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
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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 63

May 1984

Appeal to the world from the Bishop of Dili: "Open your eyes to the brutalities of Indonesia"

Less than a year after being appointed to replace Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopes who was forced to resign as Bishop of Dili because of his outspoken condemnation of Indonesian atrocities, the new Bishop (officially known as the Apostolic Administrator), Mgr Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo has made a forthright statement about the situation inside East Timor. The following is the text of a letter to his predecessor, now living in Lisbon:

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

We here are in the worst socio-political conditions, as you know, from 8 August, the situation deteriorated. They arrested people in all the *postos*—600 people in Dili alone—and they are now being charged in military courts. Others were made to disappear. We don't know if these courts are impartial and if they have defence witnesses. In the *kabupatens* of Lospalos, Viqueque, Baucau and Ainaro, there is war and the population

CHURCH REFUSING TO COOPERATE AT ALL LEVELS

The Catholic Church in East Timor is adopting an attitude of complete non-cooperation with the Indonesian military forces. In addition to the outspoken letter from Mgr Belo, the following incidents have come to light:

- A proposal by the Indonesian authorities that the territory of Oe-cussi, an enclave on the north coast of West Timor which was part of the former Portuguese colony, should be integrated into the Diocese of Atambua (West Timor) was rejected. When the proposal was made, Mgr Belo made a visit to the enclave against the wishes of the military. He was enthusiastically welcomed by the people of Oecussi who openly expressed their attachment to the East Timor church, giving him grounds to reject the Indonesian move.
- When General Benny Murdani, Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces, made a visit to East Timor on Christmas Day last year, he held a meeting in Dili to which the priests and sisters had been invited. However, they all decided to boycott the meeting and persisted in doing so despite pressure exerted on them to attend by intelligence agents. According to a communication from Jakarta, "it would have been difficult for them if people heard that they were meeting Murdani when everyone knew that a week later, there was going to be a great slaughter." (This refers to a new military operation that was due to commence on 2 January.)

is corralled. They suffer illnesses, hunger, lack of liberty and persecution. In Lospalos alone, there are ten battalions, and these *bapaks* are still not winning the war. They thought to end the affair by the end of December 1983 but we are already in February and there is no end in sight to the military operation. They have once more begun to mobilise the civilian populations in the *kabupatens* of Covalima, Ainaro, Same, Manatuto, Baucau and Viqueque. It is amazing that with so many battalions, helicopters, tanks and bomber aircraft, they still need the support of the *rayat*. And there go the men, armed with daggers and *catana* knives, leaving their fields and gardens. It's a misery, Monsignor. The Red Cross does not enter the prisons, nor can I celebrate mass for the political detainees in Comarca Prison.

In Muapitini (Lospalos) and Iliomar, popular judgements have occurred and those implicated in contacts with the bush were murdered in front of the people, stabbed with knives, chopped with *catanas* and beaten with sticks and by their own families. It is a macabre situation in which we are living. This is more or less a weak image of how we are living.

I ask Monsignor to continue to pray for us and make an appeal to the free world to open its eyes to the barbarities of which the Indonesians are capable. The Church is persecuted and accused, and our schools are searched and the students interrogated. The residence of the Salesian Fathers in Baucau was "savagely" searched by the *nanggalas*. Good Monsignor, I hope that this letter reaches your hands. Without anything special to add, I only ask you to look after our interests in the Metropole and convince the priests who are there to come back to Timor.

United in the Lord, always at your service.

Carlos Filipe X Belo, Apostolic Administrator.

Dili, 16 February. (Original, handwritten in Portuguese)

Postos: the administrative centres where the Timorese population has been forcibly resettled in concentration camps.

Kabupatans: the districts of East Timor.

Bapak: a deferential Indonesian term, used for Indonesian soldiers.

Rayat: correctly, *rakyat*) people.

Catana: a Timorese knife.

Nanggalas: knife-wielding troops of the paracommando corps, Kopassandha.

British armoured cars in use to repress students, see page 11.

Letters tell of new atrocities

(1)

The situation is extremely bad. Genocide of the population in what is truly a concentration camp continues. Each settlement is nothing but an enclosure where the military can choose who they want to kill or torture. They pay generous sums of money to spies to get them to accuse anyone they wish to eliminate. This kind of warfare is being practised everywhere. Another kind is when the invaders are subject to surprise attacks on the roads by active, tough resistance fighters, or to surprise attacks on the military posts where they are stationed and several of the occupants are killed. In less than a month (from the end of February to the middle of March), they buried about 50 inhabitants in a single region (Ainaro-Sune) which is by no means the worst region. This is just one indication of the violence with which the fighting is proceeding.

At the beginning of this month, the local military commander announced that he was giving the resistance an ultimatum of one month to surrender, and if they did not do so, everyone would be killed. They are also infuriated because the Church has not called on the resistance to surrender (which would only result, as always, in their being killed). Because of this, three important missions have been subjected to intense intimidation by the occupying forces. They have prevented the priests from moving and carried off catechists; they have beaten up the teachers and pupils of the mission schools. They have destroyed the residence of one of the main missions on the pretext that they discovered a transmitter of the resistance in the building. They are more and more openly adopting an attitude of persecution towards the Church; this is not persecution by Muslims but by the government in order to conquer this piece of land. And the real reason is that the Church will not co-operate in inducing people to surrender as a way of accelerating the genocide of the population.

In many settlements, they are forcing the population to kill people inside their own settlements (...). They display an intense hatred for the local culture and for education in the Portuguese language and even go after people for greeting them with the words "bons dias", ("good-day" in Portuguese).

There are soldiers everywhere yet they announced that a dozen more battalions are coming, to launch a massive operation of extermination in the coming few weeks. Who can it be who is helping them to escape from this dreadful degree of crimes and genocide which disgraces the reputation of their own country and is reducing our formerly happy people to a heap of corpses. At the very least, churches throughout the world should show solidarity for these martyrs. March 1984.

(2)

We declare that on 1 February, 1984, there was a violent persecution of the population of Bobonaro. The people most severely struck were the populations of Cara-Bau, Cota-Boot, Coli-Mau and Mali-Ubo in the region of Hauba, the administrative post of Bobonaro. From 1-13 February, they (the Indonesian troops) began to hunt down and arrest people. On 14 February, they began to massacre the prisoners.

At first they arrested two *hansip* (civil guard) members who had fought on their side for the past eight years, as well as a community figure who was suspected. The red-berets (paracommando *Kopassandha* troops) tortured the two *hansips* with nails, needles, cigarettes and razor-blades, and killed them both. They did not kill the community figure but broke his leg by striking it hard. He was then taken to the *kecamatan* sub-district (administration) office in Bobonaro and made to sit at the door of the *koramil* (military sub-district command) where he was ordered to identify people passing on the road. Whenever he pointed at anyone and said "that person collaborates with the guerrillas", the person was captured and killed without further investigation. In the month of February alone, more than fifty people were killed. But it is being said that the military plan to kill altogether 167 people in this zone. Only then, they say, will they be able to re-establish peace.

A pupil of the mission school who attends the SMP (Indonesian lower middle school) lost his father and two uncles. All three were murdered by the military. Then, this school-boy whose name is Pedro, being full of anguish and sorrow, went to complain to the red-berets. Their response was to tie a rope round his neck and hang him on a tree. This is how the young Pedro, pupil of the SMP at Bobonaro, died for having wept for the death of his father.

In the region of Hauba, they have forced the population to build new roads into the mountains. The troops take advantage of this forced labour to capture and kill some of the forced labourers. The families of those who were murdered—their mothers, spouses, children—have been concentrated in the town. Some of those who were to have been killed escaped and fled. In these cases, the whole family are suspected (of helping) the escape.

All homes are under surveillance, and the composition of each family is counted and compared with the number of inhabitants inside the house. If there are more inhabitants than members of the family or more members of the family than inhabitants, they are also suspected.

Starting on 4 or 5 March for 5 days, they will organise a festival for the people to swear loyalty to the military!

Court trials, a cover-up for massacres

The Indonesian authorities have recently announced that Fretilin supporters are being tried for "treason", but the trials are just a cover-up for massacres of many Timorese who have been captured during the military operations that were launched last August.

The trials were mentioned by Mario Carrascalao, the puppet governor of East Timor, in an interview with Australian correspondent, Leigh Mackay (*West Australian*, 20 March 1984). He claimed that twelve people had already been tried and that another forty were awaiting trial. After asserting that all those in gaol would be tried and that "nobody will be held without trial", Carrascalao immediately contradicted himself by admitting that there were still 2,000 detainees, described as sympathisers and relatives of Fretilin members, being held on Atauro island who would not be released until "the situation is calm".

Since then, several reports have been filed from Jakarta

about the trials in Dili, the first time since 1975 that the Indonesians have thought to make use of the courts against members of the Timorese resistance. An AP dispatch from Jakarta (*South China Morning Post*, 14 March 1984) reported that most of the Timorese are being charged with involvement in an ambush on 8 August when 16 Indonesian soldiers were killed. There are no reports about how the trials have been conducted though it is not difficult to conclude that Indonesia's draconian anti-subversion law is now being put to use to accuse Timorese of committing "treason" against an illegal force of occupation.

The recent emphasis on prisoners has been reinforced by Indonesia's decision to allow the International Red Cross (ICRC) to resume prison visits, a programme that had to be abandoned last year when facilities were withdrawn shortly before the 1983 Indonesian offensive was launched. So far, the ICRC has been allowed to visit one prison in Dili. ICRC food relief programmes, also halted last year, have not been resumed.

Portuguese and Indonesian Bishops Speak Out

The Catholic Church in Portugal as well as in Indonesia have both, for the first time since the Indonesian invasion of East Timor eight years ago, taken a public position in support of the Timorese people.

Portuguese bishops condemn genocide

The statement of the Portuguese bishops, issued on 28 March, expresses solidarity with the people of East Timor "who aspire to the full expression of their individuality, and to prevent this is tantamount not merely to physical genocide but to what can be called 'cultural genocide', even more serious than the physical because it affects not only those who die but those who survive, the present generation as well as those to come".

The Church, say the bishops, "must make its voice heard in order to stop the injustices being suffered by the Timorese people and to ensure that they can, themselves, determine their future in peace and liberty". The statement ends with a call to the Portuguese Government, "historically, morally and juridically responsible", to the Indonesian Government, "the occupying power", to various international institutions which could act as mediators, and to Timorese political leaders inside the country as well as in exile, to do everything in their power to bring an end to this tragic and seemingly endless situation.

MAWI: "... victims of cruel oppression"

The statement of the Indonesian Bishops' Conference (MAWI) which was signed by its president, Mgr F.X. Hadisumarta, and secretary, Mgr Leo Soekoto, came in response to a report about widespread hunger and repression in

East Timor made to the MAWI 1983 meeting by Mgr Belo, Apostolic Administrator of Dili who attended the meeting as an observer. The statement, which was a message addressed to the Church and people of East Timor, recognised that the things most sacred to the people of that country are "their religion, their family and their land. In other words, respect for personal property rights, a higher value for the lives and dignity of mankind and behaviour which is both civilised and just."

MAWI declared that "in spite of all the restrictions, (it) has made every possible effort to express its solidarity with the Faithful and the people of East Timor who are being deluged by most bitter trials both physically and spiritually".

We cannot refuse to confront the events that are happening among the people, especially those affairs which determine the welfare or the misery of the masses who are involved in or who are the victims of cruel oppression.

