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TAPOL

British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 76

July 1986

European Parliament hits out at Indonesia again

On 10 July, the European Parliament called on Indonesia to end its occupation of East Timor so that conditions could be created for an act of self-determination. The resolution was adopted by a 162 to 42, with 30 abstentions. The initiative was taken by Portuguese members who joined the Parliament in January this year, when Portugal became a member of the European Community. Other MEPs sponsoring the resolution were from Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Holland and the UK.

The resolution appealed to Indonesia to cease all hostilities against the people of East Timor immediately, end their occupation of the country and respect the rights of the Maubere people to self-determination. It called on the European Community to ensure that proper conditions are created to allow the East Timorese people to enjoy this right.

It urged EEC Member States to use all possible diplomatic channels to attain peace and law in East Timor and to demand that the Maubere people take part in negotiations concerning East Timor's future.

It asked Portugal to join in Community efforts to ensure that East Timor's independence is guaranteed, in line with the provisions of the Portuguese Republic.

Indonesia's illegal occupation

The early part of the resolution recalled that Indonesia has been in occupation of East Timor by force,

in defiance of international law, since December 1975. It recalled past UN resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, and of the Human Rights Committee and Minorities Subcommittee, acknowledging East Timor's right to self-determination and asking Indonesia to remove its troops from the territory.

It referred to the positions on East Timor taken by Indonesian and Portuguese bishops and to the statement of the Pope in July 1984, calling on Indonesia to respect human rights in East Timor. It recalled the Portuguese people's support for East Timor's inalienable right to self-determination in conformity with Portugal's Constitution [Article 297], which states that Portugal is "bound by its responsibility to promote and guarantee the right of East Timor to independence".

Unanimous resolution in Portuguese Parliament

On 17 July, while Indonesia was celebrating the tenth anniversary of its annexation of East Timor, the Portuguese Parliament unanimously passed a resolution denouncing Indonesian genocidal practices in East Timor. Re-affirming East Timor's right to self-determination, the resolution said the annexation and the subsequent fighting and famine "demonstrate Jakarta's disrespect of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, of the most basic norms of international relations and of recommendations and decisions taken by the UN, calling for a negotiated settlement".



A photo of Fretilin guerrillas taken in January this year

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EAST TIMOR territorial control

Reproduction of FALINTIL map
East Timor, 10 Jan. 1986



Map: Liem Soei Liong

Fretilin's map of Indonesian concentration camps

In the last Bulletin, we reproduced a map of East Timor combining information contained in two maps smuggled out by Fretilin, one from the Indonesian army showing guerrilla positions, and one by Fretilin showing Indonesian military positions. The second Fretilin map received at that time, which we reproduce opposite, gives details of Indonesia's territorial control. The map was drawn by Xanana Gusmao, commander-in-chief of the armed resistance movement, Falintil.

Autonomous units in the west

It shows that in the western sector, Indonesian control is virtually complete, except for the presence of three autonomous guerrilla units. These units do not fall under the Falintil structure but are under the direct command of Xanana. They consist mostly of Timorese who have defected from the Indonesian side in the past four years or so. Most received basic military training in the Indonesian army or police force during the early 1980s, when Indonesia tried out a policy of 'Timorisation' of the war. They served in one or other of the para-military forces used by the Indonesian high command, *Hansip*, *Wanra*, *Kamra* or *TBO*. [See Budiardjo and Liem, *The War against East Timor*, Zed Books, 1984 for an analysis of this policy.]

Details about these para-military forces is contained in an Indonesian military document smuggled out of East Timor in June this year. This 'Operational Instruction' issued in 1982 was captured by Fretilin on 28 August

1983. It describes the use the army was making at the time, of Timorese conscripts and provides the best insight yet of how these para-military units function.

Hansip [*Pertahanan Sipil* or Civil Defence] are used to protect and guard villages. Whereas in Indonesia, Hansips are generally nothing more than night-watchmen, in East Timor, Hansip troops are required to take part in military operations, in pursuit of guerrilla units.

Wanra [*Perlawanan Rakyat* or People's Resistance] are units directly under the command of the regional military command known as *Korem*.

Kamra [*Keamanan Rakyat* or People's Security] are units under the command of the police force.

TBO [*Tenaga Bantuan Operasi* or Auxiliary Operational Forces] are Timorese who accompany Indonesian troops while out on operations, with no operational function but to assist as bearers and carriers for the troops.

In late 1983, after the breakdown of the March-August 1983 ceasefire, a large number of Timorese conscripts in these units defected, taking their arms, and joined Fretilin in the bush. Many of these are now with the autonomous units operating in the western sector.

The triangle-shaped, shaded zone, running along the north coast several kilometres to the east of Dili, is under Indonesian control, with a limited presence of guerrilla forces.

Fretilin-controlled areas and the concentration camps

The area shown in white is virtually under Fretilin control, except for the roads (or tracks) and camps which are under Indonesian military control. Timorese villagers are concentrated in the camps numbered in Xanana's map from 1 - 77. They are known to the Timorese as 'concentration camps'. [For the names, see list.]

The larger black blobs indicate the location of a group of camps situated along the roads and in agricultural production sites; the smaller dots indicate camps that are situated far from the production sites.

The Portuguese term used by Xanana for the roads or tracks linking some of the camps is *linha* which is best translated as 'track' rather than road.

Fourth map sent out by Fretilin

The 77 camps shown in the present map are by no means the complete story. Yet another map which reached Lisbon last month gives far greater details of camp locations in certain regions. The map is very large (1.10 by 1.20 cms as compared with the previous maps which were only A4 size). It covers only the eastern tip of East Timor.

In its original form, as captured from the Indonesians on 20 December 1985, it was a map of the Topographical Department of the Indonesian army, presumably used for operational purposes, showing only geographical features. Before sending it out, Fretilin added a great amount of detail, showing for instance operations launched by the guerrillas since the breakdown of the ceasefire. Camp locations are also shown in great detail. There are, for instance, a number of camps in and around Lospalos.

We plan to reproduce sections of the map in forthcoming issues of the Bulletin.

Concentration camps

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Tutuala | 39. Liaruka camp/Bubuana |
| 2. Mehara/Porlamano | 40. Loilubo/Ostico track |
| 3. Pores/Assalaino track | 41. Bucoli/Ualakama |
| 4. Com | 42. Uai-ra camp |
| 5. Lautem | 43. Kairabela/Vemasse |
| 6. Raga - Lautem track | 44. Laleia |
| 7. Lospalos | 45. Cairui |
| 8. Muapitine | 46. Kaju laran Klalerek
Mutin Bikarin |
| 9. Ililapa | 47. Luca |
| 10. Maluro | 48. Bubur Lico |
| 11. Leuro | 49. Dilor |
| 12. Laleno | 50. Lacluta (vacant) |
| 13. Tutumboro | 51. Barike (only Indonesian
Army) |
| 14. Luro | 52. Kribas |
| 15. Iliomar | 53. Manatuto |
| 16. Laival | 54. Laelo |
| 17. Laga | 55. Bettau (Ilimanu) |
| 18. Saelari | 56. Maliana(?) |
| 19. Atelari | 57. Laclubar |
| 20. Baguia | 58. Soibada |
| 21. Uatu Karabau, old post | 59. Mane Hat |
| 22. Loi Ulo | 60. Natar Bora |
| 23. New post | 61. Fatu Berliu |
| 24. Kapuas Camp | 62. Alas |
| 25. Aliambata | 63. Betano track |
| 26. Uatulari | 64. Same |
| 27. Kelikai | 65. Maubisse |
| 28. Fatumaka/Seical track
from Fatumaka | 66. Ainaro |
| 29. Baucau | 67. Hudo |
| 30. Berecoli | 68. Mape |
| 31. Venilale | 69. Bobonaro |
| 32. camp, south of
the River Assalaitula | 70. Atsabe |
| 33. Nahareka & Uaibobo
camps | 71. Letefoho |
| 34. Ossu | 72. Maliana |
| 35. Track from Meabuti to
Lugasa | 73. Suai |
| 36. Beaco | 74. Ermera |
| 37. Viqueque | 75. Aileu |
| 38. Bua Nura | 76. Vicinity of Dili |
| | 77. Maulau |

Weapons pylon photo received from East Timor

A weapon shown in a photograph received this month from Fretilin has been identified for TAPOL by a disarmament expert as a weapons pylon, most likely carried on an A-4 Skyhawk or F-5E, both of them fighter-bombers supplied to Indonesia by the US. The photo provides concrete proof that these fighter-bomber aircraft were in action in East Timor in late 1985 or early January.

The photograph was on one of four reels smuggled out of East Timor by Fretilin, which reached Lisbon in June this year. The photographs were taken in January 1986.

Identification by Sussex University Disarmament Information Unit

The Armament and Disarmament Information Unit of the Science Policy Research Unit of the University of Sussex identified it as a weapons pylon from an aircraft, most likely a fixed-wing aircraft. The pylon "has six ejector release units (ERUs) which are the actual cradles for the weapons. There are three ERUs at each end of the pylon, allowing six bombs (or other weapons) to be carried". The pylon as photographed is lying face up, i.e. 'upside down' from the way it would normally be fixed to the aircraft, with three ERUs nearest the camera - one on either side of the pylon, and one on 'top'.

The ADIU expert believes the pylon is locally-built. Checking the load capacity of the OV-10, the A-4 and the F-5E, he excludes the OV-10 Bronco whose wing pylons can only carry 600 lbs and its under-fuselage pylon 1,200 lbs. It seems more likely to have come from an A-4 or F-5E plane. The latter has provision for a 'Multiple Ejector Rack' on the under-fuselage pylon, allowing it to carry up to nine 500lb bombs.

"It's not possible to say what kind of bombs might have been involved - could be anything from leaflets to napalm. One interesting point is that pylons are not normally jettisoned, suggesting the the photo is taken at the site of a crash - the bamboo and vegetation appear to be burnt."

A4-Skyhawks were supplied by Israel

The Skyhawks which carry this type of weapon were part of a US-arranged Israeli sale to Indonesia in 1979, when



18 of these aircraft were supplied specifically for use in East Timor. **The Age, Melbourne** [25 October 1983] revealed that Skyhawk missions over East Timor had dropped TAL-1 cluster bombs, made by the Israeli Armament Development Authority (Rafael) of Haifa. [See "Israel's mission in Asia", by David Patterson, in *Free Palestine, Australia*, No 40, May-June 1986]

INTERVIEW

Portuguese journalists interview Xanana

A group of Portuguese journalists submitted questions to Xanana Gusmao, Fretilin leader and commander of Fretilin's armed wing, Falintil. The answers were published in a number of Portuguese newspapers on 17 July. We reproduce below excerpts from this important interview. Other excerpts will be reproduced in our next issue.

Q: How do Falintil forces compare with Indonesian forces in terms of military strength?

In the field of combat, the Indonesians are in a superior position and outnumber us by ten or fifteen to one. Part of the occupying forces, including heavy artillery and the tank division - a contingent of around five to eight battalions - have secured certain sections of the roads, towns and camps. They also hold strategic points in the interior of our territory, from which they launch clean-up operations. Or they move out from these points to carry out reconnaissance operations, going from one region to another or actually conducting simultaneous operations throughout the country. Bronco aircraft also frequently go out on military operations.

Q: Does Indonesia control the entire territory?

No, never during the past decade of fighting have the Indonesians controlled the entire territory. Had that been the case, armed resistance would never have existed.

Q: Does Fretilin have liberated zones?

In a guerrilla war like ours, when one is dealing with such a small territory, we define liberated areas as the extensive areas we inhabit. To give you a general idea, for each cluster of camps within a town or for any camp outside a town, there is a demarcation area within which the inhabitants are permitted freedom of movement. This area includes a 500-700 metre wide strip running round the outer rim of the camps. Inside these areas, people are allowed to cultivate vegetable gardens.

