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Trade Union leader executed in secret

After 18 years in prison



Mohammed Munir

The former chairman of the All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation (SOBSI) Mohammed Munir, was executed in Jakarta on 14 May, 13 years after being sentenced to death and 18 years after being arrested. Some 15 years have passed since the Suharto regime last executed a political prisoner convicted in connection with the events of October 1965.

The news of Munir's execution has come as a great shock. It is an act of gross inhumanity for the Indonesian authorities to have proceeded with an execution after the convicted person has suffered the hardships of incarceration and separation from his family for so many years.

The execution took place under conditions of secrecy and in great haste. It has not been reported in the Indonesian press. A last request by Munir that he be allowed to meet his wife was not granted because his wife lives in Surabaya, East Java and the authorities would not postpone the execution to give her time to travel to Jakarta. Munir was therefore only able to say farewell to more distant relatives living in Jakarta.

Munir's execution places in jeopardy the lives of other political prisoners tried and sentenced to death in the early and mid 1970s. An Indonesian press report in April announced that preparations were being made for three former leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party to be executed after clemency pleas on their behalf, submitted several years ago, were turned down by General Suharto, the Indonesian president. (See page 2).

TAPOL has called on the British Government to condemn the execution of Munir at the meeting of the international aid consortium, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, to be held in Amsterdam on 4-5 June. It has also urged the British Government to use this opportunity to ask the Indonesian Government not to proceed with further executions in the interests of humanitarianism.

Mohammed Munir was born on 27 October 1925 in Madura. He founded the Automobile Workers Union in 1947 and was also active in the Union of Shipping Workers. In 1950, he became chairman of the Jakarta branch of the All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation (SOBSI) and later served the Federation at a national and international level. At the last SOBSI congress before it was banned in October 1965, Munir was elected chairman of the SOBSI National Council. He attended many international gatherings, among others, the International Transport Conference in 1952. He also became a member of the World Federation of Trade Unions general council.

He was arrested during an army raid in South Blitar, East Java where many members of trade unions and other banned organisations had gone into hiding to evade arrest during the nationwide mass arrests that followed the military takeover in 1965. He was sentenced to death in Jakarta in 1973. His High Court appeal against sentence was not rejected till November, 1981 and his Supreme Court appeal was not heard because the Court claimed the period for submission had lapsed. His wife pleaded on his behalf for presidential clemency in May 1983 but this too was rejected.

STOP PRESS

A two-way radio link-up with Fretilin inside East Timor has been opened in Australia. In the first official communication, ABC reporter Mark Aarons and Australian politicians interviewed Mau Hunu, deputy commander of Falintil, the armed resistance movement. A mass of information about conditions inside East Timor has been received through the link-up and will be reported in the next issue of TAPOL Bulletin.

Long term prisoners' lives in danger

Gatot Lestario (Sutaryo) and Djoko Untung, both members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) who were sentenced to death in 1976, still face the threat of execution even though the Indonesian government gave an assurance last November to the Dutch government that the executions would not be carried out (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No 67, January 1985). A third PKI prisoner, Rustomo, sentenced to death over ten years ago, in January 1976, is also in danger of execution. His plea for clemency was turned down by the president last December.

On 12 April, **Kompas** reported that Major-General Djatmika, Police chief for East Java, was making preparations for the execution of the three men and was only awaiting the permit of the Minister of Justice who would be the one to decide where the executions would take place. Djatmika announced that he had asked the public prosecutor's office to prepare a firing squad and a team of doctors, ready for the execution.

Since news of these preparations was received, there have been many pleas on their behalf to the Indonesian authorities, and as far as TAPOL is aware, no executions have taken place.

Readers wishing to support the campaign to save these men's lives should write to:

President Suharto
Istana Negara
Jalan Veteran
Jakarta

Lt Gen. Ismail Saleh
Minister of Justice
Jalan Hayam Wuruk
Jakarta

Hari Suharto
Public Prosecutor
Jalan Sultan Hasanuddin, 1
Jakarta, Indonesia


Hotline Asia Oceania of the Hongkong-based Centre for the Progress of Peoples, has called upon around 250 groups in all parts of the world to urge the Indonesian president to give the three prisoners clemency. Only if the three men are granted clemency will their lives be safeguarded and will they be able to hope for release from prison.

Rustomo

Now 65 years old, Rustomo was former deputy General Secretary of the East Java Provincial Committee of the PKI. He was arrested in May 1968, tried in late 1975, and sentenced to death in January 1976. He was accused of attempting to establish PKI influence within the Armed Forces prior to October 1965 and of being involved in the October 1965 events in Jakarta. (Information about Djoko Untung and Gatot Lestario was published in **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 66, November 1984.)

Ruslan Widjayastra

Another death sentence prisoner now at risk is Ruslan Widjayastra whose clemency plea was rejected at about the same time as Munir's. Ruslan was a member of SOBSI's National Council and second vice-chairman of its Central Bureau. Like Munir, he was arrested in South Blitar in 1968, then tried and sentenced in July 1974.



Ruslan Widjayastra, in court, as the death sentence was announced (*Sinar Harapan*, 4.6.74)

STOP PRESS

Three more prisoners to be executed

- **The Age** (Melbourne) reported on 29 May that the Indonesian Embassy in Canberra has confirmed that Gatot Lestario, Djoko Untung and Rustomo are due to be executed.
- In a wave of protests in Holland, there have been calls on the Dutch government to postpone the meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), due to take place in Amsterdam on 4-5 June. All political parties have called on the Dutch government to condemn Munir's execution in the strongest terms.
- In Australia, Sir Gareth Evans, spokesman for the Foreign Department, told the Senate of his government's deep dismay over Munir's execution.
- In a letter to the British government, Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, has called on the government to condemn "this barbaric act" at the IGGI meeting.

Investigation of a massacre

On 12 April, a court in Jakarta passed sentences of 1 to 3 years against 28 men accused of participating in a demonstration last September in Tanjung Priok. The men were accused of "waging resistance with violence" against the Indonesian Armed Forces. Many of the defendants had been seriously wounded when troops opened fire on them. Some were crippled for life, others still had bullets lodged in their bodies. Some were too ill to sit up during the proceedings. Sessions were frequently interrupted when members of the public wept at the sight of these unfortunate men.

When the incident occurred last year, there were calls for a public inquiry, but no inquiry was ever held. Instead, the victims of the massacre, not the perpetrators, were put on trial. Enough has appeared in the Indonesian press however to show that most of the evidence heard in court strongly challenged the Army's version of the incident. TAPOL has therefore decided to reproduce at length evidence presented during the trial which must rank as one of the most grotesque travesties of justice in Indonesian legal history.

The following account does not claim to be complete. No defence documents have yet been made available, only press reports which in many respects are of limited value. Since the

trial was held to legitimise the version of the massacre pronounced the morning after by General Benny Murdani, Commander of the Armed Forces, Indonesian newspapers were wary of publishing too much about the case for the defence. The Catholic daily, **Kompas**, provided the fullest reports, but even these were sketchy and far from complete, leaving many things unexplained. The Golkar daily **Suara Karya** published reports at variance on many points with reports in **Kompas** and other papers. Much of what **Suara Karya** reported was not based on what transpired in the courtroom; it appears to have been based on pre-trial interrogation reports even though most of these were retracted by the defendants in court.

The following account is further complicated because, until sentences were passed, all the defendants were identified only by initials. When their full names were published at the end of the trial, it was not always easy to identify the convicted men with their initials.

Most of the press clippings used below are from **Sinar Harapan** and **Kompas**. For some of the **Kompas** clippings and all references to **Suara Karya**, we relied on the logging of the trials published in **Indonesia Reports** for March 1985.

The Tanjung Priok massacre

On 12 September, a public meeting took place in Sindang Road, Rawabadak, Tanjung Priok to protest against the detention of four local inhabitants. After hearing speeches by several informal leaders including Amir Biki who was shot dead later that evening, the crowd divided into two groups and marched to the local police and army headquarters to demand the release of the four men. General Murdani's account of what happened next was broadcast by **Radio Republic Indonesia** the next day and reads as follows:

Murdani's Account

"After that, a 1,500-strong mass, some of them armed with chopping knives, sickles, crowbars and fuel, began marching to the headquarters of the security forces. Seeing this dangerous development, a unit of security forces, consisting of 15 persons, tried to prevent and obstruct the movement of the mob.

"The security unit made efforts to break up the mob by using persuasion. However, they answered with yells of "No compromise"! With the yells inciting the emotion of the masses, they pushed the security unit while swaying and raising up their sickles. When they were within a dangerous distance, the security unit began firing warning shots in the air. Because the mob did not obey, the security unit directed the shots into the ground and at the legs of the attackers. As such, casualties were inevitable.

"It was only after the arrival of other security units that the mob withdrew. . . Less than 30 minutes later, the mob attacked the security units again. Under such critical conditions, the security units were forced to shoot in order to prevent them from seizing weapons and to foil further attacks with sickles or other sharp objects. . .

"The victims have received due treatment. The government has conveyed its condolences to the families of the victims." (AFP, 13 September 1984.)

According to Murdani, on 13 September, 9 people were killed and 53 injured. On 3 October, he said the number of dead had risen to 18. This figure apparently includes not only people shot dead by the troops but also the victims of a fire that destroyed a Chinese shop which, the government alleges, was an act of arson by demonstrators.

Eye-witness accounts

TAPOL (January 1985, No.68) compiled the following summary

based on documents compiled from eye-witnesses that circulated in Indonesia after the Tanjung Priok affair. The fullest report, dated 20 September 1984 (23 Zulhijjah 1404 H), from Al Araf Mosque, was entitled "Bloody Wednesday Night in Tanjung Priok". (For the full text of this report, see Politics Supplement, **Indonesia Reports**, 15 January 1985.)

- ★ A large, unarmed crowd then marched to the local army and police offices to press their demand. Speeches at the rally had been relayed by loudspeakers over a wide area, as is the practice. By the time the marchers began, the streets were lined with heavily-armed troops.
- ★ The demonstrators were stopped short by a company of air artillery troops which has barracks in the area, and by three truckloads of troops armed with automatic weapons. Without warning, the troops fired direct into the crowd. Hundreds fell. Some of the injured who rose to their feet were killed by bayonets. Bystanders who tried to help the injured were shot.
- ★ Apart from a few of the injured who got away to local hospitals, local inhabitants were prevented from retrieving the bodies or helping the injured. Soon after the massacre, army trucks arrived to haul off the bodies and remove the injured, all of whom were transported to the Army Hospital in Jakarta. All other hospitals were instructed not to accept any casualties from the tragedy. Fire engines soon arrived on the scene to wash away all signs of blood on the street.
- ★ The most comprehensive account of the massacre puts the number of dead at 63 and the number of seriously wounded at over a hundred. The speed of the Army's cover-up operation explains why estimates of the casualties have been so difficult to confirm.
- ★ General Benny Murdani, Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief was present throughout the operation, watched its progress with Major-General Tri Sutrisno, Jakarta Military Commander, and is reported to have walked over the sprawled bodies of the dead and injured.

The trial

The indictment

The 28 defendants were accused of waging violent resistance, together with others not yet arrested, against the Armed Forces. They were said to have been armed with knives, sticks, crowbars, choppers, sickles and cans of petrol for arson attacks. Security forces obstructed their path and advised them to stop. They fired warning shots but regardless of this, the defendants and others threw stones, and struck and clubbed the security forces. Prior to the attack, they had attended a lecture meeting to hear the late Amir Biki and others speak. They then formed themselves into two groups to attack the local command posts of the police and the army, in order to release persons who were under detention. The defendants were also accused of engaging in activities of a political nature, displaying posters to disrupt public order and conducting a political demonstration, in breach of the 1963 anti-subversion law.

The Defence Team's protest

Following the indictment, defending lawyers Nursyamsi, H.C. Princen, H. Dault and Thomas Abon submitted a demurrer (*eksepsi*) complaining that most of the defendants had been seriously injured by forces of the State during the Tanjung Priok incident. They asked the court to arrange for the defendants to receive proper medical treatment. Some, they argued, should be allowed home under house arrest as they were in need of intensive care. The defence also objected to violations committed by the arresting authorities who had acted in breach of the Procedural Code (KUHAP).

The prosecutor denied that arrest procedures had been violated. He said the arrests were made in conformity with the procedures of the army security command, KOPKAMTIB which requires an arrest to be recorded in a document that is signed by the detainee.

All the objections and requests of the defence were rejected by the court.

The case of the Prosecution

All the prosecution witnesses were members of the army or the police; most were men in command of the units that fired on the demonstrators. Their evidence conformed with the Murdani account, claiming that the demonstrators ignored warning shots and advice to stop advancing on the security forces. One claimed that demonstrators had tried to seize his weapon. Their troops had first fired into the air and only after the crowd continued to press forward did they shoot down at people's feet. Two of the witnesses who commanded units that fired on the crowd were asked how many casualties had fallen but both said they did not know. None was able to identify any of the defendants as having been among their attackers, though one witness said he recognised eight defendants whom he saw in hospital when they were arrested. One witness was a police spy who attended the Sindang Road meeting incognito, then claimed he rushed to report to his office about plans to attack the police headquarters.

Although demonstrators were said to have attacked members of the security forces with their weapons, no one claiming to have been wounded in this way appeared at the trial. One officer who claims he was stabbed by a sharp instrument was unable to attend because he was, according to the prosecutor, still under treatment, so the court had to be satisfied with written evidence only. By contrast, the prosecution always made sure all the defendants were present in court despite their weak physical condition.

The prosecution submitted a number of weapons as exhibits. These were said to have been confiscated at the location of the incident, though no evidence was produced that any of these weapons were confiscated from, or indeed the property of, any of the defendants. None of the defendants recognised any of the weapons. The only exhibit they showed recognition of was a green flag, though it was not the one carried at the demonstration because it was a different size.

The evidence of the defendants

Hendra Sjafrri, 22 years, a student at the Customs and Excise Academy, was sentenced to three years.

Hendra was arrested on 20 September in Lampung while on a visit to his grandmother. His charge sheet alleged that he had "violently resisted officers".

