

Tapol bulletin no, 48, November 1981

This is the Updated version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1981) Tapol bulletin no, 48, November 1981. Tapol bulletin (48). pp. 1-16. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No 48

November 1981

Editorial

DON'T TRADE WITH MASS MURDERERS

The main item in this issue is an interview of Eliezer Bonay who served as what he himself calls "a puppet" of the Indonesians, as their first Governor of West Irian. In this interview he said:

From 1963 till 1969, up to the time of the so-called "referendum" — in fact there never was any referendum — 30,000 people were murdered. All that happened up to 1969, particularly from the time of the people's rebellion in Manokwari in 1965. They kidnapped people, one by one. Anyone under suspicion in the regions was killed. Many villages were bombed during a number of rebellions, in Manokwari, in Enarotali, and in many other places. Up to the time of the so-called "referendum" alone, 30,000 people were murdered. Then many more were killed after 1969, in 1975, then in later years.

In January 1975 (TAPOL Bulletin No 8), we quoted extensively from reports by a Dutch journalist, Henk de Mari, in De Telegraf (11, 12 and 19 October, 1974) which also gave a figure of 30,000 killed in the first period of Indonesian rule in West Papua. He described in detail one example of mass killings that he was able to investigate. We reproduce this (see box, pages 8-9) because it provides independent testimony of what Eliezer Bonay told TAPOL in his interview.

We all know plenty about the 1965-66 mass killings of at least half a million people in Indonesia, and about the estimated 200,000 people killed in East Timor since Indonesia's invasion in 1975. The mass killings in West Papua are much less widely known, but they too must be added to the list of barbaric crimes for which Indonesia's present rulers are responsible.

Western governments choose to turn a blind eye to this record. For them, the present situation in Indonesia means "good business", as Britain's Minister of Trade clearly believes (see page 15). In fact, they are doing business with mass murderers; they act with great speed to remove awkward obstacles to trade (like Britain's tactless quota system on textile imports from Indonesia, quickly removed on Mrs Thatcher's instructions) in order to sell more Hawks and other military equipment to a government that has for 16 years been engaged in a consistent pattern of bestiality to stamp out any resistance to their rule.

Much still needs to be done to alert world opinion to the horrors of life under military domination, in Indonesia, in East Timor, in West Papua, and in other places like Aceh. Bonay's interview will, we hope, be a contribution to this.

Much still needs to be done to expose the cynicism of governments which turn a blind eye to crimes committed by a regime which offers them attractive markets after having eliminated all political opposition by the most bestial of methods.

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KOPKAMTIB INTERVENTION IN LABOUR DISPUTES INSTITUTIONALISED

The year 1981 has seen a significant move towards institutionalising the role of the Army in intervening in labour disputes.

KOPKAMTIB, the Army's security agency, has now become an integral part of the government's mechanism to supervise and control the entire area of labour disputes. This has been ensured by the creation of a new body called Assistance Team for Labour Problems (Team Bantuan Masalah Perburuhan) with direct KOPKAMTIB participation. The Team, set up in July 1981, is formally headed by the Department of Labour (Depnakertrans) and also includes representatives of other government departments, of employers' organisations and of the Army-controlled trade union federation, FBSI. KOPKAMTIB's role in bringing about the creation of this Team was underlined by the presence of Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB Commander, at the Team's installation in July. (Merdeka, 14 July, 1981)

Speaking at a conference of "workers' representatives" in Jakarta a month later, Sudomo described KOPKAMTIB's role in this Team as "passive". He said: "KOPKAMTIB will remain in the background. Only if a problem cannot be settled will KOPKAMTIB help to reach a settlement. (Angkatan Bersenjata, 28 August 1981.)

In fact, KOPKAMTIB's is the opposite of "passive". Its regional executive officers, the LAKSUSDAs, were instructed, in a secret radiogram from KOPKAMTIB in February this year, to intervene directly when "activities by workers and instigators . . . are leading towards disturbances in security . . . and national development." (See box for the text of this radiogram.)

The constant use of the term "security disturbances" in Sudomo's speech and also in his radiogram to the LAKSUSDAs clearly shows that the Army will use the antisubversion laws and the very severe penalties they stipulate, against workers who take action in defence of their rights.

