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
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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 74

March 1986

# Buyung Nasution stripped of his right to practice?

The Indonesian judiciary has intensified its attack on the country's human rights lawyers by moving to suspending the licence to practice of Adrian Buyung Nasution because of his powerful challenge to the court during the trial of retired Gen. H.R. Dharsono. Buyung's defence particularly angered the regime because he tried to expose the real cause of the 12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok demonstration, which troops fired on, killing dozens of people and wounding hundreds more.

The Dharsono trial ended on 8 January with a verdict of ten years. As the verdict was being read out, Buyung, the chief of Dharsono's team of lawyers, rose to protest when the verdict accused the defence of "improper and unethical behaviour". The verdict accused the defence of "drawing the conclusion that the government had inflamed the situation [*mematangkan situasi*], implying that the Tanjung Priok incident had been planned in advance. It appears that the defence team was premature in drawing such a conclusion without adequate proof. Their conclusion is extremely dangerous because it can cause the people to have a bad image of the government. This is both improper and unethical".


When Buyung rose to protest, he repeated his demand, made on a number of occasions during the trial, that the North Jakarta chief-of-police, Ismet, should be called to

testify. This electrified the atmosphere in the courtroom, and a policeman on guard outside entered. Buyung immediately turned on the policeman, saying: "This courtroom is under the authority of the judge, not the police, so get out!" The policeman immediately withdrew.

The incident led a month later to Buyung being charged with contempt of court. Following this, the chairman of the Jakarta District Court issued an administrative decision to suspend Buyung's licence to practice. The final decision rests with the Minister of Justice. Buyung has one month in which to appeal. The Court is acting under new, unprecedented powers vested in the courts, authorising them to control and suspend lawyers.

## Buyung's challenge to the Murdani version of Tanjung Priok

A long interview of Buyung in *De Volkskrant* on 28 March reveals that the real issue at stake was not the court incident on 8 January. The real issue was the defence team's determined attempt to call the North Jakarta Chief-of-Police, Ismet to testify. There is strong reason to believe, said Buyung, that well before the demonstration, Ismet advised the army on the need to prevent any demonstration taking place, warning them that the situation in the region was very explosive.



Buyung Nasution protesting in court on the final day of the Dharsono trial. [*Tempo*, 18 January 1986]



Unfortunately, his advice was ignored, with terrible consequences. (To have presented such evidence would have profoundly undermined General Murdani's version of the incident as a deliberate and planned attack on the army and the police.)

Twice during the trial, Ismet was due to appear but each time he failed to turn up. Before the third attempt to hear his evidence, Buyung says, the chairman of the court, Sudijono, approached him privately, pleading with him not to press the court further on the matter. The question of Ismet's testimony had placed the court in an impossible position, he said, and in any case, Ismet had been transferred to North Sumatra. (Immediately after the end of the trial, Sudijono was also transferred, so the task of taking action against Buyung has fallen to his successor, Subandi.)

Buyung also told the press that his defence team had become extremely suspicious of the government's position when attempts to call two other witnesses, Syarif Maloko and Nasir, also failed. The two men had delivered fiery speeches just before the Tanjung Priok demonstration, but both had since mysteriously disappeared. If Dharsono can be tried for subversion, why haven't these two men been charged? This question had strengthened our suspicion, said Buyung, that the Tanjung Priok incident was a provocation, instigated by the authorities, and that these two men had acted on instructions from the authorities, to inflame passions in Tanjung Priok.

#### Ali Sadikin on the need to oppose Suharto

The same issue of *De Volkskrant* also quoted from an interview with Ali Sadikin, a leading figure in the Petition-of-50 group, declaring that he is not afraid to speak out openly against the Suharto government. He revealed that hardly anyone, even their relatives, now dared visit Fatwa and Dharsono, both serving long terms of imprisonment for subversion. Ali Sadikin himself visits both men in Salemba Prison.

He told *De Volkskrant* how shocked he was during a recent visit to see fifty youngsters being brought in for theft. They are not hardened criminals, he said, but youngsters forced by worsening economic conditions to resort to crime. He also warned of the effects of the decline in petroleum prices on the level of poverty in Indonesia.

## Contempt of court law in preparation

Immediately following the contempt charges against Buyung, it was announced that a law on contempt of court is in preparation. Such a law is clearly intended to curb defence lawyers as well as media reporting of trials. The chairman of the Jakarta district court, Soebandi, who initiated the contempt action against Buyung, said this law is needed "because some people have been doing everything possible to degrade the prestige of the court." He also accused the press of creating the impression that courts act unfairly. [*Jakarta Post*, 11 March]

The legal profession has reacted strongly to the proposed law. The effect would be to reinforce the powers of the judiciary while undermining even further the status of defendants, their lawyers, witnesses and spectators. Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute (LBH), Abdul Hakim G. Nusantara said such a law could only be justified if it also enabled contempt actions against prosecutors and judges.

Lawyers have been quick to point out that the sudden interest in a law on contempt of court is a reaction to the recent subversion trials. "We should avoid giving the courts executive powers," said Purnadi Purbacaraka at an LBH panel discussion. Yap Thiam Hien believes the new initiative was prompted by recent clashes between lawyers and judges. Anwar Haryono sees the new law as a reaction to developments during the current subversion trials. [*Kompas*, 21 March]

#### E. Java lawyer refuses to register

A criminal trial was adjourned in Surabaya when the judge refused to proceed because the defending lawyer had not registered at the court. The rule requiring lawyers to register and be subject to the court's supervision was introduced, against the opposition of the legal profession, early last year.

Trimulya, who chairs the Board of Honour of the East Java Bar Association [*Peradin*], repeated, despite pressure from the judge, that under no circumstances would he conform to the new regulation.



This photograph appeared in *The Jakarta Times* [11 March 1986]. The body, bent double, was discovered on a building site in East Jakarta.

#### Death-squad killings

Death-squad killings continued throughout 1985, according to a press release from the Legal Aid Institute (LBH). The situation is most serious in East Java with 200-300 victims during the year. The LBH believes the total nationwide was around 600. In 1983 and 1984, there were nearly 5,000 victims.

Most bodies are dumped by the roadside in a sack. They are riddled with bullets, with the hands and feet bound. According to the LBH, killers are paid 50,000 rupiahs (about £30) for each killing. [*AFP*, 25 March]

The Institute did not say who it thought was responsible for the "mystery killings". Para-commandos were known to be responsible in 1983-4. In 1985, the police announced their own "shoot-to-kill" operation against "criminals".

# Testimony of a witness who was shot three times

Two victims of the army massacre at Tanjung Priok on 12 September 1984 appeared as witnesses at the trial of retired General H.R. Dharsono. We publish below the full transcripts of their testimony. One of these witnesses, Yusron, was tried in early 1985 together with 27 other victims. [For details of the Tanjung Priok massacre and the trial of the 28 victims, see TAPOL Bulletin, No 68, March 1985, and 69, May 1985.]

I am Yusron, son of Pak Zainuri, 19 years old, a school-pupil, living at Rawabinangun VII/1 Rt.010/08, Koja, North Jakarta.

On 12 September 1984, I went to a friend's wedding in the afternoon. On my return home, I saw that many people had congregated on Jalan Sindang Raya for a *pengajian* (religious rally). Because I like *pengajian* programmes, I looked for the loudspeaker so as to be able to hear (the speeches). Unfortunately, it was not in front of the platform but on a gangway and the sound was often disjointed.

People said that it was Amir Biki who was speaking. One of the things I heard him say was that four brothers had been arrested by Kodim (district military command). If they could not come and appear before this rally by eleven that night, Amir Biki urged us all to go in a crowd to Kodim and call for our brothers' release. As the loudspeaker was frequently inaudible and people were also incanting prayers out loud, I wasn't able to hear much else that Amir Biki said. But I do remember hearing him say that anyone who became disorderly would no longer be a brother. I then remembered that I hadn't said my night prayer so I went home which wasn't far from where I had been listening to the *pengajian* speeches.

After saying my prayers, I felt left out. I wanted to know what would happen if the congregation went to Kodim to ask for the release of the four brothers they had arrested. So I left home and ran back, pushing my way to the front of the crowd. When we were nearing the Police headquarters in Jalan Yos Sudarso about 3 kms from the Kodim headquarters, the rows of people were already blocked by lines of soldiers in close formation, one moving fast, the next moving slowly, the next fast again, along the other side of Jalan Yos Sudarso.

Because soldiers armed with automatic rifles were blocking the way, the members of the congregation in charge prevented the crowd from pressing forward, using crossed bamboo sticks. Most of the people in the crowd sat down on the road, incanting prayers. One fellow was doing a *silat* (self-defence) performance to hold the attention of the crowd. Then, four men from the crowd went to the front and approached the soldiers who appeared to be leading the troops.

I couldn't hear what they said as they were quite a

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**"Only much later did I realise that I had been hit by a bullet..."**

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distance from where I was standing and anyway, there was still the noise of the prayer incantations. Then, all of a sudden, the man in command of the troops shouted: "Get back!" The troops moved back and immediately opened fire on the people. I turned round but fell down straight away. Only much later did I realise that I had been hit by a bullet from in front which hit me on the left side of my chest, and a bullet from behind which hit me in the waist and the left arm.

There were two hails of fire. The first occurred not long after the rows of people had come to a halt. Then, probably less than half an hour later there was another outburst of mass shooting. Apparently some people who had not been hit had got up and run away. So even more people were shot down.

As for me, I was still prostrate on the ground and I began to feel pain in those parts of my body where I had been hit, but I was still conscious. So I was able to hear the roar of army trucks arriving and see their headlamps. How could these trucks possibly drive along the road when everywhere was full of bodies, of people lying face down or bodies that had been hit by bullets like me? As I was thinking about all this, I felt a kick and heard someone shout: "This one is still alive!" followed by an order: "Finish him off!" A shot was fired from close range, but it hit the ground just beside my ear. The noise was deafening and frightened me out of my wits. I remained conscious all this time though in my heart, I longed to lose consciousness.

I don't know how long I lay there on the road, but then I felt my two hands and two legs being grabbed and I was swung up and thrown onto a truck. Luckily, I fell on top of a pile of bodies. I felt around me with my hands and

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**"I felt with my hands that there were two human bodies beneath me..."**

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realised that there were two layers of human bodies beneath me. They were stiff, immobile and had already gone cold. Twice I felt bodies being piled up on top of me. Could it be true that there were five layers of human bodies piled up in this army truck? While I was still trying to understand it all, the army truck started up, apparently because it was already full of bodies.

When we arrived at a well-lit place - I realised later this was the Gatot Soebroto Army Hospital - they sorted us out, the dead bodies from those who were still alive. I had still not lost consciousness; in fact, from where I was put down from the truck, I counted another three army trucks which had arrived in convoy from Tanjung Priok. Were they all as full as the one that had transported me?

I was treated in the hospital for a month. All that time, I didn't receive a single visit from any member of my family. Weren't they missing me? This unanswered question caused me a great deal of pain. Only later on did I hear that they were not allowed to visit me. The same fate was suffered by the others together with me in the ward on the third floor of the hospital. At one time we numbered altogether 67 people. All were victims of the 12 September 1984 Tanjung Priok incident.

After my injuries began to heal, I was moved to the military detention centre in Cimanggis, together with my fellow sufferers. Then I was dragged before a court on a charge of committing violence against the security forces. I was found guilty and sentenced to one year in prison.



# Testimony of a witness who lost a leg

I am Edi, a street vendor. I usually have a stall outside the Permai cinema in Jalan Yos Sudarso, Tanjung Priok. Every day from nine a.m., I take the clothing I have for sale to Blok M or other places. In the evening, I open up my stall near the place where I live, after storing away my wares at my lodgings which is only about one kilometre from where I have my stall. So I use a push-cart to carry everything.

On that evening (12 September 1984), I was out selling as usual and trade was brisker than usual because of all the people attending the *pengajian* (religious rally) in Jalan Sindang. Just as I was about to shut down my stall, I heard shooting. I quickly gathered up my things, bundled them into a sack and put them on my push-cart.

On the way, I saw very many people. Some were being helped along by others, as if they had been hurt in an accident. I was very scared and pushed my way through the crowds of people to get back to my storage place as fast as possible. My *kakak* (older brother or sister) was there and told me not to go out again, so I stayed in the place where I lodge with my *adik/ipar* (younger brother or sister-in-law). I fell asleep straight away. Around two in the morning, I woke up feeling hungry. My stomach was rumbling because I had forgotten to have a meal. I woke my *adik/ipar* so that we could go together to a food-stall nearby, about 200 metres from my lodgings. After we had finished eating, my *adik/ipar* went home, but I stayed behind to have a smoke.

As I was sitting there smoking, two fully-armed Armed Forces (ABRI) men in uniform came along. When they saw me, they stopped and yelled: "You're a Batak, aren't you?" I replied: "No, I'm from Padang". Then one of them said: "Come with me." I asked him, "What have I done wrong, Sir?" He replied with another question: "What are you doing here?" I replied: "I've just had a meal, Sir. You can ask the lady who runs the stall." But they yelled at me again: "That's enough of your lip. Come with us. If you don't, I'll give you a jab with this." As he said this, he pointed to the knife at the end of his rifle.

I got very scared so I did what they told me. Whether it was because they pushed me or because I tripped (I don't know) but I fell down. Then one of them shot me in the right leg as I was lying there. The ABRI men dragged me along for a while but then they let go of me and left me there on the side of the road.

