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## The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

TAPOL Bulletin No. 79

February 1987

# Usroh prosecutions continue

The Muslim movement known as *usroh* which emerged recently in the southern regions of Central Java is now spreading northward, according to warnings that have been issued by the Central Java military commander. The movement takes its name from the Arabic word, *usrah*, meaning family or close-knit group. For a full analysis, please turn to page 2.

According to TAPOL records, twenty-nine usroh activists have been tried so far, all of them on charges of subversion. The sentences have been severe and there have been no acquittals. Other trials are currently in progress and more are likely to begin soon as many witnesses are referred to only by their initials.

The trials so far have been concentrated in the south, in Klaten, Jogjakarta, Sukoharjo, Surakarta, Karanganyar, Boyolali, Brebes, Ngawi and Bantul. We have monitored sixteen verdicts ranging from five to eleven years. Five men were sentenced to seven years, four were given eight

years, four received six years and the other three got five, nine and eleven years each. The ten-year sentence against Sugiman al Yulianto (see TAPOL Bulletin No 78) was reduced to seven years on appeal.

The military authorities in Central Java have meanwhile started security operations against mosques in Semarang, the provincial capital, and elsewhere, on the pretext of rooting out usroh influence. Syafaat Habib, secretary-general of the Indonesian Mosque Council, while not daring to protest against such intrusions into places of worship, stressed that what goes on inside a mosque is a matter for the mosque committee to regulate. As for the military operations, he confined himself to saying that if usroh activities in the mosques were likely to threaten security, the authorities should act with care. "We hope that, if the military commander takes such measures, he will first have carried out thorough investigations" (*Pelita*, 30 December 1986).

### General Murdani warns against communists, Muslims, liberals and the foreign press

In a special briefing to provincial governors in advance of the general election to be held this April, General Benny Murdani, commander-in-chief of the Indonesian armed forces, listed communists, Muslim extremists, liberals and the foreign press as the main threats to Indonesia's security.

He claimed that the communists, whose party and mass organisations have been outlawed since 1965, were still the most serious threat, warning that activists from Eastern Europe had entered the country illegally and had not been captured. Moreover, during a 3-month period last year, nine tons of 'communist propaganda materials' had been seized.

As for Muslims, there had been 'riots' in the past year (not reported in the press, as far as TAPOL is aware) though 'fundamentalism' had been handled with great severity. Liberals were another menace. These were people who were "preaching human rights in order to be able to do whatever they liked".

The final bogey was the foreign media, particularly the Australian and US press, attack by Murdani "for portraying Indonesia as undemocratic and militaristic."

Peter Hiatt, BBC, reporting this latest Murdani attack on perceived security threats, said that his attack on the foreign press reinforces hints that restrictions may be placed on foreign correspondents who try to cover the elections (BBC dispatch, 21 January).

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# The Usroh movement

There is every sign that the military government has decided to step up its persecution of the *usroh* movement, a grassroots Muslim movement in Central Java. At the end of 1986, the Central Java military commander, Major-General Harsudiono Hartas claimed that *usroh* activists from Solo in the south had infiltrated six mosques in various parts of the city of Semarang. In one of the mosques, "they have recruited forty pupils," he said. Because of the spread of *usroh*, Semarang was now said to be a *daerah rawan*, a region of instability requiring heightened vigilance from the security forces. (*Suara Merdeka*, 27 December 1986 and AFP, 29 December 1986)

In our earlier reports, we suggested that *usroh* might be a phantom created by the regime as a stick with which to beat Muslim activism. However, it is now clear that this is not the case. The *usroh* movement appears to have taken root in some parts of Central Java. What the regime is now intent upon doing is to cast *usroh* as a rebellious threat to the existence of the Pancasila state in order to justify its crackdown on an allegedly subversive movement. The lawcourts are being used to further this purpose.

## What is the Usroh movement?

The word '*usroh*' is the Javanised version of an Arabic word, *usrah*, meaning 'family' in the broader sense of a close-knit group of people. In the absence of any independent evidence and assessment of the *usroh* movement in Central Java, the following account relies on what has come to light during the trials and from a few documents that have become available from inside Indonesia.

The heartland of the movement today appears to be located in the southern regions of Central Java, an area far less penetrated by Islam than the north. By contrast with the northern part of the region which was dominated by trading centres along the coast (*daerah pesisir*) in the fifteenth century when Islam first penetrated Central Java, Javanese *kebatinan* beliefs retained their grip in the south, dominated by two Javanese feudal kingdoms with their seats in Solo and Jogjakarta. Hence, the division into *santri*, or devout Muslim villages, and *abangan*, or so-called 'nominal Muslim' villages was much less marked than in the north.

It is today one of the most densely populated parts of Java where poverty is particularly widespread. Many districts are 'minus areas', meaning they are incapable of producing enough food and suffer severe food shortages almost every year.

In pre-1965 days, this southern sector of Central Java was the Communist Party's strongest bastion, where it had the support of well over half the electorate. This was the region that was first shattered by the 1965-66 massacres which followed in the wake of Suharto's seizure of power in late 1965. But unlike East Java, where the army relied heavily on Muslim youth gangs to initiate and perpetrate the killings, in Central Java crack troops, under the command of the army's strategic reserve corps, Kostrad, of which Suharto was the commander, had to be brought in to slaughter villagers. In the very areas where '*usroh* pockets' are now said to exist - in Klaten, Boyolali, Brebes and Surakarta - the massacres were particularly horrendous and left deep scars on all communities, *abangan* and *santri* alike. It is not likely that these wounds have healed, even a generation later.



Lieutenant-General Harsudiono Hartas. *Tempo*, 20 September 1986.

The military rulers have always regarded these impoverished regions of Central Java as a *daerah rawan*, as fertile soil for a communist revival or, as they now seem to think, for radical Muslim activism. Indeed, as a public relations exercise, the *usroh* trials seem to be directed primarily at the people of Central Java. National dailies are devoting little attention to the trials as compared with papers in the province.

From what is known about the *usroh* movement, it differs markedly from other Muslim revivalist movements in Indonesia. It is reformist, calling for a return to basic Islamic values. The movement takes its inspiration from an Egyptian Muslim thinker and organiser named Hassan Al-Banna, founder of the original Muslim Brotherhood which was created on the *usrah* principle. It consists of small, grassroots groups that meet weekly for the purpose of reinforcing the members' desire to live according to the Quran. The groups are seen as being part of a larger movement sometimes referred to as the *Ichwanul Islamiyah*, or the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement attaches great importance to training members on how to conduct group meetings and how to help members live according to the Quran.

The leading exponent and apparently also the founder of the movement is Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, a Muslim teacher who was attached to the *pesantren* (a Muslim boarding-school primarily focussing on religious teachings) in Ngruki, near Sukoharjo in the district of Surakarta. A book written by him entitled *Pelajaran Syariat*, The Study of Islamic Law, is, by most accounts, the basic tract for *usroh* members.

Ba'asyir was arrested several years ago and tried for links with a movement named as *Jema'ah Islam*. He was sentenced to nine years but the sentence was later reduced to four years on appeal. While he was under house arrest awaiting the results of a second appeal, he apparently escaped and went into hiding though the circumstances of his escape have never been made clear.




His non-appearance at the usroh trials has been a major obstacle to testing the truth of many prosecution claims.

### Usroh group activity

There is no way of knowing how long usroh groups have been functioning in Central Java, though trial reports suggest that the first groups were set up in 1982 or 1983. Nor is it possible to estimate how far the movement has spread or how many people are involved, whether hundreds, thousands or even more.

An usroh group is small in size, never - according to the guidelines - less than seven or more than fifteen. It generally meets in the homes of the members, each taking turns to host the group, and is expected to create close inter-personal ties and provide mutual assistance to the members in times of difficulty, which includes collecting money to help pay for marriages, funerals and the like. Usroh groups are expected to take an interest not only in religious affairs but also to devote part of their regular meeting to discussing matters of local interest.



Muslim girls attending a compulsory flag-raising ceremony. This is the kind of state-symbol glorification to which the usroh movement so strongly objects.

The movement advocates a healthy life-style by avoiding drinking, gambling and smoking, and undertaking joint cultural and physical activities. It calls on members to disassociate themselves from the non-Islamic institutions that surround them and to reject customs that contradict Islamic beliefs such as, for instance, paying respect to man-made symbols. Training courses for group leaders are conducted to help them understand the religious teachings of the movement.

The movement appears to have attracted people from many walks of life, peasants, petty traders, village teachers of religion and craftsmen as well as school-pupils and university students.

Whilst none of the literature available provides any comment on political questions, it is not difficult to see that the movement is diametrically opposed to the sole-ideology requirements of the military regime. It clearly turns its back on Pancasila indoctrination and is offended by the regime's obsession with national discipline in support of government programmes, and with ceremonial flag-raising and other acts of deference to the symbols of state.

In the usroh trials, defendants have been accused of spurning the Pancasila as a man-made ideology inferior to

## MUSLIM TRIALS

Islam. Their alleged crimes include showing disrespect for Pancasila indoctrination and *Pendidikan Moral Pancasila* or Education in Pancasila Morals, which is now a compulsory subject in all school curricula. They include opposing government programmes like family planning and transmigration. As far as can be seen from press reports, no-one has denied holding these views.

### Transforming piety and reformism into subversion


What has been vigorously denied by the men on trial is the regime's claim that the movement is dedicated to the overthrow of the Pancasila state and the creation of an Islamic state. Another accusation - that the movement is the successor to the *Jema'ah Islam* which was branded as a terrorist movement in trials held in the early 1980s - is also strongly denied. The allegations are based on statements drawn up during pre-trial interrogations and signed by defendants or witnesses. These statements have been used by the prosecution to make charges that usroh is subversive and is therefore punishable under the anti-subversion law.

As with other Muslim trials under way since early 1985, many of these highly damaging 'confessions' have been retracted in court. Both defendants and witnesses have complained that they signed these statements under pressure, during interrogation by army officers. The courts have shown no sympathy for such retractions, asserting that since the complainants were unable to identify the officers responsible or provide other evidence of maltreatment, their complaints cannot be taken seriously. In some instances, judges have even alleged that the retractions are illegal, threatening to initiate additional charges for perjury.

### Communist connections

Signs that the army in Central Java was alleging that there were connections between 'Muslim fundamentalism' and 'communist remnants' first appeared when regional military commander, Major-General Harisudiono Hartas warned that it was 'becoming difficult to distinguish PKI people from liberals or to tell whether they are Pancasila-ists or fundamentalists. Indeed, a time will come when communist thinking and liberalism will merge, giving birth to a new fundamentalism' (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 11 July 1986).

He then compared usroh to a communist-type organisation - *berpola komunis* - with the aim of 'creating discord, discrediting the government and so on'. It was 'an extremist movement whose style of teaching is communist' (*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 23 July 1986). Hartas also said that an usroh leader who went into hiding had recently been captured. He turned out to be a 'PKI man' named Tohari who was expelled from a course for police officers after



his PKI background was discovered ( *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 11 and 23 July 1986). [His full name is Tohari Suradji who has been mentioned in several usroh trials and who appeared for the first time as a witness at the end of July. In one trial he is said to have been a leader of the *Jema'ah Islam*, along with Ba'asyir.]

Then in a statement released on 1 October 1986, the day on which the regime yearly celebrates its victory over the Communist Party in October 1965, Soedarno, the Prosecutor-General for Central Java, announced that the security forces had succeeded in discovering "usroh pockets in Brebes, Surakarta and Klaten". Most of those captured were either members of the Darul Islam or former soldiers and deserters from Battalion 426, he said ( *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 3 October 1986). This was the battalion of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java most severely affected by anti-communist purges in the army in the wake of the October 1965 affair. Many soldiers were dismissed and arrested, or deserted and went into hiding. But ex-Battalion 426 members would now be in their late forties or early fifties, whereas most usroh detainees are from a younger generation.

In several of the trials, defendants are said to have been in possession of communist literature as well as books about Islam, but nothing has been said in the courtrooms about connections with Battalion 426. Maybe, if Tohari is tried, more will be heard of the alleged PKI connection.

