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
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# Stop the execution of Timzar Zubil!



Timzar Zubil at his trial in 1978 (Photo: Tempo)

Timzar Zubil, a journalist and Muslim activist in North Sumatra, is to be executed "in the near future", according to a statement by the head of the North Sumatra Higher Prosecutor's Office, Mr. Hasan Kartomihardjo, and published in the Jakarta daily, *Merdeka*, on 15th February, 1983.

Timzar Zubil was tried in 1978 under the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law "for acts against the state" and for upholding Islamic law which is seen as a betrayal of the state dogma of Panca Sila (the Five Principles). He was accused of being the leader of a discussion group which was said to be linked to a "North Sumatra War Command" although witnesses at his trial as well as the defendant denied that any such "command" existed.

News that clemency was turned down and his death sentence upheld by the President was reported more than a year ago in *Tempo* (20th February, 1982). Later, the British Foreign office checked this report at the request of TAPOL and confirmed in a letter to TAPOL (28th October, 1982) that it was true.

## Procedural Irregularities

1. The defendant was not allowed to appoint his own defence lawyers; the lawyers who defended him were court appointees. (*Tempo*, 20th February, 1982)
2. The defendant was not willing to accept the jurisdiction of the court, and refused to comply with the appeals procedure. His

lawyers, against his wishes, appealed to the President for clemency and this was rejected.

3. Zubil's family then requested the help of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta (LBH), complaining that the President's rejection was premature since prior appeals procedure had not

*Please turn to page 5*

**New information confirms resistance in E. Timor . page 7**

## Also in this issue:

- Militarisation digs deeper ..... page 3**
- Parties must give up politics ..... page 4**
- Teachers must spy on pupils ..... page 6**
- UN Commission supports self-determination for E. Timor ..... page 9**
- More W. Papuans flee across border ..... page 10**
- Indonesian students could lose passports ..... page 11**
- Guest column: Militarisation and equipping ABRI ..... page 14**

# The Army steam-rollers the MPR

This year's session of the MPR, Indonesia's upper chamber, was a non-event. This is hardly surprising considering its composition plus the fact that all decisions had been finalised in advance so as "to avoid fierce and sensational debates during the actual session", according to one Jakarta newspaper (see page 4). There was never any chance that disagreement could arise, that voting could take place, still less that some members might stage a walkout as happened in 1978 when Muslim party (PPP) members protested against the compulsory enforcement of Panca Sila indoctrination. This time the PPP members meekly voted away their own right to uphold their own religious principles.

But the session was also a non-event because of the absence of any public debate and criticism, let alone protest, at the steam-rolling of the session by the military. This is a measure of the extent to which militarisation and repression have now gone in Indonesia. Students have not only lost their right to organise on campus; anyone wanting to go to university must first give a written undertaking not to engage in political activity. Even children in school, as we report in this issue, are now being

subjected to political surveillance. Workers, faced with mass dismissals and falling wages, confront intensified military intervention when they defend their right to demand better conditions; KOPKAMTIB has now set up "detection" or "early detection" teams in so-called strategic areas (where foreign investment is high) in order to forestall industrial disputes. Peasants confront intimidation by military forces if they refuse to abandon their land rights. Lawyers must contend with the same intimidatory powers if they give legal assistance to people whose rights have been abused.

As the impact of the world recession hits the Indonesian economy more severely, the Suharto government will try to tackle the crisis by lowering living standards. This can only mean that the level of repression will increase as those who are hardest hit attempt to fight back. The army and KOPKAMTIB are better placed than ever to use any means to deal with protest, now that Indonesia's brand of militarisation — the *dwi fungsi* (the military's "dual function" in social as well as defence matters) has been legalised and given permanence. (Basic Law on Defence and Security, Law No. 20, 1982.)

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## Readers' letters

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### The RMS question

In *TAPOL Bulletin* No.55 Mr. Klemens Ludwig reacted to a report regarding South Moluccans in Bulletin No.54 (p.21). An Editor's Note in No.55 rightly points out that the Dutch Indonesia Committee was not responsible for the formulations regarding the RMS movement in No. 54. However, this does not imply that I, a member of the Dutch Committee (writing on my own responsibility) can agree with Mr. Ludwig's way of presenting the historical background of the 'Republic of the South Moluccas' (RMS).

When on 25th April 1950 a 'Republic of the South Moluccas' was proclaimed in Ambon, the Linggadjati Agreement of 1946/47 to which Mr. Ludwig refers was no longer in force. Moreover, the Agreement had never been applicable to East Indonesia; the Moluccas had become, in 1946, part of the newly created State of East Indonesia. Consequently, the legality of the Ambon proclamation had to be judged on the basis of the Treaty concluded in The Hague at the Round Table Conference of 1949. According to the provisions of this Treaty, any of the states incorporated in the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, of which East Indonesia was one, was entitled to secede from the federation. But such a right of secession had *not* been granted to *part* of such a state. In April 1950, the state of East Indonesia was still in existence; but it was expected at that time that the Parliament of East Indonesia would decide to join the Republic of Indonesia, which actually occurred a few months later.

Therefore, even if the wish to stay out of the overall state structure could be

interpreted as being rooted in the political aspirations of a majority of the South Moluccan population at that time — which is not at all certain in view of the large number of Muslims among the Ambonese — the legal basis for the proclamation of the RMS remained shaky.

It is certainly true, as Bulletin No.54 writes, that South Moluccan *separatism* (which is a correct term!) was actively supported by Dutch right-wing colonialist elements. Not only did Dr. Chr. Soumokil, leader of the RMS, have strong support from some officers in the Dutch Armed Forces at the time when he issued his proclamation; the RMS also received strong support in the Netherlands from anti-Sukarno elements concentrated in a foundation called *Door Eeuwen Trouw* ('Faithful through the Centuries', referring to the loyalties of Ambonese through the centuries to the Crown of the Netherlands). These right-wing elements had from the start opposed the Republic of Indonesia ruled by Sukarno. However, recognition of the freedom of Indonesia won a two-thirds majority in the Dutch Parliament, and consequently the Dutch government attempted to build good relationships with the newly created Indonesian state.

The way the demobilised Moluccan military people were treated after their arrival in the Netherlands (it seems that they had not even been told before their embarkment that they would lose their military status!) is certainly a shameful story and might explain a lot about the bad feelings towards the Dutch in the course of time. It is untrue, however, that it was the *Dutch* who rejected the wish of these Ambonese to go home. It was the

Indonesian government which was only prepared to receive these Moluccans as individuals accepting a position as citizens of the Indonesian state.

In the course of time, as a consequence of Sukarno's moderate policies towards opponents who had initially supported RMS, popular support for the RMS in the Moluccas decreased; the RMS finally became a movement which found its main support among Moluccans in the Netherlands though it has never achieved international recognition of any significance.

At present, there is certainly opposition to the Suharto regime in the Moluccas; after all it was Suharto who, in 1966, soon after his actual accession to power, had the leader of the RMS rebels, Dr. Soumokil, executed. But the present popular opposition in the Moluccas is not basically different from the opposition in most of Indonesia.

As has been correctly pointed out in Bulletin No.54, the group to which the Moluccans who were tried by the court in Assen belong (the appeal court in Leeuwarden has fortunately acquitted the whole group), have understood this and therefore no longer support the RMS idea, but oppose the Suharto regime in solidarity with other anti-Suharto groups. Of course, the issue of regional autonomy remains a moot one to be decided in the future in a democratic way.

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For more readers' letters, please turn to page 13



# Militarisation digs deeper as general becomes vice-president

The choice of General Umar Wirahadikusumo as Indonesia's vice-president for 1983/1988 is but a sign of how far the process of militarisation has gone in Indonesia. Any pretence for retaining a figure-head role for civilians at the top executive level has been abandoned. It may also signal too that the vice-presidency has ceased to be a figure-head position, for the present occupant, a devout Suharto man, will either be Suharto's successor or the man who oversees a "safe" succession in the case of Suharto's death.

General Umar is the most senior of Indonesia's generals after General Nasution and General Suharto. He is described by **Tempo** (5th March 1983) as the man who was "the closest person to Suharto, the first one to support him" in crushing the Communist Party (PKI) following the 30th September events in 1965. He was then military commander of the Jakarta command, and was the first provincial commander to order the suspension of activities of the PKI and its associated mass organisations in his region of command, on 18th October 1965. Less than two months later, well before Suharto had taken over the powers of the presidency on 11th March 1966 and banned the PKI nationwide, General Umar imposed his own ban in Jakarta.

At the beginning of December 1965, Umar took over from Suharto as Commander of KOSTRAD, the strategic command, the position from which Suharto launched his own takeover of power and initiated the slaughter and round-up of millions of people in the last quarter of the year. Umar later collaborated with General Ali Murtopo in reversing Indonesia's policy of confrontation with Malaysia, which was at the time a "secret" operation. After holding the position of Army Deputy-Commander for two years, he was

appointed Army Commander in 1969 and remained in that position until 1973. It was then that he was "retired" from active service and appointed Head of the State Auditing Board.

