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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No 51

May 1982

EAST TIMOR

ATAURO: ANATOMY OF A PRISON ISLAND

It is now clear, beyond any doubt, that Atauro Island, situated 20 miles north of Dili, the capital of East Timor, is a prison island. There are at least 3,737 political detainees being held there. Many are political prisoners, arrested over the past two years, who have been transferred to Atauro from the Comarca, a prison in Dili and other places of detention. Many more are people who were rounded up in various parts of the country because relatives were allegedly involved in the resistance against the Indonesian occupying forces.

Details of the conditions of Atauro prisoners are contained in a letter from East Timor, sent in November last year and published in **Timor Information Service***, Melbourne (March/April, 1982). The letter describes conditions as follows:

There is a general impression of sadness, hunger, distrust.. There are around four thousand exiles... The larger number of the exiles are from Los Palos (around 1,300), followed by Baucau and Viqueque. The majority of the exiles (about

COMARCA PRISON, A HELL HOLE

In February this year, former Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam visited Comarca Prison in Dili. The Sydney Morning Herald (8th March 1982) published a photograph of him with the "13 political detainees in the jail". Naturally, they all looked hale and hearty, and well-dressed.

Very different testimony of conditions in Comarca Prison has now come from a detainee who spent 1½ years there and who was exiled to Atauro Island last year. His report, which is published by Timor Information Service (March/April, 1982), is as follows:

I have been here in Atauro for about one-and-a-half months. I came from the Comarca prison, where I was for a year and a half. In the prison I was together with a group of fifteen people, in a room where even standing all of us could not fit. In this room there was a small hole where light and air came through. One other hole on the ground was in place of the toilet. One other little hole was for them to pass food through. Of this group of 15, four died of hunger. It was to me a very horrible experience to witness the death of these people. Death by hunger is a spectacle that cannot be described.

two-thirds) are women and children—women of every age, a good number between the ages of 60-70 years. The majority of these women are invalids; they are widows and were exiled because their sons maintain the armed resistance against the presence of Indonesia, they fight for the independence of Timor. These women live alone, sitting in a

Please turn to page 3

*In all cases of information supplied through private communications from East Timor or Jakarta, TIS states that the names of the sources are known, but are not available for publication.

ELECTIONS ROCKED BY KILLINGS, REPRESSION AND FRAUD

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THE ELECTION AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

General elections in Indonesia are not about choosing governments or presidents, they are about giving a facade of legitimacy to a government and president who came to power by illegitimate means. The methods employed to achieve this, intimidation of voters, censorship, the use of violence and ballot rigging are all reported in this issue. They are important to us because they infringe basic human rights, involve a grave restriction on civil and political freedoms, and result in arrests, injuries and deaths.

This year's elections have however provided evidence of growing discontent with elections. GOLKAR, the Army's electoral vehicle, will always win the votes it needs by fair means or foul, but it has been challenged not by political argument on the hustings (for this is not allowed) but by angry demonstrators, some of whom were no doubt supporters of the two non-government parties, frustrated by their own sense of powerlessness. With the present "putrefaction" of political processes, as one GOLPUT exponent has called it, they have no other way.

Tight control of the media which groans under KOP-KAMTIB's system of unilateral consensus has made it possible for the security command to conceal the extent to which the Army has killed and injured many hundreds, if not thousands, of people. It has enabled KOPKAMTIB to assert its own theory that the disturbances had "strategic-political-subversive" motives because they were aimed at "shaking up and discrediting the government so as to create conditions in which people no longer have confidence in the government, to heighten opposition/resistance to the government so as to overthrow and replace it". (Tempo, 10

April 1982, reporting a statement by Admiral Sudomo.) Under normally accepted democratic conditions, that is surely a fair statement of what elections are about!

According to the Far Eastern Economic Review (30th April 1982) KOPKAMTIB, evidently shaken by what has happened, is now in favour of shortening the campaigning period and replacing public meetings and rallies with "debates in the media". It looks as though the 1982 election campaign may compel the men who control Indonesia's political processes to revise quite considerably the methods they use to seek every five years to have their own legitimacy reconfirmed by "democratic" means.

STOP PRESS

PORTUGUESE PRESIDENT SEEKS POPE'S INTERVENTION ON EAST TIMOR

President Eanes of Portugal made a request to Pope John-Paul II to intervene on the question of East Timor. The request was made during the Pope's recent visit to Portugal. (Le Monde, 15 May 1982.)

The Times (17 May 1982) also reports that President Eanes raised East Timor with the Pope. According to this report, the Pope "agreed to a request by the President to resist pressure from Indonesia to nominate a new bishop it prefers". (It is known that Indonesia wants Mgr Martinho de Costa Lopez to be removed, particularly since his recent message to Australia warning of potential famine and reporting the slaughter of hundreds of Timorese in Lacluta. See TAPOL Bulletin, No 49, January 1982.)

MESSAGE OF GREETINGS

Dear TAPOL.

I note that you have received a number of messages congratulating you on the appearance of the 50th issue of

I was deeply disturbed at the time by what I heard of the killings which followed the abortive coup in Indonesia in 1965 but the full enormity of what had occurred was not fully borne home to me until I read the account written by Lucien Rey in the March 1966 issue of *New Left Review*.

Sporadic protests and criticisms of the Indonesian regime followed, in some of which I was personally involved, but it was not until the group of people who launched TAPOL came together that a systematic campaign in Britain began.

I still possess every issue of TAPOL except No. 11 and I believe it has played a key role in creating an awareness in the British Labour Movement and other public circles of the appalling suffering and deprivation of rights inflicted upon the people of Indonesia by those who have ruled the country since 1965.

Today there is fortunately a much greater consciousness in Britain of the struggle against oppression, poverty and starvation in the third world as a whole. TAPOL has made an important contribution to this.

It is cause for deep sadness that contrary to the opinions voiced by the Far Eastern Review a year or two ago TAPOL is still necessary. Even if one could leave aside the manner in which human rights have been trampled underfoot in Indonesia, the results of the terrible aggression against East Timor would still need to be exposed.

We in Liberation have sought to raise our voices on Indonesia along with you and I salute the sterling work TAPOL has done. As long as persecution and oppression, denial of human liberty, poverty and starvation persist, it is my fervent hope that there will be men and women like those who have kept TAPOL afloat prepared to dedicate themselves to ensuring that these evils will not be perpetrated unopposed.

Yours sincerely, Stans Newens MP, Chairman—Liberation.

EAST TIMOR Continued from page 1

corner of the tents, keeping company with others in the same condition. They starve, having been abandoned by all. Accommodation: The exiles live in tents. Altogether there are 45 tents; of these 43 are inhabited; all are numbered; 45-70 people (10 to 15 families) live in each tent. Those that can put up *lantens*, that is, rudimentary beds, can still escape from the rain; the others sleep on the humid and muddy ground; when it rains, everything is flooded ... All

TESTIMONY OF ATAURO DETAINEES

The following testimonies of political detainees now held on Atauro Island have been published by Timor Information Service (March/April 1982):

A WOMAN

I am in Atauro with my son. We are living in misery. I declare that many times, in my country, the commandant of *Kodim* tried to rape me. However, I prefer death than to go to the low level of such an act. However alive in this misery waiting for charity I prefer to stay here than be violated.

A YOUNG GIRL

I am not forced into exile here; I came because I want to accompany my parents in this exile. I am the daughter who has sustained my parents during those years. I have a brother who belongs to the anti-Indonesian resistance army. My parents are old; I thought it was my duty to accompany them here in this exile, and to assist them till the last moments.

AN EIGHT YEAR OLD BOY

I am an orphan. I am among the exiles because I have a brother who is fighting against the Indonesians in the mountains.

A WOMAN

I am here with my five children. My husband is imprisoned in Dili. I am here because I have a brother-in-law who belongs to the anti-Indonesian resistance army.

TIS also publishes eye-witness accounts that give some idea of the process of sending detainees to Atauro:

"LAGA (no date): In full view everyday people can be seen waiting to be taken by ship to an unknown destination. Army does it openly now . . ."

"DILI (21 September) 5.30 pm: Hundreds of people who are to be taken away sit on the outside of the warehouse of the dock. Many who were previously quiet now openly confess that they are witnessing the complete destruction of the people of East Timor. Many thousands have been moved from Uatucari, Uatucarabau. People believe this is all done with orders from senior officials."

"DILI (22 September) Morning: An eye-witness described many people lined up ready to be shipped away. They had come from Laba, Uatulari, Iliomar, Uatucarabau. A wire fence separated them from bypassers. They were not permitted to speak with anyone. They sometimes represented whole families . . ."

these tents do not offer any habitable conditions; there is no element of hygiene and cleanliness...