With only limited information at hand, it is difficult to say whether usroh will have the strength to withstand persecution by the security forces. But what is certain is that the army will use this new threat to justify continued repression in Central Java up to and beyond the elections to be held in April this year.

## Two usroh trials open in Brebes

Two trials of usroh members opened at the Brebes district court on 22 December. Four men are being tried. They are only identified by their initials.

'AG', 25 years old, a fourth-year student at the Social and Political Faculty of a university in Jogjakarta. This defendant is being tried separately from the other three who are:

'AS', 23 years old, a shoe-repairer from Siasem

village.

'G', 23 years old, a trader from Pebatan village.

'R', 23 years old, a trader, also from Siasem village.

They are all accused of being the most active exponents of the usroh movement in Brebes, which came into being in July 1986. Their teachings "oppose the foundation of the Indonesian state and aim to replace it with something else". They are alleged to have urged their followers not to respect the Indonesian flag or obey state laws and regulations.

When the trial opened, none of the defendants had lawyers. This is a violation of the Criminal Procedures Law (KUHP) which says that detainees must have legal assistance from the time of their arrest.

According to the indictments, their followers are said to consist primarily of pupils from lower and upper secondary schools, three of whom are also to be tried soon.



The first hearing attracted so much attention that the authorities had to issue special cards for those allowed into the courtroom, and to place loudspeakers outside. Dozens of troops from the army and the police were on guard round the lawcourt ( *Suara Merdeka*, 23 December).

## Usroh trial opens in Bantul

A member of usroh identified only as 'Sd bin R' is on trial in the Bantul district court, accused of organising a lecture meeting or training session that was addressed by 'SC Cs' [the use of initials suggests that this person is also due to be tried]. The lecture was said to be aimed at recruiting four people to attend another usroh training course in Sawahan, Banaran, district of Kulon Progo, the place where Tubagus Moh. Jidan was active.

Also, 'Bdm al Slh', a bicycle repair man, is being tried in Karanganyar on the usual charges.

'SA Cs' advocated opposition to the Pancasila, to the family planning programme, to transmigration and to Pancasila indoctrination. Usroh, the indictment said, used the training session as a guise to encourage people to "wage war on" - *memerangi* - government officials as well as on other Muslims who accept the Pancasila. The training course held under the defendant's auspices was attended by twenty-nine people. During answers to questions at the session, the lecturer said that family planning is prohibited by Islam, a remark which, said the indictment, "clearly undermines the authority of the government which is currently promoting a family planning programme".



## New titles

*Transmigrasi: Myths and Realities*, by Mariel Otten.

IWGIA Document No. 57, 1986. 253 pp.

Price: £3.50, UK and Europe.  
£5.00, airmail

*Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, by Richard Robison.

Allen & Unwin, 1986, 425 pp.

Available soon.



# Relatives of executed men speak out

*In September and October last year, nine longterm political prisoners convicted for alleged involvement in the events of October 1965 were executed in Indonesia. We reproduce below extracts from a report in l'Humanite Dimanche by Dominique Bari entitled, "Underground in Indonesia: I met relatives of the executed men".*

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## The suffering continues

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"We are going through an endless nightmare. I can't find words to describe this constant persecution. Right up to the last moment, the army used the dirtiest of tricks to break us. They gave us hope then dashed it."

These were the words of Mrs M. who agreed to meet the journalist. She described how on 16 September last year, a few days before the first of the nine political prisoners were executed, a senior army officer assembled the death-sentence prisoners and told them: "I have come to ask you for the addresses of your families. You will be released one day and we'd like to know what you intend to do, what job you will look for. If you have trouble finding accommodation, we want to help you for a time."

"Just imagine how these men felt. Some had been in prison for about twenty years, most of that time waiting to be shot. Even if they doubted that the promise was serious, how could they not feel hopeful?"

Dominique Bari writes that every time she managed to meet one of the relatives, there was a warm atmosphere, a long handshake, a friendly embrace, a shared emotion, but always the request not to mention names.

Following that talk by the army officer, one of the prisoners, Colonel Sudyono, arrested in 1968 and sentenced in 1972, said he would try to get work as a translator. Another, Waluyo Subono later told his daughter that he had given the officer his address and said he would try to get a job so that she, his daughter, would not have to support him after his release.

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## Playing with prisoners' emotions

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For the prisoners who had been waiting so long for the ever delayed day of execution, the prospect of death had suddenly been lifted, despite all their mistrust.

"We began to hope even more than the prisoners," said Mrs M. "We were called to army headquarters. I was asked: 'The situation may change after the spring elections [April 1987]. Will you be ready to welcome your husband home?' For a few hours I really believed that life would have some meaning again. But only for a few hours. The next day, I was again called to headquarters. On my way there, I was full of confidence. Then, showing no sensitivity, the officer told me: 'Your husband will be executed tomorrow.' I was speechless, terrorised. 'He has been transferred from Cipinang Prison to Cimanggis already.'"

"I met my husband once more before he died," the woman went on. "He told our children he would die without any sense of shame, with dignity. He regretted nothing. One can only say that it was not a broken man that the executioners killed a few hours later."

For Mrs M. the suffering did not end with her husband's death. His murder has remained a secret. Her closest friends only notice that she has stopped rushing to the bus-stop every Saturday laden with parcels, on her way to Cipinang Prison. A silent solidarity has grown around her. But she does not dare to cry in public. She locks herself in, closes the shutters and suffers her grief all alone.

All that the families got back from the authorities were the men's wedding rings and a few items of clothing. Even their writings were confiscated. Their bodies were not returned to the families. Mohammad Munir, a trade union leader, was executed a year ago in May 1985 but his wife still does not know where he is buried.

Some families have been kept in total ignorance about execution decisions. Pudji Aswati, the wife of Gatot Lestario who was shot dead in July 1985, herself a prisoner serving an 18-year sentence in Malang Prison, was not told about the murder of her husband until 22 days after his death. A letter she had sent him was returned with a note on the envelope from the prison authorities: Gatot is dead.

As for Mrs Supono Marsudiyono, she arrived at Cipinang Prison on 4 October, carrying baskets of food; it was nine days after her husband's execution. Some prisoners may have been pardoned but no official list has ever been published, and relatives know nothing, often because they live far away from the place of detention.

The prisoners' families have lived lives of hell since 1965, hunted down by the army and by the extreme right. They have had to change their names, move home, conceal their identities.

"We had no means of support," said Mrs S. "Our house had been looted, and anyway we couldn't stay in that part of town any more. Those who sympathised didn't dare help us." She sat with her grandson on her knee and her youngest son by her side.

"I only ever met my father behind bars and I'm proud of it," said the son. His mother agreed, adding: "My husband was arrested in 1968 but I didn't hear anything for a year. He was in solitary confinement and was constantly moving. Much later, I heard that he had been dreadfully tortured. Munir's execution was a terrible shock for all of us. The Cipinang prisoners were shattered by the blow. Those who are left are just waiting for the worst to happen and are preparing themselves. They place their hopes in international protests. Only pressure from abroad can end the wave of executions."

As she talked the child on her lap ran off laughing, unaware of the tragedy that engulfs his family. But he will soon know what life in Suharto's Indonesia holds for him, the grandson of a *tapol*, rejected by colleges and universities, by the public sector, the army, the private sector. He will have to hide his origins from his closest friends, always fearing that his secret may be found out.

Source: *l'Humanite Dimanche*, 14 November 1986



# Suharto's Indonesia now seen as a "high risk"

It came as a profound shock to many in Jakarta when the London Economist, in its year-end analysis of the fortunes of countries of the Third World, placed Indonesia high in the category of 'high-risk' countries, three points behind South Africa and only six points behind Chile, El Salvador, Vietnam and Zaire. The shock was so great that the article became a major contributory factor to an end-of-year rush on the rupiah, forcing the foreign exchange market in Jakarta to close for a day.

The main cause of the rush to buy dollars was a sudden panic over rumours that the Suharto government was about impose controls on foreign currency transactions or to devalue the rupiah for the second time in less than six months. According to one analyst, the fear originated among several foreign banks in Jakarta "who advised their big clients to shift to dollar positions" (*Jakarta Post*, 3 January 1987).

The panic occurred a few days after Minister of Finance Radius Prawiro announced that Indonesia's debt service ratio (the percentage of foreign exchange earnings used to pay interest and repay foreign loans) had exceeded 30 per cent and was fast approaching 40 per cent.


The rush to buy dollars is only the latest sign of a growing lack of confidence, at home and abroad, in the ability of the military regime to pull Indonesia out of the economic crisis that has gripped it for the past two years. The problems are deep and far-reaching. The 45 per cent devaluation announced on 12 September 1986 has failed to boost non-petroleum exports, foreign investors are turning their backs on Indonesia, foreign aid has become the mainstay of state revenue and, worst of all, moves to end monopolistic privileges enjoyed by close relatives and cronies of Suharto in the import business are as remote as ever.

## *The Economist's assessment*

In a league table of fifty countries published by The Economist, 20 December 1986, Indonesia did particularly badly under the heading, 'political affairs'. The countries were divided into 'hyper-risk' (four countries), 'very high-risk' (seven), 'high-risk' (seventeen) with Indonesia in fourth place, and the remaining twenty-two in 'medium-risk' and 'low risk' categories.

Indonesia's highest score was under the heading 'war', obviously for its wars against East Timor and West Papua. It got its second worst scores for authoritarianism, illegitimacy of government and the 'staleness' of its style of government. The other high scores were for corruption and commodity dependence.

No-one, not even the journal itself, claimed that the "Countries in Trouble" league table was scientifically valid. But it was intended to guide potential investors and lenders, which made it more worrying to businessmen in Jakarta than the most carefully constructed academic analysis.



"Be an optimist, mate!" *Tempo*, 3 January 1987

## A budget to stifle wages and cut jobs

The 1987/88 budget announced by President Suharto on 6 January has been designed to cut back the level of economic activity by dramatically curbing the level of government expenditure and investment. The inevitable result will be massive job losses and stagnation in pay levels at a time when the vast majority of workers with jobs receive little more than starvation wages.

Symptomatic of this policy to force down living standards is the decision, for the second year running, not to raise wages for the more than three million people employed by the government. This could mean a fall of around 20 per cent in real wages since 1985. The wage freeze will not only affect the living standards of government employees, however. It will also squeeze aggregate demand and purchasing power, with devastating consequences for businesses and jobs in all sectors of the economy.

*Tempo* (20 December 1986) emphasised that this

"unpopular" policy is the result of pressure from the World Bank, and acknowledges that it "will seriously affect efforts to create jobs and improve wage levels for the next year or two". The policy is being pursued despite the fact that about 1.8 million young people from school enter the labour force each year. It is the result of Suharto's refusal to consider deficit financing as a way to stimulate economic activity, also an essential element in the World Bank's austerity doctrine for Third World countries.

Not surprisingly, with no independent trade unions left to represent the interests of Indonesian workers, there have been no criticisms of this severe attack on living standards, though businessmen have been quick to condemn the budget because it is bound to result in retrenchment, shut-downs and bankruptcies. The attack on living standards is the price Suharto is willing to pay to safeguard Indonesia's obligations to foreign creditors.

Although Indonesia's foreign debt now exceeds \$40 billion, this latest budget gets Indonesia deeper into debt by making state revenue more than ever dependent on foreign aid. Project aid from members of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia is budgetted to go up by 55 per cent as compared with 1986/87, from Rp. 3.5 trillion to Rp 5.43 trillion, and will now account for about 25 per cent of state revenue.

The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (15 January 1987) called the budget "an unmitigated portrayal of the depth of trouble the economy has reached". The trouble stems from Indonesia's heavy reliance on petroleum for the past two decades and the huge influx of foreign aid. Just as repayment of loans and interest was beginning to peak, the bottom fell out of the world petroleum market, plunging the economy into a crisis of grave proportions.

Another factor aggravating the crisis is that around 50 per cent of Indonesia's foreign debt must be repaid in foreign currencies other than the dollar - the yen, the German mark, sterling, the Dutch guilder and so on - all of which have appreciated in value against the dollar, whereas the country's earnings from exports is received almost entirely in dollars.



per cent, will be spent to service Indonesia's foreign debt. The budget figures also reveal that the funds needed to service the foreign debt each year (Rp 6.8 trillion) now exceed the funds received in new aid (Rp 5.43 trillion), even though aid allocations are rising. Thus Indonesia now pays back more to its foreign creditors than it receives annually in new credit.