Hendra was not present at the evening meeting in Tanjung Priok nor did he take part in the demonstration demanding the release of four detainees. After attending a P-4 (Pancasila indoctrination) course at his Academy, he returned home for a meal then went to a friend's home and spent the rest of the evening until 11.30 playing cards. They were some two kilometres from the scene of the incident and did not hear the gunfire. Two friends who played cards with him testified as witnesses in support of his statement. Nevertheless, Hendra was found guilty and given the heaviest sentence.

There appear to be two reasons for Hendra's selection as the prime culprit. First is the charge that when in Lampung, he delivered a lecture at a local mosque in which he allegedly mentioned the Tanjung Priok incident. In his own testimony, he denied this and said while in Lampung he was asked to address an assembly of children, and spoke about the need to study hard and to obey one's parents. He said nothing about Tanjung Priok. In addition, prosecution witness, Lieutenant Rein Kano, sub-district military commander, alleged that Hendra was the only one of all the defendants whom he knew and who, he said, was "close to" Amir Biki both before and during the incident. "Close to" before apparently means a close friend, whereas "close to" during the incident seems to imply standing close to the main speaker at the Sindang Road meeting. The fact that the defence produced two witnesses to testify that Hendra was two

kilometres away, playing cards, did not weigh at all with the court.

Hendra was one of the defendants who spoke in his own defence after the prosecution had demanded a sentence of five years. He was particularly bitter at being singled out for the harshest sentence and protested at the trial being referred to as "The case of Hendra and company".

Despite the evidence given in court by Hendra and reported fully in *Kompas*, the GOLKAR daily *Suara Karya* distorted his evidence and had him saying that he listened to Amir Biki's talk, that he watched the demonstration though did not take part, and



Sindang Road after the massacre (*Tempo*, 22.9.84)

that he went to Lampung on 28 September (he was in fact arrested there eight days earlier!) and talked to the children there about the Tanjung Priok incident.

Musolih bin Marzuki, 25 years, was sentenced to 27 months.

Musolih, like almost every other defendant in this trial, withdrew the official record of his pre-trial interrogation which he had signed. "If the prosecutor had seen how (the defendants) were interrogated beyond the limits of humanitarianism, he would certainly agree with us in retracting our interrogation depositions", he told the court.

The only press report available about Musolih's testimony appeared in *Suara Karya* which claimed that Musolih confessed that he listened to Amir Biki's speech, then, as "ordered" by Biki, he and others went to free the four detainees, damaging Chinese shops and homes on the way.

Marwoto, 25 years, was sentenced to 27 months.

He gave graphic testimony of the brutal behaviour of the troops towards the demonstrators. He told the court that he had listened to one of the speakers at the meeting before the demonstration, but did not join them on the demonstration as it was already very late. However, since the road was jammed, he was carried along with the crowd and had to abandon his cycle. On hearing continuous gunfire from the police station, he fell to the ground and lay prone in a drainage ditch. An AFP report goes further than the Indonesian press and reports Marwoto as saying that the army trucks drove into the crowd heedless of the people lying on the pavement, running over many of them.

He only got up from the ditch when approached by a police officer, and was immediately arrested. He was taken to the local military post and beaten there. Asked by the judge about his interrogation report, he said that he retracted the whole thing: "I don't know the contents. The interrogation officer didn't allow me to read it before I signed it". He signed whatever the police wanted as they were subjecting him to violence.

Tahir bin Sarwi was sentenced to 27 months.

(It is assumed that this defendant is the person identified in press reports as "Sar bin W".) He told the court he hadn't intended to join the crowd. He is from Tegal and had just arrived in Jakarta the same day. He didn't know the area and found himself being carried along with the crowd. However peripheral his involvement in the demonstration, he got one of the heaviest sentences.

He retracted the pre-trial interrogation report.

Dudung bin Supian, 21 years, a water-vendor, was sentenced to 20 months.

Dudung had heard from a mobile loudspeaker that there was going to be a religious meeting at Sindang Road, so he went along to hear. One speaker had said the "Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle" policy of the government was causing disquiet among Muslims. When the crowd dispersed, he went to the home of a friend nearby, but the crowd went by, shouting "Allahuakbar", so he joined it to find out what was going on. Then he heard continuous firing, and was shot in the thigh and the arm. People helped him get away, and got him into a hospital where he was under treatment for two months. On discharge, he was detained. When the judge asked him, "What were you carrying at the time of the meeting?" (meaning, apparently, in the way of a weapon) he replied: "Only Rp. 5,000 and that disappeared".

Amir bin Bunari, 20 years, was sentenced to 20 months.

He told the court he wanted to retract the pre-trial interrogation report which he had signed. The truth was that he had gone to the meeting but did not hear very clearly what was said because the loudspeaker kept breaking down. But he did hear one speaker call on the crowd to go and free the four detainees. He went with the section of the crowd that went in the direction of the military command but just as he got to the junction with Jos Sudarso Road, he heard continuous firing, then saw everyone fall to the ground. He tried to run away but he was



Cassettes of speeches made at the Sindang Road meeting. Possessing one is an act of subversion.

hit and lost two fingers. Others helped him get to the BPP Hospital in North Jakarta but he was later transferred to the Military Hospital and it was there that he was detained.

Armin bin Mawi, 20 years, was sentenced to 21 months.

(Probably the defendant identified as "AM".) He said he had listened to the lectures at Sindang Road from quite a distance, then joined the demonstration because he was curious to know what would happen to the four detainees. He was right at the back of the crowd so he didn't see anything when the firing began. He didn't know who was firing nor from which direction it came. He then realised that he had been hit in the stomach by a bullet and fainted.

Wasdjan bin Sukarma, 32 years, a forklift operator, was sentenced to 18 months.

(His age was given in one press report as 39.) He had just come home from work at the docks when he saw that a lecture was going on in Sindang Road. The vehicle he was travelling in could not proceed because the road was packed with people. He stood listening for about ten minutes, then proceeded on his way in the direction of Jos Sudarso Road by foot. There he waited for public transport. He saw about 1,500 people pass by, shouting "Allahuakbar", and when they had passed, he heard continuous shooting. Suddenly he realised that his head was bleeding and he fell into the gutter. He remembers two people helping him out of the gutter, and taking him by taxi to hospital. Only when he arrived at the hospital did he realise he had been hit by a bullet. After being there for four days, he was taken away by district military command soldiers for interrogation, then transferred to Cimanggis detention centre. (Apparently, troops searched

Jakarta hospitals after the massacre, looking for young men with bullet wounds.)

Nasrum bin Sulaimanah, 18 years, was sentenced to 18 months.

He told the court that he had not gone to the lecture at Sindang Road. His home is nearby, and he was playing pingpong when the meeting was taking place. Afterwards, he lay down in a nearby prayer-house and fell asleep. He was woken by a crowd passing by, shouting "Allahuakbar". He went out to take a look but when he heard firing, he ran home. Only after reaching home did he realise that he had been hit in the buttocks and the bullet had lodged in his stomach. He was rushed to hospital by his father, and was arrested three months later.

Suherman bin Surnata, was sentenced to 18 months.

He told the court he attended the lecture meeting on Sindang Road then went with the crowd to the military command hoping to see the four people in detention. He was shot twice in the hand as he dropped to the ground. Other people in the crowd rushed him to Koja Hospital but later he was removed by soldiers and transferred to the Gatot Subroto Military Hospital. When asked by the judge to confirm the contents of his interrogation report, he said he didn't know what was in it because when he signed it, he was not given a chance to read it.

Damsirwan bin Nurdin, 21 years, was sentenced to 15 months.

He did not attend the lecture meeting at Sindang Road as he was in Rawamangun. He returned home at about 11pm and saw a large crowd at the end of the alley leading to his home. But his *kakak* (older brother or sister) asked him to go out and look for their two *adik* (younger brothers or sisters) who hadn't come home yet. First he went to the Lido Theatre and there he saw the crowd (from the meeting) mingle with the people coming out of the theatre. As he hadn't found his two *adik*, he continued on his way to the Permai Theatre. Then he heard a lot of gunfire but took no notice and continued his search. When someone running beside him collapsed after having been shot, he too fell and lay stiff pretending to be dead, but a police officer came and kicked him in the head. The officer lifted him on to a truck and he was taken to Gatot Subroto Military Hospital. He found his 2 *adik* there; they had both been shot. Then he was detained. (The *Kompas* report does not explain how seriously the 2 *adik* were hurt, or whether they were killed. *Suara Karya* reported that one was shot in the leg which was later amputated. *SK* also reports that Damsirwan was hit by two bullets.)

Irta Sumirta, 17 years, was sentenced to 15 months.

He retracted the confessions reported in his pre-trial interrogation report. He told the court he attended the lecture meeting on Sindang Road, but didn't hear the speeches very clearly because the loudspeaker kept breaking down. He heard one of the speakers, whom he identified as Amir Biki, call on the crowd to press for the four detainees to be released. He went along with the crowd, and when the shooting started, he tried to get out of the way of the bullets, but he was hit in the thigh. People rushed him to the Jakarta Islamic Hospital, but later he was shifted from there to Gatot Subroto Army Hospital.

Mardi bin Wage, 25 years, was sentenced to 15 months.

This defendant told the court he didn't really know what was happening. At 10.30 that evening, he was in Sindang Road to listen to lectures by three speakers, Salim Kadar, M. Nasir and Yayan Handayana. (All three are now under arrest.) One of the things the speakers did was to ask the people in the crowd to go to the police and military headquarters to release four detainees. The defendant joined the part of the crowd that went to the police. He was about to go home when security forces closed the road and began firing. He managed to hide in a drainage ditch but was picked up by a police officer and arrested.

The defendant also retracted his pre-trial interrogation report. "I don't know what is in that report. The officer didn't let me read it before telling me to sign it", he told the court.

(Because of the difficulty of identifying the defendants by their initials, it may be that some of the information for Mardi bin Wage and Martowo has been wrongly attributed.)

Budi Santoso, 18 years, was sentenced to 15 months.

This defendant too made a point of formally retracting the confessions contained in his pre-trial interrogation report. He told the court he attended the lecture meeting in Sindang Road but had difficulty hearing the speakers because the loudspeaker kept breaking down. When later the firing began, he dropped to the ground when he saw others doing the same thing. When the shooting stopped, he got up to run away but realised that a bullet had hit him in the back and come out through the left side of his chest. Some people helped him to get to Koja Hospital, but after he had been given treatment there, he was removed to the Gatot Subroto Army Hospital.

Afriul bin Masur, 18 years, was sentenced to 15 months.

He told the court he had gone along to the meeting at Sindang Road but hadn't heard the speeches all too well because of the poor amplification. He did hear the call made to the crowd from the platform to go and demand the release of the four detainees. He too retracted everything contained in his interrogation report which he had not been allowed to read before signing.

Sudarso bin Rais, 19 years, was sentenced to 14 months.

He too said he was at the lecture meeting but could not hear the speakers clearly, though he did hear one of them call for the release of the four detainees. After the meeting ended, he joined the rest of the crowd. When later the firing started, he was shot in the hand, and still has a bullet (lodged). He also told the court he helped lift two other defendants on to a fire-engine to be transported to hospital. The two were Magsudi bin Irsad who was seriously wounded and still has a bullet lodged in his body, and Ismail bin Abdul Hamid, who was shot in the waist. Both of these wounded men are among the defendants.

Umar bin Sundu, 18 years, was sentenced to 15 months.

This defendant also retracted his pre-trial deposition. He had not been at the meeting, nor had he joined the demonstration, he was on his way home, going in the same direction as the demonstration. This is why it looked as if he was walking with the crowd at the time. He stopped at Permai Road to wait for public transport. Suddenly he heard firing, and seeing someone nearby shot, he ran to a nearby mosque to fetch a wooden stretcher, a *keranda* (used for burials). With others, he then began to carry the body to a safe place, but a security officer intercepted them and told them to put the victim down. Umar then went to the Semper mosque to get some sleep till things were safe, but a security officer told him to go home. On the way home he was arrested.

Ferdinan M. Silalahi, probably sentenced to 12 months

The only list of sentences available at the time of going to press is the one published by *Sinar Harapan* (12 April) which is unfortunately one name short. The missing name is Ferdinan Silalahi. We assume he received a 12 months sentence as the prosecution's demand for sentence, 18 months, was the same as that demanded for other defendants who were sentenced to 12 months.

Ferdinan was the only Christian in the group of 28. He told the court he had converted to Islam since his arrest. He attended the Sindang Road meeting at the suggestion of friends, because he was already interested in Islamic teachings. He had got his parents' permission to attend. When the speakers had finished speaking, he joined the crowd of demonstrators, but fled when he heard the sound of firing. He was arrested as he was getting on to a public transport vehicle (*omprengan*) to go home. He was held in Cimanggis detention centre where he met Syarifuddin Rambe, one of the four Tanjung Priok detainees and it was under his influence that he finally converted to Islam.

Yusron bin Zainuri, 25 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

This defendant is sometimes identified as "Yus", sometimes as "Mus". Reports of his evidence are available not only from the Indonesian press but also from AFP which filed a story on 2 March that Yusron told the court that the troops opened fire on the demonstrators *after* they had obeyed the order to halt. This clearly refutes Murdani's claim that demonstrators "mobbed" the troops even after being told to stop. Yusron said in court that as soon as the shooting finished, army trucks arrived on the scene to carry the casualties off to the Gatot Subroto Army Hospital in central Jakarta. He was himself thrown onto one of these trucks which was already filled with about 50 people.

During the demonstration, he was in the front ranks of the marchers and was able to see everything very clearly. He was hit several times. One bullet pierced him right through, another is still lodged in his body. Yet another hit him in the arm, and is also still lodged inside. He opened his shirt to show the court his wounds. A few days after testifying, Yusron collapsed during a trial hearing on 12 March (see **Sinar Harapan** of the same day). He was carried out of the courtroom by two soldiers and rushed to hospital for emergency treatment.

Yusron also told the court that for two months after the incident, he was in hospital, but his parents were never informed of his whereabouts. After consulting a *dukun* (spiritual healer), they assumed that he was dead and carried out a ceremony for the dead. It was only after he was discharged from hospital and allowed to return home that they realised that he was still alive.