I called out to the woman at the food-stall to go and fetch my *adik/ipar*. Perhaps she was too frightened. My *adik/ipar* didn't turn up. Then someone happened to pass by and I asked to be carried to my lodgings. I was

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**"I had lost a great deal of blood but the hospital refused to take me in..."**

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carried back and the person even stayed the night at our place because he/she was too afraid to go out into the street again. When morning came, my *adik/ipar* went to tell my uncle and my *kakak/ipar* (older brother or sister-in-law) who live near by. That whole night, I somehow bore the pain; it was almost beyond endurance.

When my relatives arrived, they immediately started looking for public transport to take me to the nearest

hospital. But there wasn't any public transport that day so they put me on the push-cart which I used for my wares. I remained conscious all the time, though the pain was excruciating. I had lost a great deal of blood and my body was very cold. But the hospital near by refused to take me in because, they said, I must be taken to the "Gatot Soebroto" Army Hospital.

When we got on to the main road, a taxi passed by and we took it to go to the "Gatot Soebroto" Army Hospital. But when we got there, I was turned away. Apparently, it was already full of patients. Then I was taken to Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital where I was quickly given a blood transfusion. About two hours later, three ABRI men came and took me away. My relatives saw them and asked: "Where are you taking Edi? He's very ill." But one of the ABRI men asked them in return: "Who are you?" They replied: "We're his relatives." So they were taken as well. We were taken off in a jeep, not an ambulance.

When we arrived at a place which looked like the forecourt of an office building, my relatives were told to get down. I was left in the jeep for about an hour then I was taken somewhere else. As it turns out, I was taken back to the "Gatot Soebroto" Hospital to be treated there. On 15 September 1984, they operated twice on the leg which had been shot at. In fact, they operated twice but the doctor who did the operation said my leg would have to be amputated from 10 cms above the knee because the bone had been splintered by the bullet.

I was in "Gatot Soebroto" Army Hospital for about three months. The whole time I was there, no-one from my family came to visit me. I felt very sad about this at the time. It wasn't till later that I heard that my relatives had been refused permission to visit me.

The whole time I was in hospital, I saw armed members of ABRI keeping guard. In fact, I was not even allowed to go outside. On one occasion, I opened a window for some fresh air. Some nurses outside were playing volley-ball. A security guard saw me open the window and soon after, an ABRI man came. He slapped me and yelled: "You get all this nice food and have nothing to do here but sleep, yet you still want to peep out!"

Once my injury had healed somewhat and I was able to walk, I was taken by some ABRI officials to the military

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**"They gave me Rp 500 and told me not to tell anyone anything..."**

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police headquarters in Jalan Guntur. I was detained there and interrogated for ten days. Then I was taken to an ABRI hostel in Cimanggis where I was detained for a day. There were many other people there in detention.

Eventually, I was taken to the North Jakarta Kodim (District Military Command) together with 32 other people where I had to fill in a form about my personal details. Then they gave me some money, altogether five hundred rupiahs. Before releasing me and others, the Kodim commander told us not to tell anyone anything about our experiences.



# Armed Forces commander lambasts the press

The Armed Forces commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani has lashed out at the Indonesian press for "irresponsibility" and "immaturity", particularly in its reporting of the recent subversion trial of former army general, H.R. Dharsono. Many papers had reported that Dharsono was on trial because of his difference of opinion with the government whereas everyone knows(!), said Murdani, that he violated the law.

He accused some newspapers of being "*brensek*" (rotten) but without naming the papers he had in mind, he succeeded in putting all editors on their guard. [*Kompas*, 6 February]

He returned to the theme a week later when, addressing a parliamentary commission, he accused the press of being polluted by western liberalism and sensationalism, warning the press to carry out self-correction or else... An Armed Forces member of Parliament, retired General Sumrahadi, a former attorney-general and once in charge of ABRI's information section, complained that Indonesian press reporting of Dharsono's trial was biased heavily in favour of the defendant and his lawyers. But another member, Rusli Desa thought the press should be given credit for imposing "self-censorship" when national stability questions were involved. [*Kompas*, 11 February]

## Murdani on the 'benefits' of self-censorship

Returning yet again to the same theme, Murdani told an audience of journalists at a *Tempo* seminar that, as Kopkamtib [Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order] commander, he was gradually "widening the corridor" for the press. "We've stopped using those yellow cards ['early warnings'] and don't ban papers these days. Only the phone rings rather often. Aren't you pleased with this progress? If the phone rings, you're not being prohibited from printing something, only told it's a complex matter. If you go ahead and publish, and no-one reprimands you, you can count your blessings. But if you get a yellow card, then you shouldn't complain." He reminded his audience that Kopkamtib still has powers to ban the press. [*Tempo*, 15 March]

## GOLKAR takes over PPP daily

Meanwhile it has been announced that a senior executive member of the government's party, GOLKAR, Akbar Tanjung, has taken over as editor of *Pelita*, the newspaper that has until now reflected the views of the rump Muslim party, PPP. This effectively ends any pretence of a Muslim voice in the national press and provides GOLKAR with a second mouthpiece in addition to its daily, *Suara Karya*. Golkar's General Secretary, Sarwono Kusumaditama has also been given a seat on the paper's board of directors.



This is the second government overhaul of *Pelita* editorial control. In 1982, the paper was banned for publishing non-official election reports and was not allowed to re-appear until the entire editorial board had been replaced.

There are hints that the Christian daily, *Sinar Harapan* may soon be subjected to similar treatment, for when Murdani was chastising journalists for their "immature" reporting, he turned pointedly to an SH journalist to ask whether there was any truth to rumours that his paper might soon change hands. Bearing in mind the recent change at *Pelita*, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (6 March) commented that it is "hard to dismiss Murdani's query too readily".

## FEER journalist told to leave Indonesia

Lincoln Kaye, the *Far Eastern Economic Review* correspondent was forced to leave Indonesia at a few days' notice in mid March when the government refused to renew his visa. The previous FEER correspondent suffered the same fate, as well as several others before him.

Although no official reason was given for his expulsion, it was not difficult to see this coming following recent reports, one on Murdani's warnings to the press [*FEER*, 6 March] and one on the Dharsono trial [*FEER*, 23 January]. Late last year, Kaye was "reprimanded" for a series of articles [*FEER*, 24 October 1985] analysing the current re-organisation of the Armed Forces.

Regretting that Kaye was being forced to leave Indonesia after only one year in the post, the *FEER* commented [27 March]: "General Benny Murdani recently complained that journalists in Jakarta do not stay long enough to acquire any deep knowledge of the country. Not only does the treatment of Kaye discourage the cause of responsible journalism, it has cut short his considerable efforts to follow Murdani's advice and get to know the language and the people of Indonesia."

During the course of his recent tirades against the media, General Murdani has also attacked "foreign broadcasts" for commentaries which "amount to interference in Indonesia's domestic affairs". The attack is apparently directed primarily at Radio Netherlands and Radio Australia. [*Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 March]

Murdani surrounded by journalists, after one of his many attacks on the press. [Photo: *Tempo*, 15 March 1986]

At a seminar to mark the 15th anniversary of *Tempo*, Murdani said: "Free press based on Pancasila is not a free press without limitations." He said that it has been mistakenly assumed that social control can be carried out by whatever means through the press. While social control through the press has its advantages, the general said, the government is the only body that represents all the people. [*Jakarta Post*, 22 March 1986]



# Robots of justice

The trials of Irfan Suryahadi (25) and Achmad Zonet Sumarlan (24) which started in October last year have ended with sentences of 13 years for Irfan the editor, and 6 years for Sumarlan, the distributor of *Ar-Risalah* (The Letter) and *Al-Ikhwan* (The Brotherhood). The first of these publications was banned by the Attorney-General in October 1983, only to be replaced by the second which was reported in the press to have had a run of 10,000 copies, circulating in Jogjakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Bandung and Jakarta.

Sumarlan, a student at the Technical Faculty of the Indonesian Islamic University was reportedly arrested on 13 June 1985 although he insists he was picked up a week earlier on 6 June by Laksus (regional executive officer of Kopkamtib) [*Suara Merdeka*, 11 December 1985]. He was found guilty of distributing issues of the papers which dealt critically with government action following the Tanjung Priok events in September 1984, as well as distributing a pamphlet entitled, "Pancasila should be torn to shreds by every Muslim". Amnesty International has been investigating his case for adoption as a prisoner of conscience.

Suryahadi, who edited both papers, was first arrested on 28 May 1985, before the banning of *Al-Ikhwan* was made public in July. No charges were made and he was released, but re-arrested in June with Sumarlan for allegedly being in possession of a passport under a false name. Active in groups such as *Badan Komunikasi Pemuda Mesjid* (Mosque Youth Communications Body), he is alleged to have confessed under interrogation to having aspired to the goals of Kartosuwiryo, a Muslim leader who established the Darul Islam movement in West Java in the late 1940s, in opposition to the Indonesian Republic [*Surabaya Pos*, 4 October 1985].

He was tried on charges of challenging Pancasila, questioning the authority of the Indonesian state leadership and opposing the family planning programme. The trial in the Sleman district court became something of a cause celebre, with many students attending every session. Prosecution witnesses included well-known Gadjah Mada University lecturers, Dr Kuntowidjoyo of the Philosophy Faculty, Ir Syachirul Alim and Dr Amin Rais. However, none of them appeared in person; the court accepted the reports of their interrogation as evidence even though this is not permissible under the rules of procedure.

## Accused both reject defence lawyers

Neither of the defendants was willing to have defence lawyers. "God is my only defender," said Sumarlan [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 10 October 1985]. Earlier, he complained of losing personal belongings at the time of his arrest [*Sinar Harapan*, 31 October 1985]. He also objected to being tried in a State, not a Muslim, court. The presiding judge, Ngakan Nyoman Rai SH, was a Balinese Hindu, a choice calculated perhaps to antagonise the defendant. When he read out the charges, he mispronounced the Arabic greetings, whereupon Sumarlan accused him of being sinful. The judge responded by somewhat provocatively spelling out the greeting letter by letter [*Indonesia Reports*, November 1985, 10 October].

When Drs Djunaedi, head of the local *Majelis Dakwah Islam* (Islamic Missionary Council) was questioned as a prosecution witness about the legitimacy of Pancasila, Sumarlan objected that this had "absolutely no connection with the case", and a slanging match broke out in the court [*Suara Merdeka*, 27 November 1985]. The defendant also complained about being denied medical treatment for a stomach ailment [*Merdeka*, 18 December].



Irfan Suryahadi arriving in court on the day his verdict was announced. [*Suara Merdeka*, 14 February 1986]

None of the witnesses called by the defendant appeared, including Suryahadi who could certainly have been produced by the prosecution, had the court insisted on respecting Sumarlan's right to call witnesses.

Press reporting of Suryahadi's trial focussed on the non-appearance of witnesses. Five of the prosecution witnesses failed to appear, apparently because the summonses had been delivered by courier (!) to 'dead-end' addresses from which the persons had already moved, "without leaving forwarding addresses", said the prosecutor. But nor did two other witnesses appear, although their summonses had been received by their families. It was suggested in court that witnesses ought to be given at least three days' notice [*Kompas*, 29 November 1985] although whether this has anything to do with their not appearing remains a mystery.

As for the six witnesses requested by Suryahadi, not one appeared on the three occasions set aside for their testimony [*Sinar Harapan*, 27 January 1986]. Court abuse of the defendants' right to call witnesses makes a mockery of these subversion trials.

## Why not sentence me to death?

When the court pronounced a sentence of 6 years (two years less than that demanded by the prosecution), Sumarlan challenged the court to sentence him to death, if indeed he was guilty of the charges. Suryahadi made a similar remark when his sentence of 13 years was announced.

As so often happens in these trials, the judges' summing up established a curious connection between the length of the sentence and such matters as the defendant's age or demeanour. For being young, Sumarlan's sentence was reduced while his "insolence" worked in the opposite direction. In Suryahadi's case, the judge made a point of comparing the defendant's "achievements" for his country with those of another defendant, H.R. Dharsono who had been given a lighter sentence because "he has already many achievements.... But what have you done for your country? You haven't even managed to be a good citizen." Moreover, according to the judge, Suryahadi's



"deviousness" also added to the sentence. It is as if brownie points are counted, while the defendant appears also to be being sentenced for contempt of court.

It was also the court's contention that, "during the forthcoming general elections, Irfan and his masses (sic) would carry out a revolt", a thing the more lightly-sentence Dharsono had not apparently intended to do [Tempo, 22 February].

The court verdict claimed that Suryahadi's links with the shadowy 'Komando Jihad' and the so-called Biro Politik Negara Islam (Political Bureau of the Islamic State) had been indicated because he was believed to have been instrumental in appointing Syachirul Alim, a witness who failed to appear, and who is himself in detention in Jakarta [Sinar Harapan, 4 January 1986] as "chief Imam" of the "Indonesian Islamic State".

Such improbable tales and the manipulation and blocking of witnesses is standard practice in Indonesian subversion trials. For his part, Suryahadi remained steadfast throughout the trial, and took a stand that was a delight to the student audiences present.

He was possibly aware of an incident at the trial of Abdul Rany Yunsih in Jakarta, when the prosecutor demanded 17 years. The defendant responded by going up to prosecutor and presenting him with a toy robot which he had wound up to make it walk along the prosecutor's desk [Kompas, 30 December 1985]. For his part, Suryahadi gave the prosecutor a caricature of him as a robot [Suara Merdeka, 28 January]. The meaning of these symbolic gestures was not lost on any-one from the press and in the public gallery.