Like Suharto, Umar first joined military service during the days of the Japanese occupation and became a local commander of the Japanese-created **Peta** in Tasikmalaya. After independence in 1945 and until his appointment as a senior officer at the Jakarta garrison, Umar served consistently with the Siliwangi (West Java) Division, and played an active part in Siliwangi's operations against the PKI during the Madiun (Central Java)

affair in 1948. He therefore has a long history of participation in the Indonesian Army's operations to crush communism.

## Mr "Clean"

Indonesian press comments about Umar since his unexpected emergence as Suharto's team-mate have eulogised him as efficient, "clean" and a man of few words. No one, publicly at least, has drawn attention to the fact that during his tenure as the country's chief auditor for the last ten years, corruption in the state apparatus has grown steadily worse.

To provide an appearance of his appointment as being a democratic choice, the formal proposal for Umar's appointment was made by the three military-support groups in the MPR, the Golkar, Armed Forces and regional (presidential) appointees' groups. These groups together control 83 per cent of the 920 seats in the MPR.

Source for biographical data: **Tempo**, 5th March 1983.



Umar (right) being installed as KOSTRAD commander, December 1965



Umar installs General Poniman as Jakarta commander. Poniman is now Minister for Defence and Security.



## "...it's not a Parliament, just a government department"

*A few weeks before the MPR assembled to elect the President and Vice-President and adopt a host of new decisions about state policy, all unanimously of course, a Jakarta weekly, **Topik** carried a cover story revealing a few home truths about Indonesia's two "legislative" organs. We summarise the article below:*

Members of Indonesia's newly constituted Parliament are now describing the body as a "government department", nothing more than a part of the executive. The word "dewan" in its title (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), some of them are saying, should be changed to "departemen".

The cause of their cynicism is the new regime imposed on the legislature since General Amir Machmud, ex-Minister of the Interior, was appointed Chairman of the DPR after the general elections last year.<sup>1</sup>

**Topik** quotes DPR members from the non-governmental parties, PPP (Muslim) and PDI (Nationalist and Christian) as complaining bitterly about the

bureaucratic control to which their groups are being subjected by the DPR's Secretary-General who has taken it upon himself to issue instructions to various DPR consultative bodies, to check the attendance records of members (by rights, the prerogative of the groups represented in the DPR), and to insist that secretarial staff allocated to help the groups report to him about everything they are required to do.

The **Topik** report however takes the issue beyond that of DPR members complaining about bureaucratic abuse. It also discusses the more fundamental



problem of the DPR's composition, and quotes an academic, Jimmly AS as saying that the DPR is far more a voice of those in power than of the people whom it is supposed to represent. "The fact is that the membership is determined chiefly by those in power," which applies to the ones who are elected as well as the ones who are appointed, he says. "Parliament has become powerless because of the quiescence (*mlempemnya*) of the parties." This is shown by the fact that the choice of party candidates for the elections is in the hands of the executive. (All lists must first be screened by the government.)

Another point brought out in the **Topik** report is that, under its new chairman, the DPR is simply a tool of the executive. "Decisions taken by the chairman become decisions of the DPR," complained one lawyer quoted by the journal, whereas according to the rules, DPR decisions should only be reached after consultation between the groups within it.

#### Mulya Lubis: DPR Members Have No Independence

Mulya Lubis, a director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, described the DPR, in

the **Topik** report, as nothing more than the extended arm of the executive. Its budget prerogative, for instance, had become the sole monopoly of the executive. Nor does the DPR exercise any control over the use of public funds. Visits of inspection by its members, to the regions, to prisons and so on, "are nothing more than tourist jaunts," he said.

As for the members themselves, the only people appointed are those who are close to, or considered in a favourable light by, the men in power. This applies too to the ones elected at the general elections. "Are these people truly elected by the people? Don't close your eyes to the facts!" Lubis described DPR members as "parrots, yesmen, like birds in a cage. They can jabber a lot but they have no freedom."

#### The Controllers Controlled by the Government

**Topik** also draws attention to the fact that the vast majority of the members of the higher legislative chamber, the MPR, are in fact appointed by the government. "Initially, this was supposed to be temporary, but it has now become a fixture." So we are in the ludicrous

situation, the weekly goes on, where the President appoints the members of the MPR and then the MPR appoints the President. "The MPR and the DPR have been completely tamed because both bodies are dominated by Golkar and the Armed Forces . . . The very thought of anyone voicing the aspirations of the people becomes (for them) a psychological burden."

It is becoming more and more obvious that the legislature is being dictated to . . . The executive simply goes ahead and does just what it likes, then asks the legislature for a stamp of approval. The roles have been reversed. The ones who should be doing the controlling are the ones who are being controlled.

- (1) In dissident circles in Jakarta, Amir Machmud's appointment is seen as a move to halt the tendency, established over the past few years, for workers hamstrung in their labour disputes and peasants involved in land disputes to take their complaints to Parliament as a way of airing and publicising their grievances. The previous chairman, Daryatmo, also a military man, was at least amenable to such approaches. Amir Machmud by contrast is one of the most hawkish of the generals in power.

## Parties must give up politics

The two non-governmental political parties in Indonesia lost whatever meaning they had retained under "Panca Sila democracy" by decisions adopted by the MPR (the upper chamber) in its 1983 session in March this year. The main onslaught against the last vestiges of their existence as political parties came in the form of a decision requiring all political parties to have only one political creed, the Panca Sila. This means that the PPP may no longer propagate Islamic ideals, nor may the PDI pursue whatever tattered form of nationalism it has tried to cling to.

The Assembly also tore up its own constitutional right to amend the Constitution by deciding that any amendments will now have to be adopted by means of a referendum. General Suharto launched this idea several years ago, presenting it as a way of making sure that no attempts to alter the Constitution or undermine the Panca Sila could ever succeed.

The decisions, adopted by acclamation, had already been drafted and finalised by the MPR Working Committee weeks before the MPR session opened. In their eleven-day session, the MPR members had little more to do than ratify these decisions — "follow the script", as the **Far Eastern Economic Review** put it (17th February, 1983) — and make speeches explaining why they agreed.

As one Jakarta newspaper, quoted but not named by the **FEER**, put it:

This obviously is the advantage of Panca Sila democracy in which controversial and complicated subjects can be discussed and settled beforehand (through committee work). Therefore it is not necessary any more to hold fierce and sensational debates during the actual session as in the case of parliamentary democracy in the West.

Finally, for the record, it is worth recording that in his opening speech, General Suharto told the Assembly that "under Panca Sila democracy, there is no such thing as an opposition". (Perhaps foreign commentators who still persist in referring to the PPP and the PDI as "opposition parties" will now stop doing

so.) Suharto also announced that 1,800,000 government employees and 150,000 members of the Armed Forces have been through "P4" Panca Sila indoctrination courses, as a result of which, he declared, "there are enough signs to show that the Panca Sila is more deeply rooted than ever before". (**Tempo**, 5th March, 1983)

#### GLOSSARY

**DPR** The *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat* (People's Representative Council) is Indonesia's lower chamber. 364 members are chosen through so-called general elections; the remaining 96 are appointed Armed Forces 'representatives'. Golkar occupies nearly 70 per cent of the 'elected' seats.

**MPR** The *Majelis Pemusyawaratan Rakyat* (People's Consultative Assembly) is Indonesia's upper chamber, composed of the 460 members of the DPR plus 460 members appointed by the Executive. 83 per cent of MPR members are members of the Army-backed Golkar, representatives of the Armed Forces or are presidential/Executive appointees. The MPR meets every five years to elect the President and Vice-President and adopt decisions on the broad lines of state policy.

**PPP** The *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* (Development Unity Party) is the enforced fusion of Islamic parties, created in 1973.

**PDI** The *Partai Demokratis Indonesia* (Indonesian Democratic Party) is the enforced fusion of the non-Islamic parties (nationalist and Christian), also created in 1973.

# Muslim 'subversion' trial opens just before MPR begins

With less than a month to go before the 1983 session of the MPR (upper chamber) was scheduled to begin, the trial opened in Jakarta of Adah Djaelani, a Muslim who is being charged under the Anti-Subversion Law with plotting to revive the Darul Islam movement and to subvert the 'Panca Sila state'.

Political observers in Jakarta see the timing of this trial as having been deliberately planned to issue warnings about the threat of Muslim subversion in the run-up to the MPR session, "to justify the security precautions taken by the government" and "to discredit the Muslims" (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 24th February 1983). The *Review* recalls that last year, just two days before the 1982 general election campaign began, another Muslim, Imran bin Muhammed Zein, was sentenced to death on charges connected with the hijack affair. (See also *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 52, July 1982)

## Darul Islam Aims Abandoned Long Ago, Says Defendant

In his indictment, the prosecution claimed that not long after the defendant and others surrendered and accepted an amnesty, they started plotting again and organised underground movements in

West, Central and East Java, in Aceh, Central and South Sumatra, and in Sulawesi. Djaelani strongly denies this. He acknowledges that he was a commander in the Darul Islam army which fought a protracted guerrilla war in West Java and elsewhere in Indonesia, aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state. The movement was led by S. M. Kartosuwiryo. Following the movement's defeat in 1962, some 30,000 followers, according to *Tempo* (19th February 1983) surrendered, were granted amnesties and rehabilitated into society. The defendant insists that no plans have been made to revive the movement.