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There is also a strip of land, approximately one kilometre wide, beyond the demarcation area, which serves as a transitional zone between the occupied territories and our territories. These transitional zones are patrolled daily by enemy troops, although military activities are not carried out there regularly once they leave. Thus, when you step outside these transitional zones, or even within these zones, you are on land that is controlled by Falintil.

Q: Where in particular?

It wouldn't be easy to describe all the liberated areas where we are active. To do so, we would have to set out, town by town, the disposition of the camps, the areas in remote regions and the towns and camps they might include, and so on. One would need to mark out a geographical area covering most of East Timor, an extensive and laborious task. I think we can't stand before you gentlemen and give you a clear idea of which land is under Indonesia's control and which is in guerrilla hands.

Nevertheless, we can confirm that 80 to 85 per cent of the eastern point sector is under Fretilin control, and the same is true in the central region. In the border region, the entire southern strip, between Betano/Same/Bobonaro, follows the same pattern of demarcation described above.

[Xanana then gives a detailed description of camps and areas under Indonesian or Fretilin control on a particular stretch of road in the eastern sector. Sadly, space does not permit us to reproduce this interesting account.]

Q What is the relationship between the guerrillas and the inhabitants of the zones where you are active?

The same blood runs in our veins. The same thoughts, desires and aspirations live in our souls. The same concerns, hopes and determinations beat in our hearts. The same sufferings, sacrifices and weaknesses rend our bodies. There you have it... I'm not only referring to the inhabitants of the zones with our military presence. I'm also talking about the people who live in the zones where only our political influence is felt.

Q: Do you think you can defeat the Indonesians militarily, or will East Timor's independence come as a result of profound political change in Indonesia?

Fretilin has no illusions about defeating Indonesia militarily, but the Indonesians have set themselves a difficult task, trying to obliterate the guerrilla movement. Yes, I think we should commit ourselves to provoking change in Jakarta. We know this isn't easy but I think we shouldn't exhaust our energies working for this end. I say this because Indonesia relies on the support of many countries that want to maintain good relations with Jakarta.

European governments could exert a positive influence in the solution of our problem if their policies corresponded with their principles, or, better still, with certain universal principles. We notice for example how the British Prime Minister zealously defends the right to self-determination of the small population of the Falklands/Malvinas islands. But we can be sure she will not show the least concern for the East Timorese.

Closer to home, the Australians who seem so concerned over the continued presence of the French in New Caledonia, tell us we should consider ourselves lucky to call ourselves Indonesians. When referring to Kampuchea or Afghanistan, they speak of outside aggressors, invading forces and so on, but on East Timor, they go so far as to speak about the "Indonesian liberation forces". Not long ago, Mochtar confirmed that Indonesian generals have ambitions for East Timor and asserted that the West "has started to see East Timor in the light of certain realities," namely closer economic ties with Jakarta.

Q: Lately, people who have visited East Timor from the International Red Cross have said the situation in East Timor has improved and that one can detect signs of progress and growth. What do you think of these reports?

Statements like this get us nowhere, absolutely nowhere. We don't randomly condemn everything in sight out of principle. Our perspective is tempered by our principles, our values. Without a set of principles to serve as your beacon, you deny the political nature, the moral and ethical value of the sanctions needed against South Africa. Without principles to guide us, no-one would cheer the return to democracy in countries once under dictatorial rule. We are certain that Pretoria would encourage "progress and growth" - perhaps on an even grander scale - in Namibia. Does this therefore



Fretilin's commander-in-chief, Xanana Gusmao, at work with his radio transmitter. (From the set of Fretilin photos taken in January this year).

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supercede the Namibian people's right to independence? Today, the situation in Chile and the Philippines makes many people apprehensive. Does the question of rights only arise when the (economic) situation deteriorates?

In effect, reports of progress and growth lend weight to the line favoured by Indonesia. Numerous red herrings, including political ones, serve this purpose. Their aim is to distract world public opinion so that outsiders forget Indonesia's military occupation of our homeland and the criminal repression of our people.

We think these statements were made by people whose opinions were jaundiced, once the Indonesians could manipulate them. Furthermore, we see these allegations as a grave insult to our people who, across the land, are dying of hunger and disease because much-needed aid has not reached them.

We certainly do not want to disparage the valiant work of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which has alleviated the sufferings of our people during the most critical periods of our struggle to survive. However, one must not overlook the truth.

At this moment, in many parts of the interior of our country, namely in the east, and in the southern part of the central region, the people, plagued by hunger and rickets, hope that people from the ICRC will distribute food. Victims of grave illnesses would like the ICRC to administer more effective and intensive treatment (than they now get).

We understand that the policy of the ICRC is to provide humanitarian assistance to the wounded and mutilated during a state of war, without restriction. The only exception is treatment of guerrillas (although up till now, we have never requested their assistance). We would now like to ask the ICRC to persuade the Indonesian government to permit it to treat injured guerrillas and captives [prisoners of war], in order to prevent the occupying forces from amputating [the limbs of] victims, solely for the purpose of disabling them. I should add that we express our reservations as to the authenticity of these charges.

Q: Are the people who inhabit East Timor mostly of Maubere descent or has there been a transmigration

project carried out by the Indonesian government?

People say Dili has been Javanised and you can see convoys of Indonesians arriving in East Timor. However, the armed uprising of August 1983 had a negative effect on transmigration projects in certain agricultural regions such as Lospalos, Natar Bora and Ue Berak.

These projects only benefit the Indonesians, while recently, Jakarta had to re-launch its plan to obliterate the Maubere people. The town of Barike, for instance, has been at the centre of military operations since the second half of 1984. One can presume that this will be to prepare it to meet the security and accommodation needs for longterm settlement of Indonesians.

Q: How do you regard Portugal's policy towards East Timor, as defended by the President at the UN? And how do you view the negotiations taking place between Portugal and Indonesia under the Secretary-General's auspices?

Extremely positively, insofar as it reaffirms the policy line of Portugal with regard to East Timor. Bearing in mind the prolonged suffering of our people, we can only hope the next president [Dr Mario Soares] maintains this position, so that concrete gains can be made.

I would like to appeal to the Portuguese Parliament and the present government in Lisbon to take up the defence of the East Timorese who, for four centuries, were subjugated by the Portuguese. I appeal to Dr Cavaco Silva to promote the just cause of East Timor, making up for the ten years in which there was a blatant lack of political initiative regarding East Timor.

As for the talks now in progress between Portugal and Indonesia, I should first express our apprehension. While the subject matter is dear to our lives, our very existence, our interests and our people's heritage, we have not been called to speak. The very fact that we have been excluded is in contradiction of the principles of the UN Charter, as is the fact that they are holding talks on secondary questions, ignoring the fundamental issues these discussions should raise. These are the principles of the inviolability of frontiers, the right to self-determination, the principle which calls for referendums in certain cases.

It is obvious that these fundamental issues are being ignored. The repatriation of former officials immediately reveals such inconsistencies....

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International Red Cross misused

Misuse by Indonesia of abridged versions of confidential reports compiled by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has helped Indonesia convince members of the UN Human Rights Commission to remove East Timor from its agenda. Such reports have given a one-sided picture to UN agencies of the reality in East Timor. Meanwhile, the ICRC has ignored appeals by various NGOs in Geneva to publish rectifications of such deceptions, but instead, has given confidential information (about East Timor) in talks with western diplomats.

This revelation is contained in an article in the Dutch daily, Trouw [19 June 1986], quoting at length Adrien-Claude Zoller, the permanent representative of Pax Christi in Geneva.

It is a golden rule of the ICRC to preserve political neutrality. Its reports "never speak out about the political situation in a particular country. According to the same golden rule, governments are not supposed to publicise anything from ICRC reports unless they publish the reports in their entirety. If a government fails to comply with this rule, the ICRC should publish a rectification which, in diplomatic circles, is regarded as a serious disgrace".

Moreover, human rights NGOs attending the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva "have expressed grave

disquiet at the appearance of abridged reports about ICRC activities in East Timor in the official ICRC bulletin". Such one-sided accounts have been circulated by the Indonesian delegation, in order to influence the outcome of Commission deliberations on East Timor. In fact, it was such a deceptive use of ICRC information that made it possible for Indonesia to convince members of the Human Rights Commission to delete East Timor from its agenda last year.

Zoller told the newspaper there are two possible interpretations of the ICRC's indefensible behaviour. The first is that the agency is afraid to raise its voice against a cruel occupying power. The second is far more sinister, namely that the Red Cross has made a deal with Indonesia, "namely that publication of information in ICRC bulletins is the condition for the ICRC being allowed to remain in East Timor. But as yet, we are not in possession of documents to prove this."

Trouw reports that ICRC bulletin reports have mentioned ICRC visits undertaken, but omit to say anything about restrictions imposed on its activities in East Timor. It has only been allowed to visit 150 political prisoners, and only visits one of the many places of detention. Such reports create the impression that the Red Cross can

Continued on next page

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operate freely in East Timor and that its reports give a true account of the situation as a whole.

Limited role of the ICRC

Continuing the investigation of the ICRC's role in East Timor, Robin Osborne [PNG Times, 27 July] reveals that, although the agency's Charter requires it to oversee areas where armed conflict is occurring, it does not and cannot do this in East Timor. "It is denied a permanent presence on the mainland". The agency's sole staffer is a nurse based on Atauro island, while according to an ICRC booklet published recently, its staff travel in Timor "amounted to an average 10 hours a month in a chartered helicopter and minimal road travel... Its work is dependent on the Indonesian government, often the military. Being Indonesian, its ground staff are unlikely to criticise officialdom."

It is the ICRC's refusal to complain about these arrangements that has angered its critics, writes Osborne.

Australian Labour Party turns its back on East Timor

The July 1986 Conference of the Australian Labour Party turned down a resolution upholding East Timor's right to self-determination and instead, adopted one accepting the "reality" of East Timor's "incorporation" by Indonesia. This stand renders meaningless its "regrets" that "an appropriate, internationally-supervised act of self-determination has not occurred".

Mimi Ferreira, representing East Timorese refugees at the conference, criticised the policy, saying that Australia's interest in exploiting oil deposits in the waters between Australia and East Timor was responsible. Liberal Party MP, Michael Hodgman, described the ALP resolution as "morally and legally indefensible".

Jakarta 'celebrates' annexation



This photograph from *The Jakarta Post*, captioned "Warm Welcome", is of East Timorese "welcoming dignitaries from Jakarta" on 17 July. There isn't a smiling face in sight.

On 17 July, the Indonesian government celebrated the tenth anniversary of its brutal annexation of East Timor, which they prefer to call 'integrasi'. Although in the months before, Jakarta appeared to be preparing for a big event, it turned out to be very low-profile, with no foreign journalists invited.

As in 1976, when the 'bill of integration' was signed and very few foreign representatives bothered to attend, so ten years later, only six foreign ambassadors turned up, from Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, Morocco, Iran and Singapore. President Suharto also stayed away, sending instead three ministers, Acting Home Affairs Minister General Sudharmono, Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja and Information Minister Hartmoko. The other conspicuous absentee was General Murdani, Armed Forces commander-in-chief, who no doubt stayed away so as not to attract attention to the continuing high-level military focus on Indonesia's "27th province".

'Special status' criticised

Some Timorese like Governor Carrascalao and 'regional assembly' Golkar member Clementino da Reis Amaral, who

serve Jakarta in the local administration, used the tenth anniversary to complain about East Timor still being treated as a 'special region'. Carrascalao [Kompas, 17 July] mainly lamented the fact that this status led to 'dualism', undermining his authority and powers as governor. What this means in fact is that power rests with the military command because the conduct of the war is the primary consideration.