#### Six years for attending a 3-day course

A peasant from Central Java has been given a six-year sentence for attending a three-day course allegedly aimed at giving training in the delivery of "militant" sermons. He was also accused of possessing or distributing a book entitled 'Muhibah'.

Tubagus Muhammad Jihad (22) was found guilty of subversion at the district court in Wates. He was said to have spread anti-Pancasila ideology in a speech after attending the three-day course in Muntilan, and of then having set up a similar training course in his own village, Kulon Progo, although it is unclear whether any such training course ever took place.

There was characteristic confusion at the commencement of the trial over who would defend the accused [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 73, January 1986]. At one session, a member of military intelligence replaced one of the team of prosecutors who was unable to attend because he was attending a course of his own (for Pancasila indoctrination, of course) [Suara Merdeka, 15 February].

The defendant rejected the charges. However, lack of press reporting has made it difficult to follow the defendant's case. After the verdict, the prosecutor, who had demanded a sentence of 15 years, announced that he would appeal against the sentence. The defendant's lawyers announced that they would not appeal, fearing no doubt that an appeal could only make things worse.

By contrast with other subversion trials, this one had nothing to do with Tanjung Priok, the East Java bombings or similar events.

#### Educational course verdicts increased on appeal

Two of four men each sentenced to eight years in connection with the Islamic Crash-Course Educational Institute (*Lembaga Pendidikan Pondok Pesantren Kilat*) in Malang, East Java, have had their sentences increased on appeal. Andi Sukisno's sentence has been almost doubled, to 15 years. (The prosecutor had asked for 15 years for all four men.) Sugeng Budiono's sentence was increased from eight to nine years. The sentences of Murdjoko and Faisal Fachri were upheld. [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 71, September 1985 for more details of these trials.]

It is not clear from the press reports whether the appeals were lodged by the defendants or the prosecutor.


## Preacher accuses government of rigging verdicts

Professor Oesmany Al Hamidy, 72, rector of the Islamic Missionary College [*Perguruan Tinggi Dakwah Islam*] is the oldest of the preachers now on trial for subversion. He was arrested on 14 September 1984, two days after the Tanjung Priok massacre. He has rheumatism, and has spent much of his detention in hospital.

He is charged with subversion. His alleged crimes all relate to his sermons. Last month, the prosecutor demanded a sentence of 12 years which, for a man his age, is equivalent to a life sentence. Following the prosecutor's demand, he was unable to attend four sessions because of illness. He eventually appeared in a wheel-chair, to present his own defence. He protested at being taken from hospital to attend.

Professor Hamidy has repeatedly expressed profound cynicism about the court proceedings against all his fellow *mubaligh* and has poured scorn on the way sentences are fixed. He refused to accept legal aid, arguing that this cannot possibly have any influence on the verdict, already pre-determined by the executive.

When he presented his own defence statement on 17 March, he pointed out that the period allowed for detention expired two weeks earlier but he had



not been released. Yet, the accused in a murder case was released recently when his detention period expired. "Are ulamas who preach sermons regarded as being more criminal than people accused of murder?" he asked. [Kompas, 18 March]

#### Show trials

Professor Hamidy's view of the subversion trials are summed up in a

statement he made at the start of the trial. The following are extracts:

*"Everyone present should know that I am being tried for subversion not because I am accused of plotting rebellion or taking up arms against the lawful government, but only because I hold opinions that differ from the government's."*

*"The prosecutors behave just like prosecutors in totalitarian states. The precedent established in these trials shows that the executive has unlimited powers. It uses... the law arbitrarily to level charges punishable by death against anyone with dissenting views."*

*"Everything we hoped for from the New Order has not borne fruit. In these show-trials, it is very evident that the judges side with the prosecution. The judges seem to be quite powerless. They submit to the wishes of the men in power, passing down sentences of great severity... They have lost their independence."*

*"These subversion trials are being held simply to provide the ruling circles with formal juridical grounds to punish certain people severely 'in the name of justice'. Defence lawyers have no meaning in such trials yet their presence is used by the rulers to claim that justice is being done."*



# 60 MPs of all parties oppose deal with Indonesia

The following Early Day Motion was tabled in the House of Commons in February this year:

*That this House, alarmed that Indonesia is still engaged in a war against East Timor which it has occupied illegally since December 1975, distressed by continuing reports of human rights violations in East Timor documented most recently by Amnesty International in a report last year, concerned that a contract was concluded by British Aerospace with Indonesia in December 1985 for the sale of £82.7 million worth of Rapier missiles on top of an even larger contract concluded a year before, and that discussions are under way for the export from Britain of Hawk fighter aircraft and 600 Scorpion light tanks, both of which are suitable for use in East Timor, calls upon Her Majesty's Government to halt the sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia and to press Indonesia to end its military operations in East Timor and enable the people of that country to exercise their right to self-determination.*

The Motion was signed by the following Members of Parliament. MPs whose names are in emboldened type sponsored the motion:

**David Alton, L;** Paddy Ashdown, L; Guy Barnett, Lab; **Alan Beith, L;** Sydney Bidwell, Lab; **Sir Bernard Braine, Con;** Jeremy Bray, Lab; Norman Buchan, Lab; Dennis Canavan, Lab; Alex Carlisle, L; John Cartwright, SDP; Tom Clarke, Lab; Harry Cohen, Lab; Robin Corbett, Lab; Patrick Cormack, Con; Tom Cox, Lab; Lawrence Cunliffe, Lab; Terry Davis, Lab; Eric Deakins, Lab; **Alf Dubs, Lab;** Gwyneth Dunwoody, Lab; John Evans, Lab; Andrew Faulds, Lab; Martin Flannery, Lab; John Fraser, Lab; Reg Freeson, Lab; Norman Godman, Lab; Bryan Gould, Lab; Harry Greenway, Con; Dame Judith Hart, Lab; Robert Hicks, Con; Stuart Holland, Lab; Geraint Howells, Lab; Sean Hughes, Lab; John Hunt, Con; Sir Russell Johnstone, L; David Knox, Con; **Anthony Lloyd, Lab;** Hugh McCartney, Lab; Alan McKay, Lab; J. Marek, Lab; Joan Maynard, Lab; Michael Meadowcroft, L; David Penhaligon, L; P.L. Pike, Lab; Timothy Rathbone, Con; Ernie Roberts, Lab; Clare Short, Lab; Renee Short, Lab; **Chris Smith, Lab;** Robin Squire, Con; Dafydd Thomas, Pl Cymru; Jack Thompson, Lab; Richard Wainwright, L; R. Wareing, Lab; John Wheeler, Con; and

Dafydd Wigley, Pl Cymru.

\* \* \* \* \*

An amended version of the Early Day Motion was tabled in which the last four lines reads as follows:

*... calls upon Her Majesty's Government to immediately halt the sale of arms and military equipment to Indonesia and to press Indonesia to end its military operations in East Timor and enable the people of that country to exercise their right to self-determination.*

This amended Motion was signed by: Terry Fields, Lab; Dave Nellist, Lab; and Bob Parry, Lab.

Con = Conservative Party; Pl Cymru = Welsh Nationalist Party;  
Lab = Labour Party; Party;  
L = Liberal Party; SDP = Social Democratic Party

## More details of UK arms sales


In the course of our campaign against British arms sales to Indonesia, we have received information of more deals:

\* **Irvin Great Britain**, producers of parachutes, have concluded a deal worth £2.7 million for the supply of paratroop equipment to the Indonesian Armed Forces. The deal was reported in January this year in several papers in Letchworth, the town where the company is based. The

para-commando unit Kopassus will be the beneficiary of this deal.

All exports of parachutes require a government licence.

\* **British Marconi** has won an order to provide a communications system for an unidentified Indonesian warship, probably the submarine 'Multatuli', the flagship of Indonesia's Eastern Fleet. [**Military Technology**, No 12, 1985]



The latest addition to the Indonesian Navy, the Tribal Class frigate supplied by Britain, arrived in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta, on 7 March. Formerly the HMS Gurka in the British Navy, this warship has been renamed the Wilhelmus Zakarias Yohannes. It was fully overhauled at the Vosper-Thornycroft shipyard in Portsmouth and should be in service for at least ten years. The first of the three frigates supplied by Britain arrived in Indonesia last August. [**Kompas**, 7 March 1986]

\* Royal Ordnance is taking advantage of the "protracted negotiations" between Alvis and Indonesia for the sale to, or production in Indonesia of Scorpion tanks, to negotiate to sell Indonesia their 70 mm gun for the Scorpions. Local manufacture of the 76 mm system is offered by Royal Ordnance, should the Alvis deal come through. [Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 March 1986]

\* \* \* \* \*

On 21 March, TAPOL wrote to Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe about these latest deals, and said:

*In view of the frequent confirmation we have had from the Foreign Office that it is government policy not to supply arms where they may be used for purposes of internal repression, there seems to be no justification for government authorisation of these deals. The whole of the Indonesian Armed Forces has been responsible for a wide range of human rights abuses ever since General Suharto came to power in 1965, but by far the worst*

*offender has been the elite paratroop command, known as Kopassus (formerly Kopassandha and RPKAD), the beneficiary of the Letchworth deal.*

*Paracommandos...were responsible for more than 4,000 extra-judicial killings in 1983 during the officially sponsored anti-crime operation. The same command has been responsible for some of the worst human rights abuses in Irian Jaya while attempting to crush the OPM resistance movement, and killed the widely known and respected anthropologist, Arnold Ap, in April 1984. The paracommandos have been most conspicuous in East Timor where they have spread terror among the population which calls them 'nanggala' or knife-carriers. Apart from frequent reports of indescribable human rights abuses at the hands of these troops, the paracommandos have spearheaded all Indonesia's major offensives against Fretilin, the East Timorese resistance.*

*Neither Britain nor the UN General Assembly recognises Indonesia's occupation of East Timor as legitimate, and it seems inexcusable that this country should supply the forces most involved in Indonesia's illegal war.*

## Readers' Column

I read with interest the article from your special correspondent in Jakarta in TAPOL Bulletin, No. 72, November 1985, which mentions the relation between the PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] and General Amir Machmud, now chairman of the DPR [People's Representative Council or Parliament]. The fact that he was a registered member of the PKI has often been publicised, also in an article I wrote in *Demi Demokrasi* (Vol. I, No. 2, 1985, page 22) for which I was strongly criticised by many mentally-deficient Indonesian political refugees in Europe. But your correspondent went farther, mentioning who swore him in and where, and giving details of his subsequent career up to his appointment to the strategic position of military commander of the capital, Jakarta. We are left with no further room for doubt.

More revelations like this are needed simply because the more we know, the better. Is there anyone for example who knows anything about the relation between General Suharto and the PKI? I remember gossip circulating around 1960 suggesting that the PKI favoured Suharto's appointment to command the Mandala Operation [for the incorporation of West Irian, then still in Dutch hands]. It was even rumoured that the PKI leadership was instrumental in promoting Suharto's promotion as commander of Kostrad, the Army Strategic Command, the position from which he took power in 1965. Were this true, we might then know how far the flirtation between the PKI and its butcher actually went. Was the dictator, Suharto, also an undercover member of the PKI?

I was disappointed however that your correspondent went on to say that Amir Machmud was a CIA agent. There's no harm to be told this of course, but where does it lead? Everyone knows the CIA and the KGB recruit agents in countries like Indonesia, so we don't need a full list of names. What we do need is a thoroughgoing analysis of the 30 September 1965 affair. Your correspondent's remark only leads down a blind alley, as it means throwing the blame for the affair on the easy-to-blame-ugly-American-imperialist power and, in so doing, exonerates the PKI from responsibility. This is very dangerous indeed for it prevents us from identifying and locating the mistakes of the past and consequently of avoiding such mistakes in the future.

If it is indeed the task of the obsessively anti-communist American secret service to fight anything resembling communism anywhere in the world, it is also the task of marxists to avoid falling into traps. In this particular case, if some PKI members were CIA agents, there's little point spending too much time blaming the CIA; rather, we should accept the fact that the PKI is the main culprit for this mistake. This truth needs to be

recognised, for as Lenin once said: "It is worse to close your eyes to an error than to commit one." The main task of the Indonesian left today is to analyse past mistakes.

One of the main historical errors committed by the PKI leadership was their acceptance of the concept of "progressive military officers". Any military man who dabbles in politics is, by definition, anti-democratic and hence reactionary, whether he is Abdul Haris Nasution, Amir Machmud or the Iraqi officers who took power in 1958 and who Sudiman mentions in his *Analysis of Responsibility* [See C. Budiardjo in *Demi Demokrasi*, Vol. I, No 3, page 21]. Moreover, acceptance of this concept is even more difficult to understand if we remember that some PKI leaders, including Nyoto, knew that the level of civilisation of the Indonesian Armed Forces was extremely low [See Pramudya's letter to Keith Foulcher, in *Demi Demokrasi*, Vol II, No 2, 1985, page 16]. To have accepted such a concept was worse than an error; it was a crime. Or to put it more bluntly, it was a crime that stood in the path of democracy in Indonesia, the crime that ultimately led to the establishment of the bloodiest military dictatorship in the world today. Amir Machmud's recruitment to the CIA, if proven, would not change that, nor would it lessen the PKI's responsibility for the crime. The only extenuating circumstance is that all other political parties in Indonesia were, and still are, doing precisely the same thing.

Jusfiq Hadjar

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## BULLETIN

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# West Papuans secretly removed from Jayapura

Twelve West Papuans, some taken from places of detention and some from their homes, were moved from Jayapura to an unknown destination on 27 January this year. They were taken to Sentani Airport and put on a Hercules plane, the type used to transport transmigrants from Java to West Papua. They may have been taken to Java, possibly to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya. Relatives who were unable to discover what had happened, fear for their safety. The sudden transfer came following a series of actions launched by the OPM in and around Jayapura.

