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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 59

September 1983

New bloodbath engulfs East Timor

OV10 Broncos operating again

The Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) launched a massive new military offensive in East Timor in August. According to press agency reports from Jakarta, 20,000 troops are being deployed, supported by combat aircraft, helicopters, tanks and a variety of weapons. Timorese refugees who left Dili in the past few weeks report that Hercules transport aircraft are arriving every two or three days with paratroops and heavy equipment. OV10 Broncos, the counter-insurgency aircraft which caused so much

devastation during the aerial bombardment in 1977 and 1978, are in action again and have been seen going on sorties to the eastern part of the country where resistance is particularly strong.

The military build-up in preparation for the offensive commenced in early August, immediately after the departure from Dili of the Australian Parliamentary mission (see page 10). On 16 August, Indonesia's Armed Forces chief, General Benny Murdani declared that ABRI would wipe out Fretilin if they
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The OV-10 Bronco in action

Lord Avebury calls for arms embargo against Indonesia

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Bloodbath in E. Timor

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refused to surrender: "This time, no more fooling around. We are going to hit them without mercy. If this call goes unheeded, the government will use its armed forces and all its arsenal to clean up the remnants of Fretilin rebels". (*The Age*, Melbourne, 18 August, quoting a report in *Sinar Harapan* the previous day.)

Murdani is reported to be determined to "finish the job" of subjugating the people of East Timor, a job he himself started nearly eight years ago when he commanded the invasion of Dili in December 1975. He has made known his determination to capture Xanana, the Fretilin commander, and crush all resistance by 1 October this year, and present this "victory gift" to Suharto on the 18th anniversary of the events in 1965 which ushered in military rule.

Rapid military build-up under way

At the beginning of September, Australian Senator Ted Robertson drew attention in Darwin to alarming reports of a large-scale build-up of Indonesian troops and equipment in Dili and Baucau. Darwin is a likely spot for such information to surface because of its proximity to East Timor and the Timorese refugees there who maintain contact with their homeland.

Already several months earlier, in June, contacts in Jakarta had been warning activist groups abroad that Murdani was preparing a new onslaught in East Timor. On 25 June, he sent a letter to the Fretilin commander saying that a new campaign, Operation Unity (*Operasi Persatuan*) would be launched on 17th August unless Fretilin surrendered. In July he visited East Timor with Major-General Gunarso (Assistant Defence Minister for Social and Political Affairs), Major General Dading Kalbuadi (Assistant Defence Minister for Logistics, and an old hand at waging war against the people of East Timor), Brig-General Edi Nayaprada (Assistant Defence Minister for Territorial Affairs) and Colonel Ben Momongan (Deputy-Assistant for Operational Affairs). This visit was part of the preparations for Operation Unity. Jakarta press reports quoted Murdani as delivering messages to the troops which were directly related to the forthcoming operations. The words he used also indicated fury at the widespread support for the resistance struggle in East Timor recently manifested in many parts of the world. "We have paid

heavy sacrifices to defend the unity of the Republic of Indonesia," he said. "They should not believe statements being made abroad, because there is no country in the world that can help them split the united Republic of Indonesia." (*Sinar Harapan*, 15 July, 1983.)

Army takes complete control of East Timor

The Army is now in complete control of government administration of East Timor and the territory has been plunged into a virtual state of war. Non-military personnel have been withdrawn and Mario Carrascalao, the puppet Timorese governor, has been declared "non-active"; he now moves around under the escort of four paratroops. One clear sign of Murdani's "no-fooling-around" policy is the removal of Colonel Purwanto as commander of Korem 164/Wira Dharma, the military command in East Timor. Purwanto was the man who entered into negotiations with the Fretilin commander, Xanana, in March this year, which led to a ceasefire that held for nearly five months. Although Indonesia took no further steps to support the approaches made during the negotiations, the very fact that talks had taken place on Indonesia's initiative completely discredited Indonesian claims that Fretilin is a "spent force". The flood of information reaching the outside world about conditions inside East Timor—photographs of atrocities, tapes, documented reports, information about Fretilin-controlled areas and leaked Indonesian military instruction manuals—has seriously breached the tight blockade of news from East Timor, much to the embarrassment of Murdani and his general staff.

Additional moves taken to support Indonesia's offensive include:

- The suspension of all International Red Cross activities since early July. The ICRC in Geneva has not yet explained the reasons, but it is well to recall that its activities were suspended in April 1981, just prior to the launching of Operation Security.
- Departures from Dili of Timorese to join families abroad have been stopped.
- A 6pm curfew has been imposed in the towns.
- Mass arrests have taken place in Dili and Baucau, and many prisoners, including those until recently held in Comarca Prison, Dili, have been transferred to detention centres in Bali.



Indonesia now has two squadrons of Hawk ground attack aircraft. Could these be in operation now in East Timor?

Interview with former Bishop of East Timor

Monseignor Martinhu da Costa Lopez, Apostolic Administrator of East Timor from 1977 till 1983, was known as the Bishop of Dili. In May this year, he was persuaded to resign. He then decided to leave East Timor. After spending a few weeks in the Vatican to report on the situation, he went to Portugal, having refused a post offered to him in Rome. In September he visited London, Dublin, Paris and Holland and met many groups, spoke to Parliamentarians, gave press conferences and met government representatives. While in London, he gave the following interview to TAPOL:

When did you become a priest?

I studied at a minor seminary in East Timor, then after four years, I went to a major seminary in Macau, where I studied philosophy and theology. I returned to East Timor and I was ordained in 1948. I was sent to many places in the country as a missionary and then I became the head of a Seminary in Dili. In 1958, I was elected by the people of Timor to represent them in the National Assembly in Lisbon, the Portuguese parliament, so I went to Lisbon for four years as an Assembly member.

Which party did you represent?

In those days there was only one party, the government party. Then after serving in the Assembly for four years, I returned home to work again as a priest and do missionary work. In 1977, I was appointed to replace the Bishop of Dili, Father Ribeiro, and became the Apostolic Administrator, a position I held until 1983.

What were your personal experiences of the Indonesian invasion in 1975?

When the Indonesians invaded, this was the start of a period of massacres, torture, capturing people, arresting any suspect, in the middle of the night. Many people were killed, right from the very first day of the invasion. They were terrible times.

Three periods of the war

Were you in Dili on the day of the invasion?

Yes I was. And from the very start, I was deeply concerned with everything that was happening.

I think we can divide the war since 1975 into 3 periods: the first was from 1975 till 1979, the second was from 1979 till 1982, and the third is the present period. The first period was characterised by horrifying massacres, tortures, mass arrests. We try not to remember the things that happened in those days, because it is all just too painful. So many people were killed. The second period was characterised by what we call the Timorisation of the war. The Indonesian military, probably because they were not able to fight against Fretilin and because they lost so many soldiers, started to select young Timorese men, took them to Bali for military training, then brought them back to Timor and made them fight against Fretilin. So in the first period, the war was between Indonesians and Timorese but now it was between Timorese and Timorese. The Timorese soldiers were put in two special battalions, Battalions 744 and 745, and also in Hansip (the civil guard).

The third period started from the ceasefire. The first approaches were made in 1982, but the ceasefire actually started in March 1983. I watched this with great interest, hoping it would lead to a dialogue between Fretilin and Indonesia, but as we now know, the dialogue was not continued, and the ceasefire has been broken. The Indonesian military have launched a new, big offensive.

With this new offensive, I am very afraid for the fate of the civilian population, the defenceless people, women and children,

the old and the sick. I don't fear for the Fretilin, because they have so much experience of fighting, and plenty of weapons; I am quite certain they will be able to resist this offensive. But the civilians are the ones who will suffer. I think it is extremely important for all humanitarian organisations and solidarity groups, as well as Catholic organisations like the Commissions for justice and peace, and foreign governments, to be made aware of this new invasion. They must do something to stop the bloodshed that will occur, do something to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the people of East Timor.

What was the attitude of the Catholic Church at the time of the invasion?

At first, the church was powerless to do anything. We had no idea what would happen. Everybody in Dili stayed at home because they were so terrified of the Indonesian soldiers. Many

... the soldiers were killing, killing, killing ...

people were killed. I know myself how the soldiers forced Timorese people whose house may have had a Fretilin flag, to come out of the house; then all these people were killed by the soldiers.

Did the former Bishop try to protest, and protect the people?

At that time, it was absolutely impossible to do anything. All we could see were the soldiers, killing, killing, killing. No one dared to go and talk to the Indonesians. We had no idea what kind of people they were. The Timorese were just too afraid to do anything.

I remember the first day when the Indonesian troops landed in Dili. Many Indonesian paratroops dropped from the sky. And as they fell, pop . . . pop . . . pop . . . many were shot dead. The soldiers who landed started killing everyone they could find. There were many dead bodies in the streets. I was with the Bishop and some people came running to the house to tell us there were many wounded people. We decided to take them to hospital. But there were Indonesian soldiers in the streets. The hospital was about 5km away, and it was very dangerous to drive through the streets. When we went out and met some Indonesian soldiers, we showed by gestures that we wanted to take the wounded to hospital, so they replied: "Commandant, commandant", pointing to where we should go to meet their commander. The Bishop and I went to the commandant to ask for permission to drive to the hospital. We took two young Timorese to help us carry and look after the wounded. The commander (he could speak English), said that the Bishop and I could go to the hospital but the two young boys would have to stay behind. This made us very sad; these boys were afraid of what would happen to them when we left. But the commander refused to listen to our plea that the boys be allowed to go with us. We didn't dare leave them there alone. So the Bishop said to me: "You go with the wounded" (I was driving the vehicle) "and I will stay here with the boys". I felt very afraid, driving alone like that, but I drove off, with some wounded people in the back of the car.

On the way, I met many Fretilin fighters. They knew me and asked me where I was going. "To the hospital" I said. They told me to be careful because there were many people fighting. I drove as fast as I could, not stopping to look at anything. At the hospital, I asked the nurses to take the wounded people as quickly as possible, then drove straight back to where the commander was. He asked me what I had seen on the way. I told him there were Fretilin people everywhere and he should beware.

The Bishop was still there, sitting and praying with his rosary, in a corner. By this time it was about 12 noon, and the Indonesian soldiers were taking out their lunch tins. So I said to the commander: "Your soldiers are eating lunch. We are hungry too, and we want to go home and have our lunch". The commander replied "Okay, you and the Bishop can go home but the two boys must stay."

When the boys heard this, they said: "Please, Father, don't leave us here. We are afraid they will kill us". And I was very afraid for them too. So I said to the commander: "We arrived as four people and there must be four of us when we go home. I refuse to leave two people here. If anyone is to be killed, it is better that we are all killed, all four of us. We two can't go home and leave the two boys here. We refuse to do that".

After a lot of talking, the commander finally agreed that we could all leave. We had been terribly afraid of what might happen. The streets were full of dead people, dead Timorese and dead Javanese. I had never seen anything like it. Unbelievable. Death everywhere. I thought my own time had come too, but apparently it was not God's will, and I survived.

How did the former Bishop of Dili, your predecessor, Bishop Ribeiro, cope?

Oh, poor man, he could not cope at all. The whole situation was more than he could bear. All he did was cry—cry every time he heard about what the Indonesians were doing. He just cried and cried. Also, you must not forget, he is Portuguese, and it wounded his feelings very deeply to see the Indonesians pull down Portuguese flags and trample on everything Portuguese. So he asked the Vatican to allow him to resign. He retired in 1977. He is now living in Portugal and he is a very sick man.

During the first years of resistance, were you able to keep in contact with the fighting in the resistance?

No, that was impossible. All of us in the towns were quite unable to leave, or to contact anyone. Of course, the priests who were in the interior, in the Catholic missions, went with the people into the bush. Then after two or three years, we asked the priests to come back from the bush.

"Timorisation" of the war

What was the role of the Indonesian troops after the "Timorisation" of the war?

Of course, they were still involved in the fighting. But they did not want to come face to face with the Fretilin soldiers, and they used the Timorese for this. They made it look as though Timorese were fighting Timorese. But Fretilin's response was: this is not a war between us, but a war between Indonesia and Timor. So when there were encounters, the Timorese troops did not fight each other. The troops in the two Timorese battalions did not fight Fretilin troops. So you see, although the Indonesians tried hard to cajole Timorese into fighting for them, giving them attractive things, money and so on, this was not successful. I know that many of the Timorese in the two battalions are very nationalist in spirit and will not fight against Fretilin.

So, Timorisation of the war started before the Operasi Keamanan of 1981?