Amaral [Kompas, 18 July] couched his complaints in some pretty frank criticism of Jakarta's much vaunted 'development' efforts. The vast investment funds were a source of corruption. A sports hall in Baucau collapsed before the official opening, while the municipal building in Dili was a shambles because of the poor quality of materials used. The water-supply system in Liquisa was a disaster; pipes were strewn all over the place after completion, while the population gained nothing from this costly project.

Whatever the Timorese may feel about the drawbacks of 'special status', Mochtar made it clear that this would remain for the foreseeable future [Sinar Harapan, 18 July]

IGGI bolsters a declining economy

IGGI 1986 commitments

The breakdown of IGGI's 1986 commitment totalling \$2.519 million is as follows:

Bilateral commitments

For purposes of comparison, the amounts that were committed by IGGI member states in 1985 are given in brackets:

Australia	\$ 32.49m (30.56m)
Austria	\$ 6.41m
Belgium	\$ 7.65m (4.75m)
Canada	\$ 38.84m (29.30m)
Italy	\$ 30.00m (30.00m)
Japan	\$473.57m (303.26m)
Netherlands	\$ 70.96m (48.18m)
New Zealand	\$ 2.01m (1.58m)
Spain	\$ 12.00m
Switzerland	\$ 8.30m (5.49m)
UK	\$ 67.64m (19.28m)
US	\$ 86.00m (100.00m)

France and Germany delayed making commitments. Austria and Spain joined IGGI this year, and made their first commitments. Finland attended the meeting as an observer, and committed 12m marks. The UK's commitment has increased threefold, more

than any other country. In sterling, it amounts to £45 million, of which £5 million is to be given in the form of a grant and the rest in the form of soft loans to fund projects. The terms of these loans were agreed a month after the IGGI meeting: 3 per cent interest, repayment over 25 years with a 7-year grace period. The UK is committed to providing £130 million in soft loans, making Indonesia the second largest recipient of UK soft loans after China [*Financial Times*, 18 July].

Multilateral agencies

World Bank	\$1.100 billion (1.2b)
Asian Development Bank	\$ 500 million (550m)
UN Dev'tment Programme	\$ 27 million (36.4m)
International Fund for Agricultural Dev'tment	\$ 10 million (12m)
Unicef	\$ 13.4 million (15m)
World Food Programme	\$ 3.5 million
EEC	\$ 14.2 million (20m)
UNFPA	\$ 2.8 million

Thus, the burden of providing credit to Indonesia has shifted away from the multilateral agencies. All member states, with the exception of the USA, increased their commitments this year.

At a time of deepening economic crisis for the Indonesian economy, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), meeting in The Hague in June this year, agreed to provide Indonesia with economic assistance amounting to \$2,519 million. This represents an increase of more than \$100 million over IGGI assistance last year, and exceeds the amount Indonesia was reported to have requested, as recommended by the World Bank.

Not only was the overall amount increased, but member states agreed to provide a certain part of the assistance in grants or soft loans. The proportion of grants is not known except in the case of the UK [See box].

Debt burden tops \$37 billion

Indonesia's total foreign debt, not included in the IGGI's 1986 commitments, is now known to amount to \$37.4 billion, of which \$28.3 is official (ie. government) debt, \$3.8 billion is private debt and another \$5.3 billion is short-term debt. It is now calculated that the burden of official debt repayment (payment of debts falling due plus interest) will this year amount to 28.1 per cent of estimated foreign exchange earnings (this is the so-called debt-service ratio) as compared with 19.7 per cent in 1985. If the non-official debts are included, the debt-service ratio stands at 32.7 per cent [*World Bank Report on Indonesia, 1986*, as quoted in the Indonesian and international media]

The sharp increase in this burden is due on the one hand to the inexorable increase in Indonesia's debt, added to which is the sharp decline in earnings from oil exports as a result of the severe price fall since the beginning of 1986.

IGGI commitments went up this year despite the widely acknowledged fact that sizable amounts of foreign economic assistance committed up to 1985 remain unused. Estimates of unused credits range from \$3 billion to over \$9 billion.

Why should western countries still want to put funds into the Indonesian economy when it is proving incapable of absorbing funds already committed? Why are foreign funds being provided even though, according to so many circles in Indonesia, a major reason for the sluggishness of fund absorption is the shortage not of foreign currency (Indonesia's foreign reserves, in any case, stand at \$10 billion) but of rupiah financing?

Part of the answer lies in the need of financial institutions in the West to keep lending funds to so-called credit-worthy and politically reliable countries. Banks cannot survive without lending money to earn interest, which is their primary source of income. So many other third world countries are on the brink of bankruptcy that Indonesia still represents a haven for financiers in the West looking for countries willing to fall ever deeper into debt.


Harsh words from the World Bank

This is not to say that the World Bank, which oversees the Indonesian economy on behalf of the western powers, is generally satisfied with the current state of the Indonesian economy. Using the most optimistic figures for oil prices and state revenues during 1986, the Bank forecast that the level of economic growth would stagnate at just over 1 per cent. Several western embassies in Jakarta made a far more pessimistic calculation which was "leaked" to the Indonesian press shortly before the IGGI meeting took place. They estimated that there would be a decline of 3 per cent in the level of economic activity.

These bleak predictions helped fuel pressure for more drastic measures to attract foreign investors and give incentives to exporters of non-oil products. The Bank Report clearly reflected the dissatisfaction of foreign investors who have shown considerable reluctance in the last few years to invest in Indonesia. The annual level of foreign investment is now well below \$1 billion.

Primarily, investors balk at the corruption and the special levies required at every turn, all of which has earned Indonesia the reputation of having a "high-cost (the current euphemism for corruption-ridden) economy" Nor do foreign investors like the restrictions placed on their freedom to do business. Over the past decade or so, the Suharto government has introduced many barriers, limiting the scope for foreign investors and requiring a percentage of domestic participation in foreign ventures. These protectionist moves have served primarily to benefit corporations closely connected with the Suharto family, as well as helping groups close to the military to secure shares in foreign companies.

The severe decline in earnings from oil exports has made it imperative for Indonesia to promote non-oil exports. This the government has been trying to do for several years already, but to little effect. Oil still accounts for about 70 per cent of Indonesia's foreign earnings. The deepening crisis has now given the World Bank the chance to insist that the whole structure of economic regulation should shift from promoting import-substitution industries, which is where Suharto's business associates have accumulated their wealth, to promoting non-oil exports, an area where foreign capital is well represented.



West Papuan, Indonesian, Dutch and British demonstrators talking to Mrs Schoo, outside the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague, during the IGGI meeting in June. [Photo: Loth Sarakan]

These were the pressures that compelled Indonesia to introduce a package of 19 measures on 6 May, known as "Pakem" (*Paket Enam Mei*), giving export companies a number of incentives. For example, they may now import raw materials and capital goods that they were previously required to purchase from domestic suppliers at much higher prices. This privilege will also apply to projects funded with foreign economic assistance. The restrictions placed on foreign companies regarding domestic participation and the number of years they are permitted to operate, have also been greatly relaxed. In addition, as the result of a decision issued in early June, the sectors of economic activity open to foreign companies have been drastically increased from 475 during 1985/86 to 926 in the current year.

This year's **World Bank Report on Indonesia** was delayed until the Pakem regulations had been introduced. It was thus able to welcome the regulations, while expressing the hope that this was only the beginning. At the IGGI meeting, there was considerable controversy over how much more Indonesia would be expected to do to meet the needs of foreign investors. According to **Kompas** [20 June], the US delegation was particularly adamant on the need for more drastic action, while Indonesia's Minister-Coordinator for Economic Affairs, Ali Wardhana expressed fears that this could have severe consequences for the economy, warning even that it could lead to "social unrest".

According to **Kompas**, the only countries that came to his defence were Australia and the Netherlands. It would

be hard to prove that Washington's 20 per cent reduction in its aid commitment this year [see box] is a sign of US disapproval at Jakarta's apparent unwillingness to move further, but that may well be the case.

New regulations not certain to succeed

In Indonesia, there has been little enthusiasm over the Pakem regulations. On the one hand, domestic producers who have enjoyed protection from foreign competition, now see their role as suppliers to the export sector severely curtailed; they will be exposed to the winds of competition with no chance to prepare themselves. Discontent has been particularly rife among members of the association of industrialists, Kadin, who complain that the government went ahead with measures affecting their interests without consulting with them.

At the same time, there is no great confidence that the new regulations will work in practice. Many of the new incentives will have to be administered by bureaucrats, giving scope for deals and bribes. For example, to be eligible, companies will need to prove that at least 85

per cent of their business is for export.

It is worth noting, in passing, that the drastic action taken last year, shortly before the IGGI meeting, to "clean up" customs and excise control, has proven less than satisfactory. The government took control out of the hands of the Customs and Excise Directorate, and appointed a Swiss company, the SGS [*Societe Generale de Surveillance*] to supervise exports and imports. Suharto was highly commended at the time for "boldly" disregarding the interests of many hangers-on.

But it is now publicly admitted that smuggling still plagues foreign trade, apparently with the connivance of SGS officials. In desperation, KOPKAMTIB chief, General Benny Murdani, announced that the Anti-Subversion Law would be used against people who violate the terms of Suharto's Inpres No 4/1985, proclaimed at the time as the definitive measure to end smuggling [**Kompas**, 3 June].

Suharto family interests at the heart of the matter

But World Bank, and hence Washington's, disquiet about the Indonesian economy goes farther than being worried about the level of exports and foreign investment. According to the **Far Eastern Economic Review** (26 June) whose Paul Handley, expelled from Jakarta two months ago, now writes articles on the Indonesian economy from Kuala Lumpur, the central issue is "restrictive licencing and other valuable concessions which favour certain

Continued on next page

individuals but disadvantage the economy as a whole." The World Bank Report specifically mentions exclusive import and purchasing licences for certain petrochemicals and steels which are "costing the economy dearly". Handley goes on: "Not mentioned is that these licences have been granted to the relatives and friends of the highest government officials [read: Suharto], a practice underlying most of the protectionist practices."

This brings us to the contradiction between the corporate power of companies aligned to the Suharto family (which were so ferociously attacked in the article by David Jenkins, published in the *Sydney Morning Herald* on 10 April) and foreign, particularly US-based, economic interests. It is an open secret in Jakarta that the new US ambassador, Paul Wolfowitz, is now actively snooping around for "third force" elements, groups apparently more amenable to US interests. No-one appears to be more irate about such goings-on than General Benny Murdani, which may help explain why Wolfowitz was so spectacularly unsuccessful over his attempts to secure entry for two

Australian journalists attached to the White House press corps at the time of Reagan's visit to Bali in May [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 75, May 1986].

Dissident circles in Jakarta even refer to Murdani as a "latter-day Sukarnoist", representing the strong anti-Americanism and nationalism that prompted Sukarno (albeit for very different reasons) to point to the US ambassador on one memorable occasion and proclaim, "To hell with your aid!".

It is interesting to speculate on the extent to which the current economic crisis may be helping bring to a head the simmering contradiction between Suharto-backed corporations and the bureaucrats with the power to dispense the favours on which they thrive, on the one hand, and foreign investors who see this corporate control as a major obstacle to their own exploitation of Indonesia's natural resources and cheap labour power.

[The second part of this article, dealing with the impact of the economic crisis on domestic economic interests, will appear in the next issue.]

