a false statement, two witnesses were needed for his trial, so two others had to be found to make false statements about him. Once this had been done, all three were tried. So, after A had been tried and sentenced on the basis of false statements by B and C, B was tried on the basis of false statements by A and C, and so on.

How much time elapsed between signing a false statement and the trial?

Sometimes, the trial would begin on the very same day. The person would be taken across the road to the court and the trial began later that day. There was a prosecutor, a defence lawyer and a judge waiting to do their bit in the trial. The prosecutor read out the indictment, then the prisoner was taken back to the prison.

The trial went on for two or three days, perhaps up to a week. On one day the indictment, the next day the defence, then a day or two later, the judge would deliver the verdict. The whole thing had been fixed in



A show trial in progress in Dili district court. There is hardly a soul present apart from the defendant and officials of the court. *Asiaweek*. 2 August 1985.

advance by the military. The prosecutor would ask for, say, ten years; the defence lawyer would say this was too long and the judge would pass a sentence somewhere in between, according to what had been fixed by the military. No-one was acquitted, no-one rejected the verdicts and nothing was ever heard about any right of appeal.

Who were the defence lawyers?

Two women lawyers from Kupang who came to Dili, paid by the court, for the trial. During the whole time I was in Comarca, only these two women were used. I don't know their names. *[According to a report in the Indonesian press several years ago, there were three lawyers, Merri Dobo, Asmah Achmad and Saartje Seubelan, all from the Trisula Legal Aid Institute in Kupang - not to be confused with the LBHs or Legal Aid Institutes that function in Jakarta and other cities. By their names, they could indeed all be women.]*

Did anyone attend the trials, relatives for instance?

Because the prisoners were all regarded as political prisoners, other people were afraid to attend the trials. In one or two cases, where the relatives were in Dili, they did attend the trials. Many of those tried were from other parts, so the relatives could not afford to come. Other people didn't dare to attend.

Could the prisoners choose their defence lawyers?

From start to finish of our detention, no-one was able to ask for a lawyer. Anyway, there aren't any lawyers in Dili, only those two women from Kupang.

Did the tried prisoners meet the lawyers before the trial?

No, the first time they met was in court.

Why do you think the Indonesians devoted so much attention to staging these trials?

As I have explained, I refused to sign anything. During one of these sessions, an officer, Major Juanis, told me that all prisoners had to be tried. No-one could be released without being tried. He said people abroad knew that lots of people had been arrested and it was being said that these arrests were indiscriminate. So Indonesia wanted to show that this wasn't true. When I heard this, I became all the more determined not to collaborate. There were altogether fifty of us who refused to sign anything so we were not brought to the court. We were all released on 23 April 1985.

How Indonesia tried to clean up its image

So you were released much sooner just so that Indonesia could claim no-one was being held without trial?

Yes, precisely. Those who were tried weren't guilty of anything and didn't have proper statements; yet because they signed false confessions, they were sentenced and had to serve their sentences.

When I and the forty-nine others were released, there was a public ceremony in the forecourt of Comarca Prison, attended by two delegates from the International Red Cross, and representatives of the Bishop of Dili, the regional government and the military operations command, Kopskam Timtim, which had recently been established to take charge of military operations in East Timor. One of the Red Cross delegates was a man called Alfred; I don't remember his surname. Just a week before we were released, there had been an International Red Cross visit to Comarca, which is how they were



Indonesian soldiers on operations. This is from a set of photos of Indonesian soldiers in East Timor just received. Others are reproduced on page 6 and page 9.

around to attend the release ceremony.

Some of the people who had been tried remained in Comarca to serve out their sentences, some with longer sentences were sent to Cipinang and Tangerang in Jakarta, and some went to the new Comarca Prison called Becora, a newly built prison in east Dili. The old Comarca is used for prisoners who are still in the hands of the military. Those in Becora are in the hands of the justice ministry. With a few exceptions, all tried prisoners are moved to Becora, or to Cipinang in Jakarta for those with longer sentences. Some who are regarded as troublesome remain in Comarca.

About twenty prisoners were released on 22 August last year, and twenty more on 19 September, then on 5 or 6 October, more were released. [See page 1 for the official figures.] They were all people who signed false confessions in 1985. Some were released before serving their full sentences, because the Indonesians are so eager to project a better image to the world.

How do you assess Indonesia's decision to begin with the policy of holding trials in East Timor?

This was a new move in East Timor because Indonesia was being strongly attacked abroad for violating human rights. Also, there have been consultations at the UN between Indonesia and Portugal. That's why they are releasing people now, before their sentences have been served. All these people who signed false confessions.

I was just more stupid than them...

Why do you say stupid?

... well, because I didn't want to be tried. Maybe, it was supposed to be clever to go on trial. But I said when I was questioned: Indonesia claims to be a state based on the rule of law and the Pancasila. Are such trials in accordance with Pancasila? I asked. If the others had stuck to the Pancasila, they would certainly

have been released then like me. But they were intimidated into believing that they they could only survive if they agreed to be tried.

The ICJ and Amnesty both wanted to attend trials in East Timor, but they were not granted permission. What do you think about this?

World opinion has long regarded Indonesia as the worst violator of human rights in South East Asia. But Indonesia refuses to allow foreign observers to visit East Timor. I think Indonesia should be pressed to give access to East Timor. The only people they allow in are friendly parliamentarians from Australia, or the Canadian parliamentary delegation last year. Or the

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German television crew that came last September. I was asked to accompany the Germans to a coffee factory in Dili. I was working for the Central KUD (village cooperatives). But the visit did not take place. They were accompanied all the time by security personnel in civilian clothing. Timorese are always afraid to say anything to foreigners. These foreign journalists leave East Timor and make all kinds of comments. It amazes me how they think they can speak for the Timorese, yet while in East Timor, they don't speak to any Timorese. ☆

East Timor raised at UN Human Rights Commission

East Timor was raised on many occasions, both by government delegations and NGO representatives, at the 44th session of the UN Human Rights Commission in February and March this year. Although no resolution was tabled, the Commission did respond positively to the resolution adopted last August by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities which recommended that the Commission "study carefully the evolution of the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in East Timor". [See TAPOL Bulletin, No 83, October 1987.]


The Portuguese delegation spoke about East Timor in almost every one of its interventions during the Commission. Portugal's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Durao Barroso welcomed the Sub-Commission's resolution and drew attention to the many interventions about East Timor at last year's session of the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York, confirming the continued violation of numerous human rights in East Timor. The international community, he said, should continue to acknowledge East Timor's right to self-determination; he urged the Commission to continue to follow developments closely and to ensure that human rights are respected in East Timor.

The Sao Tome delegate devoted the major part of his address, under Item 9 on Self-Determination, to East Timor. He referred to several statements by Indonesian officials, including General Murdani's admission that it will still take "some time before the threat of armed rebellion can be totally eliminated". He said:

"At their annual summit meetings, the heads of state of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape-Verde and Sao Tome and Principe reaffirm their solidarity with the struggle of the people of East Timor and appeal to member states of the UN and humanitarian organisations to help in any possible manner the people of East Timor to realise their fundamental right to freedom and self-determination."

Instructions on how deceive a Security Council delegate

Pax Romana was one of several NGOs to speak out for East Timor, dealing in particular with the methods used by Indonesia to prevent the few foreign visitors allowed in from seeing the truth about the military presence. It quoted from a document of the Indonesian Department of



Cristiano Costa reading his statement at the UN Human Rights Commission.

Defence in early 1976, listing 37 instructions on how to prepare for a visit to East Timor by the UN envoy, Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, who was in East Timor from 19-26 January 1976 at the request of the Security Council. Among these instructions were:

Instruction No 6: All military forces stationed in the towns must be going on with their work, but they must wear civilian clothing so as to make the Delegation think that they are unarmed civilians.

Instruction No 9: All military elements disguised as unarmed civilians must avoid any contact or dialogue with the Delegation.

Instruction No 8: All villages occupied by military forces or villages that have been abandoned should not show any sign (weapons, ammunition, documents) that could be taken as an indication of their presence in or passage through the villages. The roads must be emptied of all military material.

Instruction No. 31: To avoid the possibility of disagreements among political leaders in the presence of the UN delegation, the selection of persons to speak with the Delegation should be such as to ensure that no-one will oppose the principle of integration with Indonesia. →

The document was drawn up by Colonel Subiyakto of the Department of Defence. *[Subiyakto, now a major-general, is at present governor of the National Defence Institute, Lemhanas, and deputy assistant for intelligence at the Defence Department.]*

A Third-World colonial power

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom made a submission, drawing attention to Indonesia's role as a colonial power with two colonial territories, West Papua and East Timor. After describing briefly the history of the annexation of these two territories, the WILPF called on the Commission:

- to keep East Timor on its agenda until the country has won its independence,
- to take the necessary steps to incorporate West Papua onto the agenda of the UN Decolonisation Committee,
- to consider on its own agenda the human rights situation in West Papua, and
- to request of the Indonesian Government that free access be allowed into both countries to ensure that human rights can be kept under close scrutiny.

East Timorese addresses the Commission

Cristiano Costa, an East Timorese who escaped from East Timor late last year, arrived in Geneva just in time to address the Commission during the closing week. His statement, describing his own experiences as a victim of human rights abuse, was closely followed by those attending the session. In conclusion, he said:

"I want to end with one of my most innermost thoughts. One day in 1983 when I was being badly tortured, I swore to myself that a time would come when I would get out of East Timor and tell the United Nations about my experiences and the sufferings of my people. Today my dream has come true. May I thank you for letting me make this statement, And may I beg you to take action to protect my family from any reprisals by the Indonesians because of my presence here." *[Turn to page 2 for an interview of Cristiano Costa.]*



Troops of Kostrad's IInd Infantry Division, receiving instructions at their barracks in Baucau, before going into battle. September 1987.

Japan's Radio Monitoring Project aimed at Radio Maubere?

In 1986/87, the Japanese Government provided 2,640 million yen (about \$22 million) for a Radio Monitoring Project; the funding was doubled to 5,710 million yen (about \$48.4 million) in 1987/88. During the first phase of the project, 21 monitoring stations were built, but the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund in Tokyo has refused to publicise the location of the stations. It is known, however, that one is located in Kupang, West Timor, close to the border with East Timor.

