



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 57, May 1983

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1983) Tapol bulletin no, 57, May 1983. Tapol bulletin (57). pp. 1-20. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26296/>

TAPOL

British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 57.

May 1983

Atauro prisoners appeal for help

An urgent plea for help was handed over secretly by political prisoners on Atauro prison island in East Timor to a visiting Portuguese television team during a trip to East Timor in February this year. Some of the prisoners whispered, "They're trying to get rid of us". One prisoner, at enormous risk to himself, succeeded in pulling a journalist aside and stuffing into his hands a list of 116 names of people who disappeared in Lospalos and have not been heard of since 1980. (See page 3.)

The Portuguese journalist, Rui Araujo described how he received the list of names as follows:

A trembling hand grabs hold of me and pulls me into a hut. A man who is sweating all over takes some paper out of his pocket; the paper is damp and crumpled. He gives it to me without saying a word. We leave the place slowly. (*ABC journal*, April/May 1983)



Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez, Bishop of Dili, who was replaced this month. "... a symbol against Indonesian oppression," wrote *The Times*, London.

The Portuguese television team's experiences during its visit to Atauro and to other parts of East Timor give the lie to claims made by Indonesian officials and uncritically repeated by other journalists who have been able to visit East Timor recently. For example, the Australian journalist, John Hamilton who visited East Timor a few weeks after Araujo, confined his report about Atauro to information provided by the military commander of the prison island, Artillery Captain A.K. Sardjono, and the island's chief-of-police, Lieutenant R. Lili Soetisna. According to these two representatives of Indonesian power, quoted uncritically by Hamilton, the prisoners on Atauro are people "who don't want to fight any more". He quotes Captain Sardjono as telling him:

The people here just want to develop their gardens. There is a plan to close Atauro down this year, but many of the people say they want to stay here. They like it better than the villages they come from. (*West Australian*, 5th May, 1983)

Araujo, being Portuguese, was able, though under extremely difficult conditions, to speak to Timorese people direct, without the intermediary of an interpreter. By contrast, his report about Atauro in addition to describing the secret encounters, also reads as follows:

"They are trying to get rid of us," someone says. In the makeshift tent of the Indonesian Red Cross, I see a little boy fall and drop two tins of food containing a little maize and some pieces of fish; the food had been brought there by helicopter the day before.

"They are trying to get rid of us," repeats another voice just behind me. The atmosphere is quite dreadful, killing. I think to myself: all this misery is caused by hunger and despair. People look bewildered. The children never smile.

Please turn to page 4

Muslim Political Prisoner Executed

page 5

Also in this issue:

- My experience in an Indonesian prison page 8
- West Papua: ABRI's 'social approach' in Irian Jaya page 10
- Bechtel-UK spends £125m British credit but workers go hungry page 13
- The Liem Empire page 15
- Profile of General Berny Murdani page 16
- Militarisation and Equipping Abri, Part II page 18

Readers' Letters

Militarisation and the Unitary State

I am writing to express my appreciation for the continuing excellent coverage your magazine is giving to human and political right violations in Indonesia. At the same time I would also like to draw your readers' attention to certain conclusions that can be drawn from the materials published in your magazine.

First, the massive violations of human, political and cultural rights by the Indonesian regime are so ignored by most Western news media that one suspects they are in fact covering up such violations as a matter of policy. Second, the Western governments, especially members of the IGGI, are subsidising the Suharto regime with the care and eagerness befitting Indonesia's new status as their common colony, with utter disregard for the misdeeds of this regime. Third, this support is not limited to finance but extends to military equipment and training for the massive military establishment that has been responsible for all the atrocities.

Fourth, the coverage also shows that Indonesia is in fact not a political community with the usual assumptions for a nation-state, but a multinational collection of disparate cultural and political communities, sometimes thousands of miles apart, without a common language, history, culture and interests, that have been forced together into one hodge-podge, previously by the armed forces of Dutch colonialism and today by the armed forces of Javanese colonialism. In fact there is no other way to enforce a unitary state system on such a far-flung empire than by force of arms. I suggest that the "original sin" was in the attempt at all costs to keep the former multinational Dutch colonial empire as a single "national" state under the new label of "Indonesia". Such a state cannot be kept as one except by the use of naked force. Without a military regime, Indonesia cannot be kept as one state. There is no other basis for unity. Therefore, those who insist on one Indonesia but oppose the military dictatorship are not seriously facing the problem. The plea for a democratic, demilitarized Indonesian state is wishful thinking, a contradiction in terms, as long as the territorial integrity of the Dutch colonial empire, without decolonization, is insisted upon. Democracy can only be established in Indonesia by properly decolonizing this Dutch colonial empire as has been done everywhere else with colonial empires, by returning each separate colonial territory to the rightful peoples — not to the Javanese generals. Only then can a proper democratic process of government be organized and genuine local self-government be affected. The bogey of the resultant mushrooming of mini-states in the

region exists only in Javanese colonialist minds.

I am impressed with your fairness after I read the letter of Mr. Klemens Ludwig published in your issue No 55 correcting the false allegation voiced in some quarters to the effect that the South Moluccan freedom fighters are not genuine seekers of self-determination but merely "separatists". Such an accusation has also been levelled at the National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra for demanding our legitimate right to self-determination and for rejecting Javanese Indonesian colonialism. Therefore I doubly appreciate the letter of Mr. Ludwig and your fairness in publishing it.

Sincerely yours,
Husaini M. Hasan,
Uppsala, Sweden

Students and Passports

Please note the following corrections to "Indonesian Students Could Lose Passports", in *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 56, March 1983:

1. Fatichin and I are functionaries not of PI (*Perhimpunan Indonesia* — Indonesian Association) but of PPI (*Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia*) — Indonesian Students' Association). I am also an active member of PI (*Perhimpunan Indonesia*) in West Berlin. Whereas PPI has branches everywhere, PI only exists in West Berlin. I was on the Executive of the West German PPI up to March, 1983.
2. Regarding the P4 Penataran and the P4 I walked out of the *P4 Penataran* (Indoctrination Course) in Hunsrück in March 1981. This was a nation-wide course and lasted for 16 days. The Indonesian embassy tried to make PPI-West Berlin participate in a week-long *P4 Penataran* held in Berlin in January 1982. The West Berlin PPI refused to do so and I was accused of "controlling" the chairman of the West Berlin PPI on that occasion.

P4 is the acronym for *Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila* (Guidance for Living By, and Serving the Pancasila) which was formulated by a Decision of the Peoples' Assembly (MPR) in 1978. There are however various ways to implement the P4. P4 courses are given in organisations, in schools, in the family, in the political parties and so on. In the case of government employees, these courses are called *P4 Penataran*.

Pipit Rochiyat,
West Berlin

The Democracy Debate Continues

Evidently (see *Tapol Bulletin* No. 56/March 1983: 13), Hadjar confuses two things: principles and specificities.

Let us refresh our memories: Hadjar (see *Tapol Bulletin* No. 55/Jan. 1983: 19, 20) makes general claims which even in principle I find so obscure that it prompted me to seek clarification. Since even as principles they are so vague (at least to me), I do not think we can seriously proceed into the realm of specificities. Achmad Wahib's book, setting out his personal ideas, obviously belongs to the second category. Hadjar neither clarifies his group's position on "democracy" (even in principle) nor convinces me that Wahib's personal views should be equated to the Indonesian Muslims' corporate principles of "democracy". For these reasons I do not see why one has to read Wahib's book first in order to question Hadjar's general principles. For these reasons I likewise consider his muddle about the "bourgeoisie", "working class", and "democratic" (sic; again, unqualified) or "social" revolutions not directly relevant. All the same, even if we ignore his palpable confusion between general principles and specificities, my original question on his "democracy" remains unanswered.

Finally, I am prepared to continue this dialogue only if Hadjar sticks as near to "fair play" as possible. I am neither equipped nor willing to plunge to the depth that he is evidently dragging this discussion. If he disputes my observation that only the Marxists have a clear-cut programme for achieving democracy for the majority of our people — peddlars, stall-holders, the majority of wage earners as well as small peasants (as opposed to big, mostly Muslim be it noted, landlords) — then why not say so, and produce the evidence? Why put words into my mouth? Wild allegations such as his, that I quote "the terrifying Stalinist dogma", is not only gratuitous but also likely to cloud the issues at hand even further than he has already done.

A.R.T. Kemasang,
London, England

TAPOL welcomes letters from readers and hopes to continue its series of Guest Column articles. Signed articles do not necessarily express views with which TAPOL can agree; they are published in order to promote discussion of issues relevant to developments in Indonesia today.

Readers' letters must be kept reasonably short, otherwise cuts will have to be made because space is limited.

All letters should be related to human rights problems with which TAPOL is concerned.

ONDE ESTÃO ESTES TIMORENSES?

O documento entregue a Rui Araújo em Timor é constituído por três folhas de 40 linhas manuscritas, com a indicação dos nomes, idades, povoação, profissão e/ou proveniência social.

São, no total, 116 nomes, divididos por três folhas, das quais aqui se reproduzem a primeira e a terceira (de 1 a 40 e de 81 a 116). Depois de utilizado, o documento será enviado por Rui Araújo à Amnesty Internacional, com sede em Londres. Aquela organização promoverá depois todas as diligências, no sentido de apurar qual foi o destino destas 116 pessoas.

Relatório dos detidos que se deu a conhecer na Vila Lapa, em 10 de agosto de 1972

(1) Nomes dos detidos que se deu a conhecer na Vila Lapa, em 10 de agosto de 1972

1. João da Costa	21
2. João da Costa	21
3. João da Costa	21
4. João da Costa	21
5. João da Costa	21
6. João da Costa	21
7. João da Costa	21
8. João da Costa	21
9. João da Costa	21
10. João da Costa	21
11. João da Costa	21
12. João da Costa	21
13. João da Costa	21
14. João da Costa	21
15. João da Costa	21
16. João da Costa	21
17. João da Costa	21
18. João da Costa	21
19. João da Costa	21
20. João da Costa	21
21. João da Costa	21
22. João da Costa	21
23. João da Costa	21
24. João da Costa	21
25. João da Costa	21
26. João da Costa	21
27. João da Costa	21
28. João da Costa	21
29. João da Costa	21
30. João da Costa	21
31. João da Costa	21
32. João da Costa	21
33. João da Costa	21
34. João da Costa	21
35. João da Costa	21
36. João da Costa	21
37. João da Costa	21
38. João da Costa	21
39. João da Costa	21
40. João da Costa	21

Relatório dos detidos que se deu a conhecer na Vila Lapa, em 10 de agosto de 1972

(3) Nomes dos detidos que se deu a conhecer na Vila Lapa, em 10 de agosto de 1972

81. João da Costa	21
82. João da Costa	21
83. João da Costa	21
84. João da Costa	21
85. João da Costa	21
86. João da Costa	21
87. João da Costa	21
88. João da Costa	21
89. João da Costa	21
90. João da Costa	21
91. João da Costa	21
92. João da Costa	21
93. João da Costa	21
94. João da Costa	21
95. João da Costa	21
96. João da Costa	21
97. João da Costa	21
98. João da Costa	21
99. João da Costa	21
100. João da Costa	21
101. João da Costa	21
102. João da Costa	21
103. João da Costa	21
104. João da Costa	21
105. João da Costa	21
106. João da Costa	21
107. João da Costa	21
108. João da Costa	21
109. João da Costa	21
110. João da Costa	21
111. João da Costa	21
112. João da Costa	21
113. João da Costa	21
114. João da Costa	21

Where are these Timorese?

Translation

The document given to Rui Araújo consists of three handwritten sheets of paper, each with forty lines giving names, ages, villages, occupations and/or backgrounds. There are a total of 116 names divided into three sheets, two of which — the first and the third — are shown here (from 1-40 and 81-116). After being used, these documents will be sent to Amnesty International head office in London, which will do everything possible to discover the whereabouts of these 116 people.