The twelve men are:

- \* **Terianus Aronggear** (48) formerly a teacher, now a businessman; fought with the OPM in the mid 1960s in Manokwari. Has been in and out of prison. On this occasion, he was taken from his home.
- \* **Edi Aronggear (Willem Auparay)** (33), a teacher at a Christian elementary school in Nabire. Has been previously detained for OPM sympathies.
- \* **Salmon Mansoben** (33), an economics graduate from Cendrawasih University in 1975 and employee of the Irian Jaya Joint Development office.
- \* **Gerry Rabrageri** (34), fought with the OPM in Manokwari in the mid 1960s. More recently a teacher at the Polimaq IV Christian primary school in Jayapura. Believed to have been tried for involvement in the February 1984 uprising and was held in Abepura Prison.
- \* **Jonas Rejauw** (26), social science student at Cendrawasih University. Sentenced to 5 years in 1985 for alleged involvement in Arnold Ap's 'escape' from prison.
- \* **Dicky Sorontouw (Serontouw)** (28) formerly in the Indonesian Military Police with the Cendrawasih [now Trikora] Military Command. May have been tried in connection with the February 1984 uprising in Jayapura.

\* **Agustinus (Gustav) Tanawani** (29) a student at Cendrawasih University, Faculty of Education. Believed to have been tried in connection with the February 1984 uprising.

\* **Daniel Tanawani** (36) from Serui, an undergraduate at the Home Affairs Academy.

\* **Selfianus Upuya** (45) from Serui. Employed by a company in Nabire. Was arrested there in 1984, then detained by the Military Police in Jayapura.

\* **Pius Wanane**, a student at the community health programme at Cendrawasih University. Was also employed by the government health service in Jayapura. Previously arrested for allegedly supplying drugs to the OPM.

\* **Jered (Jeret) Wayoi**, formerly a police sergeant-major. He is serving a 14-year sentence on charges connected with the February 1984 uprising in Jayapura.

\* **Benjamin Demena** (29), was detained after the February 1984 uprising.

Amnesty International launched an Urgent Action on 11 March on behalf of the men being held incommunicado, based on fears for their safety, because of the surreptitious way they were removed.

## Renewed OPM actions in Jayapura

There are several reports about renewed OPM activity in and around Jayapura. It appears there were several flag-raising attempts in mid January in the region of Arso, Jayapura district. An explosive device was thrown at the Jayapura General Hospital in Abepura. One report says this occurred on 20 January. Someone who later approached the area to photograph the damage was chased by troops

and his camera was confiscated.

OPM sources have reported a number of actions in Jayapura district, and claim to have killed Indonesian troops in Tor Atas, Jayapura: three infantrymen on 9 September 1985, 16 infantrymen on 28 October, seven policemen on 5 November. On 15 January, an Indonesian military transport was destroyed. Other actions took place in Urum Guai, Jayapura when a sentry was killed on 26 January, and in Tembagapura, Fak-Fak district when an oil pipeline was destroyed in February,

## Repatriated refugees are being sent to government relocation sites

Nearly 300 West Papuan refugees who have returned to Indonesian-held Irian Jaya since February have not been allowed to go back to their villages but have been 'relocated' to sites designated by the authorities. The first group of 46 from camps in Western Province in the southern border region of Papuan New Guinea were returned to Merauke in south-east Irian Jaya. Then, 31 were returned from Blackwater Camp near Vanimo, up in the north, to Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's province of Irian Jaya. A day later, another group of 213 refugees from two camps in the north, Kamberatoro and Amanap were returned to Jayapura. [Kompas, 10 and 11 March 1986]

According to Izaak Hindom, governor of Irian Jaya, they were given three "choices" - to enter a nucleus estate (PIR) project in Arso, to enter a 'translok' site, in other words, a transmigration site for local inhabitants as distinct from transmigration sites where mainly Javanese peasants are resettled, or to enter a relocation site which is under the control of the Department of Social Affairs. [Kompas, 11 March 1986] These sites are all integral to Indonesia's population-relocation programme for West Papuans, aimed at bringing scattered villagers from the interior into sites or centres that are accessible to administrative control by the Indonesian military and non-military authorities.



OPM guerrillas use sharpened stakes to prevent aircraft landing. [From, *Indonesia's Secret War* by R. Osborne]

Refugees who were repatriated last year have also ended up in government-controlled resettlement locations. In January this year, 452 repatriants were resettled in two locations in Arso, Jayapura district. Bas Jouwe, the Indonesian official who opened the sites, said the purpose was "to transform their mentality while raising their standard of living". He called on people "still roaming in the forests" to contact the authorities and "join in developing the region" [Suara Karya, 4 Jan].



When the recent repatriations occurred, both PNG and Indonesian officials expressed the hope that these were the first of a series that would take place on a regular basis. The PNG officials who escorted the group of 31 said the "border-crossers" in camps, who number around 10,500 according to the latest UNHCR figure, "would be returned to Irian Jaya in stages". [Kompas, 10 March 1986] On the other hand, Catholic missionaries working among the refugees said this repatriation "is not expected to lead to any large-scale return from the 13 camps along the border". [Jakarta Post, 11 March 1986]

#### PNG-Indonesia repatriation plan

Since the Paias Wingti government took over in PNG, their new policy on refugees announced in January has been thoroughly discussed with Jakarta. Following the visit by PNG Foreign Minister Legu Vagi to Jakarta at the end of January, it was announced that Indonesia "respects" PNG's decision to accede to the UNHCR refugees' convention. PNG announced that border camps would be relocated further inland, that any 'border-crossers' identified as political refugees would be required to remain in camps until third-country asylum had been found, and that PNG and Indonesia have agreed to conclude an extradition treaty. Well before the UNHCR had been given a chance to evaluate the status of any of the refugees, both PM Wingti and Foreign Minister Vagi expressed the opinion that all but a few hundred West Papuans now in PNG camps would be "integrated back to Irian Jaya". [Wingti interviewed by ABC on 28 January and Vagi quoted in Kompas, 1 February]

While nothing is yet known about camp relocation in PNG, it appears that a coordinated programme of repatriation is now under way. Moreover, the repatriation programme is being used to promote Indonesia's long-

stated intention to relocate West Papuans.

Virtually nothing can be ascertained about the methods or pressures used to persuade refugees in the camps to return home. A UNHCR official was at hand in Vanimo when the largest group left by ship for Jayapura. He is quoted as saying [Jakarta Post, 11 March 1986] that they "were excited about going back".

Nor will it be easy to evaluate the fate of returnees in the controlled sites to which they are being sent. The UNHCR has no standing in Indonesia to monitor this.

#### Wabo Camp for political refugees

According to UNHCR sources, a special camp is now in preparation to accommodate all West Papuan refugees who are recognised as political refugees during the screening soon to take place. The place apparently chosen by the PNG authorities is Wabo Camp on the south coast, a remote and unattractive site, described by observers as nothing less than a bleak prison camp. It would be a gross act of inhumanity to consign hundreds of political refugees and their families to live in such a place, waiting for third-country asylum which could take years to secure.

#### More Papuans arrive in Australia

Another six West Papuans, four men and two women, have landed on an Australian island north of Darwin and have asked for asylum. They reached the island of Melville in a small boat. This brings to sixteen the number of West Papuans who have made their way to Australia direct from the southern shore of Indonesian-controlled West Papua or from PNG.

## Military cooperation between Indonesia and PNG

A visit to Indonesia by the PNG Defence Forces Commander, Brig-Gen. Huai, has heralded much closer links between the armed forces of the two countries. In Jakarta at the invitation of Benny Murdani, Huai announced he had asked for Indonesian assistance to train PNG officers. It has also been agreed to exchange military attaches [Jakarta Post, 17 and 21 March]. In addition to this, a decision has been taken to carry out joint military exercises.

General Murdani clearly hopes soon to persuade PNG to agree to joint military patrols along the border. Asked about such a prospect, Brig-Gen. Huai said no plans had yet been drafted but the two countries were exchanging information on developments in the border region, "to avoid incidents" [Jakarta Post, 17 March].

This will certainly be unwelcome news to OPM forces fighting the Indonesian army near the PNG-West Papuan border, especially as Huai promised Indonesia that PNG would ensure the OPM did not operate from its side of the border.

The ease with which the Wingti government has been able to foster good relations with Jakarta fuels suspicions that there are close links between the PNG Foreign Affairs Department and the Indonesian regime. The announcement in January that PNG would accede to the UN Convention and Protocol on Refugees contradicted Indonesia's earlier insistence that the West Papuan refugees were a bilateral issue, yet no protest has come from Jakarta. It is being suggested that Jakarta's more flexible attitude on the refugee issue is calculated to win concessions from Port Moresby on the all-important question of closer military collaboration.

PNG Foreign Minister Legu Vagi recently announced that he expected a friendship treaty with Indonesia to be signed later in the year, and that he had won the Indonesians over to PNG's view on the refugees, something



When General Suharto met Brig-General Huai in Jakarta, he assured him that Indonesia has no plans to invade PNG [Jakarta Post, 17 March 1986]

no minister before him was able to do [Jakarta Post, 21 March]. Vagi spent over three years in Jakarta before taking up his present post, and it seems likely that he established close contacts with influential Indonesian officials, and was won over to their way of thinking, rather than the other way around. PNG's acclaimed new policy towards the refugees still is not convincing to those who know how PNG has been pressurised by both Indonesia and Australia in the past.





## WEST PAPUA

### No outside observers present at subversion trials in Jayapura

Seven of the twelve West Papuan refugees forced back into Indonesian custody by PNG in October last year may already have been tried for alleged involvement in the OPM, and for allegedly killing Indonesian soldiers. Amnesty International, human rights lawyer Bernard Narakobi and other NGOs have tried to have the trials monitored by outside observers, without success. Trials in Irian Jaya are never reported in the Indonesian media and are certainly never fair.

The seven men are: Elias Kareni, Lucas Maro, Isaak Rumpaisum, Amos Sorondanya, Edison Yakadewa, Sam Yaru and Iamech Yoafifi. The five other deportees, Benny Buai,

Rehabiam Nian, Robbie Nian, Aben Pagawak and John Seserai have reportedly been released, but this does not mean they are out of danger. As Corry Ap, widow of murdered anthropologist Arnold Ap, confirmed in an interview with TAPOL, West Papuans are often held for several months, then released, only to be kidnapped or killed, or to disappear later [TAPOL Bulletin 73, January 1986].

The case of the seven men was widely covered in Australia after they were interviewed by a parliamentary delegation from the opposition Liberal Party. The meeting took place at the invitation of the governor, Isaak Hindom, and caused some discomfort to Indonesian officials. In the event, with some forty Indonesians present, the prisoners were intimidated into saying virtually nothing about their detention. One paper described it as an exercise seemingly arranged "to exert psychological pressure on the Irianese being held" [Financial Review 31 January 1986].

## EAST TIMOR

### Fretilin and UDT join forces internationally

For the first time in more than ten years, the UDT (Union for a Democratic Timor) and Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor) have joined forces to campaign internationally for East Timor's self-determination.

Moises da Costa Amaral, on behalf of UDT, told a press conference in Lisbon, held with Fretilin, that they were joining forces because of the threat of genocide facing their people. "Our two groups...are uniting in a joint initiative to carry the question of East Timor into the international spotlight." [The Australian, 26 March 1986]

The two parties had a coalition in early 1975 but the UDT quit, under Indonesian pressure, and hostilities broke out between the two parties in August 1975. Since then, resistance to the Indonesians has been under Fretilin leadership. Since 1983, Fretilin has made it clear it favours political plurality, and has negotiated with UDT members in Australia and Portugal to create a new collaboration.

#### New Portuguese President supports self-determination

On the occasion of his installation on 16 March, Mario Soares, the new President of Portugal, spoke of his continuing pre-occupation with East Timor, in accordance with international law. "According to the Portuguese Constitution," he went on, "Portugal is still responsible for East Timor. To be faithful to these principles, we will continue to affirm and fight, within the limits of our resources, for the inalienable right of the East Timorese people for self-determination and independence."

Portugal has been involved in consultations with Indonesia since late 1984. Indonesia has foiled every attempt by Portugal to discuss what the latter refers to as "an honorable solution". The only result of the talks has been an agreement to allow a small number of people to repatriate. Indonesia has agreed that 24 families, whose family-heads were formerly employed by the Portuguese administration, may leave East Timor.

By refusing to allow the self-determination issue to be raised in the talks, Indonesia hopes to compel the UN Secretary-General, who is shortly due to retire, to accept that consultations have failed and that there is no point keeping East Timor on the UN agenda any more.

#### Australian press trying to forget East Timor

There is now a tendency within the Australian media to attempt to "put East Timor behind us" and come into line with Canberra's determination to clean up Indonesia's image abroad. An example of this is an article entitled

"Timor's hard times approaching an end" [Niugini Nius, 7 March], by Leigh Mackay of AAP. He claims that most younger generation Timorese "appear to be adapting to Jakarta's rule". During a 24-hour trip to Dili, he seems to have met only Indonesian-appointed officials. He paints a picture of impressive economic development and of Dili as a "bustling centre". But he also quotes puppet governor Mario Carascalao as admitting that "perhaps 100,000 died" in the war that began in 1975.