Djaelani told the court that he and others had indeed set up DI congregations solely for the purpose of preaching and religious education; they had no pretensions of opposing the Panca Sila or trying to overthrow the state. On the basis of his evidence, one of the defence lawyers reminded the court that a person "cannot be punished because of his aspirations".

A large number of people have been arrested over the last couple of years in connection with this alleged plot. According to the *Review*, they include officials employed by the MPR and DPR secretariats, personnel from universities and high schools, a member of the previous

Parliament, and other government officials. *Tempo* reports that no less than 190 people are in detention in connection with this case. Eight are due to be tried shortly in Jakarta, and one is currently on trial in Surabaya.

## Chief Prosecution Witness Works for Army

The chief prosecution witness, Ateng Djaelani, who provided the court with most of the assertions on the basis of which the defendant is being charged, was formerly a close associate of the defendant's in the Darul Islam, and surrendered together with him in 1962. For many years however, he has been on the payroll of the West Java (Siliwangi) Divisional Command.

According to the *FEER*, this latest anti-subversion trial has been greeted with more than the usual cynicism in Jakarta. One Jakarta newspaper, it writes, is concerned that the country's serious social and economic problems are not being addressed, and adds editorially:

Those are some of the thoughts that should now be keeping knowledgeable nationals busy for the right answer, not the Pancasila blah-blah or some delayed trials of defunct closet skeletons.

Sources: *FEER*, 24th February, and *Tempo* 19th February, 1983


*Continued from page 1*

been undertaken.

4. Following the presidential rejection, the LBH urged the President to reverse this decision, and condemned the use of the death sentence as a violation of human rights. In particular, LBH lawyers reject the use of the death sentence in political cases. (*Tempo*, 20th February, 1982)

5. The *Merdeka* news item referred to above reports Mr. Hasan Kartomihardjo as saying:

... Timzar Zubil's execution will definitely take place. At the moment some witnesses are still being interrogated and Timzar himself is being summoned too before the execution is to take place.



(Tempo, 12th March 1983)

This suggests that interrogations are still going on in connection with Timzar Zubil's case. On what basis, then, has it been decided to proceed "definitely" with his execution?

## Political Motives Surrounding Muslim Trials

A number of trials against Muslim dissidents in the last 18 months have clearly been timed to coincide with political events such as the 1982 general elections and the March 1983 session of Indonesia's upper chamber (MPR). At the MPR session, the Muslim party (PPP) was forced to support a Decree stipulating that all parties and organisations must abandon their own creeds and accept the Panca Sila as the sole ideology. The trials are seen as a deliberate effort by the government to intimidate Muslims and create the impression that Indonesia faces the threat of disruption from people who oppose the Panca Sila for reasons of their Islamic beliefs.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that the rejection of commutation for Zubil was made public in February 1982, shortly before the 1982 general election campaign was due to begin, and that the report of his imminent execution appeared just two weeks before the MPR session opened on 1st March, 1983.

**Protests and Calls for a Stay of Execution** should be sent to:

1. President Suharto, Office of the President, Jalan Veteran 17, JAKARTA, Indonesia
2. Commander of KOPKAMTIB, C/o Department of Defense and Security, Jalan Merdeka Barat 13, JAKARTA, Indonesia
3. Lt. Gen. Ali Said S.H., Department of Justice, Jalan Hayam Wuruk 7, JAKARTA, Indonesia.

Please send copies to TAPOL



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## Teachers must spy on pupils

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Teachers in secondary schools in East Java have been instructed by the regional office of education to compile secret dossiers on their pupils. They are required to complete questionnaires for each child in their class, answering questions about the political activities of their parents and the child's own "subversive activities, political practices, criminal record and involvement in fights".

One local East Java Assembly member said that this would draw teachers into the work of the security apparatus. Another person who chairs the East Java association of private schools said that it seemed to be being implied that if a school-child's parent opposed the government, the child would automatically be a dissident as well.

One parent commented that such dossiers could affect the chances of employment after the pupil left school, recalling that graduates from universities in Bandung are prevented from getting jobs in the civil service if they were active in the student movement while at university.

An official at the education department claimed that the purpose of the questionnaire is to enable teachers to know the family background of their pupils. "Without such knowledge," he said, "there is little chance of education being successful."

Some teachers have shown extreme reluctance to complete the questionnaires. "Children in their teens are not involved in the political activities of their parents. They (the authorities) are turning us into intelligence agents," said one.

Indeed, comments **Tempo** (26th February, 1983) which has reported this scandal:

The teachers are required to carry out these investigations secretly, to scrape around for information from various sources so as to discover the background of the parents. Pupils and their parents can be asked for information for the questionnaires, provided they are not aware of the reason why such information is being sought.

### Police supervision of schools

The police chief in one section of Jakarta is meanwhile drawing up a plan to require local police officers to "give guidance" to schoolchildren in their vicinity. The plan will require police officers to attend roll-calls as inspectors, as a way of bringing them into direct communication with the pupils as well as with the teachers. The four police officers at the district police-station will be required to visit regularly between them all the 200 secondary schools in their district for this purpose. (**Merdeka**, 19th November 1982)

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## Army intimidates peasants

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Villagers from five villages in South Lampung, Sumatra have complained bitterly about military intervention to prevent them from cultivating land that has been illegally taken over by a state-owned plantation. The land, more than 676 hectares in all, was seized by the plantation eleven years ago and used for the production of cloves and other cash crops. The villagers who own the land succeeded eventually in obtaining a document in October 1980 from the Governor of Lampung instructing the plantation to return the land to its rightful owners. The order has however been ignored, and villagers' attempts to cultivate their own crops have met with resistance from the company.

In November 1982, two local military commanders intervened in the dispute on the side of the company. The villagers from two of the villages were summoned to attend a meeting which was described as being an occasion for them to present their complaints to the local administrative authorities. When they turned up for the meeting, they found themselves confronted by the two Army officers who warned them not to proceed with their planting of crops.

One villager describes how he was threatened and intimidated by the commander of the Sidomulyo military district; he was, he said, subjected to interrogation with violence and beaten for insisting on his right to toil the land.

In an effort to obtain protection against this military intervention, the villagers have appealed to the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the Interior, and other government authorities in Jakarta. They are deeply resentful that they have been prevented from enjoying the proceeds of their own land for eleven years.

Source: **Merdeka**, 26th November 1982

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## Subversion charge for distributing "state secrets"

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A former journalist of the banned Muslim daily, **Abadi** is on trial for subversion in Jakarta for obtaining and distributing government documents said to be "state secrets". One of the documents was a report by the Department of Defence and Security relating to plans for the 1982 general elections. The other, from the same Department, was entitled "Guidance for Social Communications with the Muslim Community".

The man on trial is Hasan Suraatmadja who was first arrested in 1978, together with **Abadi's** former editor, Soemarso Soemarsono, also accused of distributing "secret documents". (Soemarso was detained for several years, then released because of ill-health; he died shortly afterwards.) On that occasion, Hasan was tried on similar charges and sentenced to two years and four months imprisonment. A year after his release in 1980, having served the full term of his sentence, he was re-arrested on new charges and has now been brought to trial for a second time.

According to evidence presented in court, the documents in question had been delivered to a small printing works to be bound, without any indication that they were "state secrets".

The prosecution argued that the documents were "secret" because they were only intended to be read by a limited number of officials. Hasan is being charged on the basis of a Law on Archives which defines all government documents, even those received from private, non-government concerns, as being for internal circulation only and therefore "state secrets". For good measure however, the defendant has in addition been charged with subversion. His defence lawyer strongly protested against the subversion charge. He also entered a number of demurrers against legal aspects of the trial, all of which were rejected by the court.

Hasan was also formerly a branch secretary of the Muslim youth organisation, *Gerakan Pemuda Islam*.

Source: **Tempo**, 5th February 1983

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## Anti-subversion trial in Aceh

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A man identified in press reports only as AJ bin H is on trial in Lhokseumawe district court for his involvement in the Aceh liberation struggle. He is said to have joined up with the movement called the "GPLHT" in the official terminology (box, P.8) in 1970. He became territorial deputy-commander of Pase region in North Aceh, and was arrested in October 1980.

The charges against him are that, both as an individual and together with others, he "corrupted the state ideology of Panca Sila and damaged the unity of the state, undermining its security". He is also accused of "causing splits and disorders, disturbances and anxieties in society on a wide scale within the territory of the motherland."

Source: **Berita Buana**, 5th February, 1983.

# New information confirms that resistance and opposition continue despite repression

East Timorese refugees reaching Lisbon around the turn of the year have provided new information about conditions in East Timor which conflict sharply with Indonesian claims that "security" has now been established and hardly any resistance remains. Their evidence, together with information contained in articles that have appeared recently in the Indonesian press, shows that resistance is still widespread.

Articles from two Indonesian publications, **Tempo** and **Sinar Harapan**, have become available, written following a trip to East Timor in January of over two dozen senior journalists and editors from all the major Jakarta publications. We quote extensively from the **Tempo** article and comment on the **Sinar Harapan** articles.

## Information from refugee sources

Below are summaries of refugees' testimony published in **Timor Newsletter** (January 1983). They spoke in all cases anonymously, for the obvious reasons.