At the same time, government investment will fall by 6.5 percent, from Rp. 8.3 trillion to Rp. 7.8 trillion. But the impact on job-creation is far worse than the 6.5 per cent contraction implied because more than half - Rp 4.4 trillion - will be spent in western countries that supply the foreign aid (Jakarta Post, 8 January 1987). [See separate item on Indonesian-UK relations.]

In his budget speech, President Suharto expressed the hope that private capital would be able to fill the gap caused by falling government investment but the business world is pessimistic. Private companies have still not absorbed the full impact of the September devaluation in terms of rising costs and falling demand. How then can they be expected to expand investments or buy up ailing state companies?

Almost without exception, commentators express the view that the only way the disastrous impact of the budget on

## Indonesia's growing debt service ratio

EXPORT EARNINGS 	1982 1983	1983 1984	1984 1985	1985 1986	1986 1987
	18,6	19,8	20,3	18,2	13
DEBT REPAYMENTS 	1982 1983	1983 1984	1984 1985	1985 1986	1986 1987
	2,6	2,9	3,8	4,7	5,8

Source: BANK INDONESIA

As a result of the foreign exchange crisis, revenues from the non-oil sector are budgetted for the first time in many years to exceed revenues from the oil companies which are expected to fall by 28.7 per cent. The budget is based on the assumption that the price of oil will average \$15 a barrel for the year.

To compensate for the fall in oil revenues, revenues from income tax and VAT are budgetted to rise by 15 per cent and 65.4 per cent respectively. Most analysts doubt whether this is realistic because of falling purchasing power and business activity. It is widely expected that economic performance in 1987 will be even worse than in 1986 when Gross Domestic Product fell by 1 per cent.

### Expenditure

The budget envisages a steep fall in the level of government expenditure within Indonesia. The expenditure side of the budget is divided into two sections: routine expenditures and 'development' expenditures or government investment. While routine expenditure will rise 14.5 per cent compared with 1986/87, from Rp. 13.1 trillion to Rp. 15 trillion, no less than Rp 6.8 trillion of this, or 45

the economy can be lessened is by overall deregulation of economic institutions, in particular, by ending the hugely profitable import monopolies that have been granted to members of the Suharto family in the past few years. In Indonesia the subject is taboo but just six weeks before the new budget was announced, the *Asian Wall Street Journal* dropped a bombshell by publishing three articles unravelling the get-rich-quick ventures of Suharto's sons and their friends. [See separate item.]

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# More Rapiers for Indonesia

British Aerospace has won its third contract in two years for the sale to Indonesia of Rapier ground-to-air missiles. The new deal, announced in December, is worth £40 million and brings the total value of Rapiers being supplied to the Indonesian armed forces to £180 million. Altogether, British Aerospace has won contracts worth £340 million from Indonesia for Rapiers and for the twenty ground-attack Hawk aircraft supplied since the late 1970s.

The latest Rapier deal incorporates 'offset' benefits, allocating part of the manufacturing of the missiles to Indonesia's state aerospace industry, the IPTN, and to another state company, Radio Frequency Communication. The deal includes training facilities for IPTN employees in the UK and other forms of technology transfer.

The Rapiers are being purchased to defend the capital, the oil installations in East Kalimantan and the huge IPTN complex in Bandung (*Tempo*, 20 December 1986).

Meanwhile, Britain delivered a survey vessel for the Indonesia Navy in December. The vessel can be equipped with weapons, as similar vessels in service with the Royal Navy were equipped during the Falklands War (*Kompas*, 3 December 1986).

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## Scorpion tank deal still under consideration

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Reports last year that negotiations were under way for Indonesia to purchase six hundred Scorpion tanks made by Alvis in Coventry have surfaced again in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (20 December 1986). The journal quotes an official of United Scientific Holdings, which owns Alvis, as saying that Indonesia is still interested in buying the vehicle though the fall in the price of oil will reduce the size of the order. An Indonesian delegation is expected to visit Alvis early in 1987 for further talks.

Other UK arms manufacturers looking for more orders from Indonesia are Marconi and Plessey who hope to sell Indonesia a radar system for its eastern region. A French company, Thompson CFS, has won an order for a similar system for western Indonesia (*Financial Times*, 3 December 1986).


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## Indonesian officers visit the UK

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There has been a steady stream of visits to the UK by officers of the Indonesian armed forces. In a written answer to Terry Davis, MP, the Foreign Office gave the following information about visits since 1985:

- \* **April, 1985:** Admiral Romly, Chief-of-Naval Staff, to attend the commissioning of a Royal Navy frigate sold to Indonesia.
- \* **May, 1985:** General Supardi, secretary-general of the Department of Defence for discussions about defence equipment.
- \* **July, 1985:** General Surono, Minister for Political and Social Affairs, and B.J. Habibie, president-director of IPTN, for talks on industrial co-operation.



A Rapier was on show at the Jakarta Air Show, 1986. *Tempo*, 20 December 1986.

Air Chief Marshall Sukardi, Chief of Air Staff, to visit UK defence manufacturers.

\* **October, 1985:** Rear Admiral Kasenda, to attend the commissioning of a Royal Navy frigate for Indonesia.

\* **June, 1986:** A party of high-ranking officers to visit the British Army Equipment Exhibition.

\* **July, 1986:** Rear Admiral Basaeki, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Logistics), for talks relating to Indonesia's purchase of more Royal Navy frigates.

\* **September, 1986:** a party of high-ranking officers to attend the Farnborough Air Show.

Air Vice-Marshal Hartono, Director of Air Defence headquarters, to visit the RAF base at Lossiemouth.

\* **October, 1986:** Lieutenant-General Sanoesi, Head of the Police Force, to visit New Scotland Yard and to look at police training facilities.

Source: *Hansard*, 12 December 1986.

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## Economic ties are strengthening

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Two trade missions from the UK have visited Indonesia in the past few months, one from the London Chamber of Commerce and one from the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce. The visits are the first since 1983 and show that British companies are hoping to make new progress in their involvement with project construction in Indonesia.

Shortly before these two missions, UK Minister of Agriculture, Michael Jopling was also in Jakarta, leading a nine-person delegation to talk about buying more agricultural products from Indonesia so as to improve two-way trade. At present, there is a large surplus in Britain's favour. In 1985, Indonesian exports to the UK amounted to \$191.4 million as against imports valued at \$300.4 million.

British Energy Minister, Peter Walker is also due to visit Indonesia in March.



New prospects have opened up for British businesses following the decision by the British Government, announced in July last year, to grant £140 million in 'soft' loans to finance the UK costs of mutually-agreed development projects in Indonesia. The agreement made Indonesia the second biggest recipient of UK soft loans after China and marked a commitment by the UK to win contracts in Indonesia with the help of concessionary financing (*Financial Times*, 19 June 1986).

As a more recent issue of the *Financial Times* (12 December 1986) reported, "Indonesia ... has rapidly become a key market for large orders of capital equipment and big construction work since the downturn of project activity in the Middle East and the Gulf". Already the British Export Credit Guarantee Department has given the go-ahead for eight large projects in Indonesia involving British companies.

This explains the composition of the London Chamber of Commerce mission, consisting of representatives of Lloyds, Barclays and Kleinwort Benson whose banking facilities will support the projects, and Balfour Beatty Construction, General Electric, Massey-Ferguson and others who will be directly involved in the projects.

While these projects will help boost British exports and sustain the level of 'development' projects in Indonesia at a time of huge budget cuts, the trend is not welcome to Indonesian contractors. The businessmen's organisation, Kadin, has already complained that an increase in the role of foreign contractors will give foreign creditors "a large influence in determining the suppliers of goods and services for the development projects they have financed" (*Jakarta Post*, 23 December 1986).

## ECONOMICS

# The Suharto family fortunes

*In a feature story published in the Asian Wall Street Journal on 24, 25 and 26 November 1986, Steven Jones and Raphael Pura made a detailed investigation of the recent business ventures of members of the Suharto family, in particular, the lucrative monopoly interests cornered by the President's sons. A long extract of the articles also appeared in the Wall Street Journal on 24 November.*

Although the three issues of the *Asian Wall Street Journal* were immediately banned, news of their contents spread fast, and the photocopy machines were soon hard at work. Five weeks earlier, the leading Jakarta evening paper, *Sinar Harapan*, had been closed down indefinitely for reporting on the same topic though with far greater circumspection than the AWSJ. By merely reporting that forty-four monopolies might be abolished, mentioning no names, the daily sent Suharto into a rage and had to pay the price. But the Jakarta business world knew precisely what lay behind the *Sinar* report. As a western diplomat said: "They (*Sinar*) put the problem right in the president's living room" (AWSJ, 24 November).

The AWSJ articles are far more topical than the article by David Jenkins, published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 10 April 1986, which dwelt on the Suharto family's past acquisitions. But who can explain why the Jenkins piece aroused such public fury, with repercussions on relations with Australia lasting for many months, while the AWSJ onslaught was hushed up and had no repercussions for Indonesia-US relations? Perhaps this was because Wall Street had a hand in this latest exposure and Suharto had to think twice before taking on such a formidable critic.

### A stake in almost every important commodity

Suharto's closest relatives have now emerged as Indonesia's richest businessmen. As AWSJ puts it:

*"In recent years the Suharto sons have put together a maze of businesses giving them a stake in almost every important commodity or service in the country. In most cases, these businesses originate from and thrive on state contracts, government decrees or licences giving concerns tied to the Suharto sons and their associates special rights to handle the import, manufacture or distribution of such goods or services."*

According to the paper, the Suharto sons benefit from the following arrangements:

- The assignment of import licences, often to a single company.
- The use of quotas to control imports, with quotas frequently divided among a few designated importers.
- The designation of 'approved traders' limiting the number of companies that may distribute a product domestically.
- Investment licensing to protect existing companies from new competition.
- The designation of local joint venture partners for major foreign investment projects, especially in public works.
- The granting of semi-exclusive rights for service contracts such as insurance (AWSJ, 24 November).

The three Suharto sons at the centre of the AWSJ investigation are Sigit Harjoyudanto, 35, Bambang Trihatmodjo, 33 and Hutomo Mandala Putra known as Tommy, 24. By combining parts of their names, the trio are referred to these days in Jakarta as 'Tosiba', after the giant Japanese electronics corporation, Toshiba. Suharto's daughter, Siti Hardiyanti known as Tutut and her husband, Indra Kowara are also part of the story.

The following is a brief summary of the dazzling array of Suharto family companies and monopolies unravelled by the AWSJ.

### Bambang Trihatmodjo

Suharto's second eldest son, the most visible of the three, has built his empire around:

P.T. Bimantara Citra, registered in May 1982. The company consists of some fifty daughter companies with interests ranging from baby food, cardboard box and plastics manufactures to liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers and oil trading. The major share-holders are Bambang and his brother-in-law, Indra Kowara.

Panca Holding Ltd which has been designated as sole agent for P.T. Mega Eltra, the state-owned trading



company that holds import monopolies for plastics. Virtually all imports of essential plastics like polypropylene and PVC must go through Panca Holding. The company was incorporated in Vanuatu and registered in Hongkong in March 1985. The three company directors are Bambang, Sigit and Sudwikatmano. Sudwikatmano is a cousin and foster brother of Suharto and grew up together with him.



*Bambang Trihatmodjo*

The 25 November issue of AWSJ deals extensively with this plastics monopoly and the damaging effects on the Indonesian economy. Several plastics manufacturers interviewed said that the Panca Holding monopoly has raised import costs by 20 to 25 per cent. Commissions and other fees paid to the company alone add 15 to 20 per cent to the cost of plastic raw materials in Indonesia. AWSJ estimates that Panca Holding earns around \$30 million simply by "shuffling paper" (AWSJ, 25 November).