ABC (Lisbon) April/May 1983

East Timor

Continued from page 1

Secret Agents Constantly Present

Araujo refers repeatedly in his article to the constant presence and watchfulness of secret agents who kept close to his team throughout the visit and even followed them into their hotel bedroom. To get the chance to look at the written messages that had been passed on to him and another member of his team, they had to retreat to the privacy of the bathroom. The hotel entrance, he writes, "was guarded by three official jeeps... which means that it was impossible for anyone to leave without their knowing." (The Resende Hotel where they stayed is the hotel used for the accommodation of all foreign guests.)

Depo Provera being Used to Reduce the Timorese Population

Araujo brought to light information about Indonesian plans "to reduce the population" of Timor through birth control. They claim, he said, that the aim is to "reduce hardship". (Yet 'hardship' can hardly describe adequately the terrible plight that has befallen the people of Timor since the Indonesian invasion in 1975 which has already decimated the population.)

The population reduction programme is being implemented, Araujo reports, by means of injecting women with the contraceptive, Depo Provera, a contraceptive that has been banned in the USA because of its potentially dangerous side-effects.

The population do not welcome this initiative at all. They regard family planning as a menace, as something that goes against the values and convictions of the Timorese people. They have a deep love of children. Families with fewer than ten children are the exception, but this does not mean that Timor is over-populated.

(Editor's note: We hope to be able to reproduce much longer extracts from Rui Araujo's article in the next issue of *TAPOL Bulletin*.)

Bishop replaced

Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez, the Apostolic Administrator of the Catholic church in East Timor, usually referred to as the Bishop of Dili, has been replaced by Carlos Ximenes Belo, a

priest from the Salesian Order. Father Belo was installed at a ceremony in Dili by Mgr Pablo Puente, the Vatican's Pro Nuncio in Jakarta, a few days after Mgr da Costa Lopez is said to have 'resigned' on 10th May.

The former Bishop whom *The Times* describes as a "symbol against Indonesian oppression" (*The Times*, London, 16th May, 1983), has for a long time been the target of a deliberate campaign by the Indonesian authorities to discredit him. It was late in 1981 that Mgr da Costa Lopez succeeded in sending out information about potential famine conditions and also reported the massacre of more than 500 Timorese at a holy shrine near Lacluta, during the course of the *Keamanan* Operation carried out in 1981. (See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 49, January 1982)

Shortly after this news hit the world's press, Gough Whitlam, former Prime Minister of Australia, and Peter Hastings, Foreign Editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, visited East Timor. In their reports, they used terms such as 'wicked' and 'mischievous' to discredit the Bishop. (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 50, March 1982) Only recently, another Australian journalist, John Hamilton, writing for *West Australian*, reports how he had been told by Indonesians that the Bishop was 'difficult'.

Jakarta radio, reporting the Bishop's replacement, said that it would facilitate relations with the Vatican over East Timor's integration into Indonesia. This may be intended to imply that the way is now open for the church in Dili to be fully integrated into the Catholic church of Indonesia, a move which Mgr da Costa Lopez is known to have opposed.

Award for East Timor Article

Rod Nordland who writes for *The Philadelphia Inquirer* has been given a special award by the George Polk Awards for Journalism for his dispatches last year from South East Asia which included his detailed account of the plight of the people of East Timor, as well as reports on Cambodia and Vietnam. The East Timor report was published on May 1982, and was reproduced in full in *TAPOL Bulletin* No 52.

The George Polk Awards, given annually, were established in 1949 by Long Island University to honour the memory of a CBS journalist killed the previous year while covering the Greek civil war.

Timor war casualties second highest in world

In a report entitled *A World at War — 1983*, the Center for Defense Information based in Washington lists East Timor as the country that has suffered the second largest number of deaths in all wars that are currently raging world-wide. The following table is reproduced from the report.

The Center for Defense Information, whose Board of Advisors includes a number of retired US Armed Forces officers, businessmen and writers, including a former Deputy Director of the CIA, is headed by Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque (retired) of the US Navy.

The Most Violent Conflicts

Conflict	Number of Deaths	Year Began
1. Kampuchea Civil War	1-4,000,000	1970
2. East Timor Guerrilla War	100-250,000	1975
3. Afghanistan Civil War	100,000+	1978
4. Iraq-Iran War	80-100,000	1980
5. Lebanon Civil War	80,000+	1975
6. Philippine Guerrilla Wars	50-100,000	1972
7. China-Vietnam War	47,000+	1979
8. Guatemala Guerrilla War	30-40,000+	1967
9. El Salvador Civil War	30,000+	1977
10. Ethiopia-Eritrea Guerrilla War	30,000+	1962

Chart prepared by the Center for Defense Information.

Muslim political prisoner executed

A Muslim opponent of the Suharto military government was executed by firing squad in Jakarta on 13th April. This is the first judicial murder of a political opponent in Indonesia for several years and the first time the military government has killed what it calls a "Muslim extremist" in this way since it came to power in 1965. Many others are under sentence of death in Indonesia for political reasons, Muslims as well as leftwingers. Last month's execution places the lives of all these men in jeopardy.

The prisoner executed was *Imran bin Muhammed Zein* (32 years) who for several years had led a Muslim congregation in West Java which was severely critical of the Suharto government, the state dogma of Panca Sila and the overall policies of the military government. In early 1981, the group was linked to a series of terrorist incidents, culminating in the hijack of a domestic-flight passenger plane which was forced to land in Bangkok. The plane was stormed by Indonesian paracommandos, under the command of the Army's top intelligence officer Benny Murdani. Doubts about the true origin of the hijack soon emerged when it became known that although only four of the five hijackers were killed during the assault, the fifth man who was taken alive and apparently unharmed was dead by the next day when all five bodies were flown back to Jakarta.

An Intelligence Frame-Up

During Imran's trial last year, his defence lawyers, all appointed by the Jakarta Legal Aid Bureau, told the court they had sought evidence from the plane's crew and passengers, only to learn that they were all under orders not to talk about the incident. The defence argued that Imran's dissident group in West Java had been infiltrated by an Army intelligence agent who provoked the group into performing a number of terrorist acts against the Army and the police; the last of these was the 1981 hijack. The agent-provocateur, named in court by the defence, was himself murdered and the man said to have been responsible for this murder, a member of Imran's congregation, was subsequently killed while in Army custody. Defence requests to call witnesses during the Imran trial to testify on these matters were all rejected by the court as "irrelevant". (See *Tapol Bulletins* No. 52, July 1982, page 6; No. 55, Jan. 1983, page 5.)

Imran in court together with his lawyers, Abdurachman Saleh (left) and Assegaf. *Tempo*, 7th May 1983



Imran's Appeal Short-Circuited

In addition to the serious obstructions to the defence lawyers' efforts to get to the bottom of this case during the trial, Imran was later prevented from consulting his lawyers and deprived of his right to use all the appeals procedures legally available to him. This is evident from the fact that only a month ago, when Imran's lawyers announced that his death sentence had been upheld on appeal by a High Court they said they would be taking the appeal to the Supreme Court. A week later, however, they were informed that Imran no longer wished to enter such an appeal and would take his case straight to the President, the final plea. The lawyers were not permitted to meet Imran to obtain confirmation of this decision or assist him in the procedure. Less than a month later, his plea had been rejected by the President and two days later he was executed.

Family Not Informed about Execution

Imran's wife and parents have been given no official notification about his execution, either before or since it took place. Neither were they given an opportunity to have a farewell meeting with him, which is the accepted procedure. His wife told *Tempo* that she last met him five months before he was executed. (She herself was held without trial for ten months in 1981.) As for Imran's parents, they last had permission to visit their son a year ago, in May 1982, soon after he had been sentenced to death. (*Tempo*, 23rd April, 1983)

Other Death Sentence Prisoners

The army has for several years been waging a relentless campaign against Muslim political activity which it now sees as the main potential challenge to its control of the Indonesian state. Imran's execution is clearly intended as a warning to the country's huge Muslim population which is far from happy under military rule.

According to TAPOL's records, there are four more Muslim prisoners under death sentence whose lives are now in jeopardy. They are:

Timzar Zubil sentenced to death in 1980 in Medan, North Sumatra. His plea for clemency was rejected last year; a press report in February this year quoted a local public attorney official as saying that his execution was "imminent".

Azhar bin Muhammed Sofar, sentenced to death as a member of Imran's group in September 1982. Nothing is known about his appeals.

Salman Hafidz, sentenced to death as a member of Imran's group sometime in 1982. His appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected in March this year and he may now be awaiting a decision on his final plea.

Maman Kuswayadi, sentenced to death as a member of Imran's group in April this year.

Apart from these Muslim death-sentence prisoners, there are fifty or so prisoners who were sentenced to death in the late 1960s and early 1970s for alleged involvement in the so called "coup attempt" which preceded Suharto's coup against President Sukarno, bringing the military to power in 1965. Information about their position vis-a-vis appeals procedures is fragmentary and largely out-of-date. One man, Air Force Colonel Sudiono is known to have had his death sentence upheld by the President early last year and could be executed at any time. Others are known to have lost their High Court or Supreme Court appeals, including the trade union leaders Muhammed Munir and Ruslan Wijayasastra.

Campaign Against the Death Sentence

TAPOL strongly protests against the execution of Imran and demands that the Indonesian government stop using the death sentence for political purposes. It also condemns the use by the Indonesian courts of the Anti-Subversion Law and calls for the immediate repeal of this legislation. It rejects the use of the Anti-Subversion Law and the death sentence for purposes of political repression, and urges readers to protest, to save the lives of those now in danger. There is an urgent need for a resolute campaign to oppose and expose this repressive legislation and to expose the use and abuse by the Suharto military government of the law and the judiciary in order to eliminate all forms of political opposition.

Timzar Zubil Executed Too?

An unconfirmed report from Medan states that Timzar Zubil, sentenced to death in 1981 for "anti-government" activities, has already been executed. According to a report in the Jakarta press last February, an official of the public prosecutor's office declared that his execution was "imminent". (See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 56, March 1983, page 1.)

Government Obstructs Access: Lawyers protest

Legal Aid Institute (LBH) lawyers who defended Imran and other Muslim prisoners in court have complained bitterly that government officials have obstructed their access to clients during appeals against sentence.

Abdurahman Saleh and Moh. Assegaf, who defended Imran, reported that after the High Court rejected his appeal, they were not granted permission to meet Imran, despite applications to KOPKAMTIB, the Regional KOPKAMTIB Officer (Laksusda) and the Jakarta Military Police. They were told that Imran did not wish to enter a plea for *cassation* to the Supreme Court, but they obtained no written notification to this effect from Imran himself. "The government has violated the Procedural Code (KUHAP)," said Abdurahman. "According to KUHAP, the accused should have the help of a lawyer right up to the conclusion of his case." He complained too that such procedural violations now occur in virtually all cases in which the government is involved. We now face the fact, he went on, that officials "can claim that a convicted person has decided to dispense with the services of a lawyer at the appeals stage and has

decided to accept the court verdict."

As for KOPKAMTIB, its cynical disregard for procedures was made clear in a remark by Colonel Arisandi, an official spokesman of KOPKAMTIB, who responded to the lawyers complaints by saying: "Why are they turning Imran into a hero? Wouldn't it be better for them to find something else to do?"

According to Arisandi, the lawyers were in any case at fault since they should have directed their application to meet their client to the courts, not to KOPKAMTIB. The lawyers however told *Tempo* that court officials had declared that they "needed to consult first with those authorities that have competence in political affairs".

