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MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

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
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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 62

March 1984

## West Papua in revolt

### Many flee from Indonesian reprisals



Papuan deserters from the Indonesian army await news of their fate in Vanimo, PNG. (Photo: *The Age*, 16 March 1984)

*At the beginning of February, the OPM launched a number of attacks on Indonesian installations around Jayapura, which were followed by fierce fighting between OPM guerrillas and Indonesian troops. The first reports of this new outbreak of resistance to Indonesian rule came as hundreds of West Papuan refugees fled from Jayapura across the border into Papua New Guinea. At the time of the fighting, General Benny Murdani, the Armed Forces Commander was on an official visit to Vietnam, but in his place Defence Minister General Poniman rushed to Jayapura to make an assessment of the situation. In recent weeks, the atmosphere there has become increasingly tense, especially with mass arrests and house-to-house searches by the security forces. The presence of KOPASSANDHA (paracommando) troops in Jayapura since late last year suggests that Indonesia has been expecting trouble to break out. In the past, the OPM has been hampered by internal divisions, but recently the two main factions issued a joint statement to work together in the fight against Indonesian rule.*

With travel to Jayapura now severely restricted and independent reports of events hard to come by (BBC World Service, 17 March 1984), accounts of what has happened there vary in some respects but it has been possible to piece together a reasonably consistent picture. An attack on Jayapura had long been under preparation but the date was brought forward following the arrest of a number of West Papuans late last year. (See TAPOL Bulletin No. 61, January 1984.) The need to act became even more pressing when

#### Indonesia bombs PNG territory

On 26 March, Indonesian aircraft and PNG and ground troops attacked locations inside PNG territory, around the village of Green River where refugees from West Papua are situated. PNG Prime Minister, Michael Somare, has made a strong protest to Indonesia about this violation of PNG sovereignty, and about Indonesian military activity in the border area.

**Harassment of ex-tapols intensified PAGE 18**



one of the prisoners, Asser Demotekai, a retired government official, was shot dead by his captors, leading to fears for the safety of the other prisoners.

During the last quarter of 1983, conditions were already very tense because Indonesian troops were conducting "Operation Clean-up" (Operasi Tumpas) in the region of Lake Sentani, to prevent villagers from cultivating gardens far from their villages. The Army suspects villagers of using these gardens to contact and supply food to the guerrillas. The murder of a villager named Membri (or Mebri)—see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 61, January 1984—happened during this operation.

**9th February:** First incidents occurred in Jayapura. Conflict erupted over prices between Serui Papuans and Makassarese Indonesians, in Hamadi market, with the result that 3 Papuans were killed, adding to an already tense atmosphere "as if there were a state of war" (**Tempo**, 10th March). Full state of alert (Siaga 1) was declared by the Army, and about 100 Papuans in 751 Battalion deserted, because their plan to attack Jayapura and raise the West Papuan flag on 11th February was discovered by security forces. An army corporal who deserted said that the OPM had intended to sabotage Sentani Airport, the harbour, electricity, fuel and military installations, and that when discovered, "we, the Melanesians in the army, about 100 of us, fled with shotguns, rifles and ammunition into the jungle" (**Post-Courier**, 20th Feb.). According to **Tempo**, they also took communications equipment with them, and staff from Cendrawasih University and Jayapura hospital fled with medical supplies.

**11th February:** OPM stormed Abepura prison and freed all political prisoners, including Arnold Ap. It seems they were not taken over into PNG, as the area from Abepura to the PNG border is now under OPM control. (**Nederland Dagsblad**, 13th March.)

**12th February:** Jayapura radio station was put out of action, and according to one report (**Nederlands Dagblad** 13th March) "blown up". OPM sources report that their forces took control of the station for a day and were able to broadcast reports about uprisings in other cities.

**13th February:** An OPM guerrilla tried to raise the West Papuan flag in front of the DPR Regional Assembly building, but was shot dead while it was only half-way up. A Papuan working in the building, who had given the guerrilla access to the flag pole, was also shot dead, and it is thought that several people may have died in subsequent shooting.

**15th February:** OPM units in Biak put Mokmer Airport out of action, and military installations were attacked and put out of action in Sorong and Manokwari. (**Ned. Dag.** 13th March.)

During the following week, Indonesian troops conducted house-to-house searches, arrested hundreds of Papuan civil servants and army deserters, and imposed a dusk-till-dawn curfew. It is reported that 3,000 troops were flown in from Ambon (**PNG Times**, 1st March), and that helicopters and ground forces have been active around Jayapura and on the border in the hunt for OPM guerrillas and army deserters. (**Post-Courier**, 21st February.) All contact with Jayapura was lost after the attacks; even the Indonesian Embassy in Port Moresby admitting it could not get through, and the OPM claims to have destroyed telephone and telex communications from Jayapura to Biak, Jakarta, Vaimo and Port Moresby. It is not certain to what extent fighting continues around Jayapura, but the state of full alert was maintained until 2nd March (**Tempo**, 10th March). One West Papuan described the OPM operations as "the biggest thing ever attempted by our forces, the first time such an attack has gone into the town of Jayapura itself" (**Post-Courier**, 15th February).

The attacks in Jayapura were led by O. Joweni of the Rumkorem faction, J. Hembrin of the Prai faction, and by J. Awom, who was formerly second-in-command of a Mobile Brigade unit of the Indonesian Army. The OPM may have intended a larger scale attack for 11th February, and perhaps a big



Women—freedom-fighters and mothers—at an OPM headquarters inside West Papua. (From an article by Neville Togarewa, in **PNG Times**, 15 March, 1984).



show of strength in March, but the Indonesian discovery of these plans prevented them from materialising. In the event, the OPM was able to call upon 500 reinforcements from the border area, and says it carried out war operations in Sorong, Fak-Fak, Manokwari, Biak and Wamena. According to Robin Osbourne (*The Age*, 15th March), PNG intelligence estimates that there are 1,000 OPM guerrillas operational in Jayapura province alone.

#### Many Papuans seek refuge in PNG

The first refugees began to arrive on 9th February, and their numbers have continued to grow ever since. Most came by boat from Jayapura and landed in Vanimo, capital of the PNG province of Sandaun on the border. By the first week of March there were over 300 refugees in Vanimo alone, and they reported that there were 2,000 more West Papuans waiting to come across the border. It is not yet known how many may already have crossed the border at other points by walking, since there have been no specific reports from different border posts, but the Provincial Secretary of Sandaun, Melchior Kapaitch, has felt it necessary to suspend all further crossings, even by those who do so regularly. The refugees are mainly people from the town of Jayapura, some of whom left members of their families behind. They came with next to no possessions, which seems to indicate an unplanned departure, and among them were a few OPM guerrillas and Papuans, deserters in Indonesian army fatigues.

All the refugees have clearly been very frightened of the fighting in Jayapura, and their accounts suggest that there have been serious clashes between the OPM and the Indonesian forces. They are more frightened of reprisals by Indonesian troops when they conduct house-to-house searches for OPM guerrillas, with good reason, because in the past those suspected of crossing the border illegally or of being sympathetic to the OPM have been subjected to harsh punishments when forced to return. When he spoke with the first refugees, Mr Kapaitch commented, "I don't know if it's real fighting, but something has scared them. They're terrified" (*Australian*, 14th February).

#### Indonesian pressure on PNG

The Indonesian government is exerting considerable pressure on PNG to hand back the refugees, and has in several cases floated claims that the PNG government has already agreed to do so. The **BBC World Service** (17th March) quoted officials in Jakarta as saying that "295 people who crossed the border . . . would be returned", that the people who crossed "were ignorant of immigration procedures or had crossed the border unintentionally", adding that reports in the foreign press about unrest in Irian Jaya, were "all lies". According to Cairns radio (21st March), the PNG government has allowed a number of the refugees to remain in PNG because they face the risk of being killed if they are handed over to the Indonesians.

The refugees have received widespread sympathy among Papuans in PNG, but less so from the PNG government. Prime Minister Michael Somare is anxious not to upset the Indonesians by appearing to take the present situation too seriously, and police have been ordered to arrest all the male arrivals from West Papua. Already 84 people have been charged with illegal entry and have pleaded guilty, which makes them liable to be fined, imprisoned or deported. The refugees have had to live in conditions described as "not fit for humans to live in", and have recently been forced to move camp much further from facilities in Vanimo. The UN High Commission for Refugees has recognised their plight and offered equipment and thousands of dollars of aid, but their fate has yet to be decided by the PNG government.

There is a great deal of controversy over West Papua in PNG, where the population tends to feel a strong affinity with their "cousins" over the border. Many people in PNG are highly critical of their government's policy towards West Papuan refugees, all of which is reflected in the PNG media. University students are raising money for refugees because they support the OPM quite openly, and some lawyers insist that West Papuans fleeing from Jayapura must be regarded, according to international law, as refugees and not charged as criminals. The Public Solicitor's Office has questioned the legality of ordering police to arrest the



refugees, and the lack of proper legal representation for those who have already pleaded guilty, and who now wish to change their pleas to not guilty.

#### UN role urged

An OPM spokesman in Port Moresby, Henk Yoku, has called for a UN peace keeping force to intervene in West Papua. Opposition MPs have called on Somare to raise the West Papuan issue at the next UN General Assembly and in the Decolonisation Committee. Somare has offered to mediate under certain conditions between Indonesia and the OPM, but Indonesia never accepts such offers, and will not acknowledge the existence of the OPM, so he is unlikely to be able to satisfy his opponents in that way.

The Indonesian attitude to recent events in West Papua has also caused great concern in PNG. Under the terms of the border agreement between the two countries, Indonesia ought to keep PNG informed of any important developments in West Papua; yet Indonesia not only maintained a conspicuous silence, while hundreds of refugees poured into PNG and Indonesian helicopters and troops hounded Papuan guerrillas right on the border, but the PNG government was unable to get a response from either the Indonesian Embassy or the Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja. The *PNG Times* wrote bitterly in its editorial of the 8th March:

The arrogance of the Indonesian Foreign Minister in refusing for a week to speak to Mr Namaliu (PNG Foreign Minister) was distressing but entirely expected.

This high-handed attitude towards PNG has only increased Papuans' mistrust of Indonesia's intentions regarding their country, but the prevailing fear of Indonesian military strength dictates that the PNG government will try to downplay its differences with the Suharto regime over West Papua.