**Witness 1** reached Lisbon in late 1982 after spending several months in Jakarta arranging his papers. He explained that he left Timor "for fear of his life and (because of) the absence of the rule of law". He did a "tour" of key Indonesian prisons after surrendering to the Army in 1978. He was first held in a detention centre in Baucau together with about a thousand prisoners, and was severely beaten under interrogation. All prisoners were forced daily to "jump on the spot a hundred times although many were in poor condition and some were old people". He was falsely accused of being a Fretilin supporter (in fact, he had previously been imprisoned by the Fretilin). Like others accused of Fretilin sympathies in Baucau prison, he was given electric shock treatment and had burns all over his body. Torture in Baucau, he said, was directed by a Major Genap of the Army intelligence.

Later he was transferred to Comarca Prison in Dili which was extremely overcrowded, with no proper sanitary facilities and a high incidence of tuberculosis. Things may have improved since the International Red Cross gained access to East Timor in 1979 but he is certain prisoners there are still suffering great hardships, and some have been there for very long terms. He met Timorese there in 1979 who had been there since 1975 and

same time and hour in various parts of Timor . . . The Javanese (use) the *hansip*<sup>1</sup> to fight against their brothers . . . Thus, Timorese kill Timorese and the Islamic Javanese stand and laugh making money, robbing and destroying . . . (Letter dated 12 October 1982)

The country has been closed to all corners of the world so that we have heard nothing of what is being said about Timor. What is certain is that since August, the Front has been considerably active and is winning more territory, although it is very limited by the lack of outside assistance. (Letter dated 22 November 1982)

**Witness 3** received a letter in December with the following:

Speaking of Tace Tolo and Areia Branca, these are sites where the Indonesians are accustomed to liquidate and martyrise Timorese. At these two places, thousands of Timorese were massacred and the blood of innocents is still being spilt there.

(Note: Tace Tolo is a lagoon on the road from Dili to Viqueque. Areia Branca is the former tourist beach on the outskirts of Dili.)

**Witness 4** arrived in Lisbon direct from Dili in January. She said Mgr Martinho da Costa Lopez, Apostolic Administrator of Dili, recently denounced, in a sermon she heard herself, the burning alive of a man by Indonesian troops in Zumalai last September. She said that in November (when the UN was discussing the East Timor resolution) a rumour swept Dili that the Portuguese would return. Fighting around Dili broke out in November and was continuing when she left; the curfew had been re-introduced. Armoured cars were patrolling the streets at night and in December, ships disembarked along the coast in Baucau.

Living costs in Dili are high because of the price of rice. Unemployed Timorese were experiencing hardship because they could not afford to buy rice.

**Witness 5** arrived in Lisbon in February 1983 after spending a month in Jakarta. He left Dili, he said, because of "the climate of fear and insecurity". He was beaten up by Indonesian soldiers last year. He also feared a new famine in 2 or 3 years and said the rice harvest was not enough to feed the population.

A situation of open warfare has returned, he said, though in some parts things had normalised. In the areas where he travelled, towards and across the border into West Timor, things were quiet, but he was quite emphatic that "things are really hot" in places like Same and Ainaro in the south-central region and especially in the eastern sector — Lospales, Ossu, Matebian and Viqueque. He had been told of an attack on an Indonesian convoy of about thirty soldiers in Same by a group of youngsters, aged around twelve, who were fighting with the resistance. He too, like Witness 4, gave testimony about the arrival of "red-beret" (RPKAD)<sup>1</sup> troops in late 1982. A large naval vessel, number 971, arrived in Dili harbour. Three landing-craft ferried red-beret commandos ashore; about two hundred disembarked in Dili, others disembarked at Baucau, Lospales and Viqueque. They frequent the Sporting Club, talking occasionally to Timorese which is how people know they were sent to put down

1. This regiment is now known as *Kopassandha*.



has every reason to believe some of these were still there in 1982.

Aside from fear, he mentioned travel restrictions and the prohibition on the use of Portuguese and Tetum as reasons for wanting to leave his homeland.

While in Jakarta before leaving for Lisbon, he heard that Fretilin attacked the outskirts of Dili in November or December 1982.

**Witness 2** receives regular, uncensored letters from East Timor. The following are quotations from these letters:

The Front continues to launch attacks on the Javanese, always at the



resistance in the east. The witness did not think they were relieving other troops because troops from Jakarta do a ten-month tour of duty, and it was not yet time to replace them. Recently, Indonesians were using more and more Timorese conscripts — *hansip* — to “Timorise” the war.

According to the witness, it was unusual for troops to come through Dili; due to the secrecy concealing the war, they normally travel direct to Baucau, the centre of military operations. The fact that the troops came through Dili this time, some of them staying there, may be due to reported restlessness in the capital around the time of the UN debate last November.

## The Hawke government and East Timor

Speculation is rife about the change that can be expected in Australian policy on East Timor, following the election of a Labour government under Bob Hawke in Australia. The Dutch journalist, Wio Joustra (*Volkskrant*, 8th March, 1983), writing from Canberra, believes that “Australia’s relations with Indonesia will undoubtedly undergo a cooling-off. By contrast with the conservatives, the Labour Party refuses to accept Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor.”

The *Far Eastern Economic Review* (17th March 1983) reports that Indonesia fears that “implementation of the Labour platform, and a possible reversal of the Australian position on East Timor at the UN could further influence the vote of small Pacific nations”. (This is an indirect reference to the efforts by the Australian diplomats at last year’s General Assembly to influence voting by Pacific countries by threatening withdrawal of economic aid.)

The *FEER* reported that on his first day in office, the new Prime Minister indicated that relations with Indonesia would be an important priority. He said:

I have no doubt we will be able to re-establish between a Labour government and Indonesia effective relations as is appropriate for this country and its near and very populous neighbour.

The *Review* speculates that if the new government were to manage to modify party policy on East Timor for a time, it would come under strong pressure from the active East Timor lobby within the Labour Party.

### Labour’s East Timor Policy

For the record, the resolution on foreign affairs adopted in 1982 by the Australian Labour Party includes the following points:

- recognition of the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self-determination and independence, and rejection of the Australian government’s recognition of the Indonesian annexation;
- opposition to all defence aid to Indonesia until there is a complete withdrawal of Indonesian occupation troops from East Timor;
- aid to East Timor should benefit the Timorese people, and not support Indonesian government integration processes or military strategy;
- support for the free migration of Timorese;
- opposition to the operations of Australian companies in East Timor until self-determination has been achieved;
- support for UN resolutions which promote the rights of the people of East Timor.

Another issue is the fate of the Australian Senate inquiry on East Timor last year, before which a great deal of evidence, including a written and oral submission from TAPOL, was presented. Following the elections, the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee will be held by the new governing party. It is not yet clear whether the Committee will produce its findings on the basis of evidence already submitted or will wish to hold further investigations before publishing a report.

## Tempo on the resistance: Translated extract

Learning from the experiences in Irian Jaya, the central government is trying to handle East Timor with greater caution. Possibly to avoid the charge of “domination by newcomers”, almost all top functions are held by people from the region. Yet nevertheless, there still are criticisms of the attitudes of these newcomers. Mario Carrascalao, the Governor of East Timor, acknowledges this.

There are reports of newcomers taking advantage of the abnormal situation for personal gain. . . . they occupied homes and land abandoned by their owners during the civil war, then refused to pay for them or quit when the owners return and ask for their property back. These psychological gaps and obstructions worsen because of communication problems. The majority of East Timorese don’t understand Indonesian which is still being actively pushed. This needs plenty of time and guidance, and good will on both sides.

As a result, there is the impression that physical development is moving faster than human development. Human development indeed seems to be the major problem in East Timor. Integration is young in years, yet many ‘imported’ social problems have already appeared. Government officials are beginning to ask for ‘fag-money’ for their services. Many reports are not being sent on to superiors. Illegal levies are becoming widespread, particularly outside the towns, at the posts set up to examine travel passes which are still required in East Timor. There are rumours of corruption and leakage of funds.

On top of this, there is an even greater problem: for the six years of integration, East Timor has lived almost entirely on subsidies from the central government. Far too many facilities are obtained with great ease; for instance, the distribution of food, medicines and the construction of houses.

From the security point of view, the provision of these facilities is understandable because one of the tactics used by the Armed Forces has been to “seize sympathy” away from the GPK (*Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, or Gangs of Security-Disruptors). According to Colonel Purwanto, Commander of Korem (Military Command) 164/Wira Dharma, there are still two or three hundred Fretilin remnants with a hundred weapons, plus a number of people who are being forced to go along with them. “Their movement is no longer significant. The operations to crush them have entered the final phase,” said Purwanto. “The GPK exists in a few districts classified as ‘first-Class Troublespots’, where they carry out terror and robberies.”

They are apparently difficult to stamp out because they are at one with the people. A characteristic of East Timor society is that family bonds are very strong: helping the family, even if they GPK, is seen as the top priority. They hide in the forest and in the mountains. “It’s not possible to carry out an operation like

### LINGUISTIC ACROBATICS

To guide readers through the confusion of terms coined by the Indonesian authorities to refer to the various liberation movements with which they have to contend, we provide the following glossary:

**GPK** or *Gerombolan Pengacau Keamanan*, meaning “security-disruptors gangs” is used for the liberation movement in East Timor led by Fretilin.