ARMS SALES

Battle of the giants



President Suharto arriving at the International Air Show in Jakarta. He visited the Show no less than three times. [*Tempo*, 28 June 1986]

The leading western manufacturers of fighter aircraft are vying with each other to win a big order from Indonesia. Until recently, it appeared that the matter was already decided. Some time ago, the armed forces placed an order for F-16s from the US company, General Dynamics and it was recently announced that the Reagan Administration is ready to approve the sale. General Murdani, armed forces commander-in-chief, has made no secret of his strong preference for this aircraft.

However, it is now clear that the decision is not in Murdani's hands. It is very much a matter for B.J. Habibie, President-Director of Indonesia's burgeoning aircraft company, *Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara* (IPTN). Habibie does not conceal his preference for other options.

Two Europe-based manufacturers are trying to undercut the US company. One is the French company, Dassault-Breguet, which manufactures the Mirage-2000; the other is Panavia, a joint British, German and Italian company, which manufactures the Tornado. British Aerospace and

Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB) each hold a 42.5 per cent interest in Panavia, with Aeritalia holding the remaining 15 per cent.

Economic crisis helps Habibie

The order, probably initially for eight or twelve aircraft, is likely to be worth well over \$350 million, an enormous drain on the Indonesian economy, now reeling from the effects of the oil price collapse and a huge foreign debt. (See separate item.) But it is the economic crisis that gives Habibie his advantage over Murdani, because it makes the terms of the deal far more crucial even than the price of the aircraft purchased. In Habibie's scheme, these orders must be used to promote the manufacturing capability of IPTN. This can be achieved by the 'offset' system which means that part of the costs would be offset by orders to IPTN for spare-parts or accessories. He would like to get at least 50 per cent 'offset'; recent reports suggest that Dassault

is offering far more than that.

A second alternative is an agreement with the manufacturer to allow IPTN to produce the aircraft under licence, the method Habibie has used hitherto with Spanish and French aircraft companies. Indeed, this is the secret of his success so far. Panavia appears to be the most forthcoming in offering this type of scheme. If used, it would mean IPTN producing Tornados not only for Indonesia's requirements but for other countries as well. Thus, although the Tornado was the last to enter the race, it may well win the contract. Nor should we forget Habibie's special relationship with MBB where he worked for many years, rising to the position of a director. He is still on their pay-roll as a senior consultant.

But Dassault has not stopped at offering 'offset'. The company has offered to help IPTN design and build its own advanced-technology aircraft. "We would act as engineering and technical consultant or even a mere sub-contractor," said one executive. "Better to co-operate with Indonesia and win over 30 per cent of workload than lose everything in this area" [*Flight International*, 5 July 1986].

To press their point, Dassault displayed the largest number of aircraft of any exhibitor at the International Air Show held in Jakarta in July this year. It is no coincidence either that President Mitterand is due to visit Indonesia in September this year.

Not to be outdone, General Dynamics have also announced that it can offer 'offset' [*Kompas*, 9 July].

International Air Show

To mark the tenth anniversary of IPTN's establishment and to confirm the company's position as a major arms manufacturer in the third world, Habibie staged Indonesia's first International Air Show in July. Altogether 19 countries took part. France was well ahead with 46 companies participating. The other leading participants were the USA (31 companies), West Germany (28), the UK (25) and Netherlands (17). Other countries included Singapore, Australia, Spain, Greece, Pakistan and Japan. The Soviet Union was to have participated, but withdrew at the last minute [*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 July 1986].



B.J. HABIBIE dan CN 235

Habibie and his 'Tetuko' baby. The name, taken from Javanese mythology, was chosen by Suharto.

Habibie's prime exhibit was the CN-235 aircraft for 40 to 44 passengers, suitable for civil and military purposes. During the Air Show, he signed contracts with the domestic airline Merpati National Airlines for 15 aircraft and with the Armed Forces for six CN-235 of the anti-submarine version. By contrast with earlier aircraft produced by IPTN under licence from CASA, the Spanish aerospace company, the CN-235 is the product of a joint venture with CASA. Habibie claims that 180 planes are already on order or under consideration in Indonesia and abroad.

ARMS SALES

Habibie's high-tech dream

The Air Show received enormous publicity in Indonesia as a great national event. Around two million people are reported to have visited the Show in less than a week, attracted primarily by the aerobatic shows put on, among others by a team of Royal Air Force pilots known as The Red Arrows, flying Hawk fighter-planes.

It was an event that served as a distraction from the gloomy economic news otherwise filling the newspapers. For a few days, the impression was created that somehow, the leap into advanced technology would resolve the country's problems.

Habibie indeed claims that high-tech industry, with arms manufacture at its core, can and must take over as Indonesia's major foreign exchange earner. He warned in an interview with *Tempo* [28 June 1986] that efforts to make up for the declining oil price by promoting traditional non-oil exports are unlikely to succeed. Nor can oil be relied upon in the long term to finance Indonesia's needs. "Don't be surprised if, in the next century, by 2006 or 2016, advanced technology industry will account for 60 to 70 per cent of Indonesia's foreign exchange earnings."

He claims that IPTN is already technically capable of manufacturing combat aircraft, though he says the decision depends on the size of local and regional markets. The company will go ahead if demand is more than 10 squadrons. If it is only five squadrons or less, "We will probably look for licensing from advanced aircraft manufacturers" [*Jakarta Post*, 23 June].

The changing structure of arms deals

The style of Habibie's management and the current economic crisis mean that, increasingly, arms producers in the west find that the best way of doing business with Indonesia is by licensing, 'offset' or joint venture deals with IPTN or the other branches of Habibie's empire (see "Indonesia's Military-Industrial Complex" in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 73, January 1986). Such arms deals are as instrumental as any other in supporting the regime of repression and colonial aggression that has its seat in Jakarta. No less than 'straight' arms deals, these should be the object of campaigning as they are an integral part of the policies of western powers in support of the Suharto regime.



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New arms deals with the UK

The following updates the current position of the arms trade between the UK and Indonesia:

* **Weston Simfire**, in a joint venture with the Indonesian company Linlibi, has won an order for its Simgun tactical small arms simulator. Simgun is to be used with the FNC Herstal (Belgian) and M16 (US) rifles, currently used by the Indonesian army [*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 8 March 1986].

* A Royal Navy survey ship, *Hydra*, was sold to Indonesia in April, the fourth of the second-hand naval vessels supplied by Britain. Like the earlier, three 'Tribal' class frigates, the *Hydra* is being refitted by Vosper Thornycroft [*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 26 April 1986].

* Negotiations for the sale of Scorpion light tanks, manufactured by Alvis, a subsidiary of United Scientific Holdings, are still under way [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 73, January 1986]. The contract which is believed to be worth about £250 million, may include giving Indonesia the job of building the basic steel fabrication while the high-tech components would be shipped from the UK [*The Times*, 12 April 1986].

* Marconi Command and Control Systems announced at the British Army Equipment Exhibition 1986 that it is pushing for the sale of its Digital Fire Control System in Indonesia. Trials are due to take place in Indonesia

later this year, following trials in Thailand and Singapore [*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 28 June].

* IPTN signed an agreement during the Air Show with Rolls Royce for authorisation to repair and overhaul Rolls aircraft engines manufactured by the British company [*Jakarta Post*, 27 June]. A similar agreement was signed with Allison Gas Turbine of the US. This is considered to be the first step towards facilitating the manufacture of aero-engine components in Indonesia.

Suharto's private aircraft supplied by British Aerospace

British Aerospace is about to deliver a four-engine 146-200 type aircraft for President Suharto's personal use [*Sinar Harapan*, 1 July].

Such a deal certainly boosts the company's chances of further deals with Indonesia. In addition to the 16 Hawk fighter planes already supplied, British Aerospace hopes to supply more of this aircraft. "We consider (Indonesia) to be one of our most important places for supplying the aircraft," said a company spokesperson [*Jane's Defence Weekly*, 5 July].



The former HMS Tartar, a warship of the frigate Type 81/Tribal class which saw service during the Falklands War, photographed on arrival at Tanjung Priok harbour, Jakarta [*Jakarta Post*, 12 July 1986]. This is the third of three frigates supplied to Indonesia by the UK, and has been renamed the KRI Hasanuddin. The refurbished HMS Tartar is equipped with anti-submarine and anti-aircraft missiles. It will be based in Tanjung Perak, and will operate in the waters of the eastern part of the archipelago.

Five more books banned

Two Pramoedya books banned

More details have emerged about the Attorney-General's banning of two books by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, *Jejak Langkah* [Footsteps] and *Sang Pemula* [The Originator], reported briefly in TAPOL Bulletin No 75, May 1986. The Attorney-General's Decision of 1 May 1986 describes them as "historical novels" (*Sang Pemula* is in fact a biography) which "are based on social contradictions and the class struggle, guided by 'socialist realism', that is to say, the kind of literature promoted by the communists". The Decision is based on the 1966 Edict banning the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and Marxism, as well as the Interior Minister's 1981 Instruction regarding surveillance of former PKI political prisoners.

In a statement on 15 May, the publishers, Hasta Mitra, said that in October last year, the Attorney-General's Office asked them by letter not to distribute the two books until clearance had been given. Hasta Mitra refused to comply because "book publications... are not subject to pre-censorship but to censorship after publication." The Attorney-General's request "is tantamount to pre-censorship and therefore conflicts with the existing publishing regulations".

The ban was based on assessments by top military agencies, the Governor of the National Defence Institute, the Written Works Assessment Team of the army's security command, Kopkamtib, and the Territorial Assistant of

Kopkamtib. [Keputusan Jaksa Agung, Kep036/JA/5/1986, 1 May 1986.]

Hasta Mitra condemned the Attorney-General's "biased and unfair attitude" towards Pramoedya, and said that decisions involving a writer "should be made only on the basis of his works as a writer and should not be prejudiced by his background as someone who was once a political detainee."

First editions sold out

Tempo (31 May) reports that although neither of the books was reviewed in the Indonesian press nor advertised until early May, the first editions of 10,000 were sold out and second editions were ready for sale. The publishers were not notified of the ban till 14 May.

Both books have also been published in their original Indonesian by a Malaysian publisher, Wira Karya, working in collaboration with Hasta Mitra. Tempo also reports that Hasta Mitra is in the process of preparing two more books by Pramoedya for publication, *Gadis Pantai* (Girl of the Coast) and *Rumah Kaca* (Glasshouse).

Pramoedya told Tempo that regardless of the ban, he will continue to write. He is preparing a dictionary of Indonesian geography with an estimated 80,000 entries, of which some 10 per cent are now ready. He is also collecting documents for a book on the polemic during the 1930s about 'co-operation' and 'non-cooperation' with the Dutch colonial regime.

GUEST COLUMN

The 'missing link' emerges again

In a recent interview with the Dutch journalist, Rene de Bok [Elsevier's Magazine, 14 June], retired General Abdul Haris Nasution said: "All human rights are guaranteed in the Constitution but you are not allowed to exercise them. Free assembly, press freedom, they have no meaning at all. They are worth nothing more than the paper on which they are printed."

On 7 June, Tempo reported a fresh case of censorship, but not directed this time against the work of an expat, such as Pramoedya Ananta Toer whose books, banned in May, are likely to become classics of Indonesian literature and historiography. The new ban concerns the Indonesian translation of an outstanding academic work on Indonesian politics, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* by Harold Crouch [Cornell University Press, 1978].

At the time of the Tempo report, the book had not yet been officially banned. However, the publishers, PT Pustaka Sinar Harapan, had already received an oral warning by Bakin, the central intelligence agency, that the book should be withdrawn from circulation. So on 30 and 31 May, advertisements appeared in Sinar Harapan, the Protestant daily, requesting bookshops to stop selling the book and return the remaining copies to the publishers.