#### Starvation-related deaths in Iliomar

His article nevertheless brings to light some gruesome facts about present-day East Timor, namely that dozens of deaths occurred at Iliomar near the south-east coast last August-September, "most from starvation-related illnesses according to some, or from measles according to others." He also reports that malaria is widespread, "the number one enemy". He did not explain, however, that until Indonesia took over, most Timorese peasants avoided living in the coastal plains where they are now forced to dwell, precisely because malaria is so endemic there.

On the military situation, he said Fretilin guerrillas "remain a disruptive force" who, according to Jakarta military sources, "killed at least 170 (Indonesian) troops, police and militia, last year, and wounded many more, a large toll for a conflict that is officially described as insignificant and goes unreported in the Indonesian media."

#### David Lange woos Suharto

New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange has gained an enviable reputation for concern about the peoples of the Pacific region and willingness to stand up to the USA and France over nuclear weapons. What is less well known is his refusal to say anything on behalf of the most oppressed Pacific peoples, the West Papuans and East Timorese. Whatever principles he may hold, they do not extend to Indonesia.

On a recent visit to Indonesia where he met Suharto, trade, regional stability and technological transfer were discussed, with no mention of human rights, East Timor or West Papua. All efforts by groups in New Zealand and elsewhere to get him to raise these issues with the Indonesian government have failed. Lange instead strives for good relations with Jakarta, in keeping with the policy of New Zealand's neighbour, Australia.

# Oil takes over as the key issue

The Age, 7 December 1985

## Bill Hayden's 'Low Key' visit to Jakarta

Australia's Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, managed to pack in a number of meetings with Indonesian officialdom during a 4-day visit to Indonesia, billed as 'unofficial' and 'low key'. The atmosphere during the visit was constantly described as 'warm', 'constructive' and 'friendly', "helped by a decline in tension over East Timor" [Sydney Morning Herald, 4 March]

Together with Australian ambassador, Bill Morrison, Hayden had a private dinner with Armed Forces Commander General Murdani, with whom Morrison is known to have a close and long-standing relationship. He met Planning Minister, Suparlan and Home Affairs Minister, retired General Supardjo Rustam with whom he discussed Australian aid to development projects in eastern Indonesia, presumably including West Papua and East Timor.

But it was at his meeting with Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja that the most important issues were discussed, a decision to speed up negotiations on the 'Timor Gap' maritime boundary, more contacts between Australia and East Timor, and the forthcoming visit by President Suharto to Australia. The Suharto visit was originally scheduled for 1986 but Mochtar now says it cannot take place until after the 1987 elections.

Jakarta Post [4 March] quotes Hayden as saying there were "no supporters of Fretilin among East Timorese living in Australia". Whether this was wishful thinking on the part of Hayden or of the Jakarta Post is difficult to determine. He also boasted that his government had never given asylum to "Fretilin rebels". He did not add that "Fretilin rebels" have had the chance to seek asylum anywhere, and are given only the choice of fighting or dying.


## Exploiting Timor's oil

According to the Sydney Morning Herald (4 March), Mochtar suggested a definition of the area for the proposed joint development zone to be located around the 'Timor Gap'. The idea of a joint development zone (JDZ) was adopted in talks last October, to by-pass the dispute between the two countries over the marine boundary and allow the exploitation of oil reserves to go ahead. Broad agreement also appears to have been reached that the two countries will equally share revenues from petroleum exploitation in the JDZ.

Negotiations have been proceeding "too slowly" in the past six years, said Mochtar, and he intended to take a personal hand in the matter. It has now been agreed in Jakarta that full-scale talks will take place in May this year. By disregarding East Timor's right to self-determination, both countries side-step the fact that neither of them has any right to be disposing of wealth in this region.

## Canberra reaping millions from 'Timor Gap' permit areas

While Hayden was paving the way to resolving the boundary issue, it was announced back home that the Australian government had received bids for three areas of the Timor Sea, for petroleum exploitation. These had been offered to petroleum companies under a new cash-bidding system and the bids made will rake in no less than A\$31.5 million for the Australian treasury. The leading company in the three consortia making the bids is Broken Hill Proprietary (BHP).



HAPPY 10<sup>th</sup> ANNIVERSARY!

## Mrs Thatcher and BHP

It has recently come to light that the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher has more than 2,000 shares in Broken Hill Proprietary, and therefore has a direct interest in dealings surrounding the exploitation of 'Timor Gap' oil.

## Northern Territory premier tags along

Hayden is not alone in his efforts. Ian Tuxworth, Chief Minister of Australia's Northern Territory, recently went to Jakarta and East Timor to investigate the possibility of some East Timorese refugees in Darwin returning home. He also accepted Indonesian claims about East Timor unchallenged, making the remarkable observation, from his brief, highly restricted visit, that "no-one takes any notice of (Fretilin) any more" [The Australian, 4 March]. With well over 10,000 troops in East Timor and the Indonesian authorities on full alert for Tuxworth's visit, he could hardly have expected to meet Fretilin supporters along the roadside.

## Bob Hawke, the Philippines and Indonesia

"And why did Mr Hawke find it distasteful to visit the Philippines under President Marcos but okay to visit Indonesia under President Suharto? Is it because Mr Marcos and his former first lady were bigger rip-off merchants than President Suharto and Ibu Tien? You'd have to be kidding.

"Did Mr Hawke object to the Philippines' rigged elections system? If he did then why not the fact that in the past 20 years, Indonesia's New Order Government has not held an election that was not rigged and the results in the final analysis guaranteed by guns?...

"My colleague David Jenkins who had a well-deserved bash at Mr Hawke on Friday, made the important point that Indonesia has proved a success story, inviting approval, and that the Philippines has not. It's an interesting observation, even if a perverse reason for Indonesia's success is the ruthless manner in which the regime ensures that everybody acclaims it as such. That's what Golkar is all about. In regional coercive politics, Suharto's Golkar leaves Marcos' KBL for dead."

Peter Hastings in the Sydney Morning Herald, 3 March.



# Corry Ap talks about the refugees and the camps

The following is the second part of an interview of Corry Ap, the widow of Arnold Ap who was killed by Kopassus (paracommando) troops on 26 April 1984, after being tricked to escape from prison together with four other prisoners. Corry arrived in Holland in December last year with her four sons, and is now living there with relatives. The first part of this interview was published in TAPOL Bulletin, No 73, January 1986.

## Camp conditions

**What about conditions in the camps? Someone just back from the border reports that things are very bad in Bewani.**

There's a tendency to treat the refugees at Blackwater better than those in other camps. They're intellectuals, government employees and they get a better deal than the people in the other camps who are village or kampung dwellers. Also, the people in Blackwater are likely to protest when they're treated badly so the government has to pay more attention. Villagers are less able to do this.

At first when the refugees started arriving in PNG, treatment from all sides was good. Then after the nine were returned in December 1984, followed by the 120 (or 90) people, then the four who were deported and murdered back home, then the deportation of the 12 (last October), the refugees have felt very uneasy that such things could happen to them at any time. This is why they hope to move elsewhere. They don't trust this new government, which probably already has its own plans. Even though they have made statements about wanting to release the refugees, in the end they will act in the same way as before.

Take for instance food. Things were good at first, but then restrictions were imposed on selling food. The refugees have been able to tend gardens, and they want to sell their produce. Sometimes they get permission, but sometimes they don't. If the refugees aren't found places in third countries, they want to live where they are, growing food and living from their own resources without government assistance. But to do this, they would also need freedom of movement.

**Why were some Blackwater refugees sent to Telefomin?**

It seems the PNG authorities regarded them as the leaders of the refugees. Being intellectuals, they were able to make reports about what goes on. Telefomin is very remote and can only be reached by mission aircraft.

After the first group of refugees had been moved to Telefomin, others realised what was going on, so when officials tried to move some more, they fought against being put on to planes and said, "Before we agree to go, you must move all the others first. We want to be the last to go". They felt responsible for everything. They were afraid that if they could be got out of the way, it would be easy for the authorities to force the other refugees back to Jayapura where anything could happen.

In the end, it was impossible for them to go on resisting, so Tom Ireeuw, Konstant Ruhukail, the Afaar family and others were forced onto planes by police. They argued strenuously but in the end they were forced to go.

**What happened in Blackwater after the move?**

Not long afterwards, many refugees were repatriated. The authorities seemed to be determined to cut the refugees off from contact with people outside, and prevent them from sending out any reports.

**Were the 12 who were deported in October from Telefomin?**

Yes. They were told they were being taken to Vanimo but

that was a lie. They were sent back to Jayapura.

**How do you feel about Bernard Narokobi's efforts on behalf of the refugees?**

He's doing what he can based on the laws of PNG. But a court decision in favour of the refugees could have brought down the government because it would have meant that the government violated its own laws. I testified in court, and my statement was published in the press. But they kept postponing the verdict. We thought the case would be cancelled altogether.

## The PNG court judgement

The judgement was announced last month. The Australian judge threw out all the complaints and rejected all the evidence of the refugees.

I didn't know that. Several of us testified. I told the court my husband had been murdered, that we fled because our fundamental rights were being violated. Tom and the others told the court the refugees were not free to move about to seek their own livelihoods, that the police and local officials treated the refugees badly, were rude towards the young girls, beat them up and so on. The food rations were cut from time to time. They mentioned reports from Jayapura that returned refugees had been poisoned and some had died. The purpose of Bernard's case was to demand protection for the refugees' rights.

But the judge said there should have been more submissions from refugees. Narokobi said this would have been too expensive. The ones who appeared represented all the others. The court refused to accept this. The government did not pay our fares to Port Moresby which are very high. Finding accommodation in Port Moresby isn't easy either.

**Who else besides Bernard helps the refugees in PNG?**

The Church and the missionaries. The ordinary people often protest about this or that but the government never listens.

**Did anyone apply for re-settlement in Australia?**

Yes, a lot of us were given application forms, mainly



Refugees in a camp in PNG

the students, government employees, those who felt they could settle down quickly in Australia, who knew some English and so on. I completed a form. Those who were heavily involved politically and who might be in danger if they remain in PNG were asked to apply. We sent in the forms ages ago, early in 1985, but nothing ever happened.

#### **What do the refugees want? Who do they think should help?**

They look first and foremost to the Dutch government which is primarily responsible for what happened to our people. It's as if the problem now rests with PNG and Australia while the Dutch government shows no interest.

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### **Why so many West Papuans left for PNG**

It's generally thought that most refugees come from the border areas, but I've been told the people who arrived in Bewani recently came from far away. Is that true?

For people who live in the interior, it's not difficult to cross mountains and walk long distances. Many people will do anything to get to PNG because they are under so much pressure in their villages, from AERI operations and from Army atrocities. People are very afraid, and only want to go to PNG.

#### **Why has the move to leave intensified recently?**

Because of widespread military operations in many parts of the country. There was a Hasanuddin Operation by troops from South Sulawesi who were extremely brutal.



**Soldiers training in Jayapura. [Photo: A. Kentie.]**

They operated in many remote areas, in the villages. This was going on while I was still in West Papua.

People regarded two Army units as being particularly brutal, the Kopassandha [now Kopassus, the paracommando] troops and troops of the Hasanuddin South Sulawesi division. They held large-scale operations throughout the interior at the end of 1983. People were terrified. No-one felt safe at night in their homes or travelling anywhere. So more and more people decided to try and leave the country. In this way too, people outside will know what is going on.

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### **Transmigration**

#### **Has transmigration been a factor in driving people away? What do Papuans think about transmigration?**

Foreign Minister Dr. Mochtar says transmigration will help our people develop, that the purpose is to teach our people how to till the soil, how to grow food and so on. But that's not true. If that's the objective, why do all the transmigrants come from Java? Why not from Kalimantan or Ambon or places like that? People from these regions know the Malay language well and can communicate with us Papuans, not like the Javanese transmigrants. They hardly know any Malay at all, so how are they supposed to teach Papuans anything? Among our own people, everyone speaks

Malay, or Bahasa Indonesia. They may be illiterate but they all speak Indonesian.

Then, there's the question of land. If the programme is intended to help the Papuans, why is all the fertile land given to the transmigrants while our people are forced to moved off their fertile land and live in much less fertile areas where they can't make a living?

Papuan traditions and culture make it difficult for them to accept being driven off their land and told to go and live somewhere else. By tradition, our people are tied to their land which cannot be given away. But now this is happening all the time. For example, people who were living along the coast of Jayapura were forced to move to Holtekang or Skou. They moved when they were told to, but after some time, they couldn't stand it and drifted back. Such policies are unacceptable to our people.

Transmigration is putting people under a lot of pressure. If this goes on, the Papuan people will simply disappear. Already, Indonesians are beginning to outnumber the Papuans. There are more Indonesian children in the schools than Papuans, for instance.

All these factors have played a part.

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### **Indonesian officials rejected**

#### **What happened when the Indonesian verification team visited Blackwater camp in November 1984?**

The PNG officials had told us an Indonesian team would be coming, and asked whether we would receive them at the camp. Through our Refugee Committee, we said we didn't want to receive any delegation from Indonesia. Before they came, we were asked to send a group of people to Vaimo for a meeting, we thought, with PNG officials. So we chose a group, but when they arrived in Vaimo and discovered that they were expected to meet Indonesians, they got very angry at having been tricked. So they came straight back to camp to decide what to do. Earlier that morning people from the PNG intelligence had come to tell us the Indonesian team would be coming anyway, so we drew up a statement declaring that if they came, whatever happened would be the responsibility of the PNG authorities.

When the Indonesian delegation arrived, there was a huge demonstration from our side. I joined in, and held up a photo of my husband. Some of the other refugees seized my children and held them up high, saying "Where is their father?"