Food: Everyone is hungry. Some groups of exiles who had been warned of their destination were able to bring some supplies with them-it is off these supplies that they are living. However, the majority had been tricked (lied to): they received orders to present themselves in Dili with promises that it was for three days, for one week or for a fortnight. The truth is that some have already been in Atauro more than one-and-a-half years; others for six months or three months, and some more recently-one month. But the exiled still arrive. As for food, they receive one small can of corn per week for each person; these cans of corn have to last for the meals of one week. To mix with the corn, the exiles go in search of leaves, roots and whatever else can be found to eat. The Catholic mission has helped substantially these exiles, and it can be said that it is due to the mission that many of these exiles are still alive. Even the Indonesian military themselves are conscious of

Clothing: The general impression is that everyone lacks clothes. The people that were not warned came only with the clothes they were wearing at the moment they were captured and taken to Atauro. Some who brought more clothing are forced to sell or exchange it for food so that they can survive.

Disease: Many diseases occur among the exiles. Lately what has affected the exiles was diarrhoea, caused by lack of obtainable food: the exiles eat what they can find and there is a lack of water. In general, it is notable that everyone lacks vitamins, the children are skeletal, badly fed and they suffer skin diseases caught since arriving on Atauro.

There is an average of two deaths per day; of these deaths, the majority are children and old people. In the month of October alone, thirty-six people died. The spectacle of the funeral of these people is very sad, and the dejection can be imagined. One case: one old man died. He was a chief (regulo). Before dying he asked that his funeral be appropriate for a human being, to be laid in a coffin; he asked that after his death a photograph be taken and sent to his families. Before dying he asked to be baptized.

150 DIE OF GASTRO-ENTERITIS

The Age, Melbourne (14th April, 1982) reported that 150 detainees on Atauro Island died within three months as a result of a gastro-enteritis epidemic late last year. In the wake of that epidemic, 300 people were sent back to Los Palos and Baucau.

This fully confirms a statement by Mgr Martinho da Costa Lopez, Apostolic Administrator of Dili (the senior Catholic cleric of East Timor, as the Vatican has not yet appointed a Bishop to head the Diocese of East Timor) that "hundreds of prisoners died on Atauro island" last year. Peter Hastings, Foreign Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald who attempted to refute Mgr Costa Lopez' statement, nevertheless quoted an International Red Cross official as saying the prisoners succumbed to gastro-enteritis because "previous malnutrition had so lowered resistance, especially in the close confinement of huts, that many were susceptible to the disease." (The Age, 6th March, 1982)

THE FALKLANDS AND EAST TIMOR

We publish below an exchange of letters between TAPOL and the Foreign Office:

the British Government is calling upon others to do and what it has failed to do to stop the Indonesian aggressors?

7th April, 1982

The Right Hon. Francis Pym, MP Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary,

Dear Mr Pym,

As you take over from your predecessor to mobilise governments for support to halt Argentinian aggression, may I ask you whether you do not consider it necessary to halt military sales to Indonesia, a country which could well be said to have set the pattern in East Timor for what Argentina is doing today?

Do you not agree that there is a paradox between what

the British Government is calling upon others to do and what it has failed to do to stop the Indonesian aggressors? You said in Parliament today (I quote incompletely from a radio report): "If the world does not oblige Argentina to stop its aggression today, it will be someone else's turn tomorrow." Maybe, if someone had acted against Indonesia when it launched its act of aggression seven years ago, and if the British Government, together with other western governments had stopped supplying it with weapons, the Argentinian Government would not have acted as it has.

I would appreciate a reply as I consider an important question of political consistency is at stake.

Yours sincerely, Carmel Budiardjo, TAPOL

See opposite

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INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS EMERGENCY PROGRAMME

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva has announced a six-month emergency programme to provide food and medical assistance to prisoners on Atauro Island (ICRC Bulletin, April 1982). Relief supplies will be taken to the island once a month for six months commencing April, and distributed under the supervision of an ICRC delegate. Medical assistance will include a nutritional centre and a malaria eradication comapign.

The ICRC will also undertake tracing activity to facilitate contact between detainees on Atauro and relatives elsewhere with whom they have lost contact.

The ICRC April announcement said that 3,280 people "have been transferred to Atauro". In a press conference given in Jakarta on 4th March, following the ICRC mission's visit to Atauro from 16-18 February, the chief delegate Dr Delaprez, gave a figure of 3,737 and referred to them as "displaced persons". It is not clear why there is a discrepancy of 457 between the two ICRC figures. The term "displaced persons" is apparently the term used by the authorities for the detainees on Atauro, just as political prisoners (tapols) exiled to Buru in 1969 and 1971 were often referred to as "persons in re-settlement".

Dr Delaprez also told his Jakarta press conference that his mission had "taken names" of the detainees on the island, which he added, "is a sort of life insurance for them". (Sydney Morning Herald, 5th March 1982) This statement makes their situation sound extremely precarious, to say the least.

Postscript to the ICRC Visit

A private communication received from Jakarta, dated 8th

March 1982, and quoted in **Timor Information Service** (March/April, 1982) cites an East Timorese official as saying that conditions on Atauro were "cleaned-up and prepared" before the ICRC visit in February.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ON PRISONERS IN ATAURO AND COMARCA

A statement submitted in October 1981 by Amnesty International to the Fourth Committee of the 1982 UN General Assembly in connection with the Question of East Timor, has the following to say about Atauro and Comarca:

"... Those held in Comarca are reported to be predominantly former combatants although an unknown number of them are former Timorese soldiers of the Portuguese Army who did not engage in combat against the Indonesians, while others, believed to have taken part in fighting the Indonesian invasion, have been imprisoned without trial since immediately after the invasion in December 1975... (the) harsh conditions and poor diet in the Comarca... seriously endanger prisoners' health.

"Since 1980 Amnesty International has received continual reports of persons held on . . . Atauro. According to information . . . those taken to the island are civilians held simply on suspicion of being sympathetic to the independence cause. In some cases, their families have been compelled to accompany them. Once on Atauro, they are required to build their own quarters and grow their own food. There are reported to be grave shortages of some essential foodstuffs . . . The organisation has received other reports indicating trainees are being held in other places, both on the mainland of Timor and on other offshore islands."

16 April 1982

Dear Mrs Budiardjo,

You wrote to the Secretary of State on 7 April about British attitudes towards East Timor and the Falkland Islands. I have been asked to reply to your letter.

As you know, the UK has never acquiesced in the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. We do not accept that it is right to seek to "solve" territorial disputes by violent means; this applies to East Timor just as it does to the Falkland Islands, as can be seen from our support for the Security Council resolutions condemning Indonesia's invasion of East Timor and calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops.

For this reason above we do not see any paradox in British reactions to the two cases. Moreover, while there are evident similarities between them, there are also important differences.

For example, the Falkland Islands are inhabited by people of predominantly British stock and British administration continued uninterrupted and undiminished until the Argentine invasion. The situation in East Timor was quite different in both respects. In any case, it would presumably have been up to the Portuguese Government of the day as the administering power to request and initiate sanctions.

Yours sincerely, Richard Powell, South East Asian Department

21st April, 1982

Mr R. S. Powell, South East Asian Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London SW1 2AH

Dear Mr Powell,

Thank you for your letter of 16th April.

The main point in my letter of 7th April was to point to the paradox between the British Government's call for an arms embargo against Argentina and its continued sale of arms, including Hawk aircraft, to Indonesia. You did not refer to this question at all in your reply.

Indeed I do know that, formally speaking, the UK has never acquiesced in the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia. If that policy is to mean anything in practical terms should not the UK government have refrained from supplying the Indonesian Armed Forces with arms, whether asked to do so or not by the Portuguese Government? Non-acquiescence means nothing if accompanied by actions which bolster the military force which is in illegal occupation of a neighbouring country.

I know that the British Government supported the Security Council resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops and condemning the invasion, but I also know that the British Government has abstained on similar resolutions in the General Assembly since 1976. That too is surely a paradox, if we are to take the policy of non-acquiescence seriously.

Whether or not the Portuguese Government took diplomatic initiatives to request sanctions is beside the point. We ourselves and others in this country have certainly done so on a number of occasions, as you well know. Selling arms to an acknowledged aggressor cannot be justified, and my question about the paradox between calling for an arms embargo against Argentina and selling arms to Indonesia remains unanswered.

I would be grateful for your comments on these points.

Yours sincerely, Carmel Budiardjo, TAPOL

11 May 1982

Dear Mrs Budiardjo

Thank you for your letter of 21 April.