The monitoring stations are used to trace radio transmitters, and record and analyse their frequency, strength and location. At least one is partly-mobile, a kind of 'monitoring car'.

Japanese groups that support East Timor fear the project may be being used to help the Indonesian army monitor and destroy Fretilin's Radio Maubere.

Fretilin representative, Roque Rodrigues, said in Japan last year that Indonesia often tried to jam Radio Maubere; when the area of transmission was discovered, the air force carried out bombing raids. Tokyo's refusal to publicise monitoring station locations reinforces suspicions that the project is supporting military operations in East Timor and should be abandoned.

UN Human Rights Commission turns Wanandi down

Indonesia's attempt to get Yusuf Wanandi, Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, elected onto the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, turned into a fiasco when he polled the lowest number of votes.

The UN Sub-Commission is composed of experts proposed by governments who are supposed to function independently of their governments. The Sub-Commission came up for re-election at this year's meeting of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Because eight Asian countries were contesting the five Asian seats on the Sub-Commission, there were three rounds of voting; all elected members must obtain at least fifty per cent of the votes from the forty-three member states on the Commission. Wanandi obtained only ten votes in the first round, lower than the other seven; China, Japan, India and the Philippines all obtained sufficient votes. In the second round, Wanandi obtained only one vote, and in the third round he got two votes. The fifth Asian seat went to Jordan.

Wanandi's chances of getting on to the Sub-Commission were severely damaged by information circulating among delegates exposing his role as Executive Director of the CSIS, in manipulating the cover-up of information about conditions in East Timor, in particular the human rights violations.

Top bureaucrat gets a new job

Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Sudharmono who was installed as Indonesia's new vice-president on 10 March has been priming himself for the job for some time. Last year he went on the pilgrimage to Mecca, a 'must' for senior officials in Suharto's close circle. Months before his appointment, local leaders of Golkar, the party chaired by Sudharmono, were hinting that 'Pak Dhar' would soon get a higher post. In the weeks preceding the recent session of the MPR, the upper chamber, it became obvious that Sudharmono had been chosen by Suharto as his deputy for the next five years.

Biodata of a loyalist

Being a Javanese traditionalist, 12 March has special significance for Sudharmono. It was his date of birth 61 years ago, and on that day in 1966, he drew up the order banning the Indonesian Communist Party. It was also the day he took office this year as Vice-President.

He became an orphan at an early age and was brought up by an uncle in Jombang, East Java. Shortly after the Japanese overran Indonesia in 1942, he and Ali Said, now also a retired lieutenant-general and Chairman of the Supreme Court, joined Seinenden, a para-military youth organisation. The two were selected for further training in Jakarta. Indeed, most of Suharto's present-day accomplices were collaborators under the Japanese.

Sudharmono has much to hide about the late 1940s. For most, even a hint of leftwing antecedents, however far back, has meant dismissal, detention or even death. Although Sudharmono says only that he was in the Ronggolawe Division of General Djatikusumo, a Javanese prince, he is remembered by many as a member of Pesindo, the Indonesian Socialist Youth, precursor of Pemuda Rakyat, the youth organisation banned in 1966 along with the PKI. He was also in the Biro Perdjungan, the body set up in 1946 by the leftwing Defence Minister, Amir Syarifuddin, to bring together all youth militias. All this has long since been forgiven and forgotten by Suharto.

In the 1950s, Sudharmono entered the Military Law Academy and after graduating in 1962, worked as an army prosecutor in Medan. He later attended Seskoad, the Army Staff and Command School. He moved up gradually in the bureaucracy and in 1966 was appointed Cabinet Secretary and Secretary of the Economic Stabilisation Agency by Suharto. In 1973, he became Minister/Secretary of State, the top civil service position, where he remained until becoming Vice-President.

A position of great power

Sudharmono has often been described as the second most powerful man after Suharto. As State Secretary and executor of Presidential Decree 4A, his approval was needed for all projects worth more than Rp. 500 million (about £166 million). After his appointment to chair



Lieutenant-General Sudharmono, right, with his successor as State Secretary, Major-General Mardiono.

Golkar in 1983, he became the country's leading politician. It fell to him to re-organise and rejuvenate Golkar, while commander-in-chief General Benny Murdani was doing the same in the armed forces. Golkar was transformed from a loosely-federated mish-mash of army-led organisations into a party with a centralised leadership. Younger officers came onto the board, in place of older generals like Suhardiman and Amir Murtono, former pillars of Golkar.

Not by chance has Sudharmono's name been mentioned as a likely successor of Suharto, though most Indonesia watchers discount the idea. As an officer with experience only in the bureaucracy, he is seen by active-duty soldiers as an outsider. The army would never allow such a man to become head of state and thus Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.

A soft demotion

When Golkar announced several months ago that it would nominate Suharto for a fifth term, Suharto said that if he was no longer able to continue as president, he would step down. Some took this as a divine signal from the ruler that he would not complete the term, conferring far greater significance on the choice of vice-president who, according to the Constitution, would take over. It would not then be difficult for Sudharmono to be elected as president in 1993.

But this is hardly likely to work with Sudharmono. The present changes are typical of Suharto's habit of

switching people round, sensing that both Sudharmono and Murdani need to be found new positions. The vice-presidency, until now largely decorative, could be a time of relaxation for Sudharmono, as compared with the last two hectic decades.

In fact, Suharto is now pushing ahead with a well-planned regeneration, replacing the Murdani/Sudharmono duo with a younger duo composed of Try as C-in-C, and Major-General Mardiono, Cabinet Secretary since 1983, who has now taken over as Minister/State Secretary, the position vacated by Sudharmono.

Suharto's remarks about stepping down should not be taken too seriously. There are no signs that the ruler's stamina is flagging. A comparison between Suharto and Franco seems more appropriate. Even on his deathbed, Franco continued to rule fascist Spain. In any case, the idea that the vice-presidency might be the stepping-stone to the top was scotched when Suharto vowed during his installation that he would serve to the end of his fifth term. Only a fatal accident can take Sudharmono to the top and even then, would the armed forces allow this to happen?

Signs of a Golkar-Armed Forces rift

A serious incident marred the MPR, immediately after Suharto was voted president. Brigadier-General Ibrahim Saleh of the armed forces fraction rushed to the podium, grabbed the microphone and started complaining about rumours surrounding the nomination for vice-president. After completing only the first sentence of his speech,

Saleh was led away, but he still had time to shout: "We all agree about the president. But both candidates for the vice-presidency are doubtful. We must find someone who's really suitable." (In addition to Sudharmono, John Naro, the chairman of the Muslim party, PPP, offered himself as a candidate but withdrew at the last minute.)

Saleh is a senior officer at the South Sumatra military command, a lecturer at Seskoad and a candidate for the post of governor of South Sumatra.

It is not conceivable that he was acting alone. More likely, he is the one who lost (or won?) when lots were drawn for this show of discontent. The swift reaction from the floor by Murdani and Sutrisno only strengthens the impression that the incident was stage-managed. Reports that he might be disciplined seemed to vanish when he made a joint appearance with Murdani at the inauguration party for Suharto and Sudharmono.

The armed forces had made it clear during the MPR that they would not "propose" Sudharmono as candidate but only "supported" his candidacy. In the drab uniformity of Indonesian politics, the difference between proposing and supporting can mean the difference between heaven and earth.

Sudharmono's early flirtation with leftwing ideas is not likely to improve his standing with the officer corps. His many posts in the bureaucracy are likely to be filled by younger men. If so, as Vice President, he will be much less powerful. Sarwono, Golkar's Secretary-General, could hardly conceal his impatience for Sudharmono to go. His tasks in his new post depend entirely on Suharto; the experiences of his predecessors, the Sultan of Jogja, Adam Malik and General Oemar, do not augur well. They were mere adornments, opening buildings and launching ships.

Perhaps sensing such a fate, Sudharmono pleaded, in his speech of acceptance, for a position of greater stature but, as with everything else in Indonesian politics today, it all depends on the great leader himself.

☆

The two generals, Murdani and Try



Seated: General Try Sutrisno, right, and General Edi Sudradjat. Standing: the armed forces general staff with Lieutenant-General Sahala Rajagukguk in the middle. *Kompas*, 24 February 1988

The announcement by General Benny Murdani on 10 February that he would be replaced as armed forces commander-in-chief at the beginning of March by army chief-of-staff, General Try Sutrisno, came as a surprise, preceding by several weeks the cabinet changes that Suharto would announce after his own re-election as president.

A few months earlier, Suharto had prolonged Murdani's active service by one year when he reached retirement age (55) in September 1987. The transfer from Murdani to Try was advanced to 27 February, two days before the MPR session began. The unusual timing of this transfer set the rumour mills working in Jakarta. Was this the downfall of Murdani, or did Suharto need him to be free for other things before the MPR began?

How is Try's period as commander-in-chief likely to compare with the Murdani era?

The Murdani era

No-one will deny that Murdani's term as C-in-C, from March 1983 till February 1988, stands out in contrast to all of his predecessors. His main job was to overhaul the armed forces (ABRI) structure, slimming down the territorial commands from sixteen to ten and shortening the lines of command. As one of the 'bridging

generation', it fell to him to preside over the transfer of the ABRI leadership from the 1945 generation to officers who graduated from the Akademi Militer Nasional (AMN) which opened in 1957. He also had to trim ABRI's budget and rid it of its top-heavy structure. Of the two hundred active generals in 1983, only seventy now remain. [See also a profile of Murdani, at the start of his term, in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 57, May 1983.]

He will no doubt go down in history as the man who professionalised the armed forces, arming the troops with modern equipment while criticising the US army with its ever burgeoning budget. Indeed, there is not much admiration in the Indonesian army for the US army, an army which has lost two wars in Asia. The likes of Murdani are far more impressed by the armies of Vietnam and Israel.

Murdani's name will also be linked with the extra-judicial killings in 1983-84, the Tanjung Priok massacre in September 1984 and the on-going repression of Muslim activists by the security command, Kopkamtib, of which he is (still) commander. Next to all this, he has been in charge of Bais, the intelligence agency, and has chaired the Development Team for East Timor.