# Transmigration plans for West Papua

Indonesia's fourth five-year plan—Pelita IV—which runs from 1984/85 to 1988/89 and commences on 1 April provides for a huge increase in the number of transmigrants to West Papua, now known in Indonesia as the province of "Irian Jaya". According to a report of the Irian Jaya Directorate for Transmigration to the Minister for Transmigration and Manpower in October, the number of families to be transported from Java to Irian Jaya during Pelita IV will exceed 200,000—203,250 to be exact—a total of roughly a million people. This compares to 8,831 families transported throughout Pelita I and Pelita II and the first three years of Pelita III.

The document, a copy of which recently came into TAPOL's hands, contains two maps showing the spread of transmigration sites up to 1982 and the planned expansion up to 1989. There is no doubt that if these plans are realised, the face of West Papua will change dramatically. The target figure of 203,250 families for Irian Jaya may have been scaled down since 1982. The report gave the overall target for the whole country as a million families but statements in the Indonesian press more recently refer to a new figure of 750,000 families, the result apparently of a departmental meeting some time in 1983. However, an analysis of transmigration to Merauke, the main growth area in Irian Jaya, published in the fortnightly *Mutiara* (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 61, January 1984, page 3) still gave a target figure of 127,000 families for that region alone.

Irian Jaya has now become the primary target for transmigration from Java. Some parts of Sumatra, formerly the primary target, are becoming so densely populated

—TRANSMIGRATION SITES UP TO OCTOBER 1982



that they are turning into regions for outward rather than inward migration. As a result Sumatra is likely sooner or later to be closed to transmigration from Java. This tends to be the trend too in North and South Sulawesi with the result that "central and eastern Indonesia will be the main target areas in Pelita IV. Irian Jaya will need as many people as possible to populate the three provinces into which the territory is soon to be divided". (*Sinar Harapan*, 14th January, 1984.)

The October 1982 report states that with the construction of two major highways, from Nabire to Ilaga and from Jayapura through Oksibil to Merauke, the numerous transmigration sites will become centres for


economic growth, the so-called "growth poles" that can develop dynamically, promoting more rapid growth of Irian Jaya in all sectors". Transmigration sites will be directed towards food production, the cultivation of plantation crops, animal husbandry, sea and inland fisheries as well as industrial activity. But there will also be what the report refers to as "*transmigrasi saptamarga*". Saptamarga is the doctrine of the Indonesian Armed Forces; in other words, sites will also be populated by members of the Armed Forces and their families where the emphasis is primarily on security.

These "saptamarga" transmigration sites are to be concentrated along the border with Papua New Guinea, in particular along the northern sector, to help seal off the region of Jayapura where the West Papuan liberation movement, the OPM, is known to be particularly strong. This is where refugees have been fleeing from military terror since early February. A vast palm-oil nucleus estate is to be established along the west bank of the Arso river, covering an area of 21,000 hectares. According to the bulletin of the Irian Jaya Development Information Service (*Kabar dari Kampung*, No. 3-4, August 1983, page 12), 300,000 transmigrants are due to settle a short distance to the north in Koya in the coming ten years. Conversion of forest land to the cultivation of estate crops will eliminate sago stands and hunting grounds, thus making the local population dependent for the first time on outside food supplies and depriving guerrilla fighters of the source of sustenance.

## Three provinces

The plan to create three provinces in Irian Jaya is closely linked to these transmigration

TRANSMIGRATION SITES PLANNED BY 1988





tion plans. The vast distances in the territory mean that more first-level administrative centres are required. Ineffective administrative control has been an important factor keeping the rate of transmigration well below target. But there are other obstacles which could stand in the way of realising the Pelita IV target; acquiring enough suitable land for the sites, preparing the land for cultivation and providing the necessary infrastructure, particularly road construction. But the authorities appear determined not to allow these difficulties to deter

them. Many instances have come to light where foreign consultancy firms have produced unfavourable feasibility reports, only to be over-ruled by a decision to go ahead with a transmigration site regardless.

The requirements of the local population whose agricultural habits are so different from the new patterns of cultivation being imposed do not get so much as a mention in official transmigration plans. The only reference in the October 1982 report to the local population refers to the requirement that they "merge" or "assimilate" into

the new sites where, according to the target, 25 per cent of inhabitants should be "trans-locals". No Papuans hold posts of any significance in the administrative staff of the transmigration programme. Of the 357 people employed by the province's Directorate for Transmigration, only 27 are "putera daerah" or "people from the region". None is higher than civil service Grade IIa which means they are at most low-grade clerical staff, far removed from any say in planning or execution.

\*About a million people

## Transmigration a top priority

On the face of it, there is reason to doubt whether such ambitious transmigration plans have any hope of succeeding. The chances of transporting a million people to Irian Jaya in the next five years, considering progress so far, would appear to be remote. But the government claims that the national Pelita III target of 500,000 families was achieved in late 1983, several months ahead of schedule.

There is a sense of increasing urgency about the transmigration programme in Indonesia as population pressure mounts in Java bringing in its trail of social problems that are clearly becoming unmanageable. The death-squad killings and plans to introduce a law on compulsory transportation of people are also part of the Army's "solution". Transmigration is increasingly seen as the "safety valve" for Java. Some analysts forecast that Java will become a "city island" with a population density of 1000 per square km by the end of this century unless transmigration is accelerated.

Some idea of the social chaos that already grips East Java is given in an article in *Sinar Harapan* (11th February, 1984) which describes the alarming rate of urbanisation not only in Surabaya but in all the towns and cities of the province. New industrial complexes which had been intended to "syphon" population pressures away from the older conurbations have now become overburdened with the influx of people driven by acute landlessness and poverty to abandon the villages. The concentration of land ownership and the conversion of much land to industrial use is a key factor:

For owners of riceland and dryland whose land is taken over, compensation is usually paid though some owners are cheated by those in power to relinquish their property at dirt-cheap prices. But farm labourers, people who herd cattle and others lose absolutely everything whereas the towns offer them nothing either because they lack the necessary skills and need to adjust to very different circumstances.

In Surabaya, spaces under bridges, near railway carriages in stations, along the banks of the Brantas-Kalimas river and around market stalls are filled with people who possess nothing at all—not to mention the prostitution complexes which spread day by day.

*Sinar Harapan*, 11th February 1984.

According to the 1980 census, writes SH, there were 2,376,958 people seeking jobs in East Java.

### Forced transmigrants coerced into marrying

One of the methods now being used by the social services is to force these deprived people to transmigrate. But transmigrants must be part of a family unit so there is additional coercion on people to marry so as to comply with the requirements. A report in *Topik* (20th December, 1983) describes a mass marriage organised by the Department for Social Affairs in Trenggalek, East Java, in preparation for transmigration to Irian Jaya. Trenggalek appears to have become a supply base for transmigrants to Irian Jaya due to a previous association with Brigadier-General Soetran, once *bupati* (district head) of Trenggalek then later governor of Irian Jaya. *Topik* describes a marriage ceremony:

The men and women have reached the canopy after many ups and downs and not a few hair-raising experiences. They were first forcibly rounded up by the authorities and put into barracks, then transported to Trenggalek and put into special training centres for vagrants and given several weeks training in basic skills, plus religious and social education to prevent them from doing things that could be troublesome to the government.

The social services then coupled the people off, which explains why this "happy" occasion is marked by an atmosphere of tension. Then comes a remark which shows how transmigration and the killings by death-squads are seen as alternative "solutions".

Long before the "dor-doran" (shooting) season began, Admiral Sudomo, then commander of Kopkamtib, suggested that former *bromocorah* (village bandits) should be transmigrated but there was no follow-up. Many felt that the risks were too great, that such a step would only result in yet more problems.

This would seem to explain why the rate of killings has been so phenomenally high in East Java.

### Villagers in Central Java also forced to marry

Another *Topik* report (29th November, 1983) draws attention to coercion on villagers in Jatiurip village to remarry if their present spouses refuse to transmigrate. Villagers in this area have been under strong pressure from the authorities to leave their homes and transmigrate. Where a husband or wife refuses to comply, the other spouse is "seized", ordered to "marry" someone else so as to be able to be transported. These "marriages" consist simply of a letter issued by the village-chief with the approval of the sub-district chief (*camat*). So far, 47 families have been moved away; 150 families remain. Pressure on them to move comes from the combined forces of the local forestry office, the village head, the sub-district head and the transmigration officer. The latter seems bent on achieving his fixed target of transported families, thus becoming eligible for a commission. As for the other officials, they want to drive the villagers away so as to gain control of the land for other uses.

### Jakarta Vagrants removed

The Jakarta Municipality has come up with its own "solution" to widespread vagrancy in the capital. It has designated Pulau Tidung Kecil, in the Bay of Jakarta, as a centre to which vagrants rounded up should be sent. These "incorrigible vagrants" as they are called, "are supposed to receive training in skills. Afterwards . . . they will be given the option of going back to their respective villages or being resettled outside Java", write *Jakarta Post* (27th January, 1984). The paper, commenting editorially, then writes:

. . . coming right on the heels of reports of the existence of an alleged draft law seeking to empower the Government to confine individuals to certain restricted areas for vaguely delineated ideological offences, the Vice-Governor's announcement cannot help bring with it some unpleasant connotations.

### Sinar Harapan "severely warned" for reporting West Papuan arrest

The Department of Information has issued "a severe warning" to **Sinar Harapan** for reporting on 6 December that Arnold Ap, curator of the Museum of Anthropology in Jayapura, had been arrested and that his family did not know his whereabouts. Still worse, says the Department's warning which was reproduced in full in **Sinar Harapan** on 13 March, the paper reported on 13 December that it was in breach of the Procedural Code for a family not to know the detainee's whereabouts whereas in fact the detainee was being treated in conformity with the laws in force.

According to the Department's warning, as a result of these reports, individuals in Irian Jaya took irresponsible action of such a nature as to put in jeopardy Indonesia's close relations with a "certain friendly foreign country". The Department's statement continued:

Although the editors of **Sinar Harapan** have apologised, the severe warning has nevertheless been delivered because the developments were out of all proportion.

The paper was warned not to "dramatise" things or use wording that could create the wrong impression in the community.



PNG journalist, Neville Togarewa, inside West Papua, interviewing OPM defence minister Lawrence Doga (left) and Senate chairman, Fisor Yarisetouw. (PNG Times, 15th March 1984.)



West Papua refugees arrived in Vanimo. (PNG Times, 1 March 1984).