Yes, in 1979. The Timorese battalions were required to take part in the 1981 operation, but the main forces used were the civilian population, and at a terrible cost. It was during this Operasi that I was taken to Baucau to have a discussion with General Jusuf, the Armed Forces Commander. He sent a helicopter to Dili to meet him in Baucau. I had made it clear

repeatedly that I absolutely did not agree with this Operasi. I met General Jusuf, with General Dading Kalbuadi and General Ali Murtopo. I told them that, in waging such a huge operation as this, they should have considered the cost in terms of food, medicine, transportation. The operations involved enormous distances and many, many people. I told these generals that people were dying in the streets from lack of food, because they were so weak. I also protested that even young boys from school had been forced to join the operations. I told them I was amazed such things had happened. He said he didn't believe it, but when he checked, he found that I was right. I told the generals that so much money must have been supplied for this operation, yet the people who were forced to take part were not being given any food; there was no medicine for them, no transportation. I was trying to hint that there had been a great deal of corruption, and

Lord Avebury calls for arms embargo on Indonesia

Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group in London, has called for an immediate arms embargo on Indonesia, in order to halt the Indonesian offensive in East Timor.

In a statement released to the press on 19 September, after returning from a visit to Portugal for discussions on the question of East Timor, Lord Avebury said:

"Action must be taken without delay by the governments of western Europe and the USA to halt the massive new offensive launched in August by the Indonesian military in East Timor. Western governments provide substantial military and economic assistance to Indonesia, and are therefore in a strong position to stop this new act of genocide inflicted on the long-suffering people of East Timor.

Refugees arriving in Lisbon last week told me of movements into the territory of Hercules aircraft every two or three days bringing in paratroops, armoured vehicles and other military material. They also saw the US-supplied OV10 Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft again operating, making frequent sorties towards the eastern part of the territory, where resistance is known to be at its strongest. This confirms reports from diplomatic sources in Jakarta last month that Indonesia is deploying 20,000 troops in its current offensive against the people of East Timor.

What we are going to do now is to call on the governments of the USA and western Europe to stop this aggression by declaring an arms embargo against Indonesia. We also intend to appeal to the UN Secretary General to demand that Indonesia stops her military operations forthwith in order to allow him to continue his consultations on the territory's right to self-determination, in accordance with the Resolution of the General Assembly of November 1982. We will appeal, further, to the President of the Council of Ministers of the European Community to initiate action by the ten member states to co-operate with the US in halting the flow of arms.

Whilst the civilised world rightly condemns the atrocity committed by the Soviet Union in shooting down an unarmed aircraft with the loss of 269 innocent lives, it ignores the murder of 200,000 Timorese and the renewed threat to their survival posed by Indonesian barbarism. We intend to do our best to make the voice of the Timorese community heard in the capitals of the West."

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all at the expense of the Timorese people. I didn't say it directly but I think these generals understood what I was trying to say.

1981 Operasi Keamanan, a total failure

Was Operasi Keamanan a success for Indonesia?

No, not at all. On the contrary, it was counter-productive. They achieved nothing, absolutely nothing. It was counter-productive because the Timorese who were involved in the so-called fence-of-legs operations, ahead of Indonesian troops, warned Fretilin fighters of Indonesian plans, and helped them escape. And during the time of that Operation and since, Fretilin has continued to fight and get stronger. The Indonesians achieved nothing.

The operation also made the Timorese more anti-Indonesian than ever. So many people who came back from the operation were in a state of terrible physical exhaustion. They couldn't work on their fields and produce food. Because I could foresee what this would do to the level of food production, I sent a letter in November 1981 to the Australian Council of Bishops warning of what could happen. During the three months of July, August and September, all the people, all males from young boys to men in their fifties, were away on these operations. They returned home weak and exhausted. As a result, the fields were not prepared for planting new crops which could seriously affect the next harvest. The planting period is at the beginning of November, but the fields have to be made ready well beforehand. Indeed there was a shortage of food in those years, in 1981 and 1982.

What has been the effect of the Indonesian occupation on the level of food production?

You know, if the Indonesians were to allow Timorese people to move around freely and live where they like, there would be no shortage of food. Of course, food production is influenced by such factors as the climate. But the problem is that people are forced to live in the settlements and are not allowed to travel outside more than five kilometres. If they go farther than that, they will almost

“... if people could live where they like, there would be no shortage of food ...

certainly be shot for trying to contact Fretilin. This is the main reason why people cannot grow enough food.

When people discuss food in East Timor, they tend to consider only whether enough food aid is available. But surely that's not the point. Did the Timorese people suffer food shortages before 1975?

No, they didn't. Of course, occasionally some natural disaster like a cyclone would damage the harvest, but generally speaking there was enough food for people's basic needs. I must say people in Timor tend not to work harder than they need to satisfy their basic needs, but they didn't used to go short of food.

What about the livestock and the agricultural implements people need?

Buffaloes used to be very important to plough the soil for the cultivation of rice, but now almost no one has any buffaloes. Many buffaloes were killed in the war. In one place, a Catholic mission has some tractors, but this can only help a few people. Everywhere else, the work to prepare fields for rice-cultivation is back-breaking because there are no buffaloes. Even the few tractors often break down, and without technical means, people cannot repair them. In former days, most peasants had buffaloes, or could borrow them from their neighbours for a small fee.

There is also a great shortage of agricultural tools, so people have to plough their fields with the help of a simple stick. That's very hard to do, very slow and it produces very low yields.

Do the Indonesians interfere with religious practices in the settlements?

No. Occasional incidents have been reported to me, but when I

protested, the matter was corrected. As you know, in the Indonesian State everyone must have a religion so they let the Timorese practise their own religion.

Have there been any attempts to replace Catholicism with other religions?

Not really. There were some occasions, in the early period, when people used money and gifts to entice Timorese to convert to Islam. People were very hungry, so they took the money and adopted Islam. But after a while, when they had got enough food from this, they abandoned Islam and returned to their own religion.


Revival of Fretilin

Fretilin was severely hit in 1978. How did it manage to restore its fortunes after then?

Yes, that is quite extraordinary. There was a period when Xanana completely disappeared. The guerrillas were very worried because they didn't know what had happened to him. But—well, I can't explain all the details—he was helped by some people to get away for a few months, which gave him time to study and consider the situation very carefully. Then he came back, and began to reorganise. They all together carried out a very good reorganisation. In 1980, 1981 and 1982 they became very strong. Xanana took over leadership of the resistance immediately after the destruction of the red bases and the killing of Nicolau Lobato. Before, Xanana was the deputy chief, and he became commander when Lobato was killed. He showed great skill in reorganising the resistance. It was a stunning blow when Fretilin launched their attack on an installation in Dili in June 1980. No one could imagine where they had got their renewed strength from. In those days, in 1980, 1981, there were many rumours about secret meetings being organised by Fretilin.

I must say I was deeply struck, reading the captured Army documents, to see how the Indonesians admit that Fretilin has been able to penetrate all the settlements, that they have bases and support groups absolutely everywhere. Were you aware of this when you were in East Timor?

Yes, I was. At first, I didn't notice anything; that was back in



1978. But then, little by little, we became aware that they were managing to penetrate everywhere, even right inside Dili. You can find Fretilin people in all the offices, even at the highest level. There they are, even inside the Indonesian armed forces. These are all clandestine of course. In his message to the Fretilin External Committee, Xanana said that when people look for Fretilin, they should realise that Fretilin is everywhere. Fretilin is the whole people. And I can tell you, that is absolutely true. Xanana said that the Indonesians go around asking where the Fretilin people are. The truth is that they are everywhere, the whole people are Fretilin. If the Indonesians want to kill off Fretilin, they will have to kill off the whole people. I am convinced of that.

They are so well organised that the leadership is informed about everything. Anything that happens in Dili gets passed on to Xanana immediately. They know everything.

Do you know anything about army personnel called "Babinsa"? They are mentioned very much in the Army documents.

Yes, the babinsas are everywhere. They are the ones who have to know about everything happening in the villages and settlements. Everything has to be reported to them. But they don't wear uniform and don't carry arms. If they need help, they call in patrols. These patrols are manned by Koramil troops. The babinsas are very important; they are responsible for everything that happens in their area. The Koramil cover larger areas, so they aren't in all the settlements, but the babinsas are.

You have lived under two colonialisms, Portuguese and Indonesia. Is there any comparison? How would you characterise the Indonesians as colonialists?

I can only tell you what people say to me all the time: it was better living under the Portuguese colonialists than under this new Indonesian colonialism. There is a very great difference between them. There is not a spark of humanitarianism among the Indonesians. Perhaps the reason is that there are so many people in Indonesia—about 150 million, isn't it?—so they simply don't value human life at all. The soldiers kill anyone without any sense

“... there is not a spark of humanitarianism among the Indonesians ...”

of guilt. If they are asked why they killed so-and-so, they say the person was related to a Fretilin member. Their officers then say that's okay. Killing people just doesn't matter.

Would you say the Indonesians treat Timorese in racist way?

No, I don't explain it like that. They always adopt an attitude of superiority towards us and feel they can abuse our people any way they like. I have seen myself instances when Indonesian soldiers have abused someone, say, the relative of a Timorese soldier. When he learns about this, the Timorese soldier becomes very angry and confronts the Indonesian. This scares the Indonesian who runs away, terrified of what will happen. So, you see, on the one hand, these Indonesians assume an air of superiority but at the same time they are deadly scared of the Timorese. Timorese people are fearless. Often, without arms, they can do nothing against an Indonesian who has wronged them, but they nurture their sense of outrage and one day they will surely take revenge. They treat you well if you behave properly, but if you abuse them, beware! The Indonesians treat the Timorese like a colonised people. They treat them not like men but like slaves.

What has the church been able to do to protect people against abuses by the Indonesians? I know you yourself have done so much, but what about the other priests?

There are many priests in the country and they possess a big influence among the people. Generally they are opposed to the oppression, so the Indonesian soldiers are afraid of them, because if people bring their complaints to the priests, the priests report them to the Bishop, so these complaints reach the officers. But sometimes, priests don't have the strength to confront Koramil



A Catholic church in E. Timor. A centre for passive resistance? Photo: Rui Araujo.

officers, so they wait for a chance to come to Dili and make the complaint to the Bishop, though often this is too late.

How were you appointed to replace Bishop Ribeiro in 1977?

The Pro Nuncio at the time, Mgr Ferrano, did it in a very proper way. He came to Dili, brought the priests together and offered them three names from which to choose their new leader. I was one of the three, and they chose me.

Did the same thing happen when your successor, Mgr Ximenes Belo was appointed?

No, that was under a new Pro Nuncio. He chose the new Apostolic Administrator himself, without any consultations at all. This made the priests in East Timor very angry, and they refused to attend the installation ceremony.

How is he likely to cope? Do you think he will try to protect the Timorese against abuses, in the way you did?

I don't know. He took up his new position with no experience of how the Indonesians have treated our people. He was not there during the invasion; he returned to Timor quite recently so he knows very little. But I strongly believe that he will, little by little, realise what is going on, and begin to do what he can. He said recently—I saw a report in a Macau newspaper—that when he went back to Timor, he thought that the process of integration with Indonesia was complete, but after working there for a while, he now realises that this is not true. Also, I have heard that a while ago, some Catholic army chaplains from Indonesia asked him for permission to say Mass in various parts of the country. Before replying, he consulted the priests and they advised him to refuse, so that is what he did. That's a good sign. It would be quite wrong to allow army chaplains to say Mass, to preach, to go everywhere. They must stick to saying Mass for the soldiers and keep away from the civilian population.

What do you feel about the present situation in ET, with the new invasion and offensive?

It is truly tragic. We must really do something to arouse public opinion about it throughout the world, to stop this offensive. Otherwise many, many people are going to be killed. We all know the effects of such a war, torture, massacre, arrests and all the

other tragedies. We all know this, so we have the moral obligation to do something to stop it. We should call upon the United Nations to do something quickly to stop it, otherwise there will be terrible abuse of human rights. The ones to suffer will be the civilian population.

How do you see this new offensive in terms of Indonesian policy?

I think it proves that Indonesian efforts at annexation have failed completely. I think that privately they know they have made a terrible mistake in trying to annex Timor, but they will never admit this publicly. The people of Timor simply refuse to be

“... we must do everything to arouse public opinion to stop this new offensive ...”

integrated. I have often said that if the people agreed with integration, I would go along with that, support it. But the converse is also true. If the people don't want to be integrated, if they want to be independent, we must do everything possible to help them. The Indonesians have made the terrible mistake of not being able to see this, and they are still making the same mistake. So they have to use violence to impose their will. It may be that with violence, they will achieve their objective, but it can only be temporarily, it cannot be a final victory.