**GPL** or *Gerombolan Pengacau Liar*, meaning “wild-disruptors gangs” is used for Organisasi Papua Merdeka, the liberation movement in West Papua.

**GPLHT** or *Gerombolan Pengacau Liar Hasan Tiro*, meaning “Hasan Tiro’s wild-disruptors’ gangs” is used for the Aceh National Liberation Front.



# ss on East Timor

*Operasi Ganesha*, rounding them all up, then screening them," said Purwanto.


This is why the approach being used is that of development. Every time the GPK burns down people's homes, better ones are built. "The more they wage terror, the more unpopular they become," said Purwanto. "We have to deal with them patiently" he added. Those who "come to their senses" and come down from the mountains will be placed in settlement projects and given food aid."

"I'm carrying out a kind of *fortress-system*, the tactic used at the time of the Diponegoro War<sup>1</sup>, building settlements to press back the GPK", said Purwanto, 42 years old, a 1961 graduate of the Armed Forces Academy.

One other consequence of the efforts to stamp out the GPK is the "Atauro case" which has shocked the international press. To cut GPK's ties with their families, some four thousand GPK family members have been placed on Atauro island since 1981. They get homes and food aid, including help from the International Red Cross. Some foreign newspapers reported that these thousands of people have been imprisoned in Atauro. "That isn't true. Atauro isn't a concentration camp," said Purwanto. A churchman confirmed that. "Their conditions are indeed good. They get enough food and other needs. A pastor visits them regularly," he said.

The local government and the Armed Forces leaders plan to resolve the Atauro problem speedily. Most of these 'displaced persons' refuse to work and are happier depending on aid. There is a plan to move them to resettlement projects so that they can live on their own. Funding for this is a problem at the moment.

Another result of the civil war and the security situation in East Timor is that there are about 10,000 civil guards (*hansip*). This means that one in 55 of the population are in *hansip*. They



get Rp.10,000 a month (less than \$15). There are also thousands of *ratih* (people's trainees) who only get some corn each time they go on duty. Demobilisation of the *hansip* without well-thought-out preparations could result in frustration and social unrest. In addition, there are thousands of widows and orphans in need of special attention.

These socially disturbing issues could become aggravated because there are apparently still circles in East Timor who do not totally agree with integration. Some even believe that the Fretilin leaders in the mountains are in fact good Catholics who only declared themselves communists "as a tactic to get support and help".

- (1) This system, used by the Dutch colonial army against the mass-based Prince Diponegoro rebellion in Central Java in the late 1820s, is described by the Australian historian Ricklefs as a system "by which small mobile columns operated independently, from an ever-growing network of strategic fortified posts and permanently policed the population". (M. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 1981, page 112) Purwanto's reference to Dutch colonial military strategy as his own model is an interesting pointer to the type of war the Indonesian Armed Forces are now waging in East Timor. (This footnote is from TAPOL.)

## UN Human Rights Commission supports self-determination

On 16th February, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted the following resolution with 16 votes in favour, 14 against and ten abstentions. (Three delegations in the 43-nation Commission did not take part in the voting):

### The Commission on Human Rights

1. **Reaffirms** the inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);
2. **Declares** that the people of East Timor must be enabled freely to determine their own future on the basis of the relevant General Assembly Resolutions and the relevant United Nations human rights instruments;
3. **Calls upon** all interested parties, namely Portugal, as the administering Power, and the representatives of the East Timorese people, as well as Indonesia, to co-operate fully with the United Nations with a view to guaranteeing the free and full exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of East Timor;
4. **Expresses its deepest concern** at the suffering of the people of East Timor now prevailing in the Territory;
5. **Calls upon** all parties concerned to facilitate the entry into the Territory of international aid to alleviate the suffering of the people of East Timor.

**Voting in favour were:** Brazil, China, Cuba, Cyprus, Ghana, Ireland, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mexico, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Togo, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United

Republic of Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

**Voting against were:** Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Colombia, Fiji, Gambia, India, Japan, Jordan, Pakistan, Philippines, United States, and Uruguay.

**Abstaining were:** Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Rwanda, Senegal, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia.

### Indonesian lobbying efforts defeated

Although the resolution was passed by such a narrow majority, it is a significant victory because, as the *International Herald Tribune* pointed out (15th February 1983), Indonesia was "lobbying furiously" to defeat it. Its delegation issued a statement a week before the vote in Geneva, referring to visits to East Timor by the International Red Cross (ICRC) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees as proof there was no famine or human rights violations there. But the statement, says IHT,

embarrassed the two agencies. A spokesman for the UN office said Friday that, though the agency operated a small repatriation program from East Timor to Australia, it had never mounted an investigation mission.

A Red Cross spokesman said Friday that the food situation had clearly improved but he warned that the 1982 rice crop had fallen far short of needs and that food aid would still be needed.

The report also pointed out that ICRC delegates had visited 3,737 "displaced persons" on Atauro island and 93 prisoners in Dili, of whom "13 were detained in connection with guerrilla activity". Ten months later, delegates made follow-up visit to 3,794 "displaced persons" and 128 prisoners in Dili and another prison. (In other words, even in terms of the restricted number of political prisoners to whom the ICRC has been given access, the numbers involved had increased in the past year.)



# Sinar Harapan misinforms on East Timor: A comment

The **Sinar Harapan** journalist, Kustigar Nadeak, produced two articles (SH, 25th and 26th January) following his visit to East Timor. Whilst providing on the one hand a confusing account of the present state of resistance, the articles unquestioningly reproduce information, much of it clearly inaccurate, from the military commander and the Indonesian-appointed Timorese governor, without making any attempt at verification.

Regarding the resistance, he reports the military commander as saying that

only five hundred people remain, spread throughout various districts and subdistricts. Just imagine: there are thirteen districts in East Timor which means 37 terrorists (*gerombolan*) on average to each district. They disappear into the bush and the forests, and in particular they are sheltered by their families. In such conditions, it is difficult to distinguish between who are terrorists, and who are not.

Elsewhere, the writer has the following to say:

Why has it taken so long to crush the rebel remnants? This was the question journalists asked Colonel Purwanto. Indeed, it is difficult (was the reply). It is extremely risky if a village of about 300 people is guarded by only two soldiers. In particular, if the gangs link up with members of their families, it is very difficult to identify them. It is impossible to know whom one should be chasing. "For this reason," said Purwanto, "it isn't possible to crush them in the way the PLO was defeated in Lebanon."

If it is so difficult to identify resistance fighters in villages under military guard, how can the writer accept Purwanto's estimate of the overall size of the resistance?

Nadeak's articles are also full of distortions of East Timor's history, all based on the version of events given by the commander. For example, he writes that the coup in Dili on 11th August 1975 was launched by Fretilin; UDT counter-attacked, took control of government buildings, after which "Fretilin troops descended from the surrounding hills, entered Dili and kicked UDT out". (It is perfectly well established that the coup was launched by the UDT.) Then, we are told, two days after Fretilin declared independence on 28th November 1975, a coalition of four pro-Indonesian parties — Apodeti, Kota, Tralabista and UDT — proclaimed independence and at the same time proclaimed East Timor's integration into Indonesia. "Then, the civil war continued until troops of these four parties succeeded in seizing Dili on 7th December, 1975." (The fact is, of course, that Dili was invaded by Indonesian troops on that day.)

## "Do They Know How Backward They Are?"

Another feature of the articles is the contempt shown for the

East Timor people. They are described as people "who used to live wild in the mountains" until the Indonesians came along, brought them down to the plains and built settlements for them. They are described as people who know nothing about how to cultivate the land. They are "sunk in alcoholism; they don't care if they don't eat so long as they can get liquor. This is the worst feature of East Timorese people." Or, take this:

Yet they understand that they are still very backward. In a charming little church that was recently built for them in the village, they often pray to God asking him to give them a decent life.

"Do they know how backward they are?" one journalist asked an elementary school teacher who went to East Timor four years ago. Yes, they do, because if someone comes along wearing better clothes than them, they want to copy them.

The writer attempts to contradict foreign journalists who have written alarming reports about conditions in East Timor, by claiming that "these foreign journalists compare housing in East Timor with housing in New York or Australia. . . If they were genuinely concerned they would make their comparisons with the 450 years of Portuguese rule when mosquitoes multiplied so fast that there was a 50 per cent (sic) death rate."

The **Sinar Harapan** articles are an example of the misinformation spread in Indonesia about conditions in East Timor. This daily is a non-government, Christian paper and might have been expected to distance itself at least a little from official propaganda supplied to Indonesian journalists on a well-publicised trip openly designed to counter the many critical reports that have been published about East Timor in the world press.

## SIX MOLUCCANS ACQUITTED ON APPEAL

The six Moluccans who were sentenced in Assen, Holland to three years' imprisonment for allegedly firing on a police van with intent to kill (see **TAPOL Bulletin**, No. 54, November 1982) were all acquitted on appeal in February. The acquittals were based on the unconvincing nature of the evidence presented by the prosecution. During the appeal proceedings, the prosecution had made a demand for the sentence to be increased to five years.