P.T. Polychem Linda, part of the Bimantara Group, is now the country's sole manufacturer of polystyrene. Although it has not the capacity to serve the huge domestic market, it has held on to its monopoly position, pushing domestic prices 10 to 15 per cent above imports.

P.T. Samudra Petrindo and Permindo Oil Trading Co. The former, set up in 1981, is jointly owned by Bambang and Indra Kowara, while Bambang, according to corporate records is the company's executive director. The Hongkong-based Permindo is 65 per cent owned by Mindo Petroleum Co. whose three largest shareholders are Bambang, Indra Kowara and Sudwikatmano who, together with A.R. Ramly, president-director of the state oil company, Pertamina, are the four directors of Permindo.

The two companies whose operations are described in AWSJ of 26 November have been given the right by Pertamina to market more than half a million barrels of oil a month and in return, supply the oil company with refined oil products from Singapore.

Samudra Petrindo or Sam Pet as it is called by oil traders, has played a significant role in Indonesia's oil trade since the early 1980s. Oil company executives familiar with the oil market say that Sam Pet and Permindo trade more than \$500 million a year in crude and distillate products, with profits running into tens of millions a year. Sam Pet also handles all shipments of Indonesia's LNG exports to South Korea under a 20-year contract. The two tankers that run the trajectory are partly owned by Sam Pet.

Bambang's Bimantara Citra is a share-holder in P.T. Food Specialties Indonesia, a unit of Nestle S.A. which produces milk powder, while P.T. Bumi Sumber Sari Sakti, part of the Bimantara group, owns 60 per cent of P.T. Gula Putih Mataram, a Sumatra-based sugar-cane plantation and sugar refinery. Bambang is the executive-director of this corporation.

The youngest of Suharto's sons was born 24 years ago when, as Major-General Suharto, today's President was in charge of the Mandala Command, the operation to 'liberate' West Papua from Dutch colonialism. 'Tommy' is the latest to emerge on the corporate scene, but his business interests are fast catching up with his older brothers. Tommy is well-known in Jakarta's jet set as a car and boat racing enthusiast.

His flag company is P.T. Humpuss, established in 1984, in which he is the executive director, with older brother Sigit as one of the major share-holders. Humpuss holds licences as sole local distributor for several vital petrochemical products produced by Pertamina, including purified terephthalic acid, an essential ingredient in the manufacture of synthetic fibre, and methanol, the major alcohol used in industry.

Humpuss also has interests in oil services and has plans to move into LNG shipping as well as become a defence contractor. Along with other members of the 'Cendana group', named after the street where Suharto's family home is located, he is a member of P.T. Gula Putih Mataram's supervisory board.



*Hutomo  
Mandala Putera*

**Sigit Harjoyudanto**

Suharto's eldest son is the one chosen to keep the family tradition high. He has been engaged in business for a number of years already and most of his corporate alliances are with his father's long-time allies, in particular Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hassan, the two Chinese entrepreneurs who have taken care of Suharto's finances since the early 1950s when he was a colonel and commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java.

While father was busy handling state affairs, Sigit took over the family's collaboration with these loyal business associates. In the late 1970s, Sigit bought up Gunung Salak, a mountain in West Java, transforming it into a huge cattle ranch, which also produces a wide variety of vegetables and other crops. The Tapos ranch has become Suharto's favourite leisure retreat, the place where he likes to portray himself as a dedicated farmer.

Bank Central Asia is Indonesia's largest private bank owned by Liem Sioe Liong. Sigit and his sister Siti Hardiyanti are listed as share-holders and directors.

P.T. Nusantara Ampara Bakti or 'Nusamba' is an investment holding company owned jointly by Sigit and Bob Hassan. Formed in 1982, Nusamba has investments in tea plantations and timber concessions and is the sole agent





*Sigit Harjojudanto*

for Nissan cars. It is also a joint holder, with state companies, of domestic monopolies covering tin-plate and oil sector insurance. Nusamba has a 24 per cent share in P.T. Pelat Timah Nusantara and a 35 per cent share in P.T. Tugu Pratama Indonesia.

P.T. Pelat Timah Nusantara Indonesia or 'Latinusa' have a monopoly over tinsplate, essential for the canning of foodstuffs. According to the AWSJ, manufacturers of goods that use tin in packaging claim that a domestically made can costs 60 to 70 per cent more than an imported one, a price difference that has caused many domestic food and native beverage manufacturers to go bankrupt.

P.T. Tugu Pratama Indonesia, an insurance company, has grown rapidly to become one of Indonesia's largest insurance concerns since it was appointed in 1981 as the sole insurer of Pertamina and the 35 foreign oil companies operating in Indonesia. Tugu Pratama's profits for the year ending 31 March 1985 were recorded at Rp. 18.7 billion or something like \$20 million. It is at present receiving an annual premium of about \$21 million from Garuda, the national airline company.

P.T. Sinar Mas Inti Perkasa is 55 per cent owned by Sigit and Liem Sioe Liong. This is the country's largest privately-owned palm-oil conglomerate and owns palm-oil plantations, processing plants and a sales network for cooking oil. Sigit is deputy president of the company's supervisory board.

P.T. Rejo Sari Bumi partially owns P.T. Gunung Madu plantations, an integrated sugar estate and refinery in Sumatra. Rejo Sari Bumi is controlled by Probosutedjo, Suharto's half brother, while Sigit is a major shareholder and executive director of the company and director of Gunung Madu.

Mention has already been made of Sigit's stakes in P.T. Humpuss, P.T. Gula Putih Mataram and the plastics monopoly, Panca Holding.

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**Siti Hardyanti and Indra Kowara**

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The business interests of this couple are primarily in the Bimantara Group, Sam Pet and Permindo. Siti Hardyanti is listed as a share-holder and director of the Bank Central Asia, while both are deeply involved in agro-businesses such as Gunung Madu Plantations, Gula Putih Mataram and P.T. Pipit Indah, a company that partly owns Gunung Madu.

But this couple have been the focus of attention recently for a different reason, following the murder last year of society model, Dietje Budimulyono who was found shot dead in her car. Dietje was known in Jakarta society as a high-class call-girl who, according to persistent rumours, had a secret liaison with Indra Kowara. When his wife, Tutut, got wind of the affair, she

is said to have hired someone to murder Dietje. For months, the police got nowhere with their enquiries, strengthening the suspicion that there was a cover-up. In January the police announced the arrest of a suspect, an elderly faith-healer named Pakde who, according to the police, murdered Dietje after failing to return money given to him on a promise that he could multiply its value. The rumours of a cover-up rumble on, however, though the names of Indra Kowara and his wife are never mentioned in public. Leading lawyers of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) have taken on Pakde's defence.

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**The older generation**

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*Sudwikatmono*

The AWSJ investigation draws attention to the rising fortunes of the second generation Suharto family clique, but what of the first generation, until recently the ones who were under the spotlight? The riches of Probosutedjo, Suharto's half-brother are far less dazzling these days possibly because he came into conflict with Suharto's closest business ally, Liem Sioe Liong.

Cousin Sudwikatmono, on the other hand, is still on the rise. His alliances with Bambang and Sigit are bringing him new riches, while his earlier ventures with Liem cover wide-ranging business activities: The Sinar Mas Group already mentioned, the Indo-Cement Tunggal Prakarsa which produces half of Indonesia's cement, Bogasari which holds the monopoly for wheat flour, and P.T. Giwang Selagram which holds the monopoly for the import of cold-rolled sheet steel, a basic ingredient for steel products ranging from car bodies to galvanised roofing and tins. Sudwikatmono holds directorships in the latter three companies. All these Liem companies rest on solid financial and political foundations.

The AWSJ investigation sheds light on the central configuration of the Indonesian business world today. The major strategic industries like oil and gas, plantations and communications are in state hands, run by state companies with Suharto loyalists in control. Alongside this state sector and fed by it are private companies, the most powerful and profitable of which are largely controlled by members of the Suharto clan or the family's close associates. This burgeoning family business empire positively puts the Marcos empire into the shade.

*The complete set of AWSJ articles is available from TAPOL for £1.00 including postage, or £1.50 airmail.*

# Population control enters a new phase

At the end of 1986 the Indonesian administration in East Timor announced that *pemukiman kembali* or re-resettlement of the population, would be given top priority in 1987/88. Basoeki Adisoekma, head of the Transmigration Department's regional office in East Timor, said the programme would involve both re-resettlement of the East Timorese and transmigration of people into East Timor from elsewhere. In other words, there are two population policy objectives, the standard Indonesian transmigration programme and the relocation of the East Timorese who since 1979 have been subject to several resettlements.

As a study of Indonesia's population policy will show, the progress of the programme is linked to the renewed military offensive code-named *Operasi Kikis* or Operation Extinction, which was launched last July.

## Population control in 1979-1982

Since 1979, there have been three phases in Indonesia's population control programme in East Timor, 1979-1982, 1982-1986 and the period which is just beginning.

The first phase began after the army's extermination and annihilation campaign which lasted from September 1977 till March 1979. During this period, the vast majority of East Timorese were outside Indonesian control. They were living in the mountainous interior; many had always lived there while others had fled inland in advance of army operations to gain control of the lowland, coastal areas.

Indonesia launched a savage campaign of aerial bombardment against the population together with troop movements to encircle Fretilin positions. The aim was to destroy the Fretilin leadership and its guerrilla forces and force the population into the lowland areas which were under Indonesian control. The campaign devastated vast areas, killed tens of thousands of people and destroyed the agricultural system, causing widespread food shortages. 1978 and 1979 were years of acute famine and disease.

After the final Indonesian push from March-July 1979, the distraught East Timorese were herded into *daerah pemukiman* or resettlement areas. It is generally accepted that by the end of 1979, about 200,000 had been killed or had died from famine and disease. It was not till October 1979, when Indonesia finally allowed international relief operations to begin, that the appallingly high death toll began to fall.

In December 1979, US ambassador Edward Masters gave an aerial map to a congressional hearing, identifying 145 resettlement areas. There were probably more than that as a Fretilin report in 1983 spoke of more camps in certain areas than appeared on the ambassador's map.

The resettlement camps set up during this first phase of population control had several characteristics:

- people had been herded into hastily created sites with an average population of 2,000 each;
- the locations had been chosen at random, mostly in places where food production was hardly possible or had ceased altogether because of the Indonesian bombing; a



East Timorese women captives gather to 'welcome' General Umar Wirahadikusumah, the Vice-President, on a visit to Atauro prison island. *Jakarta Post*, 9 August 1986.

Fretilin report in 1983 described many camps as being in barren regions, totally unsuitable for food-growing; - the primary security objectives of the resettlement policy were to separate the population from the guerrilla movement and to establish army control over the people.

In 1982 the Australian journalist, David Jenkins confirmed that many camps were unproductive, located where the soil "is often white with salt". But he had been told that the Indonesians were making plans to 'regroup' some communities back to the highlands "in the interests of higher production", though the traditional dispersal of Timorese hamlets would not be allowed (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 6 August 1982).

The camps created in this first period failed to serve Indonesian military strategy for several reasons:

Having been set up in haphazard fashion, the camps were difficult to guard and patrol, making them vulnerable to guerrilla attacks.

Conditions in the camps were so deplorable that the army's 'hearts and minds' policy had no chance of success. [Army strategists cling to the belief that better economic conditions will make people forget their right to self-determination.] Camp-dwellers had to walk miles to reach land that could be tilled and, when they went to till land, they were under constant army guard.

Under a new leadership, the Fretilin had recovered from the heavy losses of 1978-79 and had succeeded in building a network of contacts with the camps.

The resistance movement had the run of the more fertile areas abandoned by the people. Moreover, many people in the resettlements fled to join the guerrillas.



The military were compelled to rethink their settlement policy and decided to create new settlements that were more amenable to their security needs. Camp populations were uprooted again and forced to settle in new locations situated along asphalt roads built by the army, making it easier to prevent contact with the guerrillas.

Whereas camps in the initial phase had included people from different regions, the military now considered this to be a mistake and concluded that security would be better served by grouping people from the same area together. Some concessions were made to camp dwellers so that they could grow food in small vegetable plots near their homes. But tilling the soil for staple crops still involved long treks, under guard, and these trips were often forbidden because of security operations.