Then the deputy-governor spoke, saying we should all go back to Jayapura. While he was speaking, we all wanted to put questions, but they said questions should wait till after the deputy-governor's speech. When he finished, many refugees said I should be the first to speak. But as I was asking my questions, the Indonesians turned and started to leave. It was this that really infuriated the refugees, provoking such anger that the police lost control. They started throwing tear-gas bombs at us but some of the refugees grabbed the bombs and threw them back at the police. Then refugees started attacking the Indonesians. Some were injured and were treated in hospital. The fault for the incident rests with the PNG authorities and with the Indonesians for behaving so arrogantly.

#### **What did the Indonesians say?**

That we needn't be afraid and should go back. They appealed to our "national consciousness". But we felt we had every reason to be afraid because of what had happened to Arnold and Eddu. That's why the refugees wanted me to be the first to speak.

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### **The Irian Jaya Church**

The church of Irian Jaya (GKI) recently decided to send a delegation to meet the refugees. What's your opinion?



That wouldn't be the first time they've tried to do that. In 1984, before the Indonesian verification team visited Blackwater, a church team came, two ministers, both Papuans. But we didn't want to meet them either. We weren't willing to meet anyone from Indonesia, including Papuans. The government uses the church for political objectives. We feel that the GKI should not be coming to speak with the Papuan refugees but should be talking to Papuans in jail back home, doing something to help the oppressed people there. Over in PNG, Papuans are free from pressure and intimidation, they have no reason to fear they will be bumped off. So, why should the church send a mission there?

Of course there are rank-and-file church members who know what's going on and try to do something, and some ministers as well, but they are afraid to speak out.

**What about the ministers who visited Arnold in jail?**

That was just a special dispensation, and only while he was held at Kodak [police headquarters]. They couldn't visit other prisoners. And in any case, after giving my husband some privileges, the Indonesian authorities killed him in the end. So you see, all this nice treatment was just a trick. But other prisoners were all badly treated, beaten, tortured with electricity, forced to stay in water cells for long periods of time.

**The Indonesians accused Arnold of publishing an 'illegal' bulletin, Fajar Merdeka. Is that true?**

I never saw my husband do anything like this. He was always very busy with his work, his research into folk culture and also helping translate the Bible into Biaki. He certainly wasn't involved in putting out a publication like that. I never saw such a bulletin, and never heard him speak about it. It was just a false accusation to frame him.

He didn't hide his sympathy towards the OPM, but there was never any proof that he was directly involved in it. In fact, he sometimes helped the authorities. For instance, when troops go out on operations, they often have difficulty making contact with people. So, Arnold sometimes gave them tapes of his Mambesak music to attract the people...

**What do people feel about that attempted uprising in Jayapura in February 1984?**

I wasn't in Jayapura then, but the ex soldiers said the Army had decided to send local troops to fight in East Timor, all the Papuan troops. So they thought, rather than be killed in another country, they should fight in their own land. So the movement was launched, under the leadership of several Papuans in the Army - Prawor, Awom and others. The initiative was taken by Papuans in the Army, but it quickly got the support of students, school children and many others. Their pent-up frustrations were quickly aroused. As soon as news of the action spread, many others rose up, then fled to PNG. And since then, many have left the camps to join the fighters in the bush.

**You've said you don't think women should join the guerrilla struggle. Why?**

You should realise that conditions in the jungle are very difficult, and women aren't able to cope. It's not easy to wage the struggle if there are women in the movement. The Perka [Jacob Prai OPM wing] people take their women and children to the bush. The result is that during operations against the guerrillas, many more people are killed than if only men were in the bush.

**Are there rules prohibiting the refugees from leaving the camps?**

Yes. People are only allowed to go to Vanimo once a week, for shopping. There are only two trucks with space for at most twenty refugees.

**How many would you say there are now at Blackwater?**

Probably not more than about 600 - including children. Some have been repatriated. Some were transferred to other camps, like Bewani, and lots of the men went into the bush. The families of men who have gone into the bush stayed behind in the refugee camp. These are more likely to agree to go back to Jayapura. Of course many of the people came to Vanimo by foot, not by sea. The people from Waris came this way. They crossed over to Bewani, then came down into Vanimo. These were the ones who agreed to go back home. They wanted to return by foot, as they had come, but the Indonesians made them go back by sea. That's why the demonstrations were so big.

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## Protest against forced deportations

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When the demonstration took place in Vanimo after the 12 men were deported [in October 1985], people in the town were taken completely by surprise. When people at the camp first heard about the deportations, they went to check the news in Vanimo first, but everything was closed. So they went to the airport, and there, they found only the wives whose husbands had been deported, crying. Everyone became very angry, and started attacking anything around, cars for instance, breaking the windows. They went to various offices to ask for information, but no-one was to be found, so they just started attacking everything. When they went back to Vanimo, they found a truck, told the driver to get out, and the young refugees got on the truck and drove into the town. They took off their shirts, as if getting themselves ready for a fight, and started throwing things everywhere. One of them apparently had a home-made bomb but it didn't go off.

The police could not cope and called in the PNG army (Defence Force). People in Vanimo were really afraid, and everyone stayed inside because there was so much commotion in the town. The refugees were careering all over the place, shouting slogans, giving vent to their anger. Some shouted in pidgin, some in Indonesian.

Eventually, all the men returned to camp, and next morning, the police arrived. They surrounded the camp, rounded up the men and took them to Vanimo where they were detained, more than a hundred of them. This gives you some idea how many were at Blackwater at the time. This figure only includes heads-of-families, the ones who were rounded up by the police that morning. It doesn't include members of their families, and a large number of teenagers, boys and girls.

The detention facilities in Vanimo were not big enough to accommodate the men. They were sleeping in corridors, everywhere, in the forecourt of the police station. The kampung people in Vanimo collected money to bail the men out, 50 kina for each detainee.



Refugee children at a camp school.

**So there must be many children in the camps. Is there a school?**


There are hundreds of children and quite a lot, at least 60, were born there. The camp school is named after Arnold, the Arnold Ap Memorial School.



# ABRI Masuk Desa: Creating a superior breed

For the sixth year in succession, the Armed Forces (ABRI) have undertaken an *ABRI Masuk Desa* (AMD - ABRI Enters the Villages) campaign. The programme began in 1980 and it has now become a regular feature for troops to go into villages several times a year to perform special duties. Each of the ten Kodams (territorial military commands) selects tasks such as road and bridge building or village improvement like erecting village halls, civil defence posts and public lavatories. Officers also join in the programme for so-called 'non-physical' activities, giving lectures on citizenship, fighting in defence of the state, the meaning of social welfare and the importance of national security and order.

Alongside the AMD campaign, the military have more recently taken other activities under their wing in the so-called 'Manunggal' or 'at-one-with' programmes: ABRI Manunggal Reboisasi (ABRI at-one-with reforestation), ABRI Manunggal Keluarga Berencana (ABRI at-one-with the family planning programme) and ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi (ABRI at-one-with transmigration). Such activities involve a sizable number of troops. During the main 1985 AMD campaign, Army chief-of-staff General Rudini who was in charge of the operation, said 1,117 units comprising 167,550 members of ABRI (or more than a third of all ABRI personnel) were involved. Activities were undertaken in some 3,000 villages throughout the country in all 27 provinces (East Timor being the '27th province'). He denied complaints that the programme imposed a financial burden on the provincial governments or on the villages 'assisted' by the troops, asserting that costs are covered entirely by ABRI's own budget.



Jakarta military commander, Major-General Sugito inspects the work of his men, during the AMD campaign, [Jakarta Post, 19 February 1986]

## Funding AMD and Manunggal Projects

During the first five years of its existence, AMD cost over \$7 million to run, not including expenses for the troops. The expansion into Manunggal projects, such as the one-year stint preparing a transmigration site in South Sulawesi [see separate item], must be adding enormously to the costs.

Like other sectors of the economy, ABRI's allocation under the 1986/87 state budget for development announced in January was cut by more than 22 percent because of falling revenues from petroleum. Further cuts are likely because the budget was based on a petroleum price of \$25 a barrel while the actual price has since fallen by about half.

But ABRI does not rely only on the state budget for its funds and is in an advantageous position to ride the current economic crisis. It has a huge "unweildy but secretive business empire of its own, the assets of which run into billions of dollars" [Financial Times, 19 February 1986]. According to the same source, ABRI companies generate additional funds for the military

establishment equivalent to "between 30 to 50 per cent of the defence budget of \$2.27 billion".

The largest holding company in this empire is the Army's Tri Usaha Bakti which engages in a wide range of business operations and provides funding for many aspects of ABRI's activities. It funds the purchase of aircraft and other equipment now being acquired to professionalise the military establishment. It adds substantially to the meagre official salaries of officers (a general earns less than \$500 a month, a colonel a mere \$225). It invests in housing for the troops and demobilised soldiers and finances important prestige projects such as AMD.

## Competing with the civilian sector

There is no doubt that AMD and the Manunggal projects have caused considerable disquiet in the business sector because the kind of work undertaken is normally given out to contractors. General Rudini has responded to the criticism by asserting that ABRI projects are located in remote areas not suitable or attractive to private contractors. Such claims must sound particularly hollow today when budget retrenchment seriously threatens the business prospects of some 13,000 contractor firms in Indonesia who depend almost entirely on government contracts.

With so many industries sacking their workers and unemployment increasing in the countryside, these ABRI projects are also robbing the unemployed of job opportunities. At the same time, when troops descend on a village, the villagers have no alternative but to join in the work as *gotong-royong* (mutual aid) support brigades... without pay, of course.

In any case, the results of AMD for the population are marginal because much of the construction work undertaken quickly falls into disrepair through lack of maintenance and regular use, a complaint made recently by the West Java military commander, Major-General R.I. Siregar. [Kompas, 7 February]

## The ideological thrust of AMD

In fact, the AMD and Manunggal projects should not be considered according to technical criteria or funding. The proclaimed objective of improving conditions for villagers is far less important than the ideological thrust which General Benny Murdani has defined as being to "instill a spirit of struggle among ABRI personnel, making them conscious of why ABRI exists and who it is intended to serve" [Kompas, 24 March 1984].

A number of statements by military leaders have made it clear that the programme is aimed at providing the newer generation of soldiers with justification for their claim to being the country's elite, the pre-destined leaders of the nation. The earlier generation of troops rested their claims to elite status as the '1945 generation' who fought for independence. General Suharto and General Moh. Yusuf (originator of the AMD programme) wanted to make sure that the missionary zeal and vanguard role of the Armed Forces would be sustained as a new generation of soldiers with no claim to the '1945 spirit' took over.

The essential idea was, and still is, that in the process of mingling with villagers, the leading role of the Armed Forces would be enhanced throughout the community, affecting the outlook of both troops and the common people. The Jakarta military commander, Major-General Soegito launched this year's AMD campaign with the words: "ABRI as the stabiliser [*stabilisator*] and vanguard of society must at the same time set an example for the rest of the population to follow." [Kompas, 71 February]



## Military moves to bolster transmigration programme

Late last year, Army troops moved in force to take control of security at a transmigration site in Donggala, Central Sulawesi. The Sulawesi military command announced that troops would remain on the site for two months, busying themselves building roads and bridges whilst indoctrinating the transmigrants about their defence and security obligations. This was the first in a series of operations which the Armed Forces have code-named '*ABRI Manunggal Transmigrasi*' (The Armed Forces at one with Transmigration) [Kompas, 1 November 1985].

A few weeks later, troops of the same command commenced a one-year assignment to prepare a new transmigration site in South Sulawesi during which they will clear 750 hectares of land, build 500 houses and construct roads and bridges. The operation was launched in the full glare of publicity with Armed Forces commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani marching at the head of the contingent of soldiers, flanked by Major-General Nana Narundana, Sulawesi military commander, and many senior officers from the central high command.

These two events mark a significant rise in the level

after arrival had been withdrawn [Sinar Harapan, 2 July 1985]. What the Indonesian press virtually ignored, however, was the impact of transmigration on the local population whose lands have been occupied by the project.

Several days after the incident, the local authorities claimed that the transmigrants had been "incited" by former political prisoner(s) in their midst. A number of transmigrants were arrested, although whether they were ex-prisoners was not clear [Sinar Harapan, 11 July 1985].

The Donggala incident sent journalists scurrying to the region to investigate, only to discover that Central Sulawesi which has been a major transmigration recipient region for years has been plagued with such incidents most of which "haven't been reported in the media in the interests of national security". [Sinar Harapan, 18 July 1985] Severe lack of food has driven transmigrants to quit the site in search of jobs or to raid the gardens and cattle of local people. Some 17,000 people transmigrated to the area from Java four years ago but are still unable to produce food crops because of the unsuitability of the soil. [Jakarta Post, 20 July 1985]



A transmigrant from Java surveys her new home, a newly-cleared site near Rimbo Biyung in Sumatra. [Photo: Jerome Ricardou]

of military involvement in transmigration at a time when the programme is coming under increased criticism at home and abroad. But it is not unexpected. Just one year ago, General Murdani referred to transmigration as "the only programme in the economic field that must quite categorically be tied in with defence and security considerations". Furthermore, he said that site preparation and the removal of obstacles to land availability must have special focus because "the choice of locations is related to the concept of territorial management in the regions" which explains why the Armed Forces "must be involved at the earliest possible stage in selecting the sites" [Sinar Harapan, 5 March, 1985, quoted in TAPOL Bulletin, No 68, March 1985].