When asked by Tempo whether the book was actually banned, the Attorney-General's office replied: "It certainly will be banned." Though the authorities claim there is no pre-censorship in Indonesia, an oral warning by phone from Bakin turns out to have been enough to



intimidate the publishers into withdrawing the book. Pramoedya's publishers had also received a 'request' not to circulate his books six months before getting a formal decision. General Nasution is right. The constitutionally guaranteed right to publish is pure whitewash.

Why was Crouch's book banned?

Unlike the books of Pram where the basic reason is not the contents but the author, the Crouch book has been proscribed because of its contents, or more precisely, the contents of a few pages. From *Tempo*, we learn that a member of parliament named Rusli Desa drew Bakin's attention to some paragraphs which might "endanger the security of the state". Asked which passages he had in mind, he said: "There are things discussed that could cause people to lose confidence in President Suharto."

What worried him in particular was a section under the sub-title 'General Suharto' where the author discusses the suspicion that Suharto might have been implicated in the 30 September 1965 Movement. Rusli admitted that Crouch called the suggestion rather "speculative". Yet even a serious attempt to treat the issue is evidently seen by the authorities as a menace to state security.

If we take a look at the paragraphs in question [pages 123-125 of the English edition], everything becomes clear. In scholarly and cautious fashion, Crouch discusses an article of mine published in 1970, "Suharto and the Untung Coup - The Missing Link" [*Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 1]. where I drew attention to two striking facts: that Suharto was not on the list of generals who were kidnapped on 30 September, and that the headquarters of KOSTRAD [the Army Strategic Command] which was under Suharto's command, were not occupied or surrounded by the troops of the plotters although they were located on the same Merdeka Square as the president's palace, the telecommunications building and the radio station. All these were occupied or surrounded.

However, the strongest indication of Suharto's implication in the coup - in my argument, the 'missing link' - was Suharto's confession in an interview with an American journalist that he had met Colonel Latief, one of the chief plotters, in the Jakarta military hospital just a few hours before the nocturnal kidnapping operation was launched.

In a footnote on page 125, Crouch points out that, after the publication of my 'missing link' article, Suharto started to distort his story about what happened on the night of 30 September-1 October, 1965. He then told foreign diplomats that his name had been on the list of generals to be abducted but the plotters were not sure of his whereabouts. This is not true, since Latief had met him late that evening in the hospital. After the meeting, Suharto had gone straight home. Moreover, in the first edition of Roeder's biography of Suharto published in 1969, it was clearly stated that Suharto was not on the list.

By outlawing Crouch's book, the Indonesian authorities have shown just how afraid they are of any doubts being expressed in history books about Suharto's integrity, a fear that lies at the root of all the recent fury in Jakarta over the Australian newspaper article detailing corruption by the Suharto family. As it is, Crouch regarded my suggestion about Suharto's involvement in the plot as 'speculative'. Maybe he would have considered it less so had he been aware, before his book appeared, of what emerged during the trial of Colonel Latief, held in the year his book was published.

In his testimony, Latief said that when he visited Suharto at the military hospital where the general's son was being treated for serious scalds, he told Suharto of their plans for that night. The new evidence proving that Suharto at least had foreknowledge of the conspiracy was analysed in another article of mine, "Whose Plot? New Light on the 1965 Events" [*Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 9, 1979].

Ban number four

This has now been revealed in a Dutch book entitled *Indonesie: De Waarheid omtrent 1965 - Suharto staat terecht* [Indonesia: The Truth about 1965, Suharto on Trial]. A copy of this book was presented to the

chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Dutch Parliament in November last year.

Along with my article, the book contains the Dutch translation of Peter Dale Scott's article, "The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967", the original of which appeared in *Pacific Affairs* [Vol. 58, Summer 1985]. Written by a former Canadian diplomat, this article provides fresh evidence, mostly taken from recently declassified documents on US foreign policy, about American involvement in the preparations of the military takeover in Indonesia in 1965. Dale Scott's article corroborates the suspicions that the 1 October

Muslim book banned

The Muslim book caught up in the book-banning frenzy is *Membangun Struktur Masyarakat Islam Indonesia* (Building the Structure of an Indonesian Islamic Society) by M.S. Sahari, published by the Jakarta Institute for Islamic Studies. The book is deemed capable of "fanning the emotions of the reader to feel animosity towards the government" and "inciting them simultaneously to wage revolution for the creation of a new society based on Islamic values in Indonesia".

Anyone failing to comply with the Attorney-General's ban on possession, circulation or sale of the book will be liable to prosecution under the Anti-Subversion Law [*Kompas*, 10 July].

events were part of a conspiracy by anti-Sukarno elements in the Indonesian armed forces, in particular the intelligence services.

The Dutch book also contains the almost complete text, comprehensively annotated, of the defence plea of Gatot Lestario at his trial in Blitar in 1975/76. This is a courageous document in which Gatot reverses roles, becoming not the accused but the accuser of the Suharto regime. [See also *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 71, September 1985] It was made public just a few months after Gatot's execution, an event which caused outrage in many parts of the world.

The latest news is that this book too has been banned by the Indonesian authorities. Since there is no Indonesian translation, it seems that the ban simply refers to circulation in Indonesia of the Dutch-language edition. This is a ban that will surprise no-one. But it is a mark of distinction, a much greater distinction than the medal conferred on Mrs Eegje Schoo, Dutch Minister of Development Cooperation, by the Suharto regime, in appreciation of her services as chairperson of the IGGI.

W.F. Wertheim

STOP PRESS

Catholic priest beaten up in East Timor

Parishpriest Fr Walter van Wouwe SDB of Lospalos-Lautem was brutally beaten by two Indonesian soldiers on 27 June, provoking the Catholic Church in East Timor to initiate a boycott of government-run Pancasila indoctrination courses. The boycott, said Mgr Belo, head of the East Timor Church, in a letter to the Indonesian authorities, is a "strongly felt protest against the brutal and inhuman behaviour that continues to occur, and which belittles our pastors".

A copy of Mgr Belo's letter reached Melbourne and was made public by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid.

AFCOA also made public reports from Dili of mass arrests just prior to events marking the 10th anniversary of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. A letter from Dili dated 17 July reported 80 arrests in Baucau, and large but unknown numbers in Lospalos, Viqueque and Dili.

Pat Walsh of ACFOA said Mgr Belo's action reveals that relations between the army and the Church remain tense.

Harry M. Scobie and Laurie S. Wiseman (editors), *Access To Justice* Zed Press 1985, pp 208.

Access To Justice is the product of an important and unusual meeting in February 1982, a workshop attended by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from ASEAN countries concerned to promote human rights in their region. The workshop was held at the initiative of the US Human Rights Internet to answer a pressing need: the discussion and, it was hoped, the creation of a regional mechanism for the protection of human rights in the ASEAN region. The outcome was the foundation of the Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia by NGOs from four ASEAN countries. A representative for the fifth member, Singapore, could not be found, such is the nature of Lee Kuan Yew's authoritarian rule there.

The book is a compilation of essays presented to the workshop by some of the delegates. As such, it is not a comprehensive analysis of repressive practices by ASEAN governments, and the writers draw only cautious and generalised conclusions about abuses of human rights in the region. Nor do they try to provide a radical approach to the promotion of human rights. They use existing principles and examples, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and established juridical and constitutional practice in western nations, as their points of reference.

The universality of human rights principles


The writers make the important point that just because international standards for individual justice are largely western in origin, it does not mean that they are neither appropriate nor just in Asian societies, a claim often made by South East Asian regimes to justify their repressive policies. Indeed, all the writers work on the assumption that existing international standards are rooted in general human experience, and are not just the product of a particular society or culture. The writers are convincing because they can show, with their detailed knowledge of cases in their own countries, that systems claiming to be 'just' and 'fair' in an 'Asian' way are in fact arbitrary, and weighted against the protection of the individual, often in seemingly small and inconspicuous ways.

Mulya Lubis from Indonesia, for example, cites a clause in Indonesia's recent procedural code that allows legal advisors to observe but not be present at interrogations. He describes how many interrogation rooms are partitioned off by glass, so that lawyers can see but not hear the proceedings, thus preventing them from advising and protecting a client at a crucial time.

If there is a common thread running through the essays, it is a preoccupation with legal and constitutional procedures in ASEAN countries. Other human rights issues, like access to political power and to a fair share of national resources, are referred to but not discussed in detail. Many of the writers are practising lawyers, and all of them seek to take action within the existing political and economic systems, to protect human rights.

Fighting for the proper implementation of current laws and criticising unjust ones is a most effective means for NGOs to uphold individual rights without themselves being repressed.

The great weakness of human rights promotion within a legal framework is that it is effective only insofar as the governments wish to appear to be acting legally. The Indonesian regime has made only the feeblest attempts at legal justification of its brutal military operations in East Timor and West Papua, which have been conducted with a horrific disregard for international laws and principles. Instead, the regime relies on secrecy and a strict ban on domestic reporting, to prevent condemnation



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of its policies in these two territories. It is no surprise that neither of these cases is dealt with, or even mentioned, by the Indonesian writers. Likewise, military repression of rural communities by the Philippine Armed Forces leaves little scope for legal defence of any kind.

The need for structural change

All the writers recognise these limitations and they expand the debate on human rights to encompass other rights - the right to development, to freedom from poverty. At the same time, they acknowledge that there is a need for major structural changes, in which they have an important role to play. But they stop short of defining what their role in such change might be.

Their attacks on ASEAN governments are particularly important at the moment as those governments try to present a 'legal' and 'liberal' face to the rest of the world which often seems content to accept the pretence at face value. By detailing amendments to constitutions and special provisions enabling governments to suspend constitutional rights, by attacking draconian laws like Indonesia's Anti-Subversion Law, Malaysia's Internal Security Act and Thailand's laws invoking Lese Majeste, the writers show the so-called rule of law in ASEAN countries to be a cover-up for systematic abuses of human rights in the name of the state.

Access To Justice is not always approachable, and it lacks coherence because the editors have reproduced the essays as they were presented. But it marks the beginning of more coordinated action by NGOs in ASEAN to protect individuals in their countries from the actions of the state. The individual essays are original and go to the roots of the principles of human rights. The most valuable thing for activists from western countries working on this region is that this book provides a wide range of ideas and observations from people who have a unique familiarity with the difficulties of defending human rights inside the ASEAN countries.

Jeremy Smithers.

The Ecologist

BANKING ON DISASTER

Indonesia's Transmigration Programme

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More verdicts . . . and new trials

The saga of Muslim trials continues relentlessly, with some already convicted men being charged for a second time, and new groups of 'subversives' emerging to justify a new wave of trials. There is little doubt these trials will continue up to and beyond the general elections in April 1987.

Preacher gets seven years

A lay preacher, **Abdul Latief bin Amir**, 43, a furniture dealer by trade, was sentenced to seven years for a sermon he delivered last year on Idul Fitri, the festival at the end of Ramadhan. The charge complained that he accused government officials of being hypocrites and feigning Islamic beliefs, and that he enticed his audience to join "a banned organisation" the so-called Islamic Indonesian State (*Negara Islam Indonesia*). The charge alleged that such talk, at a time when the state is involved in a programme of development, could incite people to stop complying with government policies.

Found guilty under the Anti-Subversion Law, the court said he could be sentenced without regard for whether his sermon had had a negative social impact, but that it could have had such an impact [*Jakarta Post*, 5 June].

Abdul Latief first came to public attention in June 1985 when Major-General Try Sutrisno, then Jakarta Military Commander (now Army Chief-of-Staff), announced that "stern measures" would be taken against him and another lay preacher for anti-government sermons during Idul Fitri. The other preacher was Syafruddin Prawiranegara, chair of the Indonesian Corps of Mubalighs. [For a report of Syafruddin's sermon, see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 70, September 1985.] Syafruddin, a well-known politician and one-time Prime Minister, was interrogated at length at the time, but the army apparently decided against taking the risk of prosecuting him in court.