You know, we all believe in God. He cannot support such efforts by people to use brute force and violence to impose their will on other people. It is my own feeling that people will pay in this world too for the wrongs they commit in this world. I am not against Indonesia, but I would like Indonesia to respect the right of the Timorese to be independent. They already have so many people and so many islands, more than 3,000. Why don't they look after all these other islands? Many of them are poor.

Why do you think Indonesia wants to annex ET?

It's a lot to do with egoism, wanting to prove how strong and superior they are. They have no sense of humility at all. With such terrible arrogance, they are blind to everything. They simply refuse to see that the era of imperialism is over. We can see this from history. We must not forget the lessons of history. The movement of history is towards independence. All people want to be independent. Indonesia must let the people of Timor have their independence.

What's your estimate of the number of Indonesian troops in ET?

About 20,000. I have received reports about this. And this number is certain to increase. Earlier this year, before they started with the preparations for this new offensive, they had about four battalions of troops, about 4,000 men, not including Battalions 744 and 745. The Indonesians don't trust these battalions because the men in them are very nationalistic.

Troop morale on the two sides

Do you see any difference between the morale of the troops?

Yes, very much so. The guerrilla troops are very different from the Indonesian soldiers. Why? Because they are fighting for an ideal, to achieve their own independence. So, whatever may happen to them, whatever sacrifice is required of them, they go on fighting. But the Indonesian soldiers are people who have been forced to come to Timor and fight. They haven't come there because they want to. And no one can say what they are fighting for. They have no morale. But Fretilin's morale is high, very, very high. When they shed blood, or think about dying for their cause, they are very proud because they feel it is better to die than to live without our independence. Because of this, they feel that they are strong enough to fight anyone, absolutely anyone. The Indonesians fight because they are mercenaries, but the Timorese fight because we want to fight, because it is for the independence of Timor.

Have you found that some Indonesian troops are more ruthless than others?

The experience of Indonesian troops is that in their first

encounters on the battlefield, they are very ruthless, but little by little, they lose this. They get tired and fed up. Fighting in East Timor is very difficult for them. Sometimes they don't get enough food, they have to tramp in bad weather, cold, rain, with no transportation. And without any high morale, they very easily lose spirit altogether.

Do they have to rotate their troops very often?

Yes. Some of the troops really don't want to fight, because they recognise the right of the Timorese people to independence. They can see no reason for the war. You know, there have been incidents when whole companies of Indonesian troops, including their officers, have refused to fight when face to face with Fretilin troops, have handed their weapons to Fretilin and withdrawn. Many Indonesian soldiers were punished and sent to Bali for court-martial.

What do you know about the Kopassandha (RPKAD) troops?

We were told they are very good soldiers, but even they run away when confronted with Fretilin troops. They are afraid, really afraid. Sometimes it's just enough for someone to shout, "Look out, Fretilin troops! Fretilin is coming!" for these troops to run away.

But the Indonesian troops have better weapons, don't they?

Yes, they do, but Fretilin has captured many of these weapons, including automatic weapons, from the RPK and other troops. These soldiers are afraid and they don't want to die. People often wonder how the resistance can survive. You should realise that they have many weapons as well. In the early days, they got their weapons from the old Portuguese colonial army, Mauzers, G3 rifles and so on. But now they have newer, better weapons, automatics, machine-guns, ammunition—all captured from the Indonesians.

Do you know whether Indonesia has used chemical weapons?

I don't know exactly. I have no experience in military technology, but I do know that sometimes when bombs were dropped, they emitted a stream of fire which burns everything in its path, all the vegetation. Perhaps these were napalm bombs. I have seen the effects, but I can't classify the weapons.

Transmigration

The Indonesians have started bringing transmigrants to East Timor. What do you know about this?

In the beginning, I was informed by the military authorities about this. They said it would be good to bring some farmers from other parts to teach the Timorese about agricultural techniques. So, about 200 families were brought to Maliana from Bali. But they made a terrible mistake because they settled these families on land that belongs to Timorese who were driven off the land. The Timorese were very angry but, being powerless, they kept silent. They came and told me about it. They said they didn't mind if Balinese were brought there but they can't forgive the Indonesians for driving them off their land for the transmigrants. There is plenty of other land they could occupy. Why don't they go there, these people said to me. So I brought these complaints to the attention of the Indonesian authorities, and they decided to stop the transmigration for the time being. I had told them that if they didn't stop doing this kind of thing, the Fretilin might force them to stop.

Was the land given to the Balinese farmers handed back to the Timorese?

No it wasn't. And another problem is that these newcomers not only occupy the land of the Timorese. They also take over their jobs. These Balinese farmers are not familiar with the soil and didn't have much experience in agriculture so they have taken other jobs, house-building, carpenting and other crafts. They are favoured against the Timorese who have thus not only lost their land but have also lost various jobs they used to do. This has caused conflicts between the Indonesian peasants and the Timorese who have been thrust aside—the ones who have lost

their land as well as the ones who have lost work.

I told the Korem officers in Dili that this is no good, either for the Timorese or for the Indonesians who come as transmigrants. This discrimination against Timorese is absolutely wrong.

Opposition to Birth control programme

Do you know anything about Indonesia's birth control programme?

Yes, I know a great deal. Family planning is against the doctrine of the Catholic Church, so I myself, and the Catholic missionaries have all opposed it. Like other people in the East, the Timorese people very much like to have large families. This is even truer today, now that so many people have been killed since the war started. And besides this, many Timorese are Catholics. At the time they started with the family planning programme, I issued information about Catholic doctrine on the question of family planning, explaining what is allowed and what is forbidden. The result is that Jakarta's plans for family planning have not succeeded in East Timor.

I know of many cases where women have been sterilised without their knowledge and consent. There have been cases when women, under operation for some ailment, had their fallopian tubes closed without their knowledge. This is an act of violence. Such things have also led to serious conflicts in the family.

Have the authorities tried to use the contraceptive injection, Depo Provera?

Yes, indeed, very much, but with little success, at least in the countryside, because Timorese villagers are in general suspicious of injections. So the contraceptive used most is the pill. The Indonesians have made a lot of propaganda about family planning, and send officials to people's houses to convince them to use birth control. They hand out boxes of contraceptives, but after they have gone, the people give them to the priests!

Do you know whether attempts have been made to use contraceptive injections on women against their will?

This may have happened in some cases, but generally Timorese refuse injections. They are very suspicious of them. Until the time I left Dili, I think the Indonesians had made very little progress with their family planning programme.

There has been a lot of critical publicity about Depo Provera and its use in third world countries; for instance the way it was used on Puerto Rican women to test its effectiveness, even though the drug

is banned in the USA. Has this kind of thing happened in East Timor?

Not as far as I know. There are many polyclinics in Dili, and most of the nurses there are Catholic nuns, many of them Carmelite sisters. These sisters are very conscious about this problem and they keep a close watch on the injections being administered. This is largely too because there is a nun there who was in Puerto Rico and knows all about this problem.

As for the women who were sterilised against their wish, I've had many of them come to me very upset indeed. Such things have led to serious rows in many families because the husbands want children but their wives have been sterilised. I really doubt whether the family planning programme will succeed, because the Timorese, the women as well as the men, want to have children. Sometimes, the officials say, if you have big families, the government will not give you any assistance, but the Timorese say: "Never mind! We don't need or want to rely on help from the government. In any case so many people have been killed since the invasion. We need more children, not less."

People have lost their sense of sin

Why do you think the western governments have remained silent about the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor?

I think the first reason is that these countries have strong trade links, huge investments in Indonesia. They are therefore afraid that if they criticise Indonesia, they will damage these interests and lose the profits they can make from them. It is also my impression that the people in power pursue strongly materialistic motives which override any idealism or morality about human rights although they speak about these things quite a lot. They are only concerned about the profits they can make, so they sacrifice principles for their materialistic motives.

What I can observe is that many people in the west are losing their sense of sin. Nothing seems wrong any more to them, everything is allowed. And when people lose their sense of sin, they lose their sense of God. We need God because we are sinners. If people regard themselves as being super-human, they don't need God any more. That's a terrible thing.

Wouldn't that be true as well for the Indonesian soldiers in East Timor?

I don't see it like that. The soldiers do what they do because they are forced to, they are carrying out orders. But the authorities, the government of Indonesia, they are the ones who are responsible for the killing of many hundreds of thousands of people in Indonesia too, and the tens of thousands killed in East Timor. This is the sin of the government.



Junta . . .



Colonel Wismoyo Arismunandar, Commander of the elite paratroop corps, Koppasandha. He is married to Mrs Suharto's younger sister, and introduced Prabowo to the Suhartos' daughter.



General Benny Murdani, Commander of the Armed Forces. Now busy trying to annihilate resistance in East Timor. President Suharto once said of Murdani: "Benny! If you listen to Benny, you'll be in a war every day" (FEER, 21 April, 1983).



Major Prabowo weds the daughter of General Suharto in Indonesia's "marriage of 1983". Prabowo, a Kopassandha (paratrooper), killed Nicolau Lobato, Fretilin's commander in 1978, and is now "tipped as a future army chief-of-staff" (FEER, 15 September, 1983). Some say he is being groomed for President. But all agree he is the army's fastest rising star. He is now deputy commander of Kopassandha's 81st detachment (probably the detachment mentioned by Max Lane — see page 19 — as being responsible for the death squad operations).

and dynasty?



Lieutenant-General Rudini, Army chief-of-staff. A well-known Murdani loyalist, he "has leapfrogged to the most senior position in the army" writes FEER, 15 September, 1983.

Australian MP's report "tendentious, superficial and misleading" says dissenting Senator MacIntosh

The Australian Parliamentary mission which visited East Timor at the end of July has drawn the conclusion that the need to "normalise" Australia's relations with Indonesia must take precedence over concern for the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination. It claimed that Indonesia "is making significant efforts to improve the physical and material conditions in East Timor" and that "Australians need a better understanding of the Indonesian position". At the same time it spurned an opportunity to meet guerrilla leaders.

Its report, which was made public in September by the mission's chairman, Bill Morrison who was Defence Minister when Gough Whitlam was Prime Minister, points out that the Indonesian government regards the Timor question as a critical test of Australian-Indonesian relations. "How Australia votes in the UN will make no difference . . . a vote negating the Indonesian position would not alter the situation in East Timor. Such a vote would in fact diminish any role Australia could play in East Timor and Indonesia."

As for its concern with human rights abuse, the following quotation shows how its criticism of abuses was quickly softened by impressions that the physical conditions of the victims were good:

While the inhabitants are obviously being held there (in Atauro) against their will, the physical conditions under which they live are moderately comfortable and the people looked as well fed and dressed as the villagers in the other areas visited.

The only dissenting voice in the five-man delegation was that of Senator George MacIntosh who refused to sign the report,

which he described as "tendentious, superficial and at times misleading". He insisted that lack of time had meant the mission could form impressions, not soundly-based assessments. (*The Australian*, 7 September, 1983.)

Opportunity of an encounter with guerrilla leaders is lost

The mission's chairman in fact had a direct encounter with four Fretilin guerrillas who, at enormous risk, intercepted the mission's convoy on the road leading west to Baucau. The interception occurred after most of the convoy had passed, so only Bill Morrison actually met the guerrillas. His discussion with them was severely hampered by interpretations which failed to convey what the guerrillas were saying. The distortions were exposed by an Australian Broadcasting Commission journalist, John Lombard, who managed to tape most of the conversation which was later transcribed. When the transcription was publicised on an ABC programme, there was widespread criticism in the media of the translation services provided to the mission. The exposure seriously discredited many of the findings of the mission.

The guerrilla spokesman who held a discussion with Morrison was Cancio da Sousa Gama. He gave Morrison a letter and informed the mission that guerrilla leaders had moved into a concentration camp (the term Fretilin uses for the strategic settlement camps set up throughout East Timor) nearby, in Saelari, in the hope of having a meeting with the mission. Morrison was offered the chance of going there to have a discussion, but Gama's explanation of Fretilin's position in Saelari was grossly distorted. Obviously confused, Morrison only

APPEAL FROM ATAURO

THIS IS AN APPEAL TO OUR BROTHER PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA WHO PLEDGE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR WHO ARE SUFFERING THE INJUSTICE OF A WAR CAUSED BY THE COLONIAL IMPERIALIST JAVANESE DURING THE LAST EIGHT YEARS. WE EXPRESS OUR FEELINGS OF GRATITUDE TO THE PEOPLE OF AUSTRALIA WHO ARE REPRESENTED BY THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT DELEGATION NOW VISITING TIMOR.