Church members express their grief

From reliable sources in Jakarta, TAPOL has received information that members of both the Catholic and Protestant churches in Indonesia are writing letters of condolence to President Suharto about the killings in East Timor as a way of recording and drawing attention to the continuing war. General Benny Murdani is known to be extremely angry at these letters but attempts to persuade the churches to stop writing in this way have failed.



The former head of the Catholic Church in East Timor, Mgr da Costa Lopes, is received by the Pope in Rome. The Mgr told the UN Commission of Human Rights in Geneva on February 21, 1984 that the "war will go on and on for as long as natural justice and freedom are denied to the East Timorese people".

Fretilin Peace Plan launched

A Fretilin plan for negotiations leading to a just solution of the East Timor problem was made public in Lisbon on the occasion of an international solidarity meeting held there in March. The Peace Plan was originally outlined in a Fretilin document sent out in May 1983, during the period of the ceasefire and two months before Indonesia launched its 1983 offensive.

The Peace Plan calls for:

1. The holding of direct negotiations between Portugal, Indonesia and Fretilin, under UN auspices, to discuss the following:

(a) the constitution of a truly impartial UN or multinational peace force as the indispensable condition to safeguard

i. the functioning of a transitional administration;

ii. the proper implementation of decisions reached during a separate dialogue between the two belligerent forces, Falintil and the Indonesian Armed Forces, regarding the deployment of their forces;

(b) the holding of a free, democratic consultation of the people of East Timor;

(c) the fixing of the date for the transfer of sovereignty.

2. The right should be reserved for Australia to participate in the negotiations as an observer.

3. Other observers may be chosen on the proposal of the three parties mentioned in point 1) in equal numbers, each of which shall be subject to the approval of the other two parties.

Portuguese government preparing for sell-out

The week after the peace plan was announced, President Eanes announced that he was convening an urgent meeting of the Council of State to discuss the situation in East Timor and to press for action by Portugal in favour of self-determination. It was understood that he was concerned by the lack of effective action by the Portuguese government to secure self-

determination for East Timor in accordance with the Portuguese Constitution (Article 307). Indeed, rumours were circulating at the time that the Portuguese government was already involved in secret negotiations with Indonesia.

Although these rumours were initially denied, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Jaime Gama made it known in Lisbon just before the Council of State meeting took place, that his government was indeed seeking a solution for East Timor. He told the press his government believes a solution can only be found by direct negotiations with Indonesia and "did not anticipate inclusion of Timorese representatives at this stage".

Gama told journalists that although Portugal does not recognise that the Timorese people have been consulted about their future, it did not intend to make self-determination or any other issue a condition for negotiating with Indonesia. According to Jill Jolliffe (*Canberra Times*, 1 April 1984), the government's policy involves recognising Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor and re-establishing diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and opening up a Portuguese consulate in Dili in an effort to promote and preserve Portuguese culture in East Timor.

Abilio Araujo, a Fretilin representative based in Lisbon described the Portuguese government's position as "completely immoral, a betrayal of everything they have been saying in recent years. The Timorese people will not accept any solution in which they do not take part." (Ibid.)

It remains to be seen whether the Portuguese government can conclude a deal with Indonesia against the opposition not only of the President but also of a special Parliamentary Commission on East Timor, whose chairman Deputy Sottomeyer Cardia is known to be very much in favour of including Fretilin in the negotiations right from the start.

Indonesian offensive halted

Fretilin forces have successfully halted the huge Indonesian offensive launched last August, according to a report of a meeting of the Revolutionary Council for National Liberation that was held in East Timor on 16-18 March this year. The report said that

the Indonesians are growing more and more demoralised by the fact that our activities cover almost all the territory.

At the same time, the Revolutionary Council (known by its Portuguese acronym, CRRN) warns world opinion that the Indonesian military are continuing to inflict atrocities on the people of East Timor, and reports that

The Indonesians have been saying they would massacre all our people without fear of international condemnation.

Hundreds of civilians, including women and children were massacred at the height of the offensive from August to October last year, particularly in the regions of Los Palos and Viqueque, in the eastern part of the country. The CRRN report also spoke about "intimidation sessions" (probably the "people's judgements" mentioned in Mgr Belo's letter, see separate item) that had been held in villages in the eastern sector, during which Indonesian soldiers publicly tortured and beat suspected Fretilin supporters. Such "sessions" had occurred in the towns of Luro, Laga, Laivai and Saelari.

The CRRN is the supreme council of the resistance movement in East Timor and includes representatives of the fighting units as well as of the population living in Indonesian-occupied territory. The March CRRN meeting was held in Nakroma, the Fretilin name for the central sector of the country. Information from the 39-page report was released to the press in Lisbon on 16 April (*Canberra Times*, 17 April 1984).

The meeting heard a report on the military situation by Kilik Wae Gae, chief-of-staff of Falintil, the Fretilin armed forces. He declared that the Indonesian forces were "bogged down" with heavy material on the roads and only able occasionally to send columns of troops into the mountains in search of Fretilin bases. (This would not be an easy operation anyway since the guerrilla bases are extremely mobile.) Kilik Wae Gae stressed that Fretilin forces have the "tactical superiority in the current phase of the strategic counter-offensive". Indonesian plans to isolate resistance forces in the eastern sector have been thwarted because guerrillas are operating in all parts of the country. This has compelled the forces of occupation to relocate their troops.

The war against East Timor

by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong

A history of Indonesia's war of aggression in East Timor and of the stunning resurgence of the resistance movement under Fretilin's leadership following the heavy defeats of 1977/78. The book also analyses efforts to Indonesianise the military regime's "27th Province" politically, economically and socially, and describes conditions in the resettlement camps created by the forces of occupation for purposes of population control.

Nine secret counter-insurgency documents of the Indonesian Army are reproduced at length.

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240 pages, with photographs.

Probable price: £6.50.

Arnold Ap and others shot dead by security forces

According to reports from several different sources, Arnold Ap, curator of the Anthropology Museum in Jayapura, and two other political prisoners have been shot dead by Indonesian troops. Ap was last seen alive in prison on 21 April; five days later, his body was seen at a hospital in Jayapura with three bullet wounds. The reports have led Amnesty International to launch an Urgent Action to protest against these killings.

Arnold Ap was arrested by Kopassandha troops in Jayapura last November. He was well-known among West Papuans as a broadcaster as well as the promoter of Papuan culture, and his arrest caused great disquiet at the time.

Eddy Mofu is the name of one of the other prisoners shot dead with Ap; the third man's name is not known.

Irianese culture which some powerful figures in Indonesia are not prepared to tolerate.

There are no prizes for guessing who they are. The people who murdered Arnold Ap are the people who excused ill-thought-out policies in Irian Jaya with the question "do you want us to keep the place as a zoo?"

Arnold Ap's murder is inexcusable on humanitarian grounds. On political grounds it is sheer lunacy.

If the Indonesian Government wants to double the number of Irianese refugees, now a record 4,800 crossing into PNG; if it wants to go on senselessly alienating the Irianese, especially around Jayapura and the border; if it wants to entrench mounting PNG resentment; if it wants to indulge in the counter-productive exercise of generating Australian anti-Indonesian feelings, then murdering a defenceless intellectual in prison is the right way to go about it.


Sydney Morning Herald: "...premeditated"

Ten days before Ap's murder, a group of Australian journalists visiting Jayapura had been told that Arnold Ap was "all right". Among them was Peter Hastings, Foreign Editor of the **Sydney Morning Herald**, well known for his strong sympathy for the Indonesian military regime, particularly on the question of East Timor. In a feature article entitled, "The Murder of Arnold Ap" (SMH, 14 May 1984), he wrote:

Why did they murder Ap? ... They murdered him in premeditated fashion because he was an Irianese intellectual who personified



Below, a caricature drawn by Arnold Ap and published in *Kabar dari Kampung*, August 1983, the bulletin of Irja-DISC, the Irian Jaya Development Information Service Center. The caricature illustrates the harmful effects of a road to be built from Holtekang to Hamadi which will cut right across the Yotefa Bay.



Refugees' fate still uncertain

In April in Jakarta, following a top level meeting involving both Murdani and Mochtar, the Indonesian press reported 1,140 of the West Papuan refugees in Papua New Guinea would be returned. A similar report by the Indonesian press in March turned out to be untrue, and this one has yet to be verified by PNG.

Violations of PNG's border by Indonesian aircraft notwithstanding, the refugees are still the matter of greatest political and humanitarian concern to PNG. After the first wave of refugees from Jayapura arrived in Vanimo, hundreds more fled from villages along the border. Indonesian paratroops and aircraft are mounting an operation in the area to eliminate OPM resistance, and fighting has increased since the hijacking of a mission plane by the OPM in the village of Ubrub. The Swiss pilot and a teacher were later released in PNG, but two Indonesians, one military, on the aircraft were shot dead.

The Catholic mission station at Kamberatoro has been inundated with over 400 refugees, and the village of Bewani with 100 more. There are said to be at least 600 at the village of Mamamuro. The West Papuans have said they were frightened by the presence of Indonesian paratroops, and by clashes between them and OPM guerrillas. Many arrived in PNG suffering from malnutrition and exhaustion. It is likely that the two aircraft that overflowed Green River were involved in this Indonesian "clean-up" operation, euphemistically called an exercise.

The PNG Government still stands by the UNHCR recognition of refugee status for the West Papuans, and has not said that any will be returned. Nor has it acceded to Indonesia's demand for a list of all the refugees, for fear of reprisals against their families. In Jakarta, Namaliu emphasised that the refugees would not be returned unless PNG was sure they would be treated humanely, and not harassed or forced from their land. Mochtar, however, has insisted that Indonesia has the right to punish those who have "broken the law". In PNG, some of the refugees have already been charged with illegal entry. On 22 March, 73 of the West Papuans who fled from Jayapura in February were sentenced to six weeks in prison, although another 38 were found guilty but not convicted by a different magistrate. Subsequently, the 73 in prison went on hunger strike. There has been enormous opposition to this treatment of the West Papuans in PNG, ranging from the Public Solicitors Office to the Bishop of Vanimo. But whatever the purpose of the convictions, they are unlikely to deter people fleeing for their lives.

In the recent past, Prime Minister Somare has gone to considerable lengths to maintain cordial relations with Indonesia, usually by giving way to the demands and behaviour of PNG's stronger neighbour. The issue of the refugees has frustrated Somare's attempts to avoid disagreements with Indonesia, and the impression that the PNG Government merely hopes that the issue will go away has aroused widespread criticism. Indonesia continues to force more refugees into PNG by its military sweeps, while at the same time demanding their return and adding to political tension. It is certainly not safe for the refugees to go back: even villages inside PNG have been evacuated for fear Indonesian troops will move over the border, as they have previously done. Meanwhile, the refugees must subsist on handouts from the UNHCR, the PNG Government and Australia; their fate is the undecided factor in PNG's desperate attempts to extricate itself from its dilemma without offending Indonesia.

TAPOL has also received information that West Papuan villagers from the south, in the province of Merauke, have fled by sea into PNG. A group of 28 sailed through the Torres Straits and landed at a village 50 kms inside PNG; they are now in the coastal town of Daru. This would suggest that there are

Indonesian military operations in the south of West Papua as well as in the north, the only area about which information has been received up till now. Merauke is the area in which Indonesia is concentrating most of its transmigration settlements (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 62).