After sentence was announced, Abdul Latief said he would not appeal but would ask the president for clemency [*Kompas*, 5 June].

Tanjung Priok preacher arrested

Syarifin Maloko, a preacher who is said to have been in hiding since he delivered a sermon on the evening of 12 September, 1984 in Tanjung Priok, just prior to the demonstration which was fired on by troops, leaving many people dead, has been arrested in West Java.

According to official reports, Maloko was living under an assumed name, and had gained the confidence of a local congregation, winning popularity for his sermons. However, a local army intelligence officer recognised his voice with the help of a tape of his Tanjung Priok sermon.

The report of how he was arrested makes it clear that military intelligence continue with their practice of spying on preachers. [*Tempo*, 5 July]

Recent verdicts and trials

In Probolinggo, East Java, **Lufthi Ali**, 44, is on trial for subversion. He is described as the head of a local Islamic Crash Course (LP3K) and leader of Ikwanul Muslimin, an organisation said to include already convicted men such as Moh. Achwan and Simpuang Abdul Malik. Its alleged objective is the formation of an Islamic Indonesian state. The defendant is also alleged

to be involved in the plot to assassinate President Suharto. (See separate item on the Sanusi trial.)

A man found guilty of involvement in the Malang bombing incidents, **Abdul Kadir Baraja** (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 75, May 1986), had his 13-year sentence raised to 15 years, on appeal by the prosecution [*Surabaya Pos*, 24 June].

Achmad Muladawila, 25, already convicted and given a 20-year sentence, is to go on trial again, this time for possessing videotapes of Ayatollah Khomeini speeches [*Kompas*, 13 June].

Erlangga, a student charged for being the moderator at a meeting on 18 September 1984 which allegedly instigated the October 1984 bombings, was sentenced to six years on 25 July.

New wave of trials commences in Central Java

A new series of trials commenced in Central Java in June, after the reported arrest of 16 men, following the monitoring of various groups. They are said to be part of 'Usroh', seen by the authorities as the latest incarnation of the local struggle to set up an Islamic state. The first two to come on trial have so far been identified only by their initials, **W** alias **MS** and **MS** [*Kompas*, 23 June and *Suara Merdeka*, 24 June].

Surveillance of Idul Fitri sermons

The hounding of Abdul Latief and Syafruddin draws attention to the army's practice of monitoring sermons, particularly on special occasions like Idul Fitri which marks the end of Ramadhan. In addition, the authorities ban preachers whom they dislike.

However, in order to give the impression that no-one is actually banned, they control preachers by the device of preparing a list of those who are allowed to preach!

Shortly before Idul Fitri this year, it was announced that preachers were required to obtain permission to speak on Idul Fitri. So far, it was said, 156 had been positively vetted. Permits are issued by local religious affairs offices, but the names must be confirmed by the security agencies before being submitted to these offices. An official of the Jakarta Dewan Dakwah (Missionary Council) claimed that people are not banned or screened. It is simply that "organisers of Idul Fitri prayer meetings know who is allowed and who is not allowed to give sermons".

Among those who are kept off the list, said one Jakarta municipality official, are members of the Petition of 50 group. [*Jakarta Post*, 6 June]

Sanusi goes on trial again

"It would seem I'm the godfather to every disturbance in Indonesia," said Ir H.M. Sanusi, as his second trial got underway. The 65-year old businessman and former minister is already serving a 19-year sentence for financing the 1984 BCA bombings, despite all the evidence to the contrary [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 69, May 1985].

Ir Sanusi went on trial for a second time on 8 April, charged with subversion for allegedly plotting to assassinate the president on at least two occasions, as well as conspiring to overthrow the government, along with the Petition-of-50 Group.

Many of the 15 or so prosecution witnesses had already confessed a role in various plots. One of the two key witnesses for the prosecution's case, Nur Imam, a vegetable seller, claimed Sanusi gave him Rp 4 million to buy explosives to blow up the presidential car in Jakarta in July 1982, and said he went to Singapore to buy rockets. The other, Marwan Ashuri, a businessman, claimed that on hearing Suharto was still alive (!), he suggested to Sanusi that they blow up the president at the opening of the restored Borobudur Temple in February 1983. He also said Sanusi gave him a lot of money to print invitations for a gathering at Istiqlal Mosque after the assassination had been successfully implemented.

Evidence about these various transactions were confused and contradictory, while many crucial aspects of the plots remained vague. Did Nur Imam actually buy the rockets? Why were the plots not carried out? Why indeed, was nothing ever said at the time of the alleged plots, about the president being in such danger?

Sanusi was scathing about Nur Imam's "interesting fables". He told the court the prosecution had used his first trial to stereotype him by framing him for involvement in the BCA bombings, to support their even more preposterous charges of involvement in an assassination plot.

Key witness dies in detention


The Borobudur attack was said to have been planned by Moh. Zabir. However, this witness died while in detention, and written testimony from him was presented in court posthumously. According to this testimony, security at the Temple had been too tight for the bombing to take place [*Pelita and Kompas*, 7 May].

However, Sanusi later produced a document from Zabir's nephew testifying that his uncle, who had been arrested for unknown reasons, was beaten by interrogators who were attempting to extract false testimony from him. He died early this year, his body covered by wounds and bruises. [*Jakarta Post*, 11 July]

A 'Nasabri' government?

The prosecution alleged that the object of the assassination plot was to set up a new government, to include Sanusi, Ali Sadikin and other dissidents. This would be a coalition of nationalist, religious and armed forces elements, called *Nasabri*. Some even mentioned the late Adam Malik as being a likely 'acting president'.

Two witnesses whose written testimony had been widely used in earlier trials, appeared in person for the first time at Sanusi's trial, by which time they were out of prison, under house arrest. [Hardly any detainees are given this kind of 'concession'.] Mursalin Dahlan, a preacher from Bandung and founder of the Islamic Crash Courses many of whose staff are now serving heavy sentences [see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 75, May 1986], and Ir Sahirul Alim, a science lecturer at Gadjah Mada University and a highly-regarded Muslim intellectual, both testified on Sanusi's role in the assassination plot and about his presence at a meeting in Jogjakarta



Ir H. Sanusi on trial in Jakarta. [*Tempo*, 12 April]

in 1982 where the assassination plot was allegedly first hatched.

Under cross-examination, however, serious discrepancies emerged about moneys received, in what form and from whom, as well as contradictions about their own roles. Dahlan said he knew nothing about the plot except for something about remote-controlled bombs. Alim however said Dahlan knew all about the plan, and told the court (surprisingly!) that Sanusi *had nothing to do with it*.

Another prosecution witness named Rany Yunsih, who is serving a 7-year sentence for "seditious sermons", retracted statements attributed to him in pre-trial interrogation. When asked in court what he had heard Nur Imam and Sanusi discuss, he replied tersely, "cabbages" [*Jakarta Post*, 28 May].

Defence witnesses

Tashrif Tuasikal, now serving a 17-year sentence, denied being involved in any plot with Sanusi. Chris Siner Key Timu, a member of the Petition-of-50 group, vehemently denied that the Group had ever contemplated overthrowing the government. As for being involved in a plot to create an Islamic state, the implication in the charges against Sanusi, Chris Siner, a well-known Catholic intellectual, said that, were there any truth at all in such claims, he would have left the Petition Group long ago.

Two other defence witnesses failed to appear. Ali Sadikin was not allowed to testify, the court arguing that since he had attended all the trial hearings, his evidence would be "partial". Professor Ismail Suny refused to testify. No explanation was given, but he may have been embarrassed by Sanusi saying that his views about Pancasila were derived from Suny's writings.

A fifth defence witness, Moh Achwan, who is serving a life sentence, also failed to appear. In his own trial, Achwan denied that Sanusi had said he planned to kill Suharto. All he said, according to Achwan, was that Suharto was "not a very good Muslim".

Prosecution demands life sentence

Despite the contradictory nature of evidence presented in court, the prosecution persisted in pressing the charges and asked the court to give Sanusi a life sentence.

Where returning home is a crime

Four 'ex-PKI' members who returned home after spending many years abroad as political exiles have been arrested recently in Central Java. The four men, named as Tangis Darmono, Hans Dimiyati, Sambungan Simandjuntak and Tohari, are alleged to have "infiltrated" themselves back into society, and to have "so cunningly" deceived people as to make it difficult to distinguish any more between "who is PKI and who isn't".

The arrests were the subject of a "scientific lecture" delivered in July by Major-General Harsoediyono Hartas, military commander of Central Java, to an audience of faculty members of private universities from all parts of Central Java. The lecture, reported at length in the Semarang daily, *Kedaulatan Rakyat* [11 July 1986], is a particularly vicious example of the witch-hunting fervour of Indonesia's military rulers. Major-General Harsoediyono is from the new generation that has taken over in the army, who are showing themselves to be no less dogmatic than the 1945 generation.

"These PKI remnants are so cunning in their trickery and deception that it is sometimes difficult for us to distinguish between who is and who isn't PKI. They infiltrate and play their tricks in all fields, ideological, political, economic and cultural, and even military. Take for example Tohari, who managed to slip himself in as a student at the Semarang Police Academy. It's difficult to tell whether he is extreme right or PKI."

An ocean of suspects

Major-General Harsoediyono then turned the penetrating light of his scientific analysis on the "PKI remnants in Central Java who, together with their wives and children, amount to some 1.6 million people." [This is the figure usually given for 'ex-PKI' throughout Indonesia, but who cares about a little exaggeration for the sake of science and national vigilance, the two themes that, according to *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, inspired the major-general.]

"These people are classified as F-Category. Although it isn't easy to detect their activities, all their names have been registered, because we know all about their style from history. So, if there is any movement, it only remains for us to round them up."

But they are a cunning lot, the military commander continued, changing their identity, "even changing their identity cards by moving away to Lampung or Djambi, then, after getting themselves new papers, returning to Java with new identities."

They even use time to their advantage. "By behaving well [so, good behaviour has become a crime!], the community is lulled into forgetting their past treacheries, and forgives them. But remember. Once they have been forgiven, new catastrophes will befall us."

"They throw up all kinds of issues, about the presidency, about Mrs Suharto and Pak Harto, and still worse, use the *dukun* (faith-healers) for their own purposes.

"They are so brilliant at creating international intellectual cadres that it is difficult to know whether they are communists or liberals, whether they are Pancasilaists or fundamentalists. Indeed, eventually communism and liberalism will merge, giving birth to a new fundamentalism. This is very dangerous indeed."

To round off his talk, Harsoediyono Hartas dealt in detail with the 'crimes' of the four arrested men. Hans Dimiyati had learnt seven languages during his exile, and had become an expert in "military affairs, chemistry and food". He was at school in Moscow and attended a military academy in Nanking. Sambungan Simandjuntak was well trained, getting military education in Albania, Burma and

China, and his return to Indonesia was arranged through Hongkong. Tangis Darmono got back into Indonesia through Cambodia after attending military lectures in Vietnam; he graduated from school in Moscow.

Search as we might through this rather lengthy news story, however, the military commander had nothing to say about any laws they violated since their return to Indonesia. We must conclude, therefore, that their only crime was to have returned home.



Thousands of 'PKI teachers' forced into early retirement

"Thousands" of teachers who were "involved in the G30S/PKI affair" (of 1965) have been discovered, still working as teachers in Central Java. The more elderly (over 50) among them will be forced into early retirement, while the younger ones will be dismissed.