#### 'Model villages' and 'development villages'

At the same time, Jakarta poured in investment funds to try out two new forms of population control, the *desa teladan* or 'model village' and the *desa pembangunan* or 'development village'. The former is typical of settlements in a colonial, plantation economy. Some of the people in 'model villages' are transmigrants (Indonesians from outside) and some are East Timorese. 'Model villages' were the first attempt to create transmigration sites in East Timor, and are required to focus on the production of cash crops.

Plans have been announced to open up large areas for cash crop production. According to Oscar Victor, head of the East Timor Plantations Office, during the current five-year plan (1984/89), the plantation area of East Timor is scheduled to expand by 2.72 per cent annually, rising from 144,693 hectares in 1984 to 156,637 hectares in 1989. The planned acreage and output are as follows:

Coffee	48,648 ha	11,115.6 tons
Coconut	49,000 ha	10,290 tons
Areca nut	35,981 ha	3,418 tons
Kapok	9,950 ha	1,243.7 tons
Macadamia nuts	4,450 ha	890 tons
Cinnamon bark	2,916 ha	334 tons
Cloves	1,895 ha	1.5 tons
Tobacco	1,750 ha	1,093.7 tons
Cashew nuts	1,000 ha	14.5 tons
Rubber	832 ha	78.5 tons
Vanilla	80 ha	1.2 tons
Tea	70 ha	4.5 tons
Pepper	65 ha	0.4 tons

Source: *Pedoman Rakyat*, 24 October 1986

Plans like these can be expected to assume greater importance with the collapse of oil prices and Indonesia's desperate need to increase non-oil exports.

An example of a 'model village' is Salele, in the sub-district of Tilomar, 47 km from Suai, the capital of Kovalima district. It was set up in October 1985 with 500 'model' farmers, half of them East Timorese and half from East Java, Central Java, Jogjakarta and Bali. As with transmigration sites elsewhere, each family gets 0.25 hectares for a house and garden plus one hectare for crops. Salele's transmigrants are required to produce coconuts for exports. As this is a show-case village, the villagers have been well provided for. They have been given thousands of coconut plants as well as 95 cows and a promise of 250 more. Recently, Carrascalao promised to help the village set up its own village cooperative and to give it a brand-new van to carry their produce to market (*Pedoman Rakyat*, 1 December 1986).

Carrascalao said that the 'model village' concept means shifting people from high-density to low-density areas, but denied it would mean transferring poverty from one

place to another, or sending people to remote areas. It would improve living standards and open up new prospects. What he failed to say was that, before Indonesia began its violently enforced programme of population control, East Timorese lived in dispersed hamlets in the interior, where the density of population had always been low. It was the resettlement of the late 1970s that herded them together, creating heavily populated areas that never existed before the Indonesians came.

Since 1982, 825 families have been transmigrated, among them 399 families from outside and 426 East Timorese families, the so-called 'translocals'. The main districts chosen for the transmigration sites are Bobonaro and Kovalima, both near the border with West Timor (*Kompas*, 24 December 1986). Another site has been created in the east, near Viqueque, which accommodates one hundred transmigrant families from the East Java Christian Church in Jember. (*Mutiara*, 30 July-12 August 1986). Initially it was said that 100 'model villages' would be created in 1986 and 126 in 1987 but these targets are far behind



Some of the tens of thousands of East Timorese orphans doing chores at an orphanage. *Tempo*, 19 July 1986.

schedule, partly for lack of funds but also because much of East Timor is still not under Indonesian control.

The other type of village that began to emerge in 1986 was the 'development village', a concept promoted by Colonel Yunus Yosfiah, a para-commando and commander of the East Timor Wiradharma Military Command. Last July, Colonel Yosfiah said the best way to cope with the armed resistance was to improve living standards. His troops had set up 500 'model gardens' run by *babinsa* officers in the villages, the non-commissioned officers at the lowest end of the army command structure. The gardens vary in size from 250 square metres to one hectare. If each garden could provide for ten families, the population of East Timor would, according to Yosfiah, be self-supporting in three or four years. In addition, sub-district military commands had been instructed to have fish-ponds built (*Tempo*, 19 July 1986).





Non-combatant East Timorese now living in Fretilin-held areas of the country. From a set of photographs received from Fretilin in 1986.

Yosfiah's programme meant that army officers were now under instructions to control the agricultural pursuits of people in the *daerah pemukiman*. The army was also admitting that food production was still hopelessly inadequate and drastic measures were needed, but only under the direct command of the troops.

#### *Operasi Kikis* and the final stage of population control

It is highly significant that the announcement of a new resettlement programme to be launched in East Timor in 1987/88 was made by an official of the Department of Transmigration. Basoeki Adisoekma, head of the Department's regional office, said the programme could commence because the infra-structure was now ready and "security has now been restored". He said the East Timorese would be allowed to return to their native regions but his reference to infra-structure meant they would be located in specially-built sites and would not return to their original hamlets. In the first site to be set up, in the district of Baucau, 300 families would be re-resettled (*Kompas*, 24 December 1986).

Governor Carrascalao gave backing to the programme, adding significantly that "once the East Timorese have been placed in decent locations, there will be no more problems and obstacles to transmigration from outside East Timor" (*Kompas*, 24 December 1986).

What conclusions can be drawn from the plans to begin a major transmigration programme in East Timor?

First of all it suggests that *Operasi Kikis* which was launched by the army last July, was aimed primarily at driving Fretilin guerrilla forces back so as to gain more territory where transmigration sites can be established.

In line with the army's *hankamrata* or 'total people's defence' doctrine, these settlements are integral to army strategy, consolidating its control over areas against guerrilla operations, and to the army's concept of "territorial management and territorial warfare". As

General Benny Murdani, commander of the armed forces, once said, "transmigration is the only programme in the economic field that must quite categorically be tied in with defence and security considerations" (*Sinar Harapan*, 8 March 1985).

Secondly, in East Timor, unlike other areas designated for transmigration, large-scale importation of peasant labour can only proceed after the re-resettlement of the native population has been carried out. The reason is that in the *daerah pemukiman*, the inhabitants "are not given any guarantee of land tenure", according to Basoeki. In other words, they possess nothing. What Basoeki did not say was that they were robbed of the land they owned and lived from before the Indonesian invasion. In the transmigration sites, they will receive the standard plot of land, apparently as compensation for all that has happened since 1979. [Whether this will persuade them to accept integration is another matter.]

Following this, the new sites organised by Basoeki's office will receive their share of Balinese or Javanese peasants. Instead of *daerah pemukiman*, East Timor will then consist of normal transmigration sites. No figures have been given for the number of transmigrants but Carrascalao is quoted as saying that by the year 2000, the population of East Timor may reach one million (*Mutiara*, 30 July-12 August 1986).

The composition of the population of Salele indicates that the ratio between Timorese and transmigrants has been fixed at 1:1, a far higher proportion of 'translocals' than elsewhere. This is because such a high percentage of Timorese have already been uprooted and have to be put somewhere.

The third point is that with transmigration now so closely integrated with population control of the East Timorese people, the international agencies that support transmigration, in particular the World Bank and its member-states, are directly involved in Indonesia's colonisation of East Timor.

But the plan could run into trouble for a number of reasons. *Kompas*, reporting Basoeki's announcement, said that while the start of the programme was known, there



was no idea how long it would take to complete because many inhabitants were still "scattered". Without saying so, the paper seemed to hint that many East Timorese are living in areas outside Indonesian control. From Fretilin sources, we know that many non-combatants live in their areas, in family units and involved in civilian pursuits.

Recent appeals by Murdani and Carrascalao to those "wandering in the forests" to come home seem to be directed primarily at the non-combatants with Fretilin. When opening the new Los Palos-Lautem road and a new church in Rasa village in Lautem, Murdani urged villagers "to call on their brethren who are not yet conscious to rejoin their families" (*Pedoman Rakyat*, 1 October 1986).

Other problems are bound to frustrate the planners. Funds for transmigration have been cut by 65 per cent in

## EAST TIMOR

the 1987/88 budget and the Transmigration Department has announced that no new sites will be set up for the time being. Security needs may however exclude East Timor from these cutbacks.

But above all, Fretilin operations are not likely to stop. Transmigration sites in more scattered locations may be the army's way of consolidating its hold over territory but they will also lengthen Indonesia's line of defence and could compound Indonesia's security problems, rather than solve them.

# "Election fever" in East Timor

East Timor is these days preparing itself, or rather, being prepared, for the great event of 1987, the general election that is to take place in April.


All kinds of propaganda techniques are being used to arouse people's enthusiasm. The colonial administrators have even decided to use the local language, Tetum, to tell the East Timorese how to vote and who to vote for. Sixty-two election committees (*Panitia Pemungutan Suara*) have been set up and the authorities have announced that 357,754 people are entitled to vote in East Timor. Everywhere, people are being assembled to listen to information and instructions from government officials.

Members of the East Timor regional assembly, the DPRD, recently visited Jakarta and met General Amir Machmud who chairs both houses of the Indonesian legislature. DPRD chairman, Jose Valente, assured him that the elections in East Timor would be "made a success" and urged the next Indonesian Consultative Assembly (not due to meet until March 1988) to elect General Suharto for a fifth term.

### Party lists

The lists of candidates for the three parties in East Timor have been announced. Top of the Golkar list is Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, a surprising claimant to being a representative East Timorese. The role of ministers who head Golkar lists in all provinces is as "vote-getters" who won't necessarily take up a seat in parliament. Perhaps Mochtar's emergence as Golkar's "vote-getter" in East Timor is intended in some perverse way to convince the world that the East Timorese like the man who defends their persecution on the world forum.

The *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*, formerly claiming to represent nationalist and Catholic views, has its (Javanese) secretary-general at the head of its list,



Members of the Provincial Assembly of East Timor being sworn in after the 1982 'elections'. From "East Timor After Integration", Indonesian Department of Information, July 1983.

along with two (Javanese) Catholics, and two others from Dili. The *Partai Pembangunan Persatuan*, formerly, a Muslim party, has made even less of an attempt to give its list an East Timorese flavour. Five candidates "from Dili" all have Indonesian names while the sixth is a Javanese "from Jakarta".

No doubt, East Timor will record a high poll, perhaps even higher than in 1982 when more than 100 per cent turned out to vote. Last time, Golkar "won" all four seats but the other two parties, have been complaining about provinces where they have no representation in the present Parliament. Could it be that this time, they will be allowed to occupy an East Timor seat? Watch this column for the results of this thrilling contest.

## New Security Operations Commander for East Timor

As part of the new army appointments that took place in January, Brigadier-General Mantiri has been appointed commander of the Security Operations Command for East Timor (*Komando Operasi Keamanan Timor Timur*), the Command which is in control of military operations in East Timor and which is directly under the armed forces general staff.

Brig-General Mantiri has also taken over command of the First Infantry Division of Kostrad. It has become

the practice for these two posts to be held concurrently by the same commanding officer, an indication of the importance which the army attaches to its military operations in East Timor.

Brigadier-General Warsito who previously held the two posts is now chief-of-staff of Udayana/VII Regional Military Command which includes East Timor within its territory.




## British and Australian parliamentarians denied entry

British and Australian parliamentarians who wanted to visit East Timor in January this year have been denied permission by the Indonesian Government. The request was made last October by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group in London and the Parliamentary Amnesty International Group in Canberra.

The Australian group was the first to be told by the Indonesian Embassy that a visit would not be welcome in January 1987 as elections were due in April. When the British group then wrote again to the Indonesian Embassy in London, asking for permission to make the visit after the elections, they received an outright refusal.


In a press statement on 14 January 1987, Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group said:

*"It is very worrying that outside observers are being excluded from East Timor. The occupying forces of the Indonesian Government are engaged in a massive operation against the resistance forces which continue to fight for the liberty of their small country against the oppression of their mighty neighbour, eleven years after the invasion. The Indonesians want the rest of the world to think that the freedom fighters are no longer operating and this is why they cannot afford to let us see that a major war still continues."*



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## Fretilin attacks Los Palos

At the beginning December, Falintil forces, the armed wing of Fretilin, launched a major attack on Indonesian forces based in Los Palos, the main town in East Timor's eastern tip. The attack marked the eleventh anniversary of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor on 7 December 1975.