Yap: "Workers Need Not Obey the New Team"

Expressing disquiet about the creation of this new organ, the human rights lawyer, Mr Yap Thiam Hien declared recently that the Team "has not been enacted by law and it is therefore not necessary for workers to comply with its decisions". According to the labour laws in force, the agencies charged with handling labour disputes are the regional and central arbitration committees. (Kompas, 17 July 1981)

He went on to say, however, that the trouble is that workers have lost confidence in these arbitration committees, which is why so many workers involved in disputes have resorted to taking their complaints direct to Parliament. This is hardly surprising, said Yap, for it is no longer a secret that the arbitration committees have fallen under the control of the employers.

Sudomo Warns: "Strikes Won't be Tolerated"
In his speech to the conference of "workers' representatives" referred to above (which took place at Hotel Kartika

Chandra, one of Jakarta's super-luxury hotels) Sudomo warned workers not to use the strike weapon in their disputes with management. "Leftist groups are beginning to re-emerge in Indonesian society and disturbances such as strikes and the like could be utilised by them for their own purposes."

He told his audience that strikes are not only harmful to the interests of the workers and the employers but also disrupt economic stability. Therefore, in the coming period, "strikes will not be tolerated". There are signs that the increased conflict between workers and employers is leading towards the use of violence and force. "This is what makes me afraid that they will eventually cause disturbances in security and economic stability." Ankatan Bersenjata, 28 August, 1981). In fact, the only real increase is in State violence.

KOPKAMTIB INSTRUCTION

In a secret, cabled Instruction to all regional military commanders, in their capacity as regional executive officers (LAKSUSDA) of KOPKAMTIB, the Commander of KOPKAMTIB, General Sudomo, has ord-dered direct military intervention in labour disputes.

The Instruction, a copy of which recently reached TAPOL, is numbered TR.40/KOPKAM/II/1981 and bears the date, 12th February 1981.

The full text of the radiogram reads as follows:

- A. In order to bring order to labour disputes in each respective region, the LAKSUSDA should encourage the parties concerned to employ the mechanisms for settlement as provided for by the regulations in force, namely:
- 1. through official, bipartite forums.
- 2. through official tripartite channels.
- 3. through the regional arbitration committee (P4D) and, as the last resort, the regional arbitration committee (P4D) at the centre.
- B. To prevent the defence of workers' disputes from being handled by individuals or organisations outside the channels of the FBSI law team or other official law agencies requested by the workers.
- C. In the case of activities undertaken by workers and instigators which are leading towards disturbances in security and in the implementation of national development, the LAKSUSDAs should take steps in accordance with the existing powers and guided by Presidential Decree No. 7, 1963 (concerning anti-subversion? TAPOL).*
- D. The recipient to whom this is addressed should draw up an inventory of workers' basis-organisations, and should report each development to the Commander/Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB.

(slightly abridged)

* The Anti-subversion Law was PP No 11/1963. The sense of this paragraph suggests that this is the presidential decree (PP) being referred to, although the number 7 is written. If any reader knows what PP7/1963 deals with, please let us know.

JOESOEF ISHAK: JOURNALIST AND PUBLISHER

Joesoef Ishak, one of the two directors of the publishing company, *Hasta Mitra*, was arrested on 4 October this year and is being held *incommunicado*. He spent a month at Military Police headquarters in Guntur, Jakarta before being moved to a Jakarta Military Command Centre in Jalan Kramat V.

Prior to his arrest, Joesoef had been under continual harassment from the authorities since August last year when Hasta Mitra published *Bumi Manusia*, a novel by Pramoedya Ananta Toer and followed this up by the publication of *Anak Semua Bangsa* by the same author. Both he and the other company director, Hasyim Rachman were repeatedly summoned for interrogation. On 29 May this year, the two books were banned and the company had to abandon its plans to publish other works by Pramoedya.


Joesoef was born in Sumatra in 1927 and commenced his career as a journalist soon after the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945. After working several years for local newspapers he moved to Jakarta and eventually joined the staff of the nationalist daily, Merdeka. One of his special interests was writing music reviews. As an active member of the Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI), he attended several international meetings and conferences held to create an organisation of Asian-African journalists. The Asian-African Journalists Association set up its head office in Jakarta with another Indonesian journalist, Djawoto, as General Secretary. After Djawoto left Jakarta to take up a post as ambassador, Joesoef took over as Acting General Secretary, the position he held at the time of the military takeover in October 1965. Several employees of the AAJA were arrested and the organisation was



At the demonstration outside the Indonesian Embassy.

soon compelled to transfer its head office elsewhere.