IT IS A SIGNIFICANT BIG MOMENT FOR OUR HOMELAND . . . EAST TIMOR. THROUGH THE GOVERNMENT OF AUSTRALIA, WE WISH TO EXTEND THESE FEELINGS TO OUR BROTHERS AROUND THE WORLD WHO WORK AND SUPPORT US IN DIFFERENT FIELDS BY SUPPORTING OUR RESISTANCE FIGHT.

OUR TIMORESE PEOPLE HAVE SUFFERED MASSACRE, TORTURE, VIOLATION, STARVATION, SICKNESS AND MURDER, BUT WE STILL PROTEST STRONGLY AGAINST THE STATEMENT MADE BY MOCHTAR* THAT THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR IN 1976 FREELY REQUESTED INTEGRATION INTO INDONESIA.

NO! NEVER INTEGRATION, NEVER!

CAN A PEOPLE WHO IS STRETCHED BY THE ARMS EXPRESS THEMSELVES FREELY?

WE DEFEND OUR LIBERTY AND OPPOSE THE DOMINATION AND OPPRESSION IMPOSED ON US.

OUR OBJECTIVES ARE:

1. ALWAYS WITH FREILIN, WE FIGHT FOR OUR TOTAL LIBERATION.
2. WE REQUEST OUR LIBERATION AS WELL AS THE LIBERATION OF OUR COMRADES WHO ARE IMPRISONED ON ANOTHER ISLAND IN INDONESIA.
3. WE REQUEST THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AGGRESSIVE FORCES FROM OUR HOMELAND, EAST TIMOR, AND THE SECURITY AND THE PRESENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN OUR TERRITORY

THE FIGHT IS CONTINUED! HOMELAND, OR DEATH, WE WILL WIN!

SIGNED ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF EAST TIMOR AND ALL THE PRISONERS IN ATAURO.

*Mochtar Kusumaatmaja, Indonesia's Foreign Minister.

The above Appeal was attached to a list of 71 persons who have disappeared which was handed secretly to Senator MacIntosh, member of the Australian Parliamentary mission, by a prisoner on Atauro island.

told the guerrillas that he would first have to talk about this with the governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao. The mission made no further effort to link up with the guerrillas in Saelari, and one wonders what happened as soon as the Indonesian authorities learned of the presence of important guerrilla leaders at the camp.

Distorted "interpretations"

The following are some examples of the distorted way Gama's words were interpreted (the interpretations went through Indonesian and Portuguese):

Morrison: . . . I am interested to know how many men are in the camp.

Gama (properly interpreted): The camp is a concentration camp made by the Javanese. We came there two months ago waiting for you, senhors . . .

Indonesian translator: They are already there two months to wait for the delegation.

Morrison: . . . How many men are there? Just these four?

Gama (properly interpreted): In conjunction with all the population under the control of the Indonesian forces and we who came from the bush, we are more or less 40 elements, women and men. We are guerrillas from the bush.

Indonesian translator: They are altogether with the people, with the Indonesian people, the local people, they could not count this, but only that they were in all 40 people, including their wives.

Morrison: But you realise most parts of East Timor, that the Fretilin does not occupy a strong position. That your position is very weak. Why do you think you can win?

Gama (properly translated): All the people, during three years, have been the basis of our support. All the people of East Timor are decided, even those in villages controlled by Indonesian

forces, are all decided to defend their ideal, which is total independence.

Indonesian translator: They told that all the people are now under their control and including the people of Laga are under their control.

Later, the conversation continued:

Morrison: We will take the letter and have the letter translated. If we wanted to get back in touch with you . . . how would we get in contact with you?

Gama: We here are four and there are four more elements in the village, and we all want to take the delegation to Saelari to contact our leader who is at the moment in Saelari.

Indonesian translator: They do not want to answer the question; but if you want to meet them . . . they are here four people and the other four are in Laga . . . and you come to Laga. They want to bring to Saelari to discuss with their leader.

Morrison: Well, we'll leave this tonight. It is already getting dark. And I will discuss it with governor Carrascalao, and somehow we'll get a message to you if we decide to come. . . .

Gama: When you arrive in the village of Laga, talk to the leaders of the forces who are there, not to do any harm to us because we are here under the control of them . . . because already . . .

Indonesian translator (interrupting): In fact he is afraid . . . Don't talk with the authorities in Laga because he is under the control of the authorisation in Laga.

Morrison: But we . . . hear, say . . . but what, who is under control, who . . .? You said you had control of Laga.

And so the distortions continued! Yet when Bill Morrison was later confronted with these distortions on the basis of the ABC's full transcription, he actually came to the defence of the interpreters, saying they had complained about the quality of Gama's Portuguese!

Life in Fretilin-controlled areas of East Timor.



“If people could live where the shortage in

In July this year, just a few days before the visit to East Timor of the Australian Parliamentary mission, Fretilin sent out a detailed 40-page report on human rights abuse and on social and economic conditions in the many strategic settlements scattered throughout the country. The first part, on human rights, gives information about several hundred individuals (see box); two lists of disappeared persons are attached. One of the lists is the same as the list handed over secretly to Senator Gordon McIntosh, a member of the Australian Parliamentary mission, by a prisoner on Atauro island.

We publish below a shortened version of the part on social and economic conditions. For the first time, living conditions in many different camps have been revealed. The strategic settlements (known in Indonesian Army terminology as “daerah pemukiman” or settlement areas) are referred to throughout the report as “concentration camps”. The term is being used in its original meaning, when the term was first coined for the tightly-controlled concentrations of populations set up by the British Army under Lord Kitchener during the Boer War. The term is clearly not intended to invoke the more recent form of concentration camps created in Germany under Hitler.

Each section of the report, which is written in Portuguese and is mostly in hand-writing, is signed by Xanana, commander of the Revolutionary Council of National Resistance, and is dated 25 July, 1983.

Railaco, to the south west of Dili

... hunger is severe. On 6 May this year, several columns of guerrillas passed through Faeisi, a district in Railaco; when they checked the huts, they found only enough dried manioc to last three months. The economic conditions are far worse than they were in 1976–1978, at the height of the military operations. There are no medical services for the people and parents are preventing their children from learning Indonesian.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Likor/Laclo

... this is a concentration camp on the bank of the river Lado (east of Dili). Half the people here are suffering from illnesses and are in a physically weak state because of malnutrition. People lack decent clothing, their huts are often flooded ... The region used to produce rice but today this is impossible.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Bazartete

... here people grow betel, copra and coffee which helps them stave off hunger. But in March this year, taxes were imposed on these products for the first time, and people are also required to contribute one-third of their output to finance the Army's mopping-up operations. Only those who pay bribes to the Indonesian troops are permitted to take their coffee to Dili to sell it there.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Hatu Builico

... is a concentration camp on the road from Aimara to Aile. Situated in the Ramelau mountains, a crop of corn takes several months to grow. There is a severe lack of food, and during the periods of food shortage, the people go searching for wild plants. Everyone, including the women and children, are required to do forced labour. The huts with zinc roofs are occupied by Timorese who work for the colonial officials or members of *hansip*, but these huts have very thin walls. The huts where the rest of the people live are even worse, with roofs of straw or even just leaves.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Same: town and surrounding camps

... the only ones who still own some property and cattle are the civil servants, camats, bupatis, policemen, school directors

and traditional chieftains. Most people have only manioc and potatoes to eat. This is a cold, hilly region where corn grows slowly; any corn grown is sold to get cash to buy essential needs. During the hunger crisis months, December to February, the people live from wild plants. At times of intensive agricultural activity (soil preparation, weeding and sowing) people are required to work on the land of the colonial authorities for nothing. It is called *gotong-royong*. ... Strict control over the movement of the population and official decisions about which land may be cultivated—determined according to the needs of the war situation—has led to the abandonment of large tracks of land.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Betano

... is a concentration camp near the south coast about 10kms from the town of Same. The soil here is good but the people have only primitive agricultural implements with the result that output is very low. The only livestock available belong to the landowners; if people want to borrow these to help till the land to grow rice, they must pay for it with their own labour. During the hunger-crisis months, people are required to do forced labour. Throughout the year, they are required to do one or two days forced labour each week. During periods of intensive agricultural activity, they sometimes have to work one or two weeks at a stretch ...

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Alas

... situated about 5kms to the east of Same. Although two crops of corn can be grown here annually, conditions for the people are very poor because of the prevalence of mosquitoes and disease for which no medical services are available. The physical conditions of the people keep corn production very low. Go into any hut and you will see that the people live mainly on sagu and an edible root, *uhitrik*, which they gather in the forests.

In We-susu, 5kms south of Alas, conditions are better because people can grow more corn and cassava. Yet here too there are periods of hunger when the people have to rely only on sagu.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Manatuto

... is on the north coast, east of Dili. The chief occupation of the population is growing rice, but output is far below pre-war

... liked, there would be no food East Timor"

former Bishop of Dili

because of the absence of livestock—most have been taken by the Indonesians—and also because of the greatly reduced area allowed for production as a result of the policies of the occupation forces. Some people can eke a living from fishing. Producing salt is a traditional activity in this region but the areas where people were allowed to produce salt have been greatly reduced.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Kaelilo

... is the location of a camp, 2kms south of Manatuto. Corn production here is better than elsewhere, but even so people produce only enough for 3 or 4 months; for the rest of the year they must depend on gathering wild plants, leaves and roots. Most people live in straw huts. Houses with zinc roofs have been built to impress outsiders, because they can be seen from helicopters ...

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Laleia

... on the road to Baucau, 22kms east of Manatuto. Conditions here are far worse than in Manatuto ... every hut is a centre of poverty and hunger. People produce corn and rice but output is very low because of the lack of buffaloes. Things here have sharply deteriorated since "integration" which (the journalist) John Hamilton has labelled "a success story". The population is now concentrated around the town; and large areas formerly used for food production such as Santo, Nan Rain, Rotuna, Segat, We Tiran, We Morem, Seram Baek, Kok Hoio, Samblai, Tissak Um, Beko, Lian Aen and Todos have all been abandoned.

People work only with very primitive implements, which is all

they now have. Even the privileged families, associated with the colonial administration, are badly off. People are in a constant state of hunger. Because of the severe lack of food, all nearby sources of sagu have been used up, people must go farther afield to find it.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Laklubar

... about 34 kms into the interior from Manatuto, approaching the central mountainous region. Conditions here are extremely bad and people live mainly from the wine of palm trees and from potatoes or cassava. Because of the soil and climate, corn takes about 9 months to ripen and families can only produce 3 to 4 tins a year (1 tin = about 15 kgs). Starvation is therefore with the people all the year round.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★


Laclo

... about 20kms south west of Manatuto. Here people can produce rice and corn, but they also gather sagu to supplement this. The yield of corn is better here than in Manatuto, and people can sell some of their produce so as to have cash for other needs. But many production areas had to be abandoned when the people were forced into the concentration camps. These abandoned regions were well-organised rice production areas in Portuguese colonial days.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Tutuala

... is in the most eastern tip of East Timor. Famine here is chronic. The fundamental reason is the reduction of productive




areas. Areas to the south like Aleira Lafal were rice-producing regions but they are now under guerrilla control. People live mainly from cassava, a little fishing and a very small output of corn. The colonial administration has set up a "co-operative" run by the *camat* and the *Koramil* officer; this is just a device for extracting taxes from the population. Death from starvation is a frequent occurrence here.

Maeran, and camps on the road from Poro to Assalaino

... Production areas are restricted to only between 200 and 500 metres from the camp boundaries because of security considerations, so there is little food to fend off starvation—several pre-war productive regions are now abandoned. Output is very low because of this and also because people don't have any livestock.

1) Jangan sampai ada kebun/sawah penduduk yang jauh dari pemukiman/Desa



Jauh dari
Pemukiman
(SALAH)



Dekat dari
Pemukiman
(BENAR)

2) Jangan.....

RAHASIA

This diagram, from the secret Army documents captured in 1982 by Fretilin, illustrates an instruction that people's gardens must be located close to the resettlement area. The lefthand example is "wrong", the righthand example is "right".