I can only repeat that I see no paradox in British reactions to the two cases of the Falklands and East Timor. We supported Security Council Resolutions condemning both invasions. We thought it right to call for an arms embargo against Argentina because that country had invaded a British dependent territory. It is not for me to say why the Portuguese Government did not make an equivalent call in 1975.

We do not consider that such arms as we have sold to Indonesia since 1975, can be, or have been, construed as support for Indonesia's takeover of East Timor, or as bolstering Indonesian military operations in East Timor.

Yours Faithfully, Richard Powell South East Asian Dept.

E. TIMOR POLICY MUST CHANGE

US Congress Resolutions

Resolutions calling on the US Administration to reverse its policy on East Timor were tabled in the UN House of Representatives and Senate on 28th April. The identical resolutions call for the US Government to work for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor and the establishment of the internationally-recognised right of self-determination by the East Timorese.

In the House, the resolution was tabled by Congressman Tony Hall, who compared the Indonesian takeover with the recent invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina and suggested that the US Government seek to "create diplomatic initiatives" including the use of intermediaries to bring about a diplomatic solution to the Timor tragedy. The resolution in the Senate was tabled by Senator Paul Tsongas. Both members of Congress have been active for several years in raising the East Timor issue on Capitol Hill.

Tony Hall charged in his speech that the policies pursued by the Indonesian invaders have "helped to create a catastrophic famine that proportionally was among the worst this century" and expressed the fear that many more could die unless steps were taken to prevent a new military offensive by Indonesian troops.

East Timor invasion

From Lord Avebury and others Sir, The speed with which the governments of Europe have acted in concert to apply econand military omic, political, sanctions against the Argentinian Government since its illegal of the Falkland occupation Islands is remarkable. It merits comparison with their response to a recent and very similar military occupation of another European colony.

Like Argentina, the military Government of Indonesia invaded the Portuguese colony of East Timor, in December, 1975. Since then, as you noted in your editorial, "Horror in East Timor" on February 24, "it is estimated that more than 100,000 people have died, either directly as a result of military operations or from consequent famine and disease, out of a population of only about 670,000". They were all, by law, Portuguese colonial subjects.

The Timorese have repeatedly pleaded for sanctions against Indonesia, as have the Portuguese, but none has been forthcoming in six and a half years of brutal war. Indeed, governments such as our own have assisted the Indonesian military by supplying them with aircraft to facilitate their illegal occupation, repeat-

edly condemned by the United Nations.

The invasions are analogous but the European response exhibits a clear example of double standards. In the case of the Falkland Islands, it is firmly stated that a country must be supported against an illegal invader and that a people's right to self-determination must be upheld. In the case of East Timor, these rights are apparently expendable, as is the country's population.

As world opinion is being mobilized to support the Falkland Islanders, we reaffirm the conclusion you drew about East Timor that a "solution based on negotiations and the free choice of the inhabitants is urgently needed and the international community, particularly those countries which have close economic and military ties with Indonesia, including Britain, should make much more serious effort to achieve one".

Yours faithfully,
AVEBURY,
FENNER BROCKWAY,
B C BUTLER,
BOB EDWARDS,
RUSSELL KERR,
ALF LOMAS,
JOAN MAYNARD,
DOROTHY M NEEDHAM,
JOSEPH NEEDHAM,
STAN NEWENS,
8a Treport Street, SW18.



JOINT DECLARATION

British, Dutch, Indonesian, Moluccan and Papuan organisations issued a Joint Declaration on 20th April 1982, the text of which reads as follows:

On 10th April. 1982, the EEC governments, responding with great speed to a request from the British Government, agreed to stop all shipments of military equipment to Argentina because of its invasion of the Falkland Islands.

EEC countries, in particular Britain, the Netherlands, West Germany, France and Belgium, also supply large quantities of military equipment to Indonesia including Hawk aircraft, submarines, warships and electronic equipment.

In December 1975, Indonesia invaded East Timor. It has waged a ruthless war against the Timorese people since then, resulting in the death of at least 200,000 people, nearly a third of the population of East Timor. Indonesia is in illegal occupation of East Timor and rules there by means of armed terror and repression. Yet in all that time, not a single EEC government has responded to pressure to stop the supply of military equipment to Indonesia.

As organisations which campaign in West Europe to ex-

pose Indonesia's brutal aggression against East Timor and to publicise the immense sufferings inflicted on the Timorese people as a result of the gross and persistent denial of their basic human rights, we are deeply shocked at the hypocrisy of EEC governments. We call upon all those concerned about the tragic fate of the Timorese people to join us in our efforts to expose this hypocrisy and to intensify the demand for an immediate ban on all military supplies to Indonesia from EEC countries because of its illegal invasion and occupation of East Timor.

Dutch Indonesia Committee
Indonesian Movement for Basic Human Rights and
Democracy
Pattimura Movement (Moluccan)
20 May Youth Group (Moluccan)
New Guinea Work Group (West Papuan)
TAPOL, British Campaign for the Defence of Political
Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

British Campaign for an Independent East Timor.

ELECTION DEATH TOLL

Possibly as many as a hundred people were shot dead by security forces or died as a result of Army violence during the 45-day election campaign in Indonesia. Many hundreds were injured and many hundreds more were arrested.

The casualty figures could well be far higher than reported by foreign correspondents. The Indonesian press was in most cases prohibited from publishing casualty reports and was required to stick to official accounts of all serious incidents. Foreign journalists allowed into Jakarta for the election campaign needed special permission to leave the capital, according to a UPI report early in March, and were in any case restricted only to major cities. Nothing is therefore known about what happened in most cities and towns and in the countryside.

Troops on Orders to "Shoot On Sight"

In Jakarta, at least 8 people died during a GOLKAR rally on 18th March. A few days later, AFP reported that Brigadier-General Eddy Nala Praja, Chief-of-Staff of the Jakarta Military Command "reaffirmed that his troops were ordered to shoot on sight anyone trying to make trouble during the campaign period". The second serious incident occurred in Jakarta on 13 April when at least 8 people died during a PPP rally, as a result of "traffic accidents" according to military sources. Then on 20th April, one person was killed and at least five injured during a PDI rally. The heaviest toll occurred however on 25th April. Even KOP-KAMTIB admitted that 8 people had been shot dead and 97 injured during GOLKAR rallies which took place in several parts of the city. The unofficial death toll on that day was 30 dead (National Times, Canberra, 2-8 May, 1982).


In Solo, Central Java, a PDI supporter was killed early in the campaign by members of GOLKAR's youth wing, and two days later a PPP official was killed and several dozen injured in nearby Jogjakarta according to a BBC report, when GOLKAR supporters attacked a PPP office in the city.

In Banjarmasin, South Kalimantan, official sources reported that nine people died and 122 were injured at a PPP rally. According to the Indonesian news agency Antara, quoted by Reuter, they were "trampled by crowds in a stampede". Three days later, in Surabaya, East Java, four people were killed and 78 injured, also during a PPP rally.

Possibly the worst incidents of all occurred in the staunchly Muslim city of Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi. The security situation was so serious during the last week of April that Defence Minister, General M. Jusuf, flew in to investigate, postponing a trip to France. The trouble started when troops opened fire on crowds demonstrating against a GOLKAR rally. When the troops tried to move in to the university campus, they were stoned by students, and one soldier died as a result. The next day, hundreds of students demonstrated against this Army infringement of their campus and were fired upon. According to a report from Richard Cowper who reports both for the BBC and the

Financial Times "a number of people are understood to have been killed with several dozen injured".

Two incidents in West Java towns towards the end of the campaign had death tolls of 17 and 10, according to the GOLKAR daily, Suara Karya. The place names are garbled in the AFP report of the incidents, which also said that many PPP supporters had been arrested.



The GOLKAR Symbol adorned

KORPRI INSTRUCTION TO CIVIL SERVANTS

KORPRI, the GOLKAR organisation of civil servants which all state employees are required to join, issued a statement to all members at the start of the election campaign instructing them to vote for GOLKAR. The Muslim party, PPP challenged this instruction as being illegal.

Since the KORPRI instruction, there have been a number of reports of department chiefs reiterating the point to their own employees. Typical of this is a speech made on 23rd April by the chairman of the Jakarta branch of the state-owned Bank Dagang Negara (State Trading Bank) to its 6,000 employees. He told them, according to a report from Richard Cowper in Jakarta, who files stories for the Financial Times and the BBC, that as members of KORPRI they had no choice but to vote for GOLKAR, He told them they had been receiving many benefits and facilities from the government and this entailed obligations. As human beings, he said, they have their basic right not to be constrained in how to vote but to do so they would first have to take off their KORPRI uniforms and submit their resignations.