Murdani's career has long been closely associated with Suharto. From the time he parachuted as a young lieutenant into West New Guinea in 1962, followed by his clandestine intelligence work with Ali Murtopo in Bangkok in 1964 and his preparations for the East Timor invasion in 1975, he has operated under Suharto's direct command. It has been a harmonious, 'bapak-anakbua' relationship, true to Javanese tradition: impeccable loyalty from Murdani, and everything a serving officer could wish from Suharto. As a parting gift, Suharto

a move to make it up.

Still worse have been his escapades with Papua New Guinean politicians, particularly the revelation last year that he gave \$139,000 to Ted Diro when he was acting foreign minister in the Wingti government, apparently as a contribution to his election funds. When the news broke, Murdani strenuously denied it, but in January, when Prime Minister Wingti was in Jakarta, Murdani admitted that the money had been paid. Suharto even backed him up, telling Wingti that "it was purely a private affair between the two of them and did not involve the government or armed forces of Indonesia". It was, said Suharto, "only an arrangement between two individuals ... and did not compromise Indonesia's relationship with Papua New Guinea" [*Times of PNG*, 28 January - 3 February 1988]. Suharto also told Wingti that he had encouraged Murdani to have "closer dialogue" with Indonesia's neighbours.

Some circles welcomed the transfer to Try as Murdani's downfall, prematurely as it turns out. His murderous behaviour towards Muslims aroused much hostility. Pamphlets circulated in Jakarta alleging that he was 'sacked' because of ambition and greed, and claiming that he part owns an illegal casino which is operating in an island in Jakarta Bay.

In the event, Murdani went up, not down, and was appointed Minister of Defence and Security on 21 March. He will occupy this post for the next five years, most of the time as an active-duty officer; the Soldiers' Law



Red Beret paracommandos arriving at Baucau airport in July 1987.

pledged, in his opening MPR speech, to build up a "formidable modern army", notwithstanding Indonesia's massive foreign debt.

But Murdani has created quite a few problems as well. The extra-judicial killings, the Tanjung Priok massacre and the current Muslim trials put Indonesia high up among the world's human rights violators again. Murdani has often behaved like a shadow foreign minister, much to the annoyance of (ex) Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmaja. His moves against Australian journalists, even refusing entry to Australian pressmen in Reagan's party during the state visit to Bali, caused nothing but embarrassment. He made the ill-judged decision to back Marcos almost to the last, and shortly before handing over to Try, he visited President Aquino, apparently in

adopted in March extends the retirement age of flag officers from 55 to 60 years. He takes over from General Poniman who held the position as a retired officer and operated very much in the shadow of Murdani, the C-in-C.

It is virtually certain that, under the new constellation, the roles of Defence Minister and C-in-C will be reversed, with Murdani the dominating figure and Try, the C-in-C, primarily overseeing the modernisation and professionalisation of the armed forces.

The gentle-faced Try

General Try Sutrisno is an altogether different kind

of general. He takes over as C-in-C at the ripe old age of 52, far older than any of his predecessors. The 1945 generation achieved high office already in their thirties. Murdani was 50 when he took over, while others before him were in their forties or even younger.

Try's smooth appearance and populist image encourage some observers to see him as a likely successor to Suharto. The Indonesian media has boosted his 'baby-face' appearance, often referring to him as Cak Su, the nickname by which he is known to friends. A closer look at his background will show that he is in the tradition of colourless, even powerless, commanders-in-chief who held the post in the decade before Murdani.

What is most remarkable about Try, a graduate of the Army School of Engineers, is that he will be the only general in the present leadership who never attended the AMN and who has neither infantry or paratroop training and experience. All the others, Sudradjat, Sugiarto, Sahala Rajagukguk and Sugito, are paracommandos with plenty of combat experience, especially in East Timor. The man who takes over from him as army chief-of-staff, Eddy Sudradjat, is the type that most Indonesian soldiers can regard as "one of us". True, Try has sound Javanese and Muslim antecedents, but he is hardly the man to win the respect of AMN graduates. They are more likely to see him as an obstacle in the way of AMN ascendancy, only a few years older than others in the general staff who are eager to get to the top.

The two C-in-Cs who preceded Murdani were both colourless and powerless men, appointed in the aftermath of General Sumitro's term when Suharto was caught off-guard by the former's ambitions, reflected so clearly during the student unrest of 1974. First there was General Maraden Panggabean, a Tapanuli general, always ill-at-ease with the Javanese generals surrounding him.

Then came General Jusuf, a Buginese, who held non-military posts for twelve years before his unexpected appointment as C-in-C in March 1978. Jusuf's term was

highly deceptive. While he roamed the country, with journalists in tow to show him being nice to the troops, it was his deputy, Admiral Sudomo, concurrently Kopkamtib commander, who actually ran things at headquarters. Some even saw the popular Jusuf at the time as a possible crown prince; yet on leaving the top ABRI post, he was put in charge of the State Auditing Agency and expected to grapple with the misuse of state funds.

Try is very much in the tradition of Panggabean and Jusuf. His efforts to project himself as a Javanese traditionalist (he gave part of his first interview after being appointed in Javanese) will not win over many officers for whom prowess in the field of battle is paramount. His knowledge of the Qu'ran may even work against him as many senior officers look upon people from a pious Muslim background with suspicion.

But the new C-in-C has been known as one of Suharto's favourites for many years. Back in 1972, at the army seminar held to discuss "the passing on of the 1945 values", Try was the spokesman of the younger generation, being the most senior younger officer present. In 1974, Suharto made him his personal adjutant for over three years. During this time, he was treated like 'one of the family', and this became a period for establishing a special tie of loyalty to the 'state leadership'.


Try's direct link with Suharto is of special importance. None of the other generals at headquarters can be expected to have the same sense of loyalty. While they see their loyalty as being to the state and may even be troubled by the enormous power and wealth of the First Family, Try is, by contrast, Suharto's man.

After serving as Suharto's adjutant, he became chief-of-staff of Udayana Division (1978-79), encompassing East Timor. This was the worst period of hunger and devastation for the people of East Timor. Then Try took command of the South Sumatra Sriwijaya Division, and from 1982-85 he was commander of the Jakarta Military Command, a prestigious post. From there, he took two further steps up, becoming assistant ABRI chief-of-staff in 1985 and chief-of-staff in 1986. He became a four-star general in 1987.

Try's engineering background will serve him in good stead as the army becomes increasingly involved in the transfer of technology. A leading partner in this enterprise is British Aerospace, which is constructing a College of Technology in Karangploso, East Java, at a cost of £3 million, to train technicians "with the necessary background to operate and maintain the Rapier air-defence missile system being supplied by British Aerospace" [BAe News, March 1988].


Like most generals, Try also chairs a sports association, the Badminton Association, the only field of sport where Indonesia occasionally excels. ☆

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occasional reports no. 8

This is the latest in the TAPOL Occasional Reports series. It reproduces in full the letter to the World Bank on transmigration, sent on 22 January by Survival International, Friends of the Earth, The Ecologist and TAPOL.



Suharto's new team



Sarwono Kusumaatmadja, left, who joins the team, with brother Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who leaves.
Jakarta Post, 7 March 1988

Just as the Bulletin was going to press, Suharto's new cabinet was announced. He has maintained the process of regeneration, replacing half the former ministers and bringing in several new faces.

The armed forces have kept their position of dominance, holding a quarter of the seats, including the most vital posts. As the new Minister of Defence and Security, General Murdani, still an active-duty officer, will have enormous powers. Two of his closest allies, army chief-of-staff Edi Sudradjat and deputy chief-of-staff Lieutenant-General Sahala Rajagukguk, hold key positions at ABRI headquarters. Murdani's position is further enhanced by the appointment of General Rudini as Minister for the Interior, always reserved for a high-profile general. From 1983 to 1985, Murdani and Rudini operated as the team in charge of reorganising the armed forces; now the team is back in harness.

The highly ambitious Major-General Murdiono, formerly Cabinet Secretary, has become Minister/State Secretary, the position vacated by Sudharmono. Two senior retired generals, Surono and Alamsyah, have been replaced by Admiral (ret'd) Sudomo (ex Labour Minister) as Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, and General (ret'd) Supardjo Rustam (ex Minister of the Interior) as Minister-Coordinator for People's Welfare.

A few retired generals have re-emerged. General Susilo Sudarman, till recently ambassador to Washington, is now Minister for Post, Tourism, and Telecommunications. The former governor of West Sumatra, Major-General Azwar Anas has taken over as Minister of Communications.

The new technocrats

There has been a major overhaul in the economics sector. The Berkeley Mafia is almost entirely out. Among those discarded are Ali Wardhana, till now Indonesia's leading spokesman at IGGI meetings, Subroto, the Minister of Mining and Energy in charge of OPEC negotiations, and Trade Minister Rachmat Saleh. Radius Prawiro has taken Wardhana's place as Minister-

Coordinator for Financial and Economic Affairs, and Johan Baptist Sumarlin has taken over from Radius as Minister of Finance. Both men are closely identified with the First Family.

The new Minister for Energy is Ginandjar Kartasasmita, seen as a young dynamic figure, the first Japanese graduate to hold such a high post. An array of young technocrats has been brought in to run the departments responsible for boosting economic performance and promoting non-oil export commodities. Suharto no doubt expects the new team to pave the way towards 'take-off' as an industrial power. The new team represents a decided shift towards the nationalists and away from the pragmatists who are more strongly favoured by western financial institutions like the World Bank.

The weary, bumbling Martono has been replaced as Transmigration Minister by a newcomer, Sugiarto whose background is described below.

Mochtar Kusumatmadja has been replaced as Foreign Minister by Ali Alatas, a seasoned diplomat. However hard he tried to give Indonesia a higher profile on the world stage, the odds against Mochtar were too great - on the one hand, the impossibility of winning the diplomatic battle over East Timor, on the other, trying to contend with the foreign policy initiatives of Murdani. Alatas will only succeed if he accepts a more or less figurehead role.