The LBH lawyers defending two other Muslim prisoners, Iman Hidayat and Slamet Riyanto (sentenced respectively to 20 and 15 years), have also been unable to meet their client, even though the time limit for entering a *cassation* plea has almost run out. The final date for this is 6th May.

Source: *Tempo*, 7th May 1983.

Munir's Appeal to Supreme Court turned down

According to a report in a Jakarta newspaper, Mohammed Munir, the trade union leader who was sentenced to death in 1967, has lost his *cassation* appeal to the Supreme Court and has now entered a plea for clemency to President Suharto.

It is not known whether Munir who, until 1965 was chairman of the mass-based trade union federation, SOBSI, is being assisted by a lawyer at this stage of his case.



Report on the State of Human Rights in Indonesia, 1981, published by the Legal Aid Institute. Just received. We hope to publish extracts and comments in the next issue.

Book Review

Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, **Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror**, London, Zed Press, 1983, pp. 272. Foreword by W.F. Wertheim. £5.95 paperback.*

Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror provides an important analysis of the internal conditions of existence of Indonesia's New Order regime, concentrating upon the use of the legal system as a means of domination. It presents a detailed picture of the machinery of repression available to the ruling Suharto group, focussing upon the central role of the all-pervasive KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order). Being concerned primarily with making an internal analysis of the system, it does not extend discussion to foreign policy or Indonesian involvement in East Timor or West Papua New Guinea.

The first and longest chapter examines the evidence for direct and indirect US involvement in the creation and maintenance of the New Order. That there should have been US involvement is not in itself surprising: in Richard Nixon's phrase, Indonesia is the 'richest prize in the South East Asian area'. Its importance is both economic and geo-political, the interpenetration of the two aspects being symbolised by US reliance upon Indonesian oil during the Vietnam war. The importance of Indonesia to US strategy is indisputable, but the value of the study would be considerably enhanced if discussion were extended, no matter how briefly, to the regional level. Indonesia may well be America's lynchpin, but it is also part of the wider 'island strategy' adopted after US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. As it is, many of the comments quoted from US statesmen could equally well apply to other countries in the region, notably the Philippines which in terms of purely military interests is much more central to US strategy.

US economic involvement in Indonesia dates back to the last century, but direct investment becomes much more marked in the post-war period. Tacit support for the independence struggle against the Dutch becomes a prelude to increasing penetration of the economy and direct political involvement in attempts to unseat Sukarno, seen by the US as being at best a crypto-communist. Both the *Permesta* revolt and the attempted coup of 1958 bear the hallmarks of CIA involvement. Circumstantial evidence further points to complicity in (or at the very least knowledge of) the Madiun affair and the 1965 Suharto coup. But perhaps more important for the continued existence of the New Order is the US role in grooming a technocratic-military elite: to a large extent the elaboration of the ideology of the armed forces 'dual function' at the Army Staff and Command School is a continuation of the CIA-backed

anti-Sukarno plots. In a sense, the link between ABRI's* dual function and US strategy typifies the US-Indonesia connection. Neither dual function ideology nor the Suharto regime are American creations or imports, but the interests and ideology of the ruling group and US imperialism coincide to such an extent that there is little or no contradiction between the two.

A Ghost that Fills a Need

Eighteen years after the wholesale massacres of 1965, Indonesia is still haunted by the spectre of the decimated PKI (Communist Party of Indonesia). Ironically, the spectre is constantly conjured up by the one body that was meant to exorcise it once and for all: KOPKAMTIB, the security command set up in somewhat mysterious circumstances in 1965. As the authors demonstrate at length, KOPKAMTIB actually needs the ghost of the PKI if it is to carry out its task of maintaining 'order'. Again and again, the PKI is invoked as events and myths are created to justify the violence of the regime. Only Suharto and KOPKAMTIB can guarantee the safety of the Republic and history is rewritten to prove it. The Madiun affair becomes a PKI attempt to take over the embattled Republic; the confused events of 1965 become a PKI insurrection. The massacre of PKI members and 'associates' is therefore justified. Other scapegoats can be used if need arises, but the major plank in New Order ideology remains the need to lay the ghost of the PKI. Pramoedya's *Bumi Manusia* is indicted for 'making subtle propaganda for a banned ideology'. Amir Machmud can speak of the threat posed in Aceh by the unlikely hybrid of 'PKI/Muslim strategy'. The release of B category G30S *tapols* in 1979 (largely as a cosmetic measure to placate Western opinion) means that the threat is even greater. The unproven *indikasi* (indications) of their involvement in G30S are enough to justify their removal to


'resettlement' areas and their continued surveillance after their return to society. The criterion of truth is irrelevant: all that is needed is the existence of a supposed threat to justify repression and legitimise violence. If the New Order is to survive, the ghost must be shown to exist. This is a psychotic regime in every sense of the word.

Unfortunate Choice of Terminology

The social model used by the authors for their internal analysis of the regime relies upon a somewhat schematic division of Indonesian society into three groups determined by their relationship to power: dominators, collaborators and victims. The dominator group is small, consisting of Suharto's immediate associates and groups with the financial, security and military apparatuses. Its main instrument for the retention of power is of course the all-pervasive KOPKAMTIB, adroitly manipulating potential opposition as well as directing open repression. KOPKAMTIB imposes its own special brand of martial law and is answerable only to the Suharto group itself. The dominators are not short of victims: their ranks include the dead of 1965, the surviving *tapols*, the small Chinese traders murdered during the 1974 riots, the students killed in the 1978 demonstrations, in short the mass of the population.

The social roles of victim and dominator are clearly defined, but the collaborator category is rather more ambiguous. Deliberate collaborators are, in effect the functionaries of the regime and enjoy limited powers and freedom from victimization. 'Critical collaborators' include those who, thanks to their relatively privileged position, can make some limited criticisms of the regime: lawyers, students, some newspaper editors and bodies such as the LBH (Legal Aid Institute). For the authors, the limited opposition of critical

Continued on page 20



* Available from TAPOL for £5.95 plus postage. 50 pence (UK, Europe and overseas surface) or £3.00 (overseas airmail).

My experience in an Indonesian prison

by Anwar M. Amin

I was one of thousands of people of Aceh, Sumatra, arrested and tortured by the "Laksusda Kodam I" a Javanese gobbledegook for their gangs of torturers signifying a special squad stationed on my fatherland as an instrument of Javanese Indonesian colonialism. At the time of my arrest I was a senior student at the Faculty of Education, Sjah Kuala University, at Kuta Radja or Bandar Aceh, and also teaching at high school in the district of Montasik.

I was arrested on December 30, 1977, at my house in Bandar Aceh (usually misspelled by the Javanese as "Banda Aceh") by Lieutenant Colonel Ismael Jamani, head of Intelligence of the "Laksusda Kodam I", well-known as a barbarian among my people. I was arrested because they knew that I was among those who raised the flag of Aceh in front of the grand mosque of Kuta Radja, and at several other important places on December 4, 1977, to commemorate the second anniversary of the Declaration of Independence of Aceh Sumatra.

The Javanese authorities knew about this because Keutjihik Ramli Hamzah of the Free Aceh Movement, unable to control his enthusiasm, made a speech in a coffee shop. There were "Laksusda" agents everywhere including the coffee shop where Keutjihik Hamzah spoke. He was arrested at gun point, and brought to the headquarters of the Javanese occupying forces at Bandar Aceh.

A colleague badly tortured for information

Upon arrival, he was beaten first and made to bath in his own blood. He was questioned when he regained consciousness after the beating. He gave no information, so they tortured him day and night with electricity, and submerged him under water until he lost consciousness; he was lashed with leather belts and kicked with army boots in the head and face; they stepped on his neck and body, until he lost consciousness. This treatment was repeated for so long that he broke down, and confessed to knowing me, Djailani Abdulla and several others. All those he named were arrested and tortured. Abdul Ghani was tortured with electricity (a gadget that seems to be a Javanese speciality): he was submerged under water, had cold or hot water thrown at him at night when he tried to sleep, was burned with cigarette butts, beaten with chairs until the chairs broke, was struck with rattan until the whip disintegrated; kicked with army boots over the face and trampled on all over his body. Abdul Manaf was given the same treatment and his testicles were crushed with pincers. The same treatment was given to Tengku Hadji Adam who lost all his teeth in the process. My friends Kasem Karo, Harun Mahmud, Djailani Abdulla received the same, if not worse. I had the same treatment; I do not know how I survived the ordeal. In addition I was a witness to the cruel treatment of hundreds of innocent villagers accused of being sympathisers of the National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra. I saw what happened to Tengku Darul Kamal di Tiro. He was arrested and then shot at until the bone of his right arm was broken. While he was *in hospital*, the Javanese troops tortured him there: they beat him until the bandage of his broken arm and bone opened and the broken bone came out of the plaster. He was 27 years old. Many others had limbs broken, feet, legs and bones shattered until the doctors had to amputate because nothing could be done to help. The men who perpetrated these crimes were soldiers, mostly Javanese officers, of "Laksusda".

All those imprisoned by "Laksusda" were put inside concrete cubicles 2 by 1½ meters, without any window, mattress to sleep on, blanket or mosquito nets. As to the quality of food, it was not fit for human consumption. After two months I and the others involved in the flag-raising affair were moved to the Kedah Military Prison in Bandar Aceh.

We reported these abuses to the student organisation in Bandar Aceh and to the so-called Provincial House of Representatives set up by the Javanese Indonesian regime. We found ways to communicate to them. The latter paid no attention to our plight, but the Acehnese student organisation launched a strong protest to the Javanese Indonesian regime in Jakarta against the inhuman treatment of Acehnese political prisoners. These protests were sent to Suharto, the Indonesian Parliament in Jakarta and the Minister of Justice, but no one paid any attention. Instead the student leaders who signed the protest were soon arrested and thrown in jail together with us. These include Hasbi Abdullah, chairman of the student organisation, Hasballah MS, Zulkifli Amin, Ustaz Hasanuddin, Zulfan Hasan, all members of the student council. All were beaten and tortured for eight months without being brought to the court.

The plight of prisoners in the Kedah Military Prison was terrible. There were on an average about 150 political prisoners there, all accused as members or sympathisers of the National Liberation Front Aceh Sumatra. Twelve people were forced to live in a room 5 by 4 meters. With no toilet facility in the room, we were locked up 23 hours every day with half an hour in the morning and half an hour in the evening to wash up. Daily we were tortured in incredible ways: every day we were forced to crawl over hot sands under the burning sun. Our food ration consisted of a little over half a tea-cup of rice per day, with a tiny bit of salted fish often rotten and smelly. Sometimes we were given vegetables. For the three years I was in that prison, they never gave us adequate food and no change in our diet; we were never given sweet tea, a slice of cake or even half a banana. Every day we were forced to do hard labour, cleaning the



houses, kitchens, gardens and toilets of Javanese military officers; or making roads with our bare hands and primitive hoes, or preparing ground and cutting trees for a race-course for the Javanese officers.

While in jail, the prisoners were often taken to the "Laksusda" compound for further interrogation. They came back with broken arms, cut lips, bloody noses, swollen faces, broken legs, and many were vomiting blood.

Knee torture

My group of prisoners — known as the flag-raisers — were given special treatment on August 20, 1978, the eve of the 18th of Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month. On that night we were beaten by a group of Javanese Indonesian military police. For reasons unknown to me, Harun Mahmud and I were singled out for the harshest treatment. After being beaten, we were forced to drink alcohol. We refused as drinking alcohol is forbidden by our Muslim religion. So they struck our heads and faces with the bottles until they were broken, cutting our heads and faces and making the blood pour down. Then they grabbed hold of our necks, pried our mouths open and poured the alcohol down our throats. When they released us, we vomited uncontrollably. Then, they forced us to lick our own vomit. We refused. Then they held us and they banged our heads together like rams fighting, beat and knocked us down until we lost consciousness. When we regained consciousness, they burnt our bodies with cigarettes. After that Harun and I were put in separate cells nearby. A piece of wood the size of a man's arm and about one meter long was put under my knees while they forced me to kneel down. It caused pressure on my knee joints and was very painful. But that was not all. To increase the pain, my tormentor climbed on my shoulders to add his weight, so creating greater pressure on my knee joints. The pressure could have disjointed my knee-caps. It was excruciatingly painful. The Javanese officer sat on my shoulders for a good half an hour. When he finally descended — it seemed ages to me — I could no longer stand up.