ANALYSIS OF A RIGGED ELECTION

Election rigging in Indonesia stems first and foremost from the fact that the Election Institute, the Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU) is firmly and exclusively run by the Department of Home Affairs. This is the Department which, as is shown in an analysis summarised in the last issue of TAPOL Bulletin has been more profoundly subjected to military penetration than any other government department except the Department of Defence. This penetration is "a manifestation of ABRI's (the Armed Forces') need to control and oversee the government apparatus from provincial down to village level" and "to assure favourable results in periodic electoral exercises". (TAPOL Bulletin, No. 50, March 1982, page 10.)

Attempts by the two non-government political parties to broaden the composition of the LPU when the Election Law came up for revision in 1979 were defeated, and resulted in PPP members from the NU party staging a walkout when the vote was taken, the first time since Suharto came to power that such a challenge to parliamentary "consensus" took place.

There has never been any doubt about the government's plans to ensure a GOLKAR victory and to keep GOLKAR's winning percentage at around the 60% mark; not less, as this might undermine the Army's position and suggest that Suharto's claim to legitimacy is slipping, but not too much more so as to preserve the appearance of "democratic" participation of non-government parties.

Village GOLKAR quotas fixed

Control of the voting and the results is exerted by the Department of Home Affairs and the LPU in the following ways:

1) In the villages which still account for some 80% of the population, the *lurahs* (village heads) are required to fulfil GOLKAR quotas or risk replacement, demotion or dismissal. Describing the system the NRC-Handelsblad correspondent, Willem van Kemenade writes:

"Government control of the countryside is practically watertight. Each *lurah* must make sure that his village provides a substantial majority for GOLKAR. Chalik Ali, PPP member of Parliament, told me yesterday that in many places, voting slips had been lost and that in all probability this happened because *lurahs* didn't want to run the risk of falling below their GOLKAR quota." (NRC-Handelsblad, 5 May, 1982)

The vast majority of *lurahs* are Army appointees and can be relied upon to win their village for GOLKAR, but constant pressure is nevertheless exerted to guarantee results. The "loss" of ballot papers has been mentioned in several reports. It seems to be a trick to enable officials subsequently to produce GOLKAR-pierced papers so as to make up the numbers if the final count is not satisfactory. The six-week lag in publishing the final results makes this all the more possible.

2) In the cities and towns, polling booths are located in work-places which ensures 100% turnout and control of

how employees vote. The pressure on civil servants (about 2 million throughout the country) and employees of state-owned companies to vote and to vote GOLKAR is heavy-handed and persistent (see separate item). The NRC correspondent who examined voting procedures on election day wrote:

- "... although voting is not compulsory, the voting procedures ensure almost 100% attendance. Most people in the cities must vote in their work-places, government offices, banks, state enterprises, hotels, universities and schools as well as military units (the civilian personnel, Ed.). The ones who run these offices have convinced their staff to turn out in full."
- 3) The voting procedures are such as to make it possible for officials to keep track of how people vote. Again, to quote the **NRC** report:

"On arrival at the polling booth, each person must show their registration card. They each receive a number and must then await their turn. In larger booths, the official calls out the person's number and name through a microphone whereupon the person called receives a voting slip and goes into a cabin to pierce the symbol of his/her choice."

Some government critics, writes NRC, complain that this gives officials a chance of checking the votes because the slips fall into the box in sequence. He thought this unlikely as the boxes were well shaken before being opened. That may be true in some observable places; it could well be otherwise when no outside observers are present.

4) It is largely by pre-election intimidation that a GOLKAR victory is assured. The NRC correspondent reports that he

Suharto Votes . . .



... in his own home

watched the counting of votes in two booths, one at the hotel where he was staying and one at a nearby bank (he didn't explain whether they were state- or private-owned). At his hotel, the results were PPP 11, GOLKAR 80 and PDI 3; at the bank they were PPP 25, GOLKAR 65 and PDI 20. The counting looked democratic enough, he wrote.

"but there is more to it than that. A friend told me that in 1977, there was a majority in the hotel for the PPP in 1977. The personnel manager was then replaced, and his successor has since made sure that the majority of the staff will vote for GOLKAR".

5) Beyond all these manipulations, there still remains the chance of returning falsified figures from the booths. This is what the PPP charges has happened in Jakarta, for a start. There were 12,000 voting booths in Jakarta, and it must have been an organisational feat for PPP to check results at every booth, but the party has widespread support in the capital and there are certainly mosques in every single locality.

Atmosphere on Polling Day

Eye-witness reports of conditions on polling day have only come from Jakarta. In the capital, according to David Watts of The Times (5 May 1982), 35,000 troops "with orders to shoot trouble-makers" were deployed to control the streets. AMX tanks were in evidence (NRC) while landrovers and military trucks loaded with troops frequently toured the streets "to remind the people of the Internal Security Command's (KOPKAMTIB) uncompromising order" (The Times). Two days earlier, The Times reported that Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB, had issued orders "that election saboteurs were to be shot on sight" and said that "100 battalions will be fanned out throughout the country tomorrow to provide security at and around polling booths" (Times, 3 May, 1982).

GOLKAR USES INTIMIDATION AGAINST STATE EMPLOYEES

Jakarta Teachers Must Vote GOLKAR or else . . .

On 21 January, all head teachers of secondary schools and continuation schools in Jakarta were summoned to a meeting at the head office of the Jakarta Education Office and told to support GOLKAR in the general elections.

Details of the instructions are given in a letter published by **Tempo** on 10th April, the last issue to appear before the journal was closed down.

The letter refers to Sulandra, Head of the Jakarta Education Office as being "lawyer, colonel and education chief" who set out to win Jakarta for GOLKAR. The methods, as presented at the meeting, were, according to the letter:

- (1) Heads and teachers must be able to influence their pupils to vote for GOLKAR. Their success in doing so will affect their conduct record and promotion prospects.
- (2) Voting should take place in school buildings, the reason being that this would mean that schools need not be closed for voting day. (This makes it easier to check whether there has been a 100% vote for GOLKAR, Ed.)
- (3) All non permanent teachers who are not certain to vote for GOLKAR should be dismissed. All permanent teachers who are not certain to vote for GOLKAR should be reported to the Department of Education.
- (4) On election day, the University of Indonesia should be closed as it is a hotbed of GOLPUT (the 'white-group' which favours abstentions) and the opposition.
- (5) General Ali Murtopo's statement must constantly be repeated to teachers and school staff: that state employees who don't vote for GOLKAR are traitors.

Military turnout for a PPP election rally in Jakarta



De Waarheid, 15 April 1982

ELECTION RESULTS CHALLENGED

The general elections held on 4th May predictably resulted, according to official returns, in a substantial victory for the Army-backed government party, GOLKAR. Provisional returns (final returns are not due until 10 June) are as follows:

	1982	1977
GOLKAR	64.4%	61.9%
PPP	27.7%	29.4%
PDI	7.8%	8.6%

The official results have been challenged by the two non-government parties (Times, 7 May, 1982). They both demanded a re-run of the elections after widespread charges of malpractice, in particular double-voting by many who got registration cards to vote in two places while others failed to get voting cards at all. This charge was made by Nuddin Lubis, Vice-Chairman of the PPP, to British correspondents in Jakarta on the day after voting took place, and reported on the BBC World Service. PPP and PDI supportters in many places, he said, never received voting cards. In Ujung Pandang (a heavily Muslim city) "thousands of

people queued up to get their forms but in the end had been unable to cast their votes".

Jakarta Returns Challenged

At the last elections, the PPP won a decisive victory in Jakarta, so the government was determined to swing the results this time.

Two days after the elections, the Institute for the Defence of Human Rights in Jakarta stated that the PPP received hundreds of thousands more votes in Jakarta than officially admitted. Official figures are 1.4 million for the PPP and 1.6 million for GOLKAR. Actual figures, according to the Institute, are 1.8 million for PPP and 1.2 million for GOLKAR.

"The Institute's figures are based on the PPP's own assessment of its performance which was obtained by stationing an observer at each of the polling stations in the capital and making its own count of the vote. (Times, 8 May, 1982)

The PPP national daily, **Pelita**, which published these unofficial figures on 7 May was immediately banned.

PELITA BANNED

After receiving two warnings during the election campaign, the Muslim daily, **Pelita** was banned three days after the election for publishing unofficial election results for Jakarta which challenged the government's claim that GOLKAR had won a majority.

On 16 April, the paper had received its "second warning" from Admiral Sudomo, Commander of KOPKAMTIB, for publishing photographs of posters bearing the PPP's symbol, the sacred Ka'abah stone, that had been torn and defaced. Publication of such photos, Sudomo said, could "heat up the campaign" (FEER, 23 April, 1982). The FEER story which was reporting the ban on Tempo speculated that "by closing Tempo, the government may have been hoping to cool the Muslim daily's ardour. It added: "The consequences of banning Pelita are potentially very serious."