In a press statement released in Lisbon on 16 December, the Fretilin External Committee said the attack occurred just as Indonesian troops in Los Palos were preparing to begin an operation against the Falintil, as part of the latest Indonesian offensive code-named *Operasi Kikis* (Operation Extinction), initiated in July 1986. Indonesian troops were taken completely by surprise and suffered heavy casualties with the loss of nearly thirty men and large quantities of ammunition, weapons and camouflage material.

## New evening newspaper may soon appear

There are reports that a new Jakarta evening newspaper may soon appear, to take the place of *Sinar Harapan*, which was banned on 9 October for reporting that monopoly rights to certain import companies might soon be revoked.

In November, the Financial Review of Australia (12 November) reported that powerful interests close to the President were scheming to buy the paper up. Two names were mentioned, the president's cousin Sudwikatmono (see "The Suharto family fortunes" page 9-11) and Bambang Rachmadi, son of General Sudharmono, the State Secretary. Suharto's daughter, Titi Hedyanti, the wife of Major Prabowo, (not the daughter mentioned in our article on page 9-11) is also mentioned as being linked to the buy-up. The story was written by the paper's Jakarta correspondent, Michael Byrnes, just days before he left Indonesia for good after being refused a visa renewal.

A month later the story surfaced again, this time in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (4 December) which gave the impression that Sudwikatmono and Bambang were competing with each other to gain control of the publishing firm, not working together.

However, by early January, a new slant had been given to *Sinar's* rebirth. Information Minister Harmoko let it be known, after a meeting with Suharto, that a new afternoon paper would soon appear, with a new name and under new management. The Golkar lawyer, Albert Hasibuan was mentioned as the likely general manager, with Sutarno, former rector of the Christian university, Satya Wacana as editor-in-chief.

The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (1 January 1987) now reported that Suharto had been angered by reports that members of his family were buying the banned paper up. The journal even said that Suharto had specifically ordered that neither relatives of his nor relatives of his close aides should acquire interests in the paper. Clearly, Suharto had decided on a damage-limitation operation to protect the name of his family in the face of so much recent exposure. Or was the *Review* being required to eat its own words rather than lose yet another man in Jakarta?

Whatever the ownership of whatever paper appears under whatever editorial control, it is clear that the paper will be strongly committed to toeing the government line.





rather than risk the displeasure of an impoverished country dependent on the West for loans, markets and technology. The shaming of the West is dealt with in other books, but Jose brings first-hand experience of, as he calls them, "the games nations play". It is a telling testimony to the short-sighted greed and self-interest that motivates the diplomacy of most governments.

The author has included chapters on self-determination, human rights, the non-aligned movement and the attitudes of Portugal, Australia, the US and Indonesia. Again, he brings to subjects dealt with before his own stimulating insights and the poignancy of his personal experiences - the initial hopes in those countries, disappointment and then the bitter sense of betrayal. This book communicates as well as any book I can remember the indignation of a small nation crushed by the cynicism of larger nations.


#### Losing sight of the broader campaign

Yet, the book does not do justice to the independence struggle of East Timor and Fretilin's resilience. Since the author's work has largely been in the diplomatic field, it is only fitting to focus on East Timor's position at the UN. But he gives the curious impression that he has acted on his own in New York. Nowhere is there a sense of working with Fretilin representatives in Lisbon and elsewhere, and the movement inside East Timor. Although there are enormous communications problems for the guerrillas in East Timor, Jose would normally be the first to acknowledge their success at keeping in contact with Fretilin abroad. There is also scant reference to the campaigns by many individuals and organisations who have been East Timor's most consistent supporters.

Instead, we are given the author's views of the faults and merits of diplomats, and details of the tortuous way even the most limited action on East Timor is taken at the UN. It makes painful reading and was obviously frustrating for Jose, but it suggests that the decisions of double-dealing diplomats are of primary importance to East Timor's survival. He seems to lose sight of the broader international campaign for East Timor's independence amid the pragmatic twists and turns he is forced to make to keep the issue alive at the UN.

The impression of Jose's isolation from the rest of Fretilin is reinforced by a number of casual criticisms he makes of the organisation and other Fretilin members. His commitment to East Timor's independence is certainly deep and unflagging, but from the book, his commitment to Fretilin seems less so. Perhaps he was demonstrating an open mind over the issue, allowing a degree of self-criticism and criticism of Fretilin. But in the absence of any explanations for his remarks, his faith in the organisation he represents seems uncertain. Those who are learning about East Timor for the first time through this book will be left with many unanswered questions about Fretilin, and they will need to turn to other books on the subject for a more complete picture.

*Jeremy Smithers*



Jose Ramos Horta, *Funu - The Unfinished Saga of East Timor*, Red Sea Press, New Jersey, 1986.

The publication of any new book on East Timor is always a welcome event. Independent accounts of the catastrophic events in the luckless former Portuguese colony are still few and far between, and it remains almost totally sealed off from the world by the Indonesian occupying forces.

A book by Jose Ramos Horta is doubly welcome as the first detailed account of East Timor's fight for independence by one of the leading participants. Jose is one of the few Fretilin officials who had left East Timor just prior to the Indonesian invasion in 1975, and they have simply not had the resources to produce a book before. Even now this book is the work of one person, a semi-autobiographical account of events through his eyes, whose publication was plagued with financial problems.

During his long term as Fretilin's representative at the United Nations, Jose Ramos Horta has won a reputation as an astute diplomat, and has become the most widely known and articulate spokesman for the East Timor cause. There were high expectations of his book and on many counts, these are well met. The book is lucid, witty and moving. It contains original insights into many issues relevant to East Timor's struggle. In short, it is a good read, whether or not you are familiar with East Timor.

#### Self-interest and hypocrisy

Jose draws on his own experiences at the UN and exposes the cynical lack of interest in East Timor by most UN members. To accuse the West, which holds Indonesia's purse strings, and many countries from Eastern, Arab and radical blocs, of hypocrisy for their refusal to condemn Indonesia for its genocidal attack on East Timor, seems almost feeble in the face of their behaviour at the UN.

The overwhelming impression is one of deep-seated corruption and cowardice on the part of the world's most powerful nations. And what is extraordinary about the Western and Eastern bloc's betrayal of East Timor is that it would have cost so little to prevent the atrocities inflicted on the East Timorese. General Suharto is too much of a pragmatist to risk opposition to his annexation of East Timor from even just a few key trading partners. But Indonesia called their bluff and got away with it.

The author describes with savage sarcasm how the US, Europe, Japan and Australia fell over themselves to hide the truth about the invasion of East Timor, making a mockery of the UN Charter, while supplying Indonesia with military hardware to sustain its occupation. All this



# Land, social conflict and transmigration

It is evident from the public controversy that has recently flared up concerning conflicts in transmigration areas that, as more and more sites are set up, contradictions between transmigrants and native people are on the increase. The issue was thoroughly analysed in *The Ecologist*, by Marcus Colchester of Survival International in an article entitled: "The Struggle for Land: Tribal Peoples in the Face of the Transmigration Programme".

The recent controversy started with a speech by Emil Salim, Minister for the Environment, setting out to refute Colchester's analysis which concluded that as the "programme gathers momentum into the remoter parts of Kalimantan and West Papua, these conflicts (over land) can only intensify. Transmigration is fast becoming the single most important cause of conflict" (*The Ecologist*, Vol. 16 No 2/3, 1986, page 99).

Emil Salim expressed the opinion that social conflict between native inhabitants and transmigrants was "inevitable" not because of the land problem but because of "social disparities". The conflicts between Dayaks in Kalimantan, Buginese in Sulawesi and tribes in Irian Jaya (West Papua) on the one hand, and the incoming Javanese on the other, were the result of the enormous difference in lifestyles between people who live from hunting and food-gathering and the Javanese who practice sedentary agriculture.

The disparities can be resolved, he said, not by forcing tribal people in Irian Jaya to wear clothes but by integrating the local people into the general transmigration programme. This should be done by so-called *transmigrasi sisipan*, or 'side-by-side' transmigration, meaning that local people are settled on sites in between or on the fringes of sites for incoming transmigrants. This would help change the local people's way of seeing things, said Salim. He criticised Survival International for asserting that local people had been destroyed as a consequence of transmigration.

Salim also spoke about the need to protect the environment. "We should take care not to create deserts by cutting down forests, as in Ethiopia" and "the balance between the environment and the social system must be preserved". Yet he attacked shifting agriculture - a good example of environmental balance in many parts of outer Indonesia - for destroying the environment, and complained that this system was still being conducted by 11 million people (*Kompas*, 3 December 1986).

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## The source of conflict is land

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Emil Salim's analysis was soon rejected by sociologist Selo Sumardjan who argued that the land question was at the heart of social conflict in the transmigration regions. The local people felt that their heritage which had passed down from generation to generation had been damaged and torn asunder (*dirusak dan diacak-acak*) by the incoming Javanese. People's mistrust of the people who would later occupy their land began from the very moment land was selected and cleared for transmigration.

Government officials insist on having documented proof of people's claims to their land, but people who have been using the land for centuries have no documents to prove anything. Whenever land ownership cannot be formally proven to the satisfaction of the officials, it is pronounced to be state land. But people feel they have a right to the land where they hunt or carry out shifting agriculture. "The land is mine for as far as the eye can



A Javanese trans migrant with West Papuan women. Trying to be the best of friends. *Tempo*, 6 December 1986

see" is the widely-held belief of many local people (*Kompas*, 5 December). "People's anger at having their land arbitrarily seized by the government is later transferred to the transmigrants who come and occupy the land", said Sumardjan (*Kompas*, 11 December).

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## Land becoming more difficult to acquire

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A few days later, Hartono Padmowirjono who is in charge of land selection at the Transmigration Department effectively confirmed - while trying to refute - Sumardjan's (and Survival's) analysis by saying that the need for land that can be acquired cheaply and quickly for transmigration is becoming more and more pressing. Where land is said to be the ancestral land of local peoples, the government "makes approaches" to the people concerned because, by law, if land ownership cannot be established, it automatically becomes state property. He therefore said he could not agree that land is at the heart of social conflict in transmigration regions, although he seemed to be saying just the opposite.

He went on to describe how the problem of paying for ancestral land was becoming increasingly burdensome because of the current financial stringency. Moreover, producing evidence of ancestral claims is a lengthy process whereas the transmigration programme is racing against time to fill its target of 750,000 families during the present five-year plan. He admitted that it was difficult for the Transmigration Department to exercise control over the way land was expropriated because increasingly, this was taking place in remote and isolated areas (*Kompas*, 11 December). In other words, while bureaucrats at the centre claim that ancestral rights should be properly negotiated, they cannot be held responsible for what happens in the field.

## Some transmigration sites closed to foreigners

Transmigration Minister Martono recently admitted that certain transmigration sites are not open to outsiders because of restrictions imposed by the security forces. He was answering questions from foreign journalists at a press conference held to commemorate the 36th anniversary of the start of the programme. The questions were certainly prompted by the experiences of foreign journalists during a recent trip to West Papua. The visit took place at a time when military operations against the OPM (Free Papua Movement) were being conducted. It is likely that this, rather than specific problems in transmigration sites, was the reason why some areas had been declared out of bounds to journalists.

Martono said on the one hand that foreign critics of transmigration were welcome. "I take this opportunity to publicly invite our critics to come to Indonesia and see what transmigration is all about," he said. They could go "wherever they want" he said, though he admitted that some sites were closed to foreigners. This was a matter for the security forces and was not the responsibility of his Department (BBC dispatch, 12 December).

Peter Hiatt of the BBC described Martono's invitation as Indonesia's "new approach to foreign criticism"

## TRANSMIGRATION

prompted by the attack on transmigration contained in *The Ecologist*. Since then, he said, an American public relations firm had been signed up "to help Indonesia mount a vigorous counter-propaganda campaign".

### Sumatra "over-populated"

Martono also declared that while on the one hand Sumatra was now suffering from over-population and would henceforth be closed to transmigrants who are funded by the state, the government would nevertheless "give priority to encouraging spontaneous transmigrants to go there because they are not state-funded" (Kompas, 13 December).