Finally, several of the so-called 1966 exponents - activists in the army-student alliance in the early days of the Suharto regime - have been brought on to the team. Mochtar's brother, Sarwono has been put in charge of regulating the state apparatus, while Akbar Tanjung, previously a Muslim student activist, has taken over from Abdul Gafur as Minister for Youth and Sports Affairs. ★

Three-star general takes over transmigration

The post of Minister of Transmigration has been given to Lieutenant-General Sugiarto, until now armed forces chief-of-staff for social-political affairs.

This surprise appointment shows Suharto's strong commitment to the programme which has foundered for so many years under Martono. As an active-duty senior officer, Sugiarto is certain to try to put military muscle into the re-settlement of outlying parts of the archipelago.

His army career shows him to be a heavy-weight, combat officer. After graduating from the Military Academy in 1960, he fought against several regional rebellions. Since then, he has commanded regional territorial commands and later territorial divisions, in Central Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi and Irian Jaya (West Papua).

He is a para-commando and held a command position in the Strategic Army Reserve, Kostrad. He fought in East Timor during the Seroja operation, in the late 1970s, which resulted in quick promotion to colonel. ★

The Thoughts of Suharto, the Dragon King

Shortly before Suharto's re-election as president for a fifth term, a book appeared in the bookshops entitled: **Butir-butir Budaya Jawa** or Gems of Javanese Culture. It bears a Javanese sub-title: "Hanggayuh Kasampurnaning Hurip, Berbudi Bawaleksana, Ngudi Sejatining Becik", or roughly: "To Achieve Perfection in Life, be Big-Hearted and Strive for Eternal Goodness".

The luxury edition, with a black cover with red lettering, makes no mention of the author's name or the publisher or even the date of publication. Only on opening the book is it revealed that this is the work of Indonesia's First Man himself. A modest inscription on page one reads: "I give this to my children as their guide in life (pegangan hidup)."

In a long interview with **Suara Pembaruan**, Tutut Suharto, Suharto's eldest daughter, reveals that since her childhood days, 'Pak Harto' has been fond of reading ancient Javanese texts containing moral and educational homilies, like *Serat Centini*, *Cipto Hening*, *Jakalodang*, *Kalatida* and the writings of Prince Mangkunegara IV, like *Wedatama*, *Wulangreh*, *Joyoboyo* and so on. [We apologise for not being able to enlighten our readers about all these works.]

Launching her father's book, Tutut declared that the teachings handed down in the Javanese cultural tradition provide the Indonesian people with a rich treasure. Her father, she said glowingly, had systematically recorded these pearls of wisdom since his early youth so that his notebooks had grown very thick.

The book was published on 26 December 1987, the fortieth wedding anniversary of Pak Harto and Madam Tien. The work was completed by Suharto on 13 July 1983 or, according to the Javanese calendar, on 1 Sawal 1851, Suharto's 64th birthday. This too is a date full of symbolism, being his eight-times-eight (or eight windus) birthday. To highlight that significant year, the pages are adorned with engravings of the Dragon King, symbol of the year 1851.

The book, it seems, is selling well. A first limited edition of one thousand copies is already sold out and a second print of five thousand copies has been produced. Alongside the Javanese text is an English translation so that "foreigners can understand the glorious values of Indonesian (sic) culture".

It is not clear whether Suharto is trying to emulate Mao Ze Dong and his Little Red Book or Moammar Khadafi and his Green Book. The gems so far revealed however are not brimming with originality but consist of general truths like "Aja wedi kangelan, jalaran urip aneng donya iku pancen angel" or "Don't be afraid to face



Suharto in Javanese dress.

difficulties as life on earth is indeed difficult". But we can be certain that his 467 gems will from now on be fulsomely quoted by those wanting to curry favour.

Suharto's eagerness to go down in history alongside the Sultans of Java has taken other forms. His fortieth wedding anniversary was also the occasion for an announcement by The Family that a museum is to be built on 19.8 hectares of land, dedicated to glorifying the struggle of Pak Harto as the saviour of the state and nation. It will be known as Museum Purna Bhakti Pertiwi. Adjoining buildings will house various family artifacts and a library. The Family has graciously consented to finance this project, which will, at some future time, be "turned over to the people". ☆

Sahala Rajagukguk promoted again

Only six months after being appointed commander of the prestigious Army Strategic Command (Kostrad), Major-General Adolf Sahala Rajagukguk has again been promoted, this time to become deputy armed forces chief-of-staff. He was simultaneously raised in rank to lieutenant-general. [See **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 85, February 1988 for a profile.]

His predecessor as deputy chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Edi Sudradjat, now becomes chief-of-staff and a four-star general. The position of Kostrad commander has

been filled by Major-General Sugito, moving up from his previous post as commander of the Jakarta military command.

All three officers are red beret officers (paracommandos) with long experience of combat duty in East Timor. The promotion of East Timor veterans, preferably with a red beret background, to the key top positions in the army leadership is still the predominant trend. ☆

More verdicts . . . and new trials

Even as the rulers of Indonesia were celebrating Suharto's election to a fifth term as president and proclaiming that Indonesia now enjoys unprecedented political stability, the trials of Muslim activists or alleged Muslim activists continued without respite.

The trials in Jakarta reveal more clearly than ever that the spectre of the NII (Indonesian Islamic State) exists only in the courtrooms and in the fertile imaginations of the prosecutors and judges, determined to pass down harsh sentences.

Twelve years for a student

Sarjono alias Harun alias Muchtar Suroso, a student at the Karangmalang Teachers' Training College in Jogjakarta was sentenced to twelve years by the South Jakarta District Court for engaging in subversive activities in Central Java since 1983. [See also TAPOL Bulletin, No 85, February 1988]. The prosecutor's verbal assault on the accused went so far as to compare him with the government of Iran in promoting its Islamic character.

Sarjono was accused of organising 'clandestine meetings' with Muchliansyah, not yet under arrest, and Aos Firdaus (see below), and of delivering 'subversive sermons'. The prosecutor was deeply offensive towards the defence lawyers, calling them "clowns" who had infiltrated the courtroom and were calling for law enforcement while they themselves manipulate the law. On behalf of the defence team, Sri Purwani filed a complaint for contempt of court against the prosecutor, Silangit [Jakarta Post, 11 January, and 22 February 1988.]

While Sarjono's trial was under way, other cases were being heard at the same district court. Altogether eight cases have been handled by the court.

On 17 February, Juremi Adnan alias Aos Firdaus alias Maman Syaiful Rachman, a street trader, was sentenced to fifteen years. The prosecutor had demanded a twenty-year sentence, arguing that the defendant had close relations with 'hard-liners' like Adah Jaelani, now serving a 20-year sentence, Opa Mustafa and Ules Sudjai, who are both serving 12-year sentences. [Also see TAPOL Bulletin, No. 85.] He was, in addition, accused of arranging marriages between NII members without due regard for the Marriage Law [Jakarta Post, and Suara Pembaruan, 14 January, Surabaya Post, 15 January, and Merdeka, 14 January and 18 February.]

Meanwhile, at the same court, the seventh and eighth NII trials have started with Alimin, 38, and Oskandar bin Abdul Rasyid, 39, in the dock. They are both attendants at the parking lot in Pasar Santa, South Jakarta. The prosecutors have charged the two men with being members of the Fa'i group of NII, that is to say, responsible for raising funds. The two men are also accused of murdering a certain Item. [Merdeka, 18 January, and Kompas, 15 March.]

Another defendant named Muzahar Muchtar, has been sentenced to ten years by the same court, but little more than this has been reported in the press.

Four witnesses refuse to testify

The trial of Tjipto Aryono alias Ibnu Ichsan was thrown into turmoil when four out of five witnesses to be heard at one hearing, Juremi Adnan, Sarjono, Sahril

Indonesia: Muslims on trial

Published by: TAPOL, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

Since early 1985, more than 150 Muslims have been tried, convicted and sentenced to heavy terms of imprisonment in Indonesia for giving public sermons critical of the government, conducting religious courses not approved by the authorities, or producing leaflets or journals that denounce government policy. Some were held responsible for bombing incidents that were never properly investigated.

The trials followed the army's crackdown on a demonstration of Muslims in September 1984. Dozens, possibly even hundreds, were killed when troops opened fire on the unarmed crowd. The trials took place at a time of deep disquiet in Indonesia about the military government's imposition of total ideological conformity, preventing organisations from proclaiming Islamic or other religious principles.

Indonesia: Muslims on trial analyses the trials, placing them in the context of the continuing conflict between Indonesia's Muslims and the military regime.

"The first genuine attempt in the West to focus on the oppression of Muslims in a state that is more than 90 per cent Muslim, by a regime committed to establishing Western norms and values. The conflict between the political culture of the Muslim masses and their rulers is brought out vividly in Indonesia: Muslims on trial. Although it focuses on events in Indonesia, this study will help one understand why Muslim nation states are inherently unstable and are invariably held together by oppression."

Dr. M. Ghayasuddin, Editor, Muslimmedia

Indonesia: Muslims on trial



128 pp. £4.00 plus p & p.
ISBN 0 9506751 4 8

Zakaria and Bambang Suprianto, refused to be sworn in and collectively withdrew with proses-verbales. The defendant who was being tried by the North Jakarta District Court had allegedly attacked the Pancasila in a sermon at Asholihin Mosque in 1985, saying that it is "ephemeral and applies conditionally in certain places, meaning that it need not be adhered to". All four witnesses have already been sentenced by the South Jakarta District Court. Tjipto was found guilty and given a sentence of seven years.

The East Jakarta District has also started hearing NII cases. The first man is identified only as DAB, 40, a roof-tile trader, accused of raising funds for NII [Merdeka, 4 March].

While the Jakarta trials are labelled NII trials, the trials in Cirebon, West Java, are branded as Jemaah Islam trials. Press reporting has been very meagre, mentioning only the initials of the accused and the sentences passed. As reported earlier, Lukman Hakim was the first to be sentenced, receiving fourteen years. Another six, Agus Nana, Haris Mansyur, Dadang, Beny Achmad, Asep Jodi and Dalis Burhanuddin have all been given nine years.