The Department's statement appears to confirm assessments that the arrest of Ap and many others late last year provided an impetus to OPM operations in Jayapura in February. It also reinforces the impression that the Indonesian authorities are facing a serious challenge to their rule in West Papua.

### Four West Papuans seek political asylum in Holland

On 29th February, four West Papuans entered the Dutch Embassy in Jakarta and requested political asylum. The four were eventually allowed to leave Indonesia and fly to Holland, though it is unlikely that the Dutch government will offer political asylum, but will probably look for another status for allowing them to stay.

Johannes Rumbia, Jopie Rumayom, Otti Simapiaref and Loth Sarakan sent a protest on 6th December to the Indonesian Parliament concerning the wave of arrests in West Papua, when Arnold Ap was imprisoned in Abepura. They apparently became frightened of the likelihood of being arrested themselves after the uprising in West Papua, and the possible consequences of that for them in Java. The Indonesian government took the line that the men were not being sought and claimed one was a criminal, and therefore they had no grounds to ask for political asylum, but it seems to have chosen to avoid a protracted dispute over the issue and the possibility of adverse publicity.



The four West Papuans leaving the Dutch embassy in Jakarta on 13th March. (*Sinar Harapan*). They told *De Telegraaf* (24th March) that an army death-squad had called at their hostel to abduct them, but they were not at home. This is why they decided to seek Dutch protection.

### "A bit authoritarian"

"In the late 1960s, when the author asked a British civil servant in Jakarta why the British Council was spending so much money on a new large establishment there, he replied: 'We are a bit fed up with the Commonwealth countries. We are looking for other countries, a bit authoritarian, to share their development with them.'"

From Brian May, **Russia, America, the Bomb and the Fall of Western Europe**, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1984, page 124.



# Seth Rumkorem on the resistance in West Papua

*Seth Rumkorem has for many years been a leader of the OPM\* in West Papua, fighting a guerrilla war against Indonesian forces from the jungle. He left West Papua in 1982, after a decision by the OPM that he should go abroad to publicise the situation there, but was apprehended by PNG authorities as he and nine companions tried to reach Vanuatu by boat. He was acquitted of the charge of illegal entry, and allowed to stay in Rabaul. In December 1982, however, he had to leave PNG, as Prime Minister Somare was about to make an official visit to Jakarta and was anxious to avoid any criticism by Suharto over tolerance of the OPM. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees asked the Greek government to give him temporary asylum, and he has been allowed to stay in Athens indefinitely with two other OPM members. He has tried to find another country more suited to advancing the OPM cause which would offer him asylum, so far without success, and is working to establish links with similar organisations. The interview was conducted with the help of Luis Nussy, one of the OPM members with Seth.*

February 1984

## Why did you leave the jungle and your country?

On a national level, our forces matched Indonesian forces in West Papua. But at the same time, we could see that internationally our position was still far too weak. So the National Committee decided that I should leave to head the West Papua mission abroad.

## Which countries would you like to visit?

Among others, Portugal, because it maintains good relations with progressive countries in Africa. Portugal is still pressing for self-determination in East Timor, and it is sympathetic to Fretilin.

## Is the OPM seeking support from other liberation movements?

Firstly, we have good relations with Fretilin, and they once offered us help. Then there is SWAPO, which we can see has attracted many international supporters. We would like to lobby for international support with the help of SWAPO, and that of the PLO and Polisario as well.

## How do you intend to attract publicity for the situation in your country, considering that you may have to remain in Greece?

It seems that if the UNHCR officials cannot help us, we will have to stay here in Athens, in which case it will be difficult to carry out the task given to us by the national committee, particularly if we don't have support from PASOK, the party in power in Greece.

## Do you keep contact with other Papuan groups abroad, like those of Jacob Prai and Nicholas Jouwe, and will you work together with any of them?

Markas Victoria (OPM HQ in W. Papua) is represented abroad by Bernard Tenggahma, who is in Dakar (Senegal), then there are ministers in Holland like Eliezer Bonay, Markus Kaisieppo, Tang Seng Thay, and in Sweden, Amos Indey and Darius Maury. We don't have relations with Prai and Jouwe. Jouwe engages in a lot of fantasy, and his attitude is very unstable—sometimes to the West, sometimes to the East, sometimes northwards, then southwards. Today he concocts a plan, tomorrow he abandons it and makes others. Recently he put forward the idea of West Papua obtaining autonomy within the Indonesian Republic. This is totally unacceptable to us. He hasn't learned from history that it is impossible to trust Indonesia. He would like to create a sort of West Bank of the Jordan in West Papua. How is this possible if millions of transmigrants are brought there from Java, and how then can one million Papuans go on demanding self-determination? When there are 12 million transmigrants in W. Papua, Indonesia will be able to hold a referendum which it will undoubtedly win. So Jouwe's plan is pure fantasy. As for Prai, I think he is a good person. Before he left Markas Victoria, he sought my help in a number of things, and was very interested then in what I was trying to do. His shortfall is that he has a weak character and is easily influenced by others,

which is why he is now under the influence of Jouwe and Henk Yoku.

## How extensive is the OPM's influence and control of West Papua?

Let's look at it from the point of view of the territory liberated by the OPM, and territory under our influence. To start with, the district of Jayapura, which we call Mamta province, is 95% under our influence or actually liberated. In the area around Jayapura itself, 60% is under our influence. In Biak and Japen-Waropen, the situation is much the same as in Jayapura, and in the district of Manokwari, only the towns of Ransiki and Manokwari are controlled by Indonesian forces; the rest of the territory is under our influence. In Sorong district, the enemy controls the town of Sorong and the islands of Gag and Waigeo, but the rest of it is under our influence. In Enarotali, only Freeport is controlled by Indonesian forces: virtually 100% of this territory is under our influence, and this is also the situation in Wamena and Merauke. In the district of Fak-Fak, only Fak-Fak and Kaimana are under Indonesian control.

The guerrilla base in the north was moved from the border area to the interior in 1980. It is easier to keep contact with the whole of W. Papua from this position. The Indonesians don't yet know about the location of our new base. They still think it is near the border: indeed, Prai's group is still carrying out operations near the border, and also to the south inside West Papuan territory. We feel the benefit of this because it draws the Indonesian forces away to the border area, making it easier for us to start putting into practice our new strategy of switching from defensive-offensive to offensive-defensive tactics.



Seth Rumkorem (right) and Luis Nussy in Athens.

## What are the OPM's policies in social and economic matters?

That's a good question, because West Papua is the richest country in the Pacific area for minerals. There are 29 different minerals in West Papua, from copper to uranium, as well as petroleum and natural gas. In Sorong alone, the production of petroleum is now almost 500,000 barrels a day. In those areas which we have liberated, we implement a program called *program kemajuan desa*—the village advancement programme. It is

\*The OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka) is also known as the FPM (Free Papua Movement).



through this that we are laying down the foundation for our policies after we are fully independent.

The *program kemajuan desa* involves political education and literacy work, general education, health and welfare, agriculture and co-operatives, and helping the community by giving them the knowledge and guidance to set up their own enterprises. We have taken heed of the way that third world countries manage their economies. In some cases, they are still controlled by foreign interests, and the people in these countries don't participate actively in their own economic development. We are making the necessary preparations for the Papuan people to become involved later on in our own economic efforts. We don't pursue a policy of 100% free enterprise or 100% socialism, as some third world countries do; instead we've chosen a mixed system. Take, for example, timber logging. There is plenty of timber to be had. The government need only work to reach agreements with those countries interested in exploiting West Papuan timber, then once agreement has been reached, local communities can work jointly with foreign companies.

Politically, we are preparing people to feel responsible for the struggle to achieve an independent West Papua. But at the same time, we are trying to give them a sense of responsibility for collectively controlling the government so as to ensure that it is democratic. That is emphasised in point four of the general program of the West Papuan revolution: that we oppose all forms of totalitarianism.

**Life in West Papua is still very traditional. How do people react to your new economic and social policies?**

In my own experience—and I am directly involved in this *program kemajuan desa*—many people ask questions about the policies we will pursue after the world recognises our independence. We try to explain our plans slowly and carefully, and we've found that wherever we go and discuss political issues with the people, they do generally agree with our future policies. An important element in this is that we would allow traditional ways of life to continue alongside the new ideas, now during the struggle, and later when we achieve our objective. We do try to discourage old ideas like the cargo cults which don't fit in with our revolution. We explain to the people what the West Papuan republic will be like, the aims of the revolution, and then explain to them what the cargo cult really is, and what its aims are. In this way, people can make a fair comparison between the two.

**How has it been possible for the OPM to remain active and strong, and how do the Papuan people support it?**

The West Papuan people feel a sense of obligation towards participating in our struggle. They feel directly involved, and give support quite voluntarily, without us asking. That's why young people continually join our ranks. I sometimes feel very moved at the spontaneous assistance given to us. Any movement by Indonesian troops is reported to us, without our asking, and Papuan youths who are studying in Java do everything they can to help. In this way we can always follow events in Indonesia and in West Papua, which is why the OPM's position is so much stronger today than it was two decades ago. We are convinced that as our strength improves to match that of the Indonesians in West Papua, it will not be possible for Indonesia to defeat the West Papuan people's struggle.

**How have traditional land rights been affected since the Indonesians began their own social and economic policies?**

Ten years ago, it was still possible to negotiate with the Indonesians over the compensation paid by them for land taken for transmigration and other projects. Now there is no discussion or bargaining: people are deprived of their traditional land rights, and ordered off their land by the government which then pays whatever compensation it considers adequate. The land may be given to Javanese transmigrants, or to ministers and generals loyal to Suharto. For example, Holtekang near Jayapura, and the

region up to the border, all this land is now the property of Madame Suharto. We also now know from a captured document, that the entire region of Merauke is included in the areas to be used for transmigration planned for Pelita IV and Pelita V (see page 4). The government is not at all concerned about whether the local population agrees with these plans or not. West Papuan people give support to the OPM as the only possible response to this forced expropriation of their land rights. I must use this term because the compensation paid is not adequate. Where transmigration is being pushed rapidly ahead, the only chance for Papuans is to turn to us, since they hope that if the OPM is victorious, their land may be restored to them.

The whole northern coastal region in the district of Jayapura is included in the Pelita IV transmigration programme, and all the good land in the district of Wamena has been included in this programme. Looking at this document dealing with transmigration plans for Pelita IV and Pelita V, it is clear that Papuans will become foreigners in their own land, poor people in an abundantly rich country.