Pelita sales which normally approach 100,000, rose to 125,000 during the election campaign. In banning the paper, the government accused it of working against official efforts to create stability. But, writes The Australian (8-9 May 1982), "The one thing which is most unlikely to cause unrest in the capital is the Pelita banning."



GOLKAR's symbol as an Islamic vote-catcher



GOLKAR's slogan for women:
Unceasing Struggle for Women's Role in Development!

GOLPUT AND THE BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN

GOLPUT stands for "white group" and represents the growing body of opinion that favours a boycott of the elections. When first launched in 1971, GOLPUT supporters called on people to pierce the white part of the voting slip. In the current campaign, most GOLPUT supporters have advocated non-participation as a sign of protest. Some people indeed suggest that to invalidate a voting-slip by piercing the blank space, or returning the slip unpierced could only give officials a chance to use the slip for GOLKAR's count.

Certainly, it will be impossible to estimate how many people abstained from voting as a political act. The occurrence of double-voting, the "loss" of voting slips and other manipulations hopelessly distort the figures. Moreover, although GOLPUT as an idea was expressed in numerous statements issued prior to the elections, it never became an organised boycott. None of these statements was reported in the press, though discussion of the GOLPUT idea did take place in the columns of journals such as **Tempo**. What is certain is that a far wider circle of people supported the idea than during the 1971 and 1977 elections.

One of the first exponents of the GOLPUT idea, Arief Budiman, explained the idea in a letter in Tempo (3 April 1982):

"... GOLPUT undermines on a small scale the legitimacy function of the elections... Everyone knows that the government's (i.e. GOLKAR's) victory is assured. The elections are held at

VOTING FOR THE "RIGHT" SYMBOL

Mock Elections for Civil Servants

A contact working in the eastern part of Indonesia has described, in a letter written at the height of the campaign, how preparations were made to ensure a victory for GOLKAR:

with in connection with our work are dominated by striking sense of nervousness. We cant make appointments with anyone because civil servants are expected all the time to attend "special meetings", campaigns, street rallies, ceremonies and goodness knows what else. Ministers travel here, there and everywhere to "save" regions which they regard as being "vulnerable", especially places where the PPP can be expected to get a lot of support . . . District heads who previously promised their superiors a 95% victory for the government party get afraid that their target wont be achieved. Panic reigns. And the Governor's position hangs on this silken thread . . .

66 In a speech to government employees last Monday, the Governor said that government employees who are not prepared to vote for the government party will be sent packing . . . The employees vote in their own offices making things easier to control; any "deviations" can be more easily spotted. And to make absolutely certain, voting exercises-mock elections-are held. In the grounds of the office, a mock voting-booth is set up, complete with curtain, and the people are told how to vote. Afterwards the votes are counted. If quite a few people have pierced the "wrong" symbol, the head of the office makes a speech full of threats and the exercise is repeated until everyone really understands which is the "right" symbol to pierce. According to what we hear, in some offices the two "wrong" symbols are removed from the mock voting-slip. This saves a lot of effort. The brainwashing has gone so far that some lower-ranking officials reveal, in chats with us, that they are fully convinced that they are legally obliged to vote for the government party . . . 77

such great expense to provide legitimacy to the government. The parties that participate . . . have no political significance for the government. In truth, they only reinforce the government's legitimacy. (I don't imply that they are too stupid to know this. I think there are also people in the parties with ideals, who don't pursue personal interests and see their participation in the elections as an act that will save the nation some time in the future. I respect them. The point at issue, the reason why I support GOLPUT, is a difference in interpretation of what needs to be done at present for the longterm political education of the people.

In my opinion, GOLPUT is important because it directly attacks the basic objective of the government in holding elections, namely legitimacy... The success of GOLPUT is determined not by the persons who support it but by the putrefaction of the political process in this country. Its supporters may be arrested or silenced but I think GOLPUT exists, and existed before the idea was articulated in 1971... It expresses the freedom to remain inactive/silent (diam) at a time when you are powerless.)

TEMPO BANNED

Tempo, Indonesia's leading weekly magazine, with a circulation of nearly 100,000, was closed down "indefinitely" by the Department of Information on 12th April. This is the first time Tempo has been banned despite the closure of many other newspapers and journals, particularly in 1974 and 1978. In 1980, an article reporting the anti-Chinese riots in Central Java was blacked out because it infringed KOPKAMTIB reporting restrictions.

The ban was imposed because of **Tempo**'s reporting of the many disturbances that have occurred in election rallies since mid-March. In particular, its reporting of the disturbances which forced GOLKAR to abandon its first big election rally in Jakarta on 18th March (see page 13) appears to have angered the authorities. It also reported, albeit obliquely, reports of deaths that occurred during election rallies at a time when KOPKAMTIB was insisting there had been no deaths.

"UNILATERAL CONSENSUS"

In a 3-page letter to Tempo, the Department of Information accused Tempo of "infringing the consensus between government and the press by publishing articles which had implications in the field of national stability and the maintenance of security." "The rare beast the unilateral consensus," retorts Paul Quinn-Judge (Far Eastern Economic Review, 23rd April, 1982), citing a term frequently used, he says, by Indonesian journalists.

Tempo has been in existence for over twelve years and is widely acknowledged as a source of independent reporting and comment. Its regular readers will be well aware of the precautions taken by the editors to keep the journal afloat in the face of the heavy hand of censorship, from both KOPKAMTIB and the Department of Information. Certainly, TAPOL Bulletin readers will appreciate the many times we have had to rely on Tempo as a source of information.

The closure, even if it lasts only a few weeks, will bring severe financial losses: Rp 60 million for an edition that was printed but then impounded when the ban came, plus Rp. 25 million weekly in salaries for the journal's very large staff of journalists and administrative employees.

Said one observer: "The government is obviously very worried about the way things (in the election campaign) are going. They are worried they're going to lose Jakarta and perhaps Jogjakarta, and they are getting desperate to stop any press coverage that might further excite opposition supporters." (FEER, 23rd April, 1982)

99.8% "WIN" FOR GOLKAR IN EAST TIMOR!

There was a 99.8% vote in favour of GOLKAR in East Timor, or so we are now being told. The Economist (8 May 1982), reporting this figure, describes it as "hard to swallow".

Not only is the figure hard to swallow. It is impossible to believe that returns could have been received so quickly from a region where the basic means of communications—roads and telephones—are almost non-existent except in a few towns and coastal areas.

East Timor is to have four seats in the new Parliament. This alters the composition to 364 elected seats and 96 presidential appointees.

The hasty returns from East Timor and GOLKAR's "hard-to-swallow" victory can be seen as part of an attempt by the government to claim that East Timor now accepts integration. Richard Cowper, writing in the Financial Times (Frankfurt Edition, 10th May, 1982), says:

The Indonesian Government hopes that . . . it will now be better placed to persuade the UN to accept the province as an integral part of the Indonesian state . . . They will be at pains to point out that a majority of . . . voters chose to exercise their democratic rights and in doing so voted overwhelmingly for the Government's ruling GOLKAR party.

East Timor resists Indonesia

By Our Foreign Staff

Indonesia is trying to force the people of East Timor to take part in this week's presidential election, according to the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin), which has been carrying on resistance since the Indonesian seizure of the territory in 1975.

THE TIMES MONDAY MAY 3 1982

Mr Abilio Araujo, a member of Fretilin's central committee, said in London that the Indonesians were using the election "as a type of plot, to say that even the Timorese, are voting for Golkan", the party of President Suharto. He claimed that police on motorcycles were forcing people to join party meetings, and that people who refused to buy T-shirts showing Mr Suharto's picture were accused of being Fretilin supporters.

Mr Araujo, who lives in Lisbon, said that resistance in East Timor had been growing since 1980 when it was reorganized after some military setbacks. He claimed that on the last day of 1981 Fretilin carried out a series of attacks in the castern zone of East Timor, including one on a military barracks in Baguia. This resulted in a mutiny of East Timorese soldiers against their Indonesian officers, who had to escape by helicopter.

AFTER THE THURSDAY DISTURBANCES

Translated, slightly abridged, from Tempo, 3rd April 1982

Lapangan Banteng in Jakarta was packed. GOLKAR was holding an election rally. People came in droves, hoping to be entertained too by comedians, singers and pop groups.. But on that Thursday (18th March), the large GOLKAR platform, two metres high, became a target for the crowds, jostling to get closer. The entertainers waved back at the crowds as the hot sun beat down and dust filled the air.

Then, the righthand sector of the platform collapsed. With the crowds packed tight, some damage occurred, followed by things being burnt and destroyed. Finally Armed Forces and police riot squads were called in. After being removed from the Square, some of the crowds vandalised and burnt things on their way . . .