STOP PRESS

Since the accompanying item was prepared, the refugee situation in Papua New Guinea has become much more serious. The PNG Government now appears to be ready to give way to Indonesian pressure, and to send some of the refugees back. TAPOL has been told by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees that there are now 6,000 West Papuans who have fled to PNG since February, the great majority of them since the middle of April. Mission stations like Kamberatoro near the border, have been flooded with men, women and children, and are finding themselves stretched beyond their limited resources.

The UNHCR has been in constant contact with the Government in Port Moresby, but says it has no power to stop any refugees being sent back. It has also been in contact with Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in Jakarta, but says there is a 'complete block' because Mochtar refuses to accept that the West Papuans are refugees, and has said that the UNHCR has no role to play in what is purely an "internal matter". The PNG Government has said it will wait two weeks (as of 14 May) before sending any of the refugees back, to allow the UNHCR time to interview more of them and to negotiate with Indonesia. But it seems very unlikely that Indonesia will back down at all, given its previous refusal even to acknowledge the problem.

The enormous increase in the number of refugees coming over the border during the past few weeks suggests that the military sweeps have become worse. The refugees have said that Indonesian troops are conducting house-to-house searches with great brutality, and are killing and torturing people indiscriminately to try to find OPM sympathisers (*The Age*, 30 April). It is reported that border posts have been heavily reinforced (*West Australian*, 5 May). With the situation as bad as it is, there are great fears among the refugees about what will happen to them if they are forced back into Indonesian hands. Since Indonesia refuses even to allow UNHCR officials into Jayapura, since fighting continues on the border, and since Indonesia has affirmed its right to punish "law-breakers" among the West Papuans, their fears seem to be well justified.



General Rudini, Army Chief-of-Staff (left), discussing military operations in Irian Jaya with Brig-General Sembiring, military commander of the province. Major-General Ari Bandioko (centre) is Rudini's Assistant for Security. (*Sinar Harapan*, 3 April 1984.)

How Indonesia is squeezing PNG

When Colonel Sebastian Ismail, the Indonesian Defence Attaché in Port Moresby, arrived in Jakarta from Port Moresby and shouted, untruthfully, that he had been expelled, his apparent indignation convinced no-one in Papua New Guinea. Although he was threatened with expulsion due to his failure to inform anyone of Indonesian military "exercises" on the PNG/West Papua border, he was also unpopular for his activities as leader of an Indonesian spy ring in PNG. Last year in August, a West Papuan refugee, Simon Allom, was convicted of the murder of Ismail's chauffeur, Meinard Poluan. At the trial, Allom said that Poluan had tried to recruit him as a spy, and that both Poluan and Ismail were involved in a covert operation, called "Pagar Betis".¹ More recently, the PNG and Australian press have given Indonesian interference and the variety of pressures on PNG more attention.

The main object of "Pagar Betis" is to cripple OPM activities in PNG. There is alleged to be a list of prominent West Papuan refugees and PNG politicians hostile to Indonesia who are to be eliminated. The spies, some recruited in PNG and others trained in Indonesia, have been ordered to find out the positions and strengths of both the OPM and the PNG Defence Force. Many Papuans believe this operation to be a preliminary to an invasion of Papua New Guinea, and point to the way in which Indonesia is transmuting military personnel to populate the area along the border with PNG. Certainly such a campaign of destabilisation is similar to "Operation Komodo", which aimed at disrupting East Timor just before the Indonesian invasion in 1975. (PNG Times, 15 March 1983.)

The same West Papuan activists who might expect to be targets of "Pagar Betis", have also found themselves being harassed by the PNG National Intelligence Organisation (NIO). This has taken the form of house searches, interrogations and the confiscation of political documents; files are kept on all those considered to be involved in the OPM.

Australia's defence interests

The NIO's activities are better understood since the recent leak of a document in Australia, describing that country's strategic priorities. Australia regards Indonesia as its only likely threat, but thinks that avoiding conflict with Indonesia at all costs is the best way of dealing with this threat. The document also described how Australia should "encourage PNG to take action wherever possible to suppress anti-Indonesian activity by Irian Jaya dissidents" (National Times, March 1984). The continued domination of the NIO by Australian expatriates is one means by which Australia can encourage such suppression. Australia regards Indonesian hostility to PNG over OPM resistance as a potential source of conflict in which Australia could become involved, and presumably hopes that suppression of the West Papuan resistance might prevent such an eventuality. Both Indonesia and Australia would like PNG to follow such a policy and ignore the plight of people in West Papua. Given the sympathy in PNG for West Papuans, that is politically impossible for any PNG Government, but when the Indonesian military aggravate tension inside West Papua, as it has done recently, the problems spill over the border into PNG whether Somare likes it or not. The PNG Government is caught helplessly between the self-interested demands of its two giant neighbours, and is finding it impossible to oblige them. "Dislike of Indonesia in PNG is now running very high," said Rabbie Namaliu recently, "I have every pressure on me not to send the Irianese border crossers back to Indonesia." (Tribune 4 April.)

In the PNG Times on 12 April, an academic at the University of PNG gave a realistic appraisal of PNG's position:

It is evident that current activities along the border and Indonesia's unco-operative attitude threaten to inflame anti-Indonesian



Indonesian officers on 'defence trials' tour in Australia. (Cairns Post, 10 March 1984.)

sentiments in PNG. Indeed, they may well have added weight to the view that Indonesia harbours expansionist designs on PNG. In turn, such anti-Indonesian sentiments may harden attitudes in Jakarta and produce continuing tensions between the two states, with unpredictable consequences. . . . Indonesia seems to be over-applying the Thucydidesian rule that in international politics, the strong exact what they can and the weak grant what they must. It is the classic Lilliputian dilemma. And it is precisely this dilemma that PNG must try to solve.

It is not helpful to assume that the OPM will be wiped out, and therefore it is only a matter of time before PNG is free of Indonesian harassment. It is true that the Indonesianisation program that is being implemented in Irian Jaya threatens to destroy the OPM in particular, and Melanesian culture in general. But even if PNG is unable to help its Melanesian brothers and sisters for reasons other than its uncaring attitude, its own security may be at risk if the limits of permissible Indonesian behaviour along the border are not clearly defined by both governments.

1. The PNG Times writes that "Pagar Betis" means "to hobble". The Indonesian expression in fact means "fence of legs", the name used for anti-guerrilla sweeps against the resistance movement in East Timor during 1980-81.

Dutch and Australian Broadcasts Infuriate the Generals

Radio Australia and Radio Netherlands, both of which beam regular broadcasts in Indonesian, English and Dutch that are widely followed in Indonesia, have been strongly attacked by Lieutenant-General Kahfi Surjadiredja, commander of the eastern territorial defence command (Kowilhan IV).

Speaking at a seminar on developments in Irian Jaya in Jakarta this month, he bitterly complained that these two world broadcasting systems were "dominating the flow of news on Irian Jaya" and admitted that these reports "could be detrimental to the Indonesian Government" (The Age 2 May, 1984). Indonesia censors all foreign printed media on arrival in Indonesia but is helpless to control foreign broadcasts, though it closed down Radio Australia's Jakarta office in 1980.

Lieutenant-General Kahfi said that in an attempt to counteract the effects of Dutch and Australian broadcasts, Indonesia is planning to build a 250-kilowatt transmitter on the outskirts of Jakarta that will relay official broadcasts to an estimated 30 million people who inhabit the eastern region of Indonesia.

Seth Rumkorem on human rights in West Papua

Seth Rumkorem has for many years been a leader of the OPM Free Papua Movement in West Papua, fighting a guerrilla war against Indonesian forces from the jungle. He left West Papua in 1982, after a decision by the OPM that he should go abroad to publicise the situation there, but was apprehended by PNG authorities as he and nine companions tried to reach Vanuatu by boat. He was acquitted of the charge of illegal entry, and allowed to stay in Rabaul. In December 1982, however, he had to leave PNG, as Prime Minister Somare was about to make an official visit to Jakarta and was anxious to avoid any criticism by Suharto over tolerance of the OPM. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees asked the Greek government to give him temporary asylum, and he has been allowed to stay in Athens indefinitely with two other OPM members. He has tried to find another country more suited to advancing the OPM cause which would offer him asylum, so far without success, and is working to establish links with similar organisations. The interview was conducted with the help of Luis Nussy, one of the OPM members with Seth. This is the second part of the interview. For the first part, see TAPOL Bulletin No. 62, March 1984.

From what you have already said, it is clear that the OPM is strong in many parts of West Papua. How do the Indonesians respond to OPM operations?

On many occasions, they have entered the kampungs and murdered innocent people. This is clear from their "Operation Wibawa" (Operation Authority), "Operation Sadar" (Operation Consciousness), "Operation Kikis 1" and "Operation Kikis 2" (the First and Second "Chipping-Away" Operations). During the first two operations, the Indonesians did not go into the jungle, but murdered and terrorised people in the villages instead. The Indonesian objective here was to intimidate people in the period leading up to the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969. They claimed they would convince the people to agree to integrate with Indonesia, and they aimed to assert their authority over West Papuans. In the course of these operations, 30,000 Papuan people died.

During "Operation Kikis 1 and 2", most of those killed by the Indonesian military were women and children. Indonesia wished to prevent a new generation being born, so that Papuan children would not grow up to join in the fight against Indonesia. Another tactic they used was to poison the West Papuan leadership. Godfry Mirino, a member of the Indonesian Parliament was one. Then Nikolas Tanggahma, a former member of the New Guinea Council, was poisoned in Manokwari. The first deputy governor of Irian Jaya, James Mamobiro, as well as Silas Papare and Baldus Mofu were all poisoned, and Franz Kaisieppo, governor from 1964 to 1973, was poisoned in Jakarta.

They also aim in the long term, to change the character of Papuan youth, by encouraging uncontrolled prostitution, even for under-age youngsters. This has caused the spread of venereal diseases, and a report from the Provincial Government stated that 75% of the people afflicted with syphilis and gonorrhoea are youngsters. The army freely distributes pornographic photographs and films, marijuana and other drugs, sometimes with the help of teachers and heads of schools. The OPM discovered a lot about this sort of thing in June and August 1981 in Wamena and Jayapura.

During "Operation Kikis 3" and "Operation Sapu Bersih" (Operation Clean Sweep), Indonesian forces impaled the heads of those suspected of being sympathetic to the OPM, who had been killed in the bush, and displayed the heads to people held in the prisons run by the army, navy and police.

What about other human rights abuses committed by the Indonesians? What do you know about these from your own experience?

While I was an intelligence officer in the Indonesian Army, I became very familiar with reports received at army HQ. Then in 1968, I was in Biak and heard about ill-treatment from people who came to my father to protest. I have spoken a great deal with people who have witnessed or suffered inhuman treatment at the hands of Indonesian troops, and when I was myself arrested for the third time by security forces in Biak, I saw it with my own eyes.

In West Papua, two out of every ten native inhabitants have experienced imprisonment, from one day up to five years. All these people, however long they were imprisoned, have been tortured, and prisoners are still being tortured. The instruments used include red-hot irons, the tail of the sting-ray, electric current and other barbaric abuses. No differentiation is made between small children, women or men; all are treated alike. Esther Yanteo was the head of a girls school in Serui in 1969, and a member of the Gerakan Nasional Papua. When Indonesian security officers learnt that she was a member of the liberation movement, she was arrested. During her interrogation, they tried to make her speak by forcing her to strip naked, then burning her sexual organ with cigarettes. Once, when I was at my father's home, some relatives from Mumfor described how Indonesians had behaved in Jemburwo. Women were raped, then sand was put into their vaginas. The men who protested were put into sacks and dropped into the sea. As for the six women arrested and detained by the Cendrawasih XVII Military Command, in their letters to me they said that the soldiers had tied their hands and feet, then did anything they wanted with them.