### Unrest in Donggala

The Donggala site chosen for the first *Manunggal* operation was the scene of serious disturbances last July when a transmigrant was killed in a fight with local inhabitants after he was caught stealing coconuts from a garden owned by local villagers. In retaliation, transmigrants attacked the homes of local villagers and burnt down 27 houses. The incident drew attention to the impoverished condition of thousands of transmigrant families in Donggala, unable to survive once subsistence rations provided by the government for the first year

On one occasion, groups of settlers descended on the sub-district capital of Bunta and looted the food shops in the face of local resistance, while on another occasion, a local transmigration official was killed by transmigrants driven to despair by callous neglect of their needs [Sinar Harapan, 18 July 1985].

### PKI witch-hunt paves the way for tighter security measures

The unsubstantiated claim that former political prisoners provoked the trouble in Donggala was followed a few months later by a series of reports alleging that ex-prisoners have been the source of security problems on many transmigration sites throughout the country. In fact, the authorities even claimed that 426,498 heads of families on the sites are "ex-prisoners" or "ex-PKI", with a total of 1,759,492 family members spread across 183 sites in 20 different provinces [Waspada, 30 September and Suara Merdeka, 1 October 1985]. (When the family-head is said to be "ex-PKI", the entire family is automatically branded in the same way.) Since the total number of families officially said to have been resettled under the transmigration programme in the past 15 years amounts to 737,707, government statements imply that "ex-prisoners" account for no less than 60 percent of the total.

In Lampung, South Sumatra, a major transmigration

region since early this century, the military authorities said security had been tightened after it was discovered that some "ex-PKI" heads of family had disappeared, while others had "slipped in" to the region without permission from their area of origin. The South Sumatra military commander, Major-General Siswadi said there are 60,000 "ex-PKI" heads of family in Lampung, but when asked how many had "disappeared" or "slipped in without permission", he said: "I can't remember though they clearly exist" [*Kompas*, 5 October, 1986].

To draw attention to the imagined security threat posed by these political outcasts, the military authorities have since announced that "ex-prisoners" will no longer be permitted to transmigrate, and have issued instructions to the regional military commands to step up surveillance and control of transmigration sites. This explains the background to the Army's 'Manunggal' operation and the recent move into the Donggala site.

#### Army involvement in site selection

The decision to use troops to prepare transmigration sites is directly related to the statement by General Murdani last March linking the programme to defence and security. The move is based on an instruction issued last October to the Army by President Suharto to become actively involved in the choice and preparation of sites [*Kompas*, 6 January 1986].

This comes at a time when many people inside the bureaucracy are full of misgivings about the suitability of the programme. In fact, late last year, a team of bureaucrats from three government departments - forestry, environment, population and development, and the interior - together with forestry experts from the London-based International Institute for Environment and Development, produced a Forest Review which makes some devastating criticisms about the effect of transmigration on tropical forests.

Given the current objectives and operational procedures of the Transmigration Programme, the Team considers Transmigration as the single sectoral activity with the greatest potential to advance forest destruction - often to no constructive result. Whether a 'success' or 'failure' by present standards, Transmigration as currently managed can only have negative implications for forest resources. [See A Review of Policies

Affecting Sustainable Development of Forest Lands in Indonesia, 1985, Volume II, page 62.]

A detailed environmental, social and political analysis of Transmigration is to be published in the May issue of *The Ecologist*, produced in collaboration with Survival International and TAPOL. [Copies will be available to TAPOL readers at a reduced price.] An article by Charles Secrett of Friends of the Earth, London, discusses the disastrous effects of Transmigration on Indonesia's rain forests, quoting at length from the above-mentioned Forest Review. Another article, from TAPOL, analyses the military component of the programme, in particular the extension of the Army's doctrine of 'territorial management' through population control in the islands now targeted for a major influx of transmigrants.

#### Worry about foreign criticism

The transmigration authorities are very worried about international criticism of the programme, fearing in particular that this could influence funding from the World Bank and other foreign sources. Transmigration Minister, Martono, has recently referred frequently to an organised campaign originating, he claims, from Amnesty International, and alleges that he has received 87 letters of protest "from parliaments, governments, non-governmental organisations and non-governmental international organisations" [see Editorial in *Sinar Harapan*, 29 January 1986]. It is, as anyone knows, quite inconceivable that Amnesty would address the issue of transmigration nor is TAPOL aware of any document issued by Amnesty on the question. By lashing out at imagined opponents, Martono may be hoping to forestall the campaign about to be launched by environmental and human rights organisations as announced in the last TAPOL Bulletin.

Indonesian academics have also come in for rebuke. Martono accused (unnamed) academics of having misused "science-for-science-sake research" by disseminating it to the public whereas such research should only be confined to the campus, "because such lack of control from academics results in putting (transmigration) in a negative light". These academics, he went on, were behaving as if they support the opinions of experts abroad "who are clearly antagonistic towards us" [*Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 17 January 1986].



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## In memoriam

Just as the year was drawing to a close, on a day when rain fell without stop, the gloomy atmosphere grew even darker with the news that Comrade Soeprapto had passed away in Cikini Hospital, Jakarta, on 30 December 1985, in his seventy-second year.

Better known to his comrades as Prapto Cakil, he never regained his health after returning home from the Buru Island concentration camp in 1977. The torture and sufferings he experienced during his years of incarceration from 1967 to 1977 gravely undermined his health. He lived through the twilight of his life without an income, always ill with some ailment or another. Like so many other honest, loyal fighters, he died in miserable circumstances. But poverty and physical decline never made him lose hope. He remained in high spirits to the last. Whenever the discussion turned to upholding aspirations and liberating the people from backwardness and impoverishment, Bung Prapto always spoke with spirit and enthusiasm.

He was one of tens of thousands of forgotten, discarded people who had made his own personal contribution to the independence struggle. In the early years of the Indonesian republic, he was secretary of the Ministry of Defence from 1946 to 1948, then became a member of the Central Indonesian National Committee (KNIP) - forerunner of the Indonesian Parliament. From 1950 till 1965, he was secretary general of Bakuna, the National Coordination Body of Businessmen.

Bung Prapto was born in Simpang, South Sumatra in 1913, and graduated from high school (HBS) in Jakarta in 1935. After leaving school, he worked at the Department of Economic Affairs from 1936 to 1937 and it was here that he met and established a close professional and personal relationship with Amir Sjarifuddin (Information, then Defence, Minister in the governments of Sjahrir from 1945 to 1947, and Prime Minister from 1947-48). Although they worked together in the same office for only a short period, their political collaboration continued right up to the time of Amir's murder by the Indonesian Army in December 1948.

It is greatly to be regretted that Bung Prapto never had the chance to write his memoirs. His close ties with Amir, and his experience as secretary of the Defence Ministry in the early years of the Republic, made him a



Suprpto (right) being interviewed, with Pramoedya (left), in Buru. [*The Asia Magazine*, 5 March 1972]

person with intimate knowledge of Indonesian affairs in those crucial days. It is also a matter for great regret that Amir never wrote his autobiography. (One account of Amir's life written by Frederiek Djara Wellem, and published by Sinar Harapan Publishing House, Jakarta, in 1984, was immediately banned.)

He leaves a wife and seven children, five sons and two daughters.

He died, taking with him his memories, his loves and his unfulfilled feelings of revenge. But he did bequeath to us his struggle experiences, and his noble desire to build a just and prosperous society, a socialist society free from the exploitation of one person by another.

Farewell, dear Comrade, and may you rest in peace. The struggle never dies; it lives on as part of history.

*From our special correspondent in Jakarta.*

## 'Cleanliness' a la Pancasila

The following is a round-up of the latest developments in the on-going anti-communist witch-hunt:

### Army major dismissed

An army major, identified only by his initials SS, has been dishonorably dismissed after it was discovered that



The major's dishonorable dismissal is the occasion for a ceremony. [*Tempo*, 8 March 1986]

he had been a member of a banned organisation. [Although no-one bothered to make the point, whatever the organisation in question, the man's alleged membership certainly dates back to the time when it was still legal.]

The dismissal was marked by a ceremony at which Major-General D. Soetarto, commander of the Udayana military command based in Denpasar, Bali, announced that the major's past links with the "PKI/G30S" had been discovered when he was still commander of a district military command. The team investigating his background had come to the conclusion that he must be classified as 'B2 category', the category which in the years following 1965 automatically meant long-term detention without trial.

The Udayana military commander used the occasion to reiterate that the Army is constantly engaged in "intensive clean-up operations of the latent communist danger within its own ranks". Ex-Major SS was being dismissed "even though he had since served the state loyally and well" [*Berita Buana*, 21 February].

### The 'clean background' criterion

A new expression has now crept in to the witch-hunting vocabulary. 'Bersih lingkungan' could be translated as 'a

*Please turn to the back page*

# 'Opening up' Pancasila for all

From our own correspondent in Jakarta

With all the backing of executive power and the force of the law, every Indonesian social-political group, every single Indonesian citizen without exception, is now prohibited from having any beliefs other than the Pancasila. No longer is communism the only ideology to have been declared illegal. All other ideologies, social-democracy, Islam and Christianity, are now outside the law as well.

Genuine Muslims realise only too well that the decision to establish Pancasila as the sole ideology is intended to destroy Islam as a political force. It is no surprise therefore that the Muslims are fighting so hard to oppose the 'sole-ideology' law enacted last year.

Nationalists who adopted the teachings of Sukarno - his concept of Marhaenism, including Pancasila - regarded Pancasila as something superior to other 'isms' precisely because it upheld the idea of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity). In other words, it sought to preserve the co-existence of various ideologies, in the interests of national harmony. It did not aim at coercion. It was Sukarno's purpose not to use force but to invite "the whole family to eat together at the same table".

There's a world of difference between inviting and forcing people to do something. Forcing total compliance with a single ideology is the antithesis of democracy. Such ideological frameworks as socialism, nationalism and religion are a living reality in Indonesian society, and they cannot be stamped out with the use of force. Attempts to eliminate the accommodative spirit of the Pancasila can only fuel national resistance, giving the stimulus to political unrest and violence, which is what the government says it is trying to prevent.

The government claims that the 'sole-ideology' doctrine, which it has imposed upon the country, will prevent people being compartmentalised under different ideological headings, in conflict with each other.

## Ten million Golkar cadres

Pancasila is proclaimed as an ideology that is 'open to all'. and in order to make it so, Golkar has flung itself into a 'caderisation' campaign to train ten

million Golkar cadres in villages throughout the length and breadth of the country. The programme is called 'The Education and Training of Village-Level Territorial Motivators [*Pendidikan dan Latihan Penggerak Teritorial Tingkat Desa*]. Everyone must join in, along with government officials - youth, women, teachers, peasants and workers. Everyone is required to accept a common understanding of Pancasila.

Is such openness and common understanding achievable by means of Golkar's mighty bandwagon? Golkar is the only political force able to launch such a movement. The non-Golkar social-political forces are incapable of having their own 'caderisation' movements. The man or woman in the street knows very well that all talk about openness in political life is just a slogan to whitewash the regime.

Even within Golkar, the chances of openness are illusory. Why was it, for example, that Ismail Suko, a local man and a civilian, was forced to withdraw his candidacy as governor of Riau even though he won majority support in the Riau provincial assembly? How come that in his stead, a Javanese general, Imam Munandar, was foisted on the province? Why is it impossible for anyone who is not a member of Golkar to get a seat in the cabinet? Why must all government employees be Golkar members? There are a thousand and one examples to prove that openness and common understanding are simply slogans promoting the interests of a certain group, and are far removed from promoting common interests.

The last thing we can expect from the government is openness. Why is it never open about the budget of the state oil company, Pertamina? Why are economic policies adopted without any consultation with the Legislative Assembly, even though the Assembly is firmly under government control?

For how much longer can the pretence about 'openness' and 'togetherness' be maintained? Only for as long as the deep-rooted phobias and traumas in society have not been cast aside. Only then will the forces of democracy find their feet again and invite "the whole family to eat together at the same table".


## Muslim students cadre course closed down by troops

Troops broke into the Jogjakarta office of the Muslim students organisation, the HMI [*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*] in the middle of the night, dragged the occupants out of their beds and ordering them all to disperse immediately. They were attending a 4-day course to train cadres. A dozen or so soldiers armed with M-16 weapons, together with five policemen ordered all the male students to gather up their belongings and leave the building, while the women students were forced to take shelter in a small prayer-house on the premises.

The local military command claims that the course was "illegal" because the organisers did not have a permit.

Cadre courses like this are a regular occurrence in the HMI. The curriculum follows a standard pattern. The course material has been used many times before without difficulty. One organiser said that applying for a permit means getting the approval of no fewer than 19 officials, so they have lost patience with the procedure. "Even though we hold this course fifty times, using exactly the same material, we still have to apply for a permit every single time," he said.

The police chief alleged he had not been informed of the material to be used, and said it was "very easy" to obtain a permit. He denied that the break up of the course had anything to do with the 1987 general elections. "The situation here is calm. We're only



Appointing the general who lost the election as governor!  
[Kompas, 11 September 1985]



keeping a close watch and preserving our vigilance."  
[Tempo, 22 February 1986]

The move against the Jogjakarta HMI may be an indirect response to the dispute between this branch and the national organisation which is convening a congress shortly to adopt Pancasila as its sole ideology. The Jogja branch has declared its intention not to attend.



# A cover-up from Washington

Since the early 1970s, the US government has been required by law to make a yearly report to Congress on human rights practices in all countries which receive US economic and military assistance. For a country like Indonesia, State Department officials have perfected a method of drawing together a few truths and half-truths while ignoring major violations. The result is a chapter 1) which can only be described as a deliberate cover-up of repression perpetrated on a grand scale.