## AN ACT OF GENOCIDE: INDONESIA'S INVASION OF EAST TIMOR

by Arnold Kohen and John Taylor Foreword by Noam Chomsky

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## More West Papuans flee across border to PNG

More than a thousand Papuans have fled across the border into Papua New Guinea in the past month, reported a Dutch journalist in the **Volkscrant** on 17th February last. "Most of them are mal-nourished and urgently in need of medical treatment," he added. The PNG government has appealed to the UN High Commission of Refugees for financial and medical assistance to help cope with the problem.

For the time being, the refugees have been given shelter by villagers in settlements in the border region but the government in Port Moresby intends to return them soon to Indonesia. The PNG authorities are reported to be very concerned about the high influx of refugees in the last few weeks and believe that there are two reasons, according to **Volkscrant**: first of all, the renewed Indonesian offensive against the OPM (**Free Papua Movement**) and second, a significant escalation in the transmigration programme along the border between the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya and PNG. This programme involves the settlement of many thousands of Javanese in regions where the military are trying to contain the OPM.

Jakarta's tactic is to create a kind of buffer zone of Javanese estates between the West Irianese and the border. A beginning has already been made in constructing the necessary infrastructure in uninhabited regions and at the same time work has begun on the border road stretching from Jayapura in the north to Merauke in the south.

Palmoil and rubber are to be the main products of these estates which the Indonesians are referring to as "nucleus estates". The fact that this ambitious programme goes hand in hand with the expropriation of traditional lands and the disruption of West Irianese communities living in the region hardly troubles Jakarta at all.

**Volkscrant** also reports that the official Indonesian explanation for the very large number of refugees is the prolonged drought.

As readers of **TAPOL Bulletin** (No. 55) will recall, an extremely severe famine has hit parts of the Baliem Valley in the past nine months. In the absence of more detailed information about the composition of these new refugees, it is not possible to speculate on whether indeed this famine and the Indonesian neglect to bring relief and help to the victims is a factor driving Papuans across the border in search of succour.



# Indonesian students in Europe could lose passports

Several Indonesian students in West Europe are in danger of losing their passports and could be forced either to return home or seek political asylum abroad. The action is seen as an attempt to intimidate Indonesian students abroad and to put an end to independent political activity that has developed in some European cities during the past few years.

Two of the students who could lose their passports are Pipit Rochiyat and Zainal Fatichin in West Berlin, activists in the West Berlin branch of *Perhimpunan Indonesia*, (PI) the association of Indonesian students abroad. The third is Aboepriyadi Santoso, a student in Holland who has also been involved in launching a study group called *Yayasan Dialog Nusantara*.

## Political Victimisation

All three were recently given passport renewals of only six months instead of the two-year renewal normally granted. Pipit Rochiyat has received a letter dated 7th March 1983 from the Indonesian Consul in West Berlin which makes it clear that this short-term passport renewal is an act of political victimisation. The substance of the letter reads as follows:

- 1) . . .
  - 2) In addition to administering to the needs of Indonesian citizens abroad, the function of Indonesian Representation Offices abroad, including the Office in West Berlin, is to exercise supervision over and make evaluations of these citizens.
  - 3) In this connection, the Indonesian Representation Office in West Berlin evaluates your activities up to now as being extremely harmful to Indonesia's national interests.
  - 4) I therefore draw your attention to the renewal of your passport for a period of six months, in the hope that this may be a warning to you in your future activities.
- (signed) Purnomo Joedokoesoemo.

Pipit Rochiyat, who makes it quite clear that he has always been quite open about his political activity, has provided information which sets out the background to this evaluation:

— In January 1982, he walked out of the compulsory Indoctrination Course (P4) in Germany and refused to attend further sessions. (According to a Decision of the Indonesian upper chamber, MPR, in 1978, all Indonesian citizens are required to attend and "pass" a P4 course which propagates the state dogma of Panca Sila and inculcates rigid loyalty to the State Constitution.)

— He has been held responsible for the display of a photo of the late President Sukarno at PI seminars held in Dusseldorf earlier this year. A letter from the Indonesian Ambassador in Bonn to the PI complained that displaying Sukarno's photo could "create a situation that is not helpful in establishing close ties within the Indonesian community in the German Federal Republic". The Ambassador said that in all such gatherings, only the photos of the President and the Vice-President may be displayed.

— Pipit has been active in the European-based Movement for the Defence of Democracy and Basic Human Rights. This organisation publishes a bulletin called **Berita Tanpa Sensor** (Uncensored Reports).

— Accusations have been made against the West Berlin PI branch in which he is active, claiming that it has 'fallen under PKI influence'.

## BAKIN Officer Now Consul in West Berlin

There is strong reason to believe that this intensification of pressure on PI activists in Europe, particularly in West Berlin, is the work of the newly-appointed Consul in West Berlin, Colonel Purnomo Joedokoesoemo. According to reports from West Berlin, when talking to students there, he makes no secret of the fact that he is an officer of BAKIN, Indonesia's central intelligence agency.

## PI under close Embassy control

The passport threats now being made against PI activists

highlights the fact that Indonesian embassies keep a close watch on the activities of the PI and exert strong pressure on it to toe the government's line in all matters. Very few branches have been able to extricate themselves from this supervision and elect executives that properly represent the wishes and opinions of their members. One of the handful of branches to have done so is in West Berlin which is far more outspoken about conditions in Indonesia. West Berlin activists were, for example, among a number of students who added their signatures last year to the strongly critical document known as the Petition-of-Fifty.

The victimisation of PI activists is clearly aimed at intimidating Indonesian students abroad in the hope of forcing them to abandon any idea of taking an independent stance towards conditions in Indonesia.

Pipit concludes his document summarising the acts of intimidation against him with the words: "All colleagues who love our country should continue their activities as usual; do not let your spirits flag".



## Spotlight on a prisoner



**Tengku Muhammed Usman Lampoh Awe**, 45 years old, was arrested in October 1978 in Medan, North Sumatra and was tried in November 1980. He was tried with subversion for being the Minister of Finance in the government set up in Aceh by the National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra. During the trial, he refused to use Indonesian and

demanding to be allowed to speak in the Acehnese language. Although the prosecution had demanded a sentence of three years, Usman Lampoh Awe was given a sentence of twenty years. The court made it quite clear, in passing its verdict, that he had been given such a heavy sentence because of his refusal to speak Indonesian.

Tengku Lampoh Awe became politically active early in life. His father, a judge at the High Court in Pidie, was murdered by Indonesian troops during operations against an earlier Acehnese movement, in 1950. He himself, while still in his teens, was saved from death by his mother who protected him against Indonesian troops who had set fire to the family home. All the other men and boys in the house at the time were killed. He was appointed Minister of Finance by the NLFAS in December 1976. After his arrest, he was subjected to severe torture, but upheld his opinion that the NLFAS government was "the sole legal government in Aceh" and continued to maintain that the people must be allowed to exercise their right to self-determination.

A report that appeared in the Indonesian press during the early hearings of his trial stated that two witnesses who testified at his trial, both of whom had held ministerial posts in the Free Acehnese government, persisted in calling him "honourable minister". "This is greatly to be regretted," wrote one newspaper at the time, "because both these men have been freed of all charges and they both surrendered to the military commander in response to the commander's and Governor's offer of amnesty." (*Sinar Indonesia Baru*, April 1980, date not given in the clipping)

A request has been made to UNESCO to discuss the case of Tengku Lampoh Awe at its annual meeting in May this year because of the fact that his sentence is clearly based on an act of cultural victimisation.



# “Indonesia has many friends in world marketplace” — World Bank president

The World Bank President's fulsome support for Indonesia's economic strategy of rapid economic growth was expressed in no uncertain terms during his visit to Indonesia in October last year. Stressing how “deeply impressed” he and his team were, A.W. Clausen said:

Indonesia has not only built up a remarkable record of economic growth, but it has a government that has been realistic and willing to make tough economic policy decisions.

He said that unless the international economic situation got more severe than it is today, it was very natural for Indonesia to continue to finance this growth. As far as Indonesia's creditworthiness is concerned, he was very enthusiastic indeed:

I should say that Indonesia . . . deserves and is getting and will continue to receive, the highest credit rating in the international marketplace. Indonesia also has many friends in the international marketplace and also on a bilateral basis. (*Indonesia Development News*, November 1982)

## Import-Export Deficit of \$6.6 billion in 1982

According to figures published by Indonesia's central bank governor, Rachmat Saleh, Indonesia suffered a balance of trade deficit of nearly seven billion dollars in 1982 by comparison with a surplus the previous year.

Exports:	\$19.8 billion,	down 15% on 1981
Imports:	\$26.4 billion,	up 9% on 1981

Petroleum exports fell by 19% and non-petroleum exports fell by 10%. The only item to move positively was natural gas which rose by 4.3%, to \$2.4 billion.

The prospects of further reductions in the price of petroleum are, says FEER, “very worrying” because 60% of government revenues come from taxes on oil companies and 70% of export earnings come from oil products.