Seth Rumkorem in West Papua.

Even corpses are maltreated. For example, Dantje Bitbit, my personal courier was beaten until he was half-dead, in the kampung of Wagena on the island of Yarsun. When he was dead, the soldiers used his corpse as a bench to sit on, then, before leaving the kampung, they cut his body into pieces, and ordered the villagers not to bury them, but to leave the pieces where they were.

I saw many examples of torture while I was in the Navy prison in Biak, especially of local community leaders. Mr Borai, the secretary of the bupati of Biak, was so severely beaten that many of his bones were broken, but he was not given any medical assistance. The head and English teacher at the SMA (secondary school) in Biak, Mr Major, was left all night in a tub of water, and Utrecht Wompere was beaten until he was close to death, and thrown about like an animal. Some other prisoners took him back to his cell, and we nursed him for three weeks with medicines that had been smuggled in. When there was a cholera outbreak in Asmat everyone in the Navy detention centre was vaccinated, but the doctor used only one needle for 84 prisoners. We were all afraid of catching infections, but could do nothing but pray to God that we would be all right. The Navy doctors did nothing to help those who were sick, gave them no medicine, and just left them to die. One victim of this was Mr Faidiban, a mechanic with the DAMRI bus company.

One of our Warrant Officers, Obeth Sabuni came to Biak and shot dead four Indonesian soldiers and the son of the bupati of Jayapura, then ran away because he had no more bullets. He was shot in the leg by Indonesian forces. Instead of taking him to hospital, they took him straight to the interrogation room, where he was tortured to make him reveal secrets before being killed. Warrant Officer Jahje Ojaitouw and Sergeant-Major Ben Demena were held for 18 months by military police of Cendrawasih Military Command, tied hand and foot with chains. Their food and water were just thrown at them, and they were lucky if they could catch anything to eat or drink. Ben and two companions were cut into pieces, tied up in sacks and thrown into the sea so that no-one would know anything about them.

Indonesian military authorities usually like to eliminate prisoners they consider to be too dangerous to return to the community. Marthin Luther Waren was a guerrilla leader arrested in Sarmi in June 1970, together with Daan Kafiari, presently in Sweden, Baltazar Ortumilena and Keleopas Jarisetouw. After he had signed a release document, he was allowed out in August 1972, and Daan and Kalaopas saw him being offered a lift in a non-military vehicle by an intelligence officer. Marthin left with this man, and since then no-one knows what has become of him. The vehicle had the number DS 101, a well-known vehicle involved in similar disappearances in Jayapura. Now, when his relatives ask about him, the prison officials say he is no longer there, and show his signed release order.

Pregnant women are not spared torture, as I can show by giving an example from "Operation Wibawa". Because of the general amnesty announced by Suharto after the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969, everyone came out of the jungle and returned to their villages. But in May 1970, a number of women were murdered during two visits by a unit of the Udayana Division. One woman was heavily pregnant, and the army shot her in the stomach, cut out the unborn baby and cut it into two in front of the almost dead mother and 84 other women and children. This woman's name was Maria Bonsapia, the older sister of the primary school teacher Juliana Bonsapia, who was killed in the second operation. Before being killed, she was raped by twenty-five soldiers, who then cut her genitals with a bayonet. During "Operation Sapu Bersih" 500 people from the kampung of Sre-Sre in Lereh kecamatan, were killed, including one pregnant woman who was burnt alive.

The Indonesians claim they are bringing in the benefits of modernisation and spending large amounts of money to assist the Papuan people. How true are these claims?

The Indonesians always make exaggerated claims about bringing progress to Irian Jaya. As far as I have seen, there has been no development in practice, only a lot of plans on paper. Take, for example, Indonesia's budget in Irian Jaya for 1982/3 and compare it with the value of exports from the Indonesian Office of Statistics for 1978: the budget amounts to some 64 million US dollars, whereas the value of exports for 1978 was around one billion US dollars. Roads, like the planned Trans Irian highway, are built purely for military purposes, to prevent

the guerrillas operating from PNG, and to protect foreign investment in West Papua. Road construction has nothing to do with the welfare of the Papuan people.

Education seems to me to have deteriorated since the Dutch left. Under the Dutch, there were more Papuan teachers, and they were not restricted by the Indonesian education system. The fighters I have helped train who were educated under the Dutch have a better general knowledge than those educated by Indonesia, because the Indonesian teachers concentrate on indoctrinating their pupils with Indonesian nationalist propaganda. For them, knowing Pancasila is the most important part of education.

In health matters, the situation is far, far worse than before. Four Dutch health departments used to deal with malaria, TB, yaws and leprosy, but now the death rate from these and other diseases is increasing. Diseases like syphilis, gonorrhoea and cholera have become much more widespread. There are Indonesian Puskesmas (community health centres) but outside the main towns these consist only of a building and a nurse, with no medicines. In OPM liberated zones, we have our own medical services, such as those in the kecamatans of Bonggo, Betaf, Dabra, Samanente, Kasnawedja and Unurum-Guai. We must also go outside our areas to provide medical treatment.

I don't like to suggest that the Dutch period was our "Golden Era", but it makes me sad to note that had Indonesia done anything at all to promote our agriculture, West Papua would be more prosperous than many other parts of Indonesia. The Dutch started several agricultural projects, such as the "Kumbe" rice project around Merauke, cocoa estates in Serui, and coffee and rubber estates, all of which have been neglected and have reverted back to jungle again. Our livestock has suffered from the introduction of diseases which did not exist in West Papua previously. Some animals which have been brought in under the "Livestock Improvement" program, for instance the pigs brought to Wamena and Enarotali from Krawang in Java, have been infected with worms and other diseases which have caused the death of many Papuan people. Indonesia takes a great deal from our country, and there is an enormous gap between what they have profited and the little they put back.

What is the OPM's attitude towards transmigrants? If and when you achieve liberation, you may find that the majority of people living in West Papua are, by that time, Javanese transmigrants. What would you do with them?

These people are quite innocent. They have been forced or encouraged by Indonesia to go to West Papua. This problem presents us with a great challenge. It would be inhuman of us to return them to Java where there is no more land for them, and no future. We would like our state to be one with many ethnic groups, and we would like to have an open immigration policy which encourages skilled people from all over the world to help develop our country and its abundant natural resources. There would of course be a number of difficulties; the Papuan people are at a stage where they cannot compete with people coming in from outside. This is why now, even more than after our liberation, we have to bring up their level of social, political and economic awareness to match the immigrants.

We do not believe that the Javanese transmigrants should be sent back to Java, although there are many Papuans who do. They should be allowed to stay, but unfortunately most of them are not well educated, and they do not have skills to offer which Papuans don't yet have. This may sound very inhuman, but the transmigrants would have to become second-class citizens, we would have to discriminate positively in favour of the native inhabitants. This is not our fault. The Indonesians have brought in such a large, unskilled immigrant population. The root of the problem is Indonesia's refusal to recognise our right of self-determination. Because of this, a strong anti-Indonesian sentiment has developed among Papuan people, and an extremely complex situation has been made worse by the transmigration policy. If Indonesia were to recognise this right, we could co-operate in finding a solution to the transmigrant problem before it becomes worse. Those who agree with me

Diplomacy turns sour between Indonesia and PNG

Relations between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia have continued to deteriorate since two Indonesian aircraft flew over the PNG/West Papua border and allegedly fired a rocket over the village of Green River. PNG has been infuriated by Indonesia's contradictory excuses, and its deliberate indifference to PNG's concern over a serious violation of its territory. There has been intense military activity by Indonesian troops and aircraft on the border; fighting between them and OPM guerrillas has continued ever since the uprising in Jayapura in February. (See **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 62, March 1984.)

27 March: Two Indonesian F5 jet fighters crossed the PNG/West Papua border, and circled the Green River patrol post three times, flying low. On the third turn, one aircraft fired a projectile of some sort: "There was a flash and a lot of smoke, but no explosion" said one government official, "The whole station staff of about seventy saw the incident . . . some hundreds of people in the immediate area took to the bush and panicked." (**Sydney Morning Herald** 28 March.) Indonesian aircraft used plastic bombs to frighten people during border incursions in 1978, and it is possible that the Green River incident involved a dud rocket to achieve the same effect.

28-30 March: Indonesian Ambassador, Brigadier General Supomo, was handed a formal note of protest about the border violation by PNG Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu, and warned that the Indonesian Defence Attaché would be asked to leave if a satisfactory answer was not received. The Indonesian Foreign Ministry did not deny the incursion at first, and indicated that the aircraft might have been part of an "exercise" held near the border. Supomo, however, had already been instructed, probably by the military, to deny that the jets were Indonesian. PNG requested urgent talks with Indonesia, but Mochtar Kusumaatmadja said that they could not take place until he had returned from a trip to Moscow. When asked about the incident, Mochtar replied "Don't ask me, ask the army." (**Far Eastern Economic Review** 12 April.) Ambassador Supomo was equally ill-informed: when asked about fighting between Indonesian troops and the OPM on the border he said "I cannot comment because I do not have any information . . . I do not comment on matters related to the OPM; that is not my concern." (**PNG Times** 29 March.)

3 April: Indonesian military spokesman, Emir Mangaweang, denied that Indonesian jets had violated PNG airspace, and then described "border exercises" that had occurred on the same day involving jet fighters and other aircraft. He stated that jets had gone in search of a mission plane held up by the OPM, which was found in Ubrub, well inside the Indonesian side of the border, and that on return, they had gone through the sound barrier, apparently at the request of the Irian Jaya Governor to "arouse a sense of pride in the people" (**Sinar Harapan** 3 April). It was suggested that people in Green River had thought this was a rocket being fired, and even that they mistook aircraft 30 kms away for attacking jets.

Following a second protest note from PNG, Indonesia announced it was formally withdrawing the Defence Attaché on 5 April.

12 April: The Defence Attaché, Colonel Ismail, returned to Jakarta and shouted belliciously on arrival at the airport, "I have been expelled" (**Tempo** 12 April). Armed Forces Chief Benny Murdani also insisted this was the case, and said he found PNG's expulsion "incomprehensible". He said, in response to Namaliu's request that PNG should be informed about border exercises, that it was Indonesia's own business where it carried out military exercises. The "expulsion" provided Jakarta with an issue on which to protest, thus counterbalancing PNG's protest about violation of its territory.

15 April: Namaliu met Mochtar for the long awaited talks, but no agreement could be reached about the jet incident, as Mochtar had by then adopted the military view. No agreement was reached over other issues either. Namaliu made a strong statement to the Indonesian press, protesting the border violations, asking Indonesia to halt its exercises, and insisting that no refugees would be returned until PNG could be sure they would be treated humanely. Indonesia maintained its denial, and accused PNG of helping the OPM.

These tortuous diplomatic exchanges indicate a conflict between the respective approaches of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the Armed Forces leadership. Typically, the Armed Forces view predominated, and the Indonesian official line has been to deny the border incursion since the beginning of April. This has created a diplomatic impasse between the two countries which shows no sign yet of being solved.

Continued from page 9

believe in a humanitarian solution. But we need to consider very carefully how we would handle such a delicate problem. We have already suffered enough because of it.

It is well known that at the moment, Indonesia tends to ignore the traditions and land rights of the people in West Papua, in pursuit of their policies. How would you deal with the possible conflicts that might arise between traditions and land rights, and your progressive policies?