He said the problems afflicting Lampung which was now a place for the outflow of transmigrants were equally applicable throughout the whole of Sumatra. It was becoming ever more difficult to find land in Sumatra that is fertile enough for cultivation. Yet, in the same breath, Martono said that Sumatra was the best destination for spontaneous transmigrants because of its proximity to Java and the availability of good lines of communication.

## Vagrants as transmigrants

The fate of vagrants from Indonesia's largest cities has suddenly become a controversial issue between the Transmigration Department and the Department of Social Affairs, the municipalities of Jakarta and Surabaya, and several provincial governments. The dispute has drawn attention to the plight of hundreds of thousands of city vagrants many of whom have been forced to transmigrate whether they like it or not.

It is officially estimated that Jakarta has 150,000 vagrants. It is common practice for soldiers or the police to round vagrants up so as to 'clean up' a city's image. They are herded into 'social rehabilitation centres' where they are given basic training before being sent off as transmigrants. In many instances, those who are unmarried are paired off and married, as transmigration is meant exclusively for family units. These serious human rights abuses have as yet gone unchallenged by anyone.

The bureaucracy has conjured up new terms to categorise these unfortunate people. In some reports they are called 'liposos' which is short for '*lingkungan pondok sosial*', loosely translated in the English-language Indonesian press as 'former inhabitants of social rehabilitation centres'. Elsewhere they are referred to by a term in Sanskrit, much favoured by the regime, as *tuna wisma/tuna karya*, people without homes and jobs.

### Unwanted people

Jakarta's Deputy Governor, Anwar Umar has suggested that all 150,000 vagrants in the capital would be better off in transmigration sites because a house and two hectares of land are available. "You would not be able to obtain such facilities in Jakarta if you waited till the end of the world", he told a group of transmigrants who were undergoing training before being sent off the South Sumatra (Jakarta Post, 16 December).

However, Transmigration Minister Martono recently said that many provinces do not want vagrants because they have been spoilt by a life of begging into wanting an easy time. Although the transmigration of vagrants is based on a joint decision between his Department and the Social Affairs Department, he said he would prefer not to send out paupers and beggars. The Social Affairs Department meanwhile insists that it should not "shun its responsibilities" (Jakarta Post, 31 December).

The transmigration of city vagrants clearly has the backing of city governors who want to offload the social problems that appear so visibly on their streets. In December, General Suprpto, the governor of Jakarta, visited a special so-called 'liposos' transmigration site in Suka Putih village, Padamaran sub-district in South Sumatra, following the arrival of a hundred vagrant families from Jakarta, including a group of lepers. The scheme is the result of direct cooperation between the Jakarta and South Sumatra regional governments. In a speech to the newly arrived vagrants, the general appeared less concerned with their welfare than to urge them not to return to Jakarta (Berita Buana, 5 December).

But Martono's opposition to the transmigration of vagrants clearly has the backing of provincial officials, among others in West Papua where the chief transmigration official in Merauke complained to General Wahono, governor of East Java, on a visit to the area recently, that 'liposos' transmigrants were "badly behaved". They were "a nuisance and a burden" for the local authorities, unwilling to adjust to new conditions after enjoying the luxury (sic) of big city life. They tended to protest about "petty things" and had a negative influence on other transmigrants (Surabaya Pos, 27 December).

The Jayapura district chief, Bas Jouwe added his voice, saying the choice of settlers should be more selective. "They should be people who are ready to work hard" (Jakarta Post, 6 January 1987). The transmigration chief for the whole of West Papua went even farther, insisting that vagrant transmigrants should not be accepted.



# Transmigration targets and the budget cuts

*The decision to cut transmigration expenditure by 65 per cent in the 1987/1988 budget announced in January has led some people to conclude that this is in response to criticism of the programme. But closer examination will show that the cut is unlikely to result in any significant curtailment of the programme.*

Already weeks before the budget was made public in Parliament, Transmigration Minister Martono told journalists that a cut of more than half could be expected in his transmigration budget. He reiterated however that the government still sees the programme as a good way to develop the outer islands, although steep budget reductions caused by the slump in world oil prices meant that his original targets could no longer be achieved (Reuters, 20 November 1986).

When President Suharto presented his budget speech along with the figures for government expenditure on development, the amount allocated to transmigration had been slashed from Rp. 325.4 billion in 1986/87 to Rp. 112.6 billion in the year commencing 1 April 1987. In 1985/86, the transmigration budget had reached its peak at Rp 578.3 billion, meaning that funding for the programme had been cut to less than a fifth in two years.

Although at a glance it would appear that the cut will severely affect implementation of the programme, a closer look at figures in the budget as a whole could lead to quite a different conclusion. On present evidence, it is doubtful whether the programme will be hit to any significant extent.

In the first place certain items in the budget which could include expenditures for transmigration-related activities have gone up. The item entitled 'people's housing/settlement' (*perumahan rakyat/pemukiman*) is one of the few items to have increased, going up by 24 per cent from Rp. 332.7 billion to Rp 412 billion. Irrigation has also gone up by 42.6 per cent to Rp. 333.2 billion.

A second point that should not be ignored is that a large portion of transmigration expenditures go to pay for surveying by foreign companies like McDonald (UK), Euroconsult (Netherlands), GTZ (West Germany), Fenco (Canada) and others. Surveying is well ahead of actual resettlement of people so that a cutback in costs for this activity is not unexpected. Thus, for instance, vast areas of land in West Papua are already available for transmigration, far in excess of the number of families actually moved to date.

A third point to consider is that the target of 750,000 families is likely to have been fixed more for its political impact, to show that the current five-year plan would aim for a target greatly in excess of the target of half a million families fixed for the 1979-84 period. If one follows press reporting on transmigration over the past two years, there is no sign that the programme has slowed down though realisation has for some time been well below target. The adjustment of costs for actual transportation and resettlement may simply be bringing the budget more in line with realisation.

But perhaps the most important point is that in the past two years, there has been a marked shift in emphasis from so-called 'general' transmigrants - those who are fully funded by the government - to 'spontaneous' or 'independent' transmigrants who get much less funding. This will allow considerable cuts without causing a fall in the number of people who actually move.

Finally, corruption throughout the bureaucracy is notoriously a high-cost factor. Assuming that the government thinks it can combat corruption and improve efficiency in Martono's department, this could allow enormous cuts in outlay without affecting the achievements of the programme.



Javanese cultural performance put on for the benefit of the locals, at Rimba Ayu transmigration site, Kalimantan. *Geo*, no. 6, 1986.

## Transmigration site for troops in Riau

Army families from various divisional commands in Java have been despatched to a transmigration site in Baganbatu, Riau with clear instructions to strengthen the country's defences and reinforce national unity. Riau is the province that lies south-west of the Straits of Malaka and includes islands just south of Singapore. The despatch of soldiers indicates that the site has become a new 'sapta marga' transmigration project or project primarily accommodating active or demobilised members of the armed forces, named after the seven-point ideological doctrine of the Indonesian army.

In a farewell ceremony for 23 heads of family from the Diponegoro Division in Central Java, divisional commander Major General Harsudiono Hartas reminded them that soldiers had a duty to make the transmigration site an "impregnable fortress not only for the sake of development but also to protect it against all kinds of threats, challenges, obstructions and disturbances that can disrupt state and national security". Besides that, the dispersal of the population through transmigration was "the best way to step up national unity and national vigilance" (*Suara Merdeka*, 22 December 1986).

A similar ceremony took place a week later in Bandung for 23 recently demobilised soldiers from the Siliwangi Division in West Java who with their families were about to depart for the same site. The divisional commander, Major-General R.I. Siregar told his men that "as long as there is life in your bodies, you as soldiers of the Indonesian army must always live in accordance with the spirit of struggle" (*Pedoman Rakyat*, 29 December).

On both occasions, the military commanders avoided calling the soldier transmigrants 'sapta marga' transmigrants, referring to them instead as 'intransum' which is short for '*insan transmigran umum*' or general transmigration people. The sapta marga sites have been highlighted in the campaign against transmigration and have been a source of embarrassment to the Indonesian authorities as well as to the World Bank.

Indonesia's disastrous programme to resettle millions of its poorest people has come under closer scrutiny following the edition of *The Ecologist*, Vol. 16, No 2/3 1986 which is devoted to this issue. Government officials in Jakarta responded with a vigorous defence of their policies, fearing that international agencies might reconsider how their money was supporting the military regime. Suddenly transmigration was news, though not a new problem. Until this book appeared, there was no readily available source of detailed information.

Mariel Otten's study of transmigration in theory and practice will be useful to anyone wanting to study the history of transmigration, its rationale, development and difficulties. It aims to expose what she calls 'the myths' about this massive resettlement programme, and in doing so catalogues the contradictions in government policy and the miseries it has brought to so many in the name of development. Working mainly from Indonesian newspaper accounts, reports and World Bank papers she describes how transmigration policy has been pursued for the past twenty years despite its many problems and puts policy developments in a historical context. Her account reveals how aid donors have turned a blind eye to the damage inflicted on human rights and the environment.

### The myth of 'too many people'

One by one the myths created to justify transmigration are exposed. But, like the mythical Hydra, as soon as one ugly head is cut off another grows to replace it. The first myth, which started at the turn of the century under Dutch rule and has continued until very recently, is that there are 'too many people' in Inner Indonesia, particularly in Java. Moving these 'surplus people' to other, less populated islands would improve living conditions for all and even out the population throughout the archipelago. However the number of people who could be seduced or coerced into leaving have had little impact on population densities in Java, Bali, Madura and Lombok, whether through the old Dutch system, Sukarno's programme or the New Order's intensified policies.

Sukarno's myth that underproduction in the agricultural sector could be solved by exploiting more land in the outer islands has been continued by Suharto. The spread of rice farming to areas where the soils or rainfall make it unsustainable without irrigation, drainage and pesticides and fertilisers has led to costly errors for the government and incredible hardship for the transmigrants. Transmigration has had a negligible effect on national food production, whereas traditional farming practices in tune with the indigenous people and their environment have been pushed out in the name of progress.

The Indonesian government is keen to promote transmigration as a way of increasing people's living standards. Although many thousands of migrant families has been successful in their new homes, it is predominantly the poorest of the poor who have been driven to leave their birthplaces. Considering the level of poverty of a landless Javanese peasant, Ms Otten remarks that anything would be an improvement. This raises the question of what would have happened had the \$7,000 or so spent on moving each family been spent more prudently. While much money is indeed spent on the projects, a large proportion goes on fees to foreign consultancy agencies for mapping and surveys, and corrupt contractors who prepare the sites and build the houses and infrastructure such as the airport and highways in West Papua which benefit the elite and the military more than the farmers.

Other myths include the claim that transmigrants, who

return to Java after their badly planned transmigration sites have failed to sustain crops, are lazy, incompetent or anti-government; that the 'backward' outer islanders, particularly the West Papuans, need the 'civilising' presence of Javanese settlers to help them develop; and that transmigration has no military function. Ms Otten exposes the realities behind these myths and describes the justifications used to legitimise the colonisation of East Timor.

### The latest shifts in policy

Meanwhile, the Government now says it is abandoning ambitious targets to shift 65 million people by 2010 and will concentrate on improving quality. Far from giving transmigrants more help, there will be less due to Indonesia's economic problems. Not all transmigrants are skilled farmers; some are prostitutes, homeless vagrants or unemployed school-leavers forced into leaving Java. "Local transmigration" is not the answer either. Shifting cultivators do not want to abandon their traditional patterns of agriculture and live in tin-roofed huts.

Ms Otten argues that the 'new' PIR scheme of nucleus plantations is really the old Dutch indentured labour scheme and is unlikely to succeed. Unless the government pays for people to move to the plantation sites and supports them until their tree crops are productive, peasants cannot afford to become the 'spontaneous' transmigrants the regime now pins its hopes on.

So what of the future? This is where the book is weak. It is long on description and criticism and short on analysis. The final section would have benefitted from the detailed treatment given to other parts of the book. The sheer quantity of dis-information and the fragmented statistics put out by the government with the collusion of the World Bank makes this no easy matter. Even so the facts and figures could have been presented more clearly, with less repetition.