**Is it true that transmigration has become a policy with important political and security objectives?**

Transmigration to West Papua is part of the *wawasan nusantara* doctrine and it is quite clear that its aim is to achieve *ketahanan Indonesia*\* politically, economically and militarily. Politically, Indonesia would collapse without West Papua, since if West Papua were to leave the Republic, other parts of the country would try to do the same. That's why everything is done to keep West Papua within the Republic. Economically, West Papua is an important source of wealth for Indonesia, as well as a place where many people find lucrative jobs. On the military side, the island of Papua has been a front line of defence for Australia ever since the Second World War. Indonesia itself is a kind of gateway between two oceans and the link between two continents, and makes great use of the international political situation to enhance its position as a Pacific power. Without West Papua, Indonesia's strategic position in the Pacific would be much weaker. We can see its preoccupation with security in the construction of the Trans-Irian highway and the restoration of airfields in Biak and Morotai. Indonesia is using transmigration in Pelita IV to strengthen its position from all points of view in West Papua and the eastern part of the republic.

**How many freedom fighters are there fighting for the OPM, and how does the OPM co-ordinate their operations?**

In Markas Victoria, there are 500 fighters, members of the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional. Besides that, there are members in every town in a state of "stand-by", ready to take part at the right time in any major offensive. Prai's group operate from PNG, and consist of 800 people in the north and the same number in the south. Around Freeport and Enarotali, there are about 2,000 OPM fighters. All we lack are the weapons to equip our forces, which total altogether 30,000 to 50,000 people. As an indication of how much Papuan people are willing to struggle to drive the Indonesians from the country, I can say that if we had the arms, we would in a single day be able to recruit 20,000 more people.

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**"I can say that if we had the arms, we would, in a single day, be able to recruit 20,000 more people. This is quite obvious, yet Indonesia always claims nothing is going on in West Papua."**

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This is quite obvious, yet Indonesia always claims that nothing is going on in West Papua, that there is no liberation movement there. Indonesian forces know that the natural environment of our country is well suited to fighting a guerrilla war, which is why they have followed our defensive-offensive strategy and avoided armed contact with the OPM. This has meant that there have been very few opportunities for us to capture weapons from the

\**Wawasan nusantara*, island territory; *ketahanan Indonesia*, Indonesian defence capability.

Indonesian Army, while their troops stick to defending the towns. We have now switched to using an offensive-defensive strategy, which we think will enable us to obtain more arms supplies.

**As you know, Indonesia has the largest armed forces in S.E. Asia. How can the OPM mount operations against these forces and be successful?**

According to the **Pacific Defence Report**, December 1982-January 1983, ABRI has a total strength of around 450,000 men, but there is a huge gap between manpower and equipment. There are only 45 combat aircraft from the UK and the USA (Hawks, Broncos and other jet fighters) and from Australia (Sabres and Canberras). The Navy has three corvettes from Holland equipped with French Exocet missiles, and there are high speed vessels from S. Korea, plus 12 De Havilland patrol aircraft from Australia.

We hold one great advantage over the Indonesians in the area of transport and communications. To transport even a platoon of men is very difficult for them. The jungles, rivers, mountains and marshland make West Papuan terrain very difficult to travel through. We are thoroughly accustomed to this, but Indonesian soldiers who have been trained in the easier environment of Java, are quite unused to what they find in our country. If they wish to travel by foot, they must force villagers to act as guides and porters, though often these are paid workers for the Indonesians anyway. We shoot these people, leaving the Indonesian soldiers to wander until they starve, when we can attack them and take their weapons. This avoids heavy armed combat with Indonesian forces.

There is a second advantage, one we have learned from observing other liberation struggles in Africa and Asia. I myself

was formerly in the TNI, and I studied Indonesia's own anti-guerrilla tactics, known as *Perang Wilaya* (territorial warfare) as well as those used in Malaya and Indochina. Before Indonesia is able to apply these tactics, we strive to cut relations between the Indonesian government and the mass of people. There is one unit of our National Liberation Army called the "Satuan Tugas Rangkap" which has the task of giving out information to the people so that they are not deceived by Indonesian propaganda. Indonesia cannot use its "fence of legs" tactic in West Papua, because the OPM can use the very thick jungle and difficult terrain to oppose the Indonesians with a "fence of trees". We have also begun to try to attract the attention of western states through the international media in order that they might reconsider their present policy of invariably giving help to Indonesia. It is important to look to the future, and to remember that a time will come when our generation no longer exists. The younger generation now at school are showing themselves to be a lot more radical, and the time will come when they take over the movement from us. New possibilities, not now visible, will become apparent in the future.

Our political efforts are combined with small-scale armed encounters which are regulated and controlled in such a way as to grow gradually into a powerful offensive. I mean that with these small actions, people build up their courage and conviction, their political consciousness grows, and they are all the more ready and willing to support us. As this process intensifies, so people will participate without being asked, in a nationwide guerrilla war. That is our final objective, a truly national liberation war.

The second part of the interview with Seth Rumkorem will appear in **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 63.

## Death-squads

# 8,500 victims in E. Java alone, reports Dutch journalist

An Indonesian journalist who monitored the army death-squad killing of alleged criminals by collecting figures weekly from district police offices throughout East Java calculates that up to the end of 1983, about 8,500 people were murdered in that province alone. This figure only includes deaths recorded by the police; the journalist would not speculate on how many unrecorded deaths there may have been.

These findings were reported by Krijnie van de Bent in **Vrij Nederland** (11 February 1984). He later asked a lawyer in East Java who has had many dealings with people on the run from the death-squads whether he thought this figure was plausible. The lawyer thought it was. At this lawyer's office, van de Bent met a fugitive from a village in East Java who escaped when six of his friends were caught and then disappeared. This was from a village of about a hundred people.

In Central Java, van de Bent was told that people near Wonosari, where rivers flow underground through caves, had seen army trucks arrive twice weekly and dump bodies in the caves. People in the vicinity thought that these bodies were being brought there from East as well as from Central Java.

### More bodies discovered in Jakarta

With the media again under strict orders not to mention "mystery" killings after a brief spate of news items about the issue at the time Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van der Broek was in Jakarta last January (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 61, January 1984), newspapers now confine themselves to occasionally reporting the discovery of corpses. The kind of detail provided suggests that they are in fact talking about the same thing. On 2 February, **Sinar Harapan** reported the discovery of two bodies, both with gunshot wounds. On 20 February, **Sinar Harapan** and **Merdeka** both

reported the discovery of five corpses, all with gunshot wounds. One man was found hanging from a tree, but had apparently been shot dead before he was strung up.

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Villagers in Singosari, Boyolali, Central Java, found ten corpses in nearby ricefields and ditches recently, reports **Tempo** (28th January, 1984). The men had died not from bullet wounds but from starvation; their bodies were nothing more than skin and bones.

The villagers say that many so-called petty criminals, known as *gali-gali* fled to the mountains in Boyolali soon after the death-squad killings began in Central Java. They have had great difficulty surviving and frequently turn up in villages to beg for food. The villagers have no idea how many there were but thought there must be very many. The village head received so many complaints that he ordered the people to set up a village security system; villagers also decided to set up barricades every evening on all the roads leading into the village. When these measures failed to protect fruit and crops outside the boundary, the people decided to join forces with the army and police to carry out sweeps in the mountains to round up the fugitives. The operation led to the capture of only three severely malnourished men hardly capable any longer of walking, who were then detained in a local police office. The authorities have now decided that these operations are not worth the effort. "Just let them die of hunger", said one police officer.



# Two journals banned

## Topik

The weekly magazine **Topik** has been banned because of an editorial in its issue of 21 February 1984 which "contains communist tendencies" and "promotes the idea of the class struggle".

The offending issue focused its cover story on the question of poverty in Indonesia. The report was entitled "Looking for a hundred kinds of poor people" echoing the title of an article published a few months ago by the glossy magazine **Expo** which was also banned for publishing a report on "Indonesia's one hundred millionaires".

The extract from **Topik's** editorial to which particular exception was taken reads as follows:

It is out of the question for the condition of the poor to change without their having power. And power cannot be created unless it is seized. The seat of power will only come about if the oppressed exert themselves to seize it. This is a struggle that will take a very long time.

The editorial also warned that romantic attitudes towards the poor are useless, nor is it any good displaying a kind of "platonic affection" for the poor. It is worthless to place trust in the "trickle-down mechanism".

In another item in the same issue, a regular feature about "Eben", the popular character who expounds views and comments about current affairs, the opinion is expressed that "corruption in Indonesia is more dangerous than communism".

### "Cynicism and insinuations"

Although Soekarno, the Director-General for Press and Graphics Guidance at the Department of Information "could not re-

member" whether the ban on **Topik** had been preceded by a warning, he told the press that an earlier issue of the publication also caused offence because of an "Eben" piece which took the form of an imaginary interview with "Pak Harto" (the president, Suharto) and contained many criticisms of the state apparatus, the single-ideology doctrine and the "P4" compulsory indoctrination courses. That piece was full of "cynicism and insinuations, and did not reflect a free and responsible press", he said (**Tempo**, 3rd March, 1984).

**Tempo** also reports that even before the ban was imposed, the Editor-in-Chief, Soepeno, and the proprietor B.M. Diah sensed that a 'breach' had been committed by allowing these "dangerous thoughts" to be expressed. "We reported the matter to the authorities even before they took action", said Soepeno.

### No sympathy from Journalists Association

The chairman of the Indonesian Journalists' Association, PWI, H. Zulharman who warned recently of the need to "prevent PKI (Communist Party) remnants from infiltrating its ranks" (see **TAPOL Bulletin**, No.61, November 1983, page 10) said that the PWI would not lift a finger to defend **Topik** and call for the ban to be lifted. He foresaw that further problems would arise when the question of the company's business licence (SIUPP) comes up for consideration. (According to revisions made to the censorship law last year, censorship violations can now lead to the withdrawal of the licence of the publishing house as a whole, not merely to the particular title being banned. B.M. Diah who owns **Topik** is the owner of one of Indonesia's largest and oldest publishing houses whose publications include two leading dailies, **Merdeka** and the **Indonesian Observer**.)


Zulharman went on to say that the journalist who wrote the offending editorial will have to be identified. If he/she is a member of the PWI, expulsion is almost certain to follow.

