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
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DEATH SENTENCES: FINAL APPEALS FAIL

Two appeals against death sentences have recently been rejected by President Suharto. In both cases, the convicted men were charged and found guilty of subversion. The details of the case, as far as it is known, are as follows:

Trinsar Zubil was arrested in Medan, North Sumatra in January 1977 and tried for sabotage a year later. He was accused of having sought to bring about the establishment of an Islamic state, and was alleged to have been involved in a number of incidents such as bomb attacks against a hotel, a church and a cinema in Medan in 1976.

His request for clemency, submitted in March 1978, was eventually rejected on 14 December 1981 though he was not informed of the rejection till early February 1982. (*Tempo* 20 February 1982)

Colonel Sudiono formerly of the Indonesian Air Force was arrested in the late nineteen-sixties on the grounds of involvement in the G30S. He was for some years a senior officer in the Air Force intelligence service and a close Associate of Air Commodore Omar Dhani.

He was tried in 1972 and sentenced to death. Since then he has been awaiting a response to his appeal against the sentence. According to TAPOL records, there are altogether at least 60 persons who have been sentenced to death in connection with the G30S.

News that Colonel Sudiono's appeal had been turned down was received from private channels and has not been reported in the Indonesian press. It was received shortly after many newspapers in Australia, the US and Western Europe reported that President Suharto had granted clemency to Dr Subandrio, former Deputy Prime Minister, and Air Commodore Omar Dhani (see TAPOL Bulletin No 49, January 1982).

More Clemency Pleas Pending

TAPOL has also been informed that 16 other tried G30S prisoners are awaiting a decision by the President in response to appeals for clemency against death sentences.

Imran Sentenced to Death

Imran, the Muslim activist on trial for "masterminding" a hijack last year (see Buyung interview, p. 3) was sentenced to death on 13 March.

OPPOSE THE DEATH SENTENCE!

On behalf of the Legal Aid Institution in Jakarta, the lawyer T. Mulya Lubis sent a cable to the President, in which he said:

"In principle, the implementation of the death sentence is a step backwards in our efforts to uphold law and basic human rights."

He urged the President to halt the execution of the death sentence in the case of Trinsar Zubil and to stop all further death sentences in the future.

The Institute's director, Abdulrachman Saleh, has also spoken out against the execution of Trinsar Zubil. Although he is not opposed to the death sentence as such, he strongly opposes its use in political cases.

TAPOL urges its readers and supporters to cable President Suharto (Istana Negara, Jalan Veteran, Jakarta) urging him to reverse his decisions and halt the executions of Trinsar Zubil and Colonel Sudiono.

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This issue of **TAPOL Bulletin** is the 50th, hardly a time to celebrate, as our friends of the Dutch-Indonesian Committee remind us in a message. When the first Bulletin appeared in August 1973, our energies were almost entirely concentrated on campaigning for the release of the 1965 political prisoners, the *tapols*, from whom we took our name. But already in early 1974, a new generation of political prisoners had our attention, the students arrested in connection with the demonstration protesting against the visit to Indonesia of Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka. Then came the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 and a whole new wave of killings, persecution and repression. Similar human rights violations were already being perpetrated in West Papua, incorporated into the Indonesian Republic in 1963.

The 1978 student movement which grew to a climax around the election of General Suharto to a third term as President produced a new crop of human rights victims, and dozens of political trials.

The programme to release the long-term G30S prisoners was more or less completed by the end of 1979, but, as we know, the released prisoners confront major problems in returning to normal life because of the severe restrictions imposed on their civil rights. Many 1965 *tapols* remain in prison serving long prison sentences or facing the prospect of execution if the 60 or so death sentences are upheld.

But just as these releases were taking place, as Buyung Nasution so cogently reminds us in an interview published in this issue, hundreds if not thousands of Muslim activists were being detained as part of the systematic intimidation of the Muslim community. Buyung's plea on their behalf, urging TAPOL to take up their cases more vigorously, only underlines the need to work on a much more complex variety of problems.

MESSAGES ON THE OCCASION OF THE 50th ISSUE OF TAPOL BULLETIN

The 50th issue of **TAPOL Bulletin** is not really something to celebrate. But it does show your determination never to give up.

We are sure you will continue with your inspiring work, especially with **TAPOL Bulletin** which is of utmost importance for everyone who wants to know what is really going on in Indonesia.

In solidarity,
KOMITEE INDONESIA
Amsterdam-Nederland.

I see the **TAPOL Bulletin** as a fascinating pacemaker in the international politics of human rights, a kind of transnational counterpart of America's *I. F. Stone's Weekly*. Though often disagreeing with what the Bulletin has said in its editorial statements, I have consistently admired the imagination with which its staff have sought after facts and the scrupulous way in which they have presented them, whatever their source. Careful, precise vigilance journalism of this type is making an important contribution to the new morality of human rights that is now emerging, one that

We value the constant support of our readers, and your generous and encouraging response to our recent appeal for financial assistance. We can only say at this juncture that, conditions permitting, TAPOL will remain in existence and **TAPOL Bulletin** will continue to appear for just as long as there is a need for us and it.

UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO EAST TIMOR

The controversy in the press over food shortages in East Timor should not be allowed to distract from the large-scale violation of human rights there. Catholic priests working there report that the food situation is extremely serious. Mr. Whitlam, who visited E. Timor recently with an Australian journalist, has denied this and has maliciously attacked the priest who sent out the reports.

It is virtually impossible for any independent witnesses to go to E. Timor. Journalists, representatives of aid agencies and foreign visitors have all been refused entry permits. Foreigners even require a special permit to go to West Timor and their movements are closely supervised. Even those carefully selected to visit E. Timor do not have access to all the information; they are treated to stage-managed official programmes.

It is perfectly clear that the Indonesians have a great deal to hide, not only about the food situation and the treatment of political prisoners but also about the extent of resistance to its occupation. It is essential to press for unrestricted access into East Timor for independent observers so that a proper picture of the situation can be obtained.

speaks relevantly to countries and regimes of every political hue.

Herb Feith
Melbourne, Australia

Congratulations to TAPOL for translating and publishing (September 1981 Bulletin) the Report from the Provincial Assembly of East Timor, which details "from the horse's mouth" the atrocities the Timorese people are suffering at the hands of the Indonesian military forces. Your work has most certainly helped bring the issue of East Timor to the attention of the world's press again.

It was especially ironic to read the article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, "Jakarta's Can of Worms" (1 January 1982) which acknowledges TAPOL's work on this question and quotes extensively from your translation. It is not so long since Derek Davies used FEER in an attempt to discredit and break up TAPOL.

With best wishes,
Elizabeth Marlow.

BUYUNG NASUTION INTERVIEWED BY TAPOL

Adna Buyung Nasution the human rights lawyer who set up the first Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta over ten years ago, was interviewed by Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL in Holland on 12 March 1982.*

I think at this time, the Muslims can be said to represent one of the major political challenges to the government. What different forms of political repression does the Suharto government employ to intimidate and suppress Muslim activists?

Before I answer that question, I would like to express my appreciation for this question of yours because in the past I have criticised TAPOL as well as Amnesty for not raising your voices on behalf of other political prisoners in Indonesia. What I have noticed in the past is that you only cared for communist political prisoners. That gave a bad impression of TAPOL as well as of Amnesty. But this question of yours is a good sign because it really means that you care for other political prisoners in Indonesia, because it means that you will stick to the struggle for human rights as a fundamental and basic thing.

And now to your question: it is very obvious that after the release of the so-called communist political prisoners, the regime in Indonesia turned its attention towards the Muslims, in the sense that many were arrested and became political prisoners. They were arrested on the basis of several accusations—not charges, accusations which means that there is no legal case, no court case. The first were the well-known *Komando Jihad* cases, hundreds of them were arrested in the years 1977, 1978, and 1979. One of the main defendants was Ismael Pranoto, who was sentenced to death in East Java. The second case was the so-called "Warman Gang". And now there is the case of Imran. All of them are regarded as Muslim fundamentalists and extremists.

But what happened is this: in the case of Ismael Pranoto, we got data from evidence at the court hearing showing that the Pranoto case was a frame-up, that it was started by intelligence agents who made contact with people of the former Darul Islam in West Java. They were approached by intelligence agents and invited to do something to protect the motherland. The intelligence people told them that the motherland was in danger because of the communist threat from Vietnam. If they were really loyal to the country, real patriots, they should do something to protect the country. Believing this story, these Muslims felt obliged to do something. They agreed to build up Muslim power for use by the government against this communist threat from Vietnam. That was the frame-up. So they organised themselves, these youngsters from West Java, Central Java and East

Java. Of course they didn't know the background, they only believed that this was a lawful movement with support from top intelligence people. They all participated. But then, all of a sudden, they were cut off.

After that, there was the case of Warman, which is still a mystery because he was never arrested, never brought to court. He was murdered in a fight about a year ago.

And now there is the latest case which is still before the court, the Imran case. This too is a case that makes the Muslim people really angry. They believe this case is also a frame-up, because right from the beginning, when Imran started his movement, the "*Islam Ja'maah*", he made



speeches, gave sermons in the mosque containing very open, blunt statements against the government, against the constitution, against the Pancasila. This was certainly known to the intelligence community. But no action was taken against him. On the contrary, he was given facilities. When Muslims heard that he had connections or liaisons with intelligence agents they became suspicious of his movement. He was behaving so daringly, and openly criticised or attacked the constitution, the Pancasila and even

*Buyung Nasution was an activist in KASI, the United Action Front of Intellectuals set up in late 1965. This was one of the organisations which supported the establishment of the New Order. He was appointed by Suharto as a member of Parliament and the Peoples' Consultative Assembly in 1966, after both bodies had been purged of PKI and leftwing members. With a few others, he campaigned actively for the restoration of constitutional government and pressed for the repeal of the 1963 Anti-Subversion Presidential Decree. Although a decision to that effect was adopted by the Consultative Assembly, the Presidential Decree was in fact enacted as a law.

In 1968, Buyung was dismissed from the two legislative bodies and has since then continued to oppose unconstitutionality in the New Order. He has repeatedly called for the dissolution of KOPKAMTIB. In 1974 he was arrested during the crackdown on the student movement and its supporters; he spent nearly two years in detention without trial.

Suharto. Why didn't the government take action while other Muslims who didn't dare to say such things were being arrested?

It was only after the hijacking case in Bangkok that he was arrested. The government accused him of being the man behind the scenes, the *actor intellectualis*. We sent our lawyers to defend him in court but I have to admit that it is not an easy thing because not all the facts can be exposed and presented in court. Many principal witnesses cannot be brought to the trial—have not been caught—and cannot appear in court. The authorities refused to do so, giving many reasons, of course.

These were witnesses called by the defence?

Yes. For example, the co-pilot of the aircraft. He is still alive, although the pilot was killed. The stewardesses, the air crew, some of the passengers, were all "not available". Also one important man who we believe was a go-between, between Imran and the intelligence was killed too. He was murdered. So, many facts remain undisclosed.

I notice in a press clipping I've just received that Imran's defence lawyers were asking a lot of questions about the 5 hijackers who were killed. For example: were they all killed at the time the plane was stormed, why was there no post mortem, and where were they buried?

Yes, that's quite true. One of the five men, according to the information we received at the time, was not killed; he was alive when he was taken from Bangkok to Jakarta. So if the government said later on that all of them were killed, it means that the fifth person was killed in Jakarta, not Bangkok. And that has been confirmed by reports from many foreign reporters.

The arrests of Muslims are still going on. I don't know how many Muslims are now under arrest, how many Muslim political detainees there are. I think nobody knows the exact number because it is changing all the time. Especially in Jakarta, in the last few months, many Muslim leaders or executives of mosques have been arrested for several days, just for a short time, one after the other. It's a very effective way to crack them mentally.

Are they, generally speaking, activists of the PPP or the NU?

No, not necessarily. They are just people on mosque committees, people who take care of the mosques. They are not politically-orientated people, they are just good, concerned Muslims.

In the past we in TAPOL became very familiar with the whole system of repression. You were criticising us for concentrating almost entirely on the communist prisoners. It's not entirely true because we have tried to work for Malari prisoners. We publicised your case when you were in prison, and so on. But certainly when TAPOL came into existence, repression of communists was the main problem of human rights abuse in Indonesia. We became very familiar with the whole system of repression; the dismissals, the long term detention without trial. We knew about the organisations that had been banned and the kind of accusations that were being made against these people, against the

pro-PKI organisations. We knew about Buru, the so-called 'final solution'. We had a fairly comprehensive picture of the whole system of repression against what we could perhaps call the 'old left'. But I haven't in my own mind yet been able to obtain an overall picture of the repression of Muslims. Is the repression less systematic than it was towards the PKI and the so-called G30S prisoners?

Of course what you say is right. You got a clearer picture about the repression of communists because it happened over a long period of time, and you had enough time to study and observe the system. The detention of Muslims has been happening only since fairly recently. But I expect you to make as many efforts as you did for the communists, to make a study of it, and to do something about these political prisoners.

I would say the system is almost the same because the government is using the same security apparatus to arrest and detain these Muslim people. At the top is KOPKAMTIB, the *Satgas Intel Pusat* (Central Intelligence Special Squad), and in the regions where the regional military commands are, there are the LAKSUSDA, the special officers of KOPKAMTIB. They take action in almost the same way as they did towards the communist political prisoners in the past. They do it in the framework of what they call "intelligence operations". There is no law whatsoever, no legal procedure whatsoever. They arrest these people without any legal warrants, then they take them to a place without letting the family know where. And they are being detained in the same places where former tapols were held. And more than that, the same group of people who used to beat and torture these communist prisoners are now being used against the Muslim political prisoners. This is what really shocks me. When I was released from prison in 1976 I went to see Sudomo, the chief of KOPKAMTIB, and asked him to get rid of all the people who used to interrogate, torture and beat those prisoners because in my eyes they are not human beings, they are like animals, they have no conscience. It is dangerous for anybody to have people like that in power in such places. They must be sacked! If you still need people to work in KOPKAMTIB (you know of course that I am very much against KOPKAMTIB which in my opinion should be abolished; I have believed this firmly since 1968-69)—however, if they want to keep KOPKAMTIB, they must at least replace these people. What I have found in the case of the Muslim prisoners is that these really inhuman people, the people who are like animals, are still working on the Muslim political prisoners.

Do you feel there is any purpose to be served in publicising the names of people who do the torturing and beating? I ask the question because just a few weeks ago I received a report about the torture of an Achehnese prisoner and it mentioned the names of soldiers who did the torturing. I can't give you the names now as I don't have the report with me, but one of the places mentioned was a jail in Jalan Gandhi, Medan.

That was a year ago, it's not a recent case. But that does not mean that they have stopped it. It was exposed by a member of PERADIN, Sjarif Siregar, the chairman of the



Buyung Nasution with another human rights lawyer Yap Thiam Hien, signing an agreement in Manila to set up a South East Asia Human Rights Council. The Council, which also includes lawyers from the Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia, was established in February 1982. It aims to monitor human rights violations in the countries of the region.

Mr Yap Thiam Hien is Secretary of the Indonesian Institute for the Defence of Basic Human Rights.

advocates' association in Medan.

The document I have here is about Medan, but it did not come direct from Medan. It is based on a report from an Achehnese who is now a refugee in Sweden. He got out of Aceh a few months ago and has described what happened to him in Jalan Gandhi. It is true it happened a few years ago but it is not from the source you mention. He gives the names of many of his torturers.

What I heard about at the time was that the army arrested people in North Sumatra and then beat them badly, in a cruel and inhuman way. As a result, a member of PERADIN raised his voice in protest but he was almost arrested by the military authorities. He came to Jakarta for protection, and we helped him. After that, there was no-one in North Sumatra to publish anything more about those cases. But I believe the practice is still going on. So I would confirm any information about that kind of treatment in Jalan Gandhi.

We received information, again from the same person, about a secret water-room under the stage. The prison is a former school, and under the stage in the school theatre, there is a small room, without windows, with just a small hole leading in. The prisoners are forced down this hole. This room is filled several feet high with water, and the water is full of larvae, leeches and dangerous insects. The prisoners have to stand in this water for hours on end. According to our information, most of the prisoners forced to suffer this treatment either go mad or die.

Yes, I've heard about that. The prisoners have to swim

there, naked. They are made to keep their faces below the water for long periods of time.

I would say that if those people whom I would describe as animals still exist and are still in function, then things like that cannot be avoided. They will do them again and again because they are accustomed to handing out that kind of treatment. And they are animals who get enjoyment from the suffering of others.

You have mentioned the work done by the LBH in defending Muslim cases. What other work does the LBH do for the Muslim prisoners, for those who don't come to trial?

To be honest, we cannot do much, just like with the communist tapols in the past. What we can do, firstly, is to receive the families who come to us to report or to complain. This may seem to be a very small thing but, in my experience, it is something these people need; they need to have someone to whom they can speak openly, with confidence, about their problems. In this way they can share their grievances. Secondly, to find out where the detainees are being held, because the families generally are left completely in the dark. They don't know who arrested their father, husband or son because the people who came to arrest them didn't leave any documents. I remember one day somebody came to the LBH, a woman with 7 children. This was 7 or 8 years ago, her husband was a tapol, he had been a station master in West Java. She came crying, and reported that her husband had been taken in the middle of the night without any documents. When I asked who came to take him away, she said she did not know because all she

saw was that they were wearing uniforms, and came in a jeep. So I asked her what she did then, she said she went to the police station, the army headquarters, to all the local authorities, but nobody knew anything. She was totally in the dark. It took us almost a month to find out where he was. And when we discovered this, it was really great for her because she knew that her husband was still alive, and knew where he was.

It's the same now with these Muslim detainees. Many people came to us. I remember a few months ago, a father came to us informing us that his son was arrested about 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning, without any warrant. So we made enquiries and after a week, we found out that he had been arrested by a LAKSUSDA. So my deputy went to see the commander in charge. In the beginning he said: "We don't know anything about him." Many ways and tricks are used to evade our enquiries. But because my deputy was very persistent and pressed hard, in the end they admitted that this man was in their hands. But this took almost a month. He fought for days and weeks. So when we asked what the charge was, what the reason for the arrest was, on the basis of which law, they said it was "beyond the law". They used these words quite specifically to my deputy: "This is beyond the law". It was still at the *prajudicial* stage. He was arrested for security reasons, and he was also being interrogated for security reasons.

This is something very striking in Indonesia: in practice, this is a new development. Intelligence authorities in Indonesia arrest people, detain people, and interrogate people not on the basis of law and not for justice—the term we normally use is *pro-justitia*—but for what they call *prajustitia*, before the judicial procedures. This is something not only new but something never known in legal science, in law in any normal country. Only Indonesia has this practice. I say there is no law for such practices because indeed there is no law for security people to arrest, detain and interrogate people.

The new Criminal Procedure Code (HAP) hasn't made any difference, has it?

No.

I'm not sure that it made any difference in the area of criminal justice, has it?

Well, it should of course, but let's wait and see. I don't know yet. We have to observe the practice. But certainly with the compromise in the last article of the new law, which says that this new law on criminal procedure does not apply to cases coming under "special procedures", such as those coming under the anti-subversion act, it means that it has nothing to do with these security cases.

I notice that in the case of the G30S prisoners, there was no question about it: they were detained indefinitely. But when the Malari people were arrested, including yourself, the authorities, at the end of the first year (at the time of a visit to Indonesia by a Dutch parliamentary mission) made quite a lot of efforts to prove that they were keeping within the terms of the anti-subversion law which only allows detention without trial or charge for one year. So they said,

well the one year is up, but they are being re-arrested, or they didn't even release them, but prolonged their detention for another year. Do they do that now with the Muslim prisoners? Do they keep within this one-year limit, or do they just ignore it?

Well, to be honest, we need to check this. The problem is that these people are held so secretly. I would say this is more secret than the arrest of the G30S tapols. They still remain in intelligence hands by contrast with the tapols. The tapols were arrested—certainly, in 1965, 1966 and 1967 they were kept in the hands of intelligence for interrogation—but after that they were turned over to the military police. But the Muslims are, up to today, still in the hands of the intelligence people.

So do you mean that they remain at that stage until—if they are going to be tried—they actually go for trial?

Not necessarily, until they are tried. I shall try to describe the stages. The first is the intelligence operation stage. If they have finished with the intelligence operations, the prisoners are transferred to the military police, for further interrogations to prepare the case for the '*pro-justitia*' stage. That is the task of the military police or the prosecution office, or the normal police. Sometimes it is a combination of all three. But this doesn't happen with the Muslim prisoners. They remain in the hands of the intelligence people.

And even at that stage they are being held in prisons?

Yes.

In the case of the G30S prisoners they, or I should say we, were usually held in transit camps and we only went to prison after our longterm detention status had been determined. Do you mean that Muslim prisoners already in prison are still at the intelligence interrogation stage?

Yes. You see, in the communist case, there were three stages: the first was the operational stage in the hands of the intelligence, then they were transferred to the military police as detainees, pending a court trial. Then when they were almost ready for trial, they were again transferred, this time to the hands of the prosecution. And it was at this stage that the prosecution issued formal arrest documents, so that the prisoner could be accounted for later on.

Do you see any signs of longterm labour camps being set up for Muslim prisoners such as those set up for the G30S prisoners?

This could happen if the situation gets worse. If the resistance against the regime gets stronger, I bet they will do that.

But you don't see any signs of that happening at the moment?

No. They are only arrested, then detained in many places in North Sumatra, Central and South Sumatra, West, Central and East Java and Lombok, the most easterly place.

What do you think are the most effective ways of campaigning internationally against this particular kind of

repression? Should we concentrate on special areas or countries? Have you any ideas about strategy?

Well, you know more about that than I do. I would say you should get the names of these people and make them known to the public, internationally. By publicising their names, you are better able to exert pressure on the regime. One thing I have learnt about this regime, and I think this is the character of regimes like this all over the world, is that if nobody pays attention, if nobody cares about what they do, arresting and detaining people, they just go on doing these things.



Do you have any impression that any Muslim groups in Indonesia, say the PPP or any other groups, have made efforts to help these prisoners, campaigning for them or making international contacts on their behalf?

I know that some Muslim groups really work hard to help them, by supporting the families, looking after them, then contacting the LBH, and giving us information for us to use when necessary. So there are indeed Muslims working with us.

Have they made any approaches to international bodies?

No, I don't think so because they lack communication with the outside world. If they had any, it would be with countries in the Middle East. But I don't think they have such ideas. In this sense, I would say Muslim groups are weak in their communications. Sometimes I can't understand this. Why are they so weak? They depend so much on us, on the LBH, in many ways.

Do you think we in TAPOL, or Amnesty International should concentrate on certain types of organisations, such as Muslim organisations, which might take up these cases?

Well, it's logical but I wouldn't recommend it, because it might give another weapon to the government who might say these Muslims are really linked with the Pan-Islamic movement.

Now about the campaign to abolish the death sentence which was launched last year by the LBH. I understand that it became difficult to expand the campaign because the Muslim community in particular was against the campaign. I notice now that several Muslim prisoners have been sentenced to death. Do you think this might affect opinion in the Muslim community? Might they now be more attracted to the idea of abolishing the death sentence?

I can't be sure but I think that it's more favourable now to campaign on this issue. It's important to understand that we failed at the time to continue our campaign after some initial success because the climate was still rather tense; it was just after a long period of antagonism between Muslims and Christians, a time when there was still some suspicion between them. Secondly, there is indeed a dogmatic view among some Muslims because capital punishment is justified by the Holy Koran. For these two reasons perhaps, the Muslim community objected to the idea of abolishing the death sentence. But now with more death sentences against Muslims, their opinion may change. The climate may now be more favourable.

We heard recently that an appeal for clemency made by Colonel Sudiono, a G30S prisoner now under death sentence has been rejected by the President. There are many G30S prisoners under sentence of death. TAPOL has been told that sixteen of them are now waiting for replies to their appeals for clemency. I also read in Tempo that Trinsar Zubil, a Muslim prisoner has lost his appeal against the death sentence. Is it good to campaign against all these death sentences together?

Yes, I think so because in that way, we don't make any distinction. It shows that we are being more fundamental in our approach.

The disturbing thing about the G30S prisoners is that their death sentences were passed down ten years ago and in some cases even longer, 12 years or more, yet they still have no reply to their appeals for clemency.

That is very cruel indeed. It's something that I mentioned in an interview with a Dutch newspaper in 1976. Leaving people that long to wait for a decision is another form of cruelty. I really think that we have to start again from the beginning to organise a campaign against the death penalty, bearing in mind that so many people are awaiting decisions and the fact that the two you already mentioned have been turned down. I bet that the others will follow. If they have rejected clemency for these two people, it is likely the government will also refuse the others.

A problem for TAPOL about the campaign against the death sentence is that when it was launched—and we read quite a lot about it in the Indonesian press—we found absolutely no reference to the many death sentences passed against people tried in connection with the G30S. We have records of about 60 people under sentence of death. As far as I know, five of these sentences have already been carried out. Were these cases excluded from the campaign for tactical reasons?

There was certainly no intention to forget or disregard the

sentences passed against these tapols. But the point is this: we started the campaign by using the momentum of the issue at the time, the impending execution of Kusni Kasdut, a convicted murderer. It was a time when the press, especially *Kompas*, was very anxious to help Kusni Kasdut. But the death sentences against those 60 people, even if we had heard about them then, weren't known to people in general, so it would have been difficult to start a campaign about them. So, it's really a question of timing—that we started the campaign at the time of Kusni's execution.

Now I have a question about the four members of the East Timor Regional Assembly (DPRD) who were arrested last year. We got the impression that when the DPRD report was presented to the government in August 1981, it looked as though it was going to be ignored. It was only after the document they had prepared and submitted to the government was published outside Indonesia, in Holland, in Britain, in Australia and elsewhere, that the government began to get very angry about it, and that was when the four DPRD members were arrested in Bali. So it was because of the international attention given to that document. Then, there was a lot of international publicity, particularly in Australia, about the four arrests. Do you think the international publicity about the arrests was important in securing their release, because they were released very quickly, weren't they?

Yes, it was very, very important. You put it very correctly. That without being publicly known, domestically or more important internationally, this case would never have come to the surface, and the four men would not have been released, or it would have taken much longer to get their release. And I think it was very effective to publish that report.

I can say that, as we have seen so far, this regime is very sensitive to publicity or public opinion abroad, so we must make use of this to protect human rights in Indonesia. I am very convinced about this.

I'm very interested to hear you say this because very often people say to us: those people don't care, it's no use, you're making a lot of fuss about nothing. I personally don't believe that. I wouldn't be doing what I do if I believed that.

I don't believe that either. I have said many times: it is wrong to accept the advice of many people in authority who say: "Don't interfere, don't publish the names of people, or don't make any efforts because it will only harm the people in prison." That's all bluff. We should not accept such misleading advice. When I was released from my own imprisonment, I checked with some friends outside who told me they didn't do anything for me because they had been given advice from Indonesian friends and from people in authority who said: "Don't publish anything about Buyung because it will harm him." I think that's wrong. I would always advise people to do everything they can to let the government know that there are many eyes watching what they are doing. It is very important.

I must say that we in TAPOL have watched with great admiration what you have done in the LBH. It has made a

decisive difference to what we can do. The LBH didn't exist, not at any rate for outward consumption, when TAPOL first came into existence, and we had to work with very few contacts with Indonesia. I'm very grateful to have had this opportunity to meet you and do this interview because I hope it is going to bring a new period of cooperation between us. We really need people in Indonesia who understand what we are trying to do, and also understand our limitations because, you know we are very limited in what we can do. We need the help of people in Indonesia to provide us with information because we can't do anything without information from Indonesia.

I think that the four DPRD members have all been released. Are they now back in Dili? And functioning again?

Yes, they're all back in Dili. It's not so clear whether they are still functioning as DPRD members. I imagine, knowing the situation there, that even though they are back in their old functions, they cannot function as effectively as before. That's understandable because once you have been arrested, then released, it takes time for people to function normally again. I think they must still be in a cornered or awkward position, under pressure.

Do you know anything about how the DPRD members in East Timor were appointed? They were appointed from above, weren't they?

Yes, that may be, but nevertheless, within the reality of the political constellation in East Timor, there still are leaders of the East Timorese people besides those in the jungle. The fact that they are still there to act and speak up on behalf of the people means that they are worthy to be members of the DPRD, in spite of the procedure used to appoint them.

I'd like to ask you about disappearances in Indonesia. Have you for example heard about any Muslim prisoners who have disappeared?

This is a new problem for us, new in the sense that we just realise now that such cases should be documented and campaigned about. I don't mean that disappearances are a new thing for Indonesia. As I think more about this, I realise that disappearances have been going on in Indonesia for many years, since the beginning of the Republic. For example, Otto Iskandardinata of West Java disappeared at the beginning of the Republic. He had been appointed First Minister. Then, there was Tan Malaka, then Amir Sjarifuddin who also disappeared.

We have just started monitoring disappearances in the past few months. We are still looking for ways to monitor them because it is not easy to make enquiries about such things. Normally the families who have suffered disappearances are more scared than other people; they are really under stress.

I know of one G30S prisoner who was released in June last year. Early in her detention, she was interrogated with great brutality. Then, because she was refusing to speak, her 8-year-old daughter was tortured and beaten in front of her in order to make her speak. Then because neither the daughter nor the mother would speak, the soldiers threatened to take the daughter away. And that's what they did. Until now, she has not been re-united with her daughter.

LAWYERS SPEAK OUT AGAINST MILITARY INTIMIDATION—

Ex-Tapols Fully Entitled to Protection of the Law.

The director of the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) has strongly criticised civil and military officials in East Java for taking action against a lawyer who agreed to defend the interests of a group of peasants in the district of Kediri.

The lawyer, Franz Gunawan, was summoned by the district-head of Kediri last September and “handed over” to the East Java military command on the grounds that he was “helping PKI elements who were under reporting requirements” (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 48, November 1981).

The LBH Director, Abdulrachman Saleh said (**Sinar Harapan**, 6 October 1981) that it was quite wrong to raise questions about who makes an allegation or initiates legal proceedings. Even though the plaintiffs are ex-tapols, they are still Indonesian citizens and entitled to the protection of the law, he said. As to the truth of the accusation, it is for the courts to decide, not the district-head of Kediri or the military commander LAKSUSDA.

The Chairman of the Indonesian Association of Lawyers (PERADIN) has also complained about the treatment of Gunawan. “Any citizen is allowed to bring law suits regardless of his/her political beliefs”, he said. By summoning and interrogating Gunawan regarding his relationship with his clients, the district-head and the security officer were acting illegally because this contravenes the lawyers’ professional code of secrecy (**Sinar Harapan**, 6 October 1981).

Lawyers representing the law association in East Java have also raised the Gunawan case. Two lawyers in Surabaya, Pamudji and Martono Isworo, both said that they

had on a number of occasions acted on behalf of people regarded as “ex-G30S/PKI” and had not been subjected to pressure either from the civil or the military authorities.

In reply to a query addressed to the district-head of Kediri, the East Java branch of PERADIN has been told that Gunawan’s case involved “provocative actions” in Kediri, namely helping people over land disputes where the people concerned were required to report to the authorities regularly (*walap*) because of their alleged involvement in the banned communist party (**Sinar Harapan**, 9 October 1981).

“Latent Communist Threat”

An earlier news report about Gunawan has just reached TAPOL (**Surabaya Pos**, 30 September 1981) giving more details about the case.

The district-head of Kediri, Usri Sastradiredja is quoted as saying that because doubts had been raised regarding the complaints of the peasants, “bearing in mind the latent danger of the communist threat, the fact that two ex-G30S/PKI persons under reporting requirements (*walap*) were involved, and the occurrence of social disturbances during the month of September* for the last two years”, he had handed the lawyer over to the military.

A military officer, Major Soediyanto, stressed that his task was to guide the inhabitants of his territory and direct social developments, particularly with regard to G30S/PKI remnants. “Communism is a latent danger because communist ideology in a person’s brain will never disappear until that person is dead”, he is quoted as saying.

*September is the month when security agencies “intensify vigilance” on the grounds that “disturbances” are more likely to happen to “commemorate” the events in September-October 1965.

Continued from opposite page

Where did that happen?

In an interrogation centre in Gunung Sari II, Jakarta, a torture centre, in 1966. That was the centre of *Operasi Kalong*, under Major Saroso. Acep was the man who threatened to take the daughter away.

There is a working group of the U.N. Commission of Human Rights dealing with disappearances. One of the essential things in classifying a case as a disappearance, is that the person is known to have been taken into custody by the government, but no account is given of what happened. Many thousands have disappeared and have never been accounted for. It’s necessary to press the government to say what happened to them. There are women who still can’t remarry because they don’t know whether their husbands are alive or dead, they have no documents about them. They face all kinds of legal problems, about inheritance and so on. In the case of the girl I was just talking about, it’s pretty certain she is still alive, so it’s a question of tracing her. If there are cases of disappearances among Muslim prisoners, it is important to have information because they can be taken up by the U.N. Working Group. The question of disappearances has become a big international campaign, but Indonesia has not yet been taken up as a major country where disappearances have occurred. Yet Indonesia could possibly be said to be the country where the problem of disappearances first started.

I remember the case in 1965 of Sutedja, the governor of Bali. It was a very sad story. The family came to me, the

mother and the children. But we couldn’t do anything. We tried to trace him but had no success whatever.

We once made an enquiry with the International Red Cross, which runs a tracing service. We asked them about the possibility of tracing disappeared persons, and they said they could do it, but the application must come from the family, not from outsiders.

This is an example of how we can cooperate in a concrete way. This is what we are lacking in Indonesia—the knowledge about international procedures, the forums abroad we can use in our struggle for human rights. We lack access to this kind of information and knowledge. So many international forums exist, like the U.N. Human Rights Commission, the ILO, UNESCO, the Red Cross, which can be beneficial to our struggle. We are ignorant of these things. If you can inform us about the procedures, then we can cooperate. If the Red Cross needs a formal complaint from the family, we can work that out. If only you give us the names and addresses, we will approach the families. Please ask this woman to get in touch with us.

I don’t have any more questions, but I’d like to thank you very much for this interview.

All I would like to say in conclusion is that we should be open to each other and try to cooperate for the cause of human rights and justice. I think we need each other. That’s all I need to say.

MILITARY *KARYAWAN** IN INDONESIA'S TOP CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY

A well-researched analysis of the patterns of military control of the Indonesian higher central bureaucracy draws the conclusion that military *karyawan** play a crucial role in maintaining the Suharto regime in power. They now occupy half the positions in this bureaucracy. Within the two government departments most essential in maintaining the regime, military control is complete or near complete: the Department of Defence and Security (100%) and the Department of Home Affairs (89%).

The analysis, which recently came into our hands, makes the important point that there is no practical evidence suggesting an effort to 're-civilianise' even gradually those slots now held by military *karyawan* in the higher central bureaucracy. Civilians are now in the majority only in positions with the most specialised functions, (Ministers of State and Directors-General), but in both instances work mainly under military supervisors.

The higher central bureaucracy under scrutiny in this analysis includes the Presidency (President and Vice-President); the State Secretariat (eight key aides supporting the Presidency); three Senior coordinating Ministers, each overseeing several Cabinet Departments; three Ministers of State; seventeen Ministers; six Junior Ministers; eighteen people at Secretary-General level; seventeen Inspectors-General empowered to enquire into any matter in their Departments; and seventy-one Directors-General subordinate to their respective Secretaries-General.

Dealing with military domination in the Defence and Home Affairs Departments, the analysis, which is based on a wealth of published books, articles and publicly available Indonesian government directories and publications, points out:

1. That internal armed forces personnel and organisational changes in 1965-66, 1969-70, 1974-75 and 1978-81 increasingly concentrated power centrally in the Army, the Defence Ministry in Jakarta and in the person of the Defence Minister;
2. that military penetration of the Department of Home Affairs has risen more markedly since 1965 than in any other Department (from 29% of the leading positions in 1966, to 71% in 1971 and 89% in 1981).

There is apparently no Department in which the military is not suitably placed, through filling the Secretary-General or Inspector-General slots or more usually both, to control and keep track of all Departmental activities. Direct Presidential involvement in Departmental affairs serves to maintain these capabilities. The topmost technocrats and career civil servants, whose tenure depends on maintaining the trust of military patrons, are at least as active public proponents of government policies as the military *karyawan*.

Another important point is that assignments for military personnel within the bureaucracy now carry higher rank

and prestige. The attractiveness of the military *karyawan* role has been enhanced because the Army, the most prestigious of the four services, occupies 81% of military *karyawan* positions, and because the military ranks of those holding these positions have risen sharply (from Lieutenants-Colonels to Major-Colonels in the case of the Army) since 1965.

Top posts in the bureaucracy are virtually monopolised by that faction of the "1945 Generation" (those who fought actively against the Dutch in 1945) loyal to Suharto. These officers clearly intend to hold onto their powerbase for at least the next five years. There is an effective system of controlling the loyalties of retired *karyawan* by holding military rank promotion exercises for them and requiring them to join the Association of Retired Members of the Indonesian Armed Forces (PEPABRI), through which loyalty to the Armed Forces is reinforced.

The writer believes that the 1945 Generation faction loyal to Suharto intends to retain its domination in the higher central bureaucracy in order to ensure a smooth transfer of leadership in the Army staff and command structure to the "Young Generation" officers (graduates of the Magelang Military Academy) but suggests that this formula for generational succession is unlikely to succeed. The formula would appear to be that for some indeterminate time to come, there will continue to be a sharp and unprecedented rift between two major military power centres, with the 1945 Generation military *karyawan* controlling politics and the "Young Generation" officers in the Army staff and command structure controlling the guns. It is far from clear that the "Young Generation" Army officers will accept their subordinate political role in this emerging new-model New Order. The result will be that the latter will increasingly question the meaning of the armed forces' dual function (*dwi-fungsi*).

Power Concentration

In an attempt to describe the concentration of power within the top bureaucracy, the writer points out that, informally, power is concentrated in the President with the State Secretary acting as an effective screen. The Coordinating Minister for Economic, Financial and Industrial Affairs (Wijoyo Nitisastro) and the Department Ministers under the Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, and to a lesser extent this Coordinating Minister himself (General Panggabean) are best able to gain access to the President. The Commander of KOPKAMTIB, Admiral Sudomo, has unique Presidential access although he is nominally under the Minister of Defence.

A breakdown of the 50% share of positions in the higher central bureaucracy held by military *karyawan* is given as follows:

Karyawan*: **functionary. The word used instead of 'worker', to conceal the difference between employer and employee. It has in fact come to be used mainly for senior officials.

SEVEN JENGGAWAH PEASANTS IN DETENTION

Seven peasants from Jenggawah, East Java, have been in detention for eight months because the authorities suspect that they were planning to incite other peasants to refuse to plant tobacco for State Plantation XXVIII.

Some of the men have been in detention before and were brought to trial on anti-subversion charges in early 1980. (They were subsequently acquitted.)

The dispute over tobacco cultivation in Jenggawah has been going for many years (See **TAPOL Bulletins** no. 36, October 1979 and No. 38, March 1980). It involves the use of land previously tilled by peasants to grow rice and secondary crops. Eventually, the company won control over the land which gives it the power to require the peasants to use the land for tobacco cultivation for five months in every two years. This incurs considerable losses by comparison with the profits to be earned from planting

rice or other food crops.

Last May the seven arrested men were ordered to sign statements guaranteeing that the peasants involved would not refuse to grow tobacco. They said that they could not give such a guarantee and were arrested the next day. After interrogation by the East Java military command, they were transferred to Jember Prison and have been detained there ever since. Throughout the tobacco planting season, they were not allowed to receive visits from their families.

Tempo reports (2 January 1982) that the seven men are due to appear in court soon on charges of "incitement".

According to the **Tempo** report from Jenggawah, there appear to have been no moves by peasants to resist orders to plant tobacco. The harvest has however been extremely unsatisfactory. Only 35% of the crop survived heavy rain-falls and the peasants have sustained severe losses.

Continued from opposite page

- *the President (a 4-star general);
- *seven of his eight principal aides in the State Secretariat;
- *two of the three coordinating Ministers;
- *eight of the seventeen Department Ministers;
- *two of the six Junior Ministers;
- *sixteen of the seventeen Inspector-Generals;
- *twenty-five of seventy-one Director-General level posts.

In addition the Head and deputy Head of BAKIN, the State Intelligence Coordinating Body which is responsible for internal security estimates, are both military, and report directly to the President.

Defence Department

Crucial to military domination is the total military control of the Department of Defence. The prolonged process of concentrating power at the centre (in the Defence Department) began with the reshuffling, dismissal, detention, or killing of military officers considered unreliable in the purges and battles following the murders of six Army generals in 1965. Then in the six months preceding April 1970, the four service heads were downgraded, losing operational control over their respective forces. A revised system of Regional Defence Commands (KOWILHAN) integrating services in the field, together with the removal of local people from top command positions outside Java effectively ended any threat of "warlordism". These changes also institutionalised Army dominance over the other services.

Further centralisation followed the January 1974 Malari affair. And particularly after General Yusuf's appointment as Minister of Defence in 1978, still more power flowed to the centre as a consequence of the need to deal among other things with the resistance in East Timor and increased expenditure on arms and equipment modernisation.

As for ABRI's dominance in the Department of Home Affairs, this is a manifestation of ABRI's need to control or oversee the governmental apparatus from provincial down to village level, to assure favourable results in periodic electoral exercises and to advance regional development projects on which the regime's legitimacy has come in-

creasingly to rest.

There appears to be no plan, the writer concludes, for a generational succession among the military *karyawan* in the higher central bureaucracy, or if it does exist, it is not a subject of general public discussion, as is the succession for active military duty in the staff and command structure. To hammer home this point, he quotes President Suharto as referring in a speech delivered last November to his desire to spend the rest of his life in the service of the people. This is seen as being Suharto's indirect Javanese way of saying that he intends to remain President for life. As an indication of the absence of any succession between the two generations, it is pointed out that there is not a single Magelang Academy graduate officer within the higher central bureaucracy.

The evidence points to an important conclusion: that the rift which is developing between the political structure and the army command structure confines the "Young Generation" officers to a continuing secondary and subordinate role. Thus it appears that only the "1945 Generation" officers, and more specifically those loyal to Suharto, are achieving the top positions in the civil side of ABRI's *dwi fungsi* whilst the "Young Generation" remain confined to the military side. It is doubtful whether such an arrangement can remain stable, and in any event, its longevity is inherently limited by the ageing and dying off of the 1945 Generation. Even on the military side of *dwi fungsi*, control still remains firmly in the hands of the "1945 Generation". It strains credibility to think that the "1945 Generation" will voluntarily relinquish on schedule the top Hankam* posts which it now so tightly grasps as levers controlling the career prospects of the Army's "Young Generation".

The process envisaged whereby "Young Generation" officers might start questioning the operational meaning of ABRI's *dwi fungsi* could lead to the emergence of the more politically skilled "Young Generation" officers. Already the Suharto faction's deviation from the original concept of *dwi fungsi* is under attack from widely respected "1945 Generation" 'outs' such as General Nasution, the man who originated the concept.

*Ministry of Defence

Was General Suharto, Indonesia's president, involved in the 1965 36th September Movement, the movement he has always denounced as a communist attempt to take power? Was he the manipulator, the man behind the scenes, the one who conceived the whole thing as a provocation which would, in one stroke, eliminate his rivals in the Army, annihilate the Communist Party and remove President Sukarno from power?

These questions are now being raised inside Indonesia where, until recently, no-one dared publicly to question the Army's and Suharto's version of what happened in 1965. The official version has been the justification for all that has happened since—the violent, wholesale slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people, the prolonged incarceration of tens of thousands of people without trial, and the creation of a security apparatus with unrestricted powers to repress and intimidate the entire population.

The questions have been raised in two separate documents. One has been distributed openly to senior military and civil authorities; the other is circulating anonymously among dissident groups. The first document, dated 10th December 1981, is a letter signed by Sunardi, a lawyer still practising in Jakarta. In it, he calls for the postponement of the May 1982 general elections so that a thorough investigation of Suharto's role in the 1965 affair can be undertaken in order "to clear up doubts in society". Sunardi's letter was sent, on the headed notepaper of his law office, to all provincial governors, military commanders and leading officials of Parliament and the People's Consultative Assembly, Indonesia's upper chamber.

The anonymous document takes the challenge farther. It directly accuses Suharto of involvement in the 30th September Movement. It charges him with being, at the very least, an accomplice with foreknowledge in the murder of the six generals against whom the Movement was directed. It accuses him, as the man wielding power at the time, of being responsible for the "inhuman hounding, murder in custody and massacre of communists". At one point, it refers to Suharto as the *dalang*, the manipulator, the man behind the scenes.

These documents are the latest in a series of revelations, some originating from statements made by Suharto himself, which have built up a substantial case for him to answer. To demonstrate their significance, the established facts about the 30th September Movement should first be set forth. It was on the night of 30th September/1st October 1965 that kidnap squads captured six Army generals. A seventh, General Nasution, escaped though his small daughter was fatally wounded. All six generals, including General Yani, commander of the Army, were killed on the spot or a few hours later at an airforce base on the outskirts of Jakarta. The Movement was led by three Army officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, commander of the First Battalion of the Cakrabirawa Palace Guard Regiment, Colonel Latief, commander of the Mobile Infantry Brigade of the Jakarta Military Command, and Brigadier-General Supardjo, commander of the Army's Combat Command in Kalimantan.

It was claimed in a statement broadcast early on 1st October from the Jakarta Radio Station which was briefly occupied by rebel troops, that the generals had been kid-

DID SUHARTO MASTERMIND

napped in order to pre-empt and thwart a CIA-backed coup being planned by a Council of Generals to remove the ailing President Sukarno from power and reverse Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies. The statement also condemned corruption among high-ranking Army officers.

Within hours, Suharto, then a Lieutenant-General in command of the Army's Strategic Command, KOSTRAD, succeeded in encircling the air-force base used by the kidnappers, and launched a counter-attack that was to leave the Indonesian Communist Party decimated and paralysed, the entire leftwing movement outlawed and in disarray, and the Army and government apparatus thoroughly purged of leftwing and pro-Suharto elements. By mid-March 1966, Sukarno had been forced to surrender his powers to Suharto who was soon afterwards formally installed 'constitutionally' as President.

From the very start, however, not everyone was prepared to accept the official version of events. This placed the blame squarely on the Indonesian Communist Party which was said to have manipulated the Untung conspiracy by means of a Special Bureau operating directly under the Party's chairman, D. N. Aidit. He and other members of the Party's Politbureau were soon murdered, and Syam, subsequently identified as chairman of the Special Bureau, began to appear frequently as an obliging and well-informed prosecution witness in many of the military trials that were to follow. Syam was himself tried and sentenced to death but still remains a privileged prisoner, frequently allowed out of detention on mystery 'missions'.

The questions raised first centred around the mysterious Syam. Was he Aidit's man, or was he a plant? Was he in fact working for Army intelligence? And why, some people began to ask, had Suharto himself, well-known as anti-communist and corruptor, not been included on the list of generals to be kidnapped? Why did Untung's troops occupy several crucial communications centres in Jakarta yet ignore Suharto's own headquarters at KOSTRAD which was equipped with a powerful short-wave communication system? And how could one explain the fact that two of the three Army officers at the helm of the Movement, Untung and Latief, were close associates and personal friends of Suharto, having served under him on several occasions?

More specific evidence against Suharto began to accumulate however when a US journalist, Arnold Brackman, reporting an interview with him in his book, **The Communist Collapse in Indonesia** (1968) quoted Suharto as saying that he met Latief only a few hours before the kidnap squads embarked on their missions. They met, Suharto said, at the Army Hospital in Jakarta where Suharto's son was recovering from burns sustained in an accident. The meeting took place at the improbable hour for a hospital visit of 11 pm. Suharto realised later on reflection, or so he told Brackman, that Latief had come not to visit his son but to see whether he was sufficiently pre-occupied with his son's condition to

THE 1965 "COUP ATTEMPT"?

be unlikely to launch a counter-attack on the next day.

Two years after Brackman's book appeared, the meeting was mentioned by Suharto in an interview with the German weekly, *Der Spiegel*, in June 1970. This time, however, he put a different construction on the meeting. Asked why, in his opinion, he was not among the generals kidnapped, Suharto recalled Latief's late-night visit to the hospital, and said: "He came there to kill me but apparently didn't go ahead as he was afraid of doing it in a public place." But could this explanation be taken seriously? Would Latief have contemplated committing a murder at that time, thus raising the alarm and aborting the rest of the action?

Suharto's two statements about the Latief meeting were discussed in an article published in late 1970 by Professor W. F. Wertheim, a Dutch expert on Indonesian affairs. The article, entitled "Suharto and the Untung Coup: The Missing Link", came to the conclusion that the mystery surrounding the hospital meeting could remain unsolved "until Latief is able and prepared to talk". At that time, Latief was in detention, still untried, and still suffering from gunshot wounds inflicted during his arrest in 1965.

Many years later, in May 1978, Latief was brought to trial, long after his co-conspirators, Untung and Supardjo, had been sentenced to death and executed. Here at last was his opportunity to speak and much to everyone's surprise, he did talk about the meeting. Besides describing his long personal friendship and association with Suharto, he told the court that he met Suharto twice, not once, in the 58 hours before the kidnaps took place. On the first occasion, it was on a social occasion where he met Suharto. They talked about the Council of Generals said to be planning a coup and Suharto said he was checking up on these reports. Then, explaining what happened at the hospital on the night of 30th September, Latief said:

The truth is that on that night I not only went to see his son who had had an accident but also reported that a movement would be launched on the following morning to prevent a coup d'état by the Council of Generals which he already knew about beforehand.

After making this disclosure, Latief formally requested that Suharto and his wife should appear as witnesses. The court ignored this request. One of the lawyers defending Latief at his trial was Sunardi, the man now making the demand for an investigation into Suharto's role.

Latief pointed out that Suharto should at the very least be considered an accomplice, since he knew force was being planned against the generals yet did nothing to warn them or provide them with protection. As Latief told the court, this made Suharto far more heavily implicated than the hundreds of thousands of people who were subsequently killed, arrested or dismissed from their jobs for alleged involvement in the 30th September Movement.

Latief's sensational revelation was never published in the Indonesian press though reports about it spread among dissident circles and, more significantly, among Army officers. A second article by Wertheim, entitled, "Suharto

and the Latief Trial: A Painful Revelation" which was published in July 1978 (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 29, 1978), is known to have circulated within the Army.

Sunardi's demand for an investigation is supported by a long extract from an Appeal Memorandum submitted last September by another of his clients, Sawito Kartowibowo, who was tried and found guilty of subversion in 1978. Sawito was sentenced to eight years and is still in prison. In his Memo, Sawito asked why it was that he was charged under Indonesia's draconian anti-subversion law yet Latief was not. Had this law been used in Latief's case he would almost certainly have got a death sentence which is not included as a penalty under the Criminal Code for the offences he was charged with. In the event, Latief was sentenced to life though both Untung and Supardjo had been executed. Sawito sought to explain this apparent anomaly by describing Latief's close relationship with Suharto and by referring to his two last-minute meetings with Suharto. But there could be other reasons. Is it not possible that Latief is being kept alive by people inside the Army who may be only too happy to use his evidence, when the time comes, to remove Suharto from power? It took nearly 13 years for the men in charge to bring Latief to trial. During the course of his own trial in 1978, Sawito asserted that General Ali Said, then Attorney-General and now Justice Minister, had more than enough evidence about Suharto to bring an indictment against him after his removal from power. Evidence about what? The reports of his trial so far available did not specify.

Sawito's Memo also pointed out that by refusing to summon Suharto as a witness in the Latief trial, the court had only reinforced doubts raised by Latief's revelations. Hence, the need for an investigation. So much, then for the case made by Sunardi and Sawito.

The document circulating anonymously is far more outspoken in tone. No mention is made of the need for investigations. Suharto is bluntly accused of culpability for the murder of the generals. He is accused of having actively encouraged Untung and his colleagues in their action, even to the extent of bringing troops into Jakarta for use by Latief, though whether they were actually used in this role is not clear. It is claimed that he then turned against Latief and the others. He appointed himself commander of the Army which was now bereft of its commander even though Sukarno had appointed another General, Prano, to take over. Then followed the clamp-down, the massacres, the routing of the leftwing and eventually the removal of Sukarno from power. In other words, it was not a coup attempt by the communists, but a devastatingly successful coup by Suharto.

The most striking section of this document is an appendix which traces Suharto's growing animosity towards General Yani who was appointed Army commander in 1962. Suharto had wanted the post, and from then on schemed for Yani's removal, seeking commanding posts for himself to reinforce his own position, and planning the posting of Untung and Latief, both of whom he trusted as supporters. When Yani was killed on 30th September 1965, most other generals were killed with him, leaving Suharto in charge of the Army alone to deal with Sukarno in his own way. The document hints that Yani supporters still nurse a

CARRINGTON'S VISIT: A BOOST FOR BUSINESS



Lord Carrington with Radius Prawiro, Indonesia's Minister of Trade

The rapidly intensifying cooperation between the British Government and the Suharto regime (reported in **Bulletin** No. 48) received another boost when the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, paid a three-day visit to Jakarta from 27 January, as part of his tour of ASEAN capitals. The Indonesian press regard this trip as "not of a political nature" but a "trade mission" (**Tempo** 6 February 1982), with Carrington clearly acting as little more than a broker for British business interests. Accompanying Carrington on this trip were seven top British industrialists, all hoping to extend their present activities in Indonesia and attracted by the prospect of US\$3bn. worth of contracts (**FT** 1 February 1982).

Arms Sales

In the field of arms sales were Sir Frederick Page, Managing Director of British Aerospace, plus Sir Arnold Hall and Guy Checketts, chairman and Executive Director respectively of Hawker Siddeley aircraft, all hoping to increase their sales of Hawk ground-attack jets and HS-748 'Coastguarders', transporters which can be used for freight and paratroop drops. Of the eight Hawks already sold to

Indonesia, four are said to have crashed (**Times** 1.2.82). Sir Edward Ashmore of Racal Electronics was also present; Racal specialise in arms-related equipment such as avionics, electronic communications, radio surveillance and so on.

A second major element of the visit was the signing of Britain's biggest ever export credit to Indonesia. Worth £125 m., and negotiated by Lloyds Bank International with facilities provided by the Export Credits Guarantee Department of the UK Government, this is to help pay for a £550 m. extension to the oil refining project at Balikpapan (East Kalimantan). The major contractor involved in this project is Bechtel (Great Britain), subsidiary of the American-owned group (whose labour policies are outlined opposite). Another 100 UK companies are ready to supply goods and services. Farmers Boilers has already won a contract to supply £19 m. worth of furnaces.

Also riding on the Carrington bandwagon was Sir John Buckley of Davy International Ltd. Davy recently lost a valuable contract on the methanol project on Bunyu Island to their West German competitors Lurgi as a result of the 1980 'trade war' between Indonesia and Britain (see **Bulletin** No. 48). Now that the 'war' has been resolved, they are looking for a US\$ 4000 m. contract for a cold steel rolling mill, part of a US\$ 2.5 bn. extension planned for the Krakatau Steel works at Cilegon (West Java). Others on the trip were Sir Jack Wellings, reported to be representing a group of 600 UK companies, A. H. J. Hoskins, Managing Director of Matthew Hall, and D. A. Holland, Managing Director of Balfour Beatty, whose interests in Indonesia were also reported in **Bulletin** No. 48.

Carrington himself was reported to have expressed particular interest in 'energy development'. (**FEER** 5.2.82) This may refer to the joint contract involving Rio Tinto Zinc, of which he was once Director, and British Petroleum for the exploration and development of coal on a 750,000 ha. concession in East Kalimantan (**FT** 16.7.81).

British business interests seem increasingly eager to supply the necessary technology of repression. On a pre-

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deep grudge against Suharto, and could take "unconventional measures" against him if redress is not speedily taken by legal means.

There is little doubt that this renewed interest in Suharto's role is related to attempts to forestall Suharto's re-election as President which will follow inevitably after the May elections. Sunardi himself has clearly taken great care to act on his own, basing himself solely on information to which he had access in the performance of his professional duties as the defence lawyer of both Latief and Sawito. Speaking as a lawyer, he has confined himself to demanding an investigation. Others would appear to be pursuing more political objectives. The two documents are apparently quite separate though it is obvious that Suharto will lump them both together. Sunardi, the one person to have exposed himself so daringly, is bound to be the first victim of any moves to suppress this latest challenge to Suharto's authority. But if people high up in the Army and

government are themselves backing this challenge, it may not prove so easy to do as it has been in the past.

It is not easy to predict where these latest challenges will lead. So far nothing has appeared in the press apart from a brief reference in the **Financial Times** (21 December 1981). Reports have been received that Sunardi is under interrogation, possibly under arrest.

It is not likely, without severe upheavals in the Army, that Suharto will ever be called to account. But as evidence continues to mount against him, the enormity of his crime will be understood most profoundly by the millions of people whose lives have been shattered since 1965 all in the name of "involvement" in the 30 September Movement.

Meanwhile, the Western governments who rallied to Suharto's support, ignoring the bloodshed that accompanied his takeover, will no doubt continue to trade and deal with a regime that came to power by means of acts of provocation hardly paralleled in modern history, not even by the Reichstag fire.

Carmel Budiardjo

Continued from opposite page

paratory visit prior to Carrington's, the Minister for Industry and Information Technology, Kenneth Baker, announced British Government hopes for increased sales of high technology goods and services in the fields of telecommunications, information technology and aerospace (as well as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals). For example, Logica, one of the UK's leading software houses, has recently won a contract worth £500,000 to supply software for satellite systems (*Indonesian Times* 16.1.82). This marks a substantial shift in emphasis away from the banking, insurance and management consultancy services that dominated the British presence in Jakarta during the 1970s.

"No Pressing Bilateral Issues"

Carrington admits that the British Government has virtually no political differences with the Indonesian military authorities. British-Indonesian relations had "never been better", he said. There are "no pressing bilateral issues". As reported in *Bulletin* No. 48, the 1980 "trade war" over Indonesian textile exports to the UK was successfully resolved, particularly in order to maintain the sale of Hawk jets.

BRITISH INVESTORS BENEFIT FROM LABOUR REPRESSION

Bechtel, the contractors in Balikpapan which, as we reported in *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 49, refused to pay agreed food allowances to their workers over a ten-month period from January 1981, is in fact the British company, Bechtel (Great Britain) which will benefit from the £125m. credit arranged by the UK Government.

As we reported in our last issue, 1,300 workers attempted to enter into negotiations last November, but their peaceful sit-in was broken up by an anti-riot squad from the East Kalimantan police command, (KODAK). After their forced return to work, the workers continued to be guarded by security guards in plain clothes (*Merdeka*, 28 November, 1981).

To push Indonesian exports, foreign suppliers are now required to purchase an equivalent value of non-gas or -oil products from Indonesia.

However, Indonesian Trade Minister, Radius Prawiro, was able to reassure Carrington that such export rulings will be implemented "smoothly and with intelligence" with provision for "exceptions" (*Tempo*, 6. February 1982). Such backing off is usual. The Indonesian Government can hardly maintain a hard line against the foreign investors it is desperately trying to attract. There has been a sudden worsening balance of payments problem, caused by a reduction in oil income (70 per cent of government revenue) and a drop in the export of other goods. Direct income from business interests is a necessary supplement to official "military budgets" to finance expenditure on arms as well as luxurious lifestyles.

BUDGET NEWS – THE POOR MAKE THE SACRIFICES

On 4 January 1982, the subsidies on eight types of oil, including kerosene which is used throughout Indonesia for cooking and lighting, were cut, causing domestic price rises of 60–66.7%. Reports from Java say that this has sent prices of other commodities rocketing. Then, from April subsidies on rice, flour and sugar are being reduced by 39.2% which will push prices up even further. The inflation rate for the coming year is generally predicted to rise to 20–30%.

Such dramatic increases in the price of essential goods follow on from a domestic oil price rise of 50% in May 1980 and the 33% devaluation of the rupiah in November 1978 (KENOP 15) and their respective inflationary effects. This means that the Indonesian people have faced four years of crippling price rises. For example, the price of a litre of kerosene has risen from Rp. 18 in 1978 to Rp. 60 in 1982.

Announcing the 1982-83 Budget, Suharto said: "Let us be willing to make sacrifices for the sake of development". But it is always interesting to see who exactly makes sacrifices. For example, while food subsidies are cut by Ro. 121.3 bn. and fuel subsidies by Rp. 587.1 bn., there is to be an **increase** in "communications and tourism development expenditure" of Rp. 288.1 bn.

As Susumu Awanohara in the *FEER* says, this new budget "is likely to have a regressive redistributive effect, hurting lower-income groups relatively more." In blunter words, the poor are to pay for increased expenditure in areas which do not benefit them. For those millions of Indonesians who could barely feed themselves and their children last year, we can only speculate how they will manage in the coming year. Between 30 and 50% of the country's 1981 population of 155 million live below the poverty line, depending on the measurement used. (*Financial Times Survey* 21/12/81). Civil servants, comparatively well-off by Indonesian standards, have been told that their salaries will definitely not be raised. Industrial workers who demand wage rises to keep pace with inflation will no doubt continue to face the sack or military violence. (See this issue, page 16)

Quoting Awanohara again, "... the 1982-83 budget will be remembered not only for its substantial cuts but for its comprehensive statement of Suharto's development philosophy". To this we may add "the World Bank's philosophy", for it is on the Bank's advice that these major price hikes have been ordered. That Suharto can bring in such a series of unpopular measures at this time indicates his confidence at being able to 'manage' the forthcoming elections. *FEER* 15.1.82, *Tempo* 9.1.82, 16.1.82, *FT* 21.12.81

Over-Reaction

In Surabaya the sudden formation of long queues at the petrol stations after the announcement of imminent petrol price rises unnerved the authorities, and a fully-armed unit was sent in to 'guard the peace'. (*Tempo* 9.1.82)

WORKERS UNDER ATTACK

The Head of the All Indonesia Contractors' Labour Union (PBKSI), S. M. Pardede, has confirmed that the picture for contractors' workers is "very gloomy and without future". In any disagreement between workers and employers, he said, the workers always lose because they are unable to get support from the labour laws, and no government department or other social organisation is willing to aid them. Most are employed without security, as casual, daily or seasonal workers. They live in barracks and many are only paid Rp. 500/day net. They live below any decent standard of living, he added, but, because of unemployment, they are forced to accept whatever conditions there are. (Merdeka 22.12.81)

In the words of the Head of the Legal Aid Team of the All Indonesia Labour Federation (FBSI), Azhar Achmad, the abuse of human rights in labour affairs in Indonesia today has reached "the most disturbing levels, more so than in any other field". In an interview with the newspaper *Merdeka* on "Human Rights Day", he called for the intervention of the Government since the widespread prevention of workers from forming their own organisations constitutes an abuse of workers' human rights. He said that workers who try in any way to improve their fate are given the sack; they have effectively lost their voice. He estimated that only 10-25% of workers enjoy respect for their rights, adding that young women workers suffer the most, especially domestic servants, 'hostesses' and masseuses. (Merdeka 14.12.81)

About 1000 women workers from massage parlours, 'steam-baths' and brothels in the centre of Jakarta have recently been taking action against the closure of their workplaces ordered by the Vice-Governor of the city in an attempt to 'clean-up' the city centre before the elections. In one case, having worked through the night to produce banners, pamphlets and a document for the Regional People's Assembly (DPRD), their action only lasted one hour before the police were sent in to break it up. The women are protesting that without employment they will be unable to feed their children, but one employer, from PT Metropolitan which manages the Shinta massage parlour, referred to the workers' actions as "hysterical" and "very emotional".

Meanwhile, workers of all kinds find their only 'trade union', the FBSI, unable or unwilling to represent their interests properly. The Head of the Army's Security and Order Command (KOPKANTIB), Sudomo, continues to regard the FBSI as a useful puppet organisation. At a meeting of the National Council of the FBSI in December, he urged it to cooperate with the Chamber of Commerce (KADIN) to "overcome" conflicts between workers and employers. It should provide cadres with "integrity" who are "capable of guaranteeing the continued existence of enterprises" as well as attending to the welfare of workers. (Angkatan Bersenjata 18.12.81)

In what may well turn out as yet another attempt to curb workers' rights, the Director General for the Care and Protection of Manpower, Utoyo Usman, has called for the total overhaul of Law No. 21 1954. This law deals with

collective bargaining agreements and is, he says, incompatible with Pancasila labour relations. (Merdeka 15.12.81)

MORE ON KOPKAMTIB'S ANTI-STRIKE POWERS

In TAPOL Bulletin No. 48, November 1981, (page 2) a KOPKAMTIB Instruction was published. The Instruction orders local military commands to intervene directly in labour disputes "in accordance with existing powers and guided by Presidential Decree No. 7, 1963".

In response to a request to readers for information about this 1963 decree, a copy has been sent to TAPOL by INDOC, Holland.

Decree No. 7, 1963 imposes a penalty of up to one year's imprisonment for anyone

"implementing or taking part in strikes or lock-outs." (Article 2)

"Strikes" are defined as follows:

"... deliberately ignoring or refusing to carry out work or, even though there is an official order, being reluctant to, or slow to implement work that must be performed because of one's official position." (Article 1)

The decree also extends the penalty to anyone

"who provides opportunity for, provokes, calls on, suggests, instigates, encourages, instructs or forces (others to) carry out strikes..." (Article 3)

The decree is related to "vital enterprises" and three lists of these enterprises are given in a subsequent Presidential Decision No. 123, 1963. By not referring to these lists, KOPKAMTIB's Instruction apparently extends its powers of direct intervention to *all* enterprises.

The KOPKAMTIB Instruction clearly provides Army commanders with formal powers to ban strikes, although such a ban has no basis in Indonesian law.

(Editor's Note: We are grateful to INDOC for providing the Decree, to complete our analysis of KOPKAMTIB's strike-breaking powers.)



ACHEHNESE PRISONERS TORTURED

The following report received from Acehneese refugees in Sweden describes the tortures inflicted by the Indonesian army on Mohammad Sjarif Usman, a student (20), who was granted asylum in Sweden in October 1981.

Mohammad Sjarif Usman was arrested by troops of the KODAM I Division, in Medan, on September 14, 1978, without any formal charges except being found in the company of the leader of the National Liberation Front of Aceh—Sumatra, a relative of his who happened to be visiting the house where he was staying in Medan.

Three other persons were arrested at the same time, in the same house: *Tengku Djuned*, the host; *Tengku Muhammad Usman Lampoh Awe*, a leader of the NLF who was visiting Medan at the time; and *Sjeh Abdullah Hamzah*, an uncle of Mohammad Sjarif Usman. They were arrested by *Kopasandha* (para-commando) troops, well-known for their brutality. The most brutal among the captors was an officer named Budiman Glumpang Minjeuk. Mohammad Sjarif Usman, Sjeh Abdullah Hamzah and Tengku Djuned were taken to the notorious jail in Jalan Gandhi Medan. Tengku Muhammad Usman Lampoh Awe, and another man, Fauzi, were taken to Lueng Putu army barracks, some 500 miles west of Medan, also famous as a torture camp.

After arriving at Jalan Gandhi Jail, Mohammad Sjarif Usman saw Indonesian troops beat and kick his uncle, Sjeh Abdullah Hamzah, until his ribs were broken. After the beating, Hamzah was not allowed to eat anything for a week. The man responsible for Hamzah's torture was Sergeant-Major Ulillem Kutatjane.

Mohammad Sjarif Usman was put in a small cell with a bare cement floor, and no ventilation. All his belongings, his gold ring, his gold bracelet, and his Honda motorcycle, were confiscated by the troops. For the next two days, he was questioned without being tortured. On September 17, 1978, he was taken from his cell and brought to the torture chamber, where he was ordered to undress. His pants, shoes, shirt and underwear were all taken and he was left naked in the cell. Then soldiers came and began to beat, kick and assault him. His back was lashed with army belts. He was kicked with army boots, rolling from one end of the cell to the other. Some grabbed his hair to hold him back while others beat him about the stomach and chest. Mohammad Sjarif Usman still suffers from chest and back pains.

The soldier most responsible for his torture was Sergeant Undang who, when tired, turned him over to another soldier, Djalil Pungut. This man then beat and kicked him until he lost consciousness. After regaining consciousness, Mohammad Sjarif Usman was delivered to two other soldiers whose names were Sitepu and Nasrun. Both of them struck him in the face and nose until blood covered his body. His teeth were broken and loosened and are still in bad shape.

The next day he was delivered to another soldier by the name of Penan Purba, who immediately began to beat and kick him. He was returned to his first torturer, Undang, on the following day. Undang practised his karate blows on him without mercy.

The next day Mohammad Sjarif Usman was given to

three soldiers who proceeded to torture him relentlessly. They also threatened to take him to the forest and shoot him. This continuous torture lasted for 3 months, during which time he was given only two meals a day consisting of a little rice with a small piece of mouldy salted fish mixed with dirty vegetables and grass.

Three months later he was transferred to Sukamulia Prison on Palang Merah Street in Medan where he lived for 3 months on rice and corn with small pieces of rotten, salted fish. During this time he was not interrogated.


From Sukamulia jail he was brought before TEPERDA (*Team Pemeriksa Daerah* or provincial interrogation team) where he was not questioned but ordered to pay money! The TEPERDA officers told him that he and his two relatives, Sjeh Abdullah Hamzah and Tengku Djuned, must each pay Rp. 175,000 for their release.

Because of his sufferings Mohammad Sjarif Usman asked his mother to find the money. She sold everything she had and borrowed money but was able to raise only Rp. 125,000. The other two also raised the money demanded and finally gave it to Selamat. Six months later, Mohammad Sjarif Usman was released without further formalities while Tengku Djuned and Sjeh Abdullah Hamzah were transferred to Bandar Aceh jail where they are still imprisoned.

As a result of his continuous torture, Mohammad Sjarif Usman is still suffering from stomach ulcers (*Ulcus Pepticum*), extreme pain in his spinal cord and shoulder blades, and ruined teeth. Just before his escape he received news that Javanese soldiers had come to his village to arrest him again, making it impossible for him to return home. The soldiers had left a message telling him to surrender, and said that if he did not surrender, they would kill him when they next found him.

THE WATER ROOM

Accompanying the report of Mohammad Sjarif Usman's torture, is a description of a horrifying room in Jalan Gandhi Prison, Medan. It is a secret, underground room, 10m x 10m x 20m, and filled with water about 1½m deep. Prisoners are forced through a small hole 1m x 1m, the only way into the room, and made to stand in the water where rats, leeches,



lizards and larvae swim around. Most of the prisoners placed there either die or suffer mental disorders. It is little wonder Jalan Gandhi has gained the reputation of being one of the most barbaric jails, well-known for the torture of prisoners.

WHITLAM ATTACKS BISHOP OF DILI

In the wake of critical reports and editorial comments during December and January in the Australian press about the situation in East Timor, the Indonesian Government made hasty arrangements, which were kept secret till the last moment, for Gough Whitlam, former Australian Prime Minister to visit East Timor. He was accompanied by Peter Hastings, Foreign Editor of the **Sydney Morning Herald**.

The visit was said to have been organised in order to obtain an "independent assessment" of conditions in East Timor (source: **The Herald**, Melbourne, 3 March 1982). It is hard to think of any politician outside Indonesia less "independent" on East Timor than Gough Whitlam. It was he who, as Australian Prime Minister, told Suharto in September 1975, during official talks in Jogjakarta, that he considered it "desirable" for East Timor to be integrated into Indonesia (**The Age**, Melbourne, 4 March 1982). Out of office since December 1975, Whitlam has consistently defended Indonesia's annexation of East Timor, and has let no opportunity pass to claim publicly that all resistance to Indonesian occupation is now at an end.

The visit was described as being "private", despite the fact that the invitation came from, and the itinerary was arranged by, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, headed by General Ali Murtopo, Indonesia's Minister of Information (see page 22). The CSIS also arranged a visit to East Timor in November 1981 by a dozen or so pro-Indonesian academics from the USA and Britain.

From the lengthy reports by Peter Hastings it is clear

that the main purpose of the visit was to discredit Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopez, the Apostolic Administrator of Dili and to disprove his letter that a threat of famine existed in East Timor (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 49, January 1982, page 1).

Bishop described as "wicked" and "mischievous"

Two comments made by the Indonesian-sponsored visitors best show how this was the main purpose of their trip. In a press conference in Jakarta after his return, Whitlam said, of the letter: "I cannot understand why he perpetrated this wicked act and sent this cruel letter. (Age, 6 March 1982.)

As for Hastings, in an article entitled "Priest's Tale of Woe Could Cost East Timor Aid" (Age, 8 March 1982) he sets out to prove that if the Indonesian Government now refuses aid from Australia out of pique because of unfavourable publicity over the bishop's letter, it will be the bishop's fault. He actually describes the offending letter as "inaccurate and mischievous" because he says, the bishop knew 1,000 tonnes of Australian corn was on the way to East Timor and that the International Red Cross "disagreed with him" about his predictions of famine.

Hastings could equally have said that he (the bishop) disagreed with the Red Cross. Hastings chooses however to accept the credibility of outsiders, not of the man who dared to say something that he must have known would bring the wrath of the Indonesian Government on his head and place the Catholic Church in East Timor at great risk.

HASTINGS ADMITS: HUNDREDS OF PRISONERS DYING ON ATAURO ISLAND

Campaign to Discredit East Timor Catholic Leader Backfires

Peter Hastings, the pro-integration Australian journalist who visited East Timor in March, together with Gough Whitlam the Australian Labour Party politician, admits in an article about his trip (Age, 6 March 1982) that hundreds of Fretilin prisoners have been dying on Atauro, an island twenty miles north of Dili, now being used for political prisoners.

The admission comes in the midst of a lengthy attempt to discredit a statement made last November by Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopez, the Apostolic Administrator in Dili that famine could occur in East Timor.

Hastings first casts doubt on Monsignor da Costa Lopez' statement about deaths on Atauro by stressing that the Monsignor had not visited Atauro Island which is "already visible from his window" but fails to explain why he had not done so. (Could it not have been because the Indonesian authorities would not allow him to do so?)

Hastings' own evaluation about the cause of numerous deaths on Atauro reads as follows:

There was a core of truth in his statement about hundreds

dying on Atauro as we found out the next day, but not for the reasons he implied.

Starting in the middle of last year the Indonesian army started bringing in families from the Los Palos area in eastern Timor who had relatives among hard core Fretilin fighters and supporters in the hills. As kinsmen, Fretilin guerrillas could exact food and supplies from them.

The theory is simple enough. Clan and tribal lines are as tightly drawn in East Timor as in Melanesia. Relatives of Fretilin fighters would have to help them if requested. Those not related to them would not.

In all 806 families comprising 3,737 people were brought to Atauro after the military operations in eastern Timor in June, July and August. Families are now being sent back.

Many hundreds did die on Atauro because of severe gastroenteritis. According to Dr. Willy of the Red Cross, previous malnutrition had so lowered resistance, especially in the close confinement of huts, that many were susceptible to disease. This was a very different story from that of the bishop.

When we visited the island with the Red Cross we found that the Government had erected avenues of houses, provided garden plots, running water, seed, medical supplies and first aid posts which the Red Cross had regularly monitored.

"A very different story from that of the bishop" says Hastings, but he fails to mention what the bishop's "story" is, even though he says that he taped the 2-hour interview with him.

The ICRC's own evaluation is in itself horrifying enough. "... previous malnutrition" which had "so lowered resistance ... that many were susceptible to disease."

Why must we accept the vision of "avenues of houses . . . garden plots . . . and first aid posts" which the Red Cross "had regularly monitored" without hearing what the bishop and, incidentally the prisoners themselves, had to say? The Red Cross, prestigious and western, is presented as the objective source. The bishop, "a mixed-race man . . . affable if nervous . . . and quite open in his condemnation of the Indonesians" according to Hastings, is not even worth quoting.

The bishop's statements about famine and atrocities, too, were dismissed out of hand by Hastings because he, the bishop, had not himself visited the places he spoke about himself but "relied on his priests for information". Again Whitlam, Hastings, Red Cross and Catholic Relief Services officials who visited these places must be believed, not priests who live there constantly and who must have by far the best opportunity to monitor conditions regularly. But Hastings apparently made no attempt to interview these priests, or if he did, he is silent about what they said. Yet he himself admits later, in the very same article, that they "remain the conscience of the whole people". He may have discovered that they were as open in their condemnation of the Indonesians as the bishop, and therefore not to be considered suitably quotable sources in this "independent assessment" of the situation.

LECTURER BANNED FROM UNIVERSITY

Juwono Sudarsono, a lecturer in international relations at the Social Sciences Faculty of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta, has been indefinitely banned from lecturing.

The ban was issued by Daud Joesoef, Minister of Education and Culture, not by the University's recently-appointed Rector, Professor Nugroho Notosusanto. The ban made no attempt to explain the reason for this measure. The Rector only said that, had it been because of academic incompetence, he would have been the one to act.

After making a number of enquiries, Juwono eventually discovered that he was being accused of saying, during a discussion at a closed meeting in the Atma Jaya University, Jakarta, that "Suharto's government is getting more and more rotten every day and I will work actively from within to hasten this process".

In actual fact, as can be proven from the transcript of tapes made during the discussion, Juwono said no such thing. He did indeed talk about conditions under which a government might fall, but he was quoting Nixon, in his book *The Real War*. Nixon quotes a statement by Lenin that a government that has turned rotten does not need to be overthrown by a communist movement. "Such a government will fall of its own accord, because of its own internal contradictions." (Source: *Tempo*, 30 January 1982)

NEW U.I. RECTOR OPPOSED BY STUDENTS

"Don't Dirty Our Campus With Jack-Boots" is the slogan that greeted Professor Nugroho Notosusanto, the newly-appointed Rector of the University of Indonesia, Jakarta when he arrived at the University to address a meeting of students soon after his appointment had been announced.

Professor Nugroho is the chief historian of the Armed Forces (ABRI) and will retain his position as Head of the

LATE NEWS

E. Timor Assembly Members Signed Forged Document?

In another article (SMH, 12.3.1982), Hastings accused the E. Timor Assembly members who signed the June 1981 Report to Suharto criticising Indonesian occupation forces of signing "a forgery". He and Whitlam had "a lengthy interview" with the two signatories, Mr. Isaac and Mr. Soares who, he says, told them "they signed the covering letter without knowing its purport or the contents of its enclosures".

What he fails to report is that the two men had been in detention for six weeks and, whether he realised it, were still under restrictions. They could hardly have been meeting Whitlam as free agents and knew perfectly well what would happen to them if they stood by the Report. While discrediting the two Timorese, he nevertheless adds that "the accusations in the document are probably true. Certainly some of them are."

To claim, under such circumstances, that they signed a document without knowing the contents is a blatant example of journalism in the service of Indonesian interests.

ABRI History Centre to which he was appointed in 1964. He has also presided over a special committee set up some years ago to standardise school text-books in history, civics and social services and bring them into line with the State ideology, Panca Sila.

The students greeted their new Rector with a number of demands including the freedom to express opinions and the freedom to organise, and called for the appointment of teaching staff who understood the students' aspirations.

The meeting addressed by the Rector was held on 23 January, two days before the commencement of the new term. Had it been held later, there would have been far more students present, and the opposition to his appointment would certainly have been even more vociferously expressed. (Source: *Tempo* 23 January 1982)

"DISRESPECTFUL" STUDENTS SUSPENDED

Three students at the Pedagogy Institute in Jogjakarta have been suspended for two semesters for failing to show respect for President Suharto. This act of *lese majeste* occurred when the three men failed to stand up as the President entered the hall where students were gathered to listen to an address by him.

Their act of defiance was described by the Rector as "unbefitting students who are training to become teachers".

Students Protest

Students at the Institute have strongly protested against the suspensions and demanded the re-instatement of their three colleagues. "If this statement fails to evoke a response . . . and undesirable excesses occur, this will not be the responsibility of the Student Senate."

The Rector admitted there was no rule requiring people to stand up when the President entered. It was simply a matter of etiquette, he said.

(Source: *Tempo*, 23 January 1982)

SIAUW GIOK TJHAN'S BOOK BANNED

Siauww Giok Tjhan's book, *Limia Jaman* (Five Periods), was banned throughout Indonesia on January 20th 1982 by the Attorney General. The book, which is mainly about the integration of the Chinese minority into the Indonesian community, was published in Holland last year, shortly before the author died. (See **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 48 p. 11.) Several Indonesian periodicals had given the book favourable reviews.

Siauww was a leading activist in the struggle for independence from the Dutch, and was a member of parliament during the Sukarno era. He spent 13 years in detention after Suharto seized power in the 1965 coup. After his release he continued to be concerned with human rights in Indonesia and the position of the Chinese community.

In the banning order, the Attorney General, Ismail Saleh, who also recently banned the books of Parmoedya Ananta Toer, gave the reason as Siauww's "personal interpretation" of the 1948 Madiun affair and the 1965 coup. Saleh states that the book sought to incite ex-political prisoners of the G30S movement and ex-members of Siauww's own banned organisation, BAPERKI (Consultative Association on Indonesian Citizenship).

The Attorney General ordered that anyone who is in possession of the book, whether for ownership, sale or distribution, should hand over the copies to the Public Prosecutor's Office.

(Source: **Sinar Harapan** 22/1/82)

LURAH DISMISSED BECAUSE OF "OTs" AMONG VOTERS

A village head (*lurah*) in the district of Cianjur, West Java has been dismissed because there were 32 "OT" persons (persons regarded as being ex-G30S/PKI)* on the electoral roll of the village when he was elected.


Whether or not these persons voted for him, or indeed whether they took part in the election which was held in January 1979, seems to be beside the point.

The moves to dismiss the *lurah*, Dadang Rukmana, started about a year after his election. Vigorous attempts were made by the villagers to oppose his dismissal, and delegations were sent to various state bodies right up to Parliament in Jakarta. It was only recently, after Dadang had been summoned to transfer his post to the man appointed to succeed him, that the reason for his dismissal, namely the inclusion of "OT" people on the electoral roll, was made clear.

(Source: **Tempo**, 27 February 1982)

*OT stands for **Organisasi Terlarang** (prohibited organisation). It is now the designation being used in place of ET (ex-tapol). For an explanation of the origin of "OT", see **TAPOL Bulletin**, No 49, January 1982, p. 8 and p. 2, (editorial comment).

Note: Democratically-elected *lurahs* are rapidly becoming a thing of the past, and are now being replaced by people appointed from above. The removal of this particular *lurah* may in addition be intended to intimidate or "punish" a village for having too many "ex-G30S/PKI elements" in its population.



The *Golongan Putih* (White Group) anti-election symbol on display during the 1971 general election campaign. *Golput* was a movement urging people to pierce the blank part of the voting slip, in protest against the elections.

Many groups are currently declaring their intentions not to vote at all. Although they represent a variety of views and differ in their ways of expressing opposition, they are being referred to collectively as *Golput*.

THE GENERAL ELECTION: CHOSEN BEFORE BEING ELECTED

Hendrik Amahorseja

In May this year, those Indonesians who are entitled to vote under present Indonesian law will elect their representatives to the Peoples' Consultative Assembly (MPR) and the House of Representatives (DPR). The new MPR, some of whose members are elected and some appointed, will choose a President for the 1983-1988 term of office. The President will then choose a Vice-President.

Under the Indonesian system as regulated by General Suharto's regime, there are three political parties, the PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), the PPP (United Development Party), and GOLKAR (Functional Groups). These parties play a significant role in keeping the Suharto government in power.

Although the names and symbols of these three parties are very different from each other, the political ideology regulating the direction and nature of their activities is the same; the 1945 Constitution (UUD45) and the State Ideology (Pancasila). The similarity of their basic principles means that the members of the new MPR and DPR could in fact be appointed by the traditional Indonesian method of negotiation and discussion rather than going through the formality of a so-called general election. But since a general election is regarded as the way of showing that democracy exists in a society, the Suharto regime insists on holding elections in order to demonstrate that democracy is alive and well in Indonesia.

Beneath the Garuda bird on the sacred Indonesian national emblem are written the words *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika* which mean "Unity in Diversity". This motto is no guarantee that people who are entitled to vote automatically have equal rights to stand for election. Paragraph 6 of the Constitution states: "The President shall be a native (*asli*) Indonesian."^{*}

It is not necessary to summon Hitler from his grave or to invite the pro-apartheid South African Government to tell us about racial discrimination. It is a legal fact that racism holds a position of great honour in the Indonesian state.

Referring to the forthcoming election, General Suharto speaking as Head of State, categorically stated in his presidential address on 17 August 1981 that although the Armed Forces (ABRI) would not take part in the elections, they would be given a third of the seats in the MPR, and 100 of the 460 seats in the DPR. According to Suharto, ABRI's role in these bodies is as "stabiliser" and "dynamiser" in implementation of their legislative task and to control the primary functions of Parliament for the "smooth and proper" enactment of laws.¹

According to Jakarta press reports GOLKAR is expected to win 80 per cent of the votes.² GOLKAR has also proposed that General Suharto should serve another term of office as president for the period of 1983-1988. On the matter of Vice-President, the leader of GOLKAR, Amir Murtono said: "The Vice-President must be able to sleep

on the same pillow as the President."³ One Moslem group, Pembina Iman Tantrid Islam, has suggested that the MPR should appoint Mrs Tien Suharto as Vice-President.⁴

GOLKAR's proposal that Suharto should be President has received strong support. Those in power, that is to say his close associates in Jakarta as well as overseas, support his efforts to implement the *Five Year "Impoverishment" Plan (PELITA)*.⁵ All that has been achieved with this plan is that 51 per cent of the Indonesian population live below the poverty line.

In international circles he is supported in particular by the member states of the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia). Thanks to General Suharto's authority, Japan had invested US \$34,490,000,000 in Indonesia by 1980.⁶ The main source of Indonesia's revenue is oil and natural gas. Of the 16 companies extracting oil and gas in Indonesia, 11 are US-owned. Not long ago, the US Vice-President George Bush said in Manila that US policies preferred "authoritarian" to "totalitarian" governments, after a somewhat cynical remark about "loving your democratic processes".⁷ This is not surprising since the USA intends to increase military aid to Indonesia and other ASEAN countries.⁸

Neither is it strange that there is general agreement that Suharto will continue as Head of State for a fourth term (1982-1988) since one-third of the seats in the MPR are occupied by ABRI and the remainder monopolised by GOLKAR, the largest political party.

Although the positions of Suharto and the members of the MPR and DPR have already been determined in advance of the election farce on 4th May, it should be understood that if something happens suddenly and someone else is crowned instead of Suharto, a change of personnel without a change in the social, political and economic system is no guarantee that the Indonesian people will be any better off, particularly the 51 per cent who live below the poverty level. Poverty, oppression, exploitation of natural resources, and racial discrimination will continue. Basic human rights in Indonesia can only be fully realised in everyday life by striving for them by other means than the farce of a general election.

Footnotes

1. *Angkatan Bersenjata*

Footnotes

1. *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 18 August, 1981.
2. *Tempo*, 27 July, 1981.
3. *Merdeka*, 2 November, 1981.
4. *Tempo*, 14 November, 1981.
5. *Merdeka*, 12 November, 1981.
6. *Kompas*, 15 August, 1981.
7. *Financial Times*, 8 February, 1982, Section III.
8. Statement of Ambassador John H. Holdridge, Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 July, 1981 (*Hearings on US-Asian Issues*). See also *Kompas*, 6 November, 1981.

*That is, not a member of an ethnic minority such as the Chinese.

A PROFILE OF ALI MURTOPO (1924—)

The Minister for Information is one of Suharto's oldest and closest associates. Through his policies and practices, Ali has become the most ruthless and influential figure in determining the shape and methods of the Suharto regime. The following account covers some aspects of Ali's career.

Military: Ali Murtopo fought against the Dutch. Towards the end of the Japanese occupation he joined the Japanese-sponsored *Hisbullah*. Following the defeat of the Japanese he joined the Indonesian regular army. In 1952 Ali became a company commander in the Diponegoro (Suharto's) Central Java command, leading the elite *Banteng Raiders*. It was at this time that his close association with Suharto began. In 1957 he was director of Diponegoro's "political affairs" branch, the beginning of a long career in "intelligence". In 1960 Ali joined Suharto in Jakarta, when Suharto was deputy chief-of-staff at army headquarters. Ali's intelligence work intensified in 1962 when he commanded a "combat-intelligence" unit, working on Sukarno's West Irian campaign from Dobo Island. This unit was the beginning of Ali's major power base for many years — OPSUS (Special Operations). Ali's work on West Irian did not end there. In 1969 Ali, through OPSUS, supervised the travesty of the "Act of Free Choice", following which West Irian was incorporated into Indonesia against the wishes of West Papuans.

Intelligence: In 1963 Ali joined Suharto in KOSTRAD (the elite Strategic Command). From this base he consolidated OPSUS with a "defensive and active (policy) directed towards securing and protecting the national efforts by eliminating all kinds of threats, challenges and obstacles." From OPSUS, Ali gathered around himself a group of Chinese intellectuals and financiers, in particular a powerful Catholic group, including Liem Bian Kie (Jusuf Wanandi), Liem Bian Koen and Harry Tjan.

OPSUS was lavishly funded by 'State' enterprises, including the oil company, Pertamina, and forestry concessions in Kalimantan. In 1976 Ali's network was hard hit by the collapse of the Pertamina empire some months earlier. However, shortly afterwards Ali managed to place his man, Brigadier-General Abdurachman Ramly, as head of the large 'State' tin enterprise PT Timah. Later when OPSUS was formally dissolved its vast business empire remained intact.

After 1968 OPSUS was particularly concerned with Suharto's 'security'-related operations, for example, keeping an eye on party activities, and on workers. In 1970-71 Ali successfully used OPSUS to break up party politics and replace this with Suharto's election vehicle GOLKAR. In 1971 Ali's "floating mass" doctrine which banned political activities at village level was announced by Brigadier-General Widodo.


During the late 1960s Ali used his OPSUS network to support the US in Indochina. In October 1969 an OPSUS-backed resolution in Parliament called for recognition of Saigon. Ali strongly supported the Lon Nol coup in Cambodia. Meanwhile Ali's emissaries fostered American contacts in 'trade' missions to Saigon. Ali's other domestic intelligence operations also included CSIS (Centre for Strategic and International Studies) and BAKIN (Central Intelligence Body).

Smuggling: Before the 1965 Coup, OPSUS operations were funded by a large smuggling operation, under cover of

'intelligence'. Rubber and other commodities were smuggled across the Straits of Malacca, and Ali was widely known as Indonesia's biggest smuggling operator.

Sabotage: In 1964, OPSUS, headed by Ali, subverted Sukarno's nationalist Confrontation with Malaysia. Ali was smuggled into Malaysia in September-October 1964 for secret negotiations with senior British and Malaysian officials.

Coup-making: Ali's activities immediately after the 1965 Coup were crucial to the installation of Suharto. He supplied army intelligence and backing in organizing large demonstrations of anti-Sukarno students. When the student organization KAMI was disbanded by Sukarno in February 1966, the students used OPSUS as the base for organizing its demonstrations. Ali also visited pro-western Asian countries to arrange funding for the new regime. His contacts in Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong and with domestic financiers have provided the major financial support to the Suharto regime. On his return from fund-raising Ali was busy in Central Java supervising the hounding and 'purging' of pro-Sukarno members of the army. From February 1966, Ali was foremost in urging Suharto to dislodge Sukarno.



Provocation: By 1973 Ali's pro-Japanese stance had led to conflict between different Indonesian factions. His main challenge was from General Sumitro, then Commander of KOPKAMTIB. Rivalry reached its peak during the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in mid-January 1974. During large-scale rioting, 11 people were killed and there was widespread damage. It later emerged that the riots had been provoked by Ali in a successful attempt to discredit and unseat Sumitro. Following the riots Sumitro was dismissed from his command of KOPKAMTIB and 'resigned' as deputy commander of the Armed Forces. In trials which followed the riots, Ali also attempted to discredit the pro-American "technocrats", who opposed his pro-Japanese endeavours. In this he was partially successful. Meanwhile he kept his OPSUS, BAKIN and GOLKAR networks, preserving intact his considerable power base. His old smuggling colleague Admiral Sudomo became head of KOPKAMTIB.

PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME OR PROTECTION RACKET?

A new "security corps", run as a private company, is being set up in Indonesia. The corps which has been given the attractive-sounding Sanskrit name *Baladhika Karya* (Troops of Service), is the recreation of a corps set up in 1963 by SOKSI, the *Karyawan* organisation, the predecessor of GOLKAR (Functional Groups), the Army-backed party.

The chief promoter of this corps is General Suhardiman, formerly chairman of SOKSI. He announced that Major-General Acub Zaenal is to become commander. (Major-General Zaenal has served both as military commander and governor of West Irian. He was removed as Governor two years ago amid reports of his involvement in high-level corruption.)

The corps will be composed of retired soldiers, ex-convicts and members of street-gangs or school drop-outs. (Street-gang youths known in Central Java as *gali-gali*, were very active during the anti-Chinese street violence that erupted in Central Java in November 1980).

Suhardiman said in December that plans to train recruits for this security company would commence in January this year. It is intended to have one thousand "core" members and five thousand "activists" in each province. If these plans are implemented in all 27 provinces, the corps will have a total membership of 162,000.

Reporting the establishment of this corps, *Tempo* (2 January 1982) said some people feared this "security" corps would develop into an organised mafia. "That must not be allowed to happen" responded Suhardiman. 60 per cent of the company's shares would be held by SOKSI, he said, adding, in an attempt to reassure critics: "SOKSI is hardly likely to wage rebellion." As further reassurance of the "responsible" attitude this corps would adopt, Suhardiman said that the Chief-of-Police would be asked to become its Patron, while Co-ordinating Minister, General Surono and Inspector-General for Development, Major-General Sudjomo Humardani would be its advisors.

Continued from opposite page

Annexation: Apart from his role in the annexation of West Papua, Ali was also the 'mastermind' behind the violent and bloody annexation of East Timor. His campaign began as early as May 1974, one month after the overthrow of the Caetano government in Lisbon, with a recommendation in parliament that East Timor "return" to Indonesian control. Later, his full-fledged Operation Komodo included infiltration, propaganda and psychological warfare in East Timor, leading to the civil war in August 1975. Ali's emissaries were sent all over the world, to confer with the US, Australia and Portugal, and to make clear Indonesia's intention to annex the former Portuguese colony. Regular border incursions by Indonesian troops began in September 1975. On December 7th 1975 a full-scale invasion by Indonesian troops saw the end of Operation Komodo, and the beginning of the campaign of mass murder which has led to the deaths of up to 200,000 East Timorese.

Propaganda: Through his intelligence activities Ali was in a strong position to manipulate the Indonesian press from the inception of the Suharto regime. In 1971 Ali gained control of the PWI (Indonesian Journalists' Association) through rigged elections. From here he imposed his brand of 'consensual' journalism. Immediately afterwards two new dailies

One of the main tasks of *Baladhika Karya* will be to provide well-trained and highly-disciplined "security" guards to protect businesses, shops, banks and hotels against crime which is said to be on the increase in many parts of the country.

Although Suhardiman has announced that "BK" recruits will be trained at Police training centres, the Chief-of-Police, Police General Awaloedin sounded somewhat less enthusiastic about this new security venture. "Things are pretty bad", he said, "if we expect ex-convicts to guard jewellery shops."

Whether or not formal approval from the Police and the government has been granted, it seems that the first training course for 100 "BK" recruits already took place in Jakarta in January.

KOPKAMTIB to Arm Local Government Officers

Not to be outdone by this private initiative on the "security" front, Admiral Sudomo, Commander of KOPKAMTIB announced a week later (*Tempo*, 9 January 1982) that local government officers in charge of kampung administration (RT/RW) in Jakarta would soon be armed, as a measure to fight crime. There were also plans to arm members of Hansip, the Civil Guard.

In an effort to reassure the public, Sudomo said that arms would be issued indiscriminately but only to those RT/RW officers already trained in the use of weapons, namely retired or non-active soldiers.

There was a sharp increase in the level of crime in Jakarta in 1981 despite the Clean-Sweep Operation (*Operasi Sapu Jagat*) launched a year ago (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 41/42, September-November 1981). In fact, as some critics of the new plans have pointed out, one of the objectives of *Operasi Sapu Jagat* was to reduce the number of weapons being held in the community; now, KOPKAMTIB is doing precisely the reverse.

emerged, GOLKAR's *Suara Karya* and OPSUS' *Berita Yudha*, both directly under the control of Ali Murtopo. Later as Minister of Information Ali's control was extended with the power to ban any newspaper or article which does not adhere to Ali's line on any subject.

Now, apparently in ill-health, Ali is not as prominent as before. However the effects of his influence remain unimpaired, and several of his younger and fitter associates still diligently carry out his policies.

In the current battle to be chosen as Indonesia's Vice-President to serve during Suharto's next 5-year term (1983-1988), Ali Murtopo is reportedly fighting hard to force Suharto to keep a pledge made long ago to select Ali as his successor. (The battle for the position of Vice-President has assumed significance because the opinion is gaining ground among Suharto's supporters that Suharto may not complete his next term.) One of his first moves to win this position was to propose that Suharto be named "Father of Development", a proposal that has predictably been supported by numerous groups and individuals.

Ali Murtopo has left a very deep mark on Indonesian politics and society—to say nothing of West Papua and East Timor.

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Eliezer Bonay Interview, Part III

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