As a result of that night's torture, my skull was damaged and my brain was affected. The tissues of my eyes were damaged and I could not see anything for over a month. I thought I had gone blind. My knees were so painful that I could not walk for months, and as a Muslim I could not pray for months because I could not kneel down. Harun suffered the same as me. We have not recovered completely until today. They gave us no medical treatment.

Torturers named

Among the torturers I could recognise were Lieutenant Colonel Budi Permana, chief of the Indonesian Military Police (CPM) "Laksusda Kodam I"; Major Djakfar, head of interrogation section; Major Nugraha, chief of intelligence; Captain Darjoto, inspector of interrogation; Captain Wahjono, inspector of interrogation; officer M. Nur Nanuru, interrogator; officer Sarwan Jacob Ali, head of Kedah Military Prison, Bandar Aceh; and Major Abdullah Husin, intelligence section.

On December 14, 15, and 16, 1978, the "flag raisers group" were taken to the office of the High Indonesian prosecutor general for interrogation, then brought back to Kedah Military Prison. On December 17, I was taken back to the "Laksusda Kodam I" compound where I was questioned again by Major Djakfar. He said: "I have the legal right according to the Indonesian Constitution and given by the Indonesian government, to beat, torture and even murder you. Our rule is that all political individuals must be beaten first before any interrogation. You must remember that you are still in my hands."

Show trials

In 1979, the Indonesian government convened a kangaroo court in Bandar Aceh to try Harun Mahmud. Even the advocate who "defended" Mahmud was appointed by the regime. Mahmud's request to have a non-Indonesian lawyer from abroad was rejected. The reason was obvious: the Javanese were afraid their court procedures might be exposed to foreign lawyers, because there is no system of justice: anyone who can

buy the judges, the lawyers and the generals will never be convicted of anything even if they are guilty.

Two days before the trial of Harun Mahmud, we, the flag-raisers group, were brought to the Military Police (CPM) and warned: "You must all testify against Harun Mahmud and condemn the National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra. If you do not cooperate, we will beat you again".

On the day of the trial we were brought to the court in a mortuary vehicle to prevent people from seeing us and showing sympathy for us and for the liberation movement. The regime wanted to make me testify against Harun Mahmud. The entire court procedure was a set-up. They announced that the trial was public but no journalist was allowed to attend except those handpicked by the regime; even they were not allowed to report the questions and answers truthfully. Loudspeakers were set up but the volume was reduced when questioning took place. And when anyone spoke against the regime, the mike went dead! There was never any doubt where the public stand: they enthusiastically supported the Free Aceh Movement. The judge asked me, "What is the goal of the National Liberation Front Aceh Sumatra?" But before I managed to answer him, an army officer stood up and yelled: "Questions relating to the aims and goal of the Free Aceh Movement may not be asked!" The microphone went dead, the judge kept quiet. And that was that.

The "trial" of Harun Mahmud took one month. Every day we were brought to the court through the back door. The sessions lasted until late afternoon. We were always hungry because they kept us half starved. They gave us only a glass of tasteless tea for lunch. After the sessions, we were taken back to our small cell where we slept on the cement floor, hungry inside and eaten by the mosquitos outside. Harun Mahmud was accused of violating presidential decree No.11/1963 introduced by Sukarno long ago. Even by Javanese Indonesian standards it is illegal according to most lawyers. On the basis of the "law", Harun Mahmud was condemned to 6½ years imprisonment and ordered to pay costs to finance his torturers and the corrupt judges, headed by Din Muhammad.

After the trial of Harun Mahmud, we nine were tried. I was given 4 years in jail; Ramli Hamzah, 3 years; Radja Husen, 3 years; Abdul Ghani, 3 years; Hasballah Lammuelo, 3 years; Abdul Manaf, 2 years; Tengku Hadji Adam, 1 year 9 months and 18 days (how meticulously weighted!); Miss Nurhanifah Hasan, 1 year; and Sabirin, 1 year. All including costs for the show trials!

A civilian government prosecutor once said to me: "You are being brought to court for sentencing just for formality. Everything has been decided by Laksusda. We, the court, the government prosecutors are like loud-speakers for them. If we refused to do what the Laksus people order us, we will be treated like you, members of the Free Aceh Movement."

Miss Nurhanifah Hasan and I refused to accept the court's verdict on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to condemn us inasmuch as it was the court of the illegal occupiers of our country. Only a properly constituted Acehese Court can judge us. Javanese Indonesian courts have no jurisdiction in Aceh Sumatra. Our stand was based on International Law provisions that no colonial power has jurisdiction over a colonial territory. Indonesia claims jurisdiction over Aceh Sumatra on the basis of the Dutch transfer of sovereignty to it on December 27 1949, which is also illegal.

Our seven brothers accepted the court verdict because they were no longer able to suffer torture in jail. Because I refused to accept the verdict, I was kept in jail together with another 150 Free Aceh prisoners some of whom had been there for three years without being brought to trial — even a show trial.

On 12 April, 1981, I and several other colleagues managed to escape from the Indonesian Military Prison in Bandar Aceh. From Kuta Radja (Bandar Aceh) we went to liberated territory under the control of the Government of the State of Aceh Sumatra. From there I managed to go abroad and with the help of the United Nations was given political asylum in Sweden. We are grateful to the Swedish people and government.

Värmland, Sweden March 7, 1983.

ABRI's 'social approach' in Irian Jaya

Two reports sent to TAPOL this month on the current situation in West Papua provide an interesting analysis and description of present-day Indonesia's policies aimed at pacifying and subduing the people of West Papua. One report was written by an OPM observer sent to the region late last year; the other was written by one of his contacts inside. Both are in Indonesian. The following summarises the main conclusions and highlights some of the more striking accounts of life in Jayapura, the capital of Indonesia's 'province of Irian Jaya'. Apart from direct quotations, our summary draws together points made in each of the documents.

"In order to retain hold of Irian Jaya, (the Indonesians) are adopting several approaches, namely:

1. The approach of coaxing the (Papuan) community.
2. The anthropological approach: studying the characteristics of each tribe in Irian, holding lectures by anthropologists and sociologists so as to facilitate approaches to communities in the interior.
3. The educational approach: giving guidance to the community by mobilising people to support the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, to ensure that people think about nothing else.
4. The approach through (informal) leaders of society.
5. The approach through religion..."

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

"The political mechanism in Irian Jaya, directed towards securing Indonesia's national stability, is now at the stage of manipulating Irianese society, using it, controlling it and supervising it; carrying out surveillance and taking care that it does not take action in pursuance of its own ideals. We point all this out not because we are unhappy with such a state of affairs; these are indeed facts and we are compelled to draw the conclusion that, however difficult the situation may be, endeavours to neutralise it must continue as one way of advancing the struggle. Without a great deal of hard work, nothing will be achieved."

☆ ☆ ☆ ☆ ☆

Education

Both reports stress that the Indonesian colonial administration is consistently striving to undermine the Christian-based schools. The schools in Irian Jaya are run by four educational institutions: the Protestant Educational Foundation (YPK), the Catholic Education Foundation (YPPK), the Islamic Educational Foundation (YAPIS), and Inpres ('presidential instruction' schools, funded by grants specially allocated on the instructions of the President). A great deal of energy and funds have been invested in the setting up of new schools. The quality of education offered at Inpres schools is good, and the teachers are paid higher salaries than in the Christian schools with the result that there is a tendency for children and teachers to shift from the latter to the former. However, the Inpres schools have a negative impact for Papuans and are being deliberately used to weaken schools run by Protestants and Catholics. In the past, these latter were the 'key to progress' for Papuans. 'Political observers' (the term used in the original is *pengamat politik*, referring to people within the Indonesian administration) are well aware of this, and as a countervailing force, Inpres schools have been set up even in areas where Christian schools already exist, to entice pupils and teachers away; this also has the effect of impoverishing these schools. "In short," writes one of the reports, "educational policy is being specifically watched by political observers in order to put an end to such 'keys of progress' for the local people." Many Papuans now employed by the Indonesians and many of those leading the OPM are products of these schools.

The non-Inpres schools depend to a large extent on the financial support of (Papuan) parents whose economic position is

generally very weak. In some schools, pupils must travel long distances; public transport is lacking and is very expensive, and few Papuan families have transport of their own, so their children must walk to school. The children of 'newcomers' (the term used is *pendatang*, people from outside the region, in other words, Indonesians rather than Papuans), are brought to school by private transport. Another distinction which results in feelings of segregation and discrimination is the emphasis placed on the wearing of uniforms. In some schools children are required to wear different uniforms on different days of the week; for instance, a white top and a red skirt or trousers on Mondays, which is flag-raising day, to match the red-and-white Indonesian flag, and other types of uniforms during the rest of the week. This places the poorer Papuan children in a position of inferiority; some actually leave school out of a sense of shame.

Cendrawasih University (UNCEN)

The university is described as being the 'dapur' (kitchen) for methods to keep watch on people with pro-OPM sentiments; a thorough-going system of control and supervision has been devised which functions with the collaboration of the university staff and lecturers. The students, the vast majority of whom are Papuans, are closely watched. Yet nevertheless, "the spirit of patriotism flourishes like mushrooms". The vast majority of students are opposed to Indonesian rule. They cultivate the distinctive *membesak* culture, specific to Papuan people, as a way of encouraging their people to love and respect their own traditions, despite efforts by the Indonesian administration to destroy them. But in any case, most of those who graduate from UNCEN fail to get jobs because it is far easier for Indonesians from outside the region to get work with the government.

In a section on the prevalence of prostitution in Jayapura, one of the reports points out that many girls and women involved are school pupils and university students trying to earn money to pay their school fees.

Recruitment of Papuans to Leadership Roles

All Papuans selected for positions of leadership must first undergo investigation to see whether they have an 'Irianese mentality' or an 'Indonesian mentality'. If their 'mentality' is in doubt, they cannot be appointed or can only hold token positions, under close scrutiny and control. There is a growing tendency to draw Papuans into positions of leadership, as department heads, district chiefs (*bupati*) and so on. In this way the administration hopes to redress the imbalance between Papuans and newcomers, and eliminate grounds for disquiet and resentment among Papuans because of the overwhelming predominance of Indonesians.

Papuans in positions of leadership are not allowed to develop concepts of their own about how things should be done. These must come from Indonesians, whereas the local official is required to use his/her status to implement concepts drawn up by others.

A number of informal leaders such as ministers and priests have been placed in political positions, as members of the provincial assembly for instance. Their value lies in the fact that they enjoy the confidence of the community. But their political duties

force them to give up their pastoral duties, leaving communities without guidance.

The Economy

In Jayapura, Papuans are now heavily outnumbered by people from Indonesia, by roughly eight to one. One report describes Jayapura as a city badly polluted by refuse, while nothing is done to keep street surfaces clean. Little attention is paid to amenities. Drinking water supply completely dried up in some districts; as a result, a large number of Papuan women demonstrated outside the governor's office recently, banging their empty buckets. Most businesses and shops are owned by Macassarese who have gone into cattle-rearing, opened up timber works, estates and other industries. In many cases they took land from Papuans by force, but if the original owners dare challenge unlawful expropriation, ABRI invariably intervenes on the side of Macassarese.