You are right to ask such a question, for we need to consider the future in such a way as to avoid creating new difficulties for ourselves. The Indonesians offer an example of what must not be done. They simply try to force people to abandon their customs and land rights, and cause great hostility to their behaviour. The question of traditional land rights is an integral part of our customs, and we shall of course try to preserve them as much as possible. But there certainly will be conflicts between these traditional interests and our desire for modernisation. What we must do is to increase the political awareness of the people, and at the same time strengthen the understanding between us. This way we can find agreement over our policies; for instance, if we wish to build a road, we can explain better the difficulties facing the government should people demand a level of compensation the government cannot afford. In PNG, there is often trouble because of disagreements between the government and people over the compensation which ought to be paid for land. Land

rights in West Papua follow the same pattern as in the whole of Melanesia. They are inherited from generation to generation, and they are collective rights; land is the property of the marga or kampung (village). I don't own land personally, but only through my marga, so that it cannot be bought or sold, as in other countries, and I cannot buy the land of my neighbour to add to my own.

There are some things in West Papuan society which must change, because they are not in accordance with our Christian beliefs. Customs such as taking revenge by head-hunting cannot be retained in a modern society, but we can't insist that all such anachronisms are given up immediately. Again, it is a matter of getting people to understand our ideas at their own pace.

Our revolution must, as far as possible, retain its Melanesian identity, and many customs will serve as the basis for important social, political and economic institutions in the future. Our collective society puts the emphasis on local co-operative effort, and is not divided between rich and poor. Hopefully we should be able to avoid the class conflicts which disturb so much of the world. Many countries searching for independence and modernisation have abandoned their identities, and have been forced to make the choice between falling under the influence of different outside powers. This is a vital issue to which we must give a great deal of thought, just how much and how quickly we can modernise our society.

British armoured cars in Indonesia



A student being arrested and dragged onto the back of a Ferret-Scout armoured car in Jakarta.

A letter from a student, Jogjakarta 1978

...The most terrible things happened here in Jogjakarta. On two occasions, the Army handled students in an unusually brutal manner. As you can well imagine, we were powerless against bayonets, firearms and panzers. The military began to use their bayonets and to shoot at random. Just imagine 2,000 students fleeing in complete disorder – some crawling away on their bellies, some screaming hysterically as they fled, some falling to the ground. It was like a battle, like the Vietnam war.

The whole thing began on 25 February when an open meeting was convened to discuss the present situation and the corrupt state apparatus. Students came to this meeting in droves, there were thousands of them. Then the Army arrived. They closed all roads leading to the campus so that no-one could get in or out. With the university grounds completely surrounded, they then proceeded to break up the meeting by force. They closed in on the encircled students with their weapons: stabbing with their bayonets, firing their rifles at random, kicking students and throwing them to the ground. I think the soldiers shot downwards intentionally as there were bullet-holes just half a metre from the ground and some students were wounded in the legs and thighs.


From TAPOL Bulletin No. 27, June 1978



Saladin armoured car.

Richard Luce, Minister at the Foreign Office, wrote in a letter on 12 April 1984:

“... we would not approve the supply of arms if we believed the equipment was likely to be used for internal repression or to violate human rights. . .”



Saracen on the streets of Jogja, January 1978.

Photos from Indonesia Committee, Amsterdam.

IGGI aid could continue "for another 20 years"

IGGI aid to Indonesia this year will be at least as much as last year (\$2.4 billion), according to Mrs Schoo, Dutch Minister for Overseas Aid. Expressing enthusiasm for Indonesia's economic performance, at the end of a visit to Jakarta in April, Mrs Schoo said that the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia would continue to support Indonesia until it no longer needs help. "We have supported Indonesia for the past 20 years", she said, "and I can't see why we shouldn't be able to go on doing so for another 20 years." (*Kompas*, 23 April, 1984.)

According to *Kompas*, the IGGI has provided altogether \$22.3 billion to Indonesia since it was established in 1976 (less than two years after the military came to power). (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 59, September 1983, p. 22 for annual breakdown of IGGI aid.)

Human Rights and Aid

Prior to her departure for Indonesia, Mrs Schoo was under strong pressure in Parliament and in the Dutch press to take account of the massive human rights violations currently being committed by Indonesia, particularly the death-squad killings, and the widespread persecution and killings now under way in West Papua and East Timor. Although she was quoted by one Dutch newspaper (*NRC Handelsblad*, 16 April) at the time of her departure as saying that she believes "the level of development assistance should be linked to a country's respect for human rights", she expressed the connection in very different terms after her return:

I don't believe in using development assistance as a sanction. It is one of the aims of development assistance to create a situation in which people have enough to eat, can live a healthy life and the children can go to school. . . Human rights problems prevail in all developing countries. If we use respect for human rights as a sanction, it is as if we are punishing underdeveloped countries for what is a characteristic of underdevelopment. (*Source: NRC Handelsblad*, 28 April 1984.)

Mrs Schoo did not explain how genocidal persecution in East Timor and West Papua has anything to do with underdevelopment.

Having given this explanation, she had some difficulty explaining why Holland stopped giving economic aid to Suriname in December 1982 after a series of killings had taken place, but claimed this was because those events had shown very clearly that the Government was no longer representative of the people. Yet, in the case of Indonesia, it was precisely after a period of nation-wide slaughter (1965-6) when an estimated one million people were killed, that the western powers got together and set up the IGGI and launched its programme of massive yearly credit to Indonesia.

International Consortium Lends Indonesia \$750 million

An international syndicate of banks co-ordinated by Chase Manhattan Asia Bank agreed in March to grant Indonesia credit of \$750 million on very favourable commercial terms. The remarkable fact about this decision is that the amount is 50% more than Indonesia asked for, and is taken as being a sign of the confidence of the international banking system in the Indonesian economy. Altogether 79 banks are involved in the consortium. The leading members are Chase Manhattan, Lloyds Bank International, Morgan Guaranty Trust, the Bank of Tokyo and the Industrial Bank of Japan.

A leading Indonesian economist and businessman, Pang Lay Kim, who is closely associated with the Centre of Strategic and International Studies recently told an audience of students in Bandung that Indonesia's ability to win so much confidence from

the world's financiers is something to be proud of. Which country in the world, he said, can get more credit than it asked for? He went on:

Anyone with a lot of debts is king. Creditors don't want you to collapse and die. On the contrary, they will do everything to keep you alive and well, to make sure they get their money back. (*Sinar Harapan*, 4 May, 1984.)

This possibly explains why reports are now circulating that moves are afoot to remove Holland from the chairmanship of the IGGI. Reporting this, the Dutch daily *De Waarheid* (16 April, 1984) said that behind the moves is a desire on the part of the international banking syndicate which has just granted this huge line of credit to Indonesia to exert greater control over the deliberations of the IGGI. Could it be that Indonesia's international creditors are worried by growing pressure from political parties and human rights groups on the Dutch Government to revise its policy towards Indonesia?

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DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS INDONESIA

On March 27, the Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen arrived in Jakarta on an official visit to Indonesia, as part of a journey to all the ASEAN countries in order to promote Danish exports.

On April 9, Danish television carried a report on the visit by Danish journalist Tommy Osterlund who spoke about the recent activities of the death squads in Indonesia. After interviewing a representative of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta about the killings, Osterlund asked the Foreign Minister if he had talked to his Indonesian hosts about the death squads. The Minister said: No. He had gone for a different purpose, to promote Danish exports. Nor had he gone there in order to teach the Indonesians how to run their own country. "So does it mean," Tommy Osterlund asked, "that you leave your conscience behind when you travel?" The Foreign Minister, a former journalist, replied: "This is such an objectionable question that I will not answer it," adding that some countries try to "work things out in a reasonable manner". In his opinion, "Indonesia is reasonably stable politically."

When the Danish conservative paper, *Berlingske Tidende* published a letter criticising the Foreign Minister for his emphasis on Danish exports and for ignoring human rights, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen responded (15 April) by saying that "it is the



Danish Foreign Minister with Suharto. (*Sinar Harapan*, 29 March 1984.)

policy of this Government to condemn violations of human rights no matter where they take place." He also stated that the question of human rights was discussed in the United Nations, insisting that "in this area, no one can question the commitment of the Danish Government."

It so happens that the very day the Danish Foreign Minister arrived in Jakarta, Indonesian military aircraft violated Papua New Guinea territory and flew low over Green River region, intimidating the inhabitants. Reporting this, another Danish daily, **Information** (4 April) pointed out that the Foreign Minister has offered Indonesia an interest-free loan of 120 million Krona, yet only a few days before his visit to Jakarta, the Minister announced that Denmark would stop giving economic assistance to Vietnam and close down its embassy in Hanoi because the country maintains troops on foreign soil.

Like so many other West European countries, Denmark has often condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but has never condemned Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. Not even in 1975 did Denmark protest against the invasion; it has abstained on every single UN resolution about East Timor since the very beginning. So much for the Danish Government's concern about human rights. *From Torben Retbøll*



French Minister for Tourism and Trade, Edith Cresson meets Suharto. (*Sinar Harapan*, 13 February 1984.)

The illustrations on pages 11 and 13 of bulletin No. 62 were done by Hans Borkent.

South Pacific regarded as Indonesia's "backyard"

The current tensions in Indonesia's relations with Papua New Guinea have prompted senior foreign policy strategists in Jakarta to raise the question of Indonesia's role as a Pacific power. This call for a reappraisal of the geographical focus of Indonesia's foreign policy is also inspired by a sense of unease at the hasty visit made by Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja in September last year to several South Pacific countries to plead for support at the UN on the question of East Timor. The strategists, who have been quoted at length in a report in **Kompas** (23 April 1984), make no secret either of their fear that the struggles being waged by Fretilin in East Timor and the OPM in West Papua are convincing the countries of the South Pacific that Indonesia is intent upon dominating the whole region.

A "two-door policy"

Soelaeman Pringgodigdo, who heads the Economic, Social and Cultural Relations Directorate of the Department of Foreign Affairs, believes that Indonesia should become a member of the South Pacific Forum and start attending its meetings as an observer as soon as possible.

Indonesia should have two front doors in foreign affairs, one to Asia and one to the Pacific, so that we can keep a watch on all political and military movements in the West and South-West Pacific. This is very important bearing in mind that these islands are directly connected with Indonesia's own backyard, the region of Eastern Indonesia.

Dr M. Hadi Soesastro of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the think-tank formerly of General Ali Murtopo and now of General Benny Murdani, also stressed the need for Indonesia to pay attention to "its backyard" because

Indonesia itself consists of a number of ethnic groups and it so happens that those living in the eastern part of Indonesia have a cultural affinity with most of the South Pacific islands.

He connected this with a statement made recently by the PNG Foreign Minister, Rabbie Namaliu on his arrival in Jakarta in mid-April to attend talks with the Indonesian Foreign Minister on Indonesia's violations of PNG territory. Namaliu's statement, which infuriated many people in Jakarta because it was seen as "interference" in Indonesian internal affairs, suggested that PNG could help Indonesia "understand the culture and way of life of the Melanesian people who live in Irian Jaya". (*Sinar Harapan*, 16 April 1984.) A typical response came from a group called "Forum of Communication between Indonesian-Irian Jaya Communities" which proclaimed that there is nothing anyone can teach Indonesia about such matters because it is a country composed of many ethnic groups. "For us, there is no such thing as Malay, Javanese or Melanesian cultures, there is only one culture, the Indonesian culture" (*ibid.*).