But this didn't quickly get reported in the Indonesian press because on that very evening, media representatives were summoned by Sudomo, Commander of KOPKAMTIB. And, as usual, he called on them not to report the disturbances until there had been an official announcement. Meanwhile, in foreign countries, the news spread far and wide. Foreign newspapers which circulate in Indonesia naturally bore a great deal of black paint. But the Straits Times was a bit cunning. Its Singapore edition carried reports of the disturbances in Jakarta while its edition for Indonesia carried nothing. For instance, the 20th March issue not for Indonesia ran quite a long article and a photograph across five columns.

Indonesians living in Riau saw them relayed on Singapore and Malaysia television on the Saturday night news. Where had they got those reports about the disturbances? Mrs Wong Lie, General Manager of TV Singapore, refused to divulge the source when contacted by **Tempo**. But Walter J. Burgess, Visnews cameraman was only too happy to tell us.

Australian-born Burgess is proud that his film was used. He had indeed been filming the election campaign and interviewed leaders of political parties and GOLKAR. "It's routine work for me. The disturbances at Lapangan Banteng made my reports complete."

Fifty-five feet of film was sent to Rome for processing, before being distributed in Europe, to London and then by satellite to the rest of the world . . . "Anything that happens in Indonesia is always newsworthy in Southeast Asia, Australia and Japan," said Burgess.

"I'd like to go back to Kampuchea," he said, having worked in Indonesia for two years. Why? "It's difficult to get permission here to make films." But he didn't encounter any difficulty making that film of Lapangan Banteng. There was no reprimand.

He has been luckier than his Indonesian press colleagues. Yet, last week, Suara Karya, Angkatan Bersenjata, Berita Yudha and Pos Kota* published many photographs and reports of the Lapangan Banteng disturbances. Were they allowed to do this? Everyone knows who these papers are supported by And understandably, other newspapers followed their example.

"We got a reprimand by phone from the Information Section of the Department of Defence and Security." said Suara Karya editor, Sjamsul Basri. Though there was a consensus not to publish the photographs, he said, "we thought society needs to be told that disturbances can have harmful results."

The Information Department has also taken note of this breach. "The important thing is that it should not be repeated by others. If things get out of control, it could have fatal consequences in the form of shut-downs," said Soekarno SH, Director-General of the Press Guidance Section of the Department. And it seems that reprimands have been prepared for those concerned.

*Army and GOLKAR newspapers



GOLKAR podium under attack in Lapangan Bangeng, Jakarta, on 18 March.



Heavily armed troops stand by as a PPP rally takes place in Jakarta





A GOLKAR slogan: If GOLKAR wins, democracy flowers!!

A PDI rally

FORMER GOVERNOR OF WEST IRIAN INTERVIEWED

Eliezer Bonay, the man whom the Indonesian government first appointed governor of West Irian in May 1963, escaped from West Irian to Papua New Guinea in 1979. He went to Sweden in June 1981, having been forced to go there against his will, and is now living there as a political refugee.

Eliezer Bonay was the leader of the West Papua pro-independence party, Parna at the time Indonesia took over formal administration of the country in 1963. In an interview with Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL, he spoke of his experiences as governor, and later as a political refugee in Papua New Guinea. Two other Papuan refugees, D. Kafiar and Christopher Waney, also took part in the interview which took place at the hostel for political refugees in Flen, Sweden, on 19 September 1981. The first two parts were published in TAPOL Bulletins No. 48, November 1981, and No. 49, January 1982.

Could you tell us something about human rights violations in W. Papua?

For the first time, a S. Pacific Human Rights Tribunal was held four months ago, in May 1981. I testified there. There were 15 witnesses. According to the findings of the Tribunal, Indonesia is guilty of 13 kinds of human rights violations during its 17 years' rule in W. Papua. Each witness was able to talk from personal experience. They were all people who had fled from the region. The 13 violations listed were based on articles in various UN documents, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the UN Convention on Political and Civil Rights, and so on. It was because I spoke at the Tribunal that the PNG government decided I was a threat. Actually, I was not going to come to Sweden. I was going to leave for Vanuatu. It it hadn't been for the Tribunal, I would not have come to Sweden. Conditions here are not good for me. It's too cold.

Had you already been given asylum in Vanuatu?

Yes, a letter from Vanuatu agreeing to give me asylum had already been received. I was only waiting for Vanuatu's acceptance as a UN member. It wasn't yet a member. But then I was deported from PNG, and very unexpectedly.

Is it true Walter Lini, the Prime Minister of Vanuatu, was due in PNG the day you were forced to leave?

Yes. We were waiting to meet him. He was due to arrive in the afternoon but we were deported at 1 o'clock.

Was it so that you wouldn't be able to meet him?

Yes, probably. I'd really like to know why that all happened.

Could you say something about the treatment of refugees in PNG, both those coming from the jungles as well as from the towns.

They are usually put into permanent places. Those from the towns go to Vanimo, W. Sepik. They are questioned there. If they came for political reasons, for supporting the OPM, they're allowed to stay, but if not, they're usually sent back. Decisions are usually fair.

What about those from the jungles?

(Kafiar): It's basically the same. They usually go to Vanimo camp. If it's a group, then only one person is questioned. If it's clearly for political reasons, they're not sent back. The main problem is that they can be sent to prison for

illegal entry. Quite a lot are sent to prison before going to live in the refugee camps. When I with my group entered PNG, they wanted to put us in prison but I asked them why, and protested. I talked to the UN rep. Ton Unwin, protesting that we were not criminals.

How did he respond?

Well, the fact is, we weren't put in prison. Most of the others are put in prison.

For how long?

Sometimes up to 6 months. In some cases, when they're released, they're sent straight back to Indonesia.

How are they sent back?

Officials come from Jayapura to Vanimo to take them back. Sometimes, people resist and escape because they don't want to go back to Indonesia. They're afraid of what may happen to them there. Sometimes if refugees are regarded as being dangerous, they're held in prison for a long time, and are kept under supervision after release.

Do the PNG authorities sometimes use chartered planes to take them back?

Yes. We know of cases where people taken back simply disappeared. There was one case, a group returned to Biak which included a relative of mine. After reaching Biak, they disappeared.

Do you know how many political refugees have been forced to return?

(Bonay): In 1969 and 1970, many were returned against their will, in the southern sector, Merauke.

Have things changed in PNG since Julius Chan became PM? Have Indonesian pressures been intensified?

There have been certain pressures from Indonesia in the. past few years. First, Indonesia emphasises the border agreement reached. Then, in December 1980, during Chan's visit to Jakarta a joint statement was issued about joint operations between the armed forces of the two countries. And now the trend is towards closing down the refugee camps. If the camps are closed and PNG no longer wants to accept refugees, it's not clear what will happen. They seem to think that if the camps are closed, the refugees will stop coming to PNG.

Did you have to leave PNG because the camps were closed down?

We came from Wabo. It has already been closed since June 1981. The only one still open is Yako camp. In Wabo, there were 153 people, with children. The refugees from there have been allowed to stay in PNG.

Is there any campaign against the closure of the camps?

(Kafiar): There were discussions in December 1980 with Tom Unwin. He was asked what would happen about the camps. He said it all depended on the PNG government. He couldn't suggest a solution. I agree that ways should be considered of urging the UN to take action to protect the existence of the camps. It's a problem not only for the refugees who are now in PNG but for those who may come in the future. Where will they go? They would probably be sent to prison and that's very bad indeed.

Who actually runs the camps? Who staff them?

They are run by the UN and the staff personnel are UN officials, not from PNG but foreigners. There were two on the staff at Wabo camp, one an Austrian, the other a Malaysian. But in fact, PNG officials are the ones in charge.

What do you mean? What is the relationship?

Well, for example, in medical care. To get treatment, there must be permission from the PNG Foreign Ministry. If someone fell ill, we had to contact Tom Unwin who would then have to get permission for treatment. So the foreign volunteers really don't have control.

Is there anyone at the Foreign Ministry in charge of the camps, anyone who makes difficulties for the refugees?

There are several officials but it seems that the people really in charge are from Australia. PNG officials don't really have the chance to express fraternal Malaysian sympathies. They have these sympathies but the people in charge are from Canberra. All PNG government departments have Australians as advisers and they're the ones who really take the decisions.

(Bonay) Don't forget that PNG is an ex-colony of Australia, which has a lot of interests, mining interests, in West Irian.

Do you think the UN pays enough attention to the refugees' problems?

Not really. The UN should be pressed to pay proper attention to this problem. Up to now it's as if they just leave things to the UN member-state. The UN doesn't exert any control on PNG which is a UN member.