Misdi bin Saimin, 16 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

His name appears in a group of six defendants whose testimony was heard on 7 March. No details about his testimony are provided in the **Kompas** report except that he retracted his pre-trial deposition and told the court that he attended the Sindang Road meeting.

Amir Mahmud bin Dulkasan, 20 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

Very little has been reported about his testimony in court, unless the information has been mixed up with testimony from someone else, over a confusion in initials.

Ismail bin Abdul Hamid, 20 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

He, like most of the defendants would not confirm the pre-

trial interrogation deposition because he was not able to read it when he was told to sign it.

He was among the crowd of demonstrators who went to Jos Sudarso Road to call for the release of the four detainees. He was shot and wounded when the firing started. When he was being lifted up onto a truck for transportation to hospital, he was beaten up by the troops, and two of his ribs were broken. He was hospitalised for four months because of the severity of his injuries.

Syafrizal bin Sofyan, 18 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

Nothing is reported about Syafrizal's testimony in court except that he too retracted the information contained in the pre-trial deposition which he had signed without being allowed to read.

Magsudi bin Irsad, 22 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

(This defendant is sometimes identified as "Mach".) Of all the defendants still suffering from the wounds inflicted five months earlier in Tanjung Priok, Magsudi was clearly the most seriously ill. At the hearing (reported in **Kompas** on 1 March), two of the defence lawyers made a special plea on his behalf. They told the court that although a bullet was still lodged in his chest, no operation had been performed, only superficial treatment administered. His physical condition was rapidly deteriorating. The lawyer asked the court to designate a hospital to perform an urgently-needed operation to remove the bullet. Without a court order, no hospital would take him in for treatment as all hospitals had been ordered not to treat the defendants. The prosecutor rejected this and said that according to a special decision, these detainees may only be treated at the Police Hospital in Kramat Jati. It was not possible therefore for the defendants to be transferred. During most of the trial, Magsudi was not able to sit inside the courtroom but lay on a long wooden chair (a bench?) outside the courtroom. He was described as being very thin, just skin and bone, according to one report.

The first time Magsudi appeared inside the courtroom was on 14 March to testify. He was by now "even thinner". As he was escorted into the courtroom, the rancid smell of wounds which were still discharging pus, could be felt throughout the room. He was placed on a chair with his legs supported on another chair.

The defendant who makes his living selling bananas told the



Graffiti in Tanjung Priok: 'Hidup Islam' (long live Islam). (*Tempo*, 27.10.84)

court he did not attend the meeting at Sindang Road, but he overheard the speeches from the place where he was selling fruit, about three hundred metres away. After selling all his wares, he left for home but the crowd began to move. He went along because he was curious to see what was going on. When he reached the traffic lights at Jos Sudarso Road, he saw the demonstration stop in front of the troops. The crowd was only shouting "Allahauakbar" and waving their arms, so, thinking this was not very interesting, he started to go home. He had walked only four metres when he heard gunshots. He was hit in the buttocks and stomach as he was about to drop to the ground, and lost consciousness.

When cross-examined by the judge, Magsudi frequently replied that he couldn't remember anything more. Neither the prosecutor nor the defence lawyers asked him any questions when given the opportunity by the court.

For some idea of the degree of distortions about the trial in the press, *Tempo* (2 February) reports that Magsudi was wounded "by warning shots" from the security forces.

Cecep Basuki bin Wagi, 16 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

He is one of the youngest of all the defendants. He told the court he was not present at the Sindang Road meeting. He had gone out that evening to see a film at the Permai Theatre but because the film he wanted to see was no longer playing he went to a food stall to have a plate of noodle soup instead. As he finished eating, the demonstration passed by, so he got up and joined them. When the shooting started, he dropped to the ground until it stopped. Then an officer beat him with his rifle butt. After ten days' treatment in hospital, he was arrested. *Suara Karya* has him saying that he cried because he was afraid of the noise of the guns. He was taken to Guntur (military police) prison and interrogated. He said "yes" to everything in the hope that they would stop barking at him.

Asep Syafruddin bin M Subandri, 21 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

He was out shopping at Permai Market which stays open till late at night. He did not attend the Sindang Road meeting. After buying a typewriter ribbon for his parents, he saw demonstrators walking along, shouting "Allahuakbar". He was going in the same direction as the demonstrators but was about 300 metres behind. When he heard the firing start, he ran to take shelter in the small alleyways nearby. As he was running, he noticed a

lorry with security troops coming up behind him. Then a bullet hit him in the head, and he fell unconscious.

Iuscone bin Ilyas, 20 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

This defendant makes it clear that the crowd stopped when ordered to do so by the troops, contradicting General Murdani's claim that the troops starting shooting "in self-defence".

The defendant said he heard Amir Biki's speech and said the speaker asked the crowd to divide into two groups. At first, he was not intending to join in but did so out of curiosity and found himself at the head of the group moving towards the police headquarters. When they reached Jos Sudarso Road, he saw armed troops blocking the road. An officer warned the crowd to stop and they did. Without any reason, the officer then fired. The defendant was the first to be struck down. Two bullets lodged in his chest; he showed the court the two small holes. "One bullet has been removed, the other is still inside", he said.

Asked by a defence lawyer whether he had seen the crowd carrying weapons like crowbars or rocks which the prosecution had submitted as exhibits, the defendant said, "No". (*Suara Karya*'s much shorter account of this defendant's testimony has him saying that the crowd continued to advance after being told to stop.) This defendant's testimony also refutes the Army's claim that the troops first fired warning shots into the air before firing straight at the crowd.

Wahyudi bin Saleh, 22 years, was sentenced to 12 months.

This defendant can only walk with the aid of a pair of crutches. He said he attended the Sindang Road meeting and joined the demonstrators who made their way to the Army headquarters. He was immediately behind someone carrying a green banner. He too testified that the crowd had stopped advancing when ordered to halt by the troops; he said that when they were obstructed by armed security officers, they halted, some standing, some sitting down in front of the soldiers. Then, without any apparent reason, the soldiers started firing. The crowd dispersed, running off or dropping to the ground. He himself was shot in the foot as he tried to get up and run. After the shooting stopped, officers approached the victims sprawled on the ground. When he asked an officer for help, he was kicked and beaten. After being hospitalised for two months at the Gatot Subroto Army hospital, he was discharged and sent home. He was arrested in December without an arrest warrant or any report to his neighbourhood chief or his parents.

The end of the trial

The Prosecutor's Summing-up

In his summing-up of the proceedings, the prosecutor, Soerjadi, WS, showed that he treated evidence produced by the defendants with contempt. He claimed that it had been convincingly proven that the defendants waged resistance with violence. Evidence presented by the witnesses, almost all of whom were members of the security forces, (as far as we know, the only non-ABRI witnesses were the two who appeared on behalf of Hendra bin Sjafrin) has proven, he said, that the security forces faced thousands of people who were "bristling" (*beringas*) with resistance, as a result of which several members of the security forces were wounded. He claimed that there was no evidence that force had been used during the interrogation of the defendants and that therefore the interrogation reports were perfectly valid documents of evidence. By retracting their interrogation reports, the prosecution argued, the defendants had only reinforced the proof of their guilt. He dismissed the evidence presented by witnesses on behalf of Hendra Sjafrin as worthless.

Evidence from the prosecution witnesses had proven convincingly that the defendants had been wielding offensive weapons, notwithstanding the fact that none of the defendants admitted this. Moreover, since the defendants had confessed to having attended the Sindang Road meeting, there was no

question of their guilt.

Kompas (23 March) reported that as the prosecutor mentioned each defendant by name to demand sentence, people in the public gallery started weeping. Soon the weeping and wailing was so loud that the prosecutor could only make himself heard by shouting above all the noise. He demanded sentences ranging from 18 months to five years.

Before the defence lawyers delivered their defence statements many of the defendants delivered their own defence pleas. This too proved to be a very emotional occasion as many of them were unable to conceal their feelings and wept as they described their sufferings on the night of 12 September and subsequently from the injuries inflicted, and the brutalities to which they were subjected during detention.

The Defence Plea

The defence lawyers insisted that none of the charges made against the defendants by the prosecution had been proven in court. The only thing that was clear was that most of them had attended a meeting at Sindang Road on 12 September 1984 and had then gone on a demonstration. None of the prosecution witnesses heard in court was able to testify that they had seen any of the defendants conducting acts of violence against the

troops or carrying any of the "weapons" presented in court as exhibits. On the contrary, 24 out of the 28 defendants were injured when troops opened fire. "Where is the logic", asked defence lawyer H.C. Princen, "if the people who fired the shots are not punished while those who were shot are?"

He later told an Australian journalist: "The sentences called for by the Government are very heavy if one considers my clients are victims and the prosecution can't prove anything." He laughed when he was asked whether he thought he could win the case: "It is almost impossible to get a fair hearing in the case of a political trial." (*Weekend Australian*, 6-7 April, 1985.)

The Court Verdict

This almost point-for-point follows the arguments presented by

the prosecution in their summing-up. While the court did not press the subversion charge, it found all the defendants guilty of having tried to "storm" a police station and an army command post. The court was satisfied, on the basis of the testimony of police interrogators, that the defendants had signed their interrogation statements free from pressure or duress, and therefore accepted these statements as valid evidence regardless of the many retractions in court.

The court accepted as "extenuating circumstances", weighing in the defendants' favour, the fact that some of them had had to undergo major surgery for the removal of bullets and that most of them were still young. But one "aggravating" circumstance was that they "often attended talks and sermons with 'extremist' tendencies".

The Bombings Trial

A political frame-up

Nine people have been on trial for subversion in connection with a series of bombing incidents in Jakarta on 4 October 1984. Sentences passed so far are:

H. Muhammad Sanusi, 64 years, member of Petition-of-50 group, businessman and former minister (1966-68) for textile industries, was given a sentence of 19 years, the heaviest sentence of all, on trumped-up charges of funding the bombing campaign.

Melta Halim, a salesman, 32 years, who admitted to having planted one of the bombs, was given a sentence of 14 years.

Chaerul Syah, a 21-year-old student, who admitted to having helped the bombing campaign by setting the timers, was given a sentence of 10 years.

Rachmat Basoeeki Soeropranto, who confessed to having helped organise and plan the bombings, was given a sentence of 17 years.

Eddy Ramli, another of the men who confessed to planting one of the bombs, was given a sentence of 16 years.

Hasnul Arifin, involved in the bombings as the person who stored explosives, and who was also intending to produce a leaflet about the Tanjung Priok massacre, was given a sentence of 15 years.

The three others on trial are: **Muhammad Tasrif Tuasikal**, **Jayadi** and **Amir Wijaya**.

On 4 October last year, two Jakarta branches of Bank Central Asia were the targets of a bombing campaign. A third target, a Chinese-owned shop, was selected at the last minute instead of the BCA head office which turned out to be too heavily guarded. The Bank Central Asia is part of the huge finance and business empire of Liem Sioe Liong, a close business associate of President Suharto. Two people were killed by the blast at the shop, while a number were injured by the other blasts, including Jayadi, one of the men who planted the bombs.

The bombing campaign was unleashed shortly after the Tanjung Priok massacre in a wave of disturbances that reflected the disquiet and unrest among many Indonesian Muslims, not only because so many people had been killed but also because the statement issued by General Murdani on 13 September was a crude distortion of the facts. (See item on the trial of the 28, pages 3-8.) But the unrest more generally reflects resentment and dissatisfaction among many Muslims at the regime's determination to force all political and social organisations to accept the State ideology, Pancasila, as their sole ideology (*azas tunggal*) including organisations based on religious beliefs.

The three main figures being charged, Rachmat Basuki, Tasrif Tuasikal and Abdul Qadir Djaelani whose trial is scheduled to commence in June, on charges of "extremist lecturing", have been involved in previous actions to oppose adoption of the Pancasila, and were all sentenced to terms of imprisonment for involvement in an incident in March 1978 when the upper chamber (MPR) was discussing matters relating to State ideological indoctrination.

Seven of the nine trials started simultaneously in January, with the odd spectacle of defendants also being called to testify as witnesses in each other's trials. The two men whose trials were deferred till later, commencing only after most of the evidence had been heard in the other trials, were Moh. Tasrif Tuasikal and Amir Wijaya. The reasons will become clear below, as both men appear to have been playing disruptive roles within the group.

The Plot against Sanusi and the Petition-of-50 group

Of all the nine "BCA bombing" defendants, the only one who denied any involvement in the bombings is Moh. Sanusi who was accused of having supplied half a million rupiahs to fund the blasts, of supplying detonators and of helping to plan the bombing campaign.

Sanusi has been a leading member of the Muslim social organisation, Muhammadiyah for many years. He was a member of the DPR (Indonesia's parliament) from 1971-77 for the Muslim Party, Parmusi and later for the merged United Development Party (PPP). In 1980, he joined forces with critics of the regime to issue the "Petition of 50". He is one of the least charismatic members of the group and has no former military backing, by contrast with men like Marine Corps officer, Lieutenant-General Ali Sadikin, Police General Hugeng Imam Santoso. Nor does he enjoy the stature of dissident politicians like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. He also has business connections with one of the acknowledged organisers of the bombing campaign, Rachmat Basuki. His vulnerability led the authorities to single him out as the victim of a plot to establish a link between the bombing campaign and the Petition-of-50 group, in order to discredit the group.

The prosecution used Sanusi's connections with Basuki to pin the label of "bombing financier" on him, alleging that he gave half a million rupiahs to Basuki for the campaign. According to Sanusi, this was part of a broker commission he owed Basuki for a land deal. He told the court the only cash he gave Basuki for non-business reasons was Rp 60,000 and another £45,000 to investigate the facts about the Tanjung Priok massacre and print a leaflet presenting the facts. This leaflet was to have been produced by Hasnul Arifin to whom the money was passed, but the leaflet never appeared because Hasnul said that he could not find a printer prepared to take the risk involved.

The case against Sanusi had relied heavily on the testimony of the other defendants, claiming he provided half a million rupiahs for the bombs. (Sanusi never denied supplying money for an

investigation of the Tanjung Priok affair.) But at hearings on 9 March, Rachmat Basuki and Melta Halim both withdrew statements made during pre-trial interrogations about Sanusi. (It was later reported that Rachmat Basuki wrote a letter to Sanusi apologising for having got him into such deep trouble.)