The CSIS strategist also made the point that Indonesia "needs to pay attention to its backyard" (**Kompas**, 23 April 1984) and has concentrated far too much on its relations with Asia and with the developed countries of the world, Japan, the USA and the countries of western Europe "because of our emphasis on development". The trouble is, he said, that the peoples of the South Pacific are suspicious of Indonesia which looks to them like "big brother". This is particularly true of PNG as a result of "indoctrination by Australian administrators and intellectuals at the time Indonesia incorporated West Irian and then East Timor".

They spread the idea that Indonesia is expansionist so we need to tread carefully so as to eliminate that impression.

Dr Lie Tek Tjeng, a research scholar at LIPI (Indonesia's Institute of the Sciences) also recognises that Indonesia's relations with the South Pacific could be undermined by such things as East Timor, the OPM and the RMS (South Moluccas Republic). The countries of the South Pacific all have small populations and tend to look upon Indonesia as a "giant" that could dominate the South Pacific.

Groups hostile to Indonesia like the OPM, the RMS and Fretilin can exploit these factors. The countries of the South Pacific can easily believe such things because they know very little about Indonesia. Moreover those who put such ideas to them are, racially speaking, their brothers with identical cultures.

"Malay-type" Indonesians

Soelaeman Pringgodigdo also sees the problem as being closely related to Indonesia's cultural identity, to the way it projects itself as an Asian nation. He is concerned that the faces used on posters, in television programmes and elsewhere are all "Malay-type" faces, "never a single profile of anyone from the ethnic groups of Eastern Indonesia". He advocated an active programme of cultural exchange with the South Pacific, with Indonesia using in particular the peoples of Eastern Indonesia who have a cultural affinity with the people of the South Pacific islands. And, he added, "it would be very good for our national defence if Indonesia should not only be a member of ASEAN but also of the South Pacific Forum."

More votes at the UN

But for Lie Tek Tjeng, it is all very much a question of votes at the UN, certainly with East Timor in mind:

The South Pacific is very closely related to the African countries which form the largest bloc in the UN, also with the non-aligned bloc and the bloc of 77. We could take advantage of all these relations. And the fact of the matter is that in the UN, every state counts as one vote.

The "Timor Gap": Oil and Trouble

The seabed between East Timor and Australia is now known to contain rich oil deposits which could amount to as much as 5 billion barrels plus 50,000 billion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. This would put the area among the top 25 oilfields in the world. No wonder then that Australian oil companies which have been exploring the region's wealth have urged the Australian government to press for a satisfactory conclusion to negotiations with Indonesia about the maritime boundary between the two countries.

The history of the present wrangle between Australia and Indonesia dates back to 1973 when the two countries agreed that the maritime boundary should follow the "Timor trough", a seabed canyon some 30-50 miles off the south coast of Timor which marks the end of the Australian continental shelf. The boundary however could not be completed because the eastern half of Timor was then a Portuguese colony. The 250 km gap in the agreed boundary came to be known as the 'Timor gap'.

Major oil companies began to develop interests in this off-shore region during the late 1960s. In the Portuguese colony, an Australian oil company, Timor Oil concluded an agreement with Woodside-Burmah (54.5% controlled by Burmah Oil), giving Timor Oil a 70% share in the offshore oil. In the Indonesian half of the island, another Australian company, International Oil had entered into a production-sharing contract with the Indonesian state oil company, Pertamina. In 1974, Woodside-Burmah acquired a 65% interest in International Oil. This gave Woodside-Burmah a major interest in the region.

Then in September 1974, the Portuguese administration in East Timor turned its preference towards US companies and awarded exploration rights to Adobe Oil and Gas. Not long afterwards, in December that year, the Portuguese awarded Oceanic of Denver a concession of 23,192 square miles covering an area which intruded onto the Australian continental shelf. In other words, Portugal was disregarding the boundary agreement concluded the previous year between Australia and Indonesia, and awarded concessions in areas that had already been awarded by the Australian government to the Arco, Aquitaine and Exxon companies. The ensuing controversy drew attention to the Australian government's problem — a need to finalise the maritime boundary which the Portuguese had refused to recognise.

In the belief that Indonesia viewed Australian demands more favourably and relying on the agreement that had been concluded in 1973, Australian oil interests

welcomed the Indonesian annexation of East Timor with relief. The decision of the Malcolm Fraser government to give *de facto* recognition to the annexation in 1977 and *de jure* recognition in January 1978 was prompted above all by a desire to pave the way for new negotiations on the boundary and make it possible for exploitation to begin without delay. Australian eagerness to press ahead with exploitation was reinforced by the discovery late last year of the Jabiru oil deposit, following exploration carried out by a consortium headed by Broken Hill Proprietary Co, Australia's biggest firm. The field is conservatively estimated to contain about 250 million barrels of recoverable oil (*Far Eastern Review*, 19 April 1984), and is well within the section formerly acknowledged by Indonesia as belonging to Australia.

Indonesia wants to re-negotiate the boundary agreement

Small wonder then that the Australian government and major oil interests have been profoundly disturbed by Indonesian proposals to re-negotiate the maritime boundary, arguing that since the continental shelf between the two countries is continuous, the boundary should be drawn at a point equidistant between the two countries. For Australia, this would lead to the loss of major oil and gas resources and of substantial revenues accruing from the presence of companies such as Woodside-Burmah and Elf-Aquitaine.

Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, himself a specialist on sea law, recently argued that the Law of the Sea Convention was on Indonesia's side:

The Indonesian position is based squarely on the law existing at present. The Australian position is that we should just draw a line connecting the old boundary lines. In effect, it is saying: "Negotiate in 1984 on the basis of the 1958 convention which has already been revised". It is an untenable position. (Interview, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 19 April 1984)


For the Australian government, the

tricky situation is further aggravated by the Labour Party's policy to withdraw recognition of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor. The policy has already been thrown overboard by the Hawke government, but there will be strong pressure at the ALP Conference in July this year to uphold the policy and force the government to change its position. So, just as Mochtar was describing Australia's position as "untenable", the Australian Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, was pleading with Australians to afford Indonesia's annexation of East Timor "a certain recognition" because of the "extraordinarily complex and difficult and demanding negotiations" going on with Indonesia over the seabed boundary. Speaking at the Joint Services Staff College he said:

There is, as you know, a large gap off East Timor in that boundary. In that gap is positioned the natural gas fields and probably oil fields. We would not be regarded with great public celebration if we were to make a mess of those negotiations, and yet the implication of the negotiations is that as the area open or undefined at this point is off East Timor, a certain recognition must be established to East Timor. For some people in my party who have expressed concern about the presence of Indonesia in East Timor, there is a cold, hard, sobering reality that must also be addressed in respect of those other interests we must attend to. (*Canberra Times*, 18 April 1984)

The reasons for current Australian government policy on East Timor could hardly have been put more bluntly.

As for the Indonesia position, whether or not its interpretation of the Law of the Sea Convention is correct is beside the point. The crucial fact is that it has no right in the first place to be negotiating the boundary between East Timor and Australia. It is as well to recognise that the recent oil finds south of East Timor would make that country a major oil producer with enough resources to heal the devastating damage done to its people during the course of Indonesia's war of annexation.



The trials and tribulations of tried political prisoners

There are still at least 300 political prisoners in Indonesia who were arrested and tried in connection with the 1965 events. The show trials were held in the late 1960s and the 1970s. Several dozen of those convicted were given death sentences and are awaiting the results of appeals for commutation. The rest are serving long prison sentences, and often face insuperable difficulties in their legal battles to speed up their release. Many are already advanced in age and ailing, while some have lost all contact with their families.

The following information is based on cases known to TAPOL, though the identities of the prisoners have not been revealed. It is vital to draw attention to the plight of these forgotten prisoners and to press for their immediate release.

★★★★

W, a low-ranking soldier in the Indonesian Army, was arrested in October 1965 during the mass arrests that swept the country as General Suharto consolidated his seizure of power and moved against members or suspected members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). He was 33 years old at the time of his arrest.

It was not until 1978, 13 years after his arrest that W was brought to trial, one of the small minority of 'A' category prisoners scheduled for trial. Being a soldier, he was tried before a military court in East Java. Nothing is known about the charges against him or about his defence. He was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years. But on top of that, the court passed down this severe sentence **without** deduction for the pre-trial period of detention. The convicted man decided to exercise his right to appeal, first to the High Court, then to the Supreme Court. Both upheld the sentence. The appeals took years to complete, and his sentence did not commence until all this had been finalised, until, that is to say, the "execution of sentence" order had been issued in 1982. The 20-year sentence is therefore due to run until 2002, though with luck W could be released by 1992 if he gets remission normally due to him and is released "on parole" or "conditional release". By then, he will have served 27 years and will be 60 years old. That is the best he can hope for.

J, another soldier, is much "better off". He too was arrested in 1965, also in East Java, and was brought for trial in 1971. He too was given a stiff sentence of 20 years, but in his case, the sentence took effect immediately, possibly because he did not exercise his right to appeal. His remission rights began to take effect from 1972, and he was released "on parole" in 1981, having served "only" 16 years. In his case the court verdict did allow deduction for pre-trial detention.

Another prisoner arrested in 1965 was, like W, not tried until 1978, but got a heavier sentence of life imprisonment. With a "life" sentence, no provision needs to be made about deducting pre-trial detention. In his case, the execution of sentence order was issued immediately after sentence was passed. Moreover, it is usual for "life" sentences to be automatically reduced to 15 years after the first five years have been served. This prisoner was notified of the reduction to 15 years in 1982; since he had served 13 years in pre-trial detention, he was informed that he had only another 2 years to serve, so hopes to be released this year. Indeed, quite a few "life" prisoners have already been released, leaving behind numerous prisoners serving "lighter" sentences but unable to extricate themselves because of the procedural quagmire and the arbitrary decisions inflicted on them by judges or other officials.

Or, take the case of another prisoner, a civilian, arrested somewhere in Kalimantan, also in October 1965. After 10 years in detention, he was brought to trial and sentenced to 20 years.

When he announced his intention to appeal, he requested that the appeal be heard before a High Court in another Kalimantan town. Years dragged by without any information about the fate of his appeal. After many enquiries had been made, he was informed that the appeal had not yet been lodged and he should send the documents to the court himself. Not long afterwards, he was informed by the court in question that it was not competent to hear his appeal and advised him to appeal to another High Court, adding however, that he would have to wait because this other court had not yet been constituted!

Then there is the case of S, arrested in January 1968 and brought to trial more than ten years later, in May 1978. The court found him guilty and passed a sentence of 13 years with deduction for pre-trial detention. This should have meant release in 1981, or even earlier counting remission. Yet, S is still in prison, because the prosecution exercised its right to appeal against the sentence and press for a higher one. Although S has not been told whether the prosecution's appeal has been granted, it might as well have been as he has already served an extra three years.

Yet another set of problems face some prisoners whose sentences have been fully served. There are two prisoners in a prison in Central Java whose appeals procedures have been completed, and remission granted. Yet although their sentences have expired, the release documents have not been issued. Although the various court and prosecution authorities had given the necessary approval, the military authority in the locality where the prisoners are to go have refused to endorse the release and allow the men to return home.

Pre-trial detention

One of the most glaring injustices in the sentences passed against political prisoners is that many verdicts fail to grant deduction for pre-trial detention. In 1981, a new Procedural Code (KUHAP) was adopted clearly stipulating (**Article 22, para 4**) that the period of pre-trial detention must be deducted from the sentence passed. The problem is however that the 1981 Procedural Code is not applicable to cases brought under certain laws, including the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law. (See **Article 284, para 2** of the Code.)