A further eight trials have recently started, of which three names are known: IS, 33, is accused of fund-raising, Daim, 30, is said to be a liaison officer, and TR, is said to be in charge of giving guidance to new cadres [Pikiran Rakyat, 4 March]. ★

A letter from Indonesia

The following is a slightly abridged translation of a letter received from Indonesia, commenting on Indonesia: Muslims on Trial, published by TAPOL in April 1987.

Your book *Indonesia: Muslims on Trials* moved me deeply because you comprehend the subject quite well. I am fairly familiar with the case of Ir Sanusi who, as you say, received two sentences of nineteen and twenty years. He is now in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta.

The witnesses who incriminated Sanusi had been badly tortured. The prosecutor interrogated them initially without using torture but he came under pressure from the authorities to produce interrogation reports containing confessions which had been extracted by force. Later in court, the witnesses retracted their statements but the judges ignored this. The judges were also under pressure from the super-security (original, English), known as Kopkamtib. This makes it very easy for the rulers to eliminate their political opponents with the help of the Anti-Subversion Law of 1963.

Originally, the authorities constructed a case against Sanusi, setting him up as the 'godfather', the architect of Indonesia's political troubles. The scheme was shown to the other detainees who were told to endorse it. But as the events unfolded, it became increasingly difficult to stick to the story. Eventually, some cases had to be tried separately from Sanusi's, but the case they had concocted against him had gone too far to be withdrawn so they pressed ahead with the serious charges against Sanusi.

Why Sanusi?

But why did they focus on Sanusi? He had many social contacts. He was a co-founder of the HMI (Muslim Students Association) set up in 1947. He was active in many Muslim organisations and a signatory of the Petition-of-50. He started his career in the foreign service and later worked at the ministries of industry and public works. He was a cabinet minister in the first post-1965 cabinet and a member of parliament and the MPR (upper chamber) up to 1977. He wrote frequently in the press and elsewhere.


The charges against him in the first trial were fabrications. He was said to have given half a million rupiahs (about \$260) to pay for the detonators used in the BCA bombings, based on statements extracted from

witnesses by force. He first met Tashrif, the man in charge of the bombings, only a week beforehand, by which time all the preparations had been made. The only one of the group he knew well was Basuki, with whom he had some business connections.

Yet the prosecutor demanded the death sentence and the court sentenced him to 19 years; the verdict was upheld on appeal. As a matter of fact, the prosecutor was almost in tears as he read his summing-up because these were not his views but drafted on orders from above. He himself originally thought Sanusi would only get about two years.

The two main charges in Sanusi's second trial, conspiracy to assassinate Suharto in Jakarta and trying to set up an Islamic State (NII), were dropped for lack of evidence. The only remaining charge was one about a conspiracy to assassinate Suharto in Jogjakarta. The witnesses were tortured to extract statements alleging that Sanusi was the brains behind this so-called conspiracy. They all complied, with the exception of Mohamad Jabir who died in custody. You translated the statement made in court by his nephew, Taqwa, who testified that Jabir died under torture. Afterwards

Statement on EAST TIMOR
to the UN Committee of 24
August 1987



occasional reports no. 6

tapol The Indonesian Human Rights Campaign
111 Harpers Road, Thornhill, Essex, SSM 6LU 1987

Occasional Reports No 6 reproduces TAPOL's submission to the UN Decolonisation Committee in August 1987. It deals with Indonesia's policy of depopulating and repopulating East Timor by means of genocidal killings, birth control and transmigration.

Price: 50 pence

Taqwa went into hiding. I think he is now abroad, to avoid being detained and tortured like his uncle.

The case against Sanusi collapses

Things went badly wrong for the prosecution in Sanusi's first trial because all the witnesses changed their evidence in court. So the prosecution adopted different tactics in the second trial. A week before the trial began, the witnesses were allowed home after promising not to change their testimony in court. They were warned that they would be re-arrested if they changed their evidence. The trick worked because they were so afraid of being re-arrested and beaten up; moreover, Moh. Jabir had been tortured to death for refusing to incriminate Sanusi.

What can human rights activists do in the face of such goings-on? I think people should write to President Suharto to warn him that such events will shock world opinion and ask him to amnesty all these political prisoners and others serving unduly heavy sentences.

Criticisms of your book

You wrote that Rahmat Basuki incriminated Sanusi; this is not true. He retracted these statements and said Sanusi was not involved in the bombings. In doing so, he risked being re-interrogated and tortured. Fortunately for him, this did not happen.

It is true that Syarifin Maloko was accused of defecting to the security forces who are always trying to sow discord between their political opponents. But we should stand by the principle of the presumption of innocence. All the indications are that Maloko never betrayed. He evaded arrest for a year because he was protected by his uncle. He is now serving his sentence in Cipinang Prison with Sanusi, Basuki and the other

MUSLIM TRIALS

Muslim tapols. It was wrong for anyone, in particular the Legal Aid Institute, to treat Maloko so unfairly.

I also think you are wrong to suggest that there is a contradiction between the Javanese and the non-Javanese. About forty per cent of the people arrested in Jakarta after the Priok massacre were Javanese, along with eighty per cent of those arrested in Central and East Java. In fact, anti-government activities are far stronger in Central and East Java than in West Java and Jakarta.

It is a fundamental mistake to pit the Javanese against the non-Javanese. Because of the bond of Islam, there is no conflict between the ethnic groups. It is also wrong to describe the Javanese as 'statistical Muslims'; many of those tried in Central and East Java were fundamentalists. You should not forget that two of our greatest Muslim leaders, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto and Kartosuwiryo, were Javanese.

The New Order regime has provoked nationwide resistance because of the absence of democracy, the loss of political freedoms, rampant corruption, the appalling economic conditions of the vast majority of people and the "security-at-all-costs" obsession of the men in power. Muslims are in the forefront of the resistance, along with nationalists.

I fear that your assessment in this respect is the result of information from circles who are out to sow discord between the Javanese and the non-Javanese, in the interests of 'divide and rule'.

I submit these thoughts to help give you a better picture in the campaign to seek the release of all political prisoners. We need to master the "art and science" (orig. Eng.) of struggle because we confront despots of the East. They long for a good international image but one of their weaknesses is their inability to cope with the chronic problems of economic deprivation and widespread unemployment.

Thank you for your attention and help. ✧

[Name and address withheld to protect the writer.]

Beautifying Kopkamtib

Kopkamtib, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, which has since 1965 served as the army's key weapon to repress political opposition, is to be changed into a "less ferocious sounding" organ [Tempo, 19 March 1988]. The Command was set up in the aftermath of Suharto's seizure of power in 1965 and was aimed at eliminating the Communist Party (PKI) and the leftwing. It has since been used against other opponents, most recently against Muslim activists.

The new structure was not made public when Suharto announced the composition of his new cabinet on 21 March, fuelling speculation that conflicts or problems have arisen over its composition and leadership.

Several points have emerged so far: the body will no longer be a 'command' headed by a commander, but will be a 'coordination body' (badan koordinasi) headed by a 'chairman'. Its task will no longer be the 'restoration of security and order' but 'the safeguarding of development'. The chairmanship is likely to go to the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Justice or the Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs, all of them posts that are held by active-duty or retired officers. Kopkamtib's successor agency will also have powers to use the army.

The armed forces commander will be called upon to order the troops into action; in fact, he is likely to be a member of the 'badan koordinasi' as well.

'Safeguarding development' is the term already long in use to accuse people of subversion under the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law. With troops at its disposal, the change in name will not reduce the new body's repressive powers



by one iota. Nor are Kopkamtib's special powers of arrest and detention likely to be reduced; these have till now been vested in the commander and the special regional executors (laksusda) who are the regional military commanders. By virtue of these special powers, Kopkamtib officers have always stood outside the law and there is no reason to believe that the armed forces will ever relinquish these powers. ✧

Elbowing the Papuans out

by: Joh P. Rumbiak

Here's the bad news. The West Papuan nation is being elbowed out as the result of the domination of newcomers from Indonesia - Javanese, Macassarese, Buginese, Butonese and others. A bitter reality has been swamping the native inhabitants of West Papua for the past twenty-five years. According to Lucas Karl, writing in the Jayapura-based newspaper, *Tifa Irian*, the reasons are:

1. "The continuous influx of people from outside Irian [West Papua is called Irian Jaya in Indonesia] who are taking over the centres of commerce. Native Irianese always lose out in the competition because they are emotionally unprepared. They are timid, scared and feel intimidated whenever they buy and sell things. As a result, they easily give up and retreat under the pressure of competition. They are way behind in all respects, even in the most basic human needs, food, clothing, a place to sleep, education, health, a home.

2. "The strategic points in the towns and the settlement areas are dominated by newcomers while the natives are pulling out. Today, hardly any Irianese-owned facilities like hospitals, stalls, shops, restaurants and other enterprises are left; one could say that they no longer exist except for a few official residences owned by senior government officials.

3. "As a result, native children suffer from malnutrition, ill-health and inadequate schooling. Irianese are not even able to give their children the kind of education needed in today's world. They are not being properly prepared for the future. These children will swell the ranks of the unemployed, and be of no use to their generation and to development." [*Tifa Irian*, 20 November 1987.]

Suffering the same fate as Aborigines

Lucas Karl writes that scientists fear that the natives of Irian (the West Papuans) could suffer the same fate as the Aborigines in Australia and the Indians in North America. Fears about the obliteration of the Papuan nation were expressed by Dr J.V. de Bruijn, a Dutch government official from 1938 to 1962, in his book *Het Verdwenen Volk* (The Obliterated People). Are these forecasts now coming true? If the rights of the Papuans continue to be violated, if their chances of a decent education and proper health services deteriorate, if the mass persecution of villagers suspected of being OPM supporters goes on and transmigration from Java is stepped up, that will certainly happen.

Who is there to make sure that the Papuan nation does not suffer the same fate as the Aborigines and the American Indians? The neo-colonial government cannot be expected to help for they have no interest in the survival of the Papuan nation. On the contrary, the obliteration of the Papuans is precisely what they are trying to bring about. All they care about is how to exploit the mineral resources of West Papua in Indonesia's national interests. When Indonesia's



West Papuan children. Starting off at a disadvantage.