## Expo

A month before **Topik** lost its licence, the glossy fortnightly journal, **Expo** was forced to close down following publication of a series of articles entitled "A Hundred Millionaires". The Information Ministry claimed that the articles were "full of personal abuse", "sensationalist" and "full of insinuations" and were therefore in violation of "a free and responsible press". (**Tempo**, 21 January, 1984) The articles had certainly won the journal a great deal of popularity as circulation had gone up from 10,000 to 40,000 within weeks.

The Information Ministry's ban was preceded by a series of warnings related to articles published by **Expo** about customs officials (who have been under fire recently following the exposure of widespread corruption). The editors had been ordered to halt these reports because they were "one-sided", and on that occasion, they complied.

Sondang P. Napitupulu, **Expo** editor and writer of the offending articles, declares that he violated no regulations and had simply drawn together a host of data from many reliable sources. Sondang is described by **Tempo** as a "controversial" figure who goes in for a somewhat unconventional style of news gathering. He has often been threatened by people who resent things he has written. As for the Information Ministry, they have made it clear that the lifting of the ban will be conditional upon Sondang being removed from the editorial staff of **Expo**.



The "trickle-down" mechanism. (**Topik**, 14th February 1984.)



# Propaganda by satellite

The loss of the \$75 million Indonesian satellite, Palapa B2, at the beginning of February brought Indonesia's interest in space technology briefly to the world's attention. Palapa B2 was the fourth satellite to be launched by the Indonesian Government, and its loss will not impair one of the main functions of the other three, namely to provide television viewing to a remarkably large number of people over a substantial area of the archipelago. Television has become a powerful instrument of government propaganda, with over 95 million viewers, 60% of the population. While people voice understandable concern over the heavy censorship of the press, the total readership of all papers in Indonesia is nowhere near the total number who watch television.

TVRI is the only television company in Indonesia, and not surprisingly it is completely state owned and controlled. Newspapers are read mostly in urban areas, yet Indonesia is a predominantly rural country, and TVRI has gradually changed its content to suit rural audiences. Entertainment has been cut back to 27% of programme content in favour of education and culture, and in 1981, TV advertisements were banned because the Government felt they emphasised the wealth gap between rural and urban areas. There have been so many complaints about the rural orientation of TVRI that a second channel, for Jakarta, has been proposed, but for the Government it is important to extend state propaganda to different parts of the country through television.

The main radio station in Indonesia is RRI, and that too is state owned, under the control of the Department of Information. Like TVRI, it has a strongly rural outlook, unlike the urban private stations. Even these non-government stations are strictly regulated over news broadcasts; they may only put out 15-minute news bulletins compiled by RRI, six times a day. It is quite clear that broadcasting gives the Indonesian regime a degree of influence over the population that it could not hope to exert otherwise. If the Security forces take the trouble to close down dissenting newspapers, they nevertheless have a total monopoly on news and information reaching the great majority of Indonesian people. The most popular daily paper, the tabloid-style *Pos Kota*, has a readership of less than two million and a circulation of only 250,000 and the two main non-government quality papers, *Kompas* and *Sinar Harapan*, have a joint circulation of 635,000 and an estimated readership of around two-and-a-half million between them. It begins to look a very limited circulation compared to the 95 million television viewers.

Tight control of the press is still as prevalent as ever. In February, the magazine *Topik* was closed for showing supposed "communist tendencies". The "telephone tradition" is still the favoured method of censorship, whereby security forces may give sudden instructions to ban an area of coverage to editors over the phone.

More often than not the constraints placed on the press are non-negotiable. To discuss broad issues concerning press coverage, the editors have regular consultations with Information Ministry officials, who are in close touch with key military organisations such as KOPKAMTIB, the intelligence co-ordination body BAKIN and the Jakarta garrison. An extraordinary meeting, possibly attended by military officials concerned, may be called by the Information Ministry to impose a blackout on a specific news item. (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 1st March, 1984.)

It is made quite clear to newspapers that they print only with government approval, although the actual limits of censorship are undefined, so that Indonesian papers tend to censor themselves more severely than the government requires, to avoid incurring official displeasure. The penalties for straying outside "acceptable" reporting are high: recent legislation allows the Government not only to close down a paper indefinitely, but also the parent company.

Editors have no choice but to comply with restrictions, and to

report potentially problematic news in language vague enough to appear innocuous. One editor described a typical response to government objections over a report:



We reasoned at the time that the government will go on being what it is whether or not we give up: so there was no use our stopping publication in defiance . . . we chose to accommodate, taking all the consequences of our accommodation. (*FEER*, 1st March, 1984)

## Chinese-language press control

The only Chinese-language newspaper now permitted to appear is *Indonesia Ribao*, a tabloid which is published under the auspices of BAKIN. The Chinese-language content is being steadily reduced and will eventually be eliminated altogether. Apart from this publication, "Chinese-language publications can neither be imported nor produced domestically. Chinese characters are routinely blocked out of foreign news photos and advertising". (US State Department *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1983*, Washington, February 1984.)

## Women's access to medical facilities to be restricted

From now on, women may not exceed 30 per cent of students entering medical faculties throughout Indonesia, according to a decision of the university authorities. The decision was announced by Dr Mahar Mardjono, chairman of the Indonesian Doctors Association (IDI) who said that the health authorities consider that too many women have entered the medical profession in the past few years. They allege that some provincial health services are finding it difficult to staff medical centres because "only women doctors" are available. In West Sumatra, for instance, about 60 per cent of the doctors are women.

The IDI chairman also told the press that women would no longer be acceptable for appointment as assistant lecturers.

The chairwoman of the Indonesian Women's Congress, Mrs Murpratomo, greeted this decision by saying that she does not consider this an act of discrimination against women. It was taken, she claimed, with the national interests in mind, so as to ensure that there are enough doctors to meet society's needs. In her opinion, women's rights are already well protected in Indonesia. Indonesian women have no use for western movements like "women's lib" which encourage women "to think only of themselves".

Source: *Sinar Harapan*, 12th and 13th March, 1983.



## New societies law effectively ends the right to organise

A draft law on social organisations is in preparation which will completely destroy all remaining rights to organise as independent associations in Indonesia. The draft was leaked to the public before being submitted to Parliament and has already aroused criticism. Four of the five politically-aligned student organisations known as the Cipayung Group have issued a statement which condemns this as an example of power being used to legitimise measures that conflict with democratic principles and civil rights. (*Sinar Harapan*, February, 1984). The nationalist GMNI refused to sign the statement.

The draft affects not only the mass organisations of youth, students and women which, according to well-established tradition in Indonesia, generally align with various political parties and which will no longer be permitted to do so. It also affects societies in the broadest meaning, whatever the limits of their concerns. These societies which have come into existence in large numbers in the past few years are often referred to as 'NGOs' (non-government organisations).

According to the leaked draft, all organisations will be required

- to adopt the Pancasila as their sole ideology,
- to work to safeguard the success of national development and implementation of the "State Guidelines",
- to register with the authorities and maintain a list of members,
- not to confine membership to people of one ethnic origin.

Societies may only be established with the approval of the Minister of the Interior, the provincial governor or district head according to whether they are national, provincial or local in scope and membership. They will be proscribed from spreading

communist or Marxist-Leninist teachings or other teachings that conflict with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

They will not be allowed to engage in political activities and may only accept financial support from abroad with the approval of the government.

Societies pursuing similar social interests will be required to come together under a single umbrella to be regulated by the competent official. In the case of youth and women's organisations, this unifying process will be regulated by the President. They will all be subject to government supervision and will receive warnings or be ordered to disband if they violate existing laws. This supervision will be regulated by the Minister of the Interior or other competent minister, depending upon the social interest of the organisation.

All organisations in existence at the time this law comes into force will be required to bring themselves into line within a year.

### Will Youth Organisations Oppose?

Ever since the adoption of the decision on a "single ideology" (*azas tunggal*) at the 1983 session of the 'People's' Assembly, a law applying this to mass organisations has been expected. The Muslim students organisation, HMI, refused at its conference in 1983 to adopt the "*azas tunggal*", saying at the time that it would consider the matter once the law on mass organisations had been enacted. HMI was one of the four Cipayung Group organisations to criticise the draft law recently. It remains to be seen whether they will decide not to comply with the swingeing provisions of the draft law.

## A cautionary tale

### When telling your experiences can land you in jail

When Agus Salim arrived to take up his post as a teacher at the Teachers' Training College in Slawi, Central Java in February 1983, he was asked to introduce himself to a gathering of the student body. Nothing unusual about that. Then someone asked him to relate his past experiences whereupon he described an event that took place when he was a student at the Institute of Education (IKIP) in Jakarta. In 1978, he said, the students had been worried about the People's Assembly (MPR) which was to elect Suharto to his third term of office. He explained how the students had raised criticisms about the president and expressed the view that the MPR was a charade.

Soon afterwards, two students reported that he had spoken disparagingly about the Pancasila as "nothing more than a theory", a remark which certainly disqualified him as a teacher. They took their complaint to the teachers in control of the inter-school student organisation (*Organisasi Siswa Intra Sekolah*) who could not let the matter rest there. Determined to find out more about this suspect, they proceeded to compile a dossier on him and discovered that he allowed students to smoke in class, had admitted to having had 20 girlfriends, and lots of other disreputable things. When the

school director heard all this, he decided this was a matter for the district Office of Education who promptly took the case to the Central Java Kopkamtib officer who knew a suspect when he saw one. On 13th May, in the middle of the night, this dangerous character was picked up and placed in detention.

Eight months later, Agus Salim found himself in court, charged with "insulting the President" in violation of Article 134 of the Criminal Code.

"I fail to understand how such an incident could have led to a trial", the accused is reported to have said, shortly before the trial started. "In fact, I told the students at

the time to serve the Pancasila well."

In court, Agus Salim confessed to having spoken about the 1978 affair and admitted that he was wrong not to have drawn the right conclusions. "I apologise and ask forgiveness. Some students misinterpreted what I said."

Whether found guilty or not, he has already paid for his unfortunate choice of topic with nearly ten months in detention. (*Based on a report in Tempo*, 10th March, 1984.)

[Also see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 56, March 1983, for a report about teachers in schools being given instructions to spy on the political inclinations of their students and pupils.]



Thousands followed the proceedings outside the court in Slawi when the prosecution demanded a sentence of ten months for Agus Salim. (*Sinar Harapan*, 20 March 1984).