The question of deductible pre-trial detention for political prisoners was thrown into utter confusion by a Supreme Court Circular issued to judges in February 1977. The Circular drew a distinction between "judicial detention", i.e. detention by the ordinary law-enforcement agencies, and "non-judicial detention", i.e. detention carried out under the special powers of Kopkamtib, the Army's Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. The Circular specifically excluded Kopkamtib detention from deductibility when sentences are passed on the grounds that it is "non-judicial". Since so many political prisoners brought to trial served up to ten years or more as "non-judicial" detainees of Kopkamtib, this had the effect of greatly increasing the term of imprisonment actually served. After an outcry from some lawyers, the Supreme Court followed with a second Circular advising judges that they could decide whether or not to deduct Kopkamtib detention. In November 1978, Kopkamtib issued a decision stipulating that Kopkamtib detention **could** be deducted, but leaving it to judges to decide. A court verdict passed as recently as April this year (see box) reveals that judges continue to use their discretion in deciding whether to exclude Kopkamtib detention when determining the date from which a sentence runs.

Another provision of the 1981 Procedural Code that is being denied political prisoners is the provision (**Article 268**) that the sentence shall run while appeals are in progress. The Code also

establishes time limits for appeals procedures, by contrast with the experience of many tried political prisoners whose appeals have dragged on for so many years.

The central issue as far as the tried political prisoners is concerned is the flagrant injustice of the political trials to which they were subjected. But many of the prisoners consider that they could speed up their release by insisting that provisions now formally incorporated into the 1981 Procedural Code should apply in their cases too. All the 1965 political trials were held

Agus Salim gets nine months plus . . .

Agus Salim, the teacher arrested in Slawi, Central Java for telling students about his experiences during the 1978 student movement (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 62, March 1984) has been found guilty of "insulting the President of the Republic" under Article 134 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to nine months imprisonment. (**Tempo**, 21 April 1984.) This is a month less than the sentence demanded by the prosecution because, said the presiding judge, the defendant "is still a young man and he behaved politely during the trial". The circumstance which aggravated his case was that "he gave a bad example to his students, in conflict with ethical standards".

However, the nine-month sentence will not run from 13 May 1983, the day he was arrested by the military commander of Central Java acting as regional officer of Kopkamtib. It will run from 9 November, the day his case was transferred by Kopkamtib to the police, the public prosecutor's office and the court. In other words, Kopkamtib's "non-judicial" detention is not being deducted and Agus Salim will serve altogether 15 months.

Tempo reports that Agus Salim's trial probably stands out as the best-attended trial ever held in Slawi. Some 4,000 people attended sessions, inside the courtroom or following the proceedings from the forecourt outside.

before the Code came into effect, yet the Code does allow for its provisions to be applied "as far as possible" (**Article 284, para 1**) to cases heard before the Code became law. The worst

stumbling-block however is the exclusion of "subversion" cases from the procedures laid down in the Code. The Slawi court decision shows that this issue is not only the concern of the 1965 prisoners but also of anyone likely, on the flimsiest of pretexts, to find him- or herself charged before a court of law as a "subversive". The Slawi case decision (see **box**) which was not based on the anti-subversion law but on the charge of "insulting the head of state" also shows that "non-judicial" Kopkamtib detention can have the effect of almost doubling the term of imprisonment imposed by a court of law.

* * *

FORCED LABOUR FOR EX-TAPOLS

A number of ex-tapols in Central Java have been ordered to participate in a forced labour project to reclaim waste land in the region of Kedungmundu, east of Semarang. The land is being replanted with guava trees for a State plantation.

Suara Merdeka (27 February 1984) reports that the people recruited to do this "kerja bakti" ("voluntary" labour) are individuals who are "under guidance" from the authorities, living in nine villages in the locality. The project involves the planting of 1,200 seedlings and took place under the watchful eye of the local *camat* (sub-district chief), the *Koramil* (military) commander and the police chief. The *camat* was quoted as saying that "as government officials, we want to give them guidance and encourage them to participate in development activities". He was proud to be able to say that they were willing to do what was being required of them "even though this is a holiday".

The military officer who was there to help supervise the project said that similar projects would be undertaken in other villages. "We want them to be really conscious, to be willing to comply with government requirements, not to try and conceal their whereabouts by leaving Java without permission, and so on." A Plantation Service official said that his office is planning to plant 20,000 seedlings in similar projects.

A contact in Central Java has pointed out in a private communication that the people "under guidance" are all ex-tapols, and more could be drawn into similar forms of forced labour if nothing is done to stop it quickly.

Former tapols and the communist bogey

Communists "struggling to achieve their purpose" in Indonesia "no longer regard ex-G30S/PKI" political prisoners as useless. They regard them, as well as the PKI remnants who were never arrested, as strategically important potential forces for the restoration of communism in Indonesia", said General Soepardjo Roestam, Minister for the Interior.

Remarks like this, made in a speech at an indoctrination course for officials of the Department of the Interior (**Kompas**, 31 March 1984) again draw attention to the extreme vulnerability of former political prisoners. In a letter to TAPOL received recently from Indonesia, a former political prisoner writes that the Jakarta press, in particular the **Jakarta Post**, reports frequently about "the communist danger and the need to intensify supervision of the former political prisoners". Reports about increased criminality and even about the "Children of God" sect that was outlawed in Indonesia earlier this year are also linked with "communism". The theme is stressed time and time again by such people as Major-General Amir Machmud, chairman of Parliament, Major-General Tri Sutrisno, military commander of Jakarta, as well as by General Benny Murdani, Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief.

The ex-tapol reminds us that all former prisoners are required to re-register with their local Koramil (military sub-district command) every six months and to submit each time six passport photos, a photocopy of their release document (KTP) and, for those with jobs, a declaration from their employer.

The press often gives space to unsubstantiated reports about "ex-PKI" members. One claimed recently that two PKI leaders had managed to slip back into Indonesia from Vietnam and had been arrested, though no names were ever mentioned. Other reports allege that former tapols have moved to other parts of

the country without reporting to the authorities. Another report claimed that two former members of the banned People's Youth succeeded in returning home from Europe but were arrested soon afterwards, one in Solo and one in Medan. No-one has been able to provide more details about these cases.

The ex-tapol also explains that after the weekly **Topik** was forced to suspend publication for publishing an editorial on poverty (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 62, March 1984), the editors-in-chief of all publications in Jakarta were summoned to a meeting with the authorities and warned not to publish any articles written by ex-tapols from Buru. In March last year, the monthly journal **Prisma** was reprimanded for publishing articles by two ex-tapols. The warning issued in 1984 is regarded, he says, as far more serious because it is directed against ex-tapols in general.

'Get to know the enemy,' says general

General Soepardjo's warning to Department of the Interior officials also urged them to familiarise themselves "with the dangers of communist teachings and work hard to arouse the motivation and ideological resilience of the entire government apparatus and the broad mass of the people". The general was worried because the suppression of everything to do with communist teachings since 1966 has been so effective that people are even afraid to possess and study books by anti-communists analysing the danger, tactics and strategy of communism. "A whole generation has grown up since 1965," he said, "which is completely ignorant about communism . . . It would be irony indeed if officials in civilian and legal affairs as well as in the Armed Forces knew virtually nothing about this most dangerous enemy." (**Kompas**, 31 March, 1984)

TOPIK reappears . . .

The Jakarta weekly, **Topik**, which was banned in February this year for publishing an editorial that, according to the Government, "advocated class struggle" (see **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 62, March 1984) has been allowed to reappear, after having accepted a number of conditions restraining editorial policy, and after having completely overhauled its editorial staff.

The ban was lifted by the Information Department after the journal's proprietor had agreed in writing not to publish anything that could "disturb the community" or is "a slander of the state leadership". It also agreed to conform with the journalists' Code of Ethics, with government provisions and with a People's Assembly decree in 1966 outlawing the dissemination of communist teachings.

The other Jakarta weekly, **Expo**, which was banned a month earlier than **Topik** has not yet been allowed to resume publication. The Chief Editor is still pressing the Information Department for permission to reappear, but since he is the man directly responsible for the articles about Indonesia's one hundred billionaires that caused the offense leading to the ban, it would seem **Expo** is unlikely to get an early reprieve.

Source: **Tempo**, 5 May, 1984.

. . . and FOKUS disappears

The Jakarta weekly, **FOKUS**, was banned on 10 May "for publishing things that could intensify social conflict", and is accused of being "speculative" and "sensational", according to a decision of the Minister for Information.

Death-squads

The Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (LBH) issued a statement on 26 April reporting a new upswing in the number of death-squad killings in Indonesia. Reuters (**Volkskrant**, 27 April 1984) quoted the Institute as saying that hundreds more alleged criminals have been shot dead or killed in other ways since the beginning of 1984. The Institute holds the Army and Police responsible for the killings and strongly condemns the fact that the gunning down of people in the streets has now become an accepted part of everyday life in Indonesia. Popular journals frequently publish photographs of the tortured bodies of victims, although the press has been ordered not to refer any more to "mysterious" killings or to the Army's "anti-crime" operations which are responsible for the death-squad activities.

But non-government newspapers like **Kompas** and **Sinar Harapan** often carry unobtrusive reports of the discovery of corpses in Jakarta, giving facts that suggest they are the victims of the death-squads. Most corpses bear the marks of torture, mutilation or gunshot wounds, and some have been discovered wrapped up in sacks. The most recent reports from Jakarta were in **Sinar Harapan** on 17 April (three unidentified bodies) and 18 April (two unidentified bodies).

The Institute estimates that there were at least 4,000 killings in 1984. This figure does not include the estimate of 8,500 deaths in East Java reported by a Dutch journalist who visited the province in January (**Vrijx Nederland**, 11 February, 1984).



Lieutenant-General Ali Murtopo, who died this month, a loyal associate of Suharto since the 1950s. In charge of OPSUS (Special Operations), he masterminded the destruction of the political parties and, in 1974-5, directed Operasi Komodo, to destabilise East Timor.

Punished for missing a flag ceremony

A village clerk named Saimin, aged 62, collapsed and died while doing push-ups as punishment for not attending a flag-raising ceremony to mark the anniversary of Korpri, the civil servants' association which all government employees are required to join. The punishment was inflicted on Saimin and more than twenty other local government officials who had failed to turn up for the Korpri ceremony.

The tragedy occurred last November in the Balong *kecamatan* (subdistrict) near Ponorogo, in East Java, when the *camat*, a man named Winarto, summoned all those who had stayed away. Like Saimin, most had stayed at home to spend the time working on their fields after a sudden downpour of rain provided a good opportunity to do some ploughing.

After reprimanding the men, Winarto ordered a police officer to punish them. They were first told to run round a field the size of a football pitch fifteen times, and

then to do five push-ups. It was too much for Saimin who collapsed before finishing the push-ups. By the time the other men had got him to the local health centre, he was dead.

Saimin's body was taken to a local hospital, though neither the *camat* nor the policeman took the trouble to help. But the staff at the hospital refused to examine the body to determine the cause of death as no-one could afford to pay the fee of Rp. 150,000. No death certificate was issued and the body was buried without further investigation.

But since the tragedy, his family have fought hard to press the authorities to investigate the incident and to initiate proceedings against the two men responsible for Saimin's death. So far, all that has happened is that both have been transferred to other posts. "We're only little people," said one of his sons, "but don't think we can't make demands." So far, an investiga-

tion has been refused because of the lack of a death certificate.