Joesoef remained free and continued to work as a journalist until 1968 when he was arrested along with many others in a sweep against journalists said to have 'infiltrated' the 'new order' media. He remained in detention without trial for seven years, and spent most of that time in Salemba Prison, Jakarta.



After his release, he was unable to return to journalism, one of the many professions strictly closed to ex-prisoners. So, together with Hasyim Rachman, also an ex-prisoner, he eventually set up Hasta Mitra.

Joesoef's arrest in October this year followed in the wake of renewed pressures exerted by the authorities on Pramoedya Ananta Toer for having given a lecture at the University of Indonesia in September. Joesoef's son, Verdi, one of four students being held responsible for convening the meeting at which Pramoedya spoke, was also arrested, and held for several days (see separate item).

All attempts to meet him by members of his family and by representatives of the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute who wish to act on his behalf, have so far been unsuccessful. Nothing is therefore known about the reasons for his detention nor about his state of health. There is considerable concern on the latter question as he has a serious heart condition and suffered severely from this during his earlier period of detention.

Joesoef was spotlighted in *The Times* weekly "Prisoner of Conscience" column on 17 November 1981.

Appeals for his immediate release should be addressed to:

President Suharto General Norman Sasono, Commander

Istana Negara KODAM V/Jaya

Jalan Veteran (Jakarta Military Command)
Jakarta Jalan Perwira, Jakarta

Please make your concern about Joesoef known too to the Indonesian Embassy in your country.

DEMONSTRATION AGAINST BOOK-BURNING IN INDONESIA

10,000 copies of *Bumi Manusia* (This Earth of Mankind) and *Anak Semua Bangsa* (Child of All Nations), the two novels by Pramoedya Ananta Toer which were banned in Indonesia on 19 May this year, were burnt in Jakarta on 22 October, on the orders of the Attorney-General.

In protest against this new act of barbarism, demonstrations were organised outside the Indonesian embassies in London and The Hague on Tuesday, 27 October. The London demonstration, called at very short notice, with nearly forty people present, was attended by Salman Rushdie, the Indian writer who had just been awarded the Booker Prize for Literature, for his novel *Midnight's Children*. Josephine Pullein-Thompson, General Secretary of English-PEN, and George Theiner, Deputy Editor of INDEX on Censorship, also attended, together with members of TAPOL, the Malaysia and Singapore students' association, FUEMSSO, the Philippines Support Group, the Ad Hoc Group for Democracy in Thailand and the British Campaign for an Independent East Timor.

Letters protesting against the book-burning were handed in to the Embassy by Salman Rushdie and by representatives of TAPOL, English-PEN and INDEX on Censorship.

Not The First Time Books have been Burned

Tempo reports (14 November 1981) that in fact book-burnings are nothing new in Indonesia. Susandi, a spokesman of the Attorney-General's Office, is quoted as saying that books previously burned include Atheist by Achdiat K. Mihardja, and the defence pleas of student defendants tried

during 1979. Not only books, he boasted. "We also burned many copies of the Tampomas cassette." (This included a song considered as being offensive to Mrs Suharto, the President's wife. TAPOL). Susandi complained that the foreign press had got it wrong about the number of Pramoedya books burned. The impression being created is that Indonesia is a country unfamiliar with civilisation, particularly as the number of books burned is given as 10,000. In truth, according to the Attorney-General's Office, it was 972. Less uncivilised because fewer copies were burned? Yet, now we know that book-burning is a regular practice in Indonesia. All we can say is that it is a great pity we didn't know this when we demonstrated outside the Indonesian Embassy on 27 October. Our protest would certainly have included all these other victims of cultural barbarity.

Susandi acknowledged that the book-burning had aroused protest abroad. "We don't care about that. We are consistently implementing the people's sovereignty." The books, he said, were burned in compliance with a decision of the People's Consultative Assembly banning dissemination of Communist-Marxist-Leninist teachings.