## Dutch trade unionist visit

"We should make it absolutely clear that in many essential respects, the Indonesian trade union movement lacks basic rights to defend the interests of the workers", Wim Kok, chairman of the Dutch trade union federation, the FNV told a press conference in Amsterdam on his return from a visit to Indonesia and other countries of South East Asia. He had been on a mission of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which also included Moss Evans, General Secretary of one of Britain's major trade unions the Transport and General Workers Union. Moss Evans has not yet made public his impressions of the visit to Jakarta.

Workers in the public and semi-public sector are prohibited from joining unions and are required to join KORPRI which is a state organisation, not a trade union, said Wim Kok, who also condemned the fact that the right to strike had been effectively eliminated even though it still remains on the statute book, "Everything must be resolved by means of consultations, to reach a consensus. If this fails, the government steps in and insists that workers must not strike because of the need for loyalty to the state ideology, Pancasila. They are told to behave like 'good citizens'. When we asked what happened if foreign companies failed to behave like 'good citizens', we got no reply".

The Dutch trade unionist said the influence of the military is felt in all sectors of the community. "Whatever the laws prescribe, action is out of the question." The army's grip on society is very stifling. They impose their will on the workers through the FBSI, the only trade union that is permitted to exist and which he described as nothing more than an extension of the regime.

Trade unions in other countries should do everything to support Indonesian workers who have a difficult time trying to

defend workers' interests and to improve the inhuman conditions in which many of them work. "Many people whom we met urged us not to leave them in the lurch."

Source: *De Waarheid* and *Volkskrant*, 8th February 1984.

### No more strikes, says Sudomo

The Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo has categorically declared that he will reject all requests from trade unions for permission to strike, whatever the reasons. Granting permission to strike, he said, would only disrupt stability. Trade unions "should use all approaches and consultations with the employers because strikes are damaging not only to companies but also to the workers".

He said that even though the law on strikes is going to be changed, bans on strikes would only apply to vital enterprises. But trade unions should nevertheless avoid going on strike in other enterprises and should seek a settlement by consultation. (*Sinar Harapan*, 14 March, 1984.)

Sudomo's statement can be interpreted as meaning that the government feels it cannot legally ban *all* strikes, only those affecting vital enterprises. But the Minister will use his executive powers to prevent *any* strikes from occurring.




## Tennis champion stopped from going abroad

Indonesia's top tennis player, Asian Games gold-medallist Yustedjo Tarik was prevented from going abroad recently when he turned up at the international airport in Jakarta, on his way to Bangkok to participate in a tournament. Immigration officials prevented his departure on an instruction which had originated from Major-General (retired) Jonosewojo, the president of the Indonesian Tennis Federation (Pelti). The retired general decided that Yustedjo needed to be disciplined for "unruly" behaviour during training and on the courts. When asked why he had taken this extraordinary step, Jonosewojo simply said that "Yustedjo's loyalty to the Republic is questionable".

*Tempo* reports (25th February, 1984) that there are four bodies



Melatih = training. Keluar negeri = going abroad. *Tempo*, 3rd March 1984.



Brig-Gen. Jonosewojo at his Pelti office. "I'm the Commander at Pelti, aren't I?"

or officials with powers to prevent people from leaving the country: the Defence Ministry, the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief, the Supreme Court and the joint intelligence agency, BAKIN. It was the latter body which Jonosewojo used to prevent Yustedjo's departure.

The tennis champion has displayed an attitude of defiance, refusing to apologise for his alleged misdemeanours. He now refuses to play any more for the Federation and has announced that he is seeking legal advice on how to sue for damages.

Many top positions in the sporting world are held by senior army officers. Jonosewojo presides over two other sports federations, including the Weight-lifting Federation, Major-General Acub Zainul, formerly commander of Irian Jaya is leader of the Football Federation, and General Rudini, Army Chief-of-Staff was recently elected president of the Karate Federation.



# Fighting continues as hundreds flee “climate of fear” in the towns

As the Indonesian offensive continues, there are reports of more desertions from the Indonesian army, of people fleeing the Indonesian-occupied areas to join forces with the guerrillas and of “disappearances”.

AFP reported from Jakarta on 19 February that ambushes and skirmishes had become increasingly fierce six months after the offensive was launched in August. Military circles believe that operations are “likely to continue at least until the end of April” and that “elite (Kopassandha) battalions, backed by helicopters, AMX-13 tanks and Bronco OV10 fighter planes, are being led by Colonel Rudito,\* a field officer who has resolved to fight to the end” (*South China Morning Post*, 20th February, 1984).

After pointing out that these military operations are “top secret” in Indonesia and reports on them are banned in the local press, AFP adds:

The military operations and intensive activity of the Indonesian Secret Services—checks, arrests and assigned housing—have created a climate of fear among the population. Fear of arrest has led several hundred Fretilin sympathisers to take to the hills with or without their families and join the guerrillas there, church sources said.

These unexpected reinforcements, added to the some hundred “deserters” of the Indonesian Army’s Timorese Auxiliary has brought the number of Fretilin guerrillas to more than 800, the sources said.

The same report reveals that an official of the US embassy in Jakarta recently made a discreet visit to East Timor to gather information following a statement late last year by 105 members of the US Congress urging the Reagan Administration to include East Timor on its foreign policy agenda.

On the level of fighting, AFP quoted military sources in Jakarta as saying that “the fighting is worse” than expected and that “losses were too high”. A Dutch journalist in Jakarta in March wrote:

heavy fighting is still going on, particularly in the mountains . . . In the past few months, the fighting has greatly intensified. The Indonesian troops are ill-prepared to cope with the tactics of the guerrillas and are not hardened enough for the fight. (*NRC Handelsblad*, 3rd March, 1984.)

## Amnesty campaigns for more “disappeared”

On 20th February, Amnesty International launched an Urgent Action on behalf of 23 people thought to have disappeared after having been arrested some time since August 1983. They include Father Domingos Soares, a priest from Ossu, Viqueque who was arrested late in January in Ossu. The others are:

Albino Lourdes	Paulo Mesquita
Domingo Seixas	Bonifacio Magno
Joao Bosco de Araujo	Abel Ximenes
Porfirio Cursino	Fernando Soares
Eurico de Jesus	Agostinho (nurse employed at
Maria Nicolau dos Reyes	Farma Zelia, Dili)
Jose de Sousa	Antonio Piedade
David Ximenes	Filomeno Paixao
Belmiro Henrique	Jose Henriques
Helder Jordao de Araujo	Octavio Jordao de Araujo
Evangelino (teacher at primary,	Caetano de Sousa Gutierrez
school, Balide, Dili)	Francisco Calcona

Some are thought to have been sent to regional military headquarters in Bali or to Atauro. Amnesty has also received information that some may be held at a newly constructed prison in Becora on the outskirts of Dili. Amnesty has also received reports of several hundred arrests in East Timor between August 1983 and the end of January 1984.

The former Bishop of Dili, Mgr da Costa Lopez who attended a session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva in February said that, according to his information, these 23 people had been removed from their places of imprisonment late at night and shot dead. (*Radio Nederland*, 22nd February, 1984.) The former Bishop told the Commission that

only a genuine and completely free act of self-determination will bring peace to East Timor and the war will go on and on for as long as natural justice and freedom are denied to the East Timorese people.

The Human Rights Commission was also addressed by a representative of Pax Romana who said that East Timor’s right to self-determination which is non-negotiable “cannot be considered to have been forfeited . . . because of the passage of time, the weight of the Indonesian presence or material changes in the situation”. He stressed that the issue should be kept on the UN agenda and abstaining countries urged to reconsider their position and commit themselves in support of the East Timorese.

## Indonesian Bishops’ open letter to East Timor Church

The Indonesian Bishops Conference (MAWI) sent an open letter to the Catholic Church in East Timor in November expressing sympathy and friendship “with the Faithful and the people of East Timor who are being deluged by most bitter trials both physically and spiritually”.

The open letter marks an important turning point for the Indonesian Catholic Church, the first time it has publicly expressed concern for the situation in East Timor, and in terms that can only be interpreted as being strongly critical of events there, especially since the offensive launched by Indonesian troops last August.

The letter was drawn up after the Bishops had obtained a first-hand report from Monsignor Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, the newly appointed Apostolic Administrator of Dili who attended the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference last November as an observer. Shortly before his visit to Jakarta, Mgr Belo had been

\*This should read Rudjito.



Indonesian F-5E Tiger jets. Two F-5Es are reported to be operating in East Timor

warned in writing by the military authorities in Dili after a sermon he delivered in Dili protesting against arrests and violence being perpetrated by Indonesian troops.

The open letter from the Indonesian Bishops said:

... we cannot refuse to confront the events that are happening among the people, especially those affairs which determine the welfare or the misery of the masses who are involved in or who are the victims of cruel oppression.

In a remark which clearly aimed at distancing the Indonesian Catholic Church from the policies of the Indonesian state, the Bishops reiterated their belief that the Church "must in no way be confused with the political community nor bound to any political power".

# The State Department's latest distortions on East Timor

In a report on human rights practices in Indonesia in 1983, the US State Department casts doubt on the authenticity of secret Indonesian army documents issued to troops in East Timor which Amnesty International used last year to expose torture practices, and provides a grossly distorted account of developments in East Timor before and since Indonesia launched its current offensive there last August.

The report is part of the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices which the State Department is required to produce every year before foreign aid disbursements are presented to Congress.

The Indonesia chapter devotes considerable attention to the "mystery" killings of "criminals". Indeed, the Reagan administration and several other western governments have expressed concern to Indonesia over the killings, but have been conspicuously silent over the current aggression in East Timor. The State Department report reinforces the impression that there is a move in the West to make an issue of the killings, while not allowing western concern over this aspect of General Benny Murdani's policy to undermine Indonesia's attempt to crush resistance in East Timor.

The brief references in the report to East Timor conceal the fact that the current offensive had been in preparation for several months before it was launched last August, and allege that Fretilin was responsible for the breakdown of the ceasefire. The massacre of about 200 people near Viqueque is dismissed as a "charge" by "groups outside Indonesia hostile to the takeover". The

## Pope cancels visit to Indonesia

According to the **National Catholic Reporter** (US) (24 February 1984), the Pope's decision to cancel a planned visit to Indonesia during a tour he is making in May to several countries in Asia was strongly influenced by the general human rights situation in Indonesia and was prompted primarily by the move taken by the Indonesian Bishops to express concern publicly about the situation in East Timor.