Irian Jaya still depends on rice imports. All rice supplies are controlled by *Dolog*, the regional distribution board, and the government trading corporation, *Irian Bhakti*. The rice imported is government-subsidised, but the only people entitled to alloca-

tions are more senior government officials, mostly Indonesians, who also receive allocations of sugar, salt, coffee and other commodities. Marketed rice is closely supervised by *Dolog*; on the open market, it is sold at a much higher price. When sold into the interior, an additional levy is imposed for 'communications difficulties'. On the other hand, village products such as vegetables fetch only half the price they are sold for in urban areas. This double bind on village prices is forcing down living standards in the interior.

Security

Both reports describe systematic efforts by ABRI to recruit intelligence agents among Papuans. When people are arrested for OPM sympathies, the ones who show less determination are often forced to accept release on condition that they are willing to spy for the government. One of the reports however says that this kind of intelligence recruitment is now getting less emphasis because many of the Papuans involved prove less than reliable as sources of information. Moreover, there is a tendency for policies

Continued overleaf

From Lord Avebury,
Chairman

Parliamentary Human Rights Group:

I have read *West Papua: the Obliteration of a People* with sadness and indignation. It is a sorry story of the betrayal of a small and defenceless people, who were first handed over from one set of colonialists to another by the United Nations themselves, and then ruthlessly exploited by multi-nationals which plundered their forests and mineral resources. If the West Papuans had been granted a genuine free choice, instead of the transparent fraud perpetrated on them under that name, they would not have become part of Indonesia, and they would not have suffered the mass murders, imprisonment, economic repression and discrimination which has been their lot since the herrenvolk from Java assumed power in 1963.

This account should be read by all concerned with human rights. West Papua is not in the limelight, and the atrocities committed against her people have attracted very little attention. But as a case study of ruthless and cynical exploitation, the story unfolded here can have few parallels in the twentieth century world. No wonder Britain tries hard to conceal her sales of military hardware to a regime which is capable of the offences against humanity catalogued here.

Lord Avebury,
House of Lords, London

"With the publication of this book, TAPOL has thoroughly justified its continued existence . . . (its) political intent . . . does not detract from the importance and power of its message. *West Papua* is valuable for both the casual and concerned observer of developments on the other side of the border."

PNG Times, 13th May, 1983

West Papua: The Obliteration of a People



tapol

West Papua

to change drastically with each new military commander.

ABRI is now using the 'social weapon', the so-called human approach. The aim is to 'treat local communities nicely' by working through established social and religious networks, and by means of the 'ABRI-to-the-villages' programme, a 'civic mission'. Experience is far from positive however; plenty of houses may be built but they don't last long. Standards of construction are shoddy, for instance, because the mortar or concrete mix is over-diluted.

As with the intelligence service, there has been systematic recruitment of Papuans into the army and the police force. The intention is to create an 'Irianese army' for use against the OPM. However, many Papuan servicemen prove disloyal, so this recruitment is now being phased out, while those already in the services are being denied promotion. The intention was to set Papuans against Papuans.

Imprisonment and Disappearances

The report written by the person who was visiting from abroad says it was impossible to visit places of detention because the

writer was often followed. Reports from contacts in the army and the police showed that prisons are filled to overflowing; the majority of prisoners are OPM supporters. The 'diehards' are kept in underground cells; some are known to have been 'kidnapped' (*diculik*, meaning here, exterminated). Many prisoners who are released in order to engage in spying but who prove unsatisfactory are re-arrested, and then exterminated.

One of the forms of extermination used is to bind and tie up the prisoner alive in a rice-sack which is then thrown into the ocean. On occasions, the bodies come to the surface in a few days. Two men subjected to such treatment were:

Willem Yoku, a civil servant working at the Abepura District Office, from Nyao-Yosko, Jayapura; and

Jonas Tu, also a civil servant, who worked at the Public Works Department in Abepura, who was from Ubrub, Jayapura.

They were both bound up alive in sacks, then thrown into the ocean at Skyland, Abepura. Their decomposed bodies were washed up five days later. This incident occurred in 1982, at the time when three Papuan students at UNCEN were arrested for raising the West Papuan flag. (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 55, January 1983, for a report of their trial.)

More on influx of Papuans into PNG

Regarding the many West Papuans seeking refuge in PNG recently (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 56, March 1983), the *PNG Times* (11th February 1983) reports that most were "in a bad state of health and require urgent medical treatment". Some walked hundreds of miles from Wissel Lakes and Bird's Head. The sudden upsurge is due to stepped up military operations, the paper says, though church officials in Irian Jaya also believe that "a large number of villagers from remote areas are moving east . . . because of 'sheer neglect' by the Indonesian authorities".

Our last report referred to 'nucleus estates' being set up along the border. The Jakarta weekly *Topik* provides corroborative evidence of the disruptive effects of these palm-oil and rubber estates in an article published recently, which we summarise below:

Civil servants working at government offices in Irian Jaya (the name used by Indonesia for West Papua) are "joining the 'GPL' out of a sense of frustration and disappointment," reports the Jakarta weekly, *Topik* (18th April, 1983). (GPL is the designation used officially and in the Indonesian press for the Free Papua Movement, the OPM; GPL stands for 'wild disruptors gangs'.

In a report that in effect testifies to systematic racism and discrimination in Irian Jaya, *Topik* quotes a student at the Home Affairs Department Academy (APDN) in Jayapura as saying that people joining the resistance come not only from those employed in the private sector but from government employees as well. "The primary factor is a sense of disappointment," he said. *Topik* added that 'GPL' members consist mainly of people who feel that they are being pushed out, not only by transmigrants (newcomers from Indonesia) but also by so-called "jungle monsters (*raksasa-raksasa hutan*) who are blocking and taking control of the forests in a quite excessive way". The unfortunate thing, the journal adds, is that these "monsters" frequently resort to violence to achieve their aims.

The APDN student who refused to give his name, mentioned one example of a civil servant working for the Academy who fled to join the resistance. "He was a native of the region who happens to have been extremely loyal to his department; he had worked there for ten years, rarely taking time off and frequently coming to work even on holidays. He apparently very much wanted to be appointed to an official position in the Academy but this ambition was thwarted when a young newcomer, a mere novice, was 'dropped' from Jakarta and was immediately appointed to that post. This infuriated and disappointed him, so he ran away (to join the resistance)." Such things frequently create problems, the same person said, "People here regard these newcomers (*pendatang*) as competitors, even foes."

Estates Project Disrupts People's Lives

Topik also reports that a government project called the Nucleus

Estates project, involving the establishment of palm-oil estates in the Arso-Koya region of the district of Jayapura, has led to strong protests by local inhabitants. Initially, people were prepared to accept the project and received compensation for the uprooting of their sweet-potato and sago stands. But after a few months, a great deal of disquiet spread as people realised that replacement of sago and sweet potato plants by palm oil crops was having the effect of disrupting their livelihoods. They accused the government of disruption and threatened to abandon the project if they were not provided with an alternative source of living. In words that suggest deliberate deception on the part of the district chief of Jayapura, Bas Youwe who provided *Topik* with information about this project, *Topik* goes on to say that the problem was 'resolved' by proceeding with a transmigration project, "in response to the local people's demands (sic) and also in order to meet the need for a larger population. But the most important thing, said Bas, deceitfully (*berkilah*) was that the produce of the transmigrant community could be channelled."

As for Papuan attitudes towards transmigration, *Topik* quotes a local official as complaining that local opinion is guided largely by the position taken by tribal chiefs known as *ondohoule*. "The word of the *ondohoule* counts for much more than the word of the government. They are often under the influence of a 'third party' (this clearly refers to the OPM. TAPOL) which is why many projects planned by the government simply do not proceed as intended."

West Papua: The Obliteration of a People

Price: £2.50 plus postage 50 pence (UK, Europe and overseas surface): £2.00 (overseas air). Please send payment with order.

Bechtel-UK spends £125 millions of British taxpayers' money but workers go hungry

On the east coast of Kalimantan, the Bechtel Corporation is involved in two construction projects on behalf of the Indonesian state oil company, Pertamina, a new oil refinery at Balikpapan and a natural gas installation at Bontang. Though Bechtel originates from the USA, (its former directors include Caspar Weinberger, Philip Habib, and George Schultz of the Reagan administration), it is the UK subsidiary which is involved in Balikpapan, in part paid for by a trade credit agreement from the British Government worth £125 million from the British aid budget (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 50, March 1982). This money also helps pay for goods and services from about a hundred other British companies supplying Bechtel, including Balfour Beatty and Farmers Boilers.

Foreign companies are involved in many other large projects in East Kalimantan, including the Bunyu methanol plant (Lurgi of West Germany), the East Kalimantan fertilizer plant, many timber concessions, and a 750,000 ha. coal concession awarded to Rio Tinto Zinc and British Petroleum.

Many of these projects are said to be 'vital' for the future of the Indonesian economy, and the region has been granted the status of a 'strategic area', meaning, amongst other things, that special policies apply for controlling the labour force.

Kalimantan is a vast and still comparatively wild region, one of the last areas of primary forest in the world. With a scattered indigenous population, labour is scarce. Tens of thousands of workers are recruited from densely populated areas such as Java and Bali by labour subcontractors awarded permits under the regional migrant labour (AKAD) scheme of the Department of Manpower; these provide large companies with a labour force 'screened' to weed out 'troublemakers'. Transmigration schemes have also brought thousands of families from Java to cultivate patches torn out of jungle and swamps; when their new crops fail, transmigrants help provide a reserve force of unskilled marginal labour.

Tight Supervision by the Military

In late 1982 the head of the regional mili-

tary command for East Kalimantan (KODAMIX/Mulawarman), Brigadier General Henri Santoso, LAKSUSDA (the local representative of KOPKAMTIB), said that, because of the many 'vital' projects in his region, labour problems need 'tight supervision'. Though labour actions were increasing, many had been "successfully overcome by the security forces taking preventative action", he said. Recent events on the Bechtel site at Balikpapan give us a good example of how this 'preventative action' by the Brigadier's troops works to the advantage of the Suharto regime and its foreign associates.

At Balikpapan Bechtel employs between 7,000-9,000 workers, the vast majority of them migrant workers on the AKAD scheme hired through its subcontractor, PT Purna Bina Indonesia. The migrant workers are housed in two barracks, in Jalan Minyak and Camp Telindung, where the workers live four to a room, four metres by four metres.

Censorship on sticky issues

Jakarta
Essential equipment for reading foreign newspapers in Indonesia includes a pair of rubber gloves, tweezers and a powerful lamp.

It is common in Jakarta's hotel lobbies to see people trying to peel apart the sticky pages of *Time* or *Newsweek* with ink-blackened fingers. Others peer at fellow guests through a neatly cut hole on the front page of *The Asian Wall Street Journal* or myopically hold the *International Herald Tribune* up to the light.

The reason is censorship, which officially does not exist. Subscribers to the *Herald Tribune* who telephoned the distributors to ask why they had not received their copy were told the entire issue had fallen victim to censorship and been banned by the attorney general's office. The reason was apparently an article on President Suharto's leadership style, reprinted from the *Washington Post*.

Enterprising readers, wielding eyelash tweezers with sticky fingers, can often get clues to the offending articles from the odd words still legible under a mass of printer's ink. Others, their curiosity aroused, get copies under plain cover from abroad or photocopies from embassies.

The constitution guarantees freedom of expression, both written and spoken, but the local press is bound by a "consensus" with the government not to publish news which might inflame religious or ethnic sentiments, or other matters deemed sensitive. As foreign journalists are not included in this, the only way to control the inflow of their news into Indonesia is by censorship.

Last May the government effectively banned seven foreign newspapers by not renewing their import licences—the Dutch *NRC Handelsblad*, the London *Observer*, *Le Figaro*, *L'Aurore*

and *France-Soir* from France, and Australia's *Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Australian*.