## The Tanjung Priok subversion trials

The most devastating admission in this year's report comes under the heading 'Denial of Fair Public Trial' where the report refers to "stiff sentences" passed in the many subversion trials during 1985. It admits that "there may be several hundred" people serving sentences for subversion, and accepts that "in all such security-related cases, it is widely believed that the Government will ensure conviction irrespective of the evidence presented in court" (page 775, emphasis added). Elsewhere under the heading 'Disappearances', we learn that "an Indonesian Muslim social organisation developed a list of 40 or more people who 'disappeared' during the 1984 Tanjung Priok Riots and are presumed dead" (page 773).

Yet the brief account of the Fatwa and Dharsono trials ignores the most crucial issue around which the charges revolved - the White Paper (not once mentioned in the chapter) issued immediately after the Tanjung Priok Massacre calling for a public inquiry. Such an inquiry would have brought to light the true extent of the slaughter unleashed in Tanjung Priok. By refusing to countenance such an inquiry and passing down subversion convictions against those who wanted one, the regime has safeguarded a gigantic cover-up of the most serious violation perpetrated by the Army in Indonesia since the anti-communist massacres of the late 1960s. The State Department has condoned and reinforced this cover-up by its glib disregard for the information brought to light during the trials.

Under the heading 'Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile', the State Department recognises that Kopkamtib's powers of arrest "supercede" the protections guaranteed under Indonesia's Criminal Procedure Code (Kuhap) but claims that, "No cases of Kopkamtib exercising its extralegal powers were reported during 1985". This is simply not true. Anyone reading press reports of the trials will know that defence lawyers were able to prove repeatedly that the arrests made in the wake of the Tanjung Priok Massacre were carried out by troops using Kopkamtib powers, that detainees were interrogated and beaten up by troops, and many made false confessions, later retracted, under Army (ie Kopkamtib) pressure.

Nor does the chapter even mention the Tanjung Priok detentions under the heading 'Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment'. Quite apart from the many claims by defendants that they were beaten up to get 'confessions' needed by the prosecution, how else than cruel, inhuman or degrading can one describe the Army's treatment of the dozens of badly injured victims of the massacre who were later charged and found guilty of assaulting the armed troops who shot them down in cold blood?

## Pancasila as the sole ideology

Under the heading 'Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association', the State Department dilutes the most fundamental assault on this freedom by failing to state that the Societies Law enacted in 1985 requires all organisations to accept Pancasila as their sole ideology. Are there other regimes anywhere in the world, even within the socialist bloc, that demand such total ideological conformity?

The impact of such a totalitarian law on freedom of religion and freedom of speech is simply not discussed.

The State Department draws attention to the ban on certain religious groups (Jehovah's Witnesses, the Baha'i faith and 13 'mystical sects' in North Sumatra) and states that "some animists in remote parts of Indonesia have reportedly been pressured to convert to Islam or Christianity" (page 779). But it glosses over the disruptive impact of the 'sole ideology' law on organised Muslim opinion, even claiming that "missionary activities are relatively unimpeded". How to explain then the many stiff sentences passed against Muslim preachers simply because of sermons they have delivered?

The State Department cannot be ignorant of the Kopkamtib cable of 27 July 1985 instructing all military commands to monitor and control preachers' sermons and 'deal with' those who violate Kopkamtib guidelines [See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 73, January 1986, page 16]. In fact, many 1985 subversion trials were based on Kopkamtib intelligence monitoring of sermons. This proves that the 1985 instruction merely formalised a system of Army



Suharto with Reagan, in Washington, in October 1982. [Washington Post, 13 October 1982]

control that has been in operation since long before the Tanjung Priok Massacre. A number of Army and police spies gave evidence about speeches they had been monitoring for months and helped to secure stiff sentences. Yet, the State Department thinks it can get away with denying that Kopkamtib has engaged in extralegal activity during 1985!

## West Papua

As far as Washington is concerned, violations in West Papua can be dealt with in a single paragraph about the refugees in Papua New Guinea, "kept ... from returning to their homeland (by) continued rebel allegations of Indonesian military reprisals against border crossers" (page 780). Not a word about the 12 refugees so brutally returned in handcuffs to Jayapura last October, and immediately taken into detention by the Army. This is not a 'rebel allegation' but a fact substantiated even in the Indonesian press.

## East Timor

But it is on the question of East Timor that the State

---

1) The Chapter on Indonesia in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1985*, February 1986. Prepared by the Department of State for the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the US Senate.

Department surpasses itself in deception. There are brief, passing references to "restrictions on movement to and within East Timor" (page 779), "restrictions on meetings in East Timor" (page 778) and an admission that there were still 932 detainees on Atauro Island in October last year (page 774), though these were strangely not included in the overall figure of 500 persons detained without trial "in Aceh, East and Central Java, Irian Jaya and East Timor" given just a few lines earlier in the same paragraph.

Apart from that, we are expected to believe that there were "no substantiated reports of political killings... in East Timor". Yet, how can anything be substantiated to the satisfaction of Washington unless free and unfettered access is permitted? Nor does the chapter breathe a word about the most fundamental violation of all, against East Timor's right to self-determination. But then, with US aircraft assisting the Army's counter-insurgency campaign throughout East Timor where hundreds of thousands of Timorese are confined to strategic camps, it is hardly

surprising that the State Department is as equally committed as Jakarta to keeping a veil of secrecy over the true situation in East Timor.

\* \* \* \* \*

Space does not permit us to deal with many other glaring deceptions in the State Department's report. Suffice it to say that if members of Congress think they can rely on such an account to judge Indonesian human rights practices, they should be speedily warned to check the facts elsewhere. No-one expects an honest appraisal from the Reagan Administration, but members of Congress should know better. Is it not time for Congress to consider undertaking the inquiry into the Tanjung Priok Massacre which Jakarta has refused to allow? This might restore some credibility to the US law which requires US aid programmes to be reviewed each year in the light of a country's human rights performance.

## BOOK REVIEW

Robin Osborne, *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerrilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1985.\*

*Indonesia's Secret War* is required reading for anybody seeking a working knowledge of trouble spots in world affairs. It is a good readable account of the transfer of power in West New Guinea from Holland to Indonesia and the struggle which has emerged there following the denial of the right of the indigenous people to self determination. It is a good readable account and much more. Each of the five chapters reads well as a self contained essay, each contains pieces of information which have not been assembled before so that the book will also be required reading for serious students.

In Chapter 1, Osborne tells the story of Dutch colonisation then decolonisation in New Guinea and the claim by Indonesia, as successor state to that of the Netherlands East Indies, to sovereignty over West New Guinea. The focus is the form and context of the 1962 New York Agreement which provided for a transfer of power, under UN auspices, from Holland to Indonesia, subject to an act of self determination no later than 1969.

In Chapters 2 and 3 Osborne takes us from the heavily stage managed 'Act of Free Choice/Act of No Choice' to the emergence of firstly opposition then the formation of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka - Papuan Independence Organisation), the umbrella under which the resistance has organised and acted. The account of the guerrilla struggle culminates in the 1984 flight of more than 10,000 refugees into neighbouring Papua New Guinea.

In the fourth chapter, the author explores the situation inside Irian Jaya, the Indonesian policies and actions which have continued to alienate the indigenous people, the mounting toll of military repression and settler colonialism by which Indonesia has sought to integrate Irian into Indonesia.

Osborne worked in Papua New Guinea as a press secretary to Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan, later for then Deputy Prime Minister (now Prime Minister) Pias Wingti. The final chapter focuses on Papua New Guinean policy in response to the spillover of the West Papuan struggle into PNG's territory, and into its domestic politics.

Reading Osborne's book is frustrating. Its scope makes it more comprehensive than Nonie Sharp's *Rule of the Sword* and TAPOL's *Obliteration of a People*, but while its chapters are admirably self contained, they are repetitious and they do not add up to a systematic chronological account. The frustration is further heightened by its closure at the end of 1984 so that now, the treatment of PNG's response to the refugee situation reads as unfortunately foreshortened. The task of producing the definitive account of the West Papuan


struggle has been brought that much closer but remains necessarily incomplete, for the struggle itself is incomplete.

### Where lies the end?

Osborne looks towards West Papua as "an independent state or a province with considerably more autonomy than at present". These are alternatives which approximate each other only in that they both assume the survival of the West Papuan people rather than their disappearance, another conceivable end to the struggle. Twenty-three years have shown that the one other conceivable outcome, and that favoured by all close bystanders, namely peaceful absorption, was wishful thinking. Osborne looks to the survival of the West Papuans and their eventual achievement of autonomy. How?

The OPM poses, according to Osborne, "a far more serious challenge to Indonesian rule than many outsiders think, or the Jakarta government admits." (p. xiv) A page later however, he suggests that a free West Papua would be more likely to emerge from "political pressure on Jakarta, rather than a military victory by OPM". These observations occur in the introduction; Osborne leaves the reader to conjure up possible scenarios whereby Jakarta is brought to concede West Papuan autonomy, concentrating in the body of his own book on the story so far. What we can conclude from the story so far is this:

\* West Papuans have a well established sense of their own right to exist as a people and an understanding of



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the betrayal of their right to self determination.

\* The idea of a state of West Papua exists as a symbol of the identity of the people.

\* Indonesian colonial policies and repression of the right of West Papuans to express their identity continues to reinforce this identity and the will to resist.

\* While the capacity of West Papuans to organise a military struggle against the Indonesian occupation remains limited, the capacity of the Indonesian army and administration to stamp out the resistance and the idea of West Papua is also limited.

So, what next?

Jakarta can maintain its present policies or concede

*Continued from page 20*

clean environment' but for witch-hunting purposes, it means 'a clean background'. Anyone with parents, uncles or aunts or other near or not-so-near relatives who are or were (many are no doubt dead) allegedly "ex-PKI/G30S", by definition has an 'unclean background'.

The 'bersih lingkungan' criterion is being used particularly for newly-appointed government employees who must prove not only that they themselves were never in any pro-communist organisation but that "their environment has no PKI smell about it, such as for instance an uncle or other near relative involved in that movement" [Kompas, 4 February].

The expression was first used, to our knowledge, during a discussion at a parliamentary commission last month when it was said that people who were 12 years or older in 1965 must still obtain a "PKI/G30S clearance certificate" when applying for a government job. Those under 12 are not required to do so. However, one member from North Sumatra said that he knew of the case of a person born after 1965 who had been given a job in the civil service, only to be dismissed four months later when it was discovered that his father was allegedly "ex-PKI". [TAPOL Bulletin has monitored several cases like this in the past few issues.]

A.E. Manihuruk, chief of the State Personnel Administration Board was not too sure about the origins

## Censorship

Responsibility for the commission to examine and evaluate [Komisi Peneliti dan Penilai] performances put on by impressarios has been transferred from the Department of Education and Culture to Bakin, the State Intelligence Coordination Board. The Minister of Education, Fuad Hassan, who announced this, explained that a new presidential edict is to be issued soon, regulating the supervision of all public performances. Handing the commission over to Bakin in the interim reveals that the military are determined to reinforce their control over yet another area of public activity.

The commission deals with a wide range of matters involving security, such as the activities of foreigners, censorship and the like, and it was now considered beyond the competence of the Education Department to handle such things. [Kompas Minggu, 16 March]

### Javanology lecture called off

People who turned up to a meeting of the Javanology Institute, the Yayasan Panunggalan, to hear a lecture on "The Javanese belief in spirits" in Jogjakarta, were disappointed to hear that the lecture had been called off. The police permit that had already been granted was withdrawn at the last minute.

The organisers were told that the lecture would have to be "postponed" because conditions in the city were "not yet stable". On the day of the lecture, the head of the Institute had been summoned by the police to be told the lecture could go ahead, but he was summoned later that day and questioned by an officer in charge of intelligence. He returned home from this second meeting, thinking the permit was still valid, but soon afterwards, he got a letter to say the whole thing was off.

reforms. Present policies would lead to the elimination of the West Papuans as a people. Reforms would allow the West Papuans to express themselves and organise.

The long term struggle must be for self determination; the immediate struggle is to survive. The West Papuan struggle is a part of the worldwide fight back against colonialism. It takes place in the context of increasingly militant and articulate struggles by indigenous peoples and minorities everywhere for the right to survive and to manage their own affairs. Jakarta must be brought to realise that these are rights which cannot be denied.

Alan Smith

of the regulation establishing this 'bersih lingkungan' criterion, though he did know that the regulation about "clearance certificates" comes from General Murdani, commander of the army's security command, Kopkamtib.

### Keep cooperative boards clean of "ex-PKI"!

Bustanil Arifin, Minister for Cooperatives and head of the Logistics Board, Bulog, has instructed all cooperatives to make sure that no "ex-PKI/G30S" elements get elected onto their management boards. He informed a duly shocked audience that a small cooperative in Bandung had appointed an "ex-PKI element" as financial manager. He said all cooperative offices at all levels are being instructed to examine management boards throughout the cooperative movement to "keep them clean" [Kompas, 17 February].

### Banned seamen's union members first to be dismissed

Plans to rationalise the labour force in Surabaya's harbour by preventing shipping companies from handling loading and unloading will result in large-scale redundancies by the former. When asked whether reports of mass dismissals were true, a harbour official said, "Not at all!" People losing employment in shipping companies will all be absorbed by freight companies, he said, all, that is, except former members of the seamen's union, the SBPP [banned in 1965]. They would be sacked [Suara Merdeka, 13 March].



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