Minister of Mines and Energy, Professor Dr Soebroto, visited Irian Jaya last January, he spoke about its rich resources being invaluable for Indonesia's economic development. He said that new copper deposits discovered in Tembagapura, Indonesia's largest copper mine, far exceed the deposits in Gunung Biji already being exploited [*Tifa Irian*, 20 January 1988].

West Papuans are not unaware of this. They know only too well that their lands are being expropriated for transmigration by the Indonesian government and the armed forces, without proper compensation, that land has been seized for plantations, for the Trans-Irian highway, for the construction of luxury homes and so on. Copper, petroleum, natural gas and other minerals have been exploited without the Papuans enjoying any of the benefits. This is why they will continue to fight, with arms in their hands as well as by appealing to international agencies set up to protect the rights of the oppressed peoples.

This has been done most recently at the UN Sub-Commission for the Protection of Minorities and the Working Group for Indigenous People, with representatives of the West Papuan people present. [See "West Papua raised at UN in Geneva", *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 83, October 1987.] But Indonesia's neo-colonial rulers are doing their utmost to block these efforts, with the help of countries friendly to them. Much depends on whether the agencies that work to defend basic human rights have the capacity to sweep aside Indonesia's obstinacy and compel it to halt these inhuman efforts to obliterate the West Papuan nation.

☆



Transmigration to West Papua

Figures recently made public show that there has been a steady influx of transmigrant families from Java, Bali and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) into West Papua, although the scale is below the target originally set for the current five-year plan (1984-1989).

Transmigration is the cause of widespread discontent among the people of West Papua whose lands are seized without compensation. A Jakarta-based lecturer, himself a Papuan, warned in an unusually outspoken interview, that "dissatisfaction among native inhabitants in Irian Jaya (the Indonesian name for West Papua) about the transmigration programme often manifests itself in their crossing the border in the hope of a better life in Papua New Guinea" (John Djopari in *Sinar Harapan*, 25 May 1986).

Originally West Papua was due to receive a total of 137,000 families or about 685,000 people during the period. However, the drastic fall in the price of oil plunged Indonesia into an economic crisis in 1986, forcing a sharp cutback in the allocation of funds for transmigration. This meant that the re-settlement of families in far-off West Papua, involving far higher transportation costs, would be bound to fall.

Transmigration into West Papua began to occur in significant numbers during Indonesia's third Five-Year Plan (1979-84), rising from 290 families in 1979/80 and 2,521 families in 1980/81 to 5,755 families in 1983/84. In the next two years, more than 10,000 families arrived. By mid-1986, 27,726 families had moved in (families consist on average of five persons), bringing the total of transmigrants since the end of the 1970s to nearly 140,000 [World Bank, *Indonesia, Transmigration Sector Review*, October 1986 page 9 and 11].

Transmigrants now moving into Yapen Waropen

According to a recent announcement, families have now started arriving from Java for the first time in the district of Yapen Waropen, Cendrawasih Bay, making it the seventh district in the territory to receive transmigrants. During the current financial year, eight hundred families are due to come, eventually increasing to 2,400, or a total population increase of 10,000. The present population of Yapen Waropen is 52,000 [Kompas, 20 February 1988]. In all, 100,000 hectares of land have been made ready for transmigration. By the time all this land is fully inhabited by transmigrants, they could well out-number the native inhabitants.

In Timika district, which is situation on the south coast, an area of land large enough to accommodate 23,500 families (possibly in excess of 150,000 hectares) was ready for occupation in 1986 even though only a few hundred families had actually arrived [Pikiran Rakyat, 9 April 1986]. Long before the arrival of transmigrants, the loss of land suffered by local inhabitants is substantial.

West Papua is scheduled to receive 3,700 transmigrant families during the current year, of whom 1,650 will be sponsored transmigrants, that is to say, fully funded by the government. The remaining two thousand families will be used as cheap labour on nucleus estates in order to boost the production and export of cash crops [ibid].

World Bank to fund 'swakarsa' transmigrants?

Since the onset of the economic crisis, a far higher proportion of transmigrants going to various parts of Indonesia have been required to fund themselves as so-called transmigran 'swakarsa' (self-funding or self-supporting). This is one reason why the number of families moving to West Papua has fallen. However, things could soon change because the government is now planning to launch a scheme to provide 'self-funding' families with credit amounting to \$5,000 per family. The former Transmigration Minister, Martono, said the government was hoping to obtain funds to finance the scheme from the World Bank [Surabaya Post, 27 January 1988].

Such a scheme would represent a substantial advance in the World Bank's support for transmigration. By means of such subsidies, the World Bank would be turning the 'self-supporting' transmigrants into sponsored transmigrants, a move which could help Jakarta further increase the number of people being re-settled each year. ★



Javanese transmigrants in West Papua

Suharto shows contempt for shifting agriculturalists

President Suharto has made clear his contempt for shifting agriculture, the method of farming used by many tribal peoples, by blaming it for incurring losses to the state.

On a visit to South Kalimantan to inaugurate 27 'integrated forestry development projects', he implied that the practice of shifting agricultural was harmful to the preservation of the tropical rain forests [Jakarta Post, 22 February 1988]. Such advice ignores the fact that tribal people have practised such methods for generations without causing havoc to the forests. Only after their exploitation by so-called 'forest developers' have millions of hectares of rain forest been denuded and millions of hectares destroyed by fire.

Indonesia grants small concession to Australian media

The long-drawn-out campaign by Australian journalists to fight the blanket ban that has been imposed on them by the Indonesian authorities since 1986 has recently led to acrimony and bitterness between journalists and the Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden.

Hayden has consistently refused to protest against Jakarta's high-handed rejection of journalists, claiming instead that a softly-softly approach towards the Suharto regime is the only one that will work.

He is now claiming victory for his strategy following a decision in Jakarta to lift the two-year ban on the Australian Associated Press. The ban was lifted after the conclusion of the MPR session. As a result, AAP journalist James Dallmeyer, who accompanied Hayden on a trip to Jakarta in February and was granted permission to stay on for five weeks, will now be granted a one-year visa. Dallmeyer was the only Australian journalist in Jakarta to cover the MPR session.

This 'concession' merely restores the position to that of 1986 when AAP was the only Australian news agency permitted to have a resident journalist in Jakarta.

Negotiations by the Australian Broadcasting Commission to re-open its office in Jakarta have as yet failed to produce any results, despite remarks made last year by both General Benny Murdani and (then) Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja that they were not in principle opposed to the idea.

Bill Hayden has for months been virtually on his knees, begging the Indonesians to allow at least one Australian journalist back in. He has been strongly criticised in Australia for kowtowing to Jakarta. He

rejected applications by journalists to accompany him to Jakarta except for those granted permission to enter by the authorities in Jakarta. Bruce Loudon of *The Australian* wrote that Indonesia's refusal to allow Hayden to pick his own press team "is a diplomatic insult. Hayden has bitterly disappointed the media and Australia as a whole." [Retranslated from the Indonesian, as quoted in *Kompas*, 7 March 1988].

Hayden only made things worse by using his visit to Jakarta to launch a scathing attack on Australian journalism in general. "It is a great pity", he declared, "that the Australian media is not able to criticise (Indonesia) properly. The way they carry on is provocative and will disrupt the co-operation that now being carefully re-built."

Australian journalists prevented from accompanying PNG Prime Minister

Two Australian journalists who applied for permission to accompany the Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, Paias Wingti, on a visit to Indonesia in January, were refused visas by the Indonesian government. The two men, both based in Port Moresby, were Sean Dorney of the Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) and Ian Vallance of the Australian Associated Press (AAP) [Post Courier, 15 January 1988]. ★

Candid comments about press freedom

Major-General Subiyakto, the spokesman for the armed forces fraction in the MPR (upper chamber), told journalists attending a special briefing during the recent MPR session that present-day conditions in Indonesia "are not yet conducive to freedom of the press". [Jakarta Post, 9 March 1988]. He accused the press of forgetting to maintain "a balance between its entrepreneurship and the impact of its publications on society".

Asked why the government had banned a number of dailies for technical reasons in the past few months, Subiyakto said that "those technical reasons are actually only pretexts" (sic!) and that the "real reasons for the bans were the dangerous impact of the publications on the stability of the nation". [There's nothing like an occasional touch of honesty from the rulers!]

Subiyakto also said that it was a mistake for the public to evaluate events at the MPR session "in terms of foreign philosophies". He warned people to be careful in monitoring foreign broadcasts.

Weekly banned

Vista, a weekly that has recently been taken over by Suryo Paloh, the proprietor of *Prioritas*, the daily banned last July, was ordered not to circulate its third

issue under the new management and told that its publishing permit had been withdrawn.

Vista, a periodical devoted to films, music and general entertainment, has been appearing for eighteen years. It was taken over by Surya Paloh after earlier efforts to launch a new daily called *Realitas* were frustrated by the authorities. He had hoped to resume publication of some kind, partly in order to employ the staff of 98 people who lost their livelihood with the closure of *Prioritas*. In order to keep the team together, he has been paying them seventy per cent of their wages for the past seven months.

The stated reasons for the latest ban are purely technical and relate to the number of pages produced, 144 instead of the 86 permitted under the licence, and the size of the magazine which was one centimetre larger than specified in the licence. However, these are only pretexts, as Major-General Subiyakto has since confirmed.

The *Vista* editors were obviously aware of the risks they were taking. By the time they produced the third issue, the names of the members of the editorial board, all of them from *Prioritas*, had been left out and replaced by a series of dashes. On page four, the column entitled Analysis consisted entirely of dots and dashes. After a whole page of this, the 'article' concluded with the words: "Readers, please pray for us and wish us a long life." [Tempo, 5 March 1988] ★

Yet another longterm PKI prisoner executed

It was learnt in February that Sukarman, a political prisoner arrested in July 1968 and sentenced to death in May 1976, was executed on 17 November 1987 in East Java. The execution took place at Pamekasan Prison on the island of Madura, where he had spent almost twenty years, eleven of them since the death sentence was passed. He was 68 at the time of his death.

The execution has not yet been made public in Indonesia. He was in a very poor state of health at the time of the execution.