Censorship of the foreign press still available is sometimes done haphazardly by importers. A recent *Newsweek* edition on Hongkong, for example, had its front cover completely blackened and papered over, apparently because it showed a street scene with many billboards and shop signs in Chinese characters. These have been banned in Indonesia since the abortive coup of 1965, which the government says was masterminded by Beijing.

Ironically, those responsible for blacking out the offending characters apparently cannot distinguish Chinese from Japanese or Korean script, which also suffer when they appear in pictures or advertisements.

Importers of foreign magazines and newspapers are sometimes overzealous in self-censoring articles, but one company spokesman said if they always waited for a decision from the attorney general's office, subscribers would complain of late delivery. So they black out every Indonesian-dated story and all script which could be Chinese.

The local press also suffers censorship. Last year one daily newspaper and one national news magazine had their publication permits revoked for months for reporting general election violence and carrying the unofficial election results.

A new press law abolished the need for individual publications to obtain such permits but made it compulsory for a publishing company to have a general "licence for press publication."

Critics of the new law say it strengthens the government's control over the national press. They say the government can now paralyze a company's entire operation, instead of just closing down one of its publications.

—Reuters

Bechtel-UK

The Bechtel workers were for a long time refused permission to form a trade union. Instead, in 1981, Pertamina, plus the LAKSUSDA, the Police, the local Directorate General for the Development and Protection of Manpower (Binalindung), and the East Kalimantan representatives of the All Indonesia Labour Federation (FBSI) had formed an 'early detection team', designed to 'detect and defuse' labour unrest. Clearly, this team did not meet with much success, for the workers continued to voice their grievances particularly about the lack of a union, cramped housing, uncertainty over their medical insurance, unpaid food allowances (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 49, January 1982), inadequate food supplies, and discrimination between 52 Filipino workers on the site and the Indonesian workers. By October 1982 a trade union branch was at last formed, apparently headed by someone generally agreed by the workers.

Bitter Complaints about Food Supplies

The workers had long complained of inefficiency and corruption in the food catering subcontractor, PT Patra, a subsidiary of Pertamina. Bechtel was reported to provide all the raw materials to this company, who would then just cook and serve it. However, the food was virtually inedible, and often late or in short supply. For example, the workers said they often needed to re-cook the meat to make it edible, but Bechtel did not allow cooking facilities in their barracks. Then in February 1982 the majority of local workers requested a money allowance instead. Bechtel refused, saying it could not then 'control the nutrition of its workers' and that this would 'disturb working hours'. Later, Bechtel carried out a ballot, and 6,000 out of 7,000 workers voted for a food allowance, yet still this did not get implemented.

Moreover, the food subcontractor operated only three lockets to serve lunches to 3,000 workers within the lunch break of one hour. Trouble flared up in the

queues, with many workers not getting served. However, rather than put pressure on its subcontractor to improve services, Bechtel docked the wages of any worker late back from lunch, and allowed the military to intervene. From mid-1982, troops from the Mobile Brigade (Brimobdak XII) were sent to supervise the workers inside the canteen! This canteen was described by the Head of Pertamina, Yudo Sumbono, on a personal visit, as a 'prison', echoing the workers' own description of themselves as 'prisoners' on this project.

Protest Actions Confronted by Troops

These smouldering issues reached crisis point twice during the second half of 1982. On 4th September, a member of the Mobile Brigade on duty in the canteen was stabbed in the shoulder after he had fired three warning shots over workers who had jeered at him. Then on 20th October, the evening meal was very late; a worker who enquired was hit across the face with a metal ladle by the chief cook, and this sparked off rioting in the streets of Balikpapan until 4.30 a.m. When the food packets did arrive towards midnight, 3,000 workers threw them away; instead they entered the subcontractor's building and began distributing thousands of eggs. The next morning, the breakfast for those coming off the nightshift did not arrive until 10 a.m. Meanwhile two thousand dayshift workers refused to go to work, joined by another thousand by lunchtime. There followed two days of protest action, with workers using everything they could lay their hands on to write slogans such as 'Help Please, Hunger', and 'We Were Not Brought From Our Homelands To Be Hungry'.

Meanwhile, the military stood at the ready and members of the army intelligence in plain clothes took up positions at the entry and exit gates to the camp. The Bechtel site manager issued a circular declaring that workers not prepared to work should report to the time-keeping locket at Gate III; those who signed twice in 24 hours that they would remain in their barracks would have unspecified 'actions'

taken against them, but those who did not sign would be considered as having left their jobs. "This is how Bechtel in Balikpapan passes judgement on our lives", replied one worker. Few of them signed.

High level discussions were held at the Pertamina headquarters in Balikpapan, involving American Bechtel managers flown in from Jakarta, the Army, the Department of Manpower, and the union representative recently chosen by the workers but now declared unacceptable by them. Finally, after two days, the Bechtel workers were forced back to work. The military commander denied that 'trouble' had occurred, but added, "If there were excesses, that is in the form of beatings, then this was the most appropriate measure against such a numerous mass gathering". LAKSUSDA investigated the cause of the strike, but seemed unable to find any evidence that it was provoked by 'subversive elements'.

A week later the food supplies were still not sorted out. Other subcontractors were found in Balikpapan, but they were not up to the task of feeding thousands of workers. Over two hundred workers went down with vomiting and diarrhoea, twelve of whom had to be hospitalised. Once again the newspapers reported 'restlessness'.

According to *Sinar Harapan*, the food problems were caused by Pertamina, which was late in paying Bechtel which in turn was late in paying its subcontractor, a Pertamina subsidiary. Pertamina replied that it was up to Bechtel to pay, and then reclaim from Pertamina. These corporations enjoy huge revenues from worldwide oil sales plus millions of pounds from the British aid programme, yet cannot arrange to feed those who work for them in hard and dangerous conditions. (*)

Recently, Bechtel has begun to lay off workers. Construction is due to end this year, and thousands of workers will be thrown out of work.

Sources; *Merdeka* 24.5.82, 10.10.82; *Kompas* 23/24.10.82; *Pedoman Rakyat* 26.11.82; *Indonesian Times* 25.10.82; *Pikiran Rakyat* 24.10.82; *Sinar Harapan* 11.9.82 21/22/23/25/26/27/28/29/30.10.82, 7.4.83 *Financial Times* 1.2.82

* Further research reveals that *PT Purna Bina Indonesia*, Bechtel's 'labour subcontractor', is in fact a joint stock company owned by Bechtel itself. Moreover, *PT Patra Supplies*, the disgraceful food subcontractor, is listed in a British Embassy document as a *British* company.

newsletter of international labour studies

A guide to Indonesian labour and labour protest, labour studies and international solidarity with Indonesian workers is being published in May-June 1983. It is a special Indonesian issue of the *Newsletter of International Labour Studies* (NILS).



Copies from NILS, Galileistr. 130, 2561
The Hague

Price: US\$1.40 (individuals); US\$3.10
(organisations).

Orders must be accompanied with cash.

The Liem empire

The vast business empire of Liem Sioe Liong, whose interests are intimately linked with Suharto's rise to power, have been analysed in detail in a cover story in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (7th April, 1983). Under the protection of the military government and helped along by numerous favours and concessions, the Liem family has built up a huge conglomerate of companies which cover financial services (among others, Indonesia's largest private domestic banking corporation, Bank Central Asia), manufacturing and construction, and trading.

The FEER report was published in the wake of burgeoning investments by the Liem family in Singapore, Hongkong, the Netherlands and California. These include the takeover of a number of companies in Hongkong, the purchase of Hibernia, one of California's eight largest banks, and a bid to buy up Hegemeyer, a large Dutch trading company. These overseas investments were criticised earlier this year by a Jakarta — based business daily, *Jurnal Ekuin*, which has since been banned. *Jurnal Ekuin*, which referred to Liem as "the richest businessman in Indonesia", apparently stung the authorities by complaining about this flight of capital, saying that at a time when a huge balance of payments deficit was threatening the country's economy, "rich Indonesians of Chinese descent are busy taking their personal funds out of the country". The publication even hinted that the flight abroad might signal preparations for a major move of funds out of the country at a time when Suharto was approaching what could be his final term as president.

A very different interpretation could however be made, namely that Liem's rapidly growing offshore investments are based on a renewed sense of certainty about the longterm future of the military regime, in line with the consolidation of Suharto's position that has become evident since last year's general elections.

Liem and Suharto

Liem Sioe Liong, a first-generation Chinese who came to Indonesia in 1916, started trading operations in Central Java in the late 1940s in a peanut company run by his uncle. He soon became major supplier to the Diponegoro Division, with which he subsequently began to operate army-backed enterprises to help fund the division and its officers. This cemented a longterm relationship with Suharto, an officer with the division and its commander from 1956 to 1959.

By 1966, after the overthrow of Sukarno, the Liem group already had a complex network of companies engaged in trade, banking and manufacturing. With the help of lucrative concessions, "reflecting", as *FEER* puts it, "Suharto's trust in Liem" the business group really took off. It grew rapidly, helped on by profits from monopoly or semi-monopoly concessions in cloves

(an important ingredient in Indonesian-style *kretek* cigarettes) and flour. The cloves monopoly was shared with Probosutedjo, Suharto's step-brother, and profits were used among other things to finance the state-owned aircraft company, PT Nurtanio which now assembles helicopters under licence from Casa of Spain.

The Liem—controlled flour company, Bogasari which also incorporates Suharto family interests, was granted sole flour-milling operations with exclusive handling rights in Indonesia, plus exclusive marketing rights in western Indonesia which accounts for eighty per cent of domestic flour consumption. A Liem-owned textile company, PT Tarumatex, won a \$1.7 million contract to supply clothes for the military without a tender, despite Department of Industry objections that the company was unable to meet the contract terms. The group's cement interests, centred in Indocement, now account for 38 per cent of the industry's domestic capacity.


The Liem group, in which Liem Sioe Liong's son and heir-apparent, Anthony Salim, now plays the leading role, also has major holdings in property, construction, investment banking, motor-car assembly (most of it in joint ventures with Japanese companies) and sole distribution agencies, as well as mineral extraction (coal-mining), food production and life assurance.

There are close tie-ups between the Liem and Suharto families at numerous points in addition to the clove and flour ventures. For example Liem shares a fifty percent holding in a major property development project with the Kencana complex, one of the largest business groups in Indonesia with major Suharto family interests. One of Liem's four main cement projects is a joint venture with the Sahid group, led by Sukamdani Gitesardjono, a relative of Suharto's.

Longterm confidence

The Liem group's extensive interests in a number of longterm investment projects inside Indonesia, some of which could take seven to ten years to amortise, are a sign of the group's confidence in the future of its supporting prop, the military government under Suharto and his close associates. The uninterrupted growth of Liem's business interests since the 1950s and in particular since the mid sixties is a striking example of the close intermeshing between the military government and some highly selective business interests which have enjoyed protection and favours from the man who stands at the pinnacle of the system, General Suharto.

All items published in *TAPOL Bulletin* may be reproduced without permission, but the source should be given.



A profile of General Benny Murdani



2nd October 1932, Leonardus Benyamin Murdani was born in Cepu, Central Java, the son of a Javanese railway mechanic and a woman of Javanese-German parentage. Catholic.

1945 He completed his primary school education. Some claims are now being made that he fought briefly with guerrillas as a schoolboy, though this is probably to create the impression that he took part in the anti-Dutch struggle.