Basuki said the interrogators from the *kejaksaan* (public prosecutor's office) were "directing" the interrogations in order to incriminate Sanusi. "I was afraid I would end up like Hasnul Arifin. He was in a ghastly state. I didn't dare say anything different. I was psychologically under duress (*tidak bebas*)". In his own trial, Melta Halim declared that until the time of his arrest, he knew nothing at all about Sanusi. In prison, he heard so many conflicting stories from Rachmat Basuki about Sanusi that he didn't know where the truth lay. (*Kompas*, 10 March.)

Three days later, Tasrif Tuasikal and Hasnul Arifin also withdrew an earlier testimony incriminating Sanusi. Tuasikal's revised testimony suggests that even before the bombings, he had been trying to implicate Sanusi in the plot. He first testified that the detonators used were supplied by Sanusi but now said that when he asked Sanusi to provide detonators, "Sanusi greeted this coldly". It turns out in fact that Tuasikal didn't even need detonators at the time as everything required for the bomb attacks was already at hand. "I only asked him for detonators because I wanted to inveigle him into giving money. (Tuasikal's words suggest a deliberate attempt to trap Sanusi. If this is so, there is good reason to believe that army intelligence had infiltrated the BCA bombing group.)

As for Hasnul Arifin, the extreme pressures exerted on him became clear during intense cross-examination by defence lawyer Yap Thiam Hien when Arifin appeared as a witness in the trial of Rachmat Basuki. At first, when he withdrew testimony incriminating Sanusi, he claimed no force was used during interrogation. But when pressed by Yap, he told the court that before being interrogated by the police, he was interrogated by others whom he could not identify, nor did he know which authority they worked for. As Yap persisted with his questioning, the prosecution intervened, complaining that this line of questioning was "irrelevant". For once, the judges upheld the defence counsel's line of questioning. Then Hasnul proceeded to tell the court that he was arrested on 7 October by people not in uniform and without an arrest warrant. He spent the first two days at Kodim (the district military command), then was taken, blindfolded to a secret destination and interrogated by unknown people. Still blindfolded, they started to beat him. "It felt like rattan", he said. After being beaten up, he was told to make a statement and sign it fast. Later, he admitted that when under police interrogation, he could not get the image of these earlier interrogators out of his mind so proceeded to make up many things in his statement to the police.

With their case against Sanusi now in shreds, the prosecution then introduced a new witness four days later in the next hearing of Sanusi's trial. This was a man named Amir Wijaya who proceeded to incriminate Sanusi with a new set of allegations, claiming now that Sanusi gave him Rp 100,000 to buy detonators. He even alleged that Sanusi took part in the decisions about the choice of targets. This witness was fiercely




Sanusi and his wife after the verdict. (*Jakarta Post*, 17.5.85)

cross-examined by Yap. He was unable to say when he was arrested though recollected that it was by the army in Garut, West Java. In breach of procedure, no report of his pre-trial interrogation was submitted to court and the court refused to comply with a request from Yap for documents proving that Amir was detained at Salemba Prison as he claimed in court. The witness refused to answer many of Yap's questions and even used threatening language against the lawyer. As for Sanusi, he totally rejected Amir's testimony as complete fabrication.

At a subsequent hearing, Sanusi demolished the testimony of Amir. His own enquiries at Salemba Prison revealed that Amir had never been detained there. Amir's claim to have met Sanusi on 8 October was false because he was on his way home from Japan on that day.

He devoted some time to explaining to the court why he signed the White Paper on the Tanjung Priok incident. He rejected allegations that the White Paper was "illegal" or "secretive" (*gelap*). It was properly signed and intended for submission to the government as a contribution to seeking the true facts. He vigorously denied any connection between the White Paper and the BCA bomb blasts.

Unfortunately for Sanusi, however, the prosecution pursued its case against him undeterred by the damage inflicted on their case during Yap's persistent cross-examination. In his summing-up, the prosecutor demanded the death sentence, and on 15 May, the court passed a 19-year sentence against Sanusi. For a man his age, this amounts to a life sentence.



Eddi Ramli and daughter



Melta Halim




Chaerul Syah

Yap Thiam Hien sentenced to three months

While Yap Thiam Hien was fighting hard to protect the rights of his "BCA bombings" clients, he was himself being tried on charges connected with a case he defended in the late 1970s. The charges involved an announcement he placed in the press in 1979 on behalf of his client, asking her nephew to account for money he had run off with. The nephew was later cleared of this charge, but Yap argued in court that solicitors could not be charged with defamation of character for actions they took on behalf of clients. The nephew died several years ago, and moreover, the charge levelled against Yap should never have proceeded because, according to the statute of limitations, it was already out of date.

During the Yap trial, both Yap himself and his defence counsel, Haryono Titrosubono engaged in fierce exchanges with the chairman of the court. In the event, the court found Yap guilty of a secondary charge of "causing unpleasantness" while the first charge was dropped because of the statute of limitations. In passing sentence however, the chairman of the court made a number of very offensive remarks about Yap. He refused to accept Yap's age (he is 72) as an "extenuating" circumstance. Instead, he accused Yap of being "as stubborn as an old donkey. The older he gets, the more set he becomes in his ways". Moreover, he said, Yap was "arrogant, egotistical and wanting only to win (*mau menang sendiri*)".

A few days after sentence was passed, several members of the DPR publicly denounced the judge for his very emotional attack on Yap.



Yap Thiam Hien

The trial was clearly timed to discredit Yap while he was defending the "BCA" cases. Originally, he should have been tried together with his client, but even though she failed to turn up and was now abroad indefinitely, the court decided to proceed with the case against him alone and excluded her from the charge sheet.

Sources: **Sinar Harapan**, 2 April, 30 April and 3 May; **Jakarta Post**, 1 May 1985.

Lawcourts will supervise lawyers

The chairman of the Supreme Court, Lieutenant-General Ali Said has announced that a new regulation is soon to be introduced granting powers to the chairmen of high courts throughout the country to exercise supervision over lawyers. Under the new regulation, lawyers will be required to register with their regional high court chairman and will be able to practise only if they receive a licence to do so from this official.

The announcement came in response to a request for clarification from lawyers in East Java after the chairman of the Surabaya High Court introduced a regulation requiring lawyers to register and stipulating that they would need licences to practise which would have to be renewed every two years. Until now,

lawyers have needed only a licence from the Ministry of Justice when they start practising and there has never been any question of renewal throughout their career.

The Surabaya decision followed soon after Pamudji, a well-known lawyer there, was suspended from practising by the Surabaya District Court. Not long afterwards, Pamudji died of a heart attack. (See **TAPOL Bulletin** No 68, January 1985.) Surabaya lawyers had hoped Ali Said would refuse to uphold the new registration system. "They are forcing us to our knees", said one East Java lawyer, Trimoeoyo Soerjadi. In the words of **Tempo** (20 April), "it looks as though the era of free movement for lawyers is coming to an end".



The entire workforce at the United Can Company went on a one-day strike in May. Here, Labour Minister Admiral Sudomo tells the workers that 'Pancasila labour relations' forbids strikes (*Jakarta Post*, 8.5.85)

Just out

Indonesian Workers and their Right to Organise



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The Church which is moved by the deep conviction that it "not only has the right, but also the duty to express an authorised view" (Pope Pius XII, radio-message of June 1, 1941) on events that affect the social lives of people, feels the need to throw light, through its doctrine, upon the present situation of the people of East Timor. The Church in Timor shares with the People "the sorrow that oppresses it, the pain that torments it and the anguish it feels" (S.B. Antoine Pierre Khoraichei, Patriarch of Antioquia, Pastoral Letter, Lent 1976, G.S. No.1)*

The Church knows that the Timorese families have lost dearly beloved relatives, freedom, wealth and property; the Church is aware of the fact that minds have hardened with the terror of war, privation and exodus of the people of East Timor.

The Church in Timor, moved by the conscience of duty itself and sensitive to the appeals of many and to the voice of a great majority, believes that the moment has come to put forward the principles and standards which will enable its attitude towards the problem of the people of East Timor to be understood, whilst making no claim to call upon itself the means of solving these same problems.

In the case of East Timor, where it enjoys a close relationship with the People, the Church, in the exercise of its mission, has not remained nor can remain indifferent or divorced from the historical vicissitudes of this same People.

Conscious of this mission, the Church wishes to set down what it feels to be vital and urgent for the defense and safeguarding of the fundamental values and human rights of the people of East Timor, as well as their identity, at this historical moment in time.

Facts

The 25th of April of 1974 brought the people of East Timor the opportunity to exercise their inalienable rights of freedom and the ability to choose their own future.

Basing themselves on this right, recognised by the Portuguese government and promoted by the United Nations, three major political parties were formed, each with its own political ideas about how this right should be exercised. Notwithstanding the efforts of all concerned to find a solution that would safeguard the identity of the people of East Timor, the divergences arose to such an extent as to lead to an armed conflict. The present armed conflict, however, which we are encouraged to see as a fratricidal war, is in fact a struggle between the superior strength of the regular Indonesian army and those forces originally involved in the safeguarding of the identity of the Timorese people.

Doctrinal Principles

Having experienced with the People all the events, which, since 1975, have deeply affected the social and political life of this same People, the Church bears anxious witness to facts that are slowly leading to the ethnic, cultural and religious extinction of the identity of the People of East Timor.

The Church wholeheartedly proclaims and desires Peace, friendship and well-being for all peoples. The Church affirms with the strength that comes from its own mission that "the people are sovereign over their own destiny" (RH, No.17, cfr. PP No.65)*

The Church understands this principle to mean that the people have rights, which are necessary to safeguard in any and every circumstance.

In our times, in which social awareness has grown enormously, no people freely accepts being governed by another. Only a real respect for such rights endows legitimacy to any regime. Furthermore the right of authority can only be understood in the context of objective and inviolable human rights.

The Church is also convinced that the violation of human rights is linked to the violation of the rights of a nation, with which Man is intimately tied, as it were, to a greater family.

We recognise that the Indonesian government has undertaken development in several sectors of the social life in East Timor, such as in schooling, agriculture, the media, transport and health. On the other hand, since 1975 and to the

Statement by the Catholic Church

present, the people of East Timor have suffered the horrors of war, a war they did not want. There is no harmony among its children; the well-being and happiness desired by all are far from being reality for the majority of the people. The Timorese people are exhausted, their dearest hopes are frustrated and they have been deluded by so many promises. That is why we must have the courage to go to the roots of all these ills. All parties involved in this conflict must assume their own responsibilities. We cannot divide them into good and evil.

Keeping a clear head, free from political bias and preconceived ideas, let us examine the facts. We cannot build the future on a present undermined by past mistakes. We must have the courage to analyse these errors of the past to enable the goal to which all aspire to be reached after the cause of such ills has been removed.

Analysis

Throughout centuries the Church in East Timor has shared the lot of the People and the social and political conditions that have affected their lives. That is why the Church in East Timor has



Mgr. Belo (right) with his predecessor, Mgr. Martinhu da Costa Lopes (centre) in Dili

always been present and has identified with the Timorese people, rejoicing in the satisfaction of the people towards order, prosperity and freedom, and being sorrowful at the sadness of the people towards oppression, errors and misfortune. Difficult times for the people of East Timor have also been difficult for the Church.

After nine years of occupation by the Indonesian government of this territory, which it considers to be an integral part of the Indonesian nation, the war which they would have us believe to be a civil war goes on and continues to grow, which is witnessed by the constant arrival of Indonesian troops together with heavy war material, the deployment of more than 10 military helicopters for operational purposes and of several airforce combat aircraft. In view of the permanent insecurity of the population in many regions of East Timor, the continuous exodus of the Timorese people, forced migrations to resettlement camps and the absence of freedom of circulation,

the head of the h of East Timor

we think that the moment has come to put the following questions:

Is all this merely brought about by a stubborn minority or does it reveal something deeper about the demand for basic rights of the people?

The Church believes that the people of East Timor feel that fundamental human rights have been violated. Among these rights is the right of the Timorese people to choose and direct their own future. This means in fact the right to govern one's life according to one's own identity.

The Indonesian government proceeds from the assumption that the people of East Timor have already exercised their right to self-determination. However, as the necessary conditions for this have not yet been created, the Church considers that here resides one of the causes behind the situation of anguish experienced by the people of East Timor over the last nine years. A war that continues for nine years cannot be imputed to the blind obstinacy of a minority.

If that were so, what would then be the explanation of the arrests, disappearances and the deportation of thousands of civilians during these nine years? On the other hand, if the majority of the Timorese people have already chosen their future, why then do they continue to be persecuted and eliminated?

These are the questions that come to mind to anyone who has witnessed all the events which have taken place since August 1975. It is therefore a necessary and urgent prerequisite for peace, social harmony and well-being that the Timorese people effectively enjoy all their basic human rights.

Ethnic, Religious and Cultural Identity

All human beings aspire to fulfil their own personal identity as an integral part of the environment in which they live. When internal or external factors lead to a divorce or, even more serious, to loss of this identity, the person as such is annihilated.

In East Timor we are witnessing an upheaval of gigantic and tragic proportions in the social and cultural framework of the Timorese people, whose identity is threatened by destruction. Each community and ethnic group has its own identity. In each community there is a set of cultural patterns and models of behaviour which are acquired by each of its members and that determine common feelings and attitudes. This common core of feelings and attitudes which all the members of a same society share, forms what some scientists call the fundamental framework of their personalities.

This is not the time to study the identity of the Timorese people. In the midst of this catastrophe that is afflicting the people of East Timor, the Church concentrates its attention on the individual and cannot help but proclaim the message of salvation and human dignity, whilst condemning injustice and the threat to human dignity.

1. The ethnic identity of the Timorese people is being gravely violated and threatened as the following facts demonstrate:

- Successive, systematic and regular "cleaning-up operations" of the Indonesian army against centres of resistance.
- The permanent threat of reprisals with summary execution by shooting of men and youths of the villages which are considered to be sympathetic, refuge or support for the resistance forces.
- The enlistment of minors as auxiliary forces in military operations.
- Waves of arrests of villagers, even the most simple and humble peasants.
- The inefficiency of sanitary assistance to the population for numerous illnesses many of which are endemic.
- The concentration of the population in resettlement camps



A group of 'model farmers', transmigrants to East Timor, before their departure. The Governor of Bali is there to see them off (*Jakarta Post*, 13.5.85)

in inhuman conditions without recourse to self-sufficiency, making it dependent on irregular supplies.