Sukarman joined the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in the early 1950s and was elected onto the executive board of its East Java Provincial Committee in 1959. He joined forces with other PKI and non-PKI leaders in 1968, in an attempt to create an opposition base in South Blitar, East Java after the killings and mass arrests that followed Suharto's seizure of power in October 1965. He was arrested during the army's Trisula operation against the base in July 1968.

He was tried by the Malang district court eight years



Protestors outside the Indonesian embassy in Paris, October 1986

after his arrest, and found guilty on four charges: conspiring to overthrow the government, endeavouring to disrupt the government's programme, rebellion against the government, and subversion. According to Indonesian press reports at the time, Sukarman remained true to his political beliefs throughout. He "expressed no regrets at all". When sentence was passed, he rejected the opportunity to appeal against the sentence within seven days, saying he did not need any time to decide that he would accept the sentence [*Kompas*, 3 June 1976].

He was defended by two lawyers from the Brawijaya University Law Centre who had been appointed on his behalf by the court.

In a letter to the British Foreign Secretary on 11 February, Lord Avebury, Honorary President of TAPOL, called on the British Government to protest in the strongest terms to the Indonesian government, to instruct the British delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission to register a formal protest against the execution, and to urge the Indonesian government not to proceed with any more executions.

Execution of Muslim could follow soon

Meanwhile, a clemency appeal on behalf of the death-sentence Muslim prisoner, Abdullah bin Umar, 39, has been turned down by the president. Abdullah was given a life sentence by the Sleman district court, Jogjakarta in February 1985 for alleged involvement in the murder of a university professor and a student and for giving sermons that rejected the state ideology, Pancasila. He was accused of involvement in the "Warman group" which was held responsible for a series of murders and robberies in 1979. He vehemently denied the charges. He has been under arrest since 4 April 1979.

After being held for some time at Wirogunan Prison in Jogjakarta, Abdullah was moved to the prison island of Nusakambangan because he made "agitational sermons" which might influence other prisoners. According to the press, Abdullah was due to be executed on Nusakambangan in February [*Merdeka*, 27 January 1988].

Abdullah refused to appeal against his life sentence, but the public prosecutor, who had demanded a death sentence, appealed to a higher court which raised the sentence to death.

The plea for clemency was lodged not by Abdullah but by the public prosecutor, the very same functionary who had acted to have the death sentence imposed in the first place. This is because the law requires that a clemency plea must be lodged before a death sentence can be executed. In effect, the prosecutor's clemency plea has cleared the way for Abdullah's execution.

According to *Jawa Pos* [4 February], the Jogjakarta High Prosecutor's Office announced that the execution would soon be carried out; a firing squad and a doctor to attend the execution had already been appointed.

Editor reports that Umar described one of the murdered men, Hasan Bauw, as a close friend and insisted that he was in another place when the other murder was committed. Allegations that he was an 'extremist' figure in the Al-Mukmin pesantren (Muslim school) were in effect denied by several of the pesantren directors who said they had no record of his ever having been a student or lecturer there.

Amnesty alarmed at sharp rise in number of executions

In an Urgent Action issued on 9 February 1988, Amnesty International expressed concern that there has been a sharp increase in judicial killings in Indonesia. Since 1985, there have been 18 executions, fourteen former members of the PKI or people allegedly involved in the 1965 events, two Muslim activists and two men convicted of premeditated murder. In the preceding decade from 1975 to 1985, four executions took place. ★

ICFTU complains to ILO about Indonesia

The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has lodged a formal complaint with the International Labour Organisation against the Indonesian Government regarding the lack of trade union rights. The ICFTU Secretary-General points out in a letter sent on 15 December 1987 that the organisation has often expressed concern to the Indonesian authorities at the restrictions, particularly during a high-level mission to Indonesia in 1984.

The ICFTU complains about serious limitations on the right to strike, according to a 1963 presidential decision prohibiting strikes in 'essential services' which includes not only government departments, railways, harbours, transport, civil aviation, radio and post, but also state corporations (electricity, gas and oil supplies, mining, chemical plants, pharmaceuticals, sugar, rubber and tobacco estates), as well as foreign companies like Shell, Caltex, Goodyear and Dunlop.

The most serious violation of trade union rights,

according to the ICFTU, concerns the denial of the right to organise in all the public services, which include education and health care, as well as enterprises partly owned by the State. These include companies operating in the steel industry, oil and gas and their sub-contractors, import and export enterprises, as well as banks and agricultural estates. Indonesia's 1.5 million teachers are also denied the right to form a trade union. The ICFTU says that more than half the employed workers in Indonesia are deprived of the right to establish or join trade unions of their own choosing and to operate these organisations freely; they are obliged to join Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Korpri), the government-run civil service union.

"In the ICFTU's view," it says, "the compulsory membership of Korpri by all Indonesian public servants... constitutes a very serious violation of the principles of freedom of association." ★

Prisoners die in transit

Eight convicted prisoners who were being transported by ship from Ujung Pandang to Surabaya were found to be dead on arrival in the East Java capital. They were in a group of 33 prisoners being transferred to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya. The group was being guarded by mobile brigade (police) troops and had set out on 12 February, arriving in Surabaya on 15 February.

They had been kept in the ship's hold which was badly over-crowded. Doctors later confirmed that they had died from lack of oxygen. Some bodies were found to be handcuffed. Other bore wounds on their heads and chins that may have been caused by being thrown about in the hold during high seas.

According to the prison authorities, there were no funds to return the bodies to Ujung Pandang for burial; if relatives did not collect the bodies within three days, they would have to be buried locally [Kompas, 16 February, and Jawa Pos, 15 February]. ★

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Youth organisations still holding out

Local branches of two youth organisations that have refused to comply with the Societies Law requiring them to accept Pancasila as their sole ideology, are under constant pressure to dissolve and re-constitute themselves under new names in defiance of their central boards.

The branches of the Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen (Marhaen Youth Movement) and the Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic High School Students) in East Java have resisted demands of the provincial social and political affairs directorate to dismantle their signboards. By persistent cajoling, the authorities are trying to get the branches to disband themselves and take down their signboards 'voluntarily', hoping to avoid bringing the troops in.

In Jakarta, the GPM chairperson, Rachmawati Sukarno, said it was the government's affair if it did not recognise GPM's existence. "The important thing is that we exist" [Tempo, 5 February 1988].

In Aceh, the PII branch appeared to be even more defiant. More than a week after the provincial government had been instructed to 'persuade' the local branch to disband, the branch went ahead with a training course for 125 members.

A Muslim intellectual, Endang Saifuddin Anshari, formerly a PPI leader in West Java, called the situation tragic. The PII could not accept Pancasila as its sole ideology; it sticks to its opinion that Islam is not contrary to Pancasila [Tempo, 5 February]. ★

Embassy pressure on UPNG bookshop to stop selling TAPOL Bulletin

The Indonesian Embassy in Port Moresby has failed in an attempt to have copies of TAPOL Bulletin removed from the shelves of the University of Papua New Guinea bookshop. The shop has been stocking copies of the Bulletin for several years.

According to TAPOL sources in Port Moresby, the Second Secretary of the Embassy, in charge of information, exerted pressure on the bookshop manager and the Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University not to sell TAPOL Bulletin. The Vice-Chancellor took the last available copy of the December 1987 issue to check it out for himself. His opinion was that it was "hard-hitting" but appeared to be well-researched.

When it seemed that the University might cave in however, because it feared the Embassy would withdraw funds for a Bahasa Indonesia tutor on campus, a delegation from the recently-established Melanesian Solidarity for a Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific complained to the Foreign Minister, Akoka Doi, about Indonesian interference. The Minister said that if the Embassy had any complaints, they should approach the Foreign Department, not the University. He sent a message through the delegation to the Vice-Chancellor "to put TAPOL back on the shelves".

Copies of the February 1988 issue, No 85, had just arrived and were put out for sale; they sold out within hours. ★

Senior official defects from Dili

Inacio da Moura, poet and writer, a Portuguese by birth, left Dili in December 1987 with a one-month permit to spend Christmas with his wife and children in Darwin but he did not return. In February, he visited Geneva, Vienna and Lisbon. The following is based on interviews with the Portuguese media and with TAPOL.

Inacio sided with Fretilin before the Indonesian invasion in 1975. He survived the first terrible days in Dili because of his European appearance. His family had left for Australia after the turmoil in August 1975. He spent 1976 in detention where he witnessed torture and maltreatment, though was not physically tortured because he was European.

Later, when things became tense, or when foreigners were due to visit East Timor, he and many others would be detained briefly. He decided eventually to take a job with the Indonesian administration so as to impress the Indonesians and get himself off the blacklist. It worked, and he became head of the Taxation Services:

On the Indonesian armed forces:

They have about 20,000 men there, but have suffered over 15,000 casualties. The first cemetery was built near Dili harbour but it became too small so they set up a second one in Santa Cruz.

The soldiers are tired of so much war... They die or are mutilated... Many soldiers say: "We come here to die while the generals back in Jakarta are living at our expense." One has to go to Baucau, the military base from where (US-manufactured) planes take off each day to bomb Fretilin positions. The bombardments are followed by incursions by ground troops but as soon as they leave the area, the guerrillas return.

On foreign visits

Arrangements are made by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). They check out on people who ask to visit East Timor and assess whether they will support Indonesia's position. They work out where visitors will be allowed to go. The Executive Director, Yusuf Wanandi, is in charge and sometimes comes to East Timor himself, ahead of a foreign visit. The other CSIS person very much involved is Kristiadi who often accompanies foreign visitors everywhere.

The CSIS also regulates ICRC activities in East Timor. It plays a key role in international public relations work on East Timor. The CSIS is a cover for Bakin, the central intelligence agency.

I was the interpreter for Anacoreta Coreia, the Portuguese MP and travelled everywhere with him. Before doing this, I was told by the Indonesians to make sure not to translate any anti-Indonesian remarks. He travelled quite a bit and met several people, as you can see from his report.