What role did UN officials play in actually forcing you to leave PNG? It seems indeed that force was used, wasn't it? There's no special UN official in PNG to deal with the refugee problems. Tom Unwin didn't represent the High Commission for Refugees. The UNHCR representative is in Kuala Lumpur. Tom Unwin was in charge of development affairs but he also dealt with the refugee problem. He's now left for Uganda so there's no-one at all to deal with it. The only UN official in PNG is Kevin McGrade, an Australian.

He wasn't the one who came and forced me to leave, but it was someone sent by him.

(Kafiar) We were quite astonished at what happened. When we went to the Foreign Ministry to discuss our status as refugees, we were told there would be news on 1st July, but in fact they took action on 27th June. I was staying at a hostel at the time and having to report daily to the police. A UNDP official came and told me to get ready to leave. I said I didn't have any clothes ready and would have to do some ironing. He said, get ready straight away. I argued hard, I said we'd been told a decision would be taken on 1st July. But the UNDP official told me a decision had been taken and I had to leave.

MARTIN TABU SHOT DEAD

Martin Tabu, a leader of the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM—Free Papua Organisation), was taken from his cell in Jayapura, the capital of West Papua, in April this year and shot dead by Indonesian soldiers. According to OPM sources, the execution took place in Entrop, a short distance from Jayapura Harbour. Because of the large number of executions that have taken place in Entrop, the place has now become known as the "place of skulls".

Martin Tabu was captured several years ago after being lured with promises of negotiations. After being held in captivity for about a year, he was brought for trial and sentenced to thirty years. There have been many alarming reports recently of his condition. He was known to have been held for long stretches of time in an underground cell.

Operasi Sapu Bersih

OPM sources also provide information of an *Operasi* Sapu Bersih (Clean-Sweep Operation) that has been underway by Indonesian troops since last year. The objective is to undermine resistance by intimidating and persecuting the families of those who leave home to join the resistance movement in the bush. Wives are attacked and raped, often with fatal results, women are put into captivity and raped, parents of people who leave home are arrested and held in custody.

In the villages, people are chased out of their homes, their livestock shot and killed, their homes burnt down and their property stolen. In some cases where wives and children have left their villages to escape the depradations of the troops, they have fled to mountain areas where food supplies are inadequate, as a result of which they die of starvation.

Several acts of brutal murder occurred in June, July and August last year in the vilalges of Ampas-Waris and Batte-Arso, in the district of Jayapura. Whole families were killed with bayonets and their villages left to rot.

Did they force things so fast because of Walter Lini's visit? (Bonay) I had gone to Port Moresby on 17 December 1980 for medical treatment, and because the camp was going to be closed, I didn't go back there. I already had a letter from Walter for asylum in Vanuatu and I was just waiting for the implementation when I was forced to leave for Sweden.

You didn't really want to come to Sweden?

No we didn't. The weather is bad and there are many other problems. There were five of us from Wabo whose refugee status was in question, myself and four still at the camp.

(Kafiar) A UN official had come to the camp from Kuala Lumpur and asked where we wanted to go. I said, to an English-speaking country in the Pacific. I certainly didn't mention Sweden. The UN ignored our wishes.

(Bonay) I think we should see this not so much as the work of the UN as of McGrade, an Australian who happens to be the UN official in PMG. We were asked to sign statements but we refused because we would have had to promise not to do anything against Indonesia. So, we were regarded as being dangerous.

(Kafiar) Waney was being held in prison because he was regarded as being very dangerous. He was taken straight from prison to the airport, with only the clothes he was wearing. When he left Wabo with me on 9th June, they took him to prison. Hamadi and I were placed in a hostel.

When did you go to PNG (to Bonay)? In 1979.

How do Papuans feel about the foreign companies exploiting minerals in West Papua?

They can see that a number of countries—Australia, the US, W. Germany, Japan—are helping Indonesia to steal their natural wealth. Freeport mining complex was attacked and badly damaged. Afterwards, the troops on guard were increased.

Were any steps taken against the employees?

Most of them aren't local people. They come from other parts of Indonesia. Only very few Papuans work there. Many of the Papuans were dismissed after the attack. But many more were killed. 3,000 were killed.

Who were they? The workers?

No, not only workers. People there, including workers who had led the attack. The troops went into the villages and killed people. Whole villages, whole families. In Tambaga Pura. At the same time there had been an uprising in Wamena. The two (in Tembaga Pura and Wamena) were connected. There was a large-scale operation to crush the movement in Wamena, and another one in Tembaga Pura. (Kafiar) Jacob Ariangin was one of the leaders. He was working for Freeport.

Where were the 3,000 killed? In Tembaga Pura and elsewhere?

(Bonay): No, the figure of 3,000 is just for those killed in Tembaga Pura. I don't know how many were killed in

Wamena. There's not enough data. Someone working at the Interior Ministry in Jakarta sometimes gave us figures like this, but we got nothing about Wamena. Some estimate that 50,000 were killed there, in 1977. The population there is denser than anywhere else in West Papua.

I should explain that in many parts, the people are not under government control at all. It was like this when the Dutch were there and it's still the same under the Indonesians. Many villages are not under government control because the troops can't reach them. They can only bomb and attack with rockets from the sea. So, they just bomb whole regions where there are villages, wherever there are people. Indonesian troops rarely kill guerrillas; sometimes one or two. It's the people who get killed. Places with people get bombed, and when these raids occur, many people get killed. They use bombs and rockets, from the sea and from the air. The last really big actions occurred in 1978.

Are the foreign investors taking the minerals and the timber?

They're taking everything. As for timber, all timber resources throughout Indonesia have already been shared out to generals Everything. In 1975, I went to the Forestry Chief to see whether I could get some forest-land to exploit. He told me it was all shared out. Nothing was left.

What is the effect of Indonesian control upon local customs?

It has a very wide effect. It's a form of cultural expansion. If it goes on for a long time, local customs will disappear.

The Indonesians argue that Papuans are uncivilised, that they are bringing civilisation.

What they are doing is forcing their religion on our people. They are building mosques everywhere though these are not part of our culture. There are very few Papuans left in the towns. Most people in the towns are newcomers, and just a handful of Papuans. It's like that in government offices. Papuans have only very low, clerical jobs. It's very difficult for Papuans to find jobs in the towns. When they apply they're almost always turned down.

What about health conditions?

A lot of prostitutes are being brought in from outside, and being located in large complexes. They bring VD. Most of them are from Sulawesi.

You know, Suharto has said that Indonesian families should have only three children. This has made us think. Indonesia's marriage law retains the customs of Islamic marriage. Muslims can have four wives which means they can have 12 children, whereas Christian families can only have 3. This could reduce the number of Christians proportionately. 90% of Papuans are Christians.

How do you feel about your asylum here? What plans do you have?

I'm isolated here in Sweden. At the moment I'm in 'quarantine', so I can't take part in the struggle though that

WORLD BANK "UPGRADES" INDONESIA TO "MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRY" STATUS

With the vast majority of Indonesian workers and peasants living at or below an annual income level of \$400, the World Bank has now decided to upgrade Indonesia for the first time to a "middle-income country". (FEER, 14 May 1982)

The announcement of this enhanced economic status appeared during the "quiet period" before election day when parties were required to stop campaigning, but when, as the Review pointed out, the media "went back to their business of covering top government officials opening new industrial plants or launching public works projects".

The Australian (8 May 1982) meanwhile reports that Indonesia faces bleak economic prospects this year. Exports, the main source of revenue, are expected to fall by 50%, and Japan, which buys 60% of the country's oil output and most of its natural gas, is insisting that Indonesia must cut oil prices or else lose markets in Japan.

Despite this worsening prognosis, The Australian reports that

The World Bank and the group of European nations who assist Indonesia with massive injections of loan and grant funds, however, seem to take the view that Jakarta should not overreact to the oil glut and continue its

high-spending ways for at least the next year.

The paper stresses that major reductions in government subsidies in January this year on food and fuel hit the poorer sections of the population "very hard". They were part of a budget which, it says, "in a true democracy, would have ensured defeat for the ruling party".

The fraudulent elections and GOLKAR's massive "victory" can now pave the way for continued economic expansion which is likely to be further encouraged when the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia meets early in June to decide upon the 1982/83 injection of funds into the Indonesian economy. The annual IGGI meeting is normally held in April or early May but was postponed this year to await the election results. No doubt, Indonesia's western donors will feel confident that GOLKAR's "improved performance", as many western journalists are calling it, will reconfirm the Army's "right" to remain in control and ensure the much-needed stability for Indonesia to live up to its recent promotion to "middle-income country" status, a status that has only been acquired at the expense of worsening hardship for the majority of the population.