- The recruitment of the more able members of the population and their preparation for military operations.
- The compulsory night-watch duty which is carried out under inhuman conditions.
- The systematic occupation of key-posts in the public administration by Indonesians, generally belonging to the military, which means a gradual expulsion of the Timorese.
- The gotong-royong ("Mutual-help Program") which is being carried out in ignorance of people's needs.

2. Religious identity

The Timorese people live their religious beliefs. They recognise the existence of the Maromac, supreme being, as the source of all temporal and spiritual wealths. They worship *lulics* (sacred relics) and have the cult of the souls of their forefathers. Sacred houses are built where the instruments of the cult are kept.

After the arrival of the Catholic missionaries many Timorese abandoned animism and became Christians. Today there are about 400,000 Catholics in East Timor.

To ignore the religious tradition of the Timorese, even that of animism, and to attribute the same standing to Christianity as to other religions, is an attempt to destroy the people's beliefs. On the ethical and moral level the Timorese people live according to the principles of the Gospel and Christian morals.

By accusing priests, arresting those who teach the catechism, banishing and slaughtering the Christians, they are attempting to put an end to the religious feelings of the people and, as a consequence, the identity of the Timorese people itself.

3. Cultural identity

"In general terms, the word culture means all things by which Man perfects and develops the multiple capacities of his mind and body; endeavouring by his study and efforts to master the world around him, making it more human through the progress of customs and institutions; and finally, in time, culture has become communication with others and preserves in its works the great spiritual experiences and aspirations so that they may benefit many people and even humanity as a whole" (GS No.53).*

The people of East Timor have their own way of expressing their feelings through legends, stories and traditions that are manifested in certain usages and customs.

In contact with the Portuguese civilisation and under the influence of Christianity, this culture has taken on new forms and values of expression which provide the Timorese with a notion of their own historic identity. In short: there is a Timorese culture that is made up of words, attitudes, emotions, reactions, behaviour, ways of being and seeing the world. It is in these things that the people recognise their own culture and in it their own identity. They take pride in it and feel security in this background to their own future.

All attempts to hinder or to prevent this evolution would be

an attack that the people of East Timor like any other people would find intolerable.

The attempt to Indonesianise the Timorese people through powerful Pancasila (Indonesian State Ideology) Campaigns, schooling and media, by divorcing the people from their own *weltanschauung*, represents a slow assassination of the Timorese culture. To kill their culture is to kill the people themselves.

"Rich or poor, each country has its own civilisation passed down from its forefathers with institutions required by earthly life and higher manifestations – artistic, intellectual and religious – of the spiritual life. When the latter possess true human values, then it is a great mistake to sacrifice them to the former. A people which gave its consent to this would lose the best of itself, it would sacrifice its own reason for living in the misapprehension that it was seeking life itself. The words of Christ are also true for the peoples: What use is the whole world to a man, if he must lose his soul?" (PP Nr.40, Mt. 16.26)*

Conclusion

These considerations and this judgement of conscience the Catholic Church in East Timor addresses to the Indonesian government. As we have previously mentioned, the motive behind this action is the awareness of a sacred duty of

faithfulness to the divine mission of the Church itself and absolute fidelity to the people to whom we were sent to proclaim Truth, Justice, Love and Human Dignity according to the spirit of the Gospel and the social doctrine of the Church.

We appeal with the greatest urgency and energy for total respect for the fundamental human rights and ethnic, cultural and religious identity of the people of East Timor.

We also appeal that conditions indispensable for an open, frank and fruitful dialogue between the different parties involved in the problem should be created, in which especially the People of East Timor, represented by the active movements, whether inside the country or abroad, should take part free from any form of coercion.

The Apostolic Administrator and the
Council of Priests of the Diocese of Dili
Dili, January 1st, 1985
Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo
(Apostolic Administrator)

Notes

- RH Encyclical "Redemptor Hominis"
- PP Encyclical "Populorum Progressio"
- GS Encyclical "Gaudium et Spes"

Indonesia cries 'forgery'

Soon after the Belo document became public, the **Jakarta Post** (11 May) claimed that the Papal Nuncio in Jakarta had received a cable from Mgr Belo denying that he wrote a document on human rights violations in East Timor. This will not be the first time that the Papal Nuncio, Mgr Pablo Puente has come to the aid of the Indonesian government in a tight corner on East Timor. In 1982, the Papal Nuncio was given as the source for a claim in the Indonesian press that the Vatican was of the opinion that the welfare of the people of East Timor would be best served by integration with Indonesia.

A London-based Portuguese journalist, Gilberto Ferraz, writing in **Jurnal de Noticias** (19 May) categorically rejects the "forgery" claim. He describes the Belo document as "the best-prepared document ever to have come out of East Timor", and goes on:

"From the carefully-prepared analysis and the many quotations from ecclesiastical sources, we have no doubt in identifying it with someone well-versed and well-placed in the Church and very close to the sufferings of the Timorese people."

After quoting several passages to illustrate its authenticity, Gilberto Ferraz

writes:

"With so much evidence as to the religious identity of the author of this document, having compared the typeface and terminology used with other indisputably authentic documents which carry clear means of identification, and examining also the literary expressions, the style of argument and the feelings it conveys, it is virtually impossible to describe this document as a forgery. We do not for a moment hesitate to identify this document with its real author, Mgr Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo or at least, but very remotely possible, to someone very close to him."

Fretilin prisoner in Tangerang

There is, as far as we know, only one woman Fretilin prisoner among the many dozens who have been transported to Java. She is Dominggas da Costa, who is now being held in Tangerang Prison, West Java.

Dominggas was born on 2 August 1958 in Dili. While still at secondary school, she became an active member of Fretilin. She was just 17 when Indonesian troops attacked East Timor. When they captured Dili, she left the capital like many other schoolboys and schoolgirls and went into the bush with Fretilin. Her whole family also went into the bush. After five years, she returned to Dili and succeeded in obtaining work with a sub-district head (*camat*) at the time of the population census. After this job was completed, she managed to get a job as a teacher at No 12 Primary School in Dili. It was while she was working at the school that she was arrested, on 2 September 1982. Sixteen months later, in January 1984, she was

tried by the Dili District court. Nothing at all is known about the conditions under which her trial was held, who defended her, and the charges against her. After being found guilty and sentenced to six years, she spent the next few months at Comarca Prison in Dili and was then transported to Java on 17 May 1984.

She was married for a short while, and has a daughter named Luisa Maria Peres. The little girl was with her for many months in Tangerang but was recently returned to Dili with the help of the International Red Cross.

A contact in Java writes:

"Dominggas received her political education in the course of practical experience out of which she developed the conviction that independence is the most cherished possession of any nation. She learnt that freedom is the most basic right, which is why Portuguese colonialism had to be swept away. At an early age already, she threw herself into the work of mobilising



Dominggas da Costa with her daughter, outside Tangerang Prison

women while helping with logistics, and finally went with the guerrillas into the bush. After the resistance movement changed its tactics [in 1980, ed.] she returned to enemy territory to work as a school teacher. But Indonesian intelligence was well-experienced and succeeded in breaking up many cells and rounding up the members."

German MP:

East Timor, a country 'in captivity'

In an article entitled, "Everything functions as if in captivity" (*Der Spiegel*, 29 April), the West German MP, Hans-Ulrich Klose, chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Social Democratic party, who visited East Timor in March this year wrote that the Bishop of Dili, Mgr Belo has been under pressure to modify his statement in a letter last year complaining that people in East Timor "suffer from disease, hunger, lack of freedom and persecution". "In our conversation, he repeated his complaint: The Timorese are being brutally suppressed by their Indonesian 'brethren'".

Population statistics suggest that there are some 150,000 Timorese missing since the start of the Indonesian invasion. Klose gave a local example of the dramatic fall in population.

In Liquica district, east of Dili, there are about 34,000 people. According to the chairman of the local district council, the population of the district was 46,000 in 1975. Today, there should be 50,000 (allowing for normal increase). Where are the rest?

Klose and his delegation were permitted to visit the concentration camp on Atauro island. When he asked why Timorese were being held captive there, he

was told that they have relatives in the mountains with Fretilin freedom fighters. "This is enough to put them in custody. East Timor government, Mario Carrascalao calls it 'necessary isolation'". For Klose this was "collective punishment in its most classic form". His article concludes with the following impressions of Atauro and East Timor in general.

The International Committee of the Red Cross is doing everything possible to make life in the camp bearable in material terms, but the psychological conditions of the detainees are catastrophic. The people only stare at you, lifelessly. They don't do anything, they don't know anything. The authorities never tell them what will happen to them, whether they will be allowed to return home to their villages. Can they hope for anything at all? The civilian camp official speaks ominously about "new" villages where it will be possible to keep watch over the captives.

The overall impression throughout the entire island is of a place in captivity. The people never smile, in stark contrast with Indonesia's main island of Java where friendliness shines. Here in East Timor, the people look stern, bitter, hostile and numb. They are a very different type of human being, our official escort explains. A very different kind of situation, he should have added for the sake of truth.



Prisoners at Atauro concentration camp. 'A classic form of collective punishment.' (*Der Spiegel*, 29.4.85)

Members of US congress to Reagan: 'End Suffering in East Timor'

A record 131 members of the US Congress including Democrats and Republicans addressed a letter on 26 April to President Reagan calling on him to include East Timor on his agenda during discussions with the leaders of the Portuguese government during his visit to Lisbon. The letter also stressed that today "there is a community of East Timorese clergy and refugees in Portugal, many of whom were direct witnesses to the recent grim events in their homeland."

Releasing the letter to the press on 8 May, Congressman Tony Hall said:

The plight of the East Timorese is very much the responsibility of the United States as long as we are supplying Indonesia with the very arms which are being used to suppress their rights.

Pointing out that Portugal continues to pursue diplomatic initiatives regarding East Timor, the legislators expressed the hope that "you will express to the leaders of Portugal your willingness to work together with them on proposals to bring an end to the human suffering in East Timor and to bring an authentic peace to East Timor."

Portugal accuses the US of lack of neutrality

The issue of East Timor was indeed raised

during the Reagan visit, both when Reagan met President Eanes on the first day of his visit and during talks between Portuguese Foreign Minister Jaime Gama and Secretary of State George Schultz. Press reports in Portugal quoted Jaime Gama as complaining to his US counterpart that "the US

does not know how to be neutral between Portugal and Indonesia regarding East Timor". (*Expresso*, 18 May.) According to other sources, the Portuguese Foreign Minister regards US policy towards the current consultations as very pro-Indonesian, as reflected in its continuous support to Jakarta with military equipment regardless of its military operations in East Timor.

THE WAR AGAINST EAST TIMOR

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The 3 November incident in Vanimo

When members of an Indonesian Verification Team visited the Vanimo refugee camp on 3 November last year, they were physically attacked by refugees who refused to accept their presence and forced them to leave in a hurry. After the aborted visit, nine refugees were charged as "ringleaders". Six were acquitted and three were bound over. In the following account, Constantinopel P. Ruhukail, a refugee at Vanimo, explains the background.

★ ★ ★ ★

Before the visit, many meetings were held between representatives of the refugees and PNG government officials:

On 27 October, six members of the camp Refugees Welfare Committee, Tom Ireeuw, John A. Wakum, Jimmy Wawar, Constantinopel P. Ruhukail, Jack Offide and Michael Kareth were summoned to the Foreign Affairs office in Vanimo to discuss preparations for a visit by an Indonesian delegation. The refugees wanted the visit cancelled because the safety of the Indonesians could not be guaranteed. They proposed instead that a meeting should be held outside the camp, in Vanimo, between refugee representatives and the delegation. PNG officials said this was not possible as the visit had already been agreed by the PNG and Indonesian governments. The refugees suggested that a PNG government team should visit the camp to understand the refugees' antipathy towards the Indonesian government.

On 28 October, PNG government representatives came to the camp to talk about the proposed visit. The refugees unanimously rejected the visit and said that if the PNG government genuinely wanted a meeting between the refugees and the Indonesian delegation, this would have to take place outside the camp, with representatives of the refugees.

On 29 October, PNG government officials again talked to the refugees about the visit, but the idea was again rejected. The officials then threatened that those who rejected the visit would be repatriated. In face of such threats, the refugees suggested two alternatives: the Indonesian delegation would be received but outside the camp, in Vanimo or another town in PNG; or, the Indonesian delegation could visit the camp but the refugees would not be responsible for their safety. The PNG government could not accept this. The visit would go ahead and any refugees who resisted would be returned to Indonesia.

On 1 November. The Refugee Welfare Committee was given a list of 18 political leaders at the camp who would be taken to meet the PNG ambassador to Indonesia who was currently in the area. When the group of 18 arrived at the meeting place, they were confronted not by the ambassador but by the Indonesian delegation. The 18 refugees accused the PNG officials of trickery, and left the meeting place in great anger.

On 2 November, two PNG government

officials Josef Dogore, a camp supervisor and Judas, of government intelligence, visited the camp. They tried to persuade the refugees to receive the delegation. The refugees expressed their indignation and dissatisfaction with the PNG government's attitude. They repeated their antipathy towards the Indonesian government, their refusal to accept a visit at the camp and again said they could not be held responsible for the safety of the delegation.


On 3 November. Mr Dogore and Mr Judas visited the camp and told the refugees that officials from Foreign Affairs wanted to have a meeting with them, without explaining the purpose. Suddenly, Mr Judas pulled out a pistol and, twirling it around, said: "There's no other choice; you must meet the Indonesian delegation". As he was speaking a convoy of cars with the Indonesians entered the camp. The refugees quickly assembled and made their way to the Police Post to confront the delegation there. Bearing aloft the West Papuan flag and banners, the refugees approached the Indonesians who were heavily guarded by PNG security forces. The refugees quietened down to listen to the PNG government representative, Alan Oase, but when the head of the Indonesian delegation, Sugiono, began with the words, "My brothers, countrymen . . ." the refugees responded in fury. Mr Sugiono was not able to continue except to shout "Merdeka" (freedom). As the Indonesians moved back towards their vehicles, the refugees became very emotional and moved in the direction of the Indonesians. The security forces started firing into the air and exploded tear gas cannisters, which only further infuriated the refugees who

pressed on towards the vehicles. Some of the Indonesians were struck and three, including Mr Sugiono, were injured.