On Nuno Rocha's visit

In August 1987, I was asked to meet Nuno Rocha, a Portuguese journalist, at Dili airport. I was told to tell him all his expenses would be paid. Obviously he was a very "special" visitor! He arrived at 1 pm on the Saturday and left the next day. He only met Governor Carrascalao and the Bishop, Father Belo. He didn't ask to see anyone else and asked no questions about



Inacio da Moura with Luisa Pereira of the Commission for the Rights of the Maubere People, Lisbon. Returning by train to Geneva from Vienna, February 1988.

anything. I know this because I stayed with him all the time. He went to the market in Dili but only to buy a shirt and a bottle of wine. The report he published later in Lisbon is not connected with his visit at all. It was probably written beforehand anyway.

The current situation

A lot of people continue to die due to the war and starvation. Agriculture is not exploited, especially in the east and Timorese do not leave their villages for fear of falling into the occupiers' hands and being shot for collaborating with the guerrillas. Starvation affects about 200,000 of the 600,000 Timorese; they are forced to eat grass, shrubs and wild fruit.

On the resistance

The resistance controls over a hundred villages in the east... The Indonesians do not even try to control the Baucau-Vikeke road. In that area, the people say: "Indonesia rules till 4 pm, then Fretilin takes over."

It's not just Fretilin which is resisting, it's all the Timorese. On 12 December 1987, posters appeared demanding the withdrawal of the occupiers and making an appeal to Portugal. The people also resist by boycotting the initiatives of the Javanese.

On Portugal

Portugal's action has been very slight. There's a lot of bitterness in Timor because the Portuguese government fled. If they had not fled, the Indonesians would not have come in. But a lot of hope is placed on Portugal.

Canadian and Dutch MPs say: "Human rights is not a problem"

Foreign visits to East Timor have been increasingly used by Jakarta in the past year to deceive world opinion about the human rights situation there. We take a closer look below at two of these visits and compare them with the US State Department's 1988 human rights report, a source hardly likely to want to embarrass Indonesia about its record in East Timor.

A team of Canadian parliamentarians visited East Timor on 17-18 November 1988, followed in late January by Janssen van Raay, a Dutch member of the European Parliament from the Christian Democrats. Both visitors reported that human rights abuse is no longer a problem. The reports were widely publicised in the Indonesian press. Janssen van Raay had visited East Timor in advance of a resolution to be discussed by the European Parliament condemning human rights abuses in East Timor [Jakarta Post, 29 January 1988].

TAPOL has obtained copies of both reports.

Canadian MPs told about "monitoring people's movements"

The five Canadian MPs visited Indonesia before going to Dili, and were primarily interested in promoting Canadian commercial and investment ties with Indonesia. On human rights, they said:

"The delegation asked (the Governor of East Timor) some very direct questions... (on) the validity of the allegations... about human rights abuses. The Governor, a true diplomat [sic], explained at great length that there was no real problem: certain groups, especially those remote from the main centres, did not always understand the reasons for certain laws [a curious way of saying Indonesian laws are rejected]. He did say, however that people's movements were monitored on the grounds that it allowed the government to prevent mobs surging into areas where there was little chance of finding work. [This is a novel way of explaining why


many Timorese are confined to army-patrolled resettlements.] In his view, criticisms of the government were due to a variety of misunderstandings.

"In the evening, the delegation met Dili's priest and a Belgian missionary (who) were able to answer further questions on the reality of human rights in Timor. From their responses, this did not seem to be a subject of much concern."

The MPs visited Dili prison where they met 70 political prisoners and "got the impression that the inmates were not particularly [perhaps only slightly?] ill-treated. They appeared to be well fed and the institution well run, and prison authorities said they were entitled to visitors. Obviously a superficial impression was all that could be gained, since on top of everything else there was the language problem: the officials spoke Indonesian and the person providing the interpretation spoke English but was not, properly speaking, an interpreter."

Why do the MPs regard the monitoring of people's movements as not being a subject of much concern? Did they not know that the person "who was not properly speaking an interpreter" was almost certainly a security officer, making it impossible for any Timorese to talk to the visitors about conditions.

In any case, how do the parliamentarians know that the people they saw were political prisoners? It is widely acknowledged that the authorities introduce other prisoners or even non-prisoners to foreign visitors.



Dutch MEP leaves it all to the ICRC

The report of Dutch MEP, Janssen van Raay who visited East Timor in January is much the same as a report last year by the Portuguese journalist, Nuno Rocha [see TAPOL Bulletin No 83, October 1987], primarily a re-hash of Jakarta's version of events in East Timor since 1974. His only reference to current human rights abuse was that "the International Red Cross has free access to prisons where the East Timorese prisoners are held, can submit complaints to the Department of Justice and check the result". The only reference in his conclusions to present-day human rights abuse was: "Today there is no evidence of human rights still being violated, but if there are, the International Red Cross has sufficient possibilities to react properly."

On security, van Raay claimed that "there is no security problem any more. The last military operation was in 1984. Since then, the army stopped hot pursuit and mopping up operations, and Fretilin's presence is limited to small groups moving in a mountainous area."

"During my stay in East Timor, I had no security escort. I could go wherever I wanted and speak alone with whoever I wanted." [Strange to say, he mentioned no-one at all and offered no quotations of what they told him.]

Van Raay failed to say that the ICRC has access only to two prisons in Dili. It has no access to other detention and interrogation centres in Dili, in the thirteen district capitals and other towns where army commands are located.

State Department sees it differently

The shallowness and inaccuracy of these reports is exposed by no less a source than the US State Department in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1987, published in February this year.

While there is no justification for the State Department to integrate its comments on East Timor into the chapter on Indonesia, thus legitimising Jakarta's illegal annexation of the country, its comments on conditions show just how remote the foreign visitors are

from understanding the reality of East Timor's plight:

* "Periodic skirmishes between Fretilin guerrillas and the army occurred, with unknown but relatively small numbers of casualties on both sides."

* "The Government continued to permit selective access to the province (sic), primarily through escorted diplomatic visits."

* "Disappearances in East Timor... are widely believed to be at the hands of security or military authorities operating under special legal provisions exempting them from the criminal code. Reports are often unspecific and virtually impossible to confirm as the Government rarely, if ever responds to inquiries concerning disappearances."

* "One international human rights group's reports cite torture of suspected rebel sympathisers in East Timor at the hands of military forces."

* "In 1987, the last remaining Timorese held on Atauro island for suspected support of Fretilin were returned to their villages where they remain under the close supervision of local authorities."

* "Judicial warrants for searches are required except for cases involving suspected subversion, economic crimes and corruption. However, forced or surreptitious entry by security agencies occurs periodically, especially in East Timor."

* "...letter mail to and from East Timor is subject to official scrutiny. Telephone communication to and from East Timor requires special government approval."

* "In East Timor, the local Government usually authorises public assembly for social and ceremonial events and, as long as there is no perceived security risk, grants political parties permission to meet publicly." [The State Department fails to point out that only Indonesian parties are allowed; all East Timorese parties were disbanded after the invasion in 1975.]

* "The Government has relocated many rural East Timorese living in the central and eastern parts of the province since 1979 to isolate them from Fretilin rebels and, according to the Government, to facilitate their access to health, education, and other government services. Most Timorese require permission to travel outside their home districts (kecamatan). In some areas of East Timor residents may not farm beyond their immediate village area, and are restricted to their village itself during military operations in the area."

★

East Timorese students in danger

East Timorese students in Jakarta and elsewhere in Java are facing growing threats from the security forces who are worried that living in Java gives them easier access to the outside world.

According to the Students' Secret Commission, the security forces plan to eliminate all Fretilin and UDT activists. Two students, one in Semarang and one in Jogjakarta, have already met their deaths under sinister circumstances. In May 1987, Acacio from Los Palos, a student at the Agricultural Institute in Semarang, was found dead in a well, having been poisoned with gas.

"Street accident" in Jogjakarta

The second student to die was Antonio Moniz da Silva, a student at the Faculty of Cooperative Economics, IKIP, Jogjakarta. The circumstances of his death are set out in a document received in February this year.

Moniz fought with Fretilin in the bush from 1975.

After surrendering in 1979, he was sent to continue his studies in Java in 1981. Replying to a request from the governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao, he wrote the governor a letter giving his ideas on how to protect the economy and culture of the people of East Timor. The letter was intercepted by Kopskam intelligence and from then on, Moniz was a marked man.

He was questioned about the letter in August last year by Amaruddin, a security agent from Jakarta, who accused him of trying to cause political instability, a charge he vigorously denied. He was told he would be questioned again. This never happened, but on 15 December 1987 he died in hospital. The police told his wife he had been involved in an accident when a small girl was run over. But the motor-cycle he had been riding was undamaged and the "injured" child was never found.

Moniz's wife was not informed of his injuries for nearly two hours; by the time she reached the hospital, he could no longer speak and told her nothing before he died.

Later Amaruddin came to Jogjakarta again to warn the other students not to talk to anyone about the death of their friend.

★

Solidarity groups from Europe confer in Vienna



Participants from West Germany and Austria at the solidarity meeting in Vienna.

East Timor solidarity groups in Europe met in their eighth consultative conference in Vienna on 12-13 February this year. The Austrian group which hosted the meeting came into existence only two years ago. Groups from Holland, Germany, France, Portugal and the UK were present, along with a representative of the solidarity movement in Japan.

Inacio da Moura who recently left East Timor was present and spoke about recent developments. [See separate item.]

Abilio Araujo, head of the Fretilin external committee, was present and gave a detailed report about the current military and political situation in East Timor. He said the Indonesian army launched an offensive in October 1987 but suffered casualties as the result of many Fretilin attacks. Fretilin also suffered some casualties. He described the present military situation in East Timor as a "stalemate". The resistance cannot be defeated, but nor can Fretilin defeat the Indonesian army on the field of battle. Much therefore depends on working for a diplomatic solution.

Jakarta is now trying hard to smash communications between East Timor and the outside world which have enabled so much information to penetrate the Indonesian blockade of East Timor. After the international outcry when four Timorese students were prevented from leaving Jakarta for Portugal in 1986, he said the authorities were now resorting to murdering students in order to stifle contacts with abroad.

The meeting discussed coordination during 1987 for events like the June meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, meetings of the UN human rights sub-commission and Decolonisation Committee, and European Parliament sessions. It was agreed to have joint actions in a number of European capitals on 7 December which will be the thirteenth anniversary of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor.

The next conference will take place in January 1989, probably in a Scandinavian country. ☆

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