There are, according to various provincial authorities, altogether 2,832 'ex-PKI' still functioning as primary school teachers, school-caretakers and office workers at the provincial Education Office. "They must be watched and their movements restricted," said Ismail, the governor of Central Java. The military commander said it is wrong "to take the risk of letting them cling to their jobs for ever".

But, "we should be humane towards them, and let them enjoy their pensions. Otherwise, they might be completely alienated (*terkucil*)". [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 29 May]

900 railwaymen to be dismissed

As a result of the recent screening of the 11,000 employees of the railway network in Central Java, nine hundred 'ex-PKI' people have been discovered, and will be dismissed. One railway official said the extent of their 'PKI involvement' was not yet clear, as this was a matter for the military command to determine. But since they were mostly quite advanced in age and had been working for the railway for many years, it was not expected that their dismissal would cause any unrest.

The mass screening was apparently prompted by several rail accidents in the past few months. Naturally, hints of 'PKI sabotage' were dropped though no-one has been able to substantiate anything.

An assistant at the governor's office said no-one employed by the provincial administration could escape screening. From the time anyone applies for a job, they are thoroughly investigated. He felt confident 'ex-PKI' dismissals would go on without stop because of the tough screening methods used [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 21 May].

Transmigration programme under attack

The Indonesian Government is mounting strong rear-guard action to defend its controversial transmigration programme against foreign and domestic criticism. Government officials are particularly concerned that international environmental and human rights organisations are pressing the World Bank to withdraw funding from "the biggest colonisation programme in history", which has oppressed ethnic groups and caused serious ecological damage in many of Indonesia's 'outer' islands.

Jakarta has cause to worry, since the charges levelled are the same as criticisms of Brazil, the only other country with a combination of large tracts of forest, a transmigration programme and a shocking human rights record. As a result of similar protests, the US Government, the biggest single donor to the World Bank, insisted that \$256 million be withheld from Brazil because of the detrimental effects of the Amazon highway on local Indian tribes and their rainforest. And last December, the US Congress ruled that US directors of the World Bank and other agencies should only support environmentally beneficial projects, and ensure that indigenous people are not harmed.

The critical role of foreign funding

External funding is crucial for transmigration. It costs about \$7,000 to relocate each family, in a country where the average annual income per capita is less than \$600. The Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), which includes the World Bank, had provided about \$800 million by mid-1985. In other words, about one-third of transmigration costs have been borne by foreign loans and international aid.

The Indonesian economy has been hard hit by the fall in world oil prices and the recession in commodity markets over the past year. In the recent stringent budget, government spending on transmigration was slashed by 44 per cent, and further cuts have been announced more recently. This July, Transmigration Minister, Martono said that during the 1986/87 budget period, transmigration efforts are to be limited to those receiving assistance from foreign governments. In other words, foreign funding, long integral to the programme has now become its mainstay.

Transmigration is too important to Jakarta for the government to wind down its operations of its own accord. Quite apart from the numbers of military personnel and government officials who make a tidy profit from transmigration construction projects, the government has promoted transmigration as a matter of national pride and the cornerstone in its development plans.

In response to recent criticisms from Friends of the Earth, Survival International and TAPOL, the Minister of Transmigration, Martono, has taken every opportunity to 'clarify' the issues by explaining Indonesia's policies. This invariably consists of well-worn statistics about the success of the programme, an outline of its aims and the importance of national development for a rapidly growing population. Foreigners who refuse to accept these 'explanations' are accused of wilfully misinterpreting the evidence for political reasons.

Martono denies that transmigration is responsible for large-scale deforestation, and puts the blame on shifting cultivators. But three months after a press conference in Washington at which Marcus Colchester of Survival International launched the special issue of *The Ecologist*, there has still been no attempt to provide evidence which refutes the charges laid on the doorstep



Marcus Colchester, Survival International, and Charles Secrett (squatting), Friends of the Earth, demonstrating at this year's IGGI meeting. [Photo: Jan Muter]

of the regime. Indeed, some government statements confirm the criticisms.

Listed among the aims of the programme, but not promoted so publicly, are its social and military functions. Transmigration provides a ray of hope for the millions of landless poor in Java and Bali who are a potential source of unrest. Transmigration officials in Banyumas, East Java, are delighted that sixty workers made redundant by a local factory have signed up for re-settlement; as they were given no redundancy pay, and wages are too low for them to save anything, they had little choice.

Similarly for thousands of people in Central and West Java who were unfortunate enough to live in places destined for re-forestation, hydro-electric projects or other developments, plus those made homeless by natural disasters, transmigration is the only option. Even the crackdown on *becak* drivers and vagrants in Jakarta is acclaimed in newspapers in terms of another handful of urban poor who are opting for the new life. These are hardly the skilled farmers which officials claim are picked for transmigration schemes.

Frontier buffer zones

Transmigrants are being used to create buffer zones along politically sensitive borders in New Guinea and Kalimantan. For example, there have been official pleas in West Kalimantan for 'voluntary transmigrants' to settle along the border with Eastern Malaysia where houses and land stand empty, deserted by their former occupants. Yet, elsewhere in the province, nearly 20,000 'normal' transmigrant families are still awaiting their statutory allocation of agricultural land.

In July, President Suharto said the military should supply the Transmigration Ministry with river vessels to help move settlers into "inaccessible regions". One wonders how these people will get the supplies and agricultural extension services they require in such remote places, and how they are expected to market any produce.

Since the hard-hitting attack by *The Ecologist* and Survival International's press conference in Washington, the government has been trying to cover up these failures and clean up its act before the next World Bank meeting in October of this year. In May, Martono told reporters in Jakarta that the numbers of dissatisfied transmigrants

leaving their projects was not an indication of failure, but an acceptable risk with any large programme. In his view, this only represents a small fraction of total settlers, who are not "mentally prepared" (*tidak siap mental*). This ploy of attacking the victims of the regime's own incompetence is a familiar one to Bulletin readers. Time and again, speeches by government officials point out that transmigrants should show more initiative and not simply wait for state aid, even when they were lured into transmigration and away from Java and Bali by transmigration officers, making promises of golden opportunities.

Remarkably, the Transmigration Minister announced that the President has banned transmigration officials from soliciting or accepting commissions from projects. "If government representatives indulge in normal business practices," he said, "the quality of development and levels of morale will suffer." The President's own dealings, revealed in the Australian press earlier this year, are presumably excluded from these exhortations.

No more PKI transmigrants, please!

The Transmigration Minister has warned that the transmigration of ex-PKI people must stop. He also said that regional military commanders and the Armed Forces commander in chief must give "guidance" to those ex-PKI who have already managed to get themselves re-settled. [Pedoman Rakyat, 25 May]

Meanwhile, from Bengkulu in Sumatra comes a report that there are one thousand "members of banned organisations" [ie. PKI] who are a matter of concern (*sedang dipermasalahkan*) among the 22,360 families that have transmigrated into the region from Java.

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Plantation labour

Meanwhile, ministers responsible for transmigration face an uphill struggle to save face while introducing drastic financial cuts in the programme. Since May, they no longer talk about fulfilling targets, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to find accurate, comprehensive figures in newspaper reports. The keynote now is the quality of the projects, not the quantity of settlers. No new sites are to be established, apart from those already covered by foreign loans. The emphasis will be on improving existing projects and encouraging private investment.

One way to bring in private capital is by linking the scheme to the government's plantation project (PIRSUS) where the plantation company bears some of the costs of setting up new plantations for palm oil, cocoa, rubber and sugar. The company owns the 'core plot' where transmigrants will work. The latter will have land rights in 'peripheral plots' which, it seems, they will be expected to work in their free time, under the same conditions as settlers in ordinary transmigration sites. The plantation programme has had its own financial problems in the past, and this scheme smacks of the indentured labour schemes imposed by the Dutch colonial regime, prior to independence.

The government is also trying to ease the financial burden by encouraging independent transmigrants, those who resettle on government-supplied land without government support. So far, the numbers responding are much lower than was hoped. Even when land and housing have been offered to these 'voluntary migrants, they are staying put. Provincial officials in places where thousands of dollars have been spent on clearing land and building facilities may be left with an expensive white elephant.



Javanese transmigrants setting out for their new home on an outer island. [Photo: Jerome Ricardou]


Invitations that have not materialised

In his first few responses to the Survival press conference in May, Martono said Survival would be welcome to send observers to see the programme, and even said he would invite them to do so. Later, it was said, Environment Minister, Emil Salim would do the inviting. But Survival has heard nothing yet. Presumably, the authorities have not yet decided whether it is worth taking such a risk. They would want to be sure of who turns up, and of getting people who would accept government escorts as they make their 'independent' observations.

Now that some of the facts about transmigration have been brought out into the open, the authorities are showing almost as much sensitivity about allowing foreigners to visit projects as they are about allowing independent investigation of conditions in West Papua and East Timor.

Prison camps for refugees

Papua New Guinea Government plans to transfer several hundred West Papuan refugees to a prison camp have been revealed in a confidential government report. Australian journalist, Robin Osborne reports:



The Papua New Guinea government is giving serious thought to relocating up to 400 Irian Jayan refugees from the village huts they have inhabited for over two years to a prison camp where families would live in dormitory compounds inside security fences and be supervised from watchtowers, topped by floodlights.

The plan, which would cost around £400,000, is described in detail in a confidential report prepared by Trevor Downes, a former Australian patrol officer, now a senior official with PNG's Provincial Affairs Department, which administers refugee affairs.

The proposed camp, at a site named Wabo on the banks of the Purari River in Gulf Province, has for decades been a controversial place. At the time of independence, the government of Michael Somare intended to make it the centre of the planned Purari hydro scheme, selling power to Australia via a submarine cable to Darwin. For environmental and economic reasons, the scheme was scrapped.

In 1979, Wabo workers' barracks were refurbished by the PNG government and the UNHCR to help accommodate the increasing number of border-crossers from Indonesia. About 150 men, women and children lived, unhappily, in Wabo until April 1981 when, with the exception of four 'security cases', including E.J. Bonay, former governor of Irian Jaya who was given asylum in Sweden, they were allowed to resettle permanently in PNG.

An "undesirable" place

When Wabo was closed, the UNHCR's representative in PNG, Tom Unwin, said: "The UN welcomes the closure of this expensive and undesirable place." Five years later, with another, larger influx of refugees to cope with, PNG seems about to make history repeat itself. The cost, in both human and monetary terms, is likely to be high.

PNG's plans to move the 10,000 refugees away from the sensitive border region was made public in March and was not denied by the new coalition government of Prime Minister Paias Wingti. The theory is to separate the majority of border-crossers from OPM activists who are supposedly preventing their return.

PNG hope to evacuate the 15 camps along the border and relocate the residents at places matching their security classification. The majority, known in official parlance as 'simple villagers' or 'non-politicals', are due to be moved to a 600 sq km jungle expanse in Western Province, near the appropriately named site of Nomad. There, it is hoped, they will provide plantation labour to tap rubber trees.

The refugees may be reluctant to move to Nomad since malnutrition there is 50 per cent above the national average, malaria is endemic, and respiratory, gastric and dental problems (the last caused by the high mineral content of the water) are rife. Annual rainfalls average 1,200 millimetres, compounding the health risks.

Nomad, however, sounds a positive delight compared with Wabo camp, whose isolation, Trevor Downes notes in his report, makes it suitable for accommodating "hard-core political refugees". Downes inspected Wabo in late January in the company of PNG officials and a UNHCR official.

He concluded that Wabo's airstrip was in good condition and that the buildings were fair though needed some repair. However, "Wabo in its present configuration would not seem suitable for accommodation of a large number of family groups. Right now, it could accommodate about 25 or 30 families without a great expenditure."