From Titilari to Los Palos

... conditions for the population who surrendered at the end of 1978 are far worse than for those who surrendered earlier. Security restrictions on their production areas are much tighter. People here are in a very weak physical state, and are constantly hungry, so they have no energy to cultivate the soil properly or to go gathering edible roots and leaves. On occasion, people have been ordered to evacuate their homes for security reasons. This has happened mainly round Los Palos, when people have been forced out of their homes by armed troops and their huts then destroyed. When this happened they had to live under the trees for some time before new huts were built. People live almost entirely from wild roots and coconuts; the death rate from starvation is high.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Muapitine

... people from here were transferred to Vailoro in mid-1982. Their only source of food in the new place is leaves and roots. Starvation is very serious.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Camps on the road from Ililopa to Lore

... People here did not surrender till the end of 1978, so their conditions are particularly bad and they suffer from very serious restrictions in the land available for food production. They too must rely on coconuts and wild roots. Many die of starvation.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Camps on the road Laga-Saelari-Atelari

Apart from some fields along the coast belonging to people who gave themselves up in 1976, the whole road to Atelari is inhabited by people who surrendered in 1979. In pre-war days and in the years from 1976-1978, rice production was plentiful around Laga, and corn and cassava were only grown to supplement this. Now, because of the very limited land available, people must search for wild roots to survive. About 70% of the productive areas is under guerrilla control. Disease and death from starvation are widespread.

Baguia

Although this is a show place with plenty of houses with zinc roofs, the people in fact live in conditions of starvation and disease. This is in fact one of the worst areas because of the lack of land for food production and the tight security control. The death rate is high.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Uatokarabau

For those who surrendered in 1977, conditions are quite good because they can till land near the coast. The majority who surrendered in late 1978 are subject to far greater security control. They possess very few animals, have little land to till and suffer severe starvation from December to March every year.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Uatolari

Formerly this was an important rice-growing region, but today vast tracts of land have been abandoned. People don't have proper implements to till the land, only iron rods which make the work extremely hard and unproductive. Because corn and cassava output is so low, people gather edible roots and leaves. Many people are no more than skin and bone. The children and the elderly in particular display signs of advanced malnutrition and physical weakness. Many are ill, but medical facilities don't exist, except for those who can pay. Things are so bad today that it is certain many people will die of starvation. Considering that Uatolari used to be such an important rice-producing area, the claims of Mario Carrascalao, repeated by John Hamilton, that rice production in East Timor would reach 65,000 tons this year are patently absurd. The entire rice-producing area from Uatolari up to the Matabean mountains is under guerrilla control.

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Queliquai

There is a sharp contrast between the large number of people settled here and the very limited area of land available for food production. Recently, corn production has been resumed which

has improved things, but even so, the output is not enough for more than about 3 months. If it had not been for the ceasefire this year which made more food production possible, about a thousand people would certainly have died of starvation. Most people are physically very weak, especially the young and the

elderly. Huts with zinc roofs are visible from helicopters. They were built in May 1982 and until recently only Indonesian troops lived there. During the ceasefire some local people were allowed to live in these huts which had really been built only for propaganda purposes.

Forced labour widespread in Timorese resettlement camps

The practice of forced labour is now widespread in the resettlement camps which were set up in East Timor in the late 1970s as part of Indonesia's war strategy to isolate the resistance movement. Timorese people are being required to work without pay on land owned by Indonesian officials as well as on the land of more privileged Timorese (village and district heads, civil guard and Battalion 745 commanders). They also have to work on road construction, building houses and offices for the occupying forces, and to carry out timber-logging and cut down bamboo. In one area, people are required to work without pay on a state-owned sugar plantation in Ue Tice. Generally speaking, people are required to perform forced labour one day a week but this is often extended as the "need" arises.

This information is contained in a detailed report drawn up by Fretilin in July this year.

Food production critically low

In virtually all the camps, the level of food production is extremely low. Few peasants are producing rice any more and most families are not able to produce more than about 5 or 6 tins of corn (a tin contains about 15 kilos) a year. In some places, production is down to only 2 or 3 tins a year. Besides the imposition of forced labour, low production levels are the result of the very limited amount of land available to the camp inhabitants, whilst at the same time, vast tracts of productive corn- and rice-producing land have been completely abandoned because of the enforced resettlement of the peasants. Fretilin reports that fertile areas that have been abandoned include the upper reaches of the river Vemassee, and a stretch of country extending 30 kilometres westward from the town of Laleia and southwards to Bibileu, including the fertile upper valley of the river Laleia. Further south, no fewer than 14 villages and regions to the west of Ossu and Viqueque have been abandoned, and further north, another 18 food production regions are now going to waste.

Efforts to produce food on the land made available to camp inhabitants are severely hampered by the lack of agricultural implements and livestock. Few families now possess any buffaloes, except for the more wealthy, privileged Timorese families. Most implements are virtually beyond repair, yet people simply cannot earn the cash they would need to purchase new ones.

Crops burnt in advance of military operations

In early 1981, people living in the camps were suddenly ordered to gather in all their corn by April, regardless of the fact that it was not yet ripe. Nor was the time allowed anywhere near enough to complete the back-breaking task. Everything left standing in the fields after the time limit had passed was burnt, causing a 30% loss of crops. This was the time when preparations were under way for Indonesia's 1981 offensive, *Operasi Keamanan*. This year again, a similar order went out, requiring all corn to be gathered in before August, and warning people that anything left standing will be burnt. Once again, this destruction of crops can only be explained against the background of the preparations for the military offensive which was launched in August this year.

Fretilin's report about conditions in the camps is the first of its kind to be received from East Timor. It is an important record of the factors underlying East Timor's appalling food problem. The resettlement camps themselves are central to the problem, and as long as they remain in existence, famine will continue to threaten the people of East Timor.



Human rights abuses in East Timor

The Fretilin report on human rights abuse gives details of war crimes that have been committed by Indonesian troops since 1975. They include mass executions and regular cases of torture, including castration, people being burnt alive and cannibalism.

It is introduced as a report "to assist Amnesty International and human rights organisations" and documents in meticulous detail cases of execution, torture and disappearances involving about 280 people. Many of the names given are already on Amnesty International lists, and involve cases for which the organisation has been seeking more details.

It relates for the first time the fate of many Fretilin leaders who have disappeared since the invasion of 1975. For example, it mentions that the former left-wing leader, Antonio Carvarino, was captured in February 1979 and was burnt alive after being tortured. It also describes mass executions in the Matabean and Los Palos regions, giving names and dates, and provides details of some particularly savage cases of torture.

For instance, on 29 August, 1982, a guerrilla named Alberto had been captured near Dare, outside Dili, and taken to a resettlement camp. Military commanders ordered his death and, according to the report, "his body was butchered like an animal" and an "official ate his flesh in front of the assembled population, saying, 'This is what we do to Fretilin'". Details are also given of a case in September 1978 when two Fretilin local organisers were captured, tied down, castrated and otherwise tortured, then left to die in the sun.

From a report by Jill Jolliffe, in the *Canberra Times*, 4 September 1983.



Amnesty exposes Indonesian brutalities in East Timor

A representative of Amnesty International submitted testimony to the UN Decolonisation Committee in August about Indonesian atrocities and human rights violations in East Timor. The following are extracts taken from the submission. (The full document—ASA 21/09/83—is available from Amnesty head office: 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF.)

Violations of human rights in East Timor have occurred in a context in which the right to freedom of expression does not exist. People expressing that right have been detained and ill-treated.¹ Movement and communication within and beyond East Timor have been tightly controlled. Amnesty International further understands that East Timorese recently permitted to leave the territory to be reunited with their families abroad have been warned routinely by Indonesian intelligence officers before leaving not to reveal information which might discredit the Indonesian occupation and have been threatened with reprisals against themselves and members of their family still in East Timor if they do so.

Interrogation and Torture

Amnesty International has received many reports of torture of East Timorese suspected of having opposed the Indonesian occupation. A Timorese who had worked with Indonesian intelligence has described the procedure in these circumstances:

The normal procedure was to interrogate the captives or those who surrendered. People who surrendered and were not soldiers who had engaged in battle with Fretilin would be permitted to go free after the interrogation but only after approval from intelligence headquarters in Dili.

During the interrogations they were normally tortured, especially if the interrogators thought they were Fretilin soldiers or leaders. They would be tortured by hitting them with a blunt instrument, by jabbing lit cigarettes into their faces around the mouth, or by giving them electric shocks, sometimes on the genitals.

The senior authorities would decide who was to be killed after interrogation. Most of the leaders or more educated ones, those who were talented, were killed. Their wives would also be interrogated, tortured and killed.

Amnesty International would particularly like to draw attention to two interrogation houses reported to be in current use in Dili as of the beginning of 1983. There have been persistent reports of the torture and ill-treatment of persons held in these places. They are:

— a warehouse attached to the house formerly owned by Francisco Babo in the Rua Abilio Monteiro in the Colmera district, now believed to be occupied by a unit of the RPKAD (Resimen Parakommando Angkatan Darat, paratroops), recently renamed Kopassandha;

1. These include the cases of:

— three people, at one time associated with the "integrationist" Uniao Democratica Timorese (UDT), who were arrested and beaten in July 1980 reportedly for having aired criticisms of the Indonesian occupation on the Tetum-language program of Radio Republik Indonesia, Manukokorek;

— two members of the Indonesian appointed Regional people's Representative (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) arrested in November 1981 after they had written to President Suharto in June 1981 alleging serious misconduct by Indonesian officials and military personnel including the killing of non-combatant East Timorese;

— persons who had communicated with visiting delegations and television crews being subsequently taken in for questioning

— a house formerly owned by Joao do Rosario Martires in the Rua Alferes Duarte O Arbiru in the Farol district used since late 1979 for interrogation by army intelligence (A-I, commonly known as Intel).

Amnesty International has reports of persons taken to these interrogation houses who emerged bearing visible signs of torture. One such account referring to the Intel house reads:

One of my Fretilin friends was tortured with electric shocks and burning in December 1980. After the shock treatment his lips were burnt and broken as they had attached the wire to his lips. His body had also been extensively burnt with cigarettes. He was tortured because he was suspected of passing information to the Fretilin forces.

Among those held for interrogation and allegedly tortured were a number of women, some of whom had reportedly been picked up on suspicion of having communicated with relatives in the bush. Amnesty International has the names of several women held by intelligence who were reportedly raped and had burning cigarettes applied to their breasts.

An account of the RPKAD house in the Rua Abilio Monteiro attests to its fearsome reputation:

If you go there, things are 99.9% hopeless. Those sent there had been caught in the mountains fighting against Indonesian troops, especially the bush commanders. They are tortured for information with cigarettes to the cheeks, breasts, ears, genitals and with electric shocks. Then they are killed.

Amnesty International also has the names of people who were held in either of the two above-mentioned houses who "disappeared" and are feared dead.

An informant who had access in mid-1982 to the warehouse behind the RPKAD house where prisoners were held, reported seeing about 100 people there whom the informant judged from their appearance and dress to be predominantly village people from outside Dili. Amnesty International does not know the present situation of these people. However, there are grounds for concern for their safety in view of other reports indicating that people understood to have been taken to one or other of the interrogation houses in Dili have not reappeared.

One such case involves **Venancio Gomes**, a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, who was arrested in Dili in the first days of the Indonesian invasion in December 1975. Those arrested at this time who escaped immediate execution were first transferred to the Tropical Hotel and then moved to the Portuguese District Prison (the Cadeia Comarca, which is still known as the Comarca despite being renamed *Lembaga Pemasarakatan Dili* by the Indonesians) in January 1976. Venancio Gomes was released from the Comarca in 1979. Following the Fretilin attack on a broadcasting station in Dare on the outskirts of Dili on 10 June 1980, Venancio Gomes was one of about 600 people reportedly arrested in Dili. He was initially held in the Comarca but after a week was taken to the Intel house in Farol. He never reappeared.

Amnesty International has received reports of persons dying as a result of torture and beating suffered during interrogation and this may also have been the fate of others who are reported to have "disappeared". **Orlando Marques**, whom the

Indonesians had appointed *camat* (sub-district officer) of Iliomar, Los Palos, reportedly died as a result of blows received during interrogation after being picked up on suspicion of disaffection shortly after returning from an administrators' course on Java. **Afonso Freitas** who had surrendered in late 1978 reportedly died in his house in Vemasse in 1979 as a result of blows received while detained in the *pousada* (inn) in Baucau. Amnesty International has the names of 14 persons who reportedly died as a result of torture and starvation in prisons in Dili and Aileu following the Fretilin attack of 10 June 1980.

Extrajudicial Executions and "Disappearances"

There is now a large body of evidence indicating that Indonesian forces in East Timor have resorted to extrajudicial executions on a large scale since the very first days of the invasion. Amnesty International now has lists of hundreds of people who were reportedly killed outside combat, or "disappeared" between December 1975 and the end of 1982. Amnesty International's own investigations have concentrated on the period from early 1979 and have revealed recurring patterns of large-scale killings and "disappearances" as well as cases of what appear to be random killings of individuals and small groups.