## UN Human Rights Commission again backs East Timor

Though no public announcement is yet available, TAPOL has been informed that the UN Human Rights Commission again took a stand in support of East Timor at its meeting in Geneva in February 1984. The meeting heard testimony on the present situation from the former Bishop of Dili, Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez and from a representative of Pax Romana.

withdrawal of facilities to the International Red Cross (ICRC) as a result of which major relief projects had to be abandoned, ensuring the agency's absence from mainland East Timor outside Dili, is said in the Report to have occurred in August, whereas it happened in July, before the ceasefire was broken. This is crucial evidence that Indonesia was preparing military operations well before August.

As for the damning Amnesty International press release issued on 20 July 1983 exposing the existence of secret Indonesian army documents which include instructions on torture, the State Department ignored this altogether. It alleged instead that the documents were first exposed by TAPOL, "a strong critic of the Indonesian government". To have mentioned Amnesty International as the organisation which authenticated the documents as genuine would have made it impossible for the State Department to write without comment that

Indonesian officials denied the authenticity of the document suggesting it was a forgery designed to sway international opinion about East Timor. There is no evidence of the authenticity of the document.

Linking TAPOL rather than Amnesty with forgery serves State Department purposes better. TAPOL has for years been used as a bogey by Washington to warn members of Congress not to take issue with US support for Indonesia's invasion and aggression in East Timor.

## Death-squads

*The following extracts are from a report written by an anonymous ex-patriate living in one of the smaller cities of Indonesia:*

I was on my way to my office when a friend told me: "There's another one". I knew what he meant. Another dead body, allegedly a criminal, killed brutally by the government's semi-secret death-squads. "Where?" I asked. "In the cemetery, a few minutes' walk from here."

The body was covered with dust. Blood was coming from his ears and nose. He had choked to death. His face was grim and pale. From the expression, one could easily see how he had suffered before he died.

This was the second time I had seen such a thing. The first was about 4 days before.

The body was laid out near a village market, about 50 metres from a primary school, so many schoolboys still in uniform went and looked at the corpse. It was a kind of attraction for them, as well as for adults. . . . The body was shot in the head. I could see a bullet wound under his right eye. He was in his twenties, still very young. There was a lot of blood round his head. People were making jokes around the dead body. They were used to this kind of scene. After a while, police and people from the village administration came to bury the body. I asked one of the policemen whether the body had been identified. He answered: "We don't need to. He's obviously a criminal. We've already had instructions to bury him". Just like a dead dog.

Today's case was different. A man on a motorbike came and said he knew the dead

person. The man was from the staff of a neighbourhood village administration. He has been looking for the dead man since morning. He had been arrested the night before, and was known as the organiser of cattle thefts. He had many children and seemed to know that he would be arrested so had not been sleeping at home. . . . One could see from the victim's clothes that he was a poor man. Maybe, I thought, he had to steal in order to feed his children, but now he had paid with his life.

Just like four days ago, people were standing round the body making jokes about corpses. About 100 metres away was a junior high school. Teenagers still in uniform were hanging around. You could see they were quite used to such things. I too was less shocked than on my first experience a few days ago.



# British arms sales to Indonesia

In addition to the Hawk ground attack aircraft provided for the Indonesian airforce, Britain has also supplied ABRI with different types of armoured vehicles. Already, there are 65 Saladin armoured cars, 60 Saracen armoured personnel carriers, and 60 Ferret-Scout armoured cars operational in Indonesia, and there may be more on the way. In late 1982, documents were leaked from the Department of Overseas Development which revealed that export credit guarantees were being arranged to fund further supplies of armoured vehicles to the Suharto regime (TAPOL Bulletin No. 55, 1983).

According to reports on the latest military offensive in East Timor, armoured vehicles are being used there by Indonesian forces, and there is no reason why British vehicles could not be and are not part of that offensive. Certainly the specifications of the Saladin, Saracen and Ferret-Scout suggest that they would be suitable for use in East Timor, even if in less varied terrain than the French AMX tanks supplied by Holland which certainly are in action there.


The *Saladin* is a fast, rugged armoured car, with six driven wheels which give it good cross-country mobility, and enable it to function even after the loss of a wheel from mine damage. It is armed with a 76mm gun in a turret, and may carry either anti-tank or anti-personnel ammunition. The *Saracen* is designed to carry and protect up to ten troops in a combat area, and is usually armed with one or more 7.62mm machine guns. It is based on the same resilient and mobile construction as the Saladin. The *Ferret-Scout* is much smaller and faster than either the Saladin or the Saracen, and can be used in a variety of terrain, including the provision for crossing areas of deep water. It is usually armed with a 7.62 machine gun, but may also carry missiles.

## MPs express concern

The possibility that British armoured vehicles are being used in East Timor has aroused concern among some MPs, who have raised the issue in the House of Commons. On 7th March, Mr Robert Parry, MP for Riverside, asked the Secretary of State for



Saracen



Ferret-Scout



Saladin

Foreign Affairs what assurances were sought before the sale of armoured vehicles about the uses to which they would be put. Sir Bernard Braine MP and Lord Avebury have also written to the Foreign Office about the same issue. The Foreign Office reply contained some questionable points:

- 1) That the British vehicles "can only operate on roads and in reasonably dry, open country. Their usefulness in the jungle and difficult terrain of East Timor would therefore appear to be limited".
- 2) That the sale of most of the British armoured vehicles took place before 1979, under a Labour government, and it therefore could not comment on assurances made then.
- 3) That "We do not normally seek assurances which can offer no reliable guarantee about the uses to which the equipment might later be put".

On the first point, there are large areas of East Timor which have a number of roads, and country in which armoured vehicles can, and in fact do operate. They are an important part of Indonesia's forces of occupation, the illegality and brutality of which the British government is well aware. On the second point, since Britain is planning to sell more armoured vehicles to Indonesia, it is necessary to know what assurances would be sought from Indonesia before such a sale takes place. On the third point, if the guarantees given by the Indonesian regime are regarded as useless, how is it possible for the Foreign Office to claim that human rights are taken into consideration before arms are supplied?

## Stop Press

As we were going to press, we received a report that three second-hand frigates from the British Navy are due to be exported to Indonesia soon. The "Zulu" and "Gurkha" plus another frigate, according to one source, fired their last guns under the British flag in Portsmouth recently, before setting sail for Indonesia. The vessels are said to be 20 years old.

We hope to report more about this in the next Bulletin.

## West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

Price: £2.50 plus postage 50 pence (UK, Europe and overseas surface): £2.00 (overseas air). Please send payment with order.



# Murdani at home and abroad . . .



With President Suharto, reviewing the 1983 Armed Forces display in Jakarta.



With Vietnam's Defence Minister, Van Tien Dung, reviewing troops during a visit to Hanoi in February 1984. Murdani said recently in Jakarta that Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia was "a question of national survival, not of territorial ambition" and sympathised with countries like Vietnam and Israel "which are surrounded by hostile powers and tend to take an aggressive geopolitical stance". (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 29th March 1984.)



With Lieutenant-General Ershad, President and Defence Minister of Bangladesh, during a visit to Bangladesh, 26-28 February 1984.



# KOPKAMTIB regulations on job permits for ex-tapols

*The following document is a set of instructions from KOPKAMTIB, the security-intelligence command in Central Java and Jogjakarta on how to control the employment of ex-tapols. It sets out a long complex of procedures and regulations which must be complied with by both prospective employers and employees. Any such procedure would normally be fraught with bureaucratic complications and extra costs. Add to that the stigma of being an ex-tapol, and the incredibly detailed regulations in this document, and it is clear that the prospects of employment and a trouble-free life for ex-tapols have been put out of reach by yet more harassment from the military.*

*The implications of this telegram are already being realised in Java, as reports are received of people being dismissed from their jobs because of official pressure on their employees. Five teachers, ex-tapols, in Sragen and twenty more in Klaten have lost their jobs as a result of the instruction, and an Indonesian language teacher was dismissed from his SMA (secondary school) because the Mayor of Surabaya wrote to the school concerning his being an ex-prisoner.*

TELEGRAM FROM: COMMANDER OF THE OPERATIONAL  
COMMAND FOR THE RESTORATION OF SECURITY AND  
ORDER (KOPKAMTIB)—CENTRAL JAVA AND JOGJAKARTA  
IMMEDIATE AND SECRET

From the Special Executive Officer/Commander of the Regional  
KOPKAMTIB

To: All sub-regional commanders.

Heads of Social/Political Directors in Central Java and  
Jogjakarta.

Copies to: (the list includes assistants for territorial military  
affairs, Provincial Governor, Chief of Police, Public Prosecutor,  
Chairman of the High Court of Central Java, and officials in  
charge of provincial education, information, religious and health  
affairs, and the heads of second-level administrations throughout  
Central Java and Jogjakarta).

Number 226/Kamda/V/1983

30 May 1983

## A. Basics

1. Instruction from the Minister of the Interior no. 32, 1981 and Technical Guide no. 730351/421 on the guidance and control of ex-G30S/PKI prisoners, both tried and untried.
2. Radiogram from the Commander of KOPKAMTIB no. TR 112/KOPKAM/V/1983 TWP 0511 1430 hours on decree for granting permits for ex/G30S/PKI prisoners to work as teachers/lecturers, doctors, priests/preachers, *dalang* (puppeteers), lawyers (Legal Aid Institute), journalists, writers/publishers, and so on.

B. In compliance with Basics (2) above, permits for ex-G30S/PKI people to engage in activities as teachers/lecturers, doctors, priests/preachers, *dalang* (puppeteers), lawyers (LBH), journalists, writers, publishers, and so on, shall be issued by the Special Executive Officer for the Region after careful investigation of the good intentions and conduct record of the ex/G30S/PKI prisoner in question.

C. The issue of such a permit shall not mean that these persons may become a government employee or an employee of a state corporation, or of other vital enterprises.

D. For the Region of Central Java and Jogjakarta, applications for be made as follows:

1. The application shall be addressed to the Special Executive Officer/Commander of Regional KOPKAMTIB for the attention of the Assistant for Territorial Affairs, and shall be authorised by:
  - a. Official in charge of social/political affairs of second-level administration
  - b. Commander of the local district command
  - c. Head of the local department or office concerned
2. The good conduct record, whether issued by the village or *lurah*\*, shall be authorised by:
  - a. Head of the sub-district (*camat*)
  - b. Commander of the sub-district military command (Koramil)

c. A letter confirming good conduct from the local chief of police.