BRITISH STUDENTS CALL FOR RELEASE OF IRWAN AND DJAMIN

The British National Union of Students, representing 1.2 million students in more than 750 universities and colleges, has called upon the Indonesian Government to release Alexander Irwan and Raffendi Djamin immediately.

In a letter to the Indonesian Ambassador in London on 27 April, the NUS President, David Aaronovitch, said that, on the basis of the available facts, the arrests had been made for political reasons and were totally unjustified. He requested the Ambassador to provide a full explanation of the circumstances of these arrests.

(See opposite page)

Continued from page 17.

continues at home. When this 'quarantine' is over, I'll go on doing things for my people.

(Kafiar): Me too, I want to continue the struggle, here abroad.

(Bonay): The Papuan revolution is a unique revolution. It has no weapons yet it has been able to hold out. Other revolutions have machine-guns, planes, but the Papuan rebels only have parangs. It has been able to hold out even without weapons; if it got weapons, it would be even more powerful. It wouldn't take much time to finish it then.

Do you think it could succeed without weapons?

Oh, but it must seek help from abroad. An external fight without an internal fight is meaningless, but so too, an internal fight without an external one is also meaningless. The struggle has been going on for 20 years but the people are ready to continue to fight.

Oxford AI Group expresses concern

The Amnesty International Group at Oxford University has expressed concern at the continued detention of Irwan and Djamin. In a letter to President Suharto, they say:

"We ask that details of the charges against these men be made known, and that they either be released or a date set for their trial. This is in accordance with Articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whereby, 'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile' and 'Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him'."

UNIVERSITY RECTOR RESIGNS TO RESIST MANIPULATION

Rev. F. X. Danuwinata resigned as rector of Atma Jaya Catholic University March 15 because he refused to dismiss professors who had signed a petition critical of the government. He said, "I came here as educator, not to be manipulated by certain parties to serve their own interests... It is obvious that Atma Jaya's present structure, cannot be changed. Therefore, it is useless for me and Atma Jaya, to remain here."

There were rumours that the government had down-graded Atma Jaya's status so that its diplomas and degrees were no longer recognised. But Rev. Danuwinata dismissed these rumours as untrue.

Source: Hotline.

SPOTLIGHT ON TWO PRISONERS



Two students are still being held in prison in connection with the meeting at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta on September 24th, 1981. They are Rafendi Djamin, a fifth year sociology student aged 25, and Alexander Irwan, 21 years old, a third year sociology student.

Amnesty International considers them both to be prisoners of conscience, imprisoned for peacefully exercising their right to freedom of expression.

Both were members of the Student Senate of the Social Sciences Faculty which invited a journalist from the daily, Kompas, and the author Pramoedya Ananta Toer to speak in a seminar on "The Attitude and Role of the Intellectual in Indonesia". Pramoedya, an ex-political prisoner, delivered a paper but the meeting was interrupted by a university official and the speakers were told to leave. According to the military authorities, his speech included "Marxist ideology"; this is banned in Indonesia. The meeting was abandoned and Pramoedya was summoned for intensive interrogation by KOPKAMTIB officials for one week.

On 5th October, 1981, Jusuf Ishak, publisher of Pramoedya's books, and four students from the Social Sciences Faculty who had been involved in the organisation of the meeting were arrested by the local security forces, LAKSUS KODAM V Jaya (TAPOL Bulletin 49). The students were Rafendi Djamin, Alexander Irwan, Widi Krastawan and Ishak's son, Verdi Jusuf. Ishak was held in a detention centre without access to his family or a lawyer for over three months. He was released in January on health grounds but is still technically under arrest and cannot leave Jakarta.

The four students were officially released from detention on 10th October, on the orders of head of KOP-KAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo. No charges were made against them. However, on the 19th October, they were all rearrested. This time their arrest was "unofficial" as no warrants for their arrest or imprisonment were issued. They were held for four days before being released without charge.

All four students have been expelled from the University of Indonesia; three are in the final stage of their studies for a Master's degree. The Rector's expulsion order stated that "their activities in arranging the distorted discussion" had "jeopardised his authority and breached established campus discipline". But the Jakarta Military Command apparently released them unconditionally after they could prove that their conduct did not obstruct the state ideology. And KOPKAMTIB has recommended that the students should be reinstated. But the University has not reinstated them.

The next event was that Alex and Rafendi were again rearrested by the very same military authority in connection with the very same case; the third time since that meeting in September. On 28th December, Alex was formally sum-

moned to LAKSUS KODAM V Jaya. He was not allowed to return home after interrogation and was held for several days before his arrest was made official. Four months later he is still in detention. No details of the charges against him or a date for his trial have been issued. Rafendi was officially arrested by the same military authorities on 16th February. He too is being held at the detention centre of LAKSUS KODAM V in Jakarta.

Students at the University of Indonesia have written to the Rector protesting against the expulsion of the four students and objecting to the presence of military officials at the hall in the Social Sciences Faculty where the meeting was held. They point out that the meeting was a general sociological discussion, part of a forum on social science issues and had no political intent.

"Sociological theories of social conflict and social stratification are apparently taken dogmatically as only originating from Marx. Is this true? Of course it isn't. It is obvious that Marx did not have a monopoly on these theories."

They argue that this is an internal university matter which should never have involved the military, particularly when the students were not given so much as an official warning.

Student Senate "Frozen"

The Dean of the Social Sciences Faculty, Dr Tobias Soebakti, one of the people responsible for banning the meeting, has issued an order "freezing the activities of the Student Senate of the Faculty to prevent inappropriate student activities from re-occurring within the Social Sciences Faculty and within the University of Indonesia as a whole."

Previous cases have shown that international pressure has been effective in securing the release of detainees. Certainly the outcry which followed Pramoedya's interrogation and Ishak's arrest and detention in connection with the banned meeting had positive effects. The situations of the two students, Rafendi and Alex, are no less serious precisely because they are not well known outside or indeed inside Indonesia. Support from student organisations could be helpful. Send your letters to:

Admiral Sudomo Panglima, KOPKAMTIB Jalan Merdeka Barat Jakarta, Indonesia And copies to:

Brigadier General Norman Sasono Panglima Kodam V Laksusda Jaya Jakarta, Indonesia

PERADIN, Jalan Veteran 17, Jakarta, Indonesia (Lawyers' Association) Lembaga Bantuan Hukum, Jalan Diponegoro 74, Jakarta, Pusat, Indonesia (Legal Aid Bureau)

to the Indonesian diplomatic representative in your country, and to TAPOL.



SOENARDI ARRESTED

Soenardi, the lawyer who last December widely distributed a letter calling for an investigation into President Suharto's role in the 1965 "coup attempt", was arrested in Jakarta on 19th April. He is now being held in a military prison.

His arrest warrant, providing initially for a one-month detention, accuses him of insulting the Head of State and violating the electoral law. Shortly after his December letter was sent, Soenardi was hauled in for questioning five times but was not actually held in custody.

The event which led to his arrest is the distribution of a second letter, on 10th April, repeating his earlier demand for an investigation of Suharto's role and calling once again for the elections to be postponed until it can be determined whether Suharto is "fit to stand for President". He also claims in this second document that the first letter was widely read by people from many different walks of life.

(For more details of the nature of Soenardi's accusations, please see "Did Suharto Mastermind the 1965 'Coup Attempt'?" in **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 50, March 1982 pages 12-14.)

Soenardi is Counsellor of the Indonesian Bar Association (PERADIN) and Secretary-General of Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen (Marhaen People's Movement) a nationalist group that called last year for a boycott of the general elections.

The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) will be defending Soenardi if he comes for trial. According to AFP (21 April), a trial

PRAMOEDYA'S BOOK PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH

Orders can now be sent to TAPOL

Pramoedya Ananta Toer's novel, **Bumi Manusia**, banned and burnt in Indonesia, has now appeared in English as a Penguin paperback. It was published in Australia in May, and will be published in the UK on 26th August. The translation is by Max Lane.

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may take place after the elections. It could, says AFP, be turned against other opponents of the regime if the election results are less than satisfactory to the government.

BRAM ZAKIR ARRESTED

Ibrahim Zakir, one of the student leaders arrested in 1978 and tried for his part in the 1977-78 student movement, was arrested together with two colleagues in Surabaya on 28th March, after they had attended meetings with university students.

Bram Zakir was in Surabaya on an assignment for the weekly Mutiara, part of the Sinar Harapan publishing group.

In 1978 he was tried and sentenced for "insulting the Head of State". His defence plea, entitled *From Seria-ria* to Jenggawah published in book form, was later banned by the Attorney-General. Bram was also a signatory of the Petition-of-50. (Canberra Times, 6th April, 1982)

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