Amnesty International believes that it is now firmly established that several hundred East Timorese were executed throughout the territory between late 1978 and September 1979. Some were killed immediately following surrender or capture, others some time after. Others still were people suspected of associating with Fretilin but who had not themselves joined Fretilin in the bush. An analysis attached to one list of 51 names of persons killed in the eastern part of the territory during these months states that the people on the list had held positions of second and third rank in Fretilin and that some were people in civilian occupations who had never participated in the fighting. Amnesty International's own investigation of these killings suggests that the worst affected areas were in the eastern part of the territory and in particular the district of Los Palos and the towns and villages in the vicinity of Mount Matebian. In the course of one operation in the vicinity of Mount Matebian between 15 and 17 April 1979, 118 people not engaged in combat were reportedly executed in Uatolari, Uatocarabau, Viqueque, Ossu, Baguia and hamlets on the southern slopes of the mountain. Amnesty International has the names of 31 people reportedly executed in Kelikai in May-June 1979. A report on the situation in this period states:

When they want to liquidate someone, they say that they have gone to continue their studies or that they have left for Jakarta or Lisbon, or that they were called urgently to Kelikai. Kelikai is an administrative post at the foot of Mount Matebian where they have carried out many murders. To speak of Kelikai makes our heart beat and our hair stand on end, for Kelikai means certain death for those called there.

Amnesty International has the names of 82 persons who reportedly "disappeared" or were executed in the Los Palos district in 1979. Amnesty International also has the names of persons who were reportedly killed or "disappeared" in parts of the territory other than the eastern region, including the districts of Aileu and Same and in the capital, Dili.

Several surrendered and captured Fretilin leaders "disappeared" in Dili and elsewhere at this time. Among them were several persons who had been members of the Central Committee of Fretilin and persons who had been appointed ministers when the Democratic Republic of East Timor had been proclaimed on 27 November 1975 including: the Minister of Education and Culture, **Hamis Basarewan Bin Umar**; the Minister of Justice, **Antonio Duarte Cavarino**; the Minister of Finance, **Juvenal Maria de Fatima Inacio**; the Vice-Minister of National Defence, **Hermenegildo Alves**; the Vice-Minister for

Communications and Transport, **Domingos de Costa Ribeiro**; and the Central Committee members, **Maria do Ceu Pereira Cavarino**, **Dulce Maria da Cruz**, **Sebastião Montalvão**, **Alfonso Redentor de Araujo** and **Leopoldo Joaquim**.

Leopoldo Joaquim, a member of the Fretilin Central Committee, surrendered in Same in the southwest of the territory in early 1978. The event was considered sufficiently important by the Indonesian authorities for them to draw up a propaganda leaflet bearing his photograph and announcing his surrender. He was detained for several months after his surrender in the San Tai Ho warehouse. In April 1979 some time after his release, he was taken by Indonesian troops from his house and escorted to the home of his 17-year-old niece, **Maria Gorete Joaquim**. Maria Gorete Joaquim had been detained in 1976 as a member of the Fretilin student organisation, UNETIM. Both were then taken away, purportedly to work in Baucau. Neither has been seen or traced since. Various unconfirmed reports of their execution have reached Amnesty International.

Several of those who "disappeared" from Dili were being held in prison at the time of their "disappearance". Among them was the Fretilin armed forces commander, **Domingos da Costa Ribeiro**, who had reportedly been captured and brought to Dili in 1977. He and ten other prisoners held in the Comarco were reportedly taken on the night of 18 April 1979 from the prison to a beach in the east of Dili called Areia Branca and executed by members of Battalion 745, a Timorese unit commanded by Indonesians. In this group of prisoners were also **Filomeno Alves** and **Manecas Exposto**, known in Dili before the invasion as members of a popular musical group, the Cinco do Oriente, both of whom had surrendered in Maubisse in January 1979. Two other prisoners held in the Comarca, **Joao de Conceicao**, formerly an official in the Public Works Department under the Portuguese, and **Joao Bosco Sarmiento Quintao**, formerly a military policeman in the Portuguese army. Both were taken by troops of the RPKAD one night in March 1979 and never reappeared. Amnesty International has received reports that these two prisoners were killed at Lake Tacitolu, west of Dili. Amnesty International has received frequent reports of persons being taken to Areia Branca and Lake Tacitolu to be killed.

Amnesty International continues to receive reports such as the following:

— In November 1982, four persons, Jose Viegas, Augusto Bello, Augusto Gusmao and Cosmo Freitas were picked up by Indonesian troops in Vemasse, Baucau on suspicion of having relations with Fretilin. Jose Viegas, a primary school teacher, was reportedly killed after his arrest. The others who were reportedly protected by the intervention of their families were taken to Dili where they were held for a period in the former Portuguese barracks in Taibesse.

— Also in November 1982, Joao Brito from Viqueque was reportedly executed by Indonesian soldiers in Venilale, Baucau after he had beaten an Indonesian soldier who had sexually molested his wife.

— In about October 1982, F., who had surrendered the previous month, was reportedly publicly burnt to death in Ainaro. After his surrender, he had reportedly been recruited to work with the Indonesians and had been sent back to the bush with the task of inducing Fretilin followers to surrender. Soon after his return from the bush, the town of Ainaro was attacked. The Indonesians reportedly accused him of betraying them and burned him to death publicly as an example.



Amnesty protests against authorised torture in East Timor

Amnesty International recently received a copy of manuals and guidelines issued in July-September 1982 by the Indonesian commander for East Timor and his intelligence chief to Indonesian military personnel in the Baucau district of East Timor.¹ Contained in these manuals are guidelines which:

1. Condone the use of physical and psychological torture in certain circumstances during interrogation and provide guidelines to prevent its exposure. [In the manual on Established Procedures on Methods of Interrogating Captives, a section entitled "things to be Avoided" contains a sub-section on the "Use of Force and Threats". It reads:

It is hoped that interrogation with the use of force will not be implemented except in those situations where the person examined tells the truth with difficulty (is evasive).

However, if use of force is required there should not be a member of the local population (guides, members of the civil guard, ordinary people) present to witness it so that the antipathy of the people is not aroused. . .

Avoid taking photographs showing torture (taken of someone being given electric shocks, being stripped naked and so on).

Remember that such documentation/photographs should not be printed freely outside/in Denpasar and obtained by irresponsible members of society.]

2. Condone the issuing of threats on the lives of persons undergoing interrogation to ensure their co-operation. [In the Technical Manual on Methods for Village Authorities to Break up the GPK (Fretilin) Support Networks, there is a guideline which states:

Point out that their friends are still alive because they have given honest confessions and have been prepared to help the armed forces in the prompt restoration of security.

3. Prescribe a policy of transporting Fretilin supporters and the families of Fretilin members still in the bush to

"determined places" including the island of Atauro. [Section 3d of the Technical Manual on Methods for Village Authorities to Break up the GPK (Fretilin) Support Networks states:

Evacuate the network of GPK support still existing in the settlement as well as the families of GPK who have not yet been evacuated, to Atauro or other determined places.]

On 20th July 1983, Amnesty International wrote to President Suharto bringing to his attention its concern that these manuals appeared to officially condone the torture and possibly even the killing of Fretilin supporters. Amnesty International urged President Suharto most strongly to issue immediate instructions to all forces under his command prohibiting the torture of prisoners in all circumstances.

The Indonesian Government has responded to Amnesty's statement by denying that the Ministry of Defence and Security has issued any manuals specifically covering East Timor. A spokesman of the Minister of Defence and Security was quoted as saying, "we have never issued such a manual for East Timor". He added that there was a general manual issued to all Indonesian military units but declined to give details. He said that, as East Timor was considered to be a part of Indonesian territory, no special manual would have been issued specifically covering East Timor.

Amnesty International does not regard the Indonesian Government's response as satisfactory. Amnesty has said that the manuals in its possession were issued not by the Ministry of Defence and Security as the spokesman seemed to imply but by the military command for East Timor, and Amnesty has no reason to doubt that they are genuine.

Taken from Amnesty International's submission to the UN Decolonisation Commission, August 1983.

1. Substantial extracts from these documents were reproduced in Special Supplement in **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 58, July 1983.

Schoolgirls injured in clash with police

Seven schoolgirls were injured when police attacked and broke up a protest demonstration of hundreds of schoolgirls in Jakarta after girls who were wearing headscarves had been refused entry into a school building. The police struck the girls with their rifle-butts. Following this incident, many hundreds of girls all wearing headscarves and coming from many schools demonstrated outside the Ministry of Education protesting against this act of violence. Many were carrying posters demanding that they be allowed to exercise their constitutional right to practise their religious beliefs.

(Source: **Radio Netherlands**, (Hilversum) 19 August 1983)

Muslim pupils face expulsion over headscarves

Muslim girls who insist on wearing headscarves at school in accordance with their religious beliefs face the prospect of having to leave state schools. The Minister of Education, Professor Nugroho Natosusanto recently issued a press release stressing that girls are required to conform with regulations regarding school uniforms in every respect. "If there are pupils

who, for whatever reason, feel they must wear headscarves, the government will assist in their transfer to schools where the uniform incorporates headscarves".

Regarding this new development in the dispute over headscarves, **Tempo** (20 August, 1983) wonders whether this means that girls refusing to take off their scarves will now be denied the opportunity of attending state schools. The issue has been raised on a number of occasions recently because of the resurgence of Muslim practices particularly among the younger generation.



Schoolgirls entering school. (**Tempo**, 20 August, 1983.)

Army killings continue: press reporting now banned

Killings by Army death squads have continued unabated in the towns and cities of Indonesia. The difference now is that the press has been ordered to stop publishing reports of the killings. According to a UPI report from Jakarta on 5th August newspaper editors were told by phone that a new wave of killings was about to take place, described as being the "final assault to expurgate crime". Having been given this news, editors were then warned not to publish any more reports of killings because, according to Sukarno, the Director-General for Press Guidance at the Ministry of Information, "the recent reporting of the killings does not help to maintain peace and order".

On the very day this reporting ban was issued, the weekly magazine *Tempo*, appeared with a cover story on the death squads, still referred to as "the mysterious killings".

The journal made the point that many who initially supported the "mysterious killings" as a form of shock-therapy are now getting worried. A leading Muslim, the chairman of the West Java Council of Ulama, E. Z. Muttaquien is quoted as saying:

People felt relieved at first, but this is turning to anxiety that measures by people who are taking the law into their own hands will just go on and on. These murders, which are prohibited by religion, can lead to all kinds of things that could be disastrous.

The growing public concern about the killings no doubt goes a long way to explaining the sudden ban on media coverage.

Tempo reported (6th August, 1983) that news of killings was still being reported daily, often with photographs: six deaths in Wonosobo, Central Java, eight deaths in Pontianak, West Kalimantan, and several in Samarinda, East Kalimantan. A body discovered in the outskirts of Jakarta had no fewer than ten bullet wounds. There were signs that the victim had been trying to remove tattoo marks from his body. (See below.) Dr. Abdul Mun'im, forensic expert at the University of Indonesia, says some bodies have as many as eleven or twelve bullet wounds; one had five bullet wounds in the head alone. During May, June and July, he said, 69 bodies had been brought in for examination. The latest regional figures reported by *Tempo* were 96 killings in Semarang and 89 in West Java. These are all figures of reported deaths; many deaths go unreported.

According to Peter Hastings (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 8th August 1983) 1,400 have been killed since the death squads started their operations in March.

More generals justify the killings

General Amir Machmud, chairman of Parliament and the People's Assembly, has expressed full approval of the killings. The leadership of Parliament, he said, had discussed the "anti-crime campaign" with the government and had come to the conclusion that it has been "very successful" because the number of crimes being committed has fallen sharply. [In the minds of Indonesia's parliamentary leaders of course, extra-judicial murders by the State don't count as crimes, but as one western journal has pointed out, "Indonesia is experiencing a crime-wave of a different sort" (*The Economist*, 30th July 1983).]

General Ali Murtopo who was Information Minister till March 1983 and is now Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, declared that these "justified" killings were being committed on the orders of the Department of Defence because "conventional methods to combat crime have proved inappropriate in Indonesia". This is the first time the Defence Department has been publicly linked in this way. Murtopo also asserted that "drastic measures" are needed to prevent the emergence of terrorists groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Japanese Red Army" (Reuter/APF, 29th July 1983).

According to Max Lane who visited Indonesia recently, there does not seem to be any mystery about (the killings) in Jakarta. Most informed people are convinced that those responsible are members of Detachment 801—the anti-terrorist squad of the elite paratroop battalion, *Kopassandha*. (*National Times*, 19-25 August 1983.)