3. The prisoner's release document and certificate of classification/category, authorised by:

- a. Village head or *lurah*
- b. Sub-district chief (*camat*)
- c. Head of social/political affairs office of second-level administration in question

4. For those persons who have never been detained, and who have no certificate of classification or category, a declaration from the village head or *lurah* confirming the person's involvement in the G30S/PKI,\*\* authorised by:

- a. Village head or *lurah*
- b. Sub-district chief (*camat*)
- c. Head of social/political affairs office of second-level administration in question.

5. A declaration of approval or of non-objection from the Department or Directorate head in question, and a letter from the Head of District (*bupati*) or Mayor, declaring that there are no objections to the person in question taking up a profession in their area.

6. Each permit shall remain in force for only two years, whereafter it must be renewed and a new application submitted to the Special Executive Officer of the Regional KOPKAMTIB, with the following attachments:

- a. the previous permit
- b. all the documents specified in points 1. to 5. above.

E. The application shall be submitted in triplicate by the individual in question personally to the Special Executive Officer/Commander of KOPKAMTIB for the attention of the Assistant for Territorial Affairs for the Region of Central Java and Jogjakarta; no intermediary may be used.

F. Whichever official to whom the application is addressed shall immediately check and investigate the said ex-G30S/PKI prisoner who has already taken up a profession as under B. above or who has already set up a company etc, whether with or without a permit or recommendation from the Special Executive Officer/Commander of KOPKAMTIB for Central Java and Jogjakarta, in order that the permit or renewal may be issued in accordance with point D. subsections 1. to 6. above, and those who are practising without a permit from the Special Executive Officer/Commander of KOPKAMTIB for Central Java and Jogjakarta shall be deemed to have committed a breach, and their occupation shall be stopped.

G. This cable is an instruction and is to be used as the directive for guidance and control of ex-G30S/PKI people and as an intensification of SP3 BAKOM(?)

The end.

Telegram sent by

Brigadier-General Sarwono  
Commander of the Operational  
Command for the Restoration of  
Security and Order  
(KOPKAMTIB) in Central Java  
and Jogjakarta

# Beware of latent communists, warn generals

*The two top army generals in Indonesia have issued public warnings about the "latent danger" of communism in society, whilst a third has warned that social problems are becoming so critical that even minor incidents could have far-reaching consequences.*

## Murdani: Revitalise vigilance, Rewrite history

Armed Forces commander-in-chief, General Benny Murdani, used the occasion of a National Vigilance Course for businessmen to warn the Indonesian nation to revitalise vigilance against communism. Although communist teachings were constitutionally outlawed, he said, the communists never stop struggling. People tend to think that, since the G30S/PKI was crushed in 1965, communism no longer poses a problem. This is completely wrong. Even in present-day conditions of calm and stability, they adjust their struggle and are trying to make a comeback.

He then turned his wrath on history books which state that the 1926-27 revolt against Dutch colonialism was led by communists. History must be rewritten, he said, because this is not what happened. It was a people's revolt, not a communist revolt. There may have been some

communists in it but the people revolted because they hated the Dutch government, not because they accepted communist ideas. Communists have never made any contribution to the national struggle; all they have done is to cause tragedies and bloodshed. (Sinar Harapan, 27 February 1984.)

## General Rudini: Purge the Armed Forces

The second military leader to sound the alarms was General Rudini (promoted to full general rank on 1 March), the chief-of-staff of the Army, who issued an instruction in February to all ranks "to purge the Indonesian army of G30S/PKI remnants", a task which one would have thought had been completed many years ago. General Rudini however is not satisfied, hence his order to subordinates to carry out this instruction "with intensity" and "with a sense of responsibility". The tasks must be

completed by the end of March 1984. The danger of communist infiltration arises, he said, because communists have been returned to the community (a reference presumably to the release in the late 1970s of political prisoners) and they were again mingling with people in everyday life. (Sinar Harapan, 2 March, 1984.)

## Lieutenant-General Yogie Memet: Unrest and the Social Order

As for Lieutenant-General Yogie Memet, commander of the Territory of Java and Madura (Kowilhan II), he warned in a speech at a gathering of the journalists association, PWI, that population density in his territory had become critical. Efforts to solve this by transmigration did not yet match up to the size of the problem and urbanisation was proceeding at an uncontrollable level. Living conditions in the countryside were now approaching 'subsistence level' and the slightest unrest could lead to social and economic problems of unpredictable consequences, often assuming a religious or ideological guise. "But the dynamics that lead to security problems almost always originate from people in the lower strata of the middle class whose own economic circumstances are not bad but who turn their attention to 'conceptual matters' such as democracy, human rights, and freedom of speech and justice." (Sinar Harapan, 2 February 1984.)

## Ex-Prisoners Blamed for Unrest over Forced Cultivation

A bitter dispute in a group of villages in the district of Ciamis in the south of West Java has led to charges being made that the protest has been instigated by former political prisoners. The charge was made in banner headlines in several Jakarta dailies, but nothing is substantiated and no details of the people said to be responsible have been made public.

The dispute concerns several thousand hectares of land which have been tilled since 1963 by about 12,000 peasants. The lands were formerly owned by plantations but handed over to peasants for cultivation after being left unused for a long period. In 1979, the peasants were told the land would become part of a nucleus plantation project for the cultivation of hybrid coconut. Initially, they were told that only land currently not being tilled would be converted, but when the bulldozers came in to prepare the land for its new role, the entire area was flattened; their standing crops and orchards of valuable clove trees were completely destroyed. Then the peasants were told that they would be required to cultivate the new crop for State Plantation XIII which meant that, at a stroke, they had been turned from peasants working land on their own account into labourers for the state plantation.

Protests took many forms, including actions to pull up stakes that had been knocked into the land to demark areas for cultivation. A number of people were arrested by the local military, and the peasants recently asked the Legal Aid Institute to help them fight this arbitrary seizure of land and the forced cultivation of cash crops.

The Ciamis military district commander denied that peasants had been arrested. They had only been taken in for questioning and later released, he said, and the Army had intervened because there was reason to believe that the protest movement was instigated by former communist political prisoners living in the two villages involved. (Tempo, 21 January, 1984.)

## Ex-PKI member gets 11 years for murder

Ngiso Adiwahano, an employee at the Department of Labour who confessed to murdering an official at the Department for repeatedly taunting him as an "ex-PKI" has been found guilty and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. He told the court he had repeatedly asked his victim to stop harassing him like this, but the man persisted.

The accused said in court that he had been a member of the PKI but was never detained after 1965, and had been rehabilitated many years ago.

(Sinar Harapan, 10 March, 1984.)

**Merdeka** Sabtu, 21 Januari 1984

Menmud Hasrul Harahap Tinjau Pirbun V Banten Selatan

## Ada Sekelompok Eks Tapol Buru Mencoba Pengaruhi Rakyat

Serang, Jumat,-

Menteri Muda Urusan Peningkatan Produksi Tanaman Keras (UPPTK), Ir Hasrul Harahap menekankan pentingnya keterbukaan, kewajaran dan kebersamaan dalam mengelola proyek PIRBUN V Banten Selatan. Tetapi diingatkan pula agar selalu waspada terhadap oknum pengacau yang berusaha

"A group of ex Buru tapols are trying to influence people", says the headline. But the item, 50cms long, devotes only one sentence to this claim, and not a shred of proof.





## Regional Council on Human Rights in Asia

On 9th December 1983, the Asian Regional Council on Human Rights held its first general assembly in Jakarta, to discuss the scale of human rights abuses in ASEAN countries, and to draw up a set of principles on which governments in the region should act. The Council was formed in February 1982 at the suggestion of human rights campaigner Yap Thiam Hien. Present at the assembly were Buyung Nasution and Mulya Lubis of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, Philippines opposition leader Jose Diokno, and Thongbai Thongpao, a journalist and lawyer from Thailand, among others from ASEAN countries. It is no surprise that in its concluding statement, the Council noted "with regret, that the state of human rights in the ASEAN region leaves much to be desired".

The Council did not hide the fact that it felt that ASEAN governments deliberately ignored the basic rights of the people they purported to represent, and it drew attention to violations of these rights in Indonesia, particularly to the extra-judicial killings by the military which still terrorise the population. What gains had been made on the human rights front, the Council said,

are more the result of government tolerance, sometimes under pressure from foreign governments or world opinion, or of action by people's organisations, than of a sincere recognition by the authorities concerned of the rights of the people. And the gains have been outweighed by shocking examples in some countries; for instance in Indonesia, the summary extra-judicial executions of persons suspected of being common criminals.

The Council's "Declaration of the Basic Duties of ASEAN Peoples and Governments" is a detailed document which covers all areas of human rights which might be, and often are, violated by the regimes and governments of the region. Statements of principle and conduct in the Declaration are quite specific, and in direct contradiction to actual government practice. For instance, the Council stated that:

It is the duty of the government to refrain from using education as an instrument of propaganda.

In times of peace military expenditures shall not exceed expenditures for education or health.

It is the duty of government to review its land policies with a view to restoring all ancestral lands belonging to cultural communities to the tribe.

Of course the Council has set itself an ambitious task in detailing so many areas of human rights violations, and to state the problem is still a long way from solving it. All members of the Council would probably find themselves in conflict with the governments they exhort to observe these rights, every time they

sought to defend them. They concluded their statement with a significant comment:

To work for human rights is not only to combat instances of injustice. It is also to seek to change structures that exploit not merely individuals and peoples, but nature itself. One such structure is authoritarian government, which denies the right of peoples to participate in making decisions that affect their lives and the future of their children.

Governments in the region are repressive precisely because they wish to prevent their structures being changed, and to prevent people from participating in decision making which might change those structures. But it is a measure of notable progress that there is now such an organisation dedicated to facing all issues of human rights in ASEAN countries, something which countries like Indonesia so badly need.



### The war against East Timor

by Carmel Budiardjo and Liem Soei Liong

A history of Indonesia's war of aggression in East Timor and of the stunning resurgence of the resistance movement under Fretilin's leadership following the heavy defeats of 1977/78. The book also analyses efforts to Indonesianise the military regime's "27th Province" politically, economically and socially, and describes conditions in the resettlement camps created by the forces of occupation for purposes of population control.

Nine secret counter-insurgency documents of the Indonesian Army are reproduced at length in an Appendix.

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