On 5 November, nine refugees were arrested: Constantinopel P. Ruhukail, Jehuda Sorontouw, Zadrach Affaar, Marthinus Jack Oropa, Herman Wanggai, Sepi Samonsabra, Daniel Toto, Theis On-dofo, and Roy Nussy/Demotouw. They were held for one day and interrogated. After several postponements the trial commenced on 18 January. It lasted four days, and the defendants were defended by Mr Marthin Enda. The prosecution witnesses included three police officials, Laurenz Sapien of Foreign Affairs, and Messrs Dogore and Judas. The six witnesses for the defence were Tom Ireeuw, John Wakum, Michale Kareth, Jimmy Wawar, Demianus Kurni and Jack Offide.

During the hearings, it was shown that the fault lay with the PNG Government whose officials had refused to respect the views of the refugees. It was shown to the satisfaction of the court that the bloody incident of 3 November would not have occurred if the refugees' proposals made on 27 October had been respected; that the refugees had wanted a meeting with the delegation outside the camp to avert trouble and protect PNG's good name but the PNG government had brought the Indonesian delegation into the camp suddenly, without taking account of the security situation there; that the PNG Government had failed to explain the purpose of the delegation's visit; and that the Foreign Affairs officials had acted dishonestly, had threatened the refugees and had failed to respect the refugees as Melaneans who suffered grievously as a result of colonisation.

Six of the defendants were acquitted while three, Herman Wanggai, Daniel Toto and Roy Hussy were bound over and ordered not to engage in similar actions that could be harmful to the PNG Government.



Nightly rollcall of refugees in Blackwara Camp

Renewed pressure on refugees to repatriate

The Indonesian and Papua New Guinea governments are renewing efforts to bring about the large-scale repatriation of the ten thousand West Papuan refugees now living in camps along the PNG side of the border between the two countries. The first move has been an attempt to "neutralise" some of the refugees alleged to be obstructing repatriation by banishing them to isolated places.

The new Indonesian-PNG repatriation plan

After months of apparent inactivity by Port Moresby and Jakarta on the refugee question following the incident at Blackwara Camp, Vanimo, last November (see separate item), the Indonesian-PNG Border Liaison Committee met in Port Moresby early in May and agreed on a secret plan for repatriation:

- The PNG government would step up military operations against OPM units said to be operating on the PNG side of the border. To this end, 200 members of the PNG Defence Force are believed to have been despatched to the border area to "round up" the OPM.
- "Leading elements" at each of the refugee camps would be airlifted to Jayapura, capital of Irian Jaya, to be told about Indonesia's "generous" arrangements for all West Papuan refugees who agree to return. Once "convinced", these people would then be returned to the camps to facilitate repatriation.

Both Port Moresby and Jakarta must realise that this plan is very unrealistic, primarily because of the strength of feeling among refugees against repatriation as long as Indonesia remains in control of West Papua. Airlifting "leading elements" can only mean forcing people to return to Jayapura, while PNG connivance in such a move would not only meet with strong resistance in the camps but would also face public condemnation throughout PNG.

Disclosure that such a plan was in the offing was first made in March when Gregory Mongi, spokesperson for the newly-established Human Rights Association of PNG made public a confidential document of the PNG Foreign Affairs department, drafted in February. (*The Australian*, 21 March.) According to this document, PNG would select "target groups" of about 100 refugees, chosen on the basis of their apparent willingness to return to Indonesia.

A key part of the strategy was to separate leaders from their followers in the belief that it was these "big men" who dissuade refugees from returning.

Mongi said that with secret plans of this kind there was no guarantee that people would be leaving PNG of their own will. (*The Australian*, 21 March.)

Mongi also disclosed to *The Australian* that one well-known refugee leader, Tom Ireeuw, had been transferred from Blackwara Camp and sent to a camp in distant Oksapmin.

It has since become clear that other refugees from Blackwara were taken away too. More recently, they have again been moved, this time to Telefomin, not far from Ok Tedi where a small new camp is believed to be under construction. Australian visitors investigating the refugee situation recently were told by PNG officials that they were not allowed to visit Telefomin.

The three refugees now known to be at Telefomin are Tom Ireeuw, Jimmy Wawar and Constantinopol Ruhukail. Tom Ireeuw was formerly a lecturer in English at Cendrawasih University in Jayapura, and has frequently been interviewed by Australian press, radio and television about the conditions and attitudes of the refugees. He was on the Blackwara Refugees Welfare Committee and was among the group of spokespeople who tried unsuccessfully to convince the PNG authorities not to proceed with the planned visit of Indonesian officials to Blackwara last November. Jimmy Wawar and Constantinopol Ruhukail were also in the group, while both Tom and Jimmy testified on behalf of the refugees who were charged in connection with the November incident.

The real reason for their banishment to Telefomin is not

clear. Isolated from outside observation, there are fears for their safety. TAPOL has been authoritatively informed however, that they were removed from Blackwara "to reduce the presence of those in the refugee camps who seem to have in a militant way influenced the refugees not to opt for repatriation". This conforms precisely with the confidential document disclosed by Greg Mongi two months ago.

Provincial premiers offer resettlement

Semai Aitowai, the premier of Fly Province (also known as Western Province) which stretches from the central massif along the border down to the south coast, announced in April that his administration had agreed to the permanent resettlement of 7,000 refugees in traditional style. These are longum-speaking people who have already been given land to allow them to settle and cultivate gardens. Longum-speaking people cover territory on both sides of the border and comprise a distinct cultural group whose land is arbitrarily cut in two by the PNG-Indonesian border.

Utula Samana, the premier of Morobe Province, on the northern coast to the east of Western Sepik (now Sandaun) Province, and Alexis Sarei, the premier of North Solomons Province, have also agreed to the traditional resettlement of refugees.

These offers open the way to a permanent solution for the majority of refugees, though whether the provincial plans would need the official consent of the PNG government and whether this consent would be forthcoming is unclear. It leaves begging, however, the fate of the Blackwara refugees who are eligible for political asylum.

Legal action to protect the refugees

Meanwhile, a prominent PNG lawyer, Bernard Narokobi has initiated legal proceedings on behalf of a group of refugees, Tom Ireeuw, Jimmy Wawar and Cory Ap, wife of the murdered Arnold Ap, to stop the PNG and Indonesian governments from sending them back to Indonesia against their wishes. Narokobi is also a prominent member of the Melanesian Alliance, whose chairman, Father John Momis recently became a member of the Somare Government.

The lawyer told the *PNG Times* (12 May) that he is asking the Supreme Court to rule on several questions:

- 1 Whether certain government action or lack of action relating to the refugees is subject to the jurisdiction, power and the authority of the court.
- 2 Whether certain government action or inaction relating to the rights, interests and welfare of the refugees is justifiable in a democratic society that has a proper regard for the rights and dignity of man.
- 3 Whether the refugees have *inter alia* any constitutional, political, civil or legal rights and duties so long as they are residing in the country.

The *PNG Times* (12 May) comments that while the case is pending before the Supreme Court, it is most unlikely that the PNG and Indonesian governments will repatriate the 10,000 refugees. Meanwhile, Bernard Narokobi has warned: "If the government tries to remove the refugees before the hearing is over, I will apply for an injunction". (UPI report in *Jakarta Post*, 11 May.)

Thus, although Jakarta and Port Moresby appear to be set on new efforts to repatriate refugees, these moves face determined efforts by provincial premiers, the Human Rights Association and members of the legal profession to safeguard the refugees against unlawful repatriation.

ABRI and Islam: a historical conflict

According to the 1980 population census, 87% of Indonesians are registered as Muslims. More than 130 million people out of a population of 150 million regard themselves as part of the *ummah*, making Indonesia by far the largest Islamic country in the world with a Muslim community far more numerous than the *ummah* in the whole of the Middle East, the heartland of Islam. This makes it difficult for people to understand the hostile and often openly aggressive attitude of the Indonesian army towards Muslim political life in general.

It is not possible to grasp the reality of contemporary Indonesia by judging people according to their formal beliefs. Especially in Java, the most densely populated island in the world and the centre of Indonesian state power, it would be wrong to consider the huge Muslim community as a homogeneous socio-cultural entity. In Central and East Java, the home of the ethnic Javanese, one can identify two major subcultural divisions. The *santri* piously practise the teachings of Islam while the *abangan* display marked syncretic inclinations; although the majority consider themselves adherents of Islam, their *abangan* belief is a strange mixture of pre-Islamic beliefs like Hinduism and Buddhism and elements of traditional Javanese mysticism. In the seventies, Suharto and his generals gave prominence to their *abangan* belief and refurbished its image by giving it a new name, *aliran kepercayaan* or stream of faith. Many generals believe that their *aliran kepercayaan* is the highest form of faith, standing above the other recognised religions. The *santri* regard this *aliran kepercayaan* as the systematic religion of the *abangan*. As for the *abangan*, when asked what their religion is, many simply call themselves "*Islam statistik*" because everyone is required to adhere to one of the five recognised religions, Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism or Buddhism.

Priyayi and santri during the Dutch and Japanese eras

The aristocrats and bureaucrats of Javanese society are the *priyayi*, the ruling strata of the *abangan*. Because of their deep roots in ancient Javanese cultural and ritual practices, the *priyayi* are even more strongly inclined to embrace the *aliran kepercayaan* than lower-strata *abangan*. The upper *priyayi* were successfully integrated into the Dutch colonial administration and were given positions within the *Inlands Binnenlands Bestuur* (Indigenous Civil Service) while some of the lower *priyayi* were recruited to serve as non-commissioned officers in *KNIL*, the Dutch colonial army. Thus the *priyayi* class as a whole have their roots in administration, ruling and warfare.

During the Japanese occupation (1942–1945), the status of these lower *priyayi* was greatly enhanced by their recruitment into PETA (*Pembela Tanah Air* or Defence of the Fatherland), the decentralised army of Indonesian recruits organised and groomed ideologically by Japanese warriors. These lower *priyayi* soldiers were systematically pampered and given strategic positions by the Japanese authorities. It is from this generation of PETA officers that practically all the military rulers of Indonesia today originate – from Suharto to Yoga Sugomo, from Sudjono Humardani to Sarwo Edhie.

By contrast, the *santri* community were able to develop their own traditions, virtually untouched by the Dutch colonial system. In big cities like Jogjakarta, Muslim merchants called *kauman* set up their own religious and economic centres clustered around the *pesantren*, boarding-schools for school-age *santris*. *Pesantren* were also established in the villages and have continued to be the social and cultural base of rural Muslims up to the present day.

The first mass-based anti-colonial movement which came into


being at the beginning of this century was the *Serikat Islam*. Its banner was green, signifying that opposition to colonialism at that stage was inspired by the Muslim spirit. Under Dutch rule, informal Muslim leaders and *ulama* (preachers) never enjoyed any of the privileges that were heaped on the *priyayi*. The standard Dutch attitude towards the Muslims was to leave them in peace as long as they busied themselves with religious activities. As soon as they began to involve themselves in social activity or set up their own political platform, brute force was used against them. The Dutch never drew the *santri* into the bureaucracy or the army; these were the preserves of the *priyayi*.

During the Pacific War, the Japanese forces of occupation pursued a different and more positive policy towards the Muslims. To a limited degree, they succeeded in utilising some Muslim leaders for Japanese political aims but Japanese attempts to mobilise the Muslim community as a whole were unsuccessful. As former Japanese officer Captain Yanagawa has admitted, his efforts to recruit an Islamic military force named Hizbullah was a flop, while PETA, the *abangan* army with its *priyayi* officers was by contrast a resounding success.

Abangan-Santri Relations during the Independence Struggle

During the independence struggle (1945–1949), the contradictions between the *abangan* and *santri* came into the open. In the wake of the Japanese surrender, there were many attempts by local *ulama* together with other progressive forces to overthrow *priyayi* rule which was intensely despised because of its crass collaboration with the Japanese. These grassroots rebellions were crushed by the republican Indonesian Army which had grown out of its PETA predecessor. Once the Japanese occupation had ended, the Hizbullah began to prove themselves as a fighting force and came to blows with the Siliwangi Division of the Indonesian Army in West Java, creating further strains in the relations between *abangan* and *santri*.

Right from the start, relations between the republican army and the Muslims were unfriendly and often hostile. The Hizbullah often took a much more principled and militant stand towards British and Dutch forces than the Indonesian Army. This was particularly so at the time of the Renville Agreement between the Republic and the Dutch in early 1948, after which the republican Siliwangi Division withdrew from West Java under the terms of the agreement while the Hizbullah militia refused to leave. When Siliwangi troops returned to the province after the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, the Hizbullah



A *pesantren* classroom

took up arms against them, proclaiming that the Republic had ceased to exist in the area because their troops had abandoned the province. The bitter clashes that ensued between republican troops and the Hizbullah are now recorded in official Indonesian history as "a stab in the back" for the Republic from the Muslims. Official Indonesian history gives the same interpretation to the fighting that broke out between republican troops and militia under communist leadership in September 1948. Such an interpretation of these two conflicts is based on a distortion of the facts.

During the 1950s, many of the Hizbullah troops regrouped themselves as an anti-Republic movement and launched their Darul Islam movement which advocated the creation of an Islamic state. Meanwhile the Indonesian Republic evolved more and more into a priyayi-ruled state. Already during the period of Guided Democracy from 1957 (when martial law was introduced) up to 1965, the military priyayi were becoming dominant. Their pre-eminence became institutionalised once the "New Order" of the generals was installed in 1965.