Lane also reported the widely held view that General Benny Murdani, the new ABRI commander (himself a product of *Kopassandha*) is using the campaign to fashion for himself a corps of soldiers upon whom he could rely to carry out any order, including murder. "There was a widespread fear that the next target might be political opponents of the regime", Lane wrote.

Prisoners fear release

The Director of Cipinang Prison, Jakarta's largest prison for convicted prisoners, told *Tempo* that 95 per cent of the victims of the killings in Jakarta were people who had been released from Cipinang. "Some released prisoners have been murdered within a day or two of their release", he said. There are prisoners who have written to the authorities pleading to be allowed to stay in prison even though their term of imprisonment has expired. From some towns there are reports that people leaving prison have immediately committed a crime so as to be re-arrested and return to the safety of a jail.

No wonder then that the release ceremonies on 17 August, when many prisoners were allowed home as part of the annual amnesty on Indonesia's national day, were far from being happy occasions. Released prisoners were quickly bundled into vehicles and driven off to secret destinations by waiting relatives.

*continued on
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Dessin de FRANCHINI

Taken from *Le Monde*, 14 August, 1983, "L'extermination des tatoués".

The mysterious jeep on the Cimedang Bridge

One evening in mid-June, a dark-coloured jeep drew up in the middle of the bridge over the river Cimedang, which lies at about 70km east of Tasikmalaya and marks the boundary between the *kabupaten* of Ciamis and that of Tasikmalaya. A few of the local people on night-watch saw the vehicle halt in the middle of the bridge, do a U-turn, and then race off eastwards again, in the direction from which it had first appeared.

That incident might not have attracted any attention at all, had not on the following day a local man living near the bridge found a dead body caught fast in tree roots on the western bank of the river. "On the throat of the corpse was a gaping wound, the head was shattered, and blood had flowed from the mouth, nose and the throat-wound," said Sabeni (not his real name), a fisherman from Sindangsari village, kecamatan Cimerak, kabupaten Ciamis.

There were no clues as to the identity of the body, that of a man in his thirties, except that it was covered in tattoos. The villager, who was on his way to bathe in the river, pushed the body out into midstream, where it was carried off downriver. "We don't want to get involved with the police, so we didn't report the body," explained one of the villagers of Tawang, kecamatan Panca Tengah, kabupaten Tasikmalaya. The local community hoped that the current would

carry the body down to the south sea, which is about 18km from the Cimedang bridge.

"Since that first incident, the dark-coloured jeep has gone past our village and stopped on the bridge about once every two nights," explained Ilang, another villager from Tawang. And it has been established that the day after every visit from the jeep, another body covered with wounds is found caught fast on the river bank.

None of the local inhabitants has any intention of going closer to find out about the mysterious jeep's business. "A villager's duty is to farm. These killings are the affair of those in authority," said Ilang. Up until the week before Lebaran, people living along the river banks had found 18 corpses, one of which was female. None bore any indication of identity, though all were tattooed. Death was caused either by the head being shattered or by strangulation with nylon string. None of the "findings" were reported to the local police.

The villagers of Sindangsari and Tawang appear to have no intention of burying the bodies they find. "The dead person was a recidivist who'd been corroding the public all this time, wasn't he?" said Kasni (not his real name), who lives in Sindangsari. If the body drifts over to the west bank of the river on the Tasikmalaya side, the villagers push it out midstream, after which it usually gets

caught somewhere on the eastern bank. Then it's the turn of those on that side to push it back into midstream.

The discovery of these mysterious bodies has resulted in making those who live along the river banks feel ill-at-ease if they bathe or wash in the river. They are afraid that a floating corpse will suddenly appear. The fishermen are also complaining. Nobody will buy fish caught in the river for fear that they might have fed off a human corpse.

The inhabitants of both villages are unanimous in wishing to register a complaint so that no more bodies are dumped in the river. But who should they complain to? Aren't the agents of the mysterious killings unknown? Through a number of journalists who have visited the area, they have appealed for bodies to be left lying at the roadside. "We will bury them," said a local community figure. With that in mind, the local people dug three graves in a garden in Sindangsari just after Lebaran. But that was clearly wasted effort: since then there have been no more mysterious bodies seen floating in Cimedang river, and the three grave-holes still lie open.

[Translated from *Tempo*, 6 August, 1983.]

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

GUARDIAN WEEKLY, 10 July 1983

Some events in Indonesia

Within the past six weeks it has been reported in Indonesian newspapers that hundreds of "criminals" have slaughtered each other in what has been put down to internecine gang warfare.

Gangs exist, and normally one might accept that such underworld friction *has* blown up. But the coincidence that the cull has taken place simultaneously in many of Indonesia's major cities is too much to overlook. In Jakarta the death toll is unknown. Twenty corpses were reported lying in the morgue awaiting family identification. In Yogyakarta local people talk of hundreds shot and dumped down a well near Parangtritis (memories of the abortive Communist coup in 1965 when "Crocodile Hole" at Jakarta's Halim Airport became the disposal pit for 8 generals). Cool hit men on motorbikes have been witnessed. A man with "cropped hair and military bearing" casually shot dead a youth on the steps of one of Jakarta's main shopping centres. The police, we are told, are investigating. But there is little need to play charades; everyone knows the truth.

"We needed this clean-up", the people say. After all the victims

were criminals, protectionists, recidivists. They wore tattoos. This was proof enough of their guilt. Certainly, Indonesia suffers the misery of criminals being loose in society. The people are therefore understandably relieved that many have now been removed. I myself feel relief. But thinking people here, of whom some do remain, are highly concerned that, as Indonesia becomes increasingly accepted into the world family of nations favoured by the mighty, we are losing all control of our destiny.

I am an ordinary Indonesian, with a young family. I have no political interests, and I love my country. But I see around me a degenerating society which is delighted to condone its police and military (whose members themselves come from the lower end of the educational spectrum) in the wholesale murder of suspected criminals. Suspected criminals. No arrest, no trial — only execution. Where is the line drawn between suspected criminal, and either suspected dissenter, or suspected opposition to a regime which cannot be removed by the popular vote?

If we allow our overlords such total control as they now have, who

will ever clean up the graft, corruption and total abandonment of moral principle which openly and contemptuously permeates every level of Indonesian society?

Surely, if a man will kill, will he not corrupt and steal as well? And if society remains silent over institutionalised murder, then will it not prostrate itself in everything, and continue to have its rich and powerful ride rough-shod for ever?

Our state philosophy, Pancasila, proclaims social justice. You are invited to visit Jakarta's Pondok Indah (Beautiful Cottage), a suburb of palatial Grecian residences, and then talk to the beggars of my city whose only defence against the night is a cardboard box. Then call on the families of suspected recidivists whose bodies lie equally cold in the city morgue.

That, Sir, is the social justice of Pancasila.

Publication of a letter such as this would lead to the severest consequences for my family, my friends and for myself should my name be stated. I hope you will understand therefore my wish to withhold both my name and address.

Name and address supplied.

Lawyers escape kidnap attempt

Two barefoot lawyers from East Java have fled to Jakarta from Blitar to escape kidnap attempts which, they believe, were made to eliminate them because of their defence of peasants involved in land disputes. They are seeking legal protection and help from the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) in Jakarta, and refuse to return home without assurances for their safety from the authorities. They fear for their lives because a lawyer colleague was the victim of a similar kidnap and has since disappeared (*see box*).

One of the two lawyers, Umardani Kumboyo, has been involved since 1976 in fighting for the interests of about 1,400 peasant families in several districts of east Java whose land is now owned and controlled by local military officers or by private companies operating with official protection. The land dispute in Blitar concerns 110 hectares of land which was taken from a large number of peasants in the pre-1965 period. But when, after 1965, the man who had been given control of the land was taken into custody in the 1965 arrests, the land was re-distributed to a number of local military officers. Initially, because of the post-1965 political complexities, the peasants were afraid to challenge the new owners. But in the mid-1970s, they sought Umardani's help to get the land back. This case resulted in Umardani himself being arrested and tried for mis-appropriating his clients' money. After a year in prison, he was found guilty and sentenced to 18 months in prison on the evidence of one witness, even though the peasants had themselves testified in court that the charge was

a fabrication (see TAPOL Bulletin No. 48, September 1981, page 6).

In another district, Umardani has fought to secure the return of land expropriated, purportedly for government projects but which is now in private hands and is being used as a coffee plantation. Angered by the enormous profits the present owners are earning from their land, the peasants recently raided the property and helped themselves to part of the produce. Peasants were arrested, and Umardani was summoned for questioning and accused of inciting the peasants. Although he was permitted to return home, a group of men called a few days later, ordering him to accompany them. Since it was late at night and a neighbour had time to warn him that one of the men sitting the vehicle was holding a shovel, Umardani decided to make a bolt for it. He escaped through the back door, swam across a river and trekked three days till he arrived in Malang. There he met up with another lawyer, Santoso, who had also received a late-night summons and had fled, for fear of his life.

Years of service to peasants

Umardani has been helping peasants for years as a "pokrol bambu" or barefoot lawyer, having had no formal legal training. He is a pensioned low-ranking policeman and has devoted much time and energy to protecting the interests of people who, as he says, "are ignorant of the law and confront constant abuse by people in positions of power intent upon expropriating their land rights". Members of the LBH group of lawyers in Jakarta have praised him for his tremendous courage in the face of continual harassment.



Umardani (left) and Santoso.

The Lawyer who "Disappeared"

Dahayu was, like Umardani a barefoot lawyer who worked as Umardani's assistant. He was deeply involved in defending the interests of peasants in the village of Sumberwuluh, Candipuro, East Java. He had, on one occasion in 1981, visited Jakarta to report one particular case to Parliament and to the central "Clean-up" Operation (*Opstibpus*).

In September last year, a group of men visited Dahayu and told him he should call at the local government office to pick up some money he had been promised as a loan. He drove off with the men but never returned home, and disappeared without trace. His wife later received warnings not to raise complaints about her husband's disappearance or the same fate would befall her.

Umardani is fully convinced that Dahayu was kidnapped and killed because of his resolute defence of peasants and challenge to those in authority. And it was with Dahayu's experience in mind that Umardani himself decided to take no chances when he was confronted with a similar kind of "summons".

Papuan kills Indonesian in revenge for barbarism

A West Papuan refugee in Papua New Guinea, Frederick Simon Allom, who was tried in August for killing an Indonesian embassy official last year told the court in Port Moresby that he had killed his victim out of revenge for treatment he and his family had suffered under Indonesian rule in West Papua.

He told the court his father had been hanged by Indonesian soldiers, then decapitated. His mother, in a state of pregnancy, had been disembowelled, her limbs cut off, then thrown into a fire. He had also witnessed his two brothers and two sisters being killed by Indonesian troops.

He himself had been tortured in an Indonesian prison, and had been forced to stand half submerged in excreta. One of the Indonesian officials who had assaulted him while in prison was Meinard Poluan, the man whom he later killed in Port Moresby. Explaining how and why he had killed Poluan, the accused man also said Poluan was a spy and had attempted to recruit him.

The court found Allom guilty but Chief Justice Sir Buri Kidu, in passing a sentence of 15 years, said he did not impose a life sentence because of the unchallenged evidence that Allom's family had been killed by the Indonesians. "I think any reasonable man would resort to what you did," he said.

(Sunday Sun, Suva, Fiji, 21 August 1983)

continued from page 19

Most Victims have Tattoos

Many of the groups of young people, the so-called *gali-gali* have tattoos of snakes, dragons and *garuda* birds. This has become part of the sub-culture among many young unemployed people who now roam the streets. But today, tattoo marks are enough to attract the killers, which is why there has been a sudden rush by those who can afford it to have tattoos removed by plastic surgery, and those who cannot afford it, try to remove their tattoo marks with hot irons and acid. Recently an Indonesian arrived in Holland to ask for political asylum. He has many tattoo marks on his body and his life is therefore at risk.

ICJ Reports to UN Human Rights Body

The International Commission of Jurists raised the issue of the killings in Indonesia at the August meeting of the UN Sub-Commission on Minorities and Discrimination, a sub-division of the UN Human Rights Commission. In a press release on 29 August, the ICJ deplores the killings and says:

Whatever the failure of the law enforcement agencies to contain the rising crime rate, nothing can justify the summary execution of suspected criminals. Fears are already being expressed in Indonesia that similar methods could in future be resorted to for eliminating political opponents.