1950 He abandoned junior high school in the second grade and entered the Army Officers' Training Centre (Pusat Pendidikan Perwira Angkatan Darat) in Bandung. Graduates from this school, the first Army educational centre, would later become the so-called 'bridging generation' between the '1945 generation' of officers and the younger generation of officers trained at the *Akademi Militer Nasional* (AMN), and subsequently *Akabri*, the Armed Forces Academy which now combines basic officer training for all the forces. This 'bridging generation' would be seen as playing a crucial role in the 1980s in securing 'orderly succession' from Suharto to the younger officers.

1952 After a year's class work and a year as instructor, he joined a combat squad with the rank of sergeant-major, and was assigned to a unit with the West Java Siliwangi Division.

1954 He became a commissioned officer. In January, he volunteered as a trainer with the newly-established Army Command Corps (Korps Komando AD), later to become known as the RPKAD, the paratroop regiment. (In recent years, RPKAD has been given the more elegant, Sanskrit-sounding name, *Kopas-sandha*.)

1956-1958 As an RPKAD company commander with the rank of first lieutenant, he took part in military operations against the Darul Islam in West Java and against regional dissident movements in Sumatra (PRRI) and North Sulawesi (Permesta).

1958 By now a captain in the RPKAD, he was sent to the US

The man appointed in March this year as Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI) and Commander of the Army's security command, KOPKAMTIB, is a paratroop commander with long experience in intelligence work, and a history of diplomatic intrigue in Malaysia and South Korea.

where he received amphibious operational training at the Little Creek naval base in Norfolk, Virginia.

1962 He was sent to eastern Indonesia on operations with the Mandala theatre of war, under the command of Suharto, then a brigadier-general and commander of the Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD). The Mandala had been set up to wage military operations against the Dutch, then still in occupation of West Papua. This is the starting point of his continuing collaboration with Suharto.

January 1962 He gained public acclaim as a 'hero' for leading a company of paratroops dropped near Merauke in the south-east of West Papua then Dutch West New Guinea. Of the 215 troops dropped, only eighty survived. Dispersed over an area wide of the target, they took two months to re-assemble. Murdani was reputedly planning an assault on Merauke in mid-August when a ceasefire between Indonesia and Holland was announced, following the New York Agreement of 15th August 1962. For his exploits in West Papua, Murdani was awarded the top decoration for bravery, the *Bintang Sakti* although in fact he was never engaged in combat.

August-September 1964 As a member of the OPSUS (Special Operations) team of Ali Murtopo, operating under Suharto's guidance, he made secret contacts with Malaysian and British officials to subvert Sukarno's policy of confrontation with Malaysia. In the guise of a Garuda Indonesian Airways ticket-clerk in Bangkok, he headed the permanent liaison team set up by Murtopo to handle this secret operation. This was the time when OPSUS also established contact with leaders of the CIA-backed PRRI-Permesta uprisings who were living in exile in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.

June 1965 He moved to the staff of KOSTRAD, still under Suharto's command, and became an officer with its General Staff II. It was here that he commenced his career in military intelligence operations when he was appointed Assistant I, in charge of KOSTRAD's intelligence.

August 1966 By now a major, he served as liaison officer in charge of arranging for the end of confrontation with Malaysia. He was then appointed charge d'affaires and later deputy head of mission at Indonesia's embassy in Kuala Lumpur.

1971 He was appointed consul-general in South Korea, and later took charge of the Indonesian embassy in Seoul as charge d'affaires. His being dispatched to Seoul was apparently on the advice of US contacts, to give him the opportunity to study South Korea's highly efficient system of repression, imposed at a time when the country was undergoing rapid economic development. During his stay in Seoul he is known to have struck up a long-standing friendship with a South Korean army officer, Chun Doo-hwan, who, like Murdani, has a military career which combines paratroop and intelligence operations. Chun Doo-hwan became President of South Korea in May 1980, a few months after the assassination of President Park and the 'purging coup' which removed a number of top-level army officers from key positions in South Korea.

January 1974 He was suddenly recalled to Jakarta ten days after

the mid-January student demonstrations that had been badly disrupted by provocations organised by Ali Murtopo. As large numbers of students were arrested and being subjected to intensive interrogations, he was placed in command of KOPKAMTIB's Special Tasks (*Satgas*) intelligence unit that took charge of these interrogations. Six months later, he was appointed Assistant I (Intelligence) at the Department of Defence and Security, a position that he was to hold uninterruptedly until March 1983 when he was appointed ABRI commander. It is probably from this point on that he begins to shift away from and outstrip his patron, Ali Murtopo, placing himself in a much more powerful independent position in the military hierarchy. Whilst holding key Army intelligence positions, he retains his crucial link with the so-called 'RPKAD-mafia', thus combining intelligence and operational roles. Like other RPKAD officers, Murdani's military career has never included any tour of duty as an officer with a territorial division, giving him single-minded loyalty to a troop that is known to have a strong *esprit de corps*.

August 1975 He was put in charge of military preparations for the invasion of East Timor. He and other senior combat officers pressed Suharto to take the 'military option' as against the 'intelligence operation' being masterminded by Ali Murtopo and his OPSUS team.

7th December 1975 He commanded the 30,000 Indonesian troops which invaded and captured Dili, the capital of East Timor, and launched a wave of terror in the town. He went on to command the ruthless campaign of terror against the people of East Timor resulting in the death of an estimated one-third (200,000 people) of the population.

1977 He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-general. At 45, he was the youngest officer to have attained this rank under the New Order.

End 1977 He was appointed head of the Strategic Intelligence Centre.

May 1978 He became deputy head of Bakin, the state intelligence coordinating body which brings together the intelligence operations of all the Armed Forces. He was also put in charge of intelligence at KOPKAMTIB. During the course of this year, he was put in charge of several other major operations, among them the central government's team "for the development of East Timor". He is thus responsible not only for the military destruction of East Timor but also for the disruption and manipulation of that country's economy. He acknowledges the fact that he has been nicknamed "the two-headed monster of East Timor".

He was also put in charge of the government's team to handle Vietnamese refugees in Indonesia.

1979-1980 He was in charge of negotiations to purchase reconditioned jet fighters from Israel for the Indonesian Air Force, a deal which, according to some sources, won him a commission of at least 5 per cent. This deal has never been publicly acknowledged in Indonesia because of the negative impact on Muslims. His role in this deal would lend credibility to claims that close working relations have also been established between Indonesia's BAKIN and Israel's Mossad.

Around this time he also made two secret visits to Hanoi on foreign affairs missions, much to the annoyance of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.

March 1981 He directed the operation to storm the hijacked Garuda plane at Bangkok's international airport during which four of the five hijackers were killed. The fifth man, captured alive and apparently unharmed, was dead by the next day when all five bodies were flown to Jakarta. According to press reports at the time, Israeli sources gave advice for this storming operation.

March 1983 He was appointed commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces and concurrently commander of KOPKAMTIB, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, in the reshuffle of cabinet ministers and Armed Forces leadership announced by Suharto after his appointment as president for a fourth term. For the first time under the New Order

(since 1965), the posts of Minister of Defence and Security and Armed Forces commander are separated, which gives Murdani a far more powerful operational role, as he is unencumbered with the administrative and general policy functions that go along with the post of Defence Minister.

☆☆☆☆☆

In "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite" (April 1982) published in *Indonesia* (Cornell University), Murdani was described as "the most redoubtable figure in the (interstitial generation) of what might be called the 'RPKAD mafia'... arguably the second most powerful man in Indonesia". David Jenkins in *FEER* (21st April, 1983) refers to him as "a fighting man" with a long history in the RPKAD, Indonesia's 'praetorian guard'. *Tempo* (2nd April, 1983) describes his appointment as Armed Forces commander as "the bridge between the 1945 generation and the younger generation (graduates of Akabri, the Armed Forces Academy)". The journal also sees his appointment as a move to ensure a smooth transition from the one generation to the other, guaranteeing continuity in the leadership of the Indonesian state.

INDONESIA OCTOBER 1965

I told my story to the stones
the gutters ran with tears
the very houses sweated blood
and were stained red for years

but when I told it to The Times
I got a haughty stare
they had a lot of other news
more suitable for their

Top People; and the Guardian
thought it worth no reply;
a murdered half-a-million,
all innocent, to die

was not their idea of the facts
they really ought to print.
It might only trouble their
readers intelligent.

Corpses in the rivers
dead bodies everywhere,
the C.I.A. had passed that way
and none that year would say them nay.
They closed their eyes and looked away.

Arthur Clegg



Militarisation and equipping ABRI

by: Hendrik Amahorseja

(The first part of this article was published in TAPOL Bulletin No 56, March 1983. We repeat the last paragraph relating to Table 3, which was not included in the last issue.)

Army Equipment (continued)

Apart from the aircraft and helicopters shown in Table 3, the Army also possesses a number of transport ships and Landing Craft Utilities. Last December, two LCUs under construction for the Army were launched in Tanjung Priok (Koja Dock). These vessels are number 41 and 42; they are 32.80 metres long, 8.50 metres wide with a speed of 10 knots. In the middle of 1982, the Territorial Command received an additional 77 V-22 type high-speed motor-boats with a carrying capacity each of 14 soldiers.

Table 3

Aircraft		
Number	Type	
2	C-47	Planes
1	Aerocomander	Planes
1	DHC-2	Planes
1	Beach 18	Planes
18	Gelatik	Planes
16	Bell 205	Helicopters
5	Alloute III	Helicopters
16	BO-105	Helicopters

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter, Dec/Jan 1982, and other sources including Indonesian newspapers.

The Air Force

The Indonesian Air Force has altogether 26,000 members. In general, its planes (Table 4) and helicopters (Table 5) are located in Java. In mid-1982, the Nurtanio company in Bandung received orders from the Air Force for 32 CN-235 aircraft and seven Puma SA-330s. Assembling of these aircraft by Nurtanio comes under a deal concluded between Spain and the Suharto regime (1). It has also been reported that in the 1983/84 financial year, the Air Force will acquire Hercules transport/supply aircraft that can deliver fuel to other aircraft in mid-air.

Table 4

Aeroplanes		
Number	Type	Remarks
14	A-14	
12	F-5E	
4	F-5F	
2	Skyhawk TA-4	
8*	HS Hawk	
16	CA-27 Avon Sabre	
16	OV-10F	
18	C-130H-30/-130B	
1	L-100-30	
1	C-140 Jetstar	
12	C-47	
1	Skyvan	
8	F-27	
6	CASA C-212	
7	DHC-3	
12	Cessna 207/401/402	
4	T-46	
16	T-34C1	
12	Hawk T-53	
4	AS-202 Bravo	
16	A-4E	from Israel
2	TA-4H	from Israel
3	Transall C-160	
20	AS-20	
2	King Air	
1	Boeing 707	

Table 5

Helicopters	
Number	Type
2	Bell 204B
4	UH-34D
1	S-61A
16	BO-105
13	Puma SA-330
25	Bell 47
12	Hughes 500

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982 as well as Indonesian newspapers and other sources.

The Navy

There are 40,000 men in the Indonesian Navy, plus 13,000 in the Marine Corps (KKO) and 1,500 in the Navy's air wing. The main naval bases are in Surabaya, Jakarta and Gorontalo. In addition to warships (Table 6), the Navy possesses four submarines, two of which are type-209 from West Germany and two are W-class subs from the Soviet Union.

Table 6

Number	Type	Remarks
4	US-Jones	
3	Fatahilla	
3	Riga	from USSR
5	Kronshtadt	from USSR
1	US PC-461	
5	Kraljevica	from Yugoslavia
2	Kelabang	
2	Attack	
3	US PGM-39	
4	PSSM MK 5	FAC(M)
4	Lürsen TNC-45	FAC(T)
2	Spear	
6	Carpentaria	
4	T-43	from USSR
3	Corvettes	delivered by Holland in 1981 & 1982
1*	?	from Australia
13	LST	
5	LCU	
38	LCM	

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan, 1982 and other sources including Indonesian newspapers.