Tempo adds that the foreign protest referred to is probably the letter published in the international press, signed by 28 writers from 14 countries, protesting against the ban on Pramoedya's books. "Almost all the signatories are well-known people," writes Tempo, "and they do not come from any one particular (political) stream. It is not yet possible to determine the effect of this letter on Indonesia's name abroad. What is certain is that it has had a major impact for the name of Pramoedya."



At the demonstration outside the Indonesian Embassy.

Letters of Protest

From Salman Rushdie . . .

To Whom It May Concern:

Pramoedya Ananta Toer is Indonesia's finest living novelist. His books *This Earth of Mankind* and *A Child of All* have led both Dutch and Indonesian critics to describe him as a possible Nobel Prizewinner.

From 1965 to 1979, Pramoedya was jailed by the Indonesian Government, mostly on Buru Island, a sort of Far Eastern version of South Africa's Robben Island. Although he has now been released, he is the victim of continual police harassment and interrogation.

In May 1981, his two acclaimed novels were banned. He is at present forbidden to leave Jakarta without permission, and cannot leave Indonsia at all, although he has in the past been encouraged to go into permanent exile abroad. Now comes the news that the Indonesian authorities have just carried out an anto-da-fe in which 10,000 copies of Pramoedya's books were burned.

The persecution and banning of writers and their work creates constant — and necessary — indignation and outrage when the persecutors are geographically close to ourselves. It should arouse equal anger when it takes place far away.

By burning books, the Indonesian Government has revealed something very ugly about itself to the world. It has placed itself in a long and ignoble tradition among whose dark luminaries are the Spanish Inquisition and the Nazis.

In this of all years, when Elias Canetti's prophetic novel Auto-da-Fe has been honoured by the Nobel Prize, I hope that many writers, publishers and readers will wish — as I do — to condemn all those who stifle freedom of expression and build bonfires out of the precious fuel of the printed word; and to protest against the persecution of Pramoedya Ananta Toer.

From Francis King, President of the English Centre of PEN...

I am writing on behalf of the English Centre of PEN.

We understand that Mr Pramoedya Ananta Toer is being harassed by the authorities, that his books have been burned and his publisher imprisoned.

We deeply regret that this should be done in a country whose treatment of the creative artist we had begun to respect, and we ask that our fellow writer and PEN member should be allowed to write in peace and that his publisher should be released from prison.



George Theiner (INDEX), Carmel Budiardjo (TAPOL) and Salman Rushdie, at the entrance to the Indonesian Embassy in London.

From INDEX on Censorship

We have heard with dismay that the distinguished Indonesian author Pramoedya Ananta Toer, only recently released after 14 years of detention, is again being subjected to harassment and that his books have been banned by the authorities. We are also most concerned about reports that a large quantity of the books have actually been burned in Djakarta.

Our organisation was founded 10 years ago with the aim of defending the freedom of writers and scholars everywhere in the world, regardless of nationality, race or politics. We therefore appeal to you to convey our protest at the treatment meted out to Pramoedya Ananta Toer to your government who will, we hope, see fit to lift the ban on his works and the restrictions on him and his publisher.

Hugh Lunghi

Director



"No Culture Treaty With Bookburners". The demonstration at the Indonesian Embassy, The Hague, 27 October

HOW SUHARTO SUBVERTED CONFRONTATION

So, now it has come from the horse's mouth — the story of how General Suharto, in close collaboration with General Ali Murtopo, subverted the Sukarno government's policy of confrontation with Malaysia.

For a regime that rests its claim to legitimacy so firmly on the use of the anti-subversion laws, the shamelessness with which the story of Suharto's own act of subversion has now come to light is surely one of the great ironies of contemporary Indonesian history.

For Suharto has now explained that soon after he was appointed Deputy Commander of the **Dwikora Operation** (the 'Dual-Command' Operation set up in early 1965 by Sukarno to implement the policy of confrontation with Malaysia), he secretly initiated approaches with the help of a few officers to bring confrontation to an end.

"If it is true," asks Tempo (22 August 1981) in a detailed report on the events leading to reconciliation between Indonesian and Malaysia, "that the Army at the time fully supported President Sukarno's policy of confrontation, why was it that secret initiatives were taken by people within the Army leadership to bring about reconciliation?" The answer to this question was given in a speech by President Suharto at a ceremony held in August this year to mark the 15th