IGGI commends military regime for its political courage

This year's meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia was full of praise for the "political courage" shown by the Indonesian military government in adopting firm economic measures to cope with the harmful effects of the world economic recession and falling oil prices. The general consensus of delegates from IGGI member governments and international financial institutions was that Indonesia is to be congratulated for cutting food and petroleum subsidies, for devaluing the rupiah by 38.5 per cent and for introducing stringent fiscal measures and freezing the salaries of government employees, all of which have worsened living standards of the poor.

The communique issued at the end of the meeting commended Indonesia for coping with unfavourable international economic developments without compromising the principle of free trade or neglecting the needs of long-term development. Indonesia's exemplary style of economy management and the caution it has shown in borrowing internationally will guarantee that the international capital market remains open to Indonesia, the communique said.

Manifesting firm confidence in Indonesia's style of economic development, the 1983 IGGI meeting agreed to provide Indonesia with a total of \$2,240.41 million in credit, \$20 million more than the amount proposed by the World Bank. The final total for 1983 could well reach \$2,300 million when West Germany and British credits, still to be fixed, are announced. At this level, the 1983 IGGI total will exceed the 1982 total (\$1,925 million) by no less than \$375 million.

These complimentary remarks about Indonesia's "political courage" were made at a time when Indonesian newspapers were reporting daily the nationwide slaughter of criminals by Army death squads in an attempt to reduce the level of crime against property. But the brutality of this campaign of extra-judicial murder by government which is the chosen method of the military to cope with crime, itself a consequence of the worsening economic conditions—in particular for the millions of unemployed youngsters, was lost on the IGGI delegates. The IGGI chairperson, Dutch Minister for Overseas Development, Mrs E. M. Schoo had been told in detail about the activities of these death squads by the Legal Aid Institute when she visited Indonesia just a few weeks before the IGGI meeting, but she made no reference to the killings in her opening address to the IGGI meeting.


Multilateral and Bilateral Credit in 1983/84

Seventy-five per cent of the credit agreed this year will be provided multilaterally. Credit pledged at the meeting includes the following (comparative figures for 1982 are given in brackets):

World Bank	\$1,200 million (\$925 million)
Asian Development Bank	\$400 million (\$345 million)
USA	\$106 million (\$95 million)
Japan	Yen 67 million (63.17 billion)
Canada	\$32 million (\$33 million)
Australia	A\$46 million (A\$38 million)
Holland	f 160 million (f160 million)

IGGI aid commitments, 1969/1970 to 1983/1984 (in millions of dollars).

From Tempo, 25 June, 1983.



Source: 1983/1984 budget

*as at 30 September 1983

Supreme Court upholds another death sentence

The death sentence passed against Ruslan Wijayasastra, who was deputy chairman of the peasants' organisation, Barisan Tani Indonesia until it was outlawed in 1965, has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court's decision is based on a technicality because, it declares, the convicted man failed to submit a petition explaining the reasons for his request to the Court to

grant cassation of his sentence. From the press report of the Court's decision, it appears that Ruslan did submit a request for cassation but did not present the necessary explanations which should have reached the court within 14 days after the request was made. Nothing was said as to whether Ruslan would have been provided the necessary facilities to make such a submission.

The Supreme Court's decision means that the only means Ruslan Wijayasastra now has to commute his death sentence is by a plea for clemency to the President. It is not yet known whether he intends to pursue such a course.

Book Review

Timor: A People Betrayed, James Dunn. The Jacaranda Press, 65 Park Road, Queensland, Australia, 1983. (\$A15.95)

Although many articles and short texts have been published on various aspects of East Timor and Indonesia's attempted annexation of the territory, there are only a small number of works that provide a comprehensive overview.¹ Hence the timely publication of *Timor: a People Betrayed*, by James (Jim) Dunn.

To those who have followed events in East Timor; Dunn is a familiar figure. To others, his credentials speak for themselves. He was formerly Australian Consul in East Timor from 1962-4, he visited the country for two month periods in 1974 and 1975. On the first of these visits he was a member of an Australian Foreign Affairs mission, and on the second the head of an Australian Council for Overseas Aid team. His sources are many and diverse: interviews with hundreds of Timorese refugees, leaders of political parties, information from sensitively-placed Indonesian sources, and visitors to East Timor, together with (and perhaps most importantly for his purposes) sources in the Australian diplomatic community.

Dunn provides a brief historical introduction, focusing on the economic and social impact of Portuguese colonialism on East Timor. His early chapters encapsulate all the main aspects — particularly the results of political change on the former kingdoms of East Timor. More could have been presented on the transformation of the East Timorese economy, and, perhaps, on the characteristics of rural society (although some of these are dealt with elsewhere in a number of anthropological works). Reading Dunn's early chapters one gains the impression that they are not the author's main concern. This is affirmed when one reaches the fourth chapter, dealing with the Lisbon coup and the emergence of political parties in East Timor. Here both the material presented and its analysis are superb — particularly the section on the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) and its relations with Fretilin, as they emerged into prominence as parties in 1974. For me, the high points of Dunn's work after this are his analysis of *Operasi Komodo* (General Murtopo's long-term plan to annexe East Timor) and its tortuous implementation, together with his account of the Australian government's betrayal of East Timor. The latter outlines succinctly the appalling records of the Whitlam and Fraser governments. On many occasions, argues Dunn, they could have intervened to curtail Indonesia's brutal invasion by providing negotiating alternatives; yet ministers resolutely ignored such opportunities in their determined stance of support for Suharto's *Orde Baru*.

Any doubts as to the severity of Indonesia's military suppression of the people of East Timor are rapidly dispelled by Dunn's chapter ten, "Invasion, occupation and resistance". His conclusions are established through a rigorous cross-referencing of refugee accounts, eye-witness reports, church sources in East Timor, and Indonesian, US and Australian diplomatic papers. Some of the resultant accounts are horrendous. To choose one event, in May 1976, as an example from many:

... one of the bloodiest incidents occurred in Lamaknan ... in the border area. There Indonesian troops who had been badly mauled by Fretilin units took their vengeance on a large refugee settlement which housed some 5,000 to 6,000 people in temporary shelters, according to Timorese who had served as truck drivers for the Indonesian force ... The troops set fire to several of the houses, causing the Timorese to protest angrily. According to witnesses, the troops then turned their guns on the refugee community for several hours, shooting down men, women and children ... According to one of the truck drivers, about 2,000 people were killed on that day. (Dunn, p. 303).

In documenting this incident Dunn outlines what Indonesian government propaganda was presenting at the time, how the witnesses came by their information, how it was received in the diplomatic community, and so on. The documentation is rigorous, the evidence seems irrefutable. This is typical of Dunn's approach. Hence the importance of his analysis — it can be ignored, and its conclusions challenged, but the evidence is overwhelming. It gives yet more concrete content to the allegations of genocide against the people of East Timor by the Indonesian military.

Since Dunn's work will be taken — quite rightly — as one of the most authoritative works on East Timor, one feels bound to note a number of its limitations.

Firstly, I found its portrayal of Suharto's role rather paradoxical. On the one hand, we are informed that Suharto and a small grouping of generals organised the 1965-6 coup in Indonesia, and that this tightly knit group orchestrated the incorporation of West Papua (West Irian). Yet, when it comes to East Timor, we are presented with a restrained Suharto, whose hands are suddenly being forced by more hawkish generals such as Murtopo and Murdani. Indeed, we are even shown a Suharto whose hopes are somehow dashed when Whitlam tacitly supports armed intervention. This scenario seems rather unlikely; Suharto is the task-master of the puppet-show, presenting a pacifying face which conceals the most hawkish of policies, often at the expense of surrounding generals; the most elaborate ideological games can be played to outmanoeuvre even the most minor general.


There is little doubt that Suharto was committed to *Operasi Komodo* from its inception. What concerned him, rather, was the campaign's at times rather vulgar brutish appearance, which he sought to ameliorate internationally.

I also feel that in his condemnation of Australian and American diplomacy, Dunn is unnecessarily tolerant of the Portuguese government's role. No account of the "turbulence" of political events in Lisbon after the April coup can excuse successive Portuguese governments' vacillations. On many occasions, as the former colonial power, the Portuguese government could have successfully resisted the strident demands of Indonesia's outrageous "negotiators". Rather, it chose to accord the people of East Timor a low priority, and all Portuguese governments (with the exception of the Presidency in the more recent past) have preferred ultimately to sweep the problem under the table by quietly acquiescing to Indonesian integration in a more gentlemanly manner. A reading of papers assembled from government archives by Loff Barreto,² which Dunn quotes, seems to substantiate this point.

John Taylor

1. The most important of these being Jill Jolliffe's work, *East Timor, Nationalism and Colonialism*.

2. *The Timor Drama*. João Loff Barreto. A Timor Newsletter Publication, Lisbon, 1981.



Former political prisoner sues government

A former political prisoner who was charged and tried for alleged involvement in the 1965 events is to sue the government for unjustified imprisonment for a period of 872 days. This is the first time ever that a former PKI prisoner is to take such an action.

Hadi Soerono was until 1965 chairman of the Samarinda branch of the left-wing cultural organisation, LEKRA, deputy secretary of the Samarinda PKI, a former headmaster of a Muhammadiyah secondary school and teacher at a Muslim teachers' college. He was arrested in December 1967. He is being represented in his lawsuit by two lawyers of the Jakarta Legal Aid Bureau (LBH).

Soerono was held without charge until May 1975 when he was transferred from the hands of the army security command, KOPKAMTIB, to the Public Prosecution authorities, pending his trial later that year. In November 1975, he was tried and sentenced to 13 years with deduction for the time served. The verdict made it clear that the entire period of imprisonment was included in the deductible period. Had this decision been properly observed, together with remission to which prisoners are automatically entitled, he should have been released in December 1979.

However, the prison governor insisted that his deductible period only covered his period of detention by the public prosecutor's office. His grounds for claiming this was a circular issued in March 1976 by the Supreme Court which made a distinction between "non-justitial custody", ie. detention by unauthorised

bodies like KOPKAMTIB, and "justitial custody", ie. that which could be acknowledged by the judicial authorities. (The Supreme Court circular caused great confusion at the time and was criticised precisely for creating the kind of extra injustice to which Hadi Soerono has been the victim (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No 21, 1977).

Early in 1982, the prisoner's wife wrote to the LBH in Jakarta. The Jakarta newspaper, **Kompas**, reported the case on 5th May that year, and it was on that very day that the prison governor in Samarinda summoned Hadi Soerono to tell him that he was being released immediately. Hadi Soerono was so surprised at this sudden turn of events that he initially refused to leave until he knew the basis for this unexpected decision. After further clarification, he left the prison but did not abandon his determination, strongly supported by the LBH, to sue the government for damages. He is suing for Rp25,000 per day for the 872 days in question plus Rp100 million for gross injustice done.

But can a prisoner sue for damages concerning a period of "non-justitial custody"? The Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Court has expressed his doubts. "*If the prisoner is tried then acquitted, or if he is held and never tried, he would be entitled to damages. But if he is tried and sentenced, then there is no question of damages.*" If this interpretation is correct, Soerono could lose his case merely because he was tried. But at the same time, many tens of thousands of former prisoners would be entitled to damages, the majority for up to 14 years of detention by KOPKAMTIB. Hadi Soerono's case could open up a whole new issue for the legal system, and for tens of thousands of former prisoners, the vast majority of whom were never charged or tried.

(Source: **Tempo**, 3 September, 1983)

New anti-PKI purges in progress

A new purge of "former PKI people is being conducted in the Department of Labour. Already seventeen people have been dismissed and many more could be affected, because a number of employees are currently under investigation. Similarly purges are under way in other departments too.

The people in question are those who, during the nationwide purges and "screening" operations that took place in the wake of the 1965 military takeover, were classified as CI and CII. All A and B category people were arrested as well as many Cs. But some Cs were not in the event arrested or dismissed. Yet now, nearly 18 years later, the witch-hunters are at it again.

The new Minister of Labour, Admiral Sudomo, formerly commander of the Army's security command, KOPKAMTIB,

announced last month that "eventually all CI and CII people will be dismissed, in accordance with government regulations".

Former PKI Member Provoked by "PKI-baiting"

The news of this current purge came to light in an item in **Tempo** (20 August, 1983) reporting that a Department of Labour employee, Ngiso Adhiwahono, has been arrested for the murder of another department official. Confessing to the murder, Ngiso complained bitterly that the victim, his superior, had baited him for years for being "ex-PKI". His feelings of anxiety deepened recently when it became apparent that the new purge was under way and that he could soon be dismissed. He told the police that he had asked his superior whether rumours about his own

dismissal were true; when answered in an extremely hostile manner, he lost control and stabbed the man to death.

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
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
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