Santri Hopes Dashed

After the military takeover in October 1965, large sections of the ummah rallied to the anti-communist slogans of the Indonesian military and joined in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of innocent peasants and workers of the abangan, PKI-affiliated mass organisations. Having made their contribution to the obliteration of the main political force standing in the way of all-out army rule, Muslim leaders fully expected to be rewarded by the Army leaders with a share in the new power structure established in the Republic. Alas, the abangan generals had not the slightest intention of sharing power with Muslims, and they were driven back into obscurity. Their position would, as of old, remain that of an oppressed minority.

One of the main threads in the present regime's policy towards the Muslims today is the domestication and de-Islamisation of Muslim political life. Attacks on Muslim political and social activities by the country's military rulers have become a regular feature. Moreover, during the early years of military rule, the economic policy of the government, allowing foreign capital to invest freely struck deep into the social base of the small Muslim traders and businessmen. The Army's political vehicle, GOLKAR also developed an aggressive attitude towards Muslim political life, and developed its own so-called Muslim centres complete with pesantren and mosques, bribing and co-opting the weaker ulama. They also infiltrated their men into the Muslim political federation, the PPP, notably John

Naro, the hoodlum who is the present chairman of the PPP. This political offensive has intensified the disquiet among many Muslims.

Practically all the social and political upheavals since the 1970s have carried a distinct Muslim label. Most of the student leaders responsible for the student upheavals in 1974 and 1978 were Muslim. The brute force used by the regime against these movements further alienated many Muslims from the regime. In August 1982, the cleavage widened further when the military rulers decided to curtail political activity in a more institutionalised, "constitutional" way. The Pancasila-as-the-sole-principle (*azas tunggal*) was made compulsory for all social and political organisations. The Pancasila, which is the quintessence of priyayi military ideology, has been forced down the throats of the entire Indonesian population. Muslims in particular regard this as an affront, as a threat to basic Muslim principles, with the result that Muslim leaders have started raising their voices in protest against *azas-tunggal*.

In the estimation of the generals, Muslim activism is regarded as a security threat. Since the bloodbath in Tanjung Priok last September, the accusations being levelled against Muslim activists have reached almost the same pitch of intensity as those levelled against "the communist threat". According to the evaluation of the State intelligence agency, BAKIN after the Tanjung Priok massacre, four groups are identified as having contributed towards these events: former members of the communist party, Muslims trying to establish an Islamic state, professionals, intellectuals, students, retired military men and others striving to overthrow the government in the name of Pancasila, and human rights activists.

Priyayi rule during the past twenty years has developed a policy towards the Muslims that bears a striking resemblance to the patterns of official behaviour during the Dutch colonial era: Never give Muslims the opportunity to develop into a social force for change. As long as Muslims keep themselves busy with their religious affairs, the military rulers will promote such activities by means of subsidies for the construction of new mosques and pesantren.

Although a large number of Muslims have been won over by these gestures, Islamic political life cannot be curbed so easily by such forms of bribery. A new generation of Muslim radical thinkers with strong democratic convictions are likely to persist in their opposition to the military dictatorship now in power in Indonesia.

Liem Soei Liong

ABRI unearths a 'Shiite movement'

A bomb explosion on board a bus in Banyuwangi, East Java, which occurred on 15 March has led to a number of arrests, including a Muslim leader accused of "Shiite" beliefs.

The explosion killed seven passengers including three persons believed to have been carrying the bomb. The three "suspects" were Nasir and Hamsyah both from Malang, East Java, and Hakim from Tulungagung, East Java. According to East Java military spokesperson, Lieutenant-Colonel Sonny Banson, the bomb was not intended to blow up the bus but was being taken to Bali to be used to blow up a tourist attraction. The East Java military commander, Major-General Sularso, has linked this incident with bombs which exploded just before Christmas near a church in Malang and the explosions which destroyed part of the Borobudur historical monument in Central Java.

On 23 April, Major-General Sularso convened a closed meeting with leading religious figures in the province to discuss strong measures against an "extremist" group said to be operating in East Java, and allegedly called "Kelompok Islam Fundamentalists Syiah" (Islamic Fundamentalist Shiite Group). It is not unlikely that this name is an Army creation, following their attempt several years ago to create names like "Komando Jihad".

Shortly before the 23 April meeting, a top figure in the Mus-

lim organisation, Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), Kyai Haji As'ad Syamsul Arifin had a two-hour meeting with armed forces commander, General Benny Murdani, during which they agreed that speedy action must be taken to stop all activities of the "Syiah movement" in Indonesia. The NU has its main power base in East Java. Since its congress earlier this year when it decided to abandon political activities, its relations with the military authorities have greatly strengthened. Joining forces with the Army against alleged Shiites is hardly non-political.

Following the NU-Murdani talks, it has been announced that in addition to the arrest of persons suspected of involvement in the bomb blast in Banyuwangi, the leader of the Yayasan Pendidikan Islam (Islamic Education Foundation), Husein Al-Habsyi, from Bangil has also been taken into custody. He is a well-known critic of the government's chauvinistic tendencies as reflected, for example, in the repeated use of the song "Pandamu Negeri" ("To you, my country"). Husein Al-Habsyi does not, however, regard himself as a Shiite but as a Sunni, like the vast majority of Indonesian Muslims. (*Tempo*, 4 May)

Although the military authorities would not reveal whether they knew anything concrete about Husein Al-Habsyi's alleged links with the bus bomb incident, he is apparently regarded as the "brains" behind the affair.

The reorganisation of the Indonesian armed forces

The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) is entering the final stage of a major overhaul by drastically changing its territorial structure. According to the two top leaders, ABRI commander, General Benny Murdani and the Chief of Staff, General Rudini, the main thrust of this organisation is to improve the efficiency of the Armed Forces to meet the needs of the remaining years of the twentieth century. The reorganisation, the biggest since 1969, will not be completed until April 1986.

For the first time in its history, ABRI leadership is no longer in the hands of the "old generation", the generation that was involved in the so-called independence struggle from 1945 to 1950. With the exception of a few leftovers, the "1945 generation" have retired and their positions have been taken over by officers who entered the Armed Forces in the 1950s and 1960s. The two ABRI leaders, Murdani and Rudini belong to the so-called "bridging generation", men who were in their teens during the 1945-50 period and who acquired their professional training in the early 1950s. The first task for these two generals has therefore been to develop a new set of criteria for leadership in the new structure.

In previous structures, the main criteria for judging an officer's capabilities were squeezed into a formula known as *Berjuang Terus Menerus* (BTM) (Continuous Struggle). Professionalism was not considered the most important asset for an officer; more basic was the attitude and experience of the officer regarding the "spirit of 1945". Murdani now explains that the BTM criteria will be replaced by a new set of criteria called "profesionalisme dan kejuangan" (professionalism and fighting attitude). Although the difference between this and BTM is not very clear as they both use as their bedrock the claim that the military must play the leading role in society, the shift towards professionalism can be regarded as a new feature. According to Murdani's criteria, an officer should be a well-qualified professional soldier, whereas with the earlier generation, "involvement" in the independence struggle was sufficient to guarantee a successful military career.

The social and political role of officers

The word "kejuangan" which has now become a much-used army term legitimises ABRI's role in society. Another term for "kejuangan" is the social and political role of officers, usually abbreviated to "sospol". Whereas in the past, in military jargon, ABRI was regarded as "part of society", having its origins as a "people's army", the new generation of army officers will be required to prove that they are fit to perform their "sospol" duties. General Rudini has made plans for the new batch of officers to acquire these qualifications by taking "kejuangan" exams.

Once they have proved themselves capable of leading army units and mastering territorial affairs, a selected batch of officers will be "dropped" by ABRI general staff into Parliament (DPR) to serve a term as MPs. The hundred seats in the DPR allocated to ABRI will be used as a "test case" to assess these officers' ability to "mingle" with civilians. After serving as MPs for several years (apparently not for a full parliamentary term of 5 years), the officer's performance will be assessed. Provided he comes up to scratch, he will receive a new assignment in the territorial structure.

According to Rudini, these "dropped" officers will gain experience in dealing with political affairs and resolving political issues. This parliamentary "pitstop" will serve two purposes, showing officers how to "deal" with civilian affairs and constituting an integral part of the career of the future batch of ABRI leaders.

As part of their rejuvenation programme, Murdani and Rudini have created an atmosphere of bidding the "generation of 1945" farewell. They continually promise the young officers that a bright future awaits them as the "old hands" depart from the scene. In May this year, Rudini announced that retired Army



Six of the new-style regional military commands being installed. (Sinar Harapan, 9 April, 1985)

officers who still occupy seats in the DPR and in the provincial assemblies (DPRD) will be replaced by younger men who are still on active service. And by moving younger officers into the top echelons of ABRI, Murdani and Rudini hope to create a sound basis for the continuation of the military regime.

The recent appointment of two of the first graduates of the Military Academy in Magelang in 1960 onto the General Staff reflects the determination of Murdani and Rudini to implement their rejuvenation programme. Both men, Major-General Edi Sudradjat, 47 years, who has been appointed Operations Assistant, and Major-General Soegiarto, 49 years, who has been appointed Personnel Officer, have had years of experience in the elite troops. Sudradjat served as a "red beret" paracommando (RPKAD) while Soegiarto spent the early years of his army career in KOSTRAD, the Army Strategic Reserve Command. Murdani's confidence in them grew because of their combat experience in East Timor which also assured them much quicker promotion than usual.

The new territorial structure

Another important feature of the reorganisation is the major overhaul of the territorial structure. The seventeen KODAMs (Regional Military Commands) have now been reduced to nine plus a tenth for the capital, Jakarta. The upper tier known as KOWILHAN (Area Defence Command), created in 1969 by Suharto as a buffer between headquarters and the KODAMs is being dissolved. This will shorten the line of command and eliminate a structure that Murdani now regards as superfluous. The new structure is almost identical to the structure from 1950 till 1958, before the KODAMs were introduced. Both Murdani and Rudini stress that the new structure will mean major cuts in routine expenditures.

Under the previous structure, the KODAMs were territorially equivalent to the provinces, but now they are "island oriented". In Rudini's words, "Islands are the components of national defence". A lot of emphasis will be placed on consolidating the 40 KOREMs (Regional Military Commands) which come immediately below the KODAMs.

Rudini repeatedly assures the younger officers that they have nothing to worry about as regards their future careers because the new structure will provide sufficient opportunities to climb up the military ladder. But previous ABRI reorganisations have

always brought unrest among officers. By slimming down the KODAMs, there will be fewer positions for middle-ranking officers, though Rudini is at pains to convince the colonels and lieutenant-colonels that they need not worry about promotion and positions.

The new territorial structure will continue to serve the same purposes as in the past in keeping a grip on society, but it will also be responsible for a more extended implementation of the *Hankamrata* (Total People's Defence) programme for training civilians and incorporating them into para-military duties. This foreshadows a more systematic militarisation of public life at all levels of society.

Elite troops given pride of place

Of prime importance in the 1985 reorganisation is the further consolidation of ABRI's elite troops. Murdani has always been obsessed with acquiring the most advanced weapons systems and equipment and upgrading the skills of the elite troops.

The two strike forces will be expanded and given the name "Komando Utama" (Prime Command). This will consist of KOSTRAD, the Strategic Reserve Command, and KOPASSUS or Komando Pasukan Khusus (Special Troops Command), which is the new name for the notorious red-beret units. They will both be designed to become units capable of operating at short notice anywhere in the archipelago. Their mobility will be greatly enhanced by being held combat-ready at all times through massive air-lifts, capable therefore of dealing with internal "unrest" with the minimum of delay. Last year, a special unit was created, called Pasukan Pemukul Reaksi Cepat (PPRC)

or Rapid Deployment Force, in the tradition of the US Rapid Deployment Force or Britain's SAS units.

These strike forces will add enormously to the military budget, and when Murdani insists that the reorganisation is aimed among other things at economies, what he means is that by trimming the territorial structure and introducing other austerity measures the money will be found to fund these far better equipped elite troops.

Many retired officers have shown anxiety for the future of ABRI's dedication to its prime doctrine, the Dwifungsi (Dual Function) doctrine, which has been the cornerstone of military rule for the past twenty years. The ideological framework for the legitimacy of military rule has been boosted by ABRI ideologues who claim that since the Middle Ages, warriors and military men have always been the leaders of the nation.

In reply to the misgivings of the retired officers, Murdani speaks confidently about a new breed of officers more capable than former generations to fulfil their role as leaders. Murdani repeatedly claims that he is paving the way for a highly-professionalised Armed Forces, confident of their destiny as leaders and therefore far superior to professional armies trained only to follow the commands and instructions of an elected government. The Indonesian military, whether already retired or in active service, are all in the same tradition, convinced of their uniqueness on this planet, and destined to rule. Despite the differences of emphasis between the older and younger generations over the question of professionalism and ABRI's "sospol" duties, they all uphold the Dwifungsi doctrine and are, alike, the major obstacle to democracy in Indonesia.

Thatcher pledges more support for Indonesia

"Our cultures are different", said British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher at a dinner held in her honour by President Suharto on the first day of her visit to Indonesia in April, "but when it comes to defending independence and freedom, we are at one with you".

Having expounded such views, it was hardly surprising that Mrs Thatcher did not use the occasion of her visit to raise any of the many human rights violations that were brought to her notice by groups in Britain before her departure for Jakarta. She did raise the question of East Timor but asked Suharto "for more information to clarify reports critical of Indonesian conduct in East Timor". (*Daily Telegraph*, 11 April.) In other words, what she needed was arguments to cope with the critics back home.

President Suharto obliged by telling her that, as she later quoted him, "the International Red Cross (ICRC) not only has access to East Timor but is welcome there". This distorts the reality which is that since July 1983, the month before the Indonesian Armed Forces launched a new offensive in East Timor, the ICRC has been prevented from conducting much-needed relief work throughout mainland East Timor.

UK to help strengthen Indonesia's navy and air force

The Thatcher visit was focussed primarily on strengthening collaboration in the spheres of defence and industrial development. The highlight was a visit to the Nurtanio aircraft company in Bandung, the centre-piece of Indonesia's industrial-milit-

ary complex. Mrs Thatcher made a point of stressing that collaboration in the defence and aerospace industries is already well under way, not only in the supply of goods but in the transfer of technology. Unlike many other western countries, the UK does not yet have a technical co-operation agreement with Nurtanio but this will be remedied when Nurtanio's President-Director, B.J. Habibie visits London in June this year.