The department described Wabo as a CIS (Corrective Institutions Service) facility, i.e. a prison. The CIS considered making Wabo a high-security prison in 1984 when jail breaks in PNG became a major problem, and Downes did not suggest that refugees should be handled differently from prisoners.

Downes gave Port Moresby a detailed renovation plan whereby Wabo would comprise 12 dormitories capable of holding 96 "detainees" each. In Blackwater camp, each refugee family lives in its own house, made of bush materials. In Wabo, they would sleep in rows of bunks divided by screens, sharing two "water borne WCs and four showers" among 96 people. There would be one large ablution block for each dormitory, with 12 WCs and showers.

Although there is nowhere to escape to from this remote spot, inmates would be surrounded by a "standard height 2.4 metre security fence around each set of four dormitories ... forming a compound". Perimeter fencing around each compound would be a "3.65 metre high 'Y'-type fence, with a 6 metre wide 'clearway' between perimeter and compound security fence".

Watchtowers and floodlights

Wabo residents, mostly educated people from Jayapura who did not engage in violent opposition to Indonesian rule, would be overseen by nine watchtowers, 4.2 metres tall, equipped with swivel-type floodlights. The towers would be roofed, so they would presumably be manned by CIS guards.

A UNHCR official in Port Moresby observed recently that while Wabo was not envisaged for permanent resettlement (he agreed it was "not ideal" for the purpose), PNG considered it a temporary holding area for up to three or four years.

During this time, he reported, it was hoped that refugees would repatriate or that more suitable land

WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES

would be found for settlement. However, he said that officials had "stressed the difficulty of land acquisition".

The Premier of Gulf Province also opposes Wabo's long-term use, saying it should be a holding centre only pending the finding of a third country for permanent settlement. But, as Downes asked in his report: "Is the finding of a third country a realistic possibility?"

The UNHCR official said "high profile" OPM and their families to be moved to Wabo could number 300 to 400 people (half Blackwater camp's population). He added that the advance guard of 25 to 30 families would help renovate the camps. Downes however conceded that the city people might be "reluctant and possibly lacking in skills to build houses".

The UNHCR said Wabo's problems included rainfall which, as at Nomad, is very high, the terrain, which is very hard to cultivate, and transport costs would be "exorbitant".

Pre-empting the screening process

In January, when PNG announced it would sign the UN Convention on Refugees, it promised that all border-crossers would be interviewed in the camps before any move took place. Now the government has dropped screening until camp dwellers can be moved away from the border. While this will please Indonesia which believes the refugees give some of their food aid to the OPM, it has not impressed people working in the camps. One of them commented: "The stigma of being moved to Wabo, to be known as a place for the 'hardcore' politicals, means that none of these people could ever safely return to Indonesia even if they wanted to. If the plan goes ahead, the screening process will have been pre-empted."

The Australian Refugee Council said that using Wabo in this way would re-create closed camps such as in Thailand and Hongkong. "Experience elsewhere suggests this would turn the refugees into captives and create a volatile situation." The Council said PNG would be well advised to abandon Wabo. "Here is a chance for PNG to show a humane example in refugee administration".

Deported refugee describes torture in Indonesia

Aben Pagawak, one of the twelve West Papuan refugees who were forcibly deported to Jayapura last October, has again succeeded in fleeing from Indonesian control and has returned to Papua New Guinea. After spending two months in a PNG jail for "illegal entry", he has now been released and has been granted refugee status.

Torture and maltreatment

Interviewed by Bishop John Etheridge soon after he returned to Vanimo in May, Pagawak described how all the twelve deported men were immediately arrested on their return to Jayapura, and held in over-crowded, insanitary police cells. They were subjected to beatings with rubber truncheons and electric shock.

He said that he and five others (according to another report, four others) were released by the Indonesian security forces earlier this year on the understanding that they would spy on the OPM. Of the others released with him, he says, one is missing and another is now blind in his left eye. The other deportees are still in jail and have apparently been tried, though reliable information about these trials is not available.

Two days after he reached PNG soil, Pagawak was arrested and charged with illegal entry. The court told him to return to Indonesia or face up to two months in prison. This led to fears that he might again be deported. To prevent this happening, Bishop Etheridge made public the facts about Pagawak and warned that any attempt to deport him again would cause widespread unrest among the refugees. "They are grateful to be in a safe country, but for two years, they have waited in what is little more than a staging camp... They want to get on with their own lives, and that is not possible with the threat of repatriation hanging over them."

The lawyer Bernard Narokobi appealed against the court verdict, and secured an acquittal plus the protection of refugee status. Pagawak is now back in Blackwater refugee camp.

[The Catholic Leader, Brisbane 28 May, and Times of PNG, 18 July, 1986.]



Two West Papuans granted refugee status in Australia

Two of the eleven West Papuans who made their way from Merauke to Australian islands in the Torres Straits last year, have now been granted refugee status. However,

Canberra is still unwilling to grant them permanent residence in Australia and has granted them Temporary Entry Permits which are subject to review every six months, saying it would prefer them to find asylum in another country.


The nine who have not been granted refugee status will also get Temporary Entry Permits. This means they can travel anywhere in the country and seek employment.

Immigration Minister, Christopher Hurd said the two were able to produce "convincing evidence" of political activity in Irian Jaya while the others were not [Weekend Australian, 28-29 June]. This reluctant move on Australia's part is apparently intended to prevent other West Papuans concluding that Australia is a likely haven for people fleeing from Indonesian terror.

Ghana takes in OPM leaders

Meanwhile, five OPM leaders who left the bush last year and surrendered in PNG have been given temporary asylum in Ghana. The five are James Nyaro, Alex Derey, Gerardus Thomy, Ries Wader and David Timka. The UN High Commission for Refugees is trying to find permanent asylum for them in Scandinavia [Sydney Morning Herald, 25 June]. There are already several West Papuan refugees in Sweden, including OPM leader Jacob Prai.

According to Peter Hastings, President Suharto finds "the notion of refugees so embarrassing that he would never accept an invitation to visit Sweden (because) it has given political asylum to several OPM leaders" [Sydney Morning Herald, 23 June, 1986].



Colonel Yunus Yusufiah, Commander of East Timor



Colonel Yunus Yusufiah, Korem 164 Wira Dharma commander. [Tempo, 19 July, 1986]

It was only when Australian journalists visited East Timor in March this year that East Timor's new military commander made his first public appearance. Appointed commander of Korem 164 Wira Dharma, the East Timor sub-regional military command, on 18 December last year, Colonel Yunus Yusufiah has shown on several occasions that he likes the limelight. Introducing himself to the visiting journalists as 'Joe', he projected a congenial image, talkative, and at ease with westerners.

He is evidently an officer with a bright future, being the first of his 1965 class of AMN (National Military Academy) graduates to have reached the position of Korem commander, the next in line below the ten regional commands. During his relatively short military career, 'Joe' has passed through all the necessary steps to take him right to the top of the army.

He has served for much of the time as a member of the red-beret para-commandos (Kopassus) which is where he started, but has alternated as an infantry officer in a regular territorial division. This is a rather unusual combination, but fits him particularly well for East Timor where both strike-force and territorial troops are always actively involved at an operational level.

Lobato's killer

His prospects began to leapfrog in late 1978, when as a young officer in the 744 battalion, his unit tracked down and killed Nicolau Lobato, the Fretilin leader. According to Tempo [19 July], he was the one responsible for murdering Lobato, and was there to receive the warm congratulations of General Moh. Yusuf, Armed Forces commander-in-chief, who rushed to the scene from Jakarta, to be photographed with Lobato's body.

This event was also recorded on video, and Tempo relates that often, during his moments of relaxation, Colonel Yusuf takes out his video to savour that moment of triumph.

In 1979, he married an East Timorese woman, and soon after, he was sent to the prestigious Staff and Command School in Fort Leavenworth, USA, a rare boost for up-and-coming officers.

Back from the US, he returned to his native region, to become second-in-command of the Kopassus squad located in Ujung Pandang, one of the three Kopassus squads in the country. In the early eighties, he was summoned to serve again in East Timor, this time as an infantry commander. After two years as battalion commander, he again donned his red beret, to be appointed Operational Assistant of Kopassus.

Before going on to become Korem 164 commander last year, he notched up yet another important achievement, by being selected for a course at the Army's Staff and Command School in Bandung.

MILITARY PROFILE

The strike-force/territorial combination

Colonel Yunus is showing his ability to use the two elements that have shaped his military progress. His personal motto is that "an officer must be fit, not fat", and insists that his troops do regular, rigorous physical training in the hills of East Timor.

Next to his determination to hunt down and kill more guerrillas, 'Joe' is out to convince everyone that his primary concern is to teach the Timorese to grow more food. Thus, he told Tempo, all military commands down to the *babinsa* level [village military post] are under orders to cultivate "model gardens", as an example to the camp dwellers. Already, he claims, 500 of these gardens, varying in size from 250 square metres to one hectare, have been set up. It is his conviction that, in 3 or 4 years, he will be able to bring the East Timorese to a state of food self-sufficiency, while at the same time preventing people from being tempted to support the guerrillas.

Quite apart from the cynical assumption that Timorese need to be taught things that they have been doing for generations, this new-style hearts and minds policy reveals a desperation on the part of the Korem commander to entice the population away from the guerrillas, and incidentally, shows up for false claims that there are no food problems in East Timor.

No doubt, Colonel Yunus will be expected to show results soon, and he has had more than enough experience of East Timor to make his superiors confident that he will. After nearly eleven years of war, there must be plenty of people who think that it's about time too.



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Suharto and his generals

A remarkable meeting took place on 7 July in Jakarta, between General Suharto and the entire top leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces. The twenty-two senior officers from the four forces, the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, led by Armed Forces commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani, all consist, for the first time in the history of the Republic, of men from a generation that is not Suharto's generation.

These men graduated in the late fifties or early sixties, and with hardly any exceptions, have never had the 'privilege' of serving directly under Suharto and enjoying his patronage. The exceptions are General Murdani, who is nearing retirement age, and Lieutenant-General Try Sutrisno, Army chief-of-staff, who was Suharto's personal aide in the mid seventies.

The 7 July meeting followed a period of mounting criticism, directed towards Suharto and his regime, prompting him to summon his general staff and do some explaining. A comparison could be drawn with a similar occurrence in 1980, when Suharto strongly denied charges of corruption in a speech to territorial commanders. On that occasion, he struck back, hitting out at his opponents, re-affirming his commanding position and inflicting damage on those who had dared to challenge his authority.

The 1986 re-run, however, was a different affair. Suharto appeared to be very much on the defensive, lacking the determination and confidence he has shown ever since he seized power more than twenty years ago.

He defended himself on many fronts, against the attack in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, against calls for a limit to the number of terms a president may serve, against criticisms of his dubious role in an attack on Jogjakarta in 1949, against the worldwide criticism of his pet project, transmigration, against charges of human rights abuses, and against comparisons being made between him and "a fallen president in a neighbouring country".

Strange to say, however, it was left to General Murdani to inform the general public of the gist of what Suharto



Salutes (while seated) for Suharto from the generals who heard his defences against mounting criticism. [Photo: Kompas, 8 July, 1986]

had said. He saw these attacks on many fronts as a grand, worldwide conspiracy, deliberately timed to coincide with the regeneration of the Armed Forces leadership and the general elections of April 1987.

As rumours fly around in Jakarta about the growing rivalry between the factions of General Murdani on the one hand and General Sudharmono on the other, there are unmistakable signs that the ageing Suharto is becoming more and more lonely at the top, surrounded by a generation of generals none of whom can be regarded as his trustees.

Far from the roaring Suharto of 1980, barking out orders, he appeared this time to be pleading for understanding from those on whom he must now rely to carry his regime forward.

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