The photographs are of disappointing quality and there is no index. Furthermore, Ms Otten relies on the accounts of relatively few researchers, neglecting more recent Indonesian sources. Nevertheless, as the author says:

*"... this document is not written with the pretension of being objective, as it is in my view impossible to be 'objective' towards the military dictatorship of General Suharto. In addition, the transmigration programme has such a long history of failure and disappointment that it is not difficult to be critical and call for action."*

L.M.C.

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# Australian jurists visit West Papuan refugees

A group of Australian jurists who visited West Papuan refugee camps in Papua New Guinea along the border with Indonesia late last year, has reported that the events in West Papua that forced more than 10,000 to flee "are as grave as at any time since the influx began" in 1984. This situation is also bound to prevent them from ever wanting to return home. From their interviews, the jurists concluded that Indonesian military action was the main reason why they had uprooted themselves and fled across the border. (PNG Times, 12 - 18 December 1986)

This was the second mission to investigate the refugee situation sent by the Australian section of the International Commission of Jurists. The first went in late 1984 and made a number of recommendations some of which have since been implemented, notably PNG's accession to the UN Convention on Refugees.

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## UNHCR agrees that all 'border crossers' are refugees

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The mission reported that the UNHCR has now agreed to acknowledge all West Papuans in the camps as refugees under the principle of "group mass influx". It was told by Akilaja Akiwumi, the UNHCR officer in Port Moresby, that the UN agency has rejected as impracticable the PNG government's requirement that all refugees should be screened, with only the 'politicals' being recognised as refugees, while the rest would be expected to return home. This decision has not yet been officially conveyed to the PNG government.

The mission's chief recommendation was that all UN member states, especially PNG and Australia, should adopt the UNHCR decision to regard all those who have crossed the border since 1984 as refugees. It urged that others who may cross should also be granted refugee status on the same principle. Once this is established, the position of the West Papuans will at last be free from all the present uncertainties.

The mission welcomed the fact that the idea of transferring the more politically conscious refugees to the notorious Wabo camp had been abandoned. All refugees would now be relocated together, in East Awin. The idea of separating the 'politicals' from the rest was unworkable as there is a "very high level of political consciousness even among the 'traditional' people", the mission noted.

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## Other recommendations

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The mission was particularly critical of the Australian government for its unsympathetic response to PNG's problems with third-country resettlement, the prospects of which are still not good. It recommended that regional governments coordinate a programme of permanent resettlement, sharing the burden according to each country's capacities, and that until permanent resettlement can be found, PNG should accord the refugees all rights under the 1961 UN convention on refugees. Its final recommendation was that there should be an international investigation into the situation in West Papua which has led the refugees to leave their homes.



West Papuan refugees at one of the many camps along the PNG-Indonesian border. Their anxieties and uncertainties could soon end if the PNG government accepts the latest UNHCR decision to regard all 'border-crossers' in the camps as refugees.

## More West Papuans seek refuge in PNG

A group of 203 West Papuans from Ubrup district which lies a few kilometres west of the PNG-Indonesian border, crossed over into PNG and sought refuge in Green River in December, after hearing reports that Indonesian soldiers were about to attack their village. They said that Indonesian soldiers had burnt down houses and destroyed crops in their region, and it was being said that troops would take over all their villages (PNG Times, 26 December - 9 January).

This is the second large group of West Papuans to flee to PNG in the second half of 1986. An earlier group consisting of nearly 750 villagers entered PNG in August 1986. They had fled from seven villages in the vicinity of Kiwirok, much farther south, after an incident in late 1985 when a Catholic catechist was beheaded and five men were shot dead.

TAPOL has received independent confirmation of a similar incident in Kiwirok which occurred in the last quarter of 1985. According to this report, a man regarded as a 'trouble-maker' was shot dead by the local chief-of-police. The same source reported that military operations in the Paniai district, in the central highlands, towards the end of 1985 had caused many deaths. A figure of 570 dead had been mentioned though further investigations were needed to verify this figure.

## How to make West Papua more manageable

Several top officials in Jayapura have called for Irian Jaya province to be split up into three provinces as a way to improve security, enhance the exploitation of its natural resources and speed up the cultural disintegration of the West Papuns.


The idea was first mooted several years ago at the Interior Ministry in Jakarta when General Amir Machmud was still Minister. This time, the pressure is coming from Jayapura where advocates of the idea include the provincial secretary (Sekwilda) Drs Soenarto, the chairman of the provincial assembly, Bas Suebu, and the dean of Cendrawasih University, Professor Rudy Tarumingkeng.

While the two Indonesians, Soenarto and Tarumingkeng, used economic and administrative arguments for the division, Suebu concentrated more on political and security justifications. Professor Tarumingkeng argued that the economic potential of the region had not been properly exploited because the huge size made it difficult to decide on priorities. In his opinion, the Merauke and Asmat regions were very suitable for rice cultivation.

Soenarto argued that the division of the province into three would facilitate the region's development as a raw material supplier for Java's industrial needs, true to the tradition of colonies supporting the metropolitan power. He even said that Irian Jaya should be developed as a "support region" for Java.

As for Suebu, the highest Papuan serving in the Indonesian administration after Isaac Hindom, the governor, he saw the change as the way to dismantle the OPM. Having three provinces would split up the Papuan tribes and encourage them to abandon their sense of Melanesian solidarity. It would be easier for the government to monitor the population even in the remotest places, making the task of the security forces that much easier.

Source: Kompas, 9 January 1987.



## At least 1,500 political prisoners

Humanitarian organisations in Indonesia estimate that there are at least 1,500 political prisoners in Indonesia today, according to an AFP report from Jakarta on 3 January. But one lawyer added: "Only God knows the exact figure because the prisoners are frequently moved from one prison to another. In addition we do not have access to government statistics and we have little information from provinces such as Timor."

The same source said that people are sometimes arrested and held beyond the 60-day legal limit and then released without any indication of their alleged wrongdoing.

The lawyers said some two hundred Muslims have already received sentences ranging from 10 months to life imprisonment while so-called fundamentalists have become the main opposition to the government of General Suharto.

The breakdown of political prisoners, according to these sources, includes between three and four hundred Muslim prisoners who have been convicted or are awaiting trial, 37 (alleged) communists and about a hundred 'separatists' from Irian Jaya (West Papua), plus more than one thousand pro-independence militants from East Timor. [TAPOL believes that the number of prisoners from the 1965 affair is probably much higher than 37. Some are certainly communist leaders or activists, but many are soldiers caught up in the kidnaps of army generals on 1 October 1965, and are unlikely to have been communists.]

AFP also reported that according to church sources, there were still six hundred East Timorese being held on the prison island of Atauro despite promises made in 1985 by the governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao that, as from 1986, the island would no longer be used for suspected supporters of Fretilin.

### More executions feared

AFP also reported that more political prisoners most of whom have been under death sentence since the 1960s could face execution soon, possibly ahead of the April elections, if the economic situation continues to deteriorate. "The government would use the executions to remind people that it would use force against its opponents." There are three Muslim prisoners awaiting execution, and 19 or 22 communists, depending on the sources, said AFP.

Several groups in Jakarta are quoted as saying they intend to launch a campaign especially targetted on the US to draw attention to the execution of elderly and ailing detainees. They said that several political prisoners threatened with execution were seriously ill, including Ruslan Wijayasatra, 72, who has just undergone hernia surgery and has a prostate problem, and two soldiers, formerly members of President Sukarno's personal guard, Raswadi who suffers from tuberculosis, and Satar Sutarjo who has cancer.

The agency quoted a former communist militant as saying: "Europe has always provided the main moral support for us, but Europe has little influence on the Indonesian government. It may seem strange, since the communists are not supporters of the US, to try to get American public opinion to influence a Republican president who is a known foe of communism. But after all the years of suffering these men have endured, the end justifies the means," he added.

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# Armed forces reshuffle

*In the first week of January many new appointments and mutations took place in the higher echelons of the armed forces. More appointments can be expected to follow as posts become vacant, making room for the new generation of officers to move up.*

## New commander for East Indonesia

The first graduate from the class of '63 (officers who graduated from the Military Academy in Magelang in 1963) to emerge as a divisional commander is Major-General Wismoyo Arismunandar. He takes over command of the *Komando Daerah Military (Kodam) VIII Trikora*, the Regional Military Command for East Indonesia.

Wismoyo has impeccable credentials. He is a product of the elite, red-beret para-commando corps, Kopassus, and is married to the younger sister of Mrs Tien Suharto. Early in 1983, he was appointed commander of Kopassus, a post of considerable prestige. But problems arose in his private life because of an affair he had with another woman, much to the dismay of Indonesia's First Lady. According to reliable sources, she was responsible for Wismoyo's replacement as Kopassus commander, as a form of punishment, and his appointment as chief-of-staff of the Udayana Regional Military Command in Bali, a far less glamorous post than red-beret chief.

Having served his penance, he has now shot up to one of the most sensitive Kodam command posts, with his headquarters in Jayapura, capital of Irian Jaya (West Papua). This military command covers a huge area including West Papua, Maluku and East Indonesia. Here lies Merauke, the mythical eastern extremity of the Indonesian Republic, with Sabang guarding the western extremity. It is always regarded as a region of key strategic importance, covering Indonesia's most sensitive border with Papua New Guinea and the Pacific region.

Wismoyo is the fourth para-commando to take command in West Papua, a region requiring special toughness because of resolute armed resistance from the OPM, the Free-Papua Movement. At 46, Wismoyo can look forward to a bright future, possibly reaching one of the highest positions in the armed forces with still a few years to spare before retirement.

## New commander for Central Java

The man who Wismoyo replaced is Major-General Setyana, who takes over as commander of the Diponegoro IVth Regional Military Command in Central Java. Setyana was commander in Jayapura for a mere nine months and held his previous post as chief-of-staff of the Brawijaya Division in East Java for only ten months. The man Setyana replaced in Jayapura in March 1986 also held the post for only a year. Setyana is described as an officer whose star is rising fast. Indeed the rapidity with which younger generation officers are moving up in the army hierarchy gives the impression that someone is in a great hurry to get the younger officers well entrenched.

Setyana is of the class of '61, the generation that is now fast moving up behind the class of '60. He was military attache in Vientiane, then was recalled to become assistant for intelligence at Kostrad, the army's strategic reserve corps. He was appointed chief-of-staff of the regional command in North Sumatra, before a brief stint in East Java and then placement in Jayapura.

## Murdani's men move into the bureaucracy

The chain of new appointments was ushered in by the appointment of two high-ranking officers, both key Murdani associates, to top departmental jobs, suggesting that Murdani, now nearing retirement from active military service, is anxious to have strategic government posts filled by men he can trust, ready for the time when a power struggle may break out.

Lieutenant-General Bambang Triantoro, who has held the critically important position of Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff of Social and Political Affairs for several years, is now to become Secretary-General of the Department of Education and Culture. The Minister of Education and Culture, Professor Fuad Hassan is, by Indonesian military standards, almost a liberal. Murdani may feel a strong man is needed in the Department to prevent any liberal drift on the campuses and to make sure the education system conforms with the ideals of the military rulers.

The new Chief-of-Staff for Social and Political Affairs will be Lieutenant-General Soegiarto, also of the class of '60, the first of his class to be appointed as a divisional commander, back in 1979.

Lieutenant-General Dading Kalbuadi is the other Murdani man to shift from the high command to the bureaucracy. Dading will become Inspector-General of the Department of Defence and Security. This may be in preparation for Murdani's own retirement as armed forces commander-in-chief, possibly in 1988, when he is likely to want the job of Defence Minister. Dading was closely associated for many years with Murdani's East Timor campaign.

The post being vacated by Dading, Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces has been taken over by Lieutenant-General Ida Bagus Sudjana, of Balinese origin, a man of the class of '60, who also received military training at Breda Military Academy in the Netherlands. Sudjana's vacated post as Assistant for Social and Political Affairs goes to Lieutenant-General Harsudiono Hartas, who moves to the high command after serving commander of the Diponegoro Division in Central Java. Hartas had military training in New Zealand and the US.

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