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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No 49

January 1982

EAST TIMOR SITUATION TRAGIC

There is growing evidence that the situation in Indonesian-occupied East Timor worsened considerably during 1981. Following the withdrawal of the International Red Cross (ICRC) and the Catholic Relief Service (CRS) in April 1981, reports reaching the outside world from church sources and in letters smuggled out to relatives abroad, speak consistently of the mass conscription of men of all ages to participate in the Indonesian Army's renewed offensive aimed at ending all resistance to its rule. The reports also speak of widespread arrests and warn that a new famine may be imminent. Careful study of the few reports that appear in the Indonesian Press about Timor also provides evidence to support this picture.

Despite all attempts by the Indonesian authorities to convince world opinion that all resistance has ceased and

“... the social and political situation in East Timor is indeed tragic. With military operations of cleaning Fretilin during July, August and September 1981, many Timorese people were killed including innocent children, pregnant women and defenceless people, without any crime except the desire to be independent of all oppression. Therefore the Catholic Church, running all risks, had to denounce to the world the atrocities committed during four days of siege near the famous rock of St. Anthony in Lacluta where more than 500 Timorese were killed...”

“... the support we need very much ... is money (for) food, rice and corn for the survival of the people ... in the case of the expected famine ...”

Monsignor Martinho da Costa Lopes, Apostolic Administrator in East Timor, in a message to Australian Catholic Relief.

that economic development is progressing well, it is clear that hatred for the occupying forces is growing, that resistance is widespread and that human rights abuses are being committed on a vast scale.

Conscripts Used 'Like African Beaters for White Hunters'

More details are now available about the “fence of legs”

offensive, known as *Operasi Keamanan* (Security Operation) reported in **TAPOL Bulletin No 47** (September 1981). This Operation was launched in mid-1981, following the military “exercises” held in March-April when an additional 8,000 troops were brought into East Timor.

Catholic Church sources quoted by the Hongkong-based Union of Catholic Asia Newsagency (UCAN) in a report from Jakarta, speak of East Timor as “the worst situation in the world”. The UCAN report, reproduced at some length in **East Timor News No. 71-73**, reads as follows:

The Indonesian Army is driving large groups of the male population in long sweeps through mountains to eliminate the remaining guerrillas ... (My) informant conservatively estimated the total (number of Timorese involved) at 50,000. They march in groups of twelve ahead of Indonesian soldiers like African beaters for White hunters. They are ordered to look for guerrillas, shout when they see them and even engage them in struggle.

The same source said that these conscripts, who are not armed, “get sick and die from malnutrition” because they are not supplied with food by the Army and so are forced to ravage the villages they pass through to survive. When they return from the mountains, they are too weak to work and plant crops. The offensive is taking place at a crucial period when crops must be planted before the monsoon. The conscripts

have no medicine or food ... They move 3-4 kilometres a day on marches lasting months and many reportedly die from hunger and malaria. They sleep where they can,

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Former Governor of West Irian

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- A “Kind of Virus” in the Community page 8
- Portrait of a President page 12

EAST TIMOR AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY

The Report drawn up last June (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No 47, September 1981) by the East Timor Regional Assembly suddenly came into prominence when it was learnt that the two signatories had been arrested in November.

Following the arrests, the document was not only widely quoted in the Australian press, in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and by the BBC; it even received an airing in some sections of the Indonesian press.

Ironically, the arrested Assembly Members were being victimised not so much for having written such a damning report – which had been completely ignored for several months – but rather for having “leaked” it abroad and, as *Tempo* quotes one GOLKAR official as saying, for ‘disseminating abroad information about Indonesia’s bad deeds’.

Several news items made pointed reference to the fact that the document was first published in full in the September issue of *TAPOL Bulletin*. By all accounts, that particular issue must have been in great demand among journalists in Jakarta.

The whole incident shows clearly that the Suharto government is very worried about the consequences of any international exposure of conditions in East Timor. This gives us all the more reason for believing that international publicity is one of our most effective ways of helping the Timorese people win their right to self-determination.

ONE AND A HALF MILLION EX-TAPOLS?

In a report from Jakarta last month, AFP referred to the problem “posed by 1.5 million communists who were

recently released from prison”. (*Times*, December 29, 1981) This is a startling statement since no-one, right up to the top echelons of KOPKAMTIB, has ever claimed to have imprisoned anywhere near that number of “communists” since 1965.

But AFP can perhaps be forgiven its exaggerated claims, for the figure 1,580,020 is the sum total of names on a widely-reported new list entitled *Organisasi Terlarang* (Prohibited Organisations) which was compiled for purposes of determining who will not be allowed to vote in the forthcoming elections (see page 8). Newspapers in Indonesia have variously referred to those on the list as being “ex-G30S/PKI prisoners” or “people involved in the G30S/PKI”.

The publication of the list no doubt helps to remind Indonesians that the danger of “a communist comeback” is still very real, thus legitimising any repressive measures taken between now and the elections in May. It also helps further undermine the position of ex-tapols by once again drawing attention to the relentless surveillance to which they are subjected. Inclusion on the “OT list” could now become the basis for exclusion from jobs and other basic rights, in place of being an “ET” (ex-tapol) or being unable to obtain a “certificate of non-involvement in the G30S”.

Whether all those on the OT list or “only” 43,084 of them are to be entitled to vote is beside the point. Indonesian elections are meaningless, and the results – a landslide victory for GOLKAR – a foregone conclusion. What matters is that 1.5 million people have again been classified into A, B or C categories with all that this could mean for their status as and when KOPKAMTIB deems it necessary “in the interests of security” to act against them.

Letters to the Editor

Dear TAPOL,

In your last issue (No. 48), you kindly reviewed a little book published by the Swedish East Timor Committee. Let me complete your list of printing errors etc. by saying that my contribution (independent, but requested by the Committee as publishers) was ready for publication 3 years before publication and should have been marked “September 1978”, among others to explain why material like some requested in your review could not have been listed at the time.

However, like the reviewer, I do think that the book still can be used and that the analysis is basically valid. But it should be completed by a list of the most important errors and the new books, documents etc. now available.

Olle Tornquist,
Department of Government,
University of Uppsala,
Nacka, Sweden

Dear TAPOL,

Your report on increased British investment in Indonesia (*TAPOL Bulletin* No. 48, November 1981, p. 15) fails to mention that the Indonesia-UK business meeting in question was a follow-up to the trade and investment meetings held in London in June 1980, and that it was timed to coincide with a meeting held by the Joint

Anglo-Indonesian Working Party (JWP) held in Jakarta the same week (for details, see “British, Indonesian Businessmen Meet”, *Indonesia Development News*, November 1981, p. 3).

At the first meeting, Indonesia’s minister of state for administrative reform and deputy chairman of the National Planning Board (Bappenas) Dr. Johannes Sumarlin stressed the Suharto regime’s commitment to maintaining a favourable climate for foreign investment. “In return”, he said, “we expect the foreign enterprise to contribute to the achievement of a better way of life for our people and an improved social and economic environment”. For a detailed account of the (negative) contribution of British and other foreign investment to the welfare of the Indonesian people under the Suharto regime, see Richard Cowper, “Poverty”, *Financial Times*, “Indonesia Survey”, December 21, 1981, p. vi.

(Dr.) Peter Cochrane,
University of Sydney

PRAMOEDYA BIBLIOGRAPHY

The list of translated works by Pramoedya Ananta Toer promised in our last issue is in preparation and will be published in the next issue.

Editors



Timorese children in Remexio, November, 1979.

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protecting themselves from rain under trees and rocks.

"Kompas": 35,000 People 'Helping' Restore Security

Confirmation that this massive conscription is indeed taking place has come from two unlikely sources. The first is the Catholic daily, **Kompas**, Indonesia's largest circulation paper, which published a long report on 1st September last by its correspondent, Julius Pour, following a visit to East Timor. He wrote:

Some 35,000 people in the District (*kabupaten*) of Baucau have since August been helping the Armed Forces to restore security in their region.

(Population statistics issued by the Indonesian authorities in December 1978 gave a figure of 80,077 people in Baucau *kabupaten*. The **Kompas** figure, if correct, would mean that indeed the entire male adult population is involved.)

Pour's article is of course pro-integration and attempts to give a picture of satisfied Timorese being well-cared for by the Indonesian administration. But besides referring to the mass utilisation of Timorese in military operations, it provides evidence of the serious food situation that has been created by these operations. Pour quotes a local military officer in Baucau, standing among hundreds of

local inhabitants out on operations, as saying:

'As for me, a military man, it's nothing to go hungry. But these people here together with me are far from their villages, far from their families!'