It was also during her visit to Nurtanio that Mrs Thatcher declared that Britain is ready to help strengthen Indonesia's navy and air force. The UK has already supplied Indonesia with several squadrons of Hawk ground-attack aircraft and three naval frigates, besides a recent deal for the supply of £100 million worth of Rapier missiles.

Britain's economic interests in Indonesia

It was announced at the time of the Thatcher visit that British capital investments in Indonesia currently amount to £600 million, the eighth largest. But British capital also reaches Indonesia through Hongkong-based companies and Hongkong ranks second after Japan, and ahead of the USA. (This information was contained in an interview with Alan Donald, British ambassador in Jakarta, in *Kompas*, 4 April, and would certainly exclude investments in the oil industry.)

UK-Indonesian trade ties have also grown substantially in the 1980s. Since 1980, the volume of trade has doubled. Britain's exports to Indonesia amounted to £187 million in 1984, while imports were worth £181 million.



Pancasila democracy in action

TAPOL Bulletin No 68, March 1985, published a report from **Tempo** about the candidate in a village-chief election in Marihat Raya Village, Simalungun District, North Sumatra, who was disqualified because his deceased brother-in-law was a member of the leftwing union of teachers before 1965. More recent press reports help fill in a few details about election processes in the Indonesian countryside.

★ **Kompas** (25 March) reported that the Marihat Raya Village Election Committee has decided that all 499 villagers who voted for the disqualified candidate will be questioned and investigated. The *bupati* (district chief) of Simalungun said they would all be asked to explain why they supported the former village chief. The disqualified candidate Sahat Gultom would also be asked to explain why he persisted in campaigning even though he had failed to obtain the necessary political clearance because of the political affiliations of his deceased brother-in-law.

★ The *bupati* denied reports circulating that he has family ties with the man whose nomination was confirmed by the Election Committee. It is quite untrue, he said, that Sahat Gultom's candidacy was rejected because he was related to the other candidate.

★ In a letter to **Kompas** (27 March), the public relations official of the Simalungun District set out the procedure for adoption of candidates in any village-head election:


1. Each candidate must go before a Committee for

Nominations and the Conduct of the Election, then before a Control Committee at the sub-district level, and then the Investigation and Testing Committee, for provisional adoption as a candidate.

2. Before any nomination can be accepted, each candidate must pass through three levels of screening: administrative examination of the documents, a clearance test by the Social-and-Political affairs (*sospol*) Department Head of the North Sumatra Provincial Government who submits the nomination for consideration to the Social-and-Political Affairs Head of the sub-district government in question, and finally a general knowledge test. Prospective candidates can be disqualified at any of these stages.

Sahat Gultom was disqualified at the second stage because of his (deceased) brother-in-law's membership of a banned PKI organisation as a result of which he failed to obtain a "Cleanliness Certificate".

The letter claims that since Sahat Gultom's candidacy was disqualified, he could not have an election symbol. Anyone voting for the second symbol that appeared during the election was wrong to think they were voting for Gultom; they were just voting against the single candidate. Since more people voted against the single candidate (499) than for him (420), the election was declared null and void and will have to be repeated. The election will take place after the villagers have been told the true facts about Sahat Gultom and warned of the latent danger of the PKI.



Village election in progress
On 21 March 1985, *Sinar Harapan* published photographs of a village election in progress in Jatimakmur Village, Bekasi, five kms from Jakarta.

Upper left: Villagers enter a gate decorated with the photograph of the single candidate, Abdul Madjid.

Upper right: Voting forms are handed out, with Hansip (civil guard) officers at hand to keep an eye on things.

Lower left: Voters leaving the polling booths, again under the watchful eye of Hansip.

Lower right: The single candidate sits enthroned, with snacks and cigarettes to keep him going. The future village head will remain on his regal perch until the election is over.

David Jenkins: **Suharto and His Generals, Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983**. Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Monograph Series, 1984.

The July 1977 general elections in Indonesia came as something of a shock to the country's military rulers. On the face of it, there was nothing to worry about. The percentage of votes "won" by the Army's political party, GOLKAR (*Golongan Karya* or Functional Groups) had hardly slipped at all, down from 62.8% in 1971 to 62.18% in 1977. GOLKAR and the Armed Forces (ABRI) would still control 332 out of the 360 contested seats in Parliament plus 100 seats automatically occupied by ABRI appointees. In the upper chamber, the MPR, ABRI and GOLKAR together would occupy 792 out of the 920 seats. But a dent had been made in GOLKAR's unbeatable image. It had lost 4 seats by comparison with 1971 and the Muslim PPP (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* or Development Unity Party) had gained five. Moreover, the PPP had actually topped the polls in two provinces, Aceh and Jakarta and scored convincing victories in a number of districts in both Java and Sumatra.

It was an open secret that GOLKAR's victory was the result of widespread intimidation, vote-rigging and all the inbuilt advantages for GOLKAR at every stage of the election process. No less a man than General Sumitro who was Deputy Commander of the all-powerful army security command, KOPKAMTIB in 1971, was later to admit:

If you had left it to GOLKAR in 1971, without any interference by ABRI, the Muslim parties would have won. I can assure you of that! Oh yes! Seventy-one! Seventy-seven! Without the help of ABRI, PPP would have won. And won a majority!¹

The realisation had also spread that the Army's decision to force the Muslim parties in 1973 to merge into a single party, with the intention of undermining these parties and plunging them into internal feuding, had been a "tactical blunder".² The results had raised grave doubts about the government's decision to allow the PPP to use the Ka'abah (the sacred stone in Mecca) as its election symbol as it had proven to be "an effective symbol for the mobilisation of Islamic voters".³

But the electoral setback was not the only sign of trouble. University campuses had been in turmoil twice during the decade. The Sawito affair⁴ in 1976 had delivered a shock to the system. Criticism of corruption was becoming more outspoken, and there were other signs of organised disaffection.

Nowhere was the consternation about these developments greater than among the generals inside and outside the upper echelons of power, among them generals

who had fallen foul of Suharto for one reason or another since 1965. Many among them felt that the regime was using the wrong tactics to legitimise its rule. They were beginning to question Suharto's particularly crude implementation of Indonesian-style militarism known as the *dwifungsi* or dual function, the doctrine proclaiming the Army's divine right to play a social and political as well as a defence role. The internal controversy that broke out in 1978, involving active-duty as well as retired generals, focussed on two questions: whether ABRI should stand above all political forces rather than support GOLKAR up to the hilt as it had been doing since 1968, and whether it was not guilty of excesses in its implementation of the socio-political side of the *dwifungsi* because military personnel were now dominating the executive, the legislature, the judiciary as well as the regional and local government apparatus right down to the villages, and much else besides.



General Yoga Sugomo, intelligence chief

In *Suharto and His Generals*, David Jenkins describes and analyses this controversy with the help of numerous interviews and many spicy "confidential communications" from most of the protagonists. As the author shows, none of the men involved questioned the need, indeed the right, of ABRI to run the country. This effectively demolishes his attempt to differentiate between the "pragmatist" generals – Suharto and his inner core of intelligence and security generals who constantly bend the rules (which they drew up) to suit themselves and safeguard Army rule – and the "men of principle" who believe that ABRI should "take a more enlightened and indulgent view of Indonesian society and yield up a good deal of its control".⁵

The biographical notes which he provides as each general enters the scene, making the book a very useful resource about present-day Indonesia, shows each one of them to have been pragmatists time and again during their own long and bloody military careers, not least General Nasution, the leading figure on the side of "principle".

The controversy produced a number of documents. The first came from SESKOAD, the Army's Staff and Command School, and it criticised the *dwifungsi* as currently being implemented. The second which had much the same message, carried the imprimatur of General Widodo who had been appointed Army Chief of Staff in 1978 and who soon afterwards fostered a group known as *Fosko* (Forum for Study and Communication) composed of an array of "has-been" generals from the three Army divisions in Java as well as from the Air Force and the Navy. The doubters gathered in Fosko also seemed to enjoy the sympathy of General Jusuf who was appointed Defence Minister in 1978 and spent much of his time careering around the country, strengthening ABRI's "links with the people" and proclaiming its neutrality in any political contests. He seemed to be saying that his territorial troops had far more important things to do than devote much of their time to winning elections for GOLKAR.

The dispute was allowed to rumble on until Suharto publicly entered the fray in a speech in March 1980 when he made a number of things abundantly clear. ABRI certainly has a political partner, GOLKAR. ABRI will countenance no challenge to Pancasila, a remark specifically directed at the Muslims, some of whom had walked out of the 1978 MPR session which was discussing further sanctification of the hallowed Pancasila. ABRI (ie. Suharto) regards criticism of the "national leadership" (ie. Suharto) as an offence against the Pancasila. And finally, that it is ABRI's abiding duty to prevent anyone from trying to amend the Constitution or replace Pancasila. Hence the need for ABRI to control with its own appointees one-third of the seats in the MPR, quite apart from the massive number of GOLKAR representatives assuring the regime a comfortable working majority of 89%. With one-third of MPR seats in ABRI's hands, all it needed to do, said Suharto, was to kidnap one non-ABRI MPR member if it wanted to prevent any constitutional changes from obtaining the required two-thirds majority.

After Suharto's intervention, there was little more to be said except to spell out the regime's views in full. A third document appeared in 1981 which became known as the Hankam (Defence Department) Paper.⁶ This provided the historical justification for the *dwifungsi*, written by Army historian Nugroho Notosusanto, plus three other papers spelling out the reasons for ABRI's deep and everlasting involvement in social and political affairs. The reasons for its special partnership with GOLKAR were also reiterated.

General Jusuf was left looking rather foolish, having publicly taken the view of the other side. But, as Jenkins shows, Jusuf hardly seemed to be in charge of his own department anyway. Admiral Sudomo, the Deputy Minister and a loyal supporter of Suharto since the days of confrontation with the Dutch over West Papua, (who General Widodo described as a "watchdog") turns out to have been the man really in charge. Regardless of what Jusuf was saying or doing, Sudomo, who was concurrently commander of KOPKAMTIB, had his own line of communication upwards to Suharto and downwards to the provincial commanders as KOPKAMTIB executive officers. In fact, Sudomo was secretly (sic) assuring commanders on Suharto's behalf that "nothing had really changed" and that, come the next election, ABRI would again be called on to make sure that GOLKAR won.⁷ It was Sudomo too who, at a private meeting of the GOLKAR Executive Council, was minuted as saying that ABRI is "absolutely GOLKAR", whatever Widodo or Jusuf might be saying.

Besides this fascinating portrayal of intra-regime controversy, Jenkins also treats the reader to an account of how Suharto manages and manipulates his own inner core of officers. In the late seventies, there was only a tiny group of men whom he completely trusted and who held double and in some cases (Murdani) treble posts to make sure Suharto kept a grip on the three foci of power – the Defence Department, KOPKAMTIB and the intelligence agency, BAKIN.

Once the party line had been laid down, Fosko was disbanded and Widodo was replaced. Jusuf hung on till 1983, though "watchdog Sudomo" stayed around too. GOLKAR, not surprisingly, "won" the 1982 elections and since then the process of further paralysing the political effectiveness of the political parties, the PPP and the PDI has continued apace. Pancasila must now be everyone's "sole principle" and the PPP, a mere shadow of its former self, has been forced to replace the Ka'abah symbol with a safely neutral star.

Some members of the Fosko group, shocked at the vigour of Suharto's re-

sponse, went public in a statement that came to be known as the Petition of 50. Since then, the group of "sakit hati" (disgruntled) generals have found new channels to air their grievances against the regime in coalition with disaffected civilian politicians. The Jenkins study has provided a very useful insight into the workings of military minds in Indonesia. Whatever their differences, they share the same fixation about "ABRI's role" and Army rule.

Footnotes

- 1 Jenkins, *Suharto and his Generals*, page 37.
- 2 *Ibid*, page 51.
- 3 Julian M. Boileau, *GOLKAR, Functional Group Politics in Indonesia*, Yayasan Proklamasi, Jakarta, 1983, page 80.
- 4 David Bouchier, *Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Ithaca, 1984. Reviewed in *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 66, November 1984.
- 5 Jenkins, *op. cit.*, page 255.
- 6 The Hankam Paper was published as *Pejuang dan Prajurit* (Fighter and Soldier), Nugroho Notosusanto (Ed), Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1984.
- 7 Jenkins, *op. cit.*, page 146.

Publishers warned against LEKRA writers

The Attorney-General's Office has issued a warning to the Indonesian Publishers Association, IKAPI, against the publication of books written by former members of LEKRA, the organisation of cultural workers that was banned by the military in 1965 along with many other leftwing organisations.

The warning follows the decision earlier this year to ban a book about General Soedirman, largely because of an article in it by Professor Poeradisastra, a LEKRA member (see *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 68, March 1985).

The Attorney-General's warning, marked secret and dated 13 February 1985, which is accompanied by a full list of the names of members of the Central Council and Secretariat of LEKRA, asks publishers to be alert of the possibility that LEKRA writers may try to have works published under pseudonyms. It reminds IKAPI of an Instruction issued by the Minister for the Interior in 1981 which includes the following guidelines for "guidance and supervision" of former G30S/PKI detainees and convicted prisoners:

- To impose restrictions on the employment of former G30S/PKI detainees and convicts in the following professions:

Jobs which can be used to influence others directly or indirectly for the advancement of communism, such as teachers, lecturers, priests, puppeteers, legal aid lawyers, journalists and so on.

- To prevent social activities by former G30S/PKI detainees and convicts which could result in disturbances in social-political affairs, social-economic affairs, social-cultural affairs and national security and order.

- To prevent the mental attitudes of former G30S/PKI detainees and convicts from threatening and endangering the Pancasila ideology and the 1945 Constitution.

The "Four Changes"

The commander of the Tabanan Military District in Bali, Lieutenant-Colonel Panda Made Latra, has also warned people to exercise vigilance against former PKI detainees who, he claimed, are conducting a "four changes" tactic – change of name, change of domicile, change of profession and change of appearance. He added the warning that people of "the extreme left" are engaged in a variety of activities under the cloak of religion. (*Sinar Harapan*, 27 March)

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