The Finance Ministry's projection of a balance of trade deficit of \$6.2 billion for 1983 is likely to be seriously exceeded because of OPEC's failure to stabilise prices and the significant price drop that could well occur during the course of this year. (*Far Eastern Economic Review*, 3rd March, 1983)

While the World Bank persists in encouraging Indonesia to maintain high growth rates and continue with its “tough economic decisions”, Richard Cowper, BBC and *Financial Times* correspondent in Jakarta, speaking on BBC's *The World Today* programme (2nd March, 1983) predicted that Indonesia would need to turn to the International Monetary Fund for help to the tune of \$500 million before the end of 1983, to help cope with fast-falling foreign exchange reserves.

## World Bank Loan Commitment to Indonesia by Sector, as of June 30, 1982

Sector	Loan Commitment (millions of dollars)	Number of Projects	Percentage of Total Commitment
Agriculture, irrigation and transmigration	2,006.0	46	36.0
Electricity and coal mining	1,525.0	14	27.0
Industrial development	557.5	13	10.1
Transportation	797.4	13	14.2
Education	336.4	12	6.3
Urban development and water supply	225.0	6	4.1
Population and nutrition	85.7	4	1.5
Technical assistance	25.0	6	0.4
Tourism	16.0	1	0.2
Telecommunications	12.8	1	0.2
Total	5,586.9	116	100.0

Source: World Bank



A.W. Clausen in Indonesia, October 1982

## Trade union leader calls for wage cuts

Agus Sudono, Chairman of Indonesia's only trade union federation, the FBSI, made a call last December for cuts in wages of the workforce in order to prevent company closures. This statement has led to protests from worker representatives.

A group of workers from the Union of Public Workers (SBLP) in Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi who visited the FBSI to demand the withdrawal of the statement, told *Merdeka* that the employers had used Sudono's statement to dismiss workers and force a cut in wages. They said that in negotiations their union was now engaged in with the management, the management side were throwing Sudono's statement at the worker representatives. “The time has now come,” said one worker representative, “for genuine efforts to be made to struggle for the basic human rights of workers. Up to

now workers are just being utilised as tools of production by the employers.” Sudono's statement had had the effect of destroying the struggle of workers who are still living below the poverty level.

A similar protest against Sudono's statement was also made by the Jakarta committee of the Metal and Ceramic Workers Union (SBLK). It deplored the fact that Sudono's statement had been used by management to undermine the negotiating position of the SBLP. “The FBSI leadership knows very well,” said the SBLK statement, “that 60% of Indonesian workers are living below the poverty line.”

### Dismissals Hit Many Workers

Numerous reports of layoffs by companies are being reported in

the Indonesian press. **Merdeka** (24th November 1982) warned that as many as 1½ million workers may be laid off in the textile industry which has been particularly severely hit by the world recession. An editorial comment by **Merdeka** however provides an interesting insight into the background to many of these layoffs and the way Sudono's much publicised declaration is bearing fruit:

The motives behind these layoffs should be thoroughly investigated. In cases where workers are dismissed by a company that remains in business, management tactics need to be examined. We believe that the basic motive is not that the company is bankrupt. It is, rather, a move by the company to cut their wage costs. The wages being earned by those in employment are considered to be too high even though they amount to no more than a few hundred rupiahs a day. In such a case, workers are dismissed and replaced by new workers at a lower wage level. (**Merdeka**, 3rd December 1982, editorial)

The paper also expressed the fear that layoffs were affecting in particular the labour-intensive industries, for instance the textile industry. If this is allowed to proceed unchecked, the paper said, the level of unemployment could rise dramatically. "It is difficult to contemplate the moral, social and economic effects on conditions in society," the paper said.

Read side by side with the enthusiastic remarks of the president of the World Bank (see opposite page), one would hardly think they were talking about the same country.



## INDONESIAN WORKERS AND THEIR RIGHT TO ORGANISE Update No. 2

Just Out

Published by INDOC, this booklet will document the growing military intervention in labour relations, using throughout cases reported in the Indonesian press. Issues covered include:

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- strikes and protests against mass dismissals and declining living standards;
- the role of the labour union, FBSI, in undermining workers' actions, banning a trade union journal, etc.

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## Readers' letters

### A reply to Jusfiq Hadjar

Whilst welcoming Hadjar's challenge (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No.55 January 1983: **Guest Column**/19-20), I think a reply is in order to his clarion call since it sounds so sanctimonious that some **TAPOL** readers might have a wrong impression about Indonesia's non-Muslim groups (particularly the Marxist one, with whom I identify myself).

Glib rhetoric about "democracy" is all very well, faddishly speaking, but I for one need a great deal more substance to accept his claim that "democratic ideas are most likely to develop among Muslims". If it is "easier for Muslims to accept the need for democracy (sic)" simply, as he puts it, "because virtually the entire military power clique consists of *Abangan*", I am hardly surprised that he (and the Muslims he represents) are still waiting for the response from any of the groups he mentions.

What, and for whom, is this "democracy" Hadjar is talking about? And how does he propose to achieve such a "democracy"? If it is a "democracy" for the bourgeoisie, we can ape the West (as some of us are doubtless already trying to do). If it is "democracy" for the client-capitalists and comprador-bureaucrats, this is precisely what we are having at present. If it is "democracy" for the majority of the

people — comprising petty peddlars, stall-holders, the majority of wage earners as well as small peasants (as opposed to big, mostly Muslim be it noted, landlords) — then only the Marxists have a clear-cut programme on how to achieve this. Incidentally, it was primarily because of this precision about the objective, and the means to achieve that objective, that in 1965-67 Indonesian Marxists were slaughtered and to date Marxism is banned altogether (whilst other ideologies, persecutions notwithstanding, are never proscribed). The Muslims, at least as Hadjar paints them, are so vague beyond declaring slogans for an undefined "democracy" that I for one find it practically impossible to do anything positive but join in the chorus. Three hurrahs for "democracy"!

A.R.T. Kemasang  
London, England

### Jusfiq Hadjar replies

1) A.R.T. Kemasang says that he needs a great deal more substance to accept my claim that democratic ideas are most likely to develop among Muslims. He is perfectly entitled to think so, but for the sake of intellectual honesty, the least he could have done before making that statement is a) to see Achmad Wahib's book (and to read it carefully), and b) to meet Muslim

intellectuals from Indonesia (and discuss with them).

2) "Only the Marxists have a clear-cut programme on how to achieve democracy", says A.R.T. Kemasang. From a Marxist point of view, this statement is pure nonsense since it is the task of the bourgeoisie (namely the petty bourgeoisie) to carry on the democratic revolution. It does not mean that the working class in all circumstances has to wait until the bourgeoisie finishes its job before starting its own task, which is to achieve the social revolution. In certain conditions and/or at a certain moment in the history of a social formation, the working class has to *include* the task of the bourgeoisie into its own. In fact, I don't see in the history of any social formation where the working class could avoid also shouldering that task. This is also the case with the Indonesian working class.

Have the Marxists in Indonesia produced a clear-cut idea of how the working class should achieve this, or as I put it, participated in setting down milestones on the road to democracy? A.R.T. Kemasang answers by quoting the terrifying Stalinist dogma: "Only the Marxists have. . ." He confirms in his own way what I said: Not yet.

Jusfiq Hadjar,  
Leiden, Netherlands



# Militarisation and equipping ABRI

by Hendrik Amahorseja

## The militarisation of state power

Just before General Suharto went abroad on a state visit a short while ago, it was announced in Jakarta that military power was to be legalised in Indonesia.<sup>1</sup> The report appeared in October 1982 yet the domination of the military in Indonesian political and economic affairs has been a fact for many years.

Military encroachments aimed at taking over state power first became evident in 1957<sup>2</sup> when foreign, in particular Dutch, companies were nationalised. Under the existing state of emergency which vested special powers in the Armed Forces (ABRI), these nationalised companies fell under military control, from the top management positions down to the branches. Mismanagement and corruption soon became rife. Far from leading to economic stability, development and growth, nationalisation brought the country to the brink of bankruptcy. This inevitably discredited the Sukarno government.

In the civil administration, military appointees were placed side by side with provincial governors and district heads, and occupied similar positions. Although the top positions may have been held by the civilians, in practice power was in the hands of the military. Furthermore, as a way of enhancing the military vis-a-vis the trade union movement, associations of functionaries were set up which later, under the New Order, were transformed into a political party named Golkar.

As the international situation, particularly in Southeast Asia, along with the situation in Indonesia in the 1960s became more tense, it was proposed that the Guided Democracy government should arm the workers and peasants. This suggestion was turned down on the grounds that ABRI consisted of the sons of workers and peasants which meant that if worker and peasant interests came under threat, ABRI would assuredly come to their defence.

The political parties were not left out of this process of militarisation. Party members, in particular those leaders who occupied government posts, were given military uniforms and granted titular military rank. This happened even in the case of the Communist Party (PKI) which was actually the main obstacle to military rule. D. N. Aidit, the PKI Chairman who was a minister without portfolio, was given the rank of admiral. This, together with the fact that a system of ideological co-existence, formulated as Nasakom,<sup>3</sup> had been instituted should have meant that all political parties enjoyed equal opportunity in undertaking their political activities. The reality was rather different. In some provinces, the local military commands often halted the distribution of the PKI's daily, *Harian Rakyat*. In Java, the stronghold of feudalism, peasant actions for the implementation of land reform met with a great deal of obstruction from the military.

The process of militarisation reached new heights with the 30th September 1965 event. Six months later, ABRI consolidated its success by means of the 11th March Instruction (*Supersemar*), under which Sukarno handed over the powers and position of presidency to General Suharto. The day after the *Supersemar*, on 12th March 1966, the PKI and all organisations associated with it were declared illegal throughout the country.

With the reins of power now in Suharto's hands, the process of militarisation was greatly facilitated; consolidation and concentration of military power was greatly intensified in all aspects of life everywhere in Indonesia. As a result of the 30th September affair and the events before and after the *Supersemar*, it is estimated that about a million people were murdered. Hundreds of thousands more were thrown into prison or concentration camps and held for years without being charged

or tried in court to prove their guilt. Comparing these events with the brutalities and genocide perpetrated under Hitler, the British philosopher Bertrand Russell called it "the second biggest crime in our century".

Not long before the 1982 general elections, an Indonesian lawyer named Sunardi made a call for General Suharto to be examined in conformity with the law, to prove his non-involvement in the 30th September affair seventeen years ago. However, it was not Suharto who was brought to court; the lawyer himself was tried and sentenced to a term in prison. (see *TAPOL Bulletin* 50, March 1982, for the reasons for Sunardi's call.)

Commenting recently on the 30th September affair, the Jakarta daily *Merdeka* made the following points:

The destruction of the communist movement in Indonesia in 1965 may possibly have been prompted by US intelligence circles and academics, but it didn't cost the USA a single dollar by contrast with the millions of dollars spent in other countries to wage war on and annihilate the communists. Crudely speaking, in the case of Indonesia, Washington can be said to have received the elimination of the PKI "on a platter". This analysis is based on the political facts as they occurred.

The benefits that have flowed since 1965 from the imposition of US influence in the economy and the commercial system, in mass communications, in higher education, culture, the sciences, social developments and particularly in defence and security, are striking evidence of the political gains enjoyed by America in Indonesia. This country has made enormous sacrifices in order to satisfy America, out of all proportion to the real benefits Indonesia has gained from the USA.<sup>4</sup>

After the adversaries of the military had been eliminated, the New Order came into existence laying down a whole new set of political and economic principles. These changes were extremely beneficial to foreign capital investment. In response to the new political and economic climate created by the military, Japan and a number of western countries immediately set up the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). In a collaboration which served the mutual interests of IGGI and the Suharto regime, foreign investments as well as economic aid flowed in from the IGGI member states, reinforcing the position of the military regime.

One of the many generals to contribute towards the establishment of military power in Indonesia was General Nasution. Despite the significance of his contribution, he was defeated in the internal conflict within ABRI and was pushed into a position of little importance in Indonesian political life. After holding this position for a few years, he was pensioned off whilst his comrade-in-arms, General Suharto, continued to hold state power. Plans have now been made for Suharto to be crowned as "Father of Development"; a mausoleum has been built for him, located close to the tombs of the Javanese sultans in Central Java. Millions of dollars have been spent on this mausoleum.

Military propaganda never stops proclaiming how beneficial the state ideology of Panca Sila is for the welfare of the people, but the reality is very different. The men in power practise a system of "mafia-ism": power and repression are used in order to make money for their own clique. The control of profitable resources is the main objective of the inner military clique



around Suharto. Within a short space of time after the 1965 events, a number of top-ranking ABRI officers earning only a hundred or a hundred and fifty dollars a month had become very rich indeed. One western diplomat said of the president:

Suharto has his fingers in every pie. He just makes commission from everything he can . . .<sup>5</sup>

The Suharto family owns many businesses and has become one of the richest families in the country.<sup>6</sup> Yet, the vast majority of people live well below the poverty line and are becoming poorer and poorer.

In order to tighten its grip on state power, the Suharto regime has formulated a number of military doctrines known as: *Dwi-Dharma* ("the dual task"), *Hankamrata* ("overall defence and security"), *ABRI Masuk Desa* ("ABRI must go into the villages") and *Dwi Fungsi* ("dual function" or involvement in political as well as in defence affairs). General Sumrahadi Partohadiputro, the ABRI spokesman in parliament, has said that the *Dwi-Fungsi* is necessary in order to prevent a coup d'etat.<sup>7</sup>

In both the lower and upper chambers (DPR and MPR), Golkar, the party which supports ABRI, has the majority of seats; in addition to this, Suharto appoints members of ABRI to sit in these two bodies. Thus, the military not only dominate the executive, they also play the decisive role in the two legislative bodies. The 1982 Defence Law defines ABRI's role as being "a social force, the force for dynamism and stability" (*dinamisator dan stabilisator*). In such a situation, Suharto has no need of a magic wand to prolong his term of office as president. "It's just a question of pronouncing the decision", as General Amirmachmud, the chairman of the MPR and the DPR, has said.<sup>8</sup>

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## Equipping Suharto's Armed Forces

In order to re-equip the Armed Forces, Indonesia has now become a leading customer of those western countries which have advanced industrial technology. In Asia, such countries as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore have become suppliers of military equipment to Indonesia. And although Indonesia has no diplomatic relations with Israel, it has nevertheless imported military hardware from that country.<sup>9</sup>

According to press reports, Minister of Defence General Jusuf visited the USA last year specially for the purpose of buying howitzer rifles and torpedos; he also sought technical assistance for the maintenance of landing craft and other warships manufactured in the USA, as well as facilities for the repair of Indonesia's C-130 transport aircraft. Another purpose of the visit was to purchase sophisticated aircraft and air defence systems.<sup>10</sup> The range of weapons used by Suharto's Army include FAL, AR, AK-47 and M-16. As a member of ASEAN which has introduced standardisation of military equipment, the Indonesian Army now mainly uses the M-16.

### Army Equipment

The Indonesian army consists of a force of about 200,000 men. The Mobile Brigade has 20,000 members and Civil Defence (Hansip) about 80,000.

Of the Army's seventeen divisions, only three can be said to be well equipped. These are the three divisions located in Java: the Siliwangi Division (West Java), the Diponegoro Division (Central Java) and the Brawijaya Division (East Java). The Army has the following units:

- 80 infantry battalions
- 14 artillery battalions
- 13 air defence battalions
- 10 sapper battalions
- 6 strategic command battalions
- 4 cavalry battalions
- 2 tank battalions.

In military communications, there are three intelligence

communication centres in Maros (30 kilometres south of Macassar), Cijantung (East Jakarta) and Serang (West Java).

The tank units are equipped with the following tanks and armoured personnel carriers:

Table 1	
Number	Type
25	M-3A3
200	AMX-13
75	PT-76
75	Saladin
55	Ferret Scout
1000	AMZ-VC1
60	V-150
130	BTR-40/-152

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982 and various Indonesian newspapers.

The Army's artillery and air defence weapons are listed in Table 2. A short while ago, it was announced that an Indonesian military delegation had arrived in Sweden to investigate the possibility of purchasing Robot-70 type air defence systems manufactured by Bofors.<sup>11</sup>

Table 2	
Type	Caliber
Guns	76 mm
Guns	105 mm
Howitzers	122 mm
Howitzers	81 mm
Mortars	120 mm
Mortars	106 mm
Anti aircraft canon	57 mm

Source: Pacific Defence Reporter Dec/Jan 1982.

Apart from the aircraft and helicopters shown in Table 3, the Army also possesses a number of transport ships and Landing Craft Utilities. Last December, two LCUs under construction for the Army were launched in Tanjung Priok (Koja Dock). These vessels are numbered 41 and 42; they are 32.80 metres long, 8.50 metres wide with a speed of 10 knots. In the middle of 1982, the Territorial Command received an additional 77 V-22 type high-speed motor-boats with a carrying capacity each of 14 soldiers.



To be continued

### Footnotes

- 1 **International Herald Tribune**, 4th October 1982.
- 2 **ISDA Journal**, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, Vol. XIV No. 1, September 1981.
- 3 *Nasakom*: an acronym symbolising the collaboration between nationalist, religious and communist parties.
- 4 **Merdeka**, 27th July, 1982.
- 5 **International Herald Tribune**, 22nd December 1982.
- 6 **Vrij Nederland**, 10th June 1978. See also **Indonesia** No. 25 (April), 1978, Cornell University, USA.
- 7 **Sinar Harapan**, 10th September 1982.
- 8 **Sinar Harapan**, 5th October 1982.
- 9 **Pacific Defence Reporter**, August 1982, page 33. From an independent source, TAPOL was informed in August 1980 that despite official disclaimers, the Indonesian Air Force had started to take delivery of 16 former Israeli airforce A-4E Skyhawk fighter bombers, costing \$25 million. The planes were refurbished by Israel Aircraft Industries, Lod, near Tel Aviv, and shipped to Indonesia as though they came from the USA. The source added that the aircraft were clearly identifiable as being former Israeli planes by an extended jet pipe designed to reduce their infra-red "signatures" and thus baffle surface-to-air missiles; only Israeli A-4E aircraft have this particular feature.
- 10 **Merdeka**, 28th July, 1982.
- 11 **Arbetaren**, 19th November 1982.



# INDONESIA

## Law, Propaganda and Terror



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