* This vessel, called Sigalu, bears the number 857. It is 32.50 metres long, 6.09 metres wide and has a speed of 20 knots. Crew: three officers, 14 non-commissioned officers and 6 other ranks.

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982, as well as Indonesian newspapers and other sources.

* Another 4 to be delivered by British Aerospace. In addition, arrangements for the purchase of five more Hawks are now under way. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 54, January, 1983.

The Marines (KKO)

The Marines consists of about six infantry battalions, one auxiliary regiment and three amphibious battalions equipped with light tanks and APCs. The Marines are armed with 40 mm cannons for air defence. In December 1982, a new KKO corps named "Jala Mengkara" was inaugurated. It has the special task of defending vital off-shore projects.

The Air Wing of the Navy

In addition to its existing aircraft (Table 7), the Navy's air wing is to be reinforced with three Boeing 737s. One of these aircraft is already undergoing trials in Indonesia. After these trials have been completed, the aircraft will be sent back to the USA to be fitted with electronic equipment.

Table 7 Naval Aircraft

Number	Type
20	Nomad
6	CASA C-212
3	C-47
3	Aero Commander

Source: *Pacific Defence Reporter* Dec/Jan 1982, as well as Indonesian newspapers and other sources.

The Navy also possesses a number of helicopters, including five HU-16s, 6 Allouette II/III and 4 BO-105s.

There has been a sharp increase in the money spent by the State on the modernisation and re-equipping of Suharto's military Forces. In the 1978/1979 State budget, the Defence and National Security allocation was sixty-five billion rupiahs (2), but in 1983/1984, a year in which the wages of civil servants have been frozen, food subsidies withdrawn and fuel subsidies greatly reduced, there are no economies on expenditure for Defence and Security, which has been allocated 574 billion rupiahs in the budget (3). This does not include military assistance from abroad or various domestic financial contributions, for example, from Pertamina.

Colonialism and Javanisation

The growth of militarisation taking place under the Suharto military regime is rooted in colonialism. The aggression against East Timor and the annexation of that country are well known

internationally. But some basic historical facts need to be recalled regarding internal practices. During the Dutch colonial era, populations in the various parts of the Dutch colonial empire were classified into several categories. Today, under Suharto's New Order era, these traditions of colonialism have been preserved, though somewhat modified. Indonesian citizens are classified into "the natives" (*pribumi*) and the "non-natives" (*non-pribumi*) such as the Chinese and others not of "pure" Indonesian birth. But these are not the only categories. If we examine certain ethnic and geographical practices since the military regime came to power, it is clearly apparent that the role of the non-Javanese has been on the decline in all fields of government administration, at the centre of state power as well as in the regions. This is most clearly apparent within ABRI. About ninety per cent of senior positions in ABRI are now held by Javanese officers. (4) The same applies to members of ABRI who have been appointed by Suharto to the two legislative chambers, the DPR and the MPR. Not only are they all officers of the rank of colonel or higher. In addition, they are all from Java. (5) This is not a coincidence; it is inseparable from the political strategy of the Suharto regime and its supporters at home and abroad.

At a time when the economic situation is deteriorating, when earnings from exports are falling and foreign debts are increasing and when many social problems are intensifying, General Suharto will certainly continue to pursue his so-called "smiling policy" in such forms as regeneration of the ABRI leadership and personnel used in other state sectors. As with similar policies in the past, this is solely aimed at prolonging the life of the Suharto regime. There will be no fundamental change in Indonesian society. Anyone who raises demands for democratisation and presses for the implementation of basic human rights will continue to be accused of engaging in criminal or subversive activity.

Footnotes

- 1 Under a new deal with Textron Inc. (USA), announced in late 1982, Nurtanio is to co-produce one hundred Bell Model 412 helicopters for military and commercial use. (*Asia Monitor*, Vol. VI, No. 4, Fourth Quarter, 1982, 6/4)
- 2 *Kompas*, 11th January, 1978.
- 3 *Kompas*, 7th January, 1983.
- 4 *Indonesia* No. 33 (April) 1982. Cornell University, USA.
- 5 See list of names of DPR and MPR members appointed to represent ABRI, in Presidential Decision No. 150/M, 1982, and the names listed in Presidential Decision No. 151/M, 1982, dated 14th September 1982.

Students warned: Criticising P4 is subversive

Indonesian students in West Berlin, under pressure from the Indonesian Consulate-General in West Berlin for so-called 'subversive activities', have pressed the Indonesian authorities very hard to give a public account of the reasons for this intimidation. As we reported in our last issue, several Indonesian students have had their passports renewed for only six months instead of the normal two years as a warning that they are under official surveillance. (See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 56, March 1983, page 11)

Board members of the West Berlin branch of the overseas students association, *Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia* (PPI) asked for a discussion with officials of the Consulate-General. The discussion took place on 16th March (see *Majalah Gotong-Royong*, early 1983, no date, page 39-42, for a Protocol of the meeting). Asked for the criteria for deciding whether someone had acted 'against the national interests' (the pretext that has been used for refusing to renew passports longer than six months), an official said that national security covers a wide range of activities including ideology as well as social and cultural, national defence and security affairs. The authorities were concerned, he said, that criticisms being made by students overseas were 'soiling Indonesia's good reputation' and 'obstructing relations with West Germany'. The official referred specifically to newsletters published in West Berlin by another overseas Indonesian organisation, *Perhimpunan Indonesia* in its

publication entitled *Berita Tanah Air* which had, he said, distorted the decision adopted in 1978 by the People's Assembly (MPR) concerning Pancasila indoctrination courses, the so-called P4 courses. Such 'distortion', the students were told, is 'an act of subversion', and the man in charge of the publication, I Gusti Njoman Aryana, should not be surprised if his passport is renewed for only three months, or withdrawn altogether.

The offending *Berita Tanah Air* report which appeared on 20th February 1983 (*Newsletter* No. 15) challenged the way P4 courses were being used to 'impose likemindedness' among Indonesians (*seimbang-serasi-selaras*) and as an attempt to eliminate conflict in Indonesian society. The Newsletter pointed to the role of conflict in the popular Javanese epic dramas such as the *Baharata Yudha*, and to the conflict of interests between workers and employers. It also quoted Maqdir Ismail, an LBH lawyer in Indonesia as saying:

The P4 courses are aimed at making people act and speak alike: they are, to put it crudely, aimed at turning people into yesmen. They destroy creativity because people are 'chained' to what the government has defined as being the line. Everyone must think and act in a way that supports the status quo.

The item, "Indonesian Students Could Lose Passports" in *TAPOL Bulletin* No 56, March 1983, was based on reports published in *Berita dan Analisa*, March 1983, published by PPI Berlin. We apologise for not mentioning the source at the time.

Lawyers protest at accord between judges and prosecutors

A meeting held in Jakarta last month to "establish closer harmony and cooperation between the Supreme Court, judges and public prosecutors has evoked strong protest from lawyers. Typical of this angry response is a statement by Adnan Buyung Nasution, chairman of the Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes, who stressed that "people seeking justice can only suffer if these people reach accord".

The meeting was convened by the Supreme Court chairman, Mudjono, the Justice Minister Ali Said, and the Attorney-General Ismael Saleh. A new composite term, *makehja* has been coined to symbolise this three-way collaboration. 'Ma' stands for *Mahkamah Agung* (Supreme Court), 'keh' stands for *Kehakiman* (Justice Ministry) and 'ja' stands for *Jaksa Agung* (Attorney-General). The four-day get-together was thus called the *First Makehja Working Meeting*.

Buyung said he feared that such coordination would put an end to any independence for the judges, in particular in their interpretation of the law. "Jurisprudence constantly develops and changes, and it is out of the question for interpretations of the law to be laid down in a meeting of this nature." Recent develop-

ments, he said, had indeed tended towards executive interference in the judiciary.

"If top-level accord between law-enforcement agencies continues, the ones to suffer will be those seeking justice from the courts." He was particularly worried by the prospect that the courts would seek accord with the government in cases where people were suing the government for damages when, for instance, land expropriations had occurred.

Responding to these protests, the Justice Minister Ali Said claimed that the meeting had been held to standardise interpretation of the new Procedural Code (KUHAP 1981). "If that is their purpose, why did they not invite lawyers and barristers to take part," retorted Buyung. Another lawyer, Albert Hasibuan, agreed. "The articles of KUHAP are absolutely clear," he said, "and there is no need for anyone to interpret them." He feared the consequences if *makehja* collaboration became institutionalised.

Source: *Tempo*, 25th April, 1983

Book review

Continued from page 7

collaborators is functional to the regime: they are allowed to exist and to voice their criticisms (up to a point) in order to be overruled, thus deflecting criticisms of the system as a whole. The authors stress that their use of the term 'critical collaborator' is not pejorative and make a point of expressing their admiration for the LBH. But despite their express intentions, the choice of terminology is to say the least unfortunate. For a European reader in particular, the expression cannot fail to have negative connotations associated with the experience of the Second World War and no amount of authorial intention can remove them. Clearly, the LBH's appeal to principles of law is powerless in the face of the New Order's perversion of even the most elementary principles of justice. Clearly it is powerless in any conflict with KOPKAMTIB and its massive resources, financial and otherwise. Functionally, it may well be true that the LBH exists in order to be overruled, but does that destroy the moral value of its stance? Or its importance for any campaign based upon a demand for human rights in Indonesia?

Guide to a Labyrinthine 'Legal' System

Injustice is by no means an invention of the Suharto regime. Despite his anti-colonialist nationalist rhetoric, Sukarno adopted the framework of Dutch colonial law intact, even adding two anti-subversion decrees to the legal armoury he inherited. These were subsequently ratified by Suharto and invoked to obtain death sentences during the G30S trials. Conveniently, 'subversion'

remains so ill-defined as to mean virtually anything the regime wishes it to mean. Like the PKI itself, subversion functions as a catch-all category to be invoked with deadly effect in the magical ceremonies of event creation. If the New Order can recuperate colonial law to such effect, how much more easily can it adapt Javanese political tradition to its own ends. Thus, Suharto, like Sukarno before him, becomes the physical embodiment of the *Pancasila*, the *Ratu Adil* or Just Prince of tradition. The power of the Ratu Adil requires no justification or foundation in law: on the contrary, law proceeds from his person. Criticism of his actions is by definition subversive and therefore illegal.

The great strength of this study lies in its use of documentation and of material which is not readily available. It is a clear guide to the complexities of a frequently labyrinthine 'legal' system. Appendices provide a comprehensive survey of basic law and security legislation, together with the text of decrees establishing the Extraordinary Military Tribunal and other documents. The historical account of the New Order regime weaves together legislative and political history with eye witness accounts of torture, imprisonment and violence from *tapols*, students and Islamic militants. Accounts of the horrors of the system will not, sad to say, be unfamiliar to readers of *TAPOL Bulletin*. What may be less familiar is the working of the system as a whole. The account of the growth and powers of KOPKAMTIB provides a valuable addition to the available literature on contemporary Indonesia. As a guidebook to the nightmare system of Suharto's New Order, **Indonesia: Law, Propaganda and Terror** is indispensable.

David Macey



SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Annual rates (for six issues) are as follows:

	UK, Europe and overseas/surface
Individuals	£ 7.50
Institutions	£12.00
	Overseas — airmail
Individuals	£10.00
Institutions	£14.00

TAPOL's Giro account number: 56 781 4009

Overseas subscribers please note: all cheques not drawn on a London bank must add the equivalent of £1.50 to cover bank charges.

Subscribers from non-EEC European countries should also bear this in mind.

Australian subscribers can pay to:

Mr. Siauw Giok Djin
19 Rosella Avenue,
South Clayton
Victoria 3169

Subscriptions and correspondence to:

TAPOL
8a, Treport Street,
London SW18 2BP, UK