As for the *camat*, he has no regrets: "The men were being punished for lack of discipline, for not attending the flag ceremony. In any case," he said, "Saimin had a weak heart, and he would have died even without the push-ups."

Source: **Tempo**, 17 March 1984.



Saimin

We must stop being arrogant, says Indonesian doctor

Doctor Suriadi Gunawan worked as a doctor in Irian Jaya for more than 18 years. He went there with the very first volunteers in 1962 and enjoyed working there so much, he decided to stay on. The following interview was published in *Higina*, a new popular monthly devoted to questions of health and hygiene.

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Can you say something about diseases in the interior of Irian. Why is it thought that the people there don't live long?

The diseases vary from place to place. In more isolated or high-altitude regions, they differ from lowland or coastal regions. There is a high incidence of disease precisely in those places in contact with outsiders, particularly along the coast. The local environment and degree of isolation are factors determining the spread of disease. Some places are more difficult to keep clean than urban areas. But there are isolated regions which had no incidence of disease before coming into contact with outsiders, and only after making contact did illnesses like influenza occur. Leprosy and tuberculosis were also originally unknown in the interior and in the mountains.

As a matter of fact, they have been able to develop eating habits that protect them against disease. They eat tubers and leaves which contain a lot of vitamins, so you don't find anyone in the interior suffering from vitamin A deficiency, for example. They also make good use of animal proteins and eat all kinds of things like snakes, worms, lizards, small rats and so on, all of which are rich in calories, even though these creatures are difficult to catch. Strange to say, it is only after children start going to school that you find vitamin deficiency because they learn not to want to eat the things they have eaten in the interior. Or, because they spend a lot of time at school, they don't have time to go to the gardens with their parents to pick tubers and leaves or catch animals to eat. The people in the interior make excellent use of all kinds of foodstuffs without discrimination; they eat anything edible. It's only when people from the towns come and tell them not to eat this, that or the other — snakes, for instance, because it's *haram* — that the trouble begins. Such prohibitions are quite unnecessary as long as what they do isn't harmful. In fact, most of it is beneficial.

It's true they don't live long. Apart from tribal wars, this is because they live in such a difficult environment. Many get killed in accidents. There is a high mortality rate among children, perhaps because the little ones don't have the necessary resistance to their environment. But once they grow up, they adapt to their natural environment.

The people in the interior have no sense of being inferior to people from the towns. They regard themselves as human beings, even as the real human beings. They therefore have no sense of inferiority. Their self-respect is strong, and they do not feel dependent on anyone, not like town people who feel dependent on local officials, for example. They live their lives by their own efforts, gather their own food, hunt animals for themselves. People from the towns may think they are richer or better educated, but when they make contact with people in the interior of Irian, they should discard such ethnocentrist feelings . . .

You have discovered illnesses which you would not have imagined existed in the interior of Irian Jaya. What are they?

Tape worm. At first, I did not imagine that this would exist there. Then, in the 1970s, I visited a hospital in Enarotali. A number of patients were suffering from burns. A few years earlier, there had only been five but when I came this time there were more than forty. I began to wonder why. Then, I discovered that the patients with burns also had lumps on their

bodies, and further examination revealed they were suffering from tape-worm. So, what was the connection between the burns and the tape-worm? I came to the conclusion that the patients with burns had had convulsions. The climate in the interior is very cold and many people sleep or sit very close to fires. When they get a convulsion, they lose consciousness, and without realising it, they fall into the fire and get badly burnt. The convulsions are caused by growths on the brain. The tape worms spread all over the body, even into the brain, and cause the convulsions.

Other diseases to be found there are goitre and cerebral malaria. There is also a lot of gonorrhoea brought in by outsiders.

What is the effect of not wearing clothes on their health? Does this affect their resistance to disease?

Of course, there is a connection, but they have been able to adapt to their environment over a long period of time. I am not suggesting that they should be left to live without clothes, but I think that with time, as their economic conditions improve, they will come to this themselves. It's not enough to have a single item of clothing. They would need to have many items of clothing as well as soap, and they would need to know something about simple, practical hygiene. Sometimes, they are forced to wear clothes to go into town to report to the office of the local *camat*. Because they don't have enough clothes of their own, they have to borrow things from their friends. This spreads disease because the clothes are not clean and have probably been worn by many other people.

How should doctors approach the people in the interior?

It isn't easy. Treatment provided by doctors or medical staff is very different from their concept of traditional medicine. How is this gap to be bridged? The first thing is to convince them that medical personnel have the power to cure them. They are not at all bothered about our way of thinking but the important thing for them is whether medics can cure them. It's a pragmatic way of thinking, and they will come back for more treatment, and bring their children, if they feel confident we can cure them. Then, it's a matter of whether doctors can change their way of seeing things, and that isn't easy . . . Doctors need to understand their way of thinking while at the same time being less condescending themselves . . . Take for instance yaws, which exists on a wide scale in places remote from outside contact. There is an easy cure for that, but the cure doesn't necessarily change their way of thinking. They regard the medicine as magic, and think doctors have special powers as well, the power to cure them by injecting something into the body. It may take a whole generation before they can accept the scientific approach behind modern medicine. But this is not only found in Irian. There are still many people living in Jakarta who prefer magic to treat illnesses.

Are any of the traditional medicines beneficial and acceptable to the medical world?

We need to classify things, and this will take long and careful investigation. Not all doctors can do this, particularly if they haven't spent a long time in the region or integrated themselves with the environment. This is the task of social scientists, anthropologists and sociologists.

Some of their methods are very acceptable to the medical profession. Take for instance their method of giving birth. Women in the interior give birth in a squatting position or standing up, assisted by the *dukun*. This is excellent. It's far easier to give birth squatting or standing up than lying down. Then, they have a different way of treating wounds or extracting

things from their flesh. When they pull out an arrow, they do it under water which is very correct according to medical science . . . If the arrow is extracted in the air, the open wound can be penetrated by the air, or air inside the body can attack the lungs, which can be fatal. Their "war experience" has taught them that if an arrow is extracted in the open, the wounded person can suffer shock or die. So they do it under water, with much better results.

Some of their methods of treatment are dangerous though, and not acceptable to medical science. They treat many illnesses by cutting the body. For a headache, they cut the forehead, thinking this will let out the evil spirit. This is unacceptable because the cut can itself become a source of infection.

There are other forms of treatment that are neutral in their effect, for instance rubbing the body with earth or other things, or cutting hair, and so on. This doesn't go against any scientific

principles, but neither is it of any use. Yet, strangely, these methods often have the effect of curing the disease. Some forms of treatment they use cannot be classified as good or bad. For instance, mothers usually chew food before giving it to their children. I can't make up my mind whether this is good or bad. They live in the forest and have no way of preparing soft foods for their children, so they chew tubers before feeding them to children who don't have teeth. This is quite understandable, but on the other hand, it may be a source of infection. More study is needed before deciding whether these things are good or bad.

What would you say about the way we should approach people in the interior or Irian?

The main thing is to get rid of our arrogance, to stop thinking we are more civilised than them. And above all, people must stop adopting an attitude of superiority.

Why tape-worm victims will have to wait

Tape-worm is widespread in the Paniai region and is so prominent in West Papua that it is known to the medical profession in Indonesia as "Irianese tape-worm". The parasite incubates in pigs and spreads to humans through contact with the animal or from eating pig-meat. Pigs have been reared in the region for many generations but the tape-worm only appeared in the early seventies and is believed to have originated from a herd of diseased pigs donated to the community by President Suharto. The "gift" was described as a "peace offering" after Indonesian troops had quelled an uprising in 1969.

The parasite causes *cystocercosa*, with lumps growing in all parts of the body, including the brain. The cysts on the brain cause epileptic convulsions, hence the tendency for people to fall in fires, as mentioned in Dr Suniardi's interview.

An article in *Tempo* (6 August 1983)

also drew attention to the large number of Papuans treated at Enarotali Hospital for severe burns. Up to 1976, reported one official of the Department of Health, 231 people were treated, of whom 25 died, 21 underwent amputations, and 121 were left badly handicapped. In the following year (1977) — the most recent year for which data was available at the Department — *cystocercosa*-related accidents had clearly risen sharply as 367 persons were treated for burns or acute epilepsy.

Although the victims of *cystocercosa*-related accidents appear to be getting treatment, no cure is available for the disease itself. The only drug in use, reports *Tempo*, kills the tapeworm but does not destroy the head or the eggs from which comes the larvae which causes the cysts. A Catholic missionary, Pastor Yan van de Horst started looking for a cure not long after coming to the area in the early seventies and discov-

ering that the local health clinics (*puskemas*) were providing no treatment at all. After many enquiries with pharmaceutical companies in Europe, he recently discovered a drug known as *mebendazole* which has the capacity to destroy the parasite completely. But unfortunately, reports *Tempo*, it is not on the list of medicines that may be imported into Indonesia. Yet without it, there is nothing the health authorities can do, said Dr M. Adhiatua, Director-General of the Public Health Division of the Department of Health, "except advise people to change their personal habits and way of life, to cook pork well, to keep pigsties well away from their houses and maintain a good level of hygiene. In terms of national priorities", he said, "tape-worm comes much lower down than other diseases like malaria, tuberculosis and so on."

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Children with "Irianese tape-worm". (*Tempo*, 6 August 1983.)

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From Murderer to Manggala

A new term, "manggala", has recently entered the vocabulary of the Indonesian military regime. "Manggalas," writes a columnist in *Sinar Harapan* (9 April, 1984) "are the cream of the Indonesian political elite, the people who have achieved post-graduate excellence in Pancasila teaching." The word is taken from the time of the ancient Javanese Mojopahit empire; the "manggalas" were the oracles or wisemen of the regime.

A special indoctrination course for 113 "manggalas" was held at the Presidential Palace in Bogor in the last week of March, to mark the end of the third Five-Year Plan (Pelita III). The participants were the "top graduates" from a number of nation-wide indoctrination courses conducted in the past year or so. It was a collection of people of such extraordinary intellectual calibre, writes *Sinar Harapan*, that only the best would do. No fewer than 14 members of the Cabinet, including the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, General Benny Murdani, and the Attorney-General, took time off to give them instruction.

One of the most notorious of these exalted individuals is Lieutenant-General Sarwo Edhie, better known for his activities in 1965 and 1966 in another elitist role as commander of the elite RPKAD, the paracommando regiment (now known

as Kopassandha) which spearheaded the massacres that swept through Central and East Java and other parts of the country, leaving an estimated one million people dead. These were the massacres that brought about the annihilation of the Indonesian Communist Party, and helped consolidate power in the hands of Suharto. Sarwo Edhie's name is indelibly associated with the very worst of those death-squad atrocities.

In 1968, Sarwo Edhie was appointed military commander in Irian Jaya (West Papua) and was responsible for the campaign of brutality and murder to crush groups rebelling against the Indonesian takeover and trying to oppose the "Act of Free Choice" in 1969 which, under severe military repression, sealed the fate of the territory as Indonesia's 26th province.

After spending three years (1970-73) as Governor of the Armed Forces Academy (Akabri), Sarwo Edhie became ambassador to South Korea at a time when Benny Murdani, still very much his junior, was Military Attaché at the same embassy. He later became Inspector-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Having for whatever reason lost favour with General Suharto, this sample of military excellence is now a full-time "manggala" at the Office of Indoctrination (BP-7) which gives him

the opportunity to teach others the qualities and morality of Pancasila.

Source: *Tempo*, 17 March 1984



Sarwo Edhie with Suharto in 1965, then Commander of the RPKAD death-squads.

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