The other source confirming that conscription is taking place is Dr Michael Leifer, senior lecturer at the London School of Economics, who visited East Timor last November with a large group of pro-integration academics, mostly Americans, after they had attended a CSIS¹-sponsored conference on ASEAN affairs in Bali. In a talk on BBC's Indonesian-language service on 25th November, Dr Leifer spoke about "the military conscription of village inhabitants to participate in cleaning-up operations" which could "disrupt the harvest and other aspects of village life".

An Indonesian Embassy spokesman in Canberra claimed that Timorese participation in the military campaign (the existence of which has often been denied) was 'voluntary'. We do not use all the men in a village. We only use enough to maintain our operations. And we do not use them in working hours." (*The Herald*, Canberra, 11th January, 1982.)

New Dangers of Famine

All sources, including the pro-integrationist sources above, point to the problem of food supplies. Following the disastrous famine that struck East Timor in 1978 as a result of Indonesia's massive aerial bombardments, imported food aid has been crucial to survival. Now that the ICRC and the CRS have withdrawn, this no longer exists, and the food situation, fragile at best, can clearly be exacerbated by the forced utilisation of so much adult labour.

Australian Catholic Relief is meanwhile responding to a request for A\$250,000 relief from the Church in East Timor. In the light of Indonesian Embassy assertions that talk of famine in East Timor except perhaps "for some people in remote areas under Fretilin control" (*ibid*) is groundless, the ACR and the Australian Council for Overseas Aid has made a formal request to the Indonesian authorities to allow aid agencies into East Timor to see the situation for themselves. This request has been rejected.

Meanwhile, as many Australian newspapers were reporting the message received from East Timor's Apostolic Administrator (see page one) about the grave situation in East Timor, the Australian Government announced a decision to send relief supplies worth A\$430,000 to East Timor. This food would go into a buffer stock being set up by the International Red Cross, under an agreement reached in Jakarta late last year, for use in East Timor "during bad harvests".

Mass Arrests

At the same time as the military operations have been underway, there have been numerous arrests. It is not clear how many resistance fighters have been caught. Many of those arrested are reportedly teachers and civil servants or office workers, to pre-empt their joining the resistance.

1. Centre for Strategic and International Studies, headed by General Ali Mustopa

The number of people now being held on Atauro island, north of East Timor, has increased sharply, and other islands — Lira, Alor and Jaco — are also being used as detention centres.

A letter read into the US Senate records by Senator Paul Tsongas speaks about "the almost total elimination of all educated classes in East Timor". The letter, written by a priest, was summarised in **Weekend Australian** (2-3 May, 1981) a copy of which only recently came into our hands.

The writer states that almost all teachers from Baucau-Fatunaca have been imprisoned and dozens are reported to have disappeared. "All high schools are closed," the letter says. "After five years of Indonesian occupation, the highest level of education does not surpass the primary school level."

The torture in the prisons is indescribable, especially for women and children. The confiscation of property belonging to the prisoners is commonplace. Hunger and disease continue to decimate the population. Several villages have been burnt to the ground and the inhabitants sent to concentration camps.

TIMORESE REFUGEES ARRESTED

More than thirty Timorese refugees were arrested in Jakarta's airport in mid-November as they were about to board a plane to go to Australia for re-unification with their families.

They had all been granted Australian visas in their Portuguese passports, under a programme agreed in principle in 1976 between the Australian and Indonesian governments. Of the 625 persons included in the agreed lists, 347 persons have left so far.

The arrested group had spent many anxious months in Jakarta waiting for Indonesian exit permits and in desperation to leave, apparently tried to bluff and bribe their way through passport control, only to be arrested for using false documents. Indeed all those who have actually made it to Australia have paid enormous bribes even though their departure is part of an official programme.

The period of waiting in Jakarta is extremely difficult as the refugees have no work or income, no social benefits, no schooling for their children and have to rely on relatives, mainly in Australia, to survive.

AUSTRALIAN SENATE ENQUIRY ON E. TIMOR

The Australian Senate agreed last December to hold a special Enquiry on East Timor. The Enquiry has been asked to investigate and report on:

- (A) The human rights and the condition of the people of East Timor;
- (B) United Nations resolutions and actions with regard to East Timor; and
- (C) The appropriate policies to be adopted by an Australian Government in relation to matters revealed in the Committee's Enquiry.

Any persons or organisations wishing to express their views on all or any aspects of the topic are invited to send a

submission to the Committee Secretary, Mr Tony Magi, Parliament House, Canberra 2600, tel: (062) 726193.

ASSEMBLY MEMBERS HELD FOR 6 WEEKS

Several members of the East Timor Regional Assembly (two according to some reports, three or four according to others), were arrested in Dili on 18th November and taken to Bali for interrogation. After widespread publicity about these arrests, the men were released on 29th December, according to a statement by Admiral Sudomo, Commander of KOPKAMTIB.

These arrests were the direct consequence of the Report submitted by the Assembly to President Suharto on 3 June 1981, which complained bitterly about murder, torture and corruption by members of the Armed Forces (For the full text of this report, see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 47, September 1981).

Two of the arrested men were Leondro Issac and Aniotos N.F. Sousa Soares, the signatories of the letter of transmission, identified then as being 'the youngest' and 'the oldest' members of the Assembly. The third member arrested has been named as Francisco Dios Himines. The name of the fourth man is not known. Another man arrested in connection with the same incident is Oscar Lucio Goncalves, described in one news report as 'a close relative of Guilherme Goncalves, the Governor of East Timor', and in another as 'an interpreter on the Governor's staff'.

Publication Abroad "An Embarrassment"

The **Far Eastern Economic Review** (1st January 1982) gave full coverage to the arrests and to the contents of the Assembly report. It said that according to **Merdeka**, the men were arrested for allowing copies of the document to reach people abroad. As for the **Review** itself, it drew attention to the fact that the full text of the Report was first published in the September issue of **TAPOL Bulletin** and also mentioned that we had reproduced the photostat of the letter of transmission in Indonesian, bearing the two men's signatures. The **Review** describes the publication of the document as "an embarrassment for the Indonesian Government" as "it confirms that there is deep disenchantment in East Timor".

Parliamentary Human Rights Group Protest

The all-party Parliamentary Human Rights Group in London has strongly protested to the Indonesian Ambassador in London about these arrests. In a letter signed by a broad spectrum of MPs and Members of the House of Lords, the Group says:

The (Assembly's) Report itself had already given rise to some anxiety in Britain about conditions in the territory. There is little enough information about what is happening there, because foreigners are not allowed to travel freely in this land which is unlawfully occupied by your troops.

We are dismayed that Assembly members who had the courage to express their legitimate concern to the

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FORMER GOVERNOR OF WEST IRIAN INTERVIEWED

II

Eliezer Bonay, the man whom the Indonesian government first appointed governor of West Irian in May 1963, escaped from West Irian to Papua New Guinea in 1979. He went to Sweden in June 1981, having been forced to go there against his will, and is now living there as a political refugee.

Eliezer Bonay was the leader of the West Papuan pro-independence party, Parna at the time Indonesia took over formal administration of the country in 1963. In an interview with Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL, he spoke of his experiences as governor, and later as a political refugee in Papua New Guinea. Two other Papuan refugees, D. Kaffiar and Christopher Waney, also took part in the interview which took place at the hostel for political refugees in Flen, Sweden, on 19 September 1981. The first part was published in TAPOL Bulletin No. 48, November 1981. The third part will be published in our next issue.

(To Kaffiar): Were you arrested in 1971 because of activities in connection with the elections?

No, it wasn't anything to do with that. It was because of activities in support of national independence, in support of the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*—Free Papua Movement). It was just that we were arrested around the time of the elections.

At your trial, were you allowed to have a defence lawyer? What were your rights as the accused?

We didn't have any defence lawyers. We did the best we could for ourselves and got lower sentences than the prosecution had asked for: he wanted us to get 5 years.

Didn't the court tell you that you were entitled to have a lawyer? Weren't you allowed to choose a lawyer? According to the law, you are entitled to a proper defence.

We got no help at all about anything, so we defended ourselves. They never said anything about our having a defence lawyer.

(Bonay): I would like to add something. In Indonesia, even if you have a lawyer, it makes no difference. Take the case of the Serui Statement; that was in 1974. This was a statement calling for Indonesia to quit West Papua. Six people were tried. I appeared in the trial as a witness. The defendants asked for defence lawyers and they got two, one a Malukan, one a Batak. The trial took place in Jayapura. The defence insisted that the men hadn't committed any crime and should be acquitted, yet they were found guilty and sentenced to 8 years. They were charged not under any of the ordinary laws but on the basis of the anti-subversion law. If the courts can't find people guilty on the basis of ordinary laws, they use the anti-subversion law. I was present at the trial and heard how the lawyers argued in their defence but it was all quite useless.

Of the six men sentenced, one died in prison, two were sent to Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya and the other three are in prison in Jayapura.

Did the man who died die from natural causes?

No, his death is a complete mystery.

(To Kaffiar): After your release, what did you do?

I joined the guerrillas again.

(To Bonay): Have you ever been detained?

Yes. I was detained for nearly two years, from March 1967

until December 1968. Not me alone. There were about 60 of us, all held without trial.

Were there any charges against you?

No. I was just a political prisoner.

What happened during interrogations?

All kinds of things. I myself was never beaten but some of my friends were beaten till they were half dead, half alive.

What questions did they ask?

Mostly, whether we wanted to be independent from Indonesia. Then they beat people without mercy, threatened them with pistols, made all kinds of threats. (*Bonay was trembling as he spoke. We closed the window in case he was feeling cold and asked him whether he wanted to take a rest. He refused.*) The important thing for them was to know all about our activities, about our independence movement, to know where people were.

Were there many activities going on at the time?

Yes, continually from 1965. Ever since the Manokwari rebellion in 1965 right up to the present day. Things have been happening everywhere. West Papua is a very large place and each region had its own activities.

People in one region didn't know much about what was happening elsewhere. Then, when we were arrested, we told each other what was happening in our own regions and realised that they were basically the same. Things were going on everywhere.

Only since 1965?

No. Since 1963, but especially since 1965.

What were conditions like under detention?

We were all released after two years, though one of us died in prison.

What did he die of?

He was ill and he didn't get any treatment, so he died.

What food did you get?

(Bonay): Just rice and *nangka*, *nasi gudeg*, a Jogjanese dish.

(Kaffiar): In police detention, we got rice served only with *kangkung* boiled in water. We had to keep leftovers for the next day and just heated the stuff up. So we didn't have much to eat on the next day. Under police detention, we

weren't allowed to get food from home. We weren't allowed to go to hospital for treatment even when we had been beaten and were suffering from wounds. They used to put salt in our open wounds. They never gave us any clothes. In fact, they took all our things away and confiscated them. They didn't provide us with any facilities, no blankets, no mattresses or mats. Nothing at all.

Whose hands were you in?

The police. Then after the trial, we were sent to prison and guarded by prison wardens.

(Bonay): Can I add something? If you were arrested by the police, they hung on to you as their detainee. If the Army got you first, you remained *their* detainee. It all depended on who got you first.

(Kafiar): If you were caught by the military police, the police could have nothing to do with you. They each held on to their own prisoners.

Is there any difference between police and army detention?

The police treat their prisoners more leniently than the Army. The Army behaves far more brutally.

(Bonay): Yes, they each hold on to their own prisoners, saying: "This is *our* prisoner". Beatings were much worse under the Army, and there were more deaths too.

(To Kafiar): Who was it who took that co-prisoner of yours away, the one who disappeared?

It was a colonel from the Army.

Elsewhere in Indonesia, in my experience, the police have very little influence when it comes to political affairs. Is that so in West Papua?

(Bonay): Yes, it's true. The police leave political affairs to the Army. But they do arrest a lot of people.

(Kafiar): A lot depends on who is police chief at the time. At that time it was Komisaris (Police-Major) Karpono. He was *komres* (*komando resort polisi*).

In TAPOL, we know a lot about places used for detention in Jakarta, Java and elsewhere, also in Buru. They use prisons, houses, army offices, all kinds of places. Is it like that in West Papua too?

(Bonay): Yes, it's just the same. All kinds of places, army prisons, special places.

(Kafiar): When people are first arrested, they go to special interrogation centres.

That's what we used to call "operational interrogation". Did you have the same expression?

Yes, we did.

What kind of tortures did they use?

I was beaten on five occasions. They beat people till their whole skin is torn. Then, they repeat the beatings on the next day. They put a pistol inside your mouth. They handcuff people. They use electric shock.

(Christopher Waney): When my father-in-law was arrested by the RPKAD in 1966, he was beaten, treated with elec-

tric shock. He was slashed with a razor then they put salt in his wounds.

(Bonay): About 150 people have been arrested recently, for supporting the guerrillas. This has happened in the last two years. One of the people arrested is a former governor of West Irian, Elias Papirindey. The way the Indonesians do it is, if a top official becomes suspect, they first dismiss him, then later on he is arrested. All these 150 people were arrested in Jayapura. There are probably more in other regions.

(To Bonay): What happened to you after your release?

I had no longer been a government employee since 1966. I worked for *Irian Bakti*, a company that belongs to the regional government. They allowed me to work there so that they could keep an eye on me. People really need to feel at ease and peaceful, but things are never like that.

What about your family?

My wife and children are in Jakarta. When I fled from West Irian, my wife knew nothing about it. I hadn't been to Jakarta for six months. If she had known anything, she would have been interrogated. She would like to join me, but it's not easy to leave from Jakarta.

What effect did the October 1965 events in Jakarta have in West Papua, on the number of arrests, and so on?

Well, the Indonesians began to brand OPM supporters as being PKI, though there was no connection of course.

Were any concentration camps set up?

(Kafiar): There were military prisons. A lot of people arrested in those days were classified as G30S prisoners though in fact they were OPM. Some were forced to work on military-run plantations, and some of these were held until 1979, for 14 years. One of these plantations was in *Ol Tekan*, the other in *Di Doyoh*, a vegetable-growing plantation owned by the Army. I don't know how many altogether. It must have been several dozen people.

Did the PKI have much of a following in West Papua prior to the 1965 events?

(Bonay): I don't know. Up to 1965, West Papua was under "political quarantine". It was not until some time in 1965 that this quarantine ended and political parties could come into existence.

What about your decision to leave West Papua? That was in 1978, wasn't it?

Yes, I ran away. There are two streams of people leaving. Those coming, as we say, from *dalam negeri*, from "inland", the people living in towns who feel threatened or in danger. Then there are those coming from the guerrilla movement in the jungles. They go across the border because of illness, to get medical treatment in Papua New Guinea. The ones who flee across the border from the towns usually go by sea. Both streams are illegal of course.

I would like to know something about the struggle. I realise you can't talk about some things, but it would be useful to

get a picture of what's happening. That makes it easier for others to support your movement. Is the struggle widespread? Is it widely supported by the people?

(Kafiar): The guerrilla struggle clearly has the support of the people. When guerrilla activities intensify, it's the people who become targets of Army operations, not the guerrillas. For example, when I joined the guerrillas, they looked for me, then went after my family, and they were the ones who got tortured.

Do many battles take place?

They are taking place all the time. The guerrillas are trying to control as much territory as possible.

(Bonay): You ask whether the guerrilla struggle has the support of the people. If it didn't, the struggle could not have lasted so long. The guerrillas have to eat and they need the people's support.

Are the guerrillas mostly villagers, or do they come from the towns?

(Kafiar): Many come from the towns. Young people and government officials from the lowest to the highest ranks. They may be people who were threatened by the government.

So, a lot of the guerrillas are what you would call "more educated" people. So what about support from the villagers? We often hear about whole villages being destroyed and many villagers being killed. Wouldn't this have the effect of separating the villagers from the guerrilla struggle because they feel it only places them in danger?

Yes, that's what they're trying to do, and some people respond in that way but very few. What the Indonesians hope to rely on for support are the (non-Papuan) migrants moving into areas where the guerrillas are active. Many of these migrants are retired soldiers and the Indonesians hope to use them to regain control of these regions.

Don't the migrants have problems adjusting to conditions that are so different from, say, Java?


But they are given many facilities. They get homes, they are given land, everything they need. Generally speaking, their conditions are far better than the native inhabitants. They're provided with schools. And the land they get is the most fertile.

(Bonay): The government is taking over all the fertile land for the migrants. I think that within twenty years, all Papuans will have been removed from the towns and areas in the vicinity of towns. Some people predict that by the year 2000 Papuans will be like the aborigines in Australia, the Indians in America or the Maoris in New Zealand. All pushed out by newcomers.

The Papuans are on the way to becoming a minority in their own country?

Yes.

I should also explain that there are two kinds of transmigration: "official" and "spontaneous" transmigration. The "official" migrants are the ones who get the good land, they're from Java, Bali and Madura. In some cases, land is



taken without payment. There are cases where people are demanding payment for land.

What happens to people whose land has been taken? Do they go to the towns or to the jungles?

Well, you know, there's still plenty of land. I was talking about *fertile* land. People must then move to poorer land or, say, to land with large trees that have to be cut down.

What is the effect on people's livelihood?

Oh, it creates many difficulties, and it's very hard for people to find jobs. *(Tape unclear for the rest of this reply.)*

To return to the guerrilla struggle, is it going on all the time?

(Kafiar): It's been going on for years, and it won't stop.

(Bonay): Attacks on Army posts are being made all the time. Things like this aren't reported, but when Indonesia bombs places, the outside world hears about it. The outside world only hears about the major incidents, attacks with bombs and rockets, but nothing is ever heard about the smaller incidents that are happening all the time.

(To Bonay): Have you ever been to the guerrilla areas?

Yes, I went to guerrilla HQ when I was going to cross the border.

It seems the Baliem Valley is the main area of guerrilla activity.

The guerrillas are active everywhere, all over the country. There are guerrilla kampongs (i.e. bases) everywhere, not only in the border regions.

Errata

Bulletin No 48, November 1981, page 7:

First line of the answer to the second question in the Bonay interview: **President Suharto** should read **President Sukarno**.

10 lines from bottom:

de Freitas should read de Fretes.

EX-TAPOLS DISENFRANCHISED

Nearly 45,000 former political prisoners will not be allowed to vote at the general elections in May this year. They include 43,084 ex-prisoners consisting of persons in the A, B and C categories, plus all tried prisoners who were given sentences of at least 5 years. (The vast majority of sentences were well above that minimum.) The number of disenfranchised tried prisoners has not been made public. (See **Tempo**, 12th December 1981.)

Initially, the Indonesian press reported that General Amir Machmud, Minister of the Interior and Chairman of the General Elections Commission (LPU) had announced that the total number of ex-prisoners not being allowed to vote was 1,580,020, i.e. the total number of ex-tapols on a blacklist called OT 1982. (OT is short for *Organisasi Terlarang* or "prohibited organisations".)

Soon after Amir Machmud's statement, an LPU spokesman told the press there had been a misunderstanding and that the actual number of persons not entitled to vote was "only" 42,084. The OT 1982 list comprising 1,580,020 was the list of persons whose right to vote had been *under review*. This review had resulted in the compilation of a second list known as OT I/1982, namely those deemed unsuitable to exercise their right to vote. (Some Indonesian publications give the titles of the two lists the other way round.)

The initial confusion caused by Amir Machmud's statement had repercussions for the foreign press. Reports in Jakarta newspapers based on his figures were relayed abroad by foreign news agencies, and picked up by foreign journals who then reported that "1½ million Indonesians will not be allowed to vote". But when these journals were imported into Indonesia, the reports were blacked out because they were said to be "inaccurate".

The breakdown of the two lists has been made public, as follows:

OT/1982		OT I/1982	
A-Category	249	A-Category	156
B-Category	36,648	B-Category	11,909
C-Category	1,543, 123	C-Category	31,019

Re-Registration and Pre-Conditions

The OT 1982 list was drawn up on the basis of nationwide re-registration of all ex-prisoners during the first three months of 1981 (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 44, March 1981, page 4). At the time, it was announced that, according to Government Regulation No. 41, 1980, all A, B and C category ex-prisoners would be entitled to vote, provided they conformed with the following conditions:

That they have been returned to society for at least two years; that they have not engaged in any political activities, that they have displayed loyalty to the State, and that they are of good conduct and have not been involved in any criminal act. (See **Kompas**, 31st December 1980)

Since all ex-tapols were 'returned to society' well over two years ago, the authorities now appear to be claiming that more than 43,000 of them fail to meet up to the other requirements.

'Sinar Harapan' reports on Ex-Tapols

A "KIND OF VIRUS"

Recently, I had a row with a neighbour who accused me of damaging some plants in his garden. I was quite dumbfounded when, in the middle of the argument, he suddenly came out with the words: "Typical for the PKI!"

We are looked upon as a kind of virus in the community though some people accept us back quite well. But if a row breaks out, if there's a difference of opinion, the PKI accusation is bound to come up. . . One of the reasons why I resigned from my job as a clerk in a newspaper office was that, when I raised a question about my wage, someone said: "You're still Old Order. Just see!"

Rosani Sani, ex-tapol, formerly a journalist from Ujungpanjang

This quotation is from a series of articles published in the Jakarta daily, **Sinar Harapan**, on 30th September and 1st and 2nd October 1981. The articles deal in turn with the problems confronting former political prisoners and their families following release from prolonged detention, with the efforts and attitudes of four relief agencies, three of them religious (Catholic, Protestant and Muslim) and one, Humaika, which is secular, that are helping ex-tapols, and with opinions expressed by local military commanders. Admiral Sudomo, Commander in Chief of KOPKAMTIB is reported, for example, as saying that "former prisoners will have the right to vote in the general elections", a statement that has since been proven completely false (see separate item).

Although there is plenty of prejudice expressed by many of those interviewed, particularly the local KOPKAMTIB officers, the articles provide a somewhat sympathetic account of the social position of ex-tapols by contrast with the communist-baiting reports which so often appear, particularly around each 1st October when the events of 1965 are always extensively recalled in the press.

Sinar Harapan's article about the prisoners themselves clearly reflects their fears and frustrations, and the ever-present problem of anti-PKI sentiments obstructing job-hunting, relations with neighbours, and so on. Take for instance, an account by one Humaika official who described how he tried hard to convince one ex-tapol, a qualified veterinary surgeon, to apply to the academy where he graduated in Bogor for duplicates of his degree so that he could start looking for a job in his own profession. The ex-tapol, very reluctant at first, eventually made the request and obtained the documents,

but problems arose when he tried to get a job in his own profession. "Many were afraid to take him on", said Syukur (the Humaika man—Ed.). Then, eventually, this qualified veterinary surgeon . . . managed to get a job at the Bureau of Statistics, but only as a canteen caretaker!

Or take this quotation from an ex-tapol in Tasikmalaya,

IN THE COMMUNITY

Oma Husana, who told the newspaper:

I'm always afraid I'll do something wrong so I behave and speak with a great deal of caution. After all, I was formerly a prisoner on Buru. But luckily I got a job from a schoolmate of mine who now owns a factory. I get Rp. 26,000 (about £14—Ed.) a month for working 12 hours a day.

Sinar Harapan describes the problems still being faced by ex-tapols' children, and the tragic circumstances of ex-tapols who, for one reason or another, have no families to return to. There is a poignant description of life for 28 ex-tapols living in a dismal barrack that has been made available for homeless former prisoners by the Indonesian Council of Churches.

Perhaps the most striking thing about the work of the four agencies who offer relief to ex-tapols is their concentration on individual problems—job-seeking, money for medical treatment and for education, help in setting up small businesses etc.—rather than attempting to deal with the more basic problem of restoring civil rights to people subjected to grave injustices since 1965.

Father Sutopanitro, Director of the PSK (Cardinal's Social Project), a man who has for many years dedicated himself to helping prisoners, ex-prisoners and their families, is quoted as saying:

Our experience shows that, generally speaking, people feel afraid and suspicious of former prisoners. As soon as (prisoners—Ed.) get close or make contact, people don't want to become involved... Many people think that helping ex-prisoners only consists of helping them to find work, giving them capital and so on. But the most important thing is to restore their self-respect and their self-confidence. This is very difficult indeed.

H. Abdullah Salim, Deputy chairman of the Mission Board of the Indonesian Ulama's Council, which also concerns itself with relief for ex-prisoners, on the other hand, colours his sympathy for ex-prisoners with a bit of ideological intimidation. He told SH:

All God-fearing people are obliged to help their fellow beings who have just emerged from catastrophe. It is wrong for people to treat (the former political prisoners—Ed.) with suspicion. They are our fellow citizens who happened, in the old days, to follow a different ideology. If we can convince them to abandon their former ideology, society should receive them back. The hadists say that God-fearing people should not make the same mistake twice, so if any of them stick to their old views, the government should take action against them.

The only reference to the crucial problem of restoring civil rights comes in a passing remark by one agency official who speaks of the need for more legal aid groups to be set up in the regions to help ex-prisoners reclaim their confis-

cated property and secure other rights denied to them. On the other hand, some officials of these agencies are quoted as saying that they see their work as being aimed at "helping" the government "implement its policy of reconciliation". Do they really mean this? Or is this just a device to protect their work from government interference?

As for the military commanders interviewed by SH, there is the usual crop of warnings about the need for "vigilance", the importance of "Pancasila indoctrination", and relentless attention to surveilling and controlling the ex-tapols. Major-General Norman Sasono says that the ex-tapols do not really pose a "security" threat.

I think, logically speaking, that since they have spent so many years in detention, they won't want to do the things they formerly did again. All they have to do now is live out their old age. They're already old, aren't they?

The military commander of Nusatenggara, Lieut. General Sarwoto, explains his optimism about social attitudes towards ex-tapols within a somewhat more gruesome context:

I feel sure all ex-prisoners in the island of Bali are being received back well by society because generally speaking, they are only the sympathisers, the C-category people. After all, the leaders were all murdered in the public slaughter many years ago...

* * * * *

TWO DEATH SENTENCES COMMUTED TO LIFE

The Indonesian Justice Ministry announced on December 26 that the death sentences passed against former Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Subandrio and Air Marshal Omar Dhani have been commuted to life imprisonment by President Suharto. The announcement added that if both prisoners displayed good behaviour over the next five years, their sentences could be reduced to 15 years. (Both men have already spent nearly 16 years in prison—Ed.)

Reporting the Justice Ministry announcement, AFP said that Suharto's clemency had come "as a surprise". The Agency added: "It was regarded as an attempt by the President to improve Indonesia's image abroad in the face of growing criticism of its human rights record and to attract sympathy from the country's underprivileged five months before a general election is due to be held."

The *Australian* (December 28, 1981)

Continued from page 4

Indonesian authorities, who appointed them, should have been arrested.

A copy of the letter has been sent to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) with the request that the plight of these arrested Assembly Members be taken up by the IPU's Special Committee on the Violation of Rights of Parliamentarians.

BOOK REVIEW

Yudhistira ANM Massardi, **Mencoba Tidak Menyerah** (Trying Not To Surrender), Gramedia, 1979.

Much has already been written by ex-prisoners about their experiences of political detention but for obvious reasons none of this has yet been published in Indonesia. Publication abroad also poses serious problems because even if a pseudonym is used, the details can identify the writer.

The stories of children, of whole families shattered by the upheavals of arrest, detention, disappearance or murder provide the other side of the pain, suffering and injustice which so many millions have suffered since 1965. One story, already told in part (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 41/42, September-November 1980) still remains to be written in full. It is the story of the family of Trubus, the sculptor, and of their many years of fruitless searching to discover what happened to him after he disappeared from a prison in Central Java.

Trying Not To Surrender is another such story. The story-teller is a young boy, eleven years old in September

1965, who lived through a series of tragedies until the eventual disappearance of his father in late 1968. His tragedy begins when, shortly after the October 1965 events in Jakarta, with the massacre of "PKI people" under way in the surrounding countryside, school-friends yell "PKI kid" at him in the street. The persecution of the family quickly accelerates. Within days, their house is set upon by a mob who destroy and burn as they "look for important documents", find nothing, then leave the home a total wreck. To the boy, his father is a hard-working man, a Muslim who constantly instils into his children the spirit of doing a good day's work for a living. His only "political" activity was as the town agent for two newspapers, the PKI daily, **Harian Rakyat**, and a mass circulation paper, **Warta Bhakti**.

The boy's name is not revealed, nor is the name of his father, nor the town where they lived, nor even the part of the country, though at a guess it was probably somewhere in Central Java. Whether the story told is autobiographical is not clear but it is told in such graphic detail and with such moving reality and horror that the reader cannot but feel this must be a true story, or perhaps a compilation of several stories. Every incident described must have been ex-

Continued on opposite page

From TRYING NOT TO SURRENDER

And when I read one day an item in the newspaper, my heart shuddered. I began to cry. From pain and fear. How otherwise! The item said there was a PKI member in our town who hoarded stocks of rice, sugar and tapioca flour in his house for the PKI people still on the run who occasionally carry out acts of terror. It said too that this PKI man had once been the agent for **Harian Rakyat** and **Warta Bhakti**.

I choked when I read this. That person said to be a PKI man had to be Father. My own Father! That's crazy! Criminal! How criminal of anyone to write that!

If it indeed referred to Father—and it was quite clear to me that it did (wasn't he the only person in the town who had stocks of rice, sugar and tapioca flour in his house?)—then it was a really criminal item of news. Pure slander! Wasn't it perfectly clear that the rice, sugar and tapioca stored in our house belonged to the co-operative to be dispatched to the sub-districts in our district. These sub-districts were not communist. And this supply of foodstuffs was not organised at the wish of Father. It was based on a decision taken by the district government. Father was only the one who carried out that decision. If Father was said to be a PKI man stocking foodstuffs, this surely meant that all the subdistricts were PKI too. And the District Head who gave Father his instructions had to be a PKI man too. And if he was a PKI man, then, since he gets his instructions from the government, the government also had to be PKI. That's absolutely impossible! Out of the question!

The whole thing was a pack of lies, pure slander!

As for being an agent for PKI newspapers, that was just a trumped-up excuse. Who was to know that the PKI would launch a rebellion and do those cruel things to the Generals? Wasn't it a fact that the PKI had not been banned by the government? So, if Father happened to be the agent for PKI newspapers, he was obviously not guilty of anything and this should not be taken as meaning that he was a PKI man. And besides, in those days there weren't any other newspapers circulating in our town apart from the PKI papers. And when we became the agents, when I myself went round selling the papers, many people subscribed and bought them. Many traders in the markets, many shopkeepers bought them.

Was everyone who bought the papers automatically PKI? If so, why did they still have their shops intact, why did they still live in their houses, and why were they still wealthy?

If everyone who bought, read, kept, used for wrappings or anything else, or even merely touched these papers with their finger-tips could be regarded as PKI, how many of them there must be! How many PKI people there must be in our town! Crazy! The whole idea was crazy! So if the news I read in the paper mentioned this as proof, it was just using something to make it sound more convincing. No! I couldn't accept that! It wasn't fair! The person who wrote that had to be a bastard!

I was burning with hatred. I felt very angry. I was deeply offended! And then, I was very frightened! Very frightened indeed!

perienced thousands of times over, in many different places.

After their home is destroyed, the family move to another home until a new disaster strikes, the publication of a news item accusing the father of being PKI [see box]. Arrest follows almost immediately, then new problems—the difficulty of finding work, making a living, and of trying to keep track of the whereabouts of the father. The birth of a severely undernourished baby brother who suffers painful skin eruptions adds to the collective misery.

Suddenly, the father returns home. The boy, alone at home at the time, clutches his father in disbelief then rushes excitedly through the town to bring the good news to his mother and brothers and sisters working in different places. But if father is released, why does he have to report every night, sometimes not returning home for hours?

One night he goes off as usual to report but this time never returns. Kidnapped? Yes, but by whom? The military officers in the town disclaim all knowledge. The children spend frantic days enquiring everywhere but with no result. Then they start searching for his body in the nearby woods. They come across newly-dug graves and even traces of human remains but are too scared to look further.

How does the boy regard the PKI? With a great deal of confusion and fear. The vague and imprecise impression he has of the PKI before October 1965 as part of the officially-

supported national front is quickly replaced by shock and fear based on the reports of what happened in Jakarta, the brutal murder of six generals, the unquestioning acceptance of everything reported in the press (except of course the slander levelled against his own father) and the feeling of terror at what could happen to those branded as PKI. He mentions for instance that as the late 1965 massacres were in progress, a slogan appeared in the streets of his town: "For every soul, a soul! The souls of the six generals must be paid for with the souls of six million communists and their cronies!"

Trying Not To Surrender was published in book form in 1979 after appearing in serialised version in *Kompas* in October and November 1978. Several other novels about tapols or ex-tapols have appeared in print in Indonesia recently, all written by non-tapols. One is *The Detached Wheel* (Indonesian title?) by Ashadi Siregar which has been described as "a pop-novel . . . geared to the tastes of teenagers, (which) is extremely critical of the treatment meted out to the families of PKI members by the government and society". Another is *Kubah* by Ahmad Tohari, reviewed in *Tempo* (12th December 1981). It is, I think, significant that the immense human tragedy of political imprisonment and persecution of the Left is now becoming available to the general public through literature.

Carmel Budiardjo

BECHTEL WORKERS BEATEN UP BY TROOPS

Anti-riot troops were out in force to remove 1,300 workers from a Bechtel construction site in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan, in November. The workers were staging a sit-in to support their demand for immediate payment of 10 months' unpaid food allowance. They had reported for work but remained in the forecourt waiting to see a union (FBSI) official who had undertaken to negotiate with the management.

The troops came into action after the East Kalimantan Police Commission ordered the workers to start work or leave the site. All the workers then left and a short distance away, they were set upon and beaten with rattan canes and clubs. They complained afterwards that they had gone to hear the results of negotiations but had been confronted by security forces. Their FBSI negotiator failed to show up, and the East Kalimantan FBSI chairman later explained that the FBSI man had not been able to meet the workers "because his actions in defence of the workers were an infringement of organisational discipline".

Bechtel, the US construction corporation with many contracts in Indonesia, is engaged in enlarging the Balikpapan refinery. Wages to siteworkers include a daily food allowance but this has been withheld for nearly a year.

Lt.-Colonel Sonny of the local military command (KODIM) warned Bechtel employees that any strike "would be dealt with". He said he was discussing security, not social justice, and went on to warn the workers not to "disturb security".

(Source: *Sinar Harapan*, November 24, 1981)



A production of *The Government Inspector* by Gogol was banned in Jogjakarta, Central Java, just a few hours before the first performance was due to begin. A permit had been issued two weeks beforehand but, according to *Tempo* (12 December 1981), officials who sat in on rehearsals said it was "full of innuendos about officials". The Jogjakarta Army Commander (Laksusda) felt the play "could disturb stability in Jogjakarta where things are already stable".

Fred Wibowo, Deputy Chairman of the Jogjakarta Arts Council, expressed surprise at the ban. "As a matter of fact, it is a play that sides with the government and supports the Special Operation (Opstib) in its campaign to clean up corruption."

Editor's Note: For a discussion of KOPKAMTIB's special instructions to local commanders on handling labour disputes, see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 48, November 1981, page 2.

PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT

"For they are above all no great political criminals but the perpetrators of great political crimes, which is not at all the same." (Bertholt Brecht, *The Resistible Rise of the Man Arturo Ui*.)

(The following does not pretend to be a comprehensive biography of President Suharto. The purpose of this, and biographies of other Indonesian leaders to follow, is to give a better idea of the nature of the New Order government.)

1921, 28 June: Suharto is born in Godean village, near Yogyakarta. His father is a village irrigation official.

1939: Suharto finishes middle-school education.

1940-2: Joins the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL), when Sukarno and other nationalists are in exile or detention for anti-colonial activities.

1943: During the Japanese occupation, Suharto joins the Japanese Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Homeland (PETA). By this time the Japanese have imposed forced deliveries of rice and forced labour (Romusha) on the Indonesian population. He becomes a PETA company commander.

1945, February: Following a revolt in the Blitar PETA battalion, the Japanese execute the leaders. Suharto is sent to rebuild the unit.

1945, September: After the defeat of Japan, Suharto joins the Republican Army, and leads an attack on the Yogyakarta Japanese garrison.

1947: Suharto marries Siti Hartinah (Tien), the daughter of a minor noble.

1950: Suharto's troops in the Garuda Mataram Brigade brutally crush a regional revolt in South Sulawesi.

1950: Suharto is warned by his commander, Colonel Gatot Subroto over a transport enterprise using army vehicles in Yogyakarta.

1956: Becomes Acting Commander of the Central Java Diponegoro Division.

1957: Suharto makes use of his martial law powers for "fund-raising". With Major Sujono Humardhani and Colonel Sutomo, he sets up a number of enterprises and establishes the Yayasan Dana Pembangunan Territorium IV (Territory IV Development Contributions Fund) and the Yayasan Territorium Empat (Territory IV Foundation). He becomes known as an efficient money-maker.

1958: Suharto found to be involved in illegal barter trade. An enquiry commissioned by Nasution also finds that he has been making illegal levies for the Development Contributions Fund.

1958-9: Suharto is not involved in putting down the CIA-backed regional revolts.

1959, October: Nasution (quietly) relieves Suharto of his command and assigns him to SESKOAD, the army staff and command school at Bandung. Suharto later claims to US ambassador Howard Jones that this is because he is "too anti-communist". Suharto is heavily influenced by the doctrines of Suwarto who, influenced by US military theorists



like Guy Pauker, advocates the doctrine of "Territorial Management"—the involvement of the army at all levels of civilian life.

1960: Placed in charge of intelligence as first deputy to the Army Chief of Staff.

1961: Suharto is given command of the Strategic Reserve Command (KOSTRAD).

1962: Promoted to major-general and given command of the "Mandala" theatre of war to claim West Papua from the Dutch. He gathers a military clique of intelligence and military contacts, the cores of the New Order government today.

1964: Suharto sets up the Yayasan Dharma Putra, a KOSTRAD "fund-raising" foundation which establishes the Bank Windhu Kencana and sets up airlines and many other companies. This Kencana group of companies, managed by Liem Siu Liong, is one of the biggest business groups in Indonesia.

1964, August-September: With Ali Murtopo, the head of KOSTRAD's Special Operations Branch, Suharto subverts Sukarno's Confrontation with Malaysia in secret contacts with Malaysian and British officials. Ali Murtopo also contacts the leaders of the CIA-backed Outer Islands revolt, exiled in Malaysia and Singapore.

1964: With Ali Murtopo and Colonel (now Admiral) Sudomo, Suharto is involved in a huge smuggling operation.

1965, 1 October: A middle-ranking group of army officers attempt to bring the army leadership to account before Sukarno for corrupt practices. Suharto "restores order" and initiates his own Coup against Sukarno, while claiming to protect him from "an attempted communist coup".

1965, 2 October: Suharto disobeys Sukarno's order to appoint General Pranoto "daily caretaker" of the army.

1965, 3 October: Suharto extracts formal authority from Sukarno to "restore security and order". He formally calls for the elimination of the PKI, and issues Directive No. 22/KOTI/1965 which authorises the "absolutely essential cleaning out" of the PKI. This helps initiate a massacre in which at least half a million are killed. He sets up KOP-

SPOTLIGHT ON A PRISONER



Johannes Parsidi, now 57 years old, is one of an unknown number of tried political prisoners still being held on the prison island of Nusakambangan, south of Central Java. He is in the Gligier unit.

He was arrested in late 1965, but not tried until more than ten years later, in April 1976 when he was found guilty and given a sentence of 13 years *without* deduction. He was also ordered to pay costs (**Merdeka**, 6th April, 1976).

According to information received by TAPOL in September 1980, Parsidi's release date has been fixed for 15th September 1987, apparently with remission of 1½ years. However, Amnesty International in its 1981 Annual Report states that he has been granted four years remission, though does not mention his planned release date.

Johannes Parsidi was in the PKI leadership in Jogjakarta and had been active as a trade unionist, in the Union of Public Works Employees and also in the regional council of SOBSI, the All-Indonesia Trade Union Federation. He was a member of the Jogjakarta Regional Assembly at the time of his arrest, and had been on the Jogjakarta Municipal Council since 1957.

The charges brought against him at his trial were connected with his activities as a PKI member and local leader. He made no secret of his political affiliations, nor of his response to the events in Jakarta on 1st October 1965. A day later, he led a demonstration in Jogjakarta calling on the local authorities to respond to the proclaimed establishment of a Revolutionary Council in Jakarta by setting up a similar council in Jogjakarta. One of the charges against him was that he had "illegal" meetings with D. N. Aidit, PKI Chairman during the time he was in Central Java after 1st October and before his capture (and murder) in November 1965.

KAMTIB with virtually unlimited powers to restore "order". Mass arrests take place.

1966, 11 March: Obtains a mandate (SUPERSEMAR) from Sukarno, under threat of civil war, to take "all necessary steps" to protect Sukarno. Uses the mandate as a *carte blanche* for his own ends.

1966, 12 March: Suharto dismantles Sukarno's NASAKOM government by formally banning the PKI. Six days later he arrests 15 of Sukarno's ministers.

1966, June-July: Sukarno is compelled to ask Suharto to form a new cabinet.

1966, September-December: The show trials of Sukarno's ministers Jusuf Muda Dalam, Subandrio and Omar Dhani are used to implicate Sukarno himself in the "attempted coup" and to discredit his "Old Order" government.

1967, March: Suharto elected as acting President.

1967: The Waringin group of companies associated with Suharto through Liem Siu Liong obtains vast government credit.

1968: The import monopoly of Indonesia's lucrative clove trade is granted to Liem Siu Liong and Suharto's half-brother Probosutejo. The Suharto family forges alliances with several other Chinese businessmen, e.g. Bob Hassan, and Ong Seng Keng (alias Arief Husnie). A Lockheed memo implicates Suharto in the Lockheed corruption scandal.

1968, 7 April: Suharto authorises Jantje Lim Poo Hien (alias Harjanto) to conduct a transaction involving old landing craft, in which twelve million guilders "disappear".

1969, November: The so-called Act of Free Choice is conducted in West Papua—amid intimidation and repression.

1971: Tien Suharto announces plans to build the \$26 million "Indonesia in Miniature" tourist project. Hundreds of families are evicted from the site.

1974, January: Large student demonstrations protest against corruption and Suharto's special group of advisers (ASPRI) known for their business contacts in Japan.

1974: Suharto personally intervenes to set up Nurtanio, Indonesia's aircraft company, using money from the "State" clove account.

1975, 7 December: Indonesia invades East Timor, less than 24 hours after Suharto confers with President Ford and Henry Kissinger in Jakarta. Subsequently some 200,000 East Timorese die as a result of the invasion and occupation.

1978: Students demand that Suharto withdraw from the presidential candidacy because he has violated the constitution.

1978, July: Colonel Latief, on trial as one of the middle-ranking officers who planned the kidnap of Army generals in late 1965, tells the court he informed Suharto of this action the night before it took place.

1980, July: Kartika Ratna Thahir, the widow of a former Pertamina official alleges that the Suharto family accepted 5% and 7% commissions on arms deals with Israel and West Germany. She also alleges that Suharto condoned Pertamina's secret profits and bribery, and that Tien received gifts of expensive jewellery from Thahir when he was alive.

1981, December: In a widely distributed document, Sunardi, a lawyer, calls for Suharto's role in the 1965 events to be thoroughly investigated as a precondition for his nomination as President. "Feelings of uncertainty in society", particularly following Latief's disclosure in 1978, need to be cleared up, he says. He suggests that the May 1982 elections should be postponed until these investigations have been held.

HUNDREDS OF MUSLIMS BEING HELD

There are about 400 Muslim political prisoners in detention in Indonesia, according to Mulya Lubis, Director of the Legal Aid Institute in Jakarta. A hundred or so are in Jakarta, about 50 in Bandung and the rest are being held in major cities throughout the country (**Tempo**, November 28, 1981).

KOPKAMTIB has however refused to give any overall figure for the number of Muslim prisoners. Generally speaking, they are referred to under the blanket description of *Komando Jihad* (Holy War) though some officials maintain that this term, offensive to the Muslim community as a whole, has now been abandoned.

Muslim prisoners appear to include people allegedly involved in a number of incidents, such as the Garuda aircraft hijack of March 1981, the "Warman terror" case, the attack on a police station in Cicendo, West Java in March 1981 and the so-called "Libya connection" case.

They also include 13 employees on the staff of Parliament who were arrested in November 1981 according to the Jakarta Muslim daily, *Pelita* (see **Tempo**, November 28, 1981).

Muslim Trials

A large number of trials of Muslim political prisoners are also reported to have been held. No fewer than 27 have been held in East Java, while 15 prisoners are awaiting trial in West Java.

In North Sumatra, five persons have been tried; one man was sentenced to death, and the other four got stiff sentences of between 14 and 18 years. Another 11 are awaiting trial in Medan. In Padang, West Sumatra, three men have been tried and given sentences of from 10 and 15 years (**Tempo**, November 14, 1981).

Preparation of Documents for Trial

Who prepares these political cases for trial, KOPKAMTIB or the Public Prosecutor's Office? Considering the conflicting statements made by spokesmen for these two organs, the answer would appear to be: neither. On the one hand, a Public Prosecution spokesman declared that the preparation of documents for trials was entirely in the hands of the military. All his Office had to do, he said, was to present the cases to the court, without carrying out any investigations of its own (**Tempo**, November 14, 1981).

Admiral Sudomo however had a different story to tell. Speaking at the ceremonial transfer of the documents of one case into the hands of the Public Prosecutor's Office, he said:

"These documents are only the result of intelligence investigations", that is to say, investigations undertaken for "operational purposes". "They are not *pro justitia* investigations", he said. "We consider however that there are sufficient grounds for a trial to take place." (**Tempo**, November 28, 1981.) Considering the way things work in "security" cases, that is a view that the Public Prosecutor's Office will not feel inclined to dispute.

JOESOEF ISHAK INCOMMUNICADO

Joesoef Ishak, the publisher and journalist who was arrested on 4th October last year, is still in detention and continues to be held incommunicado.

A letter to the British press calling for Joesoef's release and demanding that his wife be permitted to meet him immediately has been signed by the following:

Alexandre Blokh, International Secretary of International PEN;

Peter Galliner, Director of the International Press Institute;

Francis King, President of the English Centre of PEN;

Hugh Lunghi, Editor of INDEX on Censorship;

Tom Maschler, Chairman of Jonathan Cape Publishing Company;

Alan Sillitoe, novelist;

Phillip Whitehead MP, Deputy Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group.

Reflecting the general lack of interest in the British press about Indonesian affairs, neither **The Guardian** nor **The Times** published the letter.

Meanwhile, the International Federation of Newspaper Publishers in Paris has informed TAPOL that it will take action on Joesoef Ishak's behalf. The **Canberra Times** published an item on 7th January, about Joesoef's continued arrest.

BRITISH JOURNALISTS PROTEST

The National Union of Journalists sent the following letter, on 15th January to President Suharto:

On behalf of the National Union of Journalists which represents 32,000 working journalists in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Eire, I appeal for the protection of journalist Joesoef Ishak, who was arrested on October 4th 1981, and has been held incommunicado ever since.

Following a previous prison term, when he was held without trial for eight years, Ishak has been banned for continuing his career as a journalist. Once again he is being held without being charged.

You are urged in the cause of justice and free speech to reveal the whereabouts of Ishak, to release him or bring charges before him at an open trial.

Kenneth B. Ashton, General Secretary

Readers wishing to help Joesoef Ishak should write to:

President Suharto,
Istana Negara,
Jalan Veteran,
Jakarta

General Norman Sasono,
Commander, Jakarta Military
Command/Kodam V
Jaya/Laksusda,
Jalan Perwira, Jakarta.

INDONESIA'S ECONOMY 1982: BOOM OR BUST?

An article on Indonesian industry in the **Financial Times'** latest **Supplement on Indonesia** (December 21, 1981) begins: "For Indonesian industry 1981 may well be remembered as the year the Government signed more multi-million-dollar contracts for new capital-intensive industrial plant than in any previous time in the history of President Suharto's 'new order' regime." In the past 12 months the regime spent around \$10 billion setting up a "sizeable" petro-chemicals industry, doubling its liquefied natural gas output and effecting a "massive" expansion in both fertilisers and cement.

Despite the growth in the manufacturing sector, the fact remains that "for a country the size of Indonesia, the manufacturing sector is still extremely small and underdeveloped, and Indonesia seems likely to remain primarily an agricultural country until well into the next century." Modern manufacturing employs just 1 million people out of an estimated labour force of over 55 million. "Even if growth rates in this sector are high it will only absorb a small proportion of the 2 million or so new entrants on to the labour market each year." In other words, though the **Financial Times** is too polite to say so, while the members of the Suharto regime reap the rewards of their own investments in themselves, the overwhelming majority of Indonesia's 147 million people can at best look forward to subsisting on an average per capita income of less than \$100 per annum.

In fact, the relative prosperity of Indonesia's (i.e. the Suharto elite's) economy in recent years has derived almost solely from petroleum and gas revenues. Petroleum accounts for 70% of the country's exports and almost 70% of government revenues (**Financial Times**, November 24, 1981). Despite the FT's basically optimistic survey of prospects for 1982, there are signs that the heady days of quick, fast profits from the regime's greedy exploitation of energy wealth are at an end. Finance Minister Ali Wardhana told the Parliamentary Budget Commission in November that "the easy and comfortable years when Indonesia was floating on oil are over" (**International Herald Tribune**, November 24, 1981). Clearly, OPEC's latest decision not to allow petroleum prices to rise came as a serious blow to Indonesia, but the longer-term outlook for Indonesia's petroleum is far more worrying. With domestic consumption rising each year, some informed commentators (see for example, "International Market Place" column in **Newsweek**, October 12, 1981) forecast that before the end of this decade, Indonesia will be out of OPEC because its petroleum exports will have become insignificant.

As early as May 1981, a confidential 600-page World Bank document severely criticised the regime's mismanagement of the economy (**Far Eastern Economic Review**, May 29, 1981; **Financial Times Supplement**, p. vii). Since then, while economic "management", Suharto-regime-style, continues as normal (*Après moi le déluge!*), and despite the regime's "open door" encouragement to foreign corporate exploitation of its oil and gas wealth, the depressing effect on world market prices of the present energy glut has re-

sulted in a radical reversal in the regime's balance of payments. Despite record 1981 oil and gas production figures, Indonesia's balance of payments is now set to plummet from surpluses of \$1.7 billion in 1979-80 and \$2.7 billion in 1980-81 to a sizable deficit (the first in 10 years) in 1982 (**Far Eastern Economic Review** July 17 and October 23, 1981; **The Times**, December 29, 1981). Soegito, Director-General for Monetary Affairs told Parliament Indonesia would probably record an overall balance of payments deficit in 1981/82 of around \$800 million (**FT**, November 24, 1981). "What he did not say", adds the **FT**, "was that on current account, the deficit would be approaching \$2 billion . . . in contrast to a \$3 billion surplus on current account last year".

The general decline in Indonesia's exports in 1981 has been such (the value of non-petroleum exports fell by 30%) that the government is now insisting that foreign companies selling to Indonesia or winning government contracts must purchase Indonesian exports in return (**Far Eastern Economic Review**, December 18 and 26, 1981). It remains to be seen whether this policy will succeed as Indonesian officials themselves admit that non-oil exports are very uncompetitive in all the crucial areas of quality, administration, transportation and banking (**Sinar Harapan**, December 3, 1981).

In addition to the negative effects of corruption and mismanagement as normal, and the severe balance of payments prospects, there are reports of growing labour unrest. Despite the repressive attentions of KOPKAMTIB (**TAPOL Bulletin** No. 48, November 1981, p. 2) and the fact that strikes are banned, **The Times** reports that "at least 100 actions by organised labour were registered around Jakarta in the first six months" of 1981, a trend **The Times** expects to increase as the 1982 "election" approaches (**The Times**, December 29, 1981). In order to try to maintain something like profitable corruption and consumption as normal, the regime has "called for belt-tightening and faces the need for cuts in routine spending in order to maintain the momentum of development [sic] at a high, albeit reduced, level" (*ibid.*)*.

All this is cold comfort for the remaining Indonesian victims of economic "development" and state repression under the "New Order". In the words of the **Financial Times** article surveying "Poverty" in Indonesia: "Indonesia remains one of the poorer countries in the world despite its large reserves of oil and gas, its abundance of natural resources and a government which has achieved a decade of rapid economic growth" (**Supplement**, December 21, 1981, p. vi). For the victims, if not the exploiters of the Indonesian economy, 1982 may prove to be a grim year indeed.

***Stop Press.** The 1982/83 budget announced by President Suharto on 5th January provides for a 40% cut in subsidies on food and fuel and a salary cut in real terms for 2 million civil servants (**Financial Times**, January 6, 1982). Prices of petroleum and kerosene, widely used for cooking, will rise by 63%.

BOOK REVIEW

Amnesty's 1981 Report: Indonesia, East Timor, West Papua, Amnesty International Publications, 10 Southampton Street, London WC2E 7HF. 426pp. £5.00.

There are a number of criticisms to be made of the recently released **Amnesty International Report 1981**. This review is confined to an examination of Amnesty's account of human rights violations from May 1980 to April 1981 in Indonesia, East Timor and West Papua (pp. 220-5).

As readers of this Bulletin well know, Indonesia launched its invasion and brutal occupation of East Timor on December 7, 1975. At least 200 thousand East Timorese have since died as a result of deliberate Indonesian terror, starvation and repression—a fate which may await most if not all of the remaining 300-400 thousand East Timorese unless effective international protest and opposition proves effective. Amnesty's record of opposition to Indonesia's bloody record in East Timor has hardly been as strong or outspoken as one would have wished. Nevertheless, it has never—hitherto—recognised Indonesia's annexation, in whole or part.

This 1981 Report marks a significant change in this regard—for the worse. While the general section is headed "Indonesia and East Timor", the accompanying map has East Timor (and West Papua) shaded as part of the Republic of Indonesia. It is impossible to regard this as accidental. It is, on the contrary, necessary to see—and condemn in the strongest possible terms—this "slip" as symptomatic of Amnesty's *de facto* (if not *de jure*) acceptance of Indonesia's annexation of East Timor.

The Report asserts (p. 225) that "all of those [East Timorese] known to Amnesty International who 'disappeared' did so after being taken into custody". This statement clearly expresses the inadequacy of Amnesty's narrow focus on just the named and "known" individual cases of human rights violations. For Amnesty, to exist is to be individually named and known. But this approach means that of necessity Amnesty must remain silent about the tens-of-hundreds-of-thousands of victims in East Timor, Indonesia and elsewhere who "disappear", suffer and die unnamed and unknown. Had Amnesty existed at the time of Hitler or Stalin, it would have been obliged to be silent about and "know" nothing of, the violation of perhaps thirty million human individuals. Significantly, Amnesty continues to have nothing to say about the massive unnamed, "unknown" number of past or present victims of Indonesian terror, starvation and repression.

The Report devotes two short paragraphs to the tens of thousands of victims of Indonesian oppression in West Papua (the Report uncritically refers to West Papua as "Irian Jaya"). We are told that in 1981 Amnesty "continued to work on behalf of three people from Irian Jaya, formerly West Irian" (p. 224) [emphasis added—PF]. Once again, Amnesty's ability to focus selectively on an iceberg tip subset of individuals in abstraction from the enormous remaining number of West Papuan victims of all forms of Indonesian violation, is scandalous. As in the case of East Timor, the facts concerning the scale and character of the systematic violation of the rights of the West Papuan people have been documented in this Bulletin.

The discussion of Indonesia proper (pp. 220-3) remains flawed by the same self-imposed myopia—not to mention more than a little politico-ideological inconsistency and confusion concerning the character of "the coup attempt of October 1965" (pp. 220, 222). Such uncritical acceptance of the Suharto regime's specious "justification" for its awesomely successful coup and massacre of 1965-6—the supposed existence of an "attempted [communist] coup"—is remarkable. Amnesty's uncritical collaboration in this falsification of the facts of Indonesian history tells us at best something about its susceptibility to ideology and propaganda.

If Amnesty is to realise its objective of speaking out on behalf of and defending the rights of the victims of political repression everywhere, it must render more consistent, radical and total its critical focus. Otherwise it will continue to collaborate by default in all those violations of humans about which it is at present silent.

Pat Flanagan

THE CIA IN INDONESIA: BUSINESS AS NORMAL

The role of the CIA in serving US corporate and state interests in Indonesia before and under the Suharto regime is well known (see, for example, Peter Dale Scott, in M. Caldwell (ed.) **Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia**, Spokesman, 1975; Noam Chomsky and Ed Herman, **The Political Economy of Human Rights** Vol. I, ch. 4.2, Spokesman, 1979). The role of CIA agents in serving these interests by no means ceases with their official retirement from the Agency, however; quite the contrary. A recent article on the money-making activities of former CIA agents in the **International Herald Tribune** (10/12/81) by Jeff Gerth, details the career and activities of former US (CIA) military attaché in Indonesia, George C. Benson.

At present the Washington representative for Indonesia's state-owned oil company Pertamina, Benson served as "the key military intelligence attaché" in Indonesia for nine years and was, according to the IHT, "the American with the closest ties to the Indonesian generals" who took power "with covert US support" in 1965. "He also served as the Pentagon's expert on Indonesian affairs".

After leaving government employment, Benson was hired in 1973 to head Pertamina's Washington office. According to Benson, when he was hired, then Pertamina head Ibnu Sutowo told him: "We need an office in Washington, we need someone we know well . . ." Asked straight out whether he got his private job because of his government contacts, Benson said: "Absolutely, that's the only reason they hired me". In 1980, Benson was receiving at least \$15,000 a month for his services to Indonesian (and American) corporate and state interests.

A PLEA

To those of our readers who responded to our appeal for financial assistance, we express warmest thanks.

To those who haven't got round to sending us something, we remind you that our needs are very pressing, if we are to continue to work at our present level and intensify our work as the situation so clearly demands.

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