



VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 54, November 1982


This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1982) Tapol bulletin no, 54, November 1982. Tapol bulletin (54). pp. 1-24. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26303/>



British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No. 54

November 1982

Compulsory log-felling in West Papua

Tripida Officials directly involved, says Kompas

A large number of Asmat people who live in Merauke, the most southeastern district of West Papua (now the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya), are being forced to fell timber for private companies, virtually without pay. The private timber companies operate a system of compulsory deliveries, using the *Tripida* (local military, police and civilian government officials) as their labour brokers. Whole Asmati families are being forced to spend weeks away from their homes to cut down trees, and transport them to the coast for loading onto ships. The low wage paid for these labours is often withheld for months, if paid at all.

In a series of articles describing this scandalous exploitation of Papuans, the Jakarta daily **Kompas** (4th, 6th and 7th October, 1982) warns that the system is also undermining the social and cultural traditions of the Asmat people.

The **Kompas** reporter, who spent some time in the district last September, was told by a Catholic missionary, Father Uce H. Pramudya, that three years ago, in 1979, instructions were issued by the Merauke District Chief ordering the *Tripida* to stop such practices but things, he said, had not improved.

They have even got worse. The Asmat people feel more oppressed now than ever. They are becoming more aware; they are conscious of their powerlessness to deal with this system and with the government officials. Their present apathy could turn to aggression.

Two timber companies in particular are involved, neither of which, explains another Catholic missionary, P. Agustinus Made, has yet been granted concessions to fell timber. The *Tripida* authorities, who are in the pay of the companies, simply order the villagers to go out to their own forest lands, cut down trees and transport them down the river to Sawa Erma and Ats for loading onto ships. He spoke of the grave damage being done to forests that provide the Asmat people with sagu, their staple foodstuff. It is a system, he went on, in

which the companies bear no risk at all. The villagers receive next to nothing for their work, while *Tripida* officials are rewarded with large commissions.

The payment offered is supposed to be Rp 3,500 (about US\$5.50) per cubic metre, but this generally turns out to be the sum paid per trunk. Trunks that are rejected as being below a certain diameter are not paid for yet nevertheless are exported by the companies. And as for the delay in payment, the **Kompas** journalist discovered that timber felled in July and exported in August had still not been paid for at the end of September.

The two timber companies involved are named by Kompas as PT AOI and PT PHT.

Protest equals 'Rebellion'

Kompas reports that *Tripida* officials have been involved in such practices since the early 1970s. When villagers protest, security troops brandish their weapons and accuse the people

please turn to page 4

Timorese refugee interviewed
by TAPOL page 15

Campaign against ex-Tapols
continues page 3
UK to sell frigates to Indonesia? . . . page 7
Timor overshadows Suharto's
Washington trip page 9
What is happening to Borobudur . . . page 11
Racist victimisation of Moluccans
in Holland page 21

Britain and East Timor: 'abstention' diplomacy plus warships for the aggressor

Despite strenuous efforts by Indonesia to wipe East Timor off the agenda of the United Nations, the Fourth (Decolonisation) Committee of the 1982 General Assembly once again adopted a resolution on East Timor. The resolution upholds "the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination and independence" and requests the UN Secretary-General to initiate consultations with all parties concerned to seek a solution and report to next year's General Assembly.

On the Fourth Committee, the votes in favour were 48, with 42 against and 54 abstentions. Last year, the General Assembly adopted the East Timor resolution by 54 votes against 42, with 46 abstentions.

Although Portugal gave its full backing this year to the resolution, sponsoring it for the first time, and sent its Deputy Prime Minister to London to discuss East Timor with the British government, Britain yet again abstained in the voting. The Portuguese government expected, according to a BBC dispatch from Lisbon, that its unstinting support for Britain during the Falklands War would be sufficient grounds to convince Britain to support East Timor this time against the aggressor. But Britain clearly differentiates between aggressors and aggressors, between those that should not be supported with weaponry, and those that should. At the very time Britain was abstaining at the UN on a resolution that should have the support of any government which professes

not to support Indonesia's forcible integration of East Timor, a document was leaked in London (see page) revealing that Britain is planning to sell warships, missile launchers and yet more Hawk ground-attack aircraft to Indonesia.

Less than a month before the UN vote and the arms-deal leak, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym wrote to Lord Avebury asserting: "We have not, as you know, assented to East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia because we do not accept that territorial disputes can be 'solved' by forcible takeover." Yet, sales of deadly military equipment to that very aggressor are being secretly negotiated.

Force is the key word in understanding not only Indonesia's takeover of East Timor but also the military regime's grip on Indonesian society, but the leaked internal document recommending government support for the new arms deals justifies this on the grounds that there is "no effective challenge to the present system of government . . . the existing regime is unlikely to change."

Clearly, the 'Falklands factor' in Britain's foreign policy goes no farther than declarations of principle that aren't worth the paper they are written on. Military government is worthy and solid enough in Indonesia to brush principles aside in the cause of profitable arms sales.

*This bulletin went to press before the General Assembly voted on the resolution.

READERS LETTERS

Dear TAPOL,

I am writing to you as a long standing admirer of TAPOL, and on the basis that intelligent criticism is a mark of respect.

The subject of this letter is an article titled "Thousands of Papuans Killed by Indonesian Troops in West Papua", in the TAPOL bulletin No.53.

My concern is firstly, the importance of the claim that 14,000 Papuans have been killed by Indonesian troops, and secondly, to what extent this is true and how it reflects on TAPOL.

The tone of the article suggests that it is all confirmed fact but despite the importance of the claim it is

- a) vaguely sourced and without much detail, and more importantly contains no qualification by TAPOL editors as to its reliability, and
- b) placed on page 7 whereas if it was true it would easily push the lead article off page 1.

The content of the article and its presentation seem to be at variance; its soundness does not necessarily follow from its seriousness, and it is its seriousness that has made me write this letter.

In my consideration of the article I have kept in mind the necessarily discreet nature of your sources and the difficulties you face in gathering any reliable information. Notwithstanding this, the importance of the claim that 14000 Papuans have been killed should merit careful verification and subsequently careful presentation.

I also recognise the need to publish what information is available where it is a case of putting something important before the public and the only alternative is to withhold it indefinitely until more information is available. However this demands that what is not reasonably certain be clearly distinguished from what is certain, otherwise it can be a

dangerously misleading exercise.

I would be grateful if you could allay my anxieties about this article.

The integrity of organisations such as TAPOL can be seriously damaged by making important claims that leave the reader with doubts.

The fact that people such as the Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, can try publicly to dismiss TAPOL as mere 'pamphleteers', shows that TAPOL must always try to be above reproach in its reporting.

Thank you for your consideration of this letter, and once again my admiration for your efforts.

Yours,

Tony Hill.

Kirribilli, New South Wales.

Editor's Note:

The point about the need to verify reports of this nature is perfectly valid. TAPOL did indeed write to several contacts in close touch with developments in West Papua to seek further clarification about this horrifying report. Our enquiries have not yet been answered.

The basic problem, however, particularly about information from West Papua as well as from East Timor, is that two-way communication is difficult and time-consuming. The source of the report mentioned in this reader's letter was quoted in the **Bulletin**, and we therefore felt disinclined to withhold it. Our experience generally with information originating from OPM sources is that in most cases it is subsequently corroborated by international news agency reports and even, on occasion, by the Indonesian press. It should be added that, even when it is not corroborated, there is no reason for us to disregard it.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST EX-TAPOLS CONTINUES

"Released political prisoners are as free as anyone else in society", said Admiral Sudomo, Commander of the Army Security command KOPKAMTIB. "But they must be supervised and directed in such a way that they know they are being supervised although this should not be visible." The security chief was speaking at a top-level, one-week Communication Course on the Guidance and Supervision of former G30S/PKI prisoners.

The course, held in August this year, was attended by senior officers and officials from government, the military, the police and the attorney-general's office, coming from all parts of the country.

"All their movements must be known. They can travel between provinces as long as they get permission, say where they are going and when they'll be back. Every local administration must keep a complete list of ex-prisoners with all their biographical details. This control can only be effective if the administration is tightened up."

Sudomo complained of a lack of uniformity in the standard of supervision. In some cases, even data had been lost.

"We need to check the intensity of their communist ideology and the extent to which they perform their religious duties. We need psychologists and men of religion to help with this. Ex-prisoners should be involved in social activities, such as cooperatives, but they must not take on positions of leadership."

He went on to say that an inventory of ex-tapols must be drawn up, to see which of them are still without work. They need to get work, in labour-intensive projects, on development sites, and back in their professions. "People without work", he said, "can more easily fall under the influence of irresponsible elements."

All political events should be investigated to see whether subversive elements are involved. Subversion on the right and subversion on the left make use of the same methods. It was necessary to see whether any new PKI cadres were emerging and to watch their movements. According to the theory, he went on, the restoration of the PKI would be the work of new cadres. There was not any evidence that this was happening although it could well be that they are working from abroad.

Whatever the "theory", according to Sudomo, he made it quite clear that the current campaign being whipped up against "latent left subversion" is being directed quite specifically against former G30S prisoners. He admitted however that there was no evidence of any communist revival in Indonesia.

Operation Ksatria

Sudomo also said that since well before the release of G30S/PKI prisoners began in 1974, an Operasi Ksatria ('Ennobling' Operation) had been launched. This Operation was given six main tasks: 1. to reinforce national stability; 2. to tighten up control of ex-tapols; 3. to enhance society's resilience in rejecting communism; 4. to increase vigilance against latent communist dangers; 5. to continue to purge the Armed Forces and the government apparatus of the vestiges of PKI; 6. to follow closely and study communist strategies at home and abroad.

Source: *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 11th August, 1982.

Ex-Tapols Banned from Transmigration Projects

In an apparent move to "tighten control" over ex-tapols, Admiral Sudomo announced in September that they will not be permitted to resettle in places outside Java under the transmigration programme. To allow them to move, he said "would be like transferring 'disease' to the resettlement areas". For good measure he added that allowing them to transmigrate would only add to the burden of supervising and guiding them. Another reason he gave for the ban was that many Buru tapols had refused to be resettled there, preferring to return to Java. "If they now want to be resettled outside Java, the government will not so easily give them permission for that." If they were really anxious to move, the authorities would consider providing them with "special locations", he added.

Source: AAP-AFP, reproduced in *Canberra Times*, 20th September, 1982.

TWO MPs DISMISSED

Two recently-elected members of Parliament from the Muslim party, PPP, have had their names struck off as MPs, on the instructions of KOPKAMTIB, only days before they were due to be sworn in on 1st October. Despite security screening of all parliamentary candidates before their names were accepted for nomination by the Elections Commission, it now appears that new evidence has come to light, making these two men no longer desirable in Indonesia's Pancasila-style 'democracy'.

In the case of one, Syukron Saleh from East Java, the security command now claims to have discovered that he was a member of the left-wing students' organisation, CGMI which was banned by the military in 1965. He himself denies the claim, and admits only that he was a student at the Res Publica University's Faculty of Law until 1965. This was the university that was closed down in sweeps against the left in late 1965. "I was among those who passed the security screening of students at the time", he said.

The other luckless MP is Zainuddin Manshur, of West Nusa Tenggara. He has already served as an MP since 1977, from the Nahdlatul Ulama slate of PPP candidates. In his case, parliamentary status was arbitrarily revoked because, it is claimed, he "has been involved in *Komando Jihad* (Holy War Command) actions". He 'admits' that a Muslim activist who was recently arrested, often visited him, and believes that this person must have 'incriminated' him under interrogation. But *Tempo* reports one source as saying that Zainuddin "is often regarded as over-acting in his attacks on the government in the speeches he makes."

Whether or not the accusations are correct, it is clear that these two men have no recourse to challenge their dismissal. The PPP Deputy General Secretary, Ali Tamin, has declared that their fate is now sealed. In fact, the PPP, far from protesting at this renewed interference in their slate of MPs, has, says Ali Tamin, "expressed gratitude to the Elections Commission for informing us of this decision and asking for replacements. In the interests of upholding the New Order, we accept this decision", he said.

Source: *Tempo*, 16th October 1982.

West Papua

of "making rebellion and opposing the government". The writer warns that things have gone beyond endurance and hostilities could easily break out.

In addition to the compulsory log-felling, villagers are subjected to other forms of forced labour. "It's called *kerja bakti*", said the missionaries, "or 'voluntary labour'. Villagers are forced to work without pay for development projects, for example to build roads. The *Tripida* arrest and detain people on petty charges, and hold them in detention to do *kerja bakti*." the **Kompas** journalist met two Asmatians who had been under arrest for two weeks for having had a row about a chicken. "We have to carry timber for a new harbour office. We've done nothing wrong but we won't be allowed home for another week." The missionaries said that to describe this as work for the government is just a trick. "It's for the business interests of these individuals."

Threat to Ecology

The American Catholic bishop of the Agats-Asmat region, Fr Alphonse A. Sowada OSC who has been in the district for about 20 years, said that the forests now being exploited were the sole source of livelihood for the Asmat people. "Firm measures should be taken to guarantee them a proper wage for the work they do, and there should be a labour contract. It is quite wrong for the companies to operate in this way through the *Tripida* officials."

He warned that the life-style and cultural traditions of the Asmatians are in the process of being destroyed. The Asmat people have a long tradition of producing sculptured masks and carvings. Severe damage is also being inflicted on the environment; large-scale logging could be catastrophic. The land will lose its top-soil through leeching by rains flowing down from the Jayawijaya mountain range¹ "The result could be the total annihilation of the Asmat people", he warned.

Log-felling on a small scale started during Dutch times, explains **Kompas**. In those days, the Asmatians were not paid money, but cigarettes, tools and trinkets. After Indonesia took over, the new timber companies began operations. Money was introduced but with a great deal of cheating because the Asmatians had no experience of money exchange. Then the companies began to operate through the *Tripida* officials, people who can use the prestige of their position as 'the government' to browbeat the villagers.

The companies set a target, and the *Tripida* divides this out between villages. Village chiefs are required to supply a fixed amount of timber, and so must mobilise their villagers to go out and fell trees. In order to fulfil their targets, villagers must go and work in the forests for several weeks at a stretch. Their wives go too, to help with food preparation and of course, the children must go too. The logs must be rolled down to the river, bound together into rafts and floated downstream to the harbour for loading onto waiting ships. Initial payment *in natura* (cigarettes or trinkets) is regarded as formalising a labour relationship, and when the sum of money owed is eventually paid, the original 'loans' must first be deducted. Neither the companies nor the *Tripida* are liable for sickness or injuries caused by falling branches, attacks by crocodiles or other hazards.

1. The trees provide protection from heavy rains and the hot sun. Without them, the top-soil loses its nutrients from decaying leaves, is exposed to heavy downpours and then to the withering effects of the hot sun.

LOG-FELLING ABUSE HAS LED TO CLASHES, SAYS OPM

OPM sources inside West Papua have also sent out information about the log-felling scandal. The compulsory logging, they say in a report sent to TAPOL by Jacob Prai, the exiled Papuan guerrilla leader, also involves a gross violation of Asmatian land rights.

According to OPM sources, many Asmatian people have fled into the jungle. Small-scale clashes occurred in the early part of 1982, but since nothing was done to alleviate the cause of the people's anger, there were large-scale military clashes in August and September.

The **Kompas** reports make no reference to open clashes. Its investigation could have been prompted as a result of its close ties, as a Catholic newspaper, with Catholic orders working in the Asmat region. It is not unlikely that its investigations were undertaken precisely because of reports about rising tensions in the area.

NPN...



William Wise 1981

...NATURAL PEOPLES' NEWS is the only European-based, English language newspaper devoted to Aboriginal and "Indian" issues.

NPN no.8 - just out - contains articles on Guatemala, the Philippines, Aboriginal Australia, the Pacific struggle for independence, East Timor, West Irian, Maori New Zealand, and native America. Also: special four-page feature on the Sandinistas and the Miskito "rebellion".

Take out a sub - it's only £2.50 a year - and you'll get our Summer '82 issue FREE! Otherwise please send 60p to: CIMRA/NPN, 218 Liverpool Rd, London N1.

Asmati boy beaten to death

In September last year, reports *Kompas* (7th October, 1982), Bewir, a schoolboy from Mbu-Agani village in his teens was beaten to death by a *Tripida* official after his school headmaster reported that the boy had married a schoolmate.

Early marriages are customary among the Asmatis, and this couple had got married with the consent of their parents. There is apparently a local government regulation prohibiting marriages of this kind and it was out of fear of spoiling his own good-conduct record that the schoolmaster felt obliged to report the marriage. Three other boys were also reported to the authorities for similar "crimes".

Thereupon a "trial" took place, writes *Kompas*, with Bewir being accused of trying to disrupt his school by entering into a customary marriage. . . He, together with the other three boys, was arrested, held at the government office, and then the interrogation began accompanied by violent beating with rattan. Bewir started vomiting blood, say his friends. He asked to go to the toilet and died soon afterwards.

When the boy's family complained, the *camat* (district official) stepped in with reprimands for those responsible. He then convened a "trial".

This emergency "trial", reports *Kompas*, took place without regard for any court procedures. Naturally, the *Tripida* officials won. "We were accused of subversion for complaining against state power", said a teacher who had helped formulate the complaint. "We simply cannot understand such methods."

Other blatant abuses perpetrated by *Tripida* officials against Asmati people are listed by *Kompas*:

- One *camat* boiled (*merebus*) a child's hand because the child interfered with his pig.
- Another *camat* forced more than a hundred men to strip naked and stand in the blazing sun for hours, beating them till he had completely exhausted himself.
- One policeman rounded up dozens of villagers and raped the women.
- One official fired shots in a village, causing the villagers to flee into the jungle out of fear for their lives.¹
- Another official is notorious for forcing Asmatis to hand over their prized sculptures and statues in exchange for worthless tobacco.

Schools have been built for Asmati children, *Kompas* continues, but the children are forced to spend half the day on *kerja bakti* ("voluntary" labour projects) to grow food for the school's upkeep.

Source: The *Kompas* clipping sent to TAPOL (7th October, 1982 issue) is unfortunately incomplete. Two centre columns were not included.

1. Incidents like these must clearly have involved far more than a single official. *Kompas* however reports them in this way.

Seth Rumkorem in Papua New Guinea

The saga of refugees passing from western to eastern New Guinea took a new turn in September/October with the arrest and release of prominent West Papuan freedom-fighter Seth Rumkorem, in Rabaul, capital of East New Britain province in Papua New Guinea. A group of ten West Papuans who had travelled a thousand miles by boat from Jayapura were taken into PNG hands on Friday 17 September. Charged with illegally entering the country, they appeared in court on the 28th September. It was found that there was no case to answer and that they had not intentionally left international waters.

Their 12-metre craft with double-outriggers, twin 40-horsepower outboard engines and four 44-gallon drums of fuel, was intended to complete the journey to Vanuatu and the men stepped ashore in Rabaul only after being invited to do so by Government authorities. There was applause from the courtroom when the decision was passed. Outside, Rumkorem later explained, "I knew God was with us throughout our journey."

The Foreign Affairs Department intends to appeal against the verdict (*Post Courier*, 4th October). This may delay the UN High Commissioner for Refugees securing a country of residence for the group who come from areas all over West Papua. Rumkorem, 49, married with five children, comes from Biak Island. His military training was at the elite Bandung College in West Java during the Sukarno era. His previous visits to PNG included talks with civil and military leaders in an effort to explicate the plight of the people of West Papua.

Another prominent figure in the struggle for independence who experienced difficulty with the PNG Foreign Affairs Department in 1978 was Jacob Prai, now residing in Sweden. At the time of Prai's arrest in Vanimo, thirty miles from the Indonesian border, PNG Prime Minister, Michael Somare, was in the region attending to provincial government matters. Prai's deliberately-timed visit, like Rumkorem's intended itinerary, was cut short. It is likely that the place of exile for the group of ten will be Sweden, joining Prai and a dozen other expatriate Papuans. PNG Foreign Minister Namaliu has made it clear the government will not return Rumkorem to Indonesia, although Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB commander, has requested extradition.

Rumkorem entertained hopes of publicising the West Papuan struggle from Senegal where there is already an office located for that purpose. Vanuatu Prime Minister, Walter Lini, an Anglican priest, has announced that, although there is an office in Vanuatu for West Papuan publicity, the acceptance of refugees holus-bolus was not about to become government practice. The *Times* of PNG (October 1st) commented: "It looked as if a quiet campaign by Australia and Papua New Guinea had succeeded." In Port Vila, capital of Vanuatu, formerly the New Hebrides (UK and French), a senior Foreign Affairs official said that while Vanuatu gave recognition to independence movements in the region it had no plans to harbour "rebel elements" from the Indonesian province of Irian Jaya.

Please turn to next page

Munir and Ruslan sentences still under review

A flood of letters from several countries, expressing concern over the reported imminent execution of two political prisoners, Mohammad Munir and Ruslan Wijayasastra (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 53, September 1982) has had the effect of forcing the Attorney General's Office in Jakarta to issue a public statement clarifying the position.

The statement, reported in **Kompas** (1st October 1982) denied that the men had been executed (no-one said they had!). Their cases are now under *kasasi* appeal to the Supreme Court. Their appeals to the High Court were rejected on 25th November 1981 but these verdicts were not notified to the prisoners till mid-April, nearly 4½ months later. The reason for this delay is not explained, nor indeed the reason why the High Court took so long to reach a decision, the appeals having been submitted not long after the sentences were passed in 1973 and 1974. The Attorney-General's statement does however say that within four days of being notified of the High Court verdict, Munir and Ruslan made appeals to the Supreme Court, on 12th April. And this is where the two cases now stand.

Colonel Sudiono's clemency appeal rejected

The persistent reports that the death sentence of Air Force Colonel Sudiono was upheld earlier this year by the President have been confirmed by several contacts in Jakarta . . . It is learnt however that reports that his wife had had her final meeting with him are untrue. He is still alive, and nothing is known about plans for an execution.

Status of Timzar Zubil unclear

The present status of a fourth political prisoner, the Muslim Timzar Zubil, who was sentenced to death in 1977 is however unclear. According to information passed on to TAPOL by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office after making enquiries through the British Embassy in Jakarta, his appeal for clemency has indeed been rejected. "Although execution

normally follows soon after a rejection," wrote the FCO, "Timzar Zubil has still remained in prison."

From other sources, TAPOL has been told that the decision rejecting clemency for this prisoner has been formally challenged because it was taken before other appeal procedures had been followed.

All the evidence suggests that considerable bureaucratic muddle and delay surrounds the appeals procedures, which must cause serious hardship and distress both for the prisoners as well as their families. This could explain why some people in Indonesia believed that Munir and Ruslan were under threat of imminent execution.

The long-drawn-out sufferings of the death sentence prisoners is clearly a matter needing constant attention. As one contact has pointed out, commutation of these sentences is essential, not only to put their lives out of danger but also to make it possible for them to receive remission which is only conceivable for prisoners under life sentence or less.

More death sentences for Muslims

Two more death sentences have been passed against Muslims, accused of involvement in the attack on the police post in Cicendo, West Java and the hijack of a Garuda Indonesia plane. Both incidents occurred in March last year. (For the background to these incidents, see report of the Imran trial in **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 52, July 1982, when defence efforts to prove that intelligence agents carried out provocation were thwarted by the court.)

Salman Hafidz, a member of Imran's congregation, was tried and sentenced a few months ago in connection with the Cicendo attack. His appeal against sentence to the High Court has already been turned down. In August, he presented his *kasasi* for annulment of sentence to the Supreme Court. The other death sentence, passed in September, was in the case of Azhar bin Mohamad Safar, accused of helping plan the Garuda hijack. (**Tempo**, 2 October 1982.)

West Papua

Continued from page 5

Repression by the Indonesian military against West Papuans has persisted since 1962, when UN intervention "eased over" the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch, thwarting the final steps towards independence for a West Papuan state. For twenty years a struggle for self-determination and independence, *the stated purpose of the UN intervention in 1962*, has continued. It was only after the mockery of the 1969 "Act of Free Choice" in 1969 that Rumkorem and Prai began to organise armed resistance to Indonesia and set up the Free Papua Movement. Rumkorem, who trained in the Indonesian Army, took the opportunity of a trip to Jayapura to join the guerrillas, whereas Prai abandoned his law studies at Cendrawasih university in Jayapura. The 1969 travesty had left them with no alternative.

JAYAPURA PRISONERS TRANSFERRED TO WAMENA
Political prisoners being held at the military police

(POMDAM) headquarters in Jayapura, capital of Irian Jaya province, have been transferred to Wamena in the highlands. According to a report which reached TAPOL recently, the first group of six was moved on 30th June this year, followed by another group on 5th July. It is understood that all political prisoners being held in Jayapura are to be transferred.

People fear for the consequences of this move. Although Jayapura is relatively inaccessible to the outside observer, Wamena, a more remote town, is far less accessible, giving the military more scope to treat the prisoners at will.

The first group of prisoners, moved in June, included Persila Yacadewa, the woman who led the group of women who unfurled the West Papuan flag outside the Irian Jaya Governor's office in August, 1980 (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 45, 1981). Also in the group was her husband, Chris Yacadewa, as well as Renny Toto, another of the six women. Joel Wamai and Jareth Wayoi, two men who were reportedly to have been tried, were also transferred.

Lord Avebury condemns Indonesia at UN 4th Committee

Lord Avebury, Chairman of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, has strongly condemned Indonesia's illegal invasion and occupation of East Timor, in a submission to the UN 4th Committee. Speaking before the Committee on 9th November, during the debate on the East Timor resolution, he accused Indonesia of "flagrantly violating" that country's right to freely determine its status as laid down in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. He also condemned British government policy towards Indonesia, saying:

Our own government has colluded in Indonesian aggression by restricting access to information, misrepresenting events, and supporting the Indonesian military by supplying weaponry which might be used against the people of East Timor.

He described British policy as being one of "complicity and acquiescence in the Indonesian occupation of East Timor while maintaining a front of nominal adherence to the principle of self-determination".

In his submission to the 4th Committee, Lord Avebury examined in detail Indonesia's attempts to justify their illegal occupation of East Timor, devoting particular attention to the so-called People's Assembly of East Timor which presented a petition to the Indonesian government for integration in June 1976. He examined the Indonesian Government's recent

publication which is, he said, "their latest version of history published under the misleading title *Decolonisation of East Timor*". This document describes the Assembly members as being "duly-elected". Lord Avebury went on:

The Indonesian Government's account gives no details of the elections which are supposed to have taken place in the spring of 1976, not even the date on which they were held. It is claimed, I believe for the first time, that two delegates were elected from each of the 13 districts in the territory with the exception of the area around Dili, which elected three. In addition there were ten members nominated by the Provisional Government. No indication is given of who appointed them. We are not told how the electoral rolls were prepared, what facilities were afforded to political parties to make their views known, what was the system of voting, or how the count was operated. It may be reasonably supposed that in fact no elections ever took place, and that the so-called "People's Assembly" was merely a creature of the occupying military forces. (Significantly, a completely different version was given in an official document issued by the Department of Information of Indonesia in 1979, entitled *To Build a Better Tomorrow in East Timor*. Not a word about the elections appeared then.)

Lord Avebury concludes from all this that

the resolution of this body of 1976 May 31, in favour of integration with Indonesia, was null and void and the delegation which presented the alleged request for integration . . . had no claim whatsoever to speak on behalf of the people of East Timor.

UK negotiating to sell Frigates to Indonesia

The British government is negotiating to sell frigates — small-sized warships — to Indonesia. If concluded, the deal will be underwritten by the Export Credits Guarantee Department. The frigate already under negotiation is a Mark 15 frigate costing £273,300,000.

Information about a new round of British arms sales to Indonesia, including these frigates, was made public by the *New Statesman* (12th November 1982), based on a classified report obtained by the journal.

Other military sales to Indonesia, apparently already in the pipeline and backed by export credit guarantees, include an additional five Hawk ground-attack aircraft at a cost of £29,300,000, eleven armoured security vehicles costing over a million pounds, and an unspecified number of Sea Wolf Launchers costing £36,000,000. The latter are designed to launch sea wolf anti-missile missiles.

UK exports to Indonesia have grown remarkably in the past year, encouraged in particular by the trade mission to Indonesia last year undertaken by John Nott, then Britain's Minister of Trade and now Secretary of State for Defence, followed in February this year by a top-level mission of businessmen led by Britain's then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington. The composition of Lord Carrington's mission (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No.50, March 1982) highlighted the priority attached to expanding exports in the framework of Britain's relations with Indonesia. The above information about arms sales shows how important military equipment is now becoming in the overall composition of UK exports to Indonesia.

As a further boost, Britain has just won a contract for the construction of Indonesia's fourth oil refinery, at a cost of £1,176 million (more than double the amount mentioned in (*TAPOL Bulletin* No.50). The major construction company that will benefit from this deal is Bechtel-UK, the British

Continued on page 10

AGGRESSION DOESN'T PAY . . . OR DOES IT?

"We have not, as you know, assented to East Timor's incorporation into Indonesia because we do not accept that territorial disputes can be 'solved' by forcible takeover".

Thus wrote Britain's present Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym, in a letter to Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, on 25th October 1982.

How many times too have we heard the Foreign Secretary and indeed the Prime Minister repeat their declaration, made of course in reference to the Argentine's attempt to occupy the Falklands, that aggressors must be shown that "aggression doesn't pay". All aggressors? Or only some?

When the Hawks deal was first concluded, government ministers insisted that they were for training purposes only and therefore not usable in East Timor. Can a frigate costing £273,000,000 also just be for training?

The New York Times

Founded in 1851

ADOLPH B. OCK, Publisher 1896-1933
ARTHUR HAYS SULZBERGER, Publisher 1935-1961
DEVID E. DRYPFOOD, Publisher 1961-1982

Forgotten Sorrows in Timor

At the very least, Indonesia's rulers have to be persuaded to open the doors to East Timor. But there is nothing persuasive about a United Nations that regularly threatens Israel for much lesser transgressions while gently chiding Indonesia for the abduction of a whole people. And it does not help for the United States to mute its protest in gratitude for Indonesia's anti-Communism.

Protesting the situation in East Timor is not just a matter of arraigning a new nation for what the old colonial powers used to do with impunity. It is a way

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1982

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

What About East Timor?

... they have a special claim to the... of their human rights.

Reliable reports from East Timor are few and far between. Still, Indonesia's refusal to countenance reasonably open access by relief agencies, journalists and other observers makes it hard to rebut critics of its policy. Over a period of time, accounts tell of army brutality, persecution of real and imagined political opponents, and malnutrition and hunger so widespread that deaths are estimated in six figures. Such conditions are an embarrassment to the American relationship with Indonesia. Why should Mr. Reagan not tell Mr. Suharto, in his fashion, that he does not understand why Indonesia lets it go on?

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

"First the blade, then the ear, then the full grain in the ear."

The Monitor's view

Wednesday, October 13, 1982

... but questions on East Timor

President Suharto's economic achievements cannot hide the growing world concern over the reported massive denial of human rights in East Timor. Brutality is said to take place in the former Portuguese colony, and reports continue of food shortages resulting from Indonesian military operations. With 84 members of the United States Congress calling for a full inquiry as well as for discussions on self-determination for the people of East Timor, Mr. Reagan should feel no constraints in raising the issue with the Indonesian leader.

Unfortunately, President Suharto has not allowed journalists to travel freely in East Timor. He also is charged with delays in accepting aid from international relief organizations

The Boston Globe

Founded 1872

WILLIAM O. TAYLOR, Chairman of the Board and Publisher
THOMAS WINSHIP, Editor
JOHN P. GIUGGIO, President
MARTIN F. NOLAN, Editor, Editorial Page

RICHARD C. OCKERBLOOM, Executive V.P.
DAVID STANGER, Senior V.P., Business Manager
ARTHUR KINGSBURY, V.P., Treasurer
MILLARD G. OWEN, V.P., Marketing & Sales
ROBERT H. PHELPS, Associate Editor
JOHN S. DRISCOLL, Executive Editor
MATTHEW V. STORIN, Managing Editor, Daily
MICHAEL C. JANEWAY, Managing Editor, Sunday
ROBERT L. HEALY, Associate Editor

Publishers
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, 1873-1922
WILLIAM O. TAYLOR, 1922-1955
WM. DAVIS TAYLOR, 1955-1977
President
JOHN I. TAYLOR, 1963-1975

Remember East Timor

... to leave East Timor for reunions with their families have been stopped.

Members of Congress, led by Paul Tsongas on the Senate side, have urged President Reagan to use the Suharto visit to press the necessity of Indonesia's allowing a continuing international relief program in East Timor and of its acceptance of an internationally negotiated settlement designed to grant the East Timorese political rights.

The President should heed the congressional advice. As Sen. Tsongas told a House

October 13, 1982

San Francisco Chronicle

THE VOICE OF THE WEST

EDITORIALS

Indonesia and East Timor

... Asia region.

BUT THERE IS a shadow that falls across Suharto's visit, and it is the shadow of Indonesia's conduct in East Timor. This former Portuguese colony was taken over by Indonesia in a bloody invasion during 1975, and reports that filter out from the island indicate it is still the scene of oppression and famine.

A bipartisan group of senators and representatives has urged the Indonesian government to allow international relief agencies free access to the area. It is also pressing President Reagan to open up the whole question of human rights on East Timor with President Suharto.

The Philadelphia Inquirer

An Independent Newspaper

Published Every Morning by Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
400 N. Broad Street, P.O. Box 8263, Philadelphia, Pa. 19101

SAM S. McKEEL
President

EUGENE L. ROBERTS JR.
Executive Editor

EDWIN GUTTMAN
Editor

Wednesday, October 13, 1982

Page 14-A

Grim situation in Timor

... access to it has been in

It seems that another reason for the world's indifference is that Indonesia, a predominantly Muslim nation, has lots of oil and a strategic location. Washington, under the last three administrations, has borne the sufferings of the people of East Timor in silence while providing resolutely anti-Communist Indonesia with military hardware used to bomb Timorese towns and crush Timorese aspirations for independence.

Last spring, Rod Nord

Timor overshadows Suharto's visit to Washington

"By all accounts Reagan tactfully overlooked the Timor issue which dominated press and congressional commentary on Suharto's visit."

Far Eastern Economic Review, 22nd October 1982.

Setting the tone for the Reagan Administration's (and indeed the Ford Administration's) attitude on the question of East Timor is a statement made before a Congressional Subcommittee hearing recently by John Holdridge, Under Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific (now appointed US ambassador to Indonesia) that

the US accepts the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia without recognising that there has been an act of self-determination.

Although past and present US presidents have chosen to refuse to allow Indonesia's brutal invasion of East Timor to disturb relations with Indonesia, many members of Congress look at the matter in a very different light. Congressional concern about Timor grew significantly during the months prior to President Suharto's visit to Washington. In April this year, concurrent resolutions were tabled in the Senate and the House of Representatives calling for access to East Timor for aid agencies, the press and human rights organisations, for progress in the family reunion programme and for negotiations on Indonesian troop withdrawals and the conduct of an act of self-determination. Sixty-six members of both Houses have so far added their names to these resolutions.

On 14th September, hearings on East Timor were held by the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, at which Michael Williams, representing Amnesty International, said:

those violations of human rights which Amnesty International seeks to expose occur (in East Timor) within the context of an occupation of extraordinary brutality in which a whole range of fundamental rights have been denied the population.

In a statement at these hearings, Senator Paul Tsongas dealt with a wide range of problems: famine, human rights abuse and gross intimidation by the Indonesian military, and concluded with the words:

I, together with a growing number of my Senate colleagues believe that a lasting solution must be found to bring this tragedy to an end. The President and Congress must find the means to convince Jakarta to agree to an internationally-negotiated settlement that would guarantee Indonesia's legitimate security interests while providing the people of East Timor with the political autonomy to which they are entitled. . . *The sooner that the occupation of East Timor is honourably terminated, the better it will be for the peoples of East Timor, Indonesia and the world.*

On 30th September, sixteen Senators called upon the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to hold hearings on East Timor. Among those signing this request was Daniel Moynihan, the same man who claimed, in his published memoirs, that as US ambassador to the UN, he deliberately blocked UN action after Indonesia's invasion of East Timor. He wrote:

The State Department desired that the UN prove utterly ineffective in whatever measure it undertook. The task was given to me and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.

It would appear that Senator Moynihan has now had a change of heart.

The Republican Senator, Daniel Durenberger, is actively pushing for this Senate hearing. **The Christian Science Monitor** (12th October 1982) also reports that Senator Barry Goldwater (Republican) is also very concerned about what he sees as "the disturbing situation in East Timor." He has written to Senator Durenberger assuring him that if the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee does not take the matter up, the Senate's Select Committee on Intelligence of which he is the chairman will itself take the matter up.

Most striking of all, however, is the letter signed by no fewer than eighteen Senators and sixty-six members of the House of Representatives and sent to President Reagan just a few days before Suharto's visit to Washington. It asked that "the Timor tragedy be accorded priority attention" during Suharto's visit to Washington. The letter reaffirms the point made earlier by Senator Tsongas about the need for an internationally-negotiated settlement that would provide East Timor with the political rights to which it is entitled.

Altogether a total of twenty-eight Senators have been signatories of these and other letters concerning East Timor in the past few weeks, which means that in all nearly a hundred members of Congress are involved in moves to press for serious consideration of the question of East Timor.

JOURNALISTS PLAGUE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON

The White House press conference held on 12th October, immediately following Suharto's meeting with Reagan, was dominated by questions about East Timor. Journalists time and again pressed the State Department spokesperson to say whether Timor was discussed, only to be rebuffed by statements like:

"When it comes to questions such as human rights issues. . . our policy is to rely on quiet diplomacy, behind the scenes."

"I'm not going to answer you. I've already said all I care to say on the subject."

"I am not going to comment on discussions on this issue which may or may not have gone on between the two Heads of State."

Eventually, with the ninth attempt by journalists to elicit some clarification about East Timor, the spokesperson lost his cool and interrupted the question with the words:

"Let me say that you people have asked me about sixteen questions, all regarding one issue. Now there are a lot of other issues that are existing between (the two countries) and we certainly do not let one issue eclipse (sic!) the need to discuss all others."

Sunardi sentenced to 3 years 4 months

Sunardi, the lawyer who made two public requests, in December last year and in April this year, for allegations about President Suharto's role in the October 1965 events to be investigated, has been found guilty of slandering the President. (See **TAPOL Bulletin** No.50, March 1980 p.12-14)

The presiding judge claimed, according to a BBC report, that the court was not involved in making any political judgments. All it was concerned with was the accuracy of Sunardi's allegations against the President. It was clear, the court proclaimed, that charges that President Suharto was involved in the 1965 events were without foundation, and that accusations that he had been unfaithful to the Indonesian Constitution and the State ideology were a stain on his honour.

Sunardi who rejected the charges was defended by Yap Thiam Hien. Three quite lengthy articles from the Indonesian press reporting the case, are typical in that they all present the prosecution's case at great length while providing only passing reference to the case made by the defence. Yet, one of these reports (**Merdeka**, 31st August 1982) was supposed to be reporting the session devoted to the demurrer from the defence, stating its objections to the indictment. All that emerged from **Merdeka's** report was that Sunardi complained that a third letter he sent to President Suharto had been

ignored by the prosecution. The contents of the letter were not even mentioned.

The court found Sunardi guilty of distributing circular letters to a large number of government officials, urging that a special session of the Consultative Assembly be held to consider the allegations made against President Suharto. It also accused him of calling for a revision of the state laws on the general elections, on the political parties and on Parliament and the Consultative Assembly, so as to bring them into line with the Constitution and the Pancasila.

Aggravating circumstances, according to the prosecution, were that Sunardi, as a lawyer, could have been expected to understand proper procedures and to know that it was wrong "to poison society with false reports". His actions could undermine people's confidence in the leadership of President Suharto. Furthermore, he behaved discourteously during the trial and had to be reprimanded repeatedly by the court. Extenuating circumstances were that he had never before been convicted, that he had frankly admitted the actions charged against him and that he was still "young enough to reform".

Sources: **Merdeka**, 24th August and 31st August 1982, **Sinar Harapan**, 8th October 1982, and **BBC Report** 28th October 1982.

FATWA ATTACKED AND BADLY INJURED

A.M.Fatwa, one of the leading members of the opposition group known as the "Petition of 50" group, was seriously injured recently when unknown assailants attacked him as he was travelling in his car. The incident was reported by the **Far Eastern Economic Review** (29th October 1982).

Fatwa is currently suing two government officials and three Army officers for damages because of a physical assault made against him by the three officers in August 1980 (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 43, October 1980). Shortly after the new act of violence against him last month, the five lawyers who were representing him in his case against the government announced that they had been compelled by circumstances to withdraw from the case. In a letter to the Jakarta Court before which the case is due to be heard, the lawyers declared that "the atmosphere and conditions surrounding the case did not permit them to perform their duties as legal counsel."

A few days beforehand, Adnan Buyung Nasution, chairman of the Association of Legal Aid Institutes, complained publicly of acts of terror against the lawyers. The lawyers' homes had been stoned on 17th and 18th October, and they had received threatening phone-calls demanding that the case be dropped.

Fatwa is suing the Indonesian Government, the Minister of Defence, and the Commander of the security command KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo, and the three officers who kidnapped and assaulted him in 1980, for Rp.50,521,000. The Rp.50 million is for mental distress and the slur on his character, and the remainder for hospital expenses. (Fatwa was hospitalised for 20 days after the attack.)

The first hearing was due to take place on 5th October, but was rescheduled to 2nd November. Now, "in conformity with a request from Admiral Sudomo", the court announced, "the hearing has again been postponed till 29th November." (**AFP**, 2nd November 1982).

Pelita allowed to resume publication

Pelita, the daily newspaper of the Muslim party, PPP, which was banned on 5th May this year for its reporting of the general election results, (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No.51, May 1982), was allowed to resume publication early in September, on condition however that it cease to be the official organ of the PPP.

The paper has a new editorial board which includes a representative of KOPKAMTIB, the Army security command as well as of the government party GOLKAR, in order to safeguard the paper's independence.

Continued from page 7

subsidiary of Bechtel-USA, the company so powerfully represented in the Reagan Administration. Both Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of State for defence Casper Weinberger came to these posts direct from top executive positions in Bechtel.

It is interesting to note that in an assessment of the Indonesian market for credit-guarantee-backed exports, particular importance as a favourite factor is attached to Suharto's "firm control", the "large majority" won by GOLKAR in the May 1982 general elections, and the "absence of any effective political opposition".

What is happening at Borobudur

On a hill some 42km. to the north-west of Jogjakarta, Central Java, stands Borobudur, the world's largest Buddhist stupa. Shaped like a giant Mandala, a Buddhist prayer symbol, its sculptured terraces and galleries encircle the hill, providing a mythological model of the Universe. Its architectural features, found nowhere else, contain many symbolic meanings concerning life, material and spiritual, earthly and heavenly. It has been described as "an impassive monument, with a contemplative style befitting a Buddhist place of worship."¹

Planned by people with a profound knowledge of Buddhist philosophy, it was built with the labour of some ten thousand peasants and artisans in the years 778-850 AD. This temple of 2 million cu.ft. of stone is said to have exhausted five generations of labourers. It predates the French cathedrals of Notre Dame and Chartres by 200 years, and the Buddhist temple of Angkor Wat in Kampuchea by 300 years. Indonesian leaders are fond of referring to Borobudur as proof that their country has a civilisation of depth and variety.

Apparently abandoned soon after completion, Borobudur became buried under ash from the neighbouring Merapi and Merbabu volcanoes. It was rediscovered by an English colonel during the British rule over Java in 1814, and, under the supervision of Governor-General Raffles, restoration work was started. It took decades to remove the ash, soil and

forests. Then, exposure to the air brought its own problems, particularly oxydisation of the sculptured reliefs and the growth of lichens. Also, because the temple was built by encasing a natural hill with stone, it was in danger of collapse through subsidence and water erosion.

Restoration of the Temple

In 1969 a massive restoration project was launched. The Government of Indonesia declared the site a National Archaeological Park (Taman Purbakala Nasional, or Tapurnas), and aid poured in from 28 countries, under the supervision of UNESCO. The work, which is scheduled to be completed this October, has entailed the removal, numbering, treatment, storage and re-siting of thousands of stone blocks, now reset into a reconstructed hill with proper drainage. Those involved have included experts from West Germany, Italy, France, Belgium, Netherlands and Japan, as well as their Indonesian colleagues. The temple is due to be reopened by President Suharto in February 1983.

Over the years, some US\$50 million have been contributed towards this project, including US\$11.7 from Japan, US\$1.2 million from the US, and US\$5.9 million from UNESCO. Like most projects in Indonesia involving large sums of money, this one too has been surrounded by accusations of misappropriation and private profiteering.

Footnotes

1. Bruce Grant, *Indonesia*, Penguin, Australia, 1967.

Privatisation of an international heritage

The Tourist Park Company

During the late 1970s the idea of establishing a 'Tourist Park' (Taman Wisata) around the base of the temple gathered momentum. A team from the University of Gadjah Mada in Jogjakarta, and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), were set the task of investigating its potential. Then, in 1980, responsibility for the plan was handed over to a specially-created company, The Borobudur and Prambanan Temples Tourist Park Company (PT Taman Wisata Candi Borobudur dan Prambanan), whose director is P. Boediardjo, a retired airforce marshall, former Minister of Information and ex-Ambassador to Spain. Boediardjo has issued conflicting statements on his company's attitude towards the project. He has answered fears of commercialisation by saying that any, almost non-existent, profits would be ploughed back into the maintenance of the temple. Yet he has also stated that the project will need a commercial outlook to pay back loans. For this it is envisaged to sell entry tickets to Buddhist pilgrims.

The declared basic capital of this company is Rp.10 bn. (US\$16 million) of which the Government has contributed just over one third, Rp.3.8 bn., out of the national budget. The right to hold shares will be awarded as a priority (but not exclusively) to the Governments of the Province of Central Java and the Special Territory of Jogjakarta, which means the company is open to private shareholders. Apart from this, in Indonesia today so-called 'public' ownership is one element in the private fiefdoms of the top brass of the Indonesian regime. The creation of this company is, then, likely to lead

to the privatisation of Borobudur.

The Tourist Park Plan

Zone I, From the foot of the temple to a radius of 200m is reserved for the Borobudur Restoration Project (Tapurnas) and its preservation work.

Zone II, within a radius of 200-500m. from the foot of the temple, a total of 85 ha., is reserved for a museum, conservation centres, parking lots, hotels, shops, stalls, and restaurants.

Zone III, totalling 35 ha., is for the resettlement of communities evicted from Zones I and II.

Zone IV is a 'Javanese village' and Merapi history project. This has been likened to the 'Taman Mini' (Miniature Indonesia Park) in Jakarta, partly financed by one of Ibu Tien Suharto's companies.

Zone V is an archaeological zone.

Zones II and V are those under the management of the Tourist Park Company, as distinct from Zone I which is controlled by the Restoration Project. In a letter to the newspaper *Sinar Harapan* in March 1981, Adieb Susilo, an inhabitant of Sabrangrowo village, accused the Tourist Park Company of deliberately misleading the public by confusing the two separate projects. He said it was a ploy to get villagers to release their land to the Company on the grounds that otherwise they would be hindering restoration work.

Compulsory Eviction for Villagers

Of all the recent developments at Borobudur, great

Borobudur

indignation has been aroused over the treatment by Government and Tourist Park Company officials of the local population. Once again powerful vested interests are riding roughshod over the lives and rights of ordinary people.

The creation of Zones I (Restoration Project) and II (Tourist Park) entails the expulsion of two hamlets, Ngaran-Krajan and Kenayan, and parts of three others, Gopulan, Gendingan and Sabrangrowo. Altogether, some 400 families have been faced with eviction, of whom some 135 absolutely refused to leave. To gain some collective strength they formed a group, Paguyuban Ngesti Rahardjo, and in February 1981 issued a document, *The Voice from the Heart of the People of Borobudur*.


The Borobudur villagers fully support the preservation of the temple and say they would agree with the entire plan if they thought this was truly in the common or national interest. They have suggested locating the Tourist Park to the north, west or south of the temple, where there is no great

others for free. Local lawyers point out that the latter are unlikely to receive compensation for trees which are not their own but which have become their working capital. In any case, it would take many years to establish new trees for tapping.

Under pressure of protest and publicity, Boediardjo has conceded that coconut trees within the Park could be allowed to stand, and sugar tapping continue, perhaps with the formation of a "cooperative". He added that villagers "could be given uniforms to improve their appearance while working within the sight of onlookers, rather than in their tattered clothing."

From the beginning, many villagers stressed that they were not interested in compensation; they simply did not want to move. On the contrary, they wished to be incorporated into the Tourist Park project and to enter into discussions to that end. "After all, doesn't Borobudur belong to us too? Authorise us to guard the temple."

Far from being included in discussions, some found their land being measured and staked out by Japanese personnel without notice. Many have been subjected to intimidation



concentration of population, rather than destroy their villages on the eastern side. Or, they would be willing to improve their own houses, adapting them to the old Javanese style to fit in with the restoration plan. However, their suggestions have met with a blank. Boediardjo of the Tourist Park Company has argued that the eastern side is the traditional gateway of the temple, and therefore "most suitable" for the Tourist Park. He continues to assert that the villagers do not understand the "importance" of the Park.

By being moved, the villagers stand to lose much of their livelihood. Some will lose fertile rice fields. Many depend on tapping coconut trees to make coconut sugar; some tap their own trees; others have an arrangement to tap the trees of

and force:

- in order to persuade villagers to release land, officials and police, often ten or fifteen at a time, have visited the homes of individuals at night;
- the Magelang branch office of the National Electricity Company informed villagers that electricity to their homes in Zones I and II would be cut off from August 1982; an electricity supply to their new homes in Zone III would be connected free of charge;
- villagers have been forcibly moved, before compensation has been agreed;
- four inhabitants who are civil servants were ordered to choose between surrendering their land or losing their

jobs;

- seventeen people in Kenayan received letters ordering them to demolish the homes they were living in.

Villagers also complain that they have faced a full range of trickery from officials, particularly from the Land Appropriation Board, including:

the incorrect measurement of land and categorising of buildings for compensation; incomplete paperwork; unfair compensation, with payments below that previously guaranteed by the Regency Government (*Kabupaten*), and below that necessary to buy replacement land of similar size and quality; illegal "cuts" taken on every transaction; the visit by officials to the homes of people who have recently received compensation money to demand "contributions".

In all, individual villagers report losses between Rp.35,000 and Rp. 1 million each. They also accuse officials of diverting State funds into their own pockets.

The villagers have tried registering official complaints. They visited the Anti-Corruption Operation (OPSTIB) in Jakarta (March 1982) and the Provincial Governor in Semarang (May 1982), under advice from the Legal Aid Institute and the Legal Study and Aid Group of Jogjakarta. The Governor declined to discuss the matter with them.

The head of the Magelang Regency's Agrarian Office, Widoyoko, has confirmed corruption among officials; he said that action has been taken against some of them. However, he blamed the villagers themselves for wanting secrecy in their dealings.

In recent interviews, Borobudur inhabitants have clearly become tired of trying to enter into a reasonable dialogue with unreasonable and self-seeking officials. They say,

"If we are treated politely (*halus*), then we too wish to be polite. But if they wish to play rough (*main kasar*), then we too will play rough."

However, for many villagers, the pressure has clearly become too intense. Most recent reports are that many have finally conceded, and are now hoping for some fair compensation.

Legal manipulations

The Government and the Tourist Park Company have been accused of manipulating the law and acting illegally over land appropriation. The following points have been raised by the Group for Legal Study and Aid (Kelompok Studi dan Bantuan Hukum, KSBH) and the Legal Aid Institute (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, LBH), in collaboration with the Indonesian Legal Aid Association (Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia, YLBHI), in their book *Voice from Under Borobudur* (Suara dari Borobudur), published in English as well as in Indonesian.

- It is necessary to prove public or national interest before land can be appropriated; this has yet to be proven.
- The Basic Agrarian Act, No.20 1961, says only that land rights *may be* repealed. Yet owners at Borobudur face compulsion.
- The repealing of rights and ownership has legal force (only?) when three requirements have been fulfilled:
 - * formal approval from the President has been issued;
 - * agreed compensation has been given and accepted;

* those whose rights to land have been repealed have been resettled on new sites;

These requirements are still in question.

With heavy irony, the book quotes from Presidential Instruction No.9 1973:

"Revocation of rights of land and every object upon it should be done only for urgent common interest. It should be done most carefully and in ways which are wise and just. Everything should be in line with the rules in effect."

Mr. Setro Wikromo has lived in the vicinity of Borobudur since birth. He is a 55 year old carpenter, with one child and four grandchildren. He speaks in brief phrases and has the habit of looking hard at the person he is conversing with, his eyebrows meeting.

He is not against the Park Project but he does not wish to be moved away from the land that he has come to love deeply. He says, "We as the people of this nation understand that the government wishes to carry out developments in the Borobudur region, and as citizens we would like to give support to those plans . . . but we beg not to be exposed to any harm (and) we ask to be saved from being evacuated or transferred from lands within the village of Kenayan.

Mr. Andul Fatah, 60 years, comes from one of the foremost families of Gendingan village. He said, "Frankly, I have been able to enjoy some contentment in the last two years." He owns 900 sq.m. of land. "Anyone living in the vicinity of Borobudur knows that I acquired this land by toil and sacrifice. . . For years I was forced to lead a life in need; it was already something to be able to eat once a day. Now I am required to move when I have been able to reap the rewards just a little. I really live off this land." He added, "I am haunted by troubled feelings because of the instruction to move. I have great objections."

Mr. Sastro Prawiro (pseudonym) works for the government. Having lived in his village since birth, he feels quite at home on his land near Borobudur. He has three children who are still small. Mr. Sastro personally does not mind very much having to move from his birth-place. "I am not like those coconut sugar tappers", he said. However, his sense of solidarity towards his fellow residents did not allow him to leave them and let them fight by themselves. In June 1982 he was summoned to his superior's office in Magelang. There he was given two alternatives: relinquish his job or hand over his land to the Tourist Park Company. Pushed into a corner, he surrendered, on one condition, agreement on price. Officials came to his house three times, but no agreement on price was reached. Then in July he was transferred to another job, in a remote place a good distance from his home.

Taken from *Voice from Under Borobudur*, KSBH and LBH, Jogjakarta.

Borobudur

A long trauma

Part of the current anger aroused among the villagers of Borobudur stems from the fact that this is not the first experience of its kind, but only the most recent in a long series of manipulations:

- 1970 land within a radius of 200m. of the foot of the temple was appropriated for the Restoration Project. The market price of land at that time was Rp.750 per sq.m. but the owners were paid only Rp.200.
- 1972 (a) land was appropriated for a bus terminal. Though the market price had risen to Rp.1250 per sq.m., the owners received only Rp.200-225.
(b) land belonging to 43 people at Dagi Hill was compulsorily bought up by the Regional Government. One owner recalls being told it was "being bought by the Governor in the interests of regional government". Plans for the site included hotels, restaurants and housing to be owned by the Regional Government. Compensation ranged from Rp.125 per sq.m. for land near the main road, to Rp.60 for land far away from the road. Owners were told by officials that the land would be taken from them whether they agreed or not. One villager calculates he is still owed Rp. 70,000, misappropriated by the village head (*lurah*). Villagers have complained that they were forced to pay tax on this land which was no longer theirs, until February 1981. Today, this land is owned by a private company, PT Bukit Dagi, and occupied by a large restaurant, the Indras, owned by the Ambarukmo Sheraton Hotel, Jogjakarta's largest international hotel.

1976 Stall-owners were required to rebuild their to kiosks according to an official blueprint. Two
1977 months after the original instruction, came another ordering that the work should be done through a specified contractor, to whom Rp.100,000 should be paid for each kiosk 3m. x 3m. in area. 115 kiosks were to be rebuilt. Some owners paid in full, others Rp. 40-90,000 according to their means, and their stalls were pulled down ready for reconstruction. To date, 37 of those stalls finished have fallen down again, and many others have never been rebuilt. No monies have been returned to the stall-holders. The contractor seems to have disappeared.

(Mutiar, 4—17.3.81)

Sources

Mutiara 4—17.3.81 and 3—16.2.82; Buana Minggu 27.6.82; Suara Merdeka 13.12.81 and 28.5.82; Kompas 7.2.81; KR 26.3.82 and 29.5.82;
Also "Paguyuban Rakyat Dalam Kasus Borobudur", Bantuan Hukum, No.3, Year 1, September 1981.

BUDDHISTS PROTEST

According to Aggi Tjetje, General Chairman of the Indonesian Buddhists Organisation (Musyawarah Kekeluargaan Budhis Seluruh Indonesia), Indonesian Buddhists are not alone in protesting against the Tourist Park plan. "Buddhists all over the world are also protesting against it", he stated. He fears increasing commercialisation, a loss of respect for cultural values, violation of the sacredness of the temple (for example, hotel nightclubs serving alcohol), and pollution of the environment. All this would be added to the sacrifice of the local population, he said.

(Mutiar, 4-17 March 1981)

From: Voice from Under Borobudur



Reconstruction work in progress

East Timorese refugee interviewed by TAPOL

Carlos Afonso, a Timorese refugee in Perth, Australia, left Jakarta for Australia in March this year. Before his departure, he was on a training course in Malang, East Java. From 1975 till 1980 he lived in Indonesian-occupied Dili. In an interview with Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL, given in Perth on 18th September, he describes some of his experiences. The interview took place in Indonesian.

What happened to you up to the time of the Indonesian invasion?

I was born in Dili on 24th February 1957. I attended a Catholic primary school in Maliana, then a middle school in Dili. Before I graduated from upper middle school, the 25th April 1974 event occurred in Lisbon and my education was interrupted. Though I was still at school, my sympathies were with Fretilin¹ so I became involved with them. Then in August 1975, the clash took place between UDT and Fretilin. The UDT attacked Fretilin on 11th August, and on 20th August, Fretilin counter-attacked. UDT was defeated and went to the border; they were chased by Fretilin and withdrew to West Timor.

I went with Fretilin to Balibo and Batugade. I saw with my own eyes Indonesian troops attacking from the west. I saw their ships. That was in Batugade. I was not on the front line. I was asked to take the films that had been shot by those (Australian) journalists, so I went back to Dili. Dili was under Fretilin control. Then I was sent to Same. I returned to Dili in December and should have left again for Same but just as I was about to leave, the Indonesians attacked Dili. At 6 on the Saturday evening, 6th December, the ships attacked, at Comoro. We could see the cannon fire from the ships, and troops were already landing. Then at five the next morning, soldiers began landing by parachute. The first to land were red-berets, the RPKAD.² Many people ran into the churches or fled to the mountains. I was still at home and I couldn't run away because there were troops already next door. They asked me which party I was from, so I said Apodeti. I was afraid. They asked me where the Fretilin troops were, and I told them I didn't know. I those days, I couldn't speak Indonesian, and I could hardly speak any English.

Then I tried to escape to the mountains but when I reached Balide, Indonesian troops were blocking the road. By then it was about 10am and there was no way for me to leave, so I had to remain in Dili.

At about 12 noon, the green-berets began to land, as I recall from battalions 501 and 502. They advanced to where I was. They ordered us all out of our homes, to gather in the street. We were taken to an open space, women, children, old people, and men including me. There was a (Portuguese) military police barracks nearby but the Indonesians were afraid to enter so they ordered us in and told us to bring out the weapons and ammunition.

Then they ordered us to gather together again; we didn't know why. There were about fifty of us then, all men, just picked up at random. All able-bodied men. In the middle,

“...they started spraying us with bullets.”

one of their men, an Indonesian soldier was lying dead. Then the soldiers, there were three of them, started spraying us with bullets. Many died on the spot, some managed to run off, falling as they fled because they had been hit. I was one of these. I had been hit in the hand and it was bleeding, so when I fell I covered my head with blood to make it look as though

I was dead. When they came to check up, they thought I was dead. Then they left, and we got up and ran away. There were about ten of us who ran off but some fell on the way after 10 or 20 meters because they had lost so much blood. Some of those who fell died there in the street. As far as I know, only 3 or 4 out of the 50 men are still alive.

I managed to reach the hospital and stayed there because of my wound. There were many people there. Afterwards I asked an ambulance man how many had died on the spot where we were shot, near the police barracks. He said 29, not counting the ones who had fallen or died as they fled.

On 11th December, the troops attacked the hospital. We were all ordered out, all the sick people there. We were taken out of the premises, and I was together with a friend from Cape Verde in Africa. As we came near Balide Church, this friend and another man were dragged off by the soldiers. We kept going; we had been told to go into the town. After walking on a few meters, we heard shots. These two friends had been shot dead.

They just killed people at random, and stole their things. They plundered shops, homes, everywhere. In those days it was dangerous to wear a watch. A soldier, seeing it, would

“They plundered shops, homes everywhere. In those days, it was dangerous to wear a watch. . .”

come and ask for it at pistol point; we simply had to give it up. One day, they came to our house and took everything. Many people were murdered, some on the wharf; many of those killed were Chinese.

I remained in Dili, then in 1977 I got work. Many couldn't find work. A friend offered me a job as a clerk at the Regional Assembly (DPRD)³. Until then I didn't have any work.

How did you live?

They were still distributing rice in those days, so we could survive.

Were you married, with a family?

No, I was living with my parents. My father was a customs official, at the harbour. Because of his work, he could speak Indonesian.

Could your father speak Indonesian before the invasion?

Yes. Many ships used to come from Singapore, so he learned to speak Indonesian.

He told me he saw many people shot dead at the harbour. The Indonesian soldiers did exactly as they liked at Dili. They killed people, they raped women. My aunt told me things about that.

You told the Senate Inquiry about the raping of women, didn't you?

Yes, that was in 1978 or 1979. At the time I was working at the DPRD so I was sent to the hospital to check. I had a

East Timor

relative, my aunt, working there. But there was nothing we could do. A young girl had been brought there. They injected her, and as she lay unconscious they raped her. One of them took a photo, and showed it off to others. No-one dared do anything against the soldiers. One woman working there was planning to expose everything but then she was driven away.

Because of my work, I saw and heard about many things, murders, rapes, crimes, everything. People came to the DPRD to complain, and all of us working at the DPRD heard everything, but there was nothing we could do.

How were the DPRD members chosen? Were there any elections?

No, no elections. This is how it happened. Anyone nominated would have to be screened by the first assistant (intelligence officer)⁴. His past would be checked; if he was from Fretilin or UDT, he couldn't become a member. Most of the candidates were proposed by Apodeti people, then they would be chosen by Indonesian officers. Fretilin people are generally much cleverer than Apodeti people who are mostly very ignorant, but they were always the ones who were chosen. It's much easier to treat them as puppets.

Were you ever arrested?

Yes, it was in 1977, after I had started working. The Indonesians had spies so we couldn't do anything when people came with complaints. And we could be arrested.

Were the spies Timorese?

Yes, Apodeti people. When I was summoned, I realised someone in the office had spoken about me, an agent. I was accused of hiding weapons at home. I was interrogated. "We've been told you have weapons and that you're in contact with people in the mountains." I told them it wasn't true. My hands and feet were tied together and I was stripped naked. They gave me electric shocks, held a pistol at my head and threatened me with a knife. Everyone who gets arrested is beaten. Many of my friends were treated like this. Anyone who gets arrested tells the same stories when they come out. I was beaten, then they put me into something called a

"...they put me in a safe, so tiny I couldn't stand up or lie down. I breathed through a small hole."

'jackpot' during Portuguese times.

Was that place formerly the Casino?

Yes. The place where they put me was a safe, only one meter high and one meter wide. A tiny place, and I could hardly breathe. And they put water in it. This was where I was told to sleep.

How long were you inside?

Three days and three nights. I only came out when they wanted to interrogate me. The safe was made of cement.

How did you breathe?

There was a small hole, so I breathed through that. I couldn't stand or lie down so I folded my legs like this. That's how I slept, for three days and nights. I was interrogated by a man called Nursalam, the one who had arrested me. I was given food once a day. My things were covered with blood.

While I was there, my father looked for help to get me out. He knew the vice-governor, Lopez. He also spoke to an Indonesian working there, but this fellow wanted money to get me out. Then I was released. Anyone who gets arrested can easily get out if they have money, regardless of whether you've committed a crime or not. If you don't have money you can stay there for a year, even if you're innocent.

What was the place where you were being held?

The RPKAD office.

Have any political prisoners been tried?

No, none. There haven't been any public trials which the public can attend. The only trials are those at the places of detention, during interrogation. Other people are not tried either. People held on criminal charges, members of the Army as well as non-Indonesians. These cases should be settled in court, but no-one is ever brought to court.

"The only trials are at places of detention, during interrogation."

Are there any lawyers in Timor?

Yes, but Javanese, not Timorese.

What work do they do? Do they help the prisoners in any way?

No, not at all. That's all in ABRI's hands. Civilians can't do anything. It's just the same at the DPRD. When people come with complaints, all the DRRD can say is: it's all because of the *situasi* and *kondisi*. *Sitkon*. That's the term. We can't do a thing. Everything's in ABRI's hands. We have to remain silent.

When the DPRD made its report to Suharto, you weren't there any more, were you? Do you know the people who made the report?

I was already in Malang then. Yes, I know Leandro, one of the signatories. We were at school together. I heard from a friend recently who told me Leandro is still alive.

What else did you hear?

Well, the news is very recent, from Dili, about events in August. Fighting is still going on in the eastern part of the country. The people in the mountains have set up a new front called the Red Brigade, to fight the Indonesians. And their forces are getting stronger. People are still being arrested and sent to Atauro. There are more than 4,000 people on Atauro now. I saw things like this myself when I was still in Dili. A family I knew. The husband's name is Daniel. When his wife was arrested, they took everyone, even the dog, the pigs, everything. If anyone does something wrong, the whole family is picked up and sent to Atuaro. After I came here (to Australia), my mother in Dili had problems. They've taken her house even though I had nothing to do with that house.

What about office workers? Can Timorese keep their jobs?

At first, yes. Documents, letters, circulars were all in Portuguese, and all those who had worked for the Portuguese administration were invited back. But then, Portuguese was replaced by Indonesian, and gradually people who didn't know Indonesian were replaced, one by one. They found excuses. The tendency is to remove the Timorese. Timorese applying for jobs in competition with people from other provinces will always lose. How can you work, they say, if

you don't know Indonesian? People who come to Timor from places other than Java start off first as traders, street-vendors. Then in a few months, they get jobs in the offices. Timorese could do the work but they're not accepted because of the language.

Is it just because of the language, or are the Indonesians suspicious?

Yes, they're suspicious, and the tendency is to remove all the Timorese from jobs. And many people are arriving from other places, from Java and elsewhere.

What about places of detention outside Dili. Are there many of them?

People who surrender, who come down from the mountains, are usually arrested. People in the towns are also often arrested. Nobody knows who has the power to arrest. The best-known place is Comarca. But elsewhere there are detention places; lots of people have powers to arrest. If the police want to arrest someone for political reasons, the person is arrested by *Komsek* who do just whatever they like. The arrested person may have to work for the policeman or may be handed over to military intelligence. And other military units arrest people, like *Koramil*, or *Kodim*. So, there are people under arrest at the *Kodims*, *Koramils*, *komseks*, and also in Comarca. People who believe a member of their family has been arrested have difficulty knowing where to go, there are so many prisons or places of detention. All those organisations do just as they like, and then there are the first assistants (intelligence) everywhere, in Dili and everywhere else.

Say, we need to go to *Koramil* or *Komsek* to ask for papers; we'll certainly see prisoners there. East Timor is a small place, and we know when someone is arrested, where they're from.

Not only in Dili, but in Baucau, and other places, too?

Yes, everywhere. In Dili, they have to be a bit cautious, but in the *kabupatens* or the *kecamatan*s they feel safer to do what they like. If they want to kill, they just kill; no-one can find out.

Is Comarca a big place?

Yes. And it's been a prison since former times. I don't know how many people are there now but it's a big place. I once went there to visit a friend in 1977, but I got scared. We were all searched; the food was searched, everything. That's why I didn't go there again.

Before the Indonesian invasion you were close to Fretilin. Didn't anyone betray you to the Indonesians?

Yes, that's why I was arrested in 1977. You know, if a soldier wants a woman but she's married, the soldier will simply say that her husband is Fretilin and have him arrested. Things like that often happen.

Do all Indonesians behave like that?

Some of them are very brutal, but others coming from provinces other than Java don't like this sort of thing.

Is this mainly then your experience of people from Java?

Well, there are two battalions, 747 and 745. Many of the soldiers are East Timorese. These soldiers don't like such behaviour. A friend of mine, who's in the Army, told me that

when people surrender, they look upon them as the enemy, yet they have feelings towards them, as brothers. So, someone surrenders and is well received, then not long afterwards, he disappears. This makes the Timorese soldiers very unhappy. The Army propaganda claims that people who surrender will be treated well, but many of them disappear even though they were promised amnesty. I saw it all myself, in April 1979, when many people disappeared.

Why? What happened then?

My home was right near the RPKAD, the most dangerous ones. Every night they went out capturing people. I saw it all myself, through the window. The soldiers went out, dressed in sarongs, with their weapons hidden underneath. They'd go off to take people in. Then, a few days later, we'd hear: so-and-so has disappeared. Or someone would come and say, my friend disappeared last night. During that time, people were really afraid. Many, many people disappeared.

Amnesty International on the 1979 executions and disappearances

"Amnesty International has the names of 89 Timorese who were executed in the years 1977-79 after surrender or capture but the total number killed was undoubtedly far larger. Most of these executions occurred in 1979 between March and September. Amnesty International has the names of 28 individuals executed in Quelicai, Baucau in May-June 1979. Amnesty International has also received general reports of large numbers of executions of people from the surrounding area taking place at this time in Quelicai when 'going to Quelicai' became a euphemism for being executed. Those reported to Amnesty International to have been executed were predominantly former Fretilin fighters but among the victims there were also students and teachers alleged to have assisted Fretilin."

"In the same period, many Timorese 'disappeared'. Typically those who 'disappeared' were people thought to be associated with Fretilin who had been released from detention or were still detained at the time of their 'disappearance'. Amnesty International learned of this pattern of 'disappearances' in early 1980. At that time Amnesty International was not able to ascertain the fate of these people. It has subsequently obtained evidence that many of those who 'disappeared' were in fact executed: many of these executions were reportedly carried out at Lake Tacitolo, west of Dili, by a special unit commonly referred to as Ramelau 41 after the truck they used to pick people up in. According to reports received from several reliable sources, the executions and the 'disappearances' were part of a co-ordinated operation designed to eliminate Fretilin leadership and cadres who were no longer fighting, many of whom had surrendered under an amnesty guaranteeing their safety."

Taken from Amnesty International's Prepared Statement before the US Congressional Sub-Committee Hearings on East Timor, 14th September, 1982.

East Timor

Was there anything happening at the time?

All I know is that they sent a special 'clean-up' team from Jakarta, to 'clean up' people. Some had surrendered a year before and had been living in the town since. Then, they just disappeared. Some soldiers in this 'clean-up' team were based a little way away, near a Chinese school, others were based at the RP^{ULAD} office next door to where I lived. I think the Commander's name was Sunarto. Many friends of mine disappeared during that time: Uli Karpo, Minu, Minu Alwis, Jon Kosesa (the spellings are probably not accurate, CB). We were all terribly afraid and couldn't sleep at night, wondering when we'd be picked up. We'd be afraid to go out after dark. They used a truck, number 41. Ours at the DPRD was number 42. That's how I can remember the number. When people saw this truck on the street, they got really scared.

The people taken were not imprisoned but murdered?

Maybe murdered, I don't know. They just disappeared. Many of them.

There were three parties in East Timor weren't there, before the Indonesian invasion?

Yes. There were others too, Trahbalista, Kota, but they were very small.

What happened to UDT after its defeat in August 1975?

It ceased to exist in East Timor. There was only Fretilin. Those disorders were deliberately created, to give Indonesia a pretext to come it.

Did UDT and Apodeti continue to exist after Indonesia invaded?

No. The Indonesians said: now there are no parties, no UDT, no Apodeti. That's the theory, but in practice, they always appoint UDT or Apodeti people. As organised parties, though, they don't exist any more.

Has the composition of the population of Dili changed?

Yes, it has. Some new kampungs have been built but most of the people living there are not Timorese but people from outside. But if we go to storehouses (*gudang*), that's where

"Some new kampungs have been built but most of the people living there aren't Timorese. They're people from outside."

we'll see Timorese living, because there aren't homes for them.

Who run the shops now?

Still a few Chinese, but now mostly Javanese. Chinese don't want to stay in Timor any more. They don't feel free. If a Chinese has a shop and an Indonesian comes in, they'll just take what they like. The Chinese are the most afraid of all. Many have left already. Those still there are just working to collect enough money to leave. It's not easy to leave, it costs so much. Back in 1977 and 1978, an exit permit cost Rp 100,000. Even a travel pass from one kabupaten to another in Dili cost Rp 5,000. Just one travel pass!

But you need those in Indonesia, to prove where you live, don't you?

Yes, I know. I lived in Java and I saw how things work there. In Java, in the villages, people still feel some freedom in face of ABRI by comparison with Timor. In Timor anyone who sees a soldier gets really scared. It's not like that in Java. And when you apply for a travel pass in Java, they say: you have to pay, but it's up to you to decide how much. It's not like that in Timor. The amount is fixed, and even when you pay, you may have to wait a month for the pass. And you have to pay whatever they ask for.

What about commerce? How does economic life compare with formerly?

People still can't sell their coffee. You can't take more than a kilo of coffee to Dili, or else you'll be punished. Outside Dili, there are two control posts especially for coffee, one on the road to Ailieu and one on the road to Ermera. All vehicles are stopped and checked. And if we're taking more than two sacks of rice whereas our travel pass only says two sacks, they take the rest and keep it for themselves.

Does your travel pass have to record the goods you take?

Yes, and if they find you carrying more, you'll be punished. I used to go to the mountains, to Ermera, taking rice to exchange for coffee. But the coffee can only be sold in Ermera, and the price is very low, only 50 cents a kilo. When we show our travel pass, they always ask for cigarettes, and if you haven't got any, you can be held up, or forced to stay the night.

People aren't free to sell their coffee; only to PT Denok. They're the only ones allowed to buy coffee.

Do you know who runs PT Denok?

No, I don't. High up people, generals. I don't know their names.

Do you know the name, Benny Murdani?

Yes, he's from intelligence. Then there was Colonel Sinaga but he's gone back to Jakarta. That Colonel Sinaga, he was the worst of all, ruined many people (*banyak makan orang*). Took their money, ruined so many Chinese.

And what about Dading?

He's not in Timor. He's in Bali. The man who's secretary of the government now is Colonel Kalangie, also from intelligence. Then there's Sahala Raja Guru; I don't know where he's from. He's commander of *Korem*, the military office at gubernorial level; the top level in Timor, *Kodim*, is at kabupaten level, and *Koramil* below that, at kecamatan level.

Who is the most powerful man in Timor?

Sahala Raja Guru. He's the top man in the Army. And in the government, it's Colonel Kalangie. He used to be commander of *Korem*, but then he moved from the Army to the government. He's now a soldier in the civilian administration. He replaced Sinaga, and was replaced in the Army by Sahala Raja Guru.

The governor is Timorese, but he's nothing more than a puppet. Pretty well all the letters and decisions are signed by Kalangie.

Could you tell me something about night-watching?

We all have to do that. A man from every family has his name on a list kept by the kampung head. Everynight someone must go on guard, from each family. There are

special posts in every kampung.

Guarding against what?

Against the enemy, in case Fretilin comes into the town. People can't sleep at night. At one o'clock, a piece of iron must be struck once, at two o'clock twice, and so on until five o'clock. *Koramil* controls the guard posts. In Java, the guarding is done by *Hansip* (Civil Guards) but in Timor civilians have to do it. And no-one gets paid. Soldiers only guard their barracks and offices. Everywhere else, we have to do it.

Is there a curfew?

Well, if we're out later than 10 pm, we're bound to be stopped, your name taken, where you are from and so on. So people prefer not to go out.

How do things compare now with Portuguese times? The Indonesians say there was no development under Portugal but there is now.

Yes, they have built some roads. But you can't exchange development for people. People who disappeared have

“. . .you can't exchange development for people.”

disappeared for good. The Indonesians need to do some development so as to show it to people from other countries. But the Timorese don't like the Indonesians, they want their freedom.

What about schools and hospitals?

As I said just now, houses are being built but not for Timorese. The people in these houses are from outside. The roads have been asphalted but in great haste. Things like that should be done with care, by people who know how. But they did it anyhow, just to be able to say that all roads in Dili have been asphalted.

In the schools, all the teaching is in Indonesian. It's only up to lower middle school. And that's only in the towns, not in the mountains. If you want to go to SMA (upper middle school), you have to go to Java, and that's difficult. Even children have to be screened by intelligence. They want to know who your parents are. If they're from Apodeti, then everything's alright.

How did you manage to go to Malang?

I took a test. If you know a lot of people, you can manage it. I wanted to do an agricultural training course, and the agriculture department was next to our office so I had friends there. I went to Java alone first. When I was there, I went to the Australian embassy to get my papers to leave because I have relatives in Australia. When that was done, I returned home and got married, then returned to Java. My real purpose was to get out, but it's very difficult to do that so I entered a course in Malang. I was there for a year.

You must have mixed with many Indonesians then. What is your impression? Do they understand anything about the situation in Timor?

Some know that things are very bad. I always told them everything. People often asked me how things were, what had happened, what the war was like, how about integration with Indonesia, and so on. So I told them what happened, and how things had come to such a pass as now.

Did you talk about this quite openly? Wouldn't this have been risky?

I always spoke openly. Nothing's happened up till now. I spoke mostly to people from outside Java, but I also had Javanese friends.

Did you find any difference in their attitudes?

Well, the people from outside Java understand our situation much better. Perhaps it's because they feel colonised, like us. The Javanese aren't being colonised by anyone so they don't understand what it's like.

What is the attitude of Javanese towards Timorese?

The Javanese in Timor have feelings of superiority. They're arrogant because they are Javanese and we are Timorese. They always feel superior. There was a Javanese in my office, and he regarded Timorese as stupid. He always considered himself more knowledgeable.

Why do you think that is?

Well, in my opinion, they think they're from a civilised place (*yang maju*) whereas we're of no use. They regard themselves as the people on top. This makes Timorese feel: ach, we're still being colonised. Timorese always make the comparison between the colonisers and the colonised. And we feel we're being colonised by the Javanese.

Was it like that in Portuguese times?

Yes, before 25th April, 1974. There was no freedom of speech and we were afraid. But in those days many people in the mountains didn't know who the colonisers were. Then the parties began to organise, they got to know. I've seen for

“We feel we're being colonised by the Javanese.”

myself how the people in the mountains has their eyes opened up. They knew so much more about politics. Very steady (*mantap*), far more so than the people in Dili. All of them who came down were so steady.

Why was that?

Well, during that time they learnt for the first time about their lives. Even though they were in the forests, they ran schools. Lectures were given. They only had bamboo for writing but they were organised. And they knew who the enemy was. If they captured a civilian, they didn't regard him as an enemy. And they tried to show Indonesians what it is that Timorese people want.

Are there many people in Timor who still want to leave?

Yes, very many, but there's no way to leave. You need a lot of money for that, so it's mostly just Chinese who can leave. They're the only ones who can afford it. The friend I spoke to this morning told me he wants to leave and come to Australia. It's such a pity because he doesn't have anyone to arrange it for him. He would have to be sponsored by a relative in Australia.

Were you on the list of people to come to Australia under the family reunion programme?

I had registered twice with the Red Cross to leave, but I was also among those who, before September 1980, had relatives outside, in Lisbon or in Australia, and were allowed to enter Australia. So I was on that list too. I wanted to leave



Napsiah and Djoko Untung, wife and husband, were arrested in July 1968. They were caught in the sweep of arrests that followed the discovery of an underground network which had been set up in Blitar, East Java in which many pre-October 1965 left-wing activists were involved.

Napsiah is now 61 years old. She has a long period of political activism in the women's movement as well as in the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). During the 1945-1949 period of defending the newly-proclaimed Republic of Indonesia against the Dutch military attacks aimed at restoring Dutch colonialism, she was in the youth movement *Pesindo* as well as the women's organisation, *Perwari*. She joined the PKI in 1949 and subsequently helped to develop the left-wing women's organisation, *Gerwani*. She was at all times active in her native East Java.

By the time of the October 1965 events and the subsequent mass arrests, she was a member of the PKI East Java Provincial Committee. She evaded arrest and is believed to have played an active and leading role in organising underground work in East Java after the PKI and *Gerwani* had been unlawfully banned.

She was brought to trial in 1976 before the Malang District

Court and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The prosecution demanded a life sentence. In announcing its verdict and sentence, the court mentioned as an extenuating circumstance the fact that when cross-examined, "she answered frankly and with clarity".

She is now in Malang Prison and is understood to be due for release in 1989. It is not clear whether her sentence is being counted from the date of her arrest or the date of her sentence. If she is released in 1989 she will in any case have been in prison for 21 years.

Djoko Untung was also a member of the PKI East Java Provincial Committee in the years leading up to October 1965. He is from Kediri, East Java. He stood as a candidate for the PKI in the 1955 general elections, and became a member of Parliament. He was also active in cultural work and became a member of the *ludruk* institute in 1964. *Ludruk* is a form of Javanese people's drama.

Like his wife, he evaded arrest and went underground in late 1965. When he became involved in the Blitar underground network, he is understood to have been responsible for producing its Bulletin.

When he was tried in 1975 before the Blitar State Court, he was in the dock together with two other men, also Blitar activists. One of the men, named Basuki, died while the trial was in progress. The other, Gatot Sutaryo was found guilty and sentenced to death. Djoko Untung too was given the death sentence. His present place of imprisonment is not known.

East Timor

Timor because I had no future there. The future was so grim, full of suspicions. I hope to continue with my education here, once I've mastered English.

You mentioned in a previous conversation that you met Francisco Xavier do Amaral. Could you tell me about that?

It was when I was passing through Bali, in 1980. I had to go to the Commander's place. If a Timorese wants to go back to Dili and can't get a seat on the plane, we can go to the Commander's place, speak to his aide who then phones the airport for a seat. It was there that I saw Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the former President of Fretilin. I spoke to him but he didn't recognise me. I saw him there, at the back of the Commander's home, in short pants. Being formerly a sympathiser of Fretilin, I felt terrible seeing him like that. I asked him: how are things with you? Alright, he said. You can see for yourself how things are with me. Then I told him who I was. He had forgotten me. He and my father were friends formerly, they worked in the same office as customs officials. He had once visited our home.

Then we had a chat, and he asked me when I would be going back to Dili. I felt awful, to see him there working as a coolie for the Commander. He looks after the Commander's horse, washes it, feeds it. He's a prisoner although he's not in a prison. In Timor there are many people like that. Living in officers' homes and working for them. Washing their cars, carrying water, anything. Alarico Fernandez is in just the same position. Then there was Leopold, also Fretilin. He

surrendered. The Indonesians made a lot of propaganda about his surrender. He went back home, and lived with his wife for some time, but then he was murdered, he disappeared.

About those who are still alive, there is an expression: '*masih dipakai*', or 'there's still a use for them'. That's the expression about people who've come down from the mountains who are still alive.

Footnotes

1. *Fretilin*: Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor.
UDT: Timor Democratic Union.
Apodeti: The party which favoured integration with Indonesia.
2. *RPKAD*: Paratroop Command Regiment. The interviewee constantly refers to this unit as 'RKP'.
3. *DPRD*: The Regional People's Assembly. The interviewee constantly uses the abbreviation, DPR, the initials for Parliament in Jakarta. He is clearly referring however to the DPRD in Dili.
4. *Asisten satu*: first assistant. The First Assistant to military commanders at all levels of the Army structure is in charge of intelligence.



Racist victimisation of Moluccans in Holland

Six Moluccans, all of them activist members of the Moluccan Educational Collective (MSK — Moluks Scholings Kollektief) and the Masiun anti-drugs addiction centre in Assen, in Holland, have been found guilty of firing shots at a police car with intent to kill and sentenced to three years imprisonment. Three others tried with them were acquitted. One other Moluccan, who is awaiting trial, is still under detention.

The verdict was passed even though the prosecution failed to produce a single eye-witness, nor was any weapon discovered. Evidence presented by the prosecution regarding bullet holes in the tyres of the police car was categorically rejected by the defense, as the forensic investigation took place **after** the tyres had been shot at during a reconstruction of the alleged incident.

All the accused vehemently denied the charges. They told the court of flagrant physical and psychological abuses during their pre-trial interrogation, and their lawyers complained that they had been denied access to some of their clients. Attempts were even made during these interrogations to link the accused to international 'terrorism'; they were repeatedly questioned about their alleged links with Irish and West German 'terrorist' groups.

When the accused were first arrested in July, many house searches took place at Moluccan homes in Assen, and the Masiun centre was raided and searched. At the same time, reports appeared in the press that a conspiracy to kidnap Queen Beatrix and Prime Minister van Agt had been discovered, linked presumably to the same group of men.

The case has aroused widespread condemnation in the Netherlands, particularly among Dutch groups such as the Dutch Indonesia Committee which organise solidarity with the Indonesian people. The trial and verdict has been condemned for its strong racist overtones and as an attempt to undermine new forms of political activity among Moluccans in the Netherlands.

MSK, A Break with the RMS Tradition

The MSK was set up a few years ago to organise the study of political developments in Indonesia and the position of Moluccans in Holland. Its main objectives are:

* to support progressive liberation movements in the Indo-

nesian archipelago,

- * to support progressive forces in Indonesia which are working for the restoration of democracy, and
- * to support rural and local initiatives directed towards these objectives.

It has participated in a number of solidarity actions recently in Holland, and supports the call for a halt to Dutch weapons deliveries to Indonesia. When its office in Assen was raided by the police, books, documents and posters relating to this campaign were confiscated.

The Masiun centre is a joint initiative by the MSK and other Moluccan social organisations to help drug addicts, the homeless and the unemployed among young Moluccans in Assen. The centre was set up because of a lack of attention to these problems by the city council. Although its activities are clearly directed towards helping to solve deep-rooted social issues, the centre has not been welcomed either by the police or the city council.

The MSK as a political group represents a break with the RMS tradition which has dominated Moluccan political activity in Holland since the 1950s. The RMS (Republik Maluku Selatan) was a separatist movement set up in the South Moluccas after the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic in 1945; it had the support of Dutch colonialism. When the Dutch finally conceded sovereignty to the Republic in December 1949, some 10,000 Moluccans, soldiers and their families left Indonesia to settle down in the Netherlands. This became the basis for a strong RMS support movement. In pursuance of these objectives, pro-RMS groups organised a number of internationally-reported incidents during the 1970s, including a train hijack and the taking of hostages at the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague.

Although new political traditions are now developing among younger Moluccans, rejecting both the objectives and methods of struggle of pro-RMS groups, it appears that some circles are trying to reinforce the racist image of Moluccans as 'terrorists'. Seen in the broader context, the Assen trial is also considered as a deliberate attempt to undermine the development of the MSK and the Masiun centre.

Source: Four Dossiers produced by the Dutch Indonesia Committee, Amsterdam.

Freedom for Assen Moluccans!



Embassy interference during Tapol visit backfires

Indonesian Embassy attempts to disrupt a visit to New Zealand by a representative of TAPOL backfired miserably. Media attention aroused by this interference only helped give the visit far greater publicity than it otherwise might have had.

The TAPOL representative was Carmel Budiardjo who visited New Zealand for nine days in October, on a tour sponsored by *Corso*, the main New Zealand aid agency, *Christian World Service*, the aid agency of New Zealand's National Council of Churches, and the *Catholic Commission for Evangelism, Justice and Peace*.

Shortly before her arrival in the country, Corso's head office in Wellington received a phone-call from Boni Siagian, Information Officer of the Indonesian Embassy, advising Corso to cancel a public meeting at which the TAPOL representative would speak and suggesting that the agency should withdraw its sponsorship of her tour. The Embassy spokesman claimed, said Corso's Bill Aldridge to the *New Zealand Press Association*, that "the meeting would not help relations between the two countries". (*Press Association* report, published in many New Zealand newspapers on 5th October.)

The next day, in a face-saving denial, the Embassy claimed

they did not believe the meeting could harm relations, that it was New Zealand's business whether the meeting was stopped or not, and added that the Embassy knew that "everyone has the right of freedom of speech in New Zealand." (*Evening Post*, Wellington, 6th October 1982)

A Corso report, summarising the impact of the TAPOL visit said:

Thanks to the intervention of the Indonesian embassy, there was extensive media publicity prior to and during her visit. A wide range of individuals, many not seen before at Corso meetings, attended the public meeting on 7th October.

Media coverage included an interview on the main TV evening news programme plus TV coverage for the public meeting, an interview with the main radio news programme the day Carmel arrived in Wellington, a half-hour interview on Sharon Crosby's talk show which has a nation-wide audience, and several newspaper interviews.

Besides going to Wellington, Carmel also visited Christchurch, Dunedin and Auckland, met a number of groups and addressed several public meetings and church services.

TAPOL testimony to Australian Senate

This visit to Australia followed a trip Carmel made to Australia where she presented oral testimony to the Australian Senate Inquiry on East Timor. This opportunity came as the result of an invitation from the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee which is conducting the inquiry. TAPOL had already submitted written testimony in March.

TAPOL's submission and oral evidence concentrated on its own evidence and experience of the workings of KOPKAMTIB, the Indonesian Army's security command. Intimate experience of its comprehensive system of repression throughout Indonesia is important, TAPOL stressed, in understanding the nature of repression that has been inflicted upon the people of East Timor since Indonesia's invasion of that country in 1975. It is not simply a matter of compiling accessible information about the names of political prisoners and disappeared persons, and the number of prisoners being held in the more visible places of

detention in East Timor. In addition, there is a vast network of local KOPKAMTIB posts, manned by Army officers right down through the military command structure, where repression, arrests, detentions, torture and other abuses are everyday practice.

TAPOL also drew attention to the way Army authorities have consistently tried over the years to deceive foreign visitors wishing to investigate the conditions of political imprisonment in Indonesia. It described in particular the deceptions employed when an International Red Cross mission visited Indonesian prisons in 1977. (See *TAPOL Bulletin* No 21, April 1977.) These and other examples meant that the Senate Inquiry should treat with the utmost caution the impressions given by foreign visitors to East Timor.

During her trip to Australia, Carmel also visited a number of places, met groups and addressed public meetings in Perth, Adelaide, Canberra, Melbourne, Sydney and Hobart.

"The Evening Post," Tuesday, October 5, 1982 9

Indonesia tries to stop Corso speaker

CHRISTCHURCH, Oct 4 (PA). — Corso has been urged by the Indonesian Embassy to cancel a public meeting in Wellington at which a former political prisoner in Indonesia is to speak.

"The Evening Post," Wednesday, October 6, 1982
MEETING 'OKAY' BY INDONESIANS
The Indonesian Embassy denies that it has urged can- It was New Zealand's business whether the meet-

Where the 'phone-call' system of censorship doesn't work

Legalising *Dwi-Fungsi* militarism to safeguard its survival

In September, during the last days of Indonesia's outgoing Parliament, a new Basic Law on Defence and Security was passed virtually without discussion. The Law legalises Indonesia's particular brand of militarism known as *dwi-fungsi*, the dual function of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI). The *dwi-fungsi* doctrine conveniently avoids such terms as 'junta' or 'military rule'; Indonesia's military rulers prefer to describe their commanding position simply in terms of shouldering a double role, of being a social as well as defence force.

The new Law replaces the 1954 Defence Law which, in the words of Defence Minister and ABRI Commander, General Jusuf, "no longer conforms with present needs because . . . it draws a sharp dividing line between civil and military affairs". Such complaints about the 1954 Law are tardy to say the least. Hardly had the ink run dry on that piece of legislation than the constraints it placed on ABRI's involvement in non-military affairs had been broken asunder. The *dwi-fungsi* has been creeping up on Indonesia since the late nineteen-fifties, under Sukarno, when the Army first assumed special powers and then took charge of an important segment of the Indonesian economy.

There is no constitutional basis for militarism in Indonesia. The 1945 Constitution, restored by Sukarno in 1959 at the insistence of the Army leadership, serves the present regime well because it provides for presidential government free from parliamentary control. The only reference General Jusuf could find in the Constitution to justify the *dwi-fungsi* doctrine, in his speech introducing the new Law, was the stipulation that the State is "based on the family spirit" which means, he said, that everyone, including ABRI, must play a role in running it. The way things are run in Indonesia, this leaves precious little for the other members of the family to do.

ABRI's commanding position in Parliament and the upper house Assembly is well known to TAPOL readers, and its predominance in the bureaucracy was comprehensively analysed in the paper, "Patterns of Military Control in the Indonesian Higher Central Bureaucracy" by John MacDougal, summarised in **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 50 (March, 1982).

Besides legalising *dwi-fungsi* militarism (Article 10), the new Law gives the President absolute prerogative over the determination of defence policy, assisted by a National Defence Council, the members of which are all presidential appointees (Article 19). He is also empowered to determine the policy of ABRI's role in social, i.e. non-military affairs. "The President", states the elucidatory document attached to the Law, "is responsible for, and wields top authority over, implementation of ABRI's *dwi-fungsi*". Undoubtedly this has been the reality for many years; the only difference is that now it's legal.

The new Law places the police within the ABRI command structure, also confirming the prevailing situation. Law enforcement and the protection of the rights of the individual citizen, tasks normally designated to the police, are thus

legally part and parcel of overall State defence, and are at the mercy of ABRI's — and the President's — interpretation of Indonesia's security needs. Indeed, since 1965 and the establishment of KOPKAMTIB, the police have been allowed little scope in matters related to security and order. KOPKAMTIB, a body that is not mentioned in the new Law, remains intact. It is strange that it should not be mentioned for it is one of the most powerful aspects of ABRI's role as a "social force".

Significantly, the new Law legally extends ABRI's role in State affairs to include control of the country's natural resources and infrastructure. The justification given for such sweeping powers is that these are strategic factors that could be under threat in times of emergency. ABRI now has *carte blanche* to determine the use and exploitation of all raw materials, and the deciding voice in such fundamental matters as agricultural, industrial and communications policy.

On the question of Indonesia's defence philosophy, the 1982 Law describes this as being "active defensive". General Jusuf explained this further as being "non-aggressive and non-expansionist. Insofar as its national interests are not under threat, (Indonesia) will not launch an attack". Such a philosophy provided the justification for Indonesia's act of aggression against East Timor in 1975. A tiny neighbouring country with neither the intention nor indeed the potential to attack Indonesia, was perceived as a threat to security and therefore legitimate victim of its "active defensive" policy. With such a philosophy and experience, ABRI's professions of "non-expansionism" can be of little comfort to other neighbouring or nearby countries such as Papua New Guinea or Brunei.

Why Legalise Militarism Now?

If ABRI has, since 1965 when Suharto came to power, so successfully imposed its *dwi-fungsi* brand of militarism, why, one may ask, has it now felt the need to make it legal? The answer probably lies in the fact that today's top Army leadership still consists almost entirely of the older, so-called 1945 generation. The MacDougal study referred to above makes the point that the ABRI men who control the upper echelons of the bureaucracy are all from this generation, as well as most senior officers within ABRI itself.

The *dwi-fungsi* doctrine is not without its critics even among retired military officers who feel resentful at their own exclusion from the benefits of Suharto-style military rule. Such criticisms are never reported in Indonesia's tightly-controlled press media, but they rumble on below the surface. A new generation of military rulers who must soon start taking over can be expected to find it much harder to withstand such challenges without the backing of legalised militarism. It is not so much therefore that the new Law makes it legal; the important thing is that legalising militarism gives it a greater chance of becoming permanent.

Indonesian trade unions – the international connection

By Elizabeth Marlow

The All Indonesia Labour Federation (FBSI), the only 'trade union' allowed to exist in Indonesia, enjoys widespread recognition in international trade union circles. It is a prominent Third World member of the ICFTU, and 'represents' Indonesian workers at the ILO. Its head, Agus Sudono, sits on the Governing Bodies of both these powerful organisations, where he regularly acts as spokesman for workers throughout 'free' Asia.

The collaboration the FBSI receives from trade unions throughout the world does not reflect the reality of its role at home. In Indonesia, the FBSI consistently works with, and is partly financed by, the military regime, fully supporting its 'Pancasila Labour Relations' policy for tripartite collaboration between workers, their employers and the State which works to suppress workers' free and independent organisation. The FBSI has a long record of intervention along with the military and police forces to break strikes, and indeed Agus Sudono has declared that industrial action is a luxury which workers in developing countries cannot afford. "They only end up cutting their own throats", he says. He has also admitted that his organisation is "toothless" and corrupt.

Employers are entitled to regard the FBSI as a puppet. The Indonesian Employers Association, PUSPI, and the FBSI are both members of a new team set up in mid-1981 by the Manpower Ministry to defuse the widespread labour unrest which has been erupting over the past three years. Indonesian workers have something to complain about; their wages are among the lowest in the world, lower even than in India. When in 1979 Union Carbide sacked 200 workers who had contracted mercury poisoning at their West Java battery factory, there was not a word of protest from the FBSI. Some of the leading officials of the FBSI are on the management of large corporations. W. Purba, the Head of the Electronics Workers Section of the FBSI is also Assistant Personnel Manager of Fairchild Semiconductor's assembly plant in Jakarta. The 5,000 workers at this plant, mostly young girls, went on a long strike earlier this year, without support from the FBSI, against unilateral cuts in working hours and take-home pay imposed on them.

The most powerful men in labour relations in Indonesia today are those who head the FBSI, including Sudono and other members of his Central Board like Adolf Rachman and Sukarno, as well as the Director General for Manpower Protection, Utoyo Usman. These so-called "labour leaders" did not grow from within the Indonesian labour movement (those that did were massacred or imprisoned after the 1965 military takeover), but were carefully selected and groomed as early as the late 1950s, sent for training in the US in labour relations and public administration, before returning to various of the right-wing trade unions then competing with the left-wing and only mass-based trade union movement, SOBSI. Once SOBSI had been destroyed, and after a few years' lull when all active trade unionism was banned, the remaining emasculated unions, then existing only in name, were forcibly federated in 1973 to form the present FBSI, with Sudono at the helm. Prime movers in establishing the FBSI were the ICFTU, the American AFL-CIO and the West German Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

Sudono, who was once voted one of Indonesia's ten best dressed men, has emerged in international circles as a champion of Third World workers rights, speaking fullsome rhetoric from the podium of the ICFTU and ILO, even while his own "union" continues to oppose attempts by workers at home to fight for their rights. His officials, often hand-picked military men, continue to receive training in the West. The experience of many Indonesian workers is now so bitter that they are refusing to cooperate with the FBSI leaders. Trade unions worldwide are in the invidious position of collaborating with trade union leaders whom Indonesian workers themselves reject.

Reference: *Indonesian Workers and Their Right to Organise*, Indonesian Documentation Centre, Leiden, Netherlands, May 1981.

4,800 DETAINEES ON ATAURO

The number of detainees now being held on Atauro has increased in the past six months from 3,500 to 4,800, according to an AFP report from Jakarta, dated 28th October, 1982.

The prisoners, alleged to be Fretilin sympathisers and their families, include about 450 children under 5 years of age. "They live in crowded, unhygienic shanties, and suffer from malnutrition and such diseases as gastro-enteritis, cholera and tuberculosis. Some of the internees were reduced to eating roots", writes AFP.

The AFP report, filed by reporter Gilles Bertin, also states that nationalist resistance guerrillas have stepped up their attacks on police posts and Army targets. It states that "at least 15 people have been killed in the past three months by guerrillas of the Fretilin". Forty houses in Viqueque District were burnt down in August as well as two schools where the teachers were not from East Timor. AFP quotes circles in Jakarta as the source of these reports. They claim that the intensified military activity launched by Fretilin is linked to the debate on East Timor at the UN General Assembly, due to take place in early November.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Increase in Subs. To cover higher printing costs, postal charges, and to ensure the regular production of *at least 20 pages* each issue, subscription rates are being increased as follows:

Annual rates (6 issues)	UK, Europe and Overseas-surface	Overseas-air mail
Individuals	£ 7.50	£10.00
Institutions	£12.00	£14.00

TAPOL's Giro Account number: 56 781 4009.

Overseas subscribers please note: If you pay by cheque not drawn on a London bank, please add the equivalent of £1.50 to cover bank charges.

Subscriptions and correspondence to: TAPOL, 8a, Treport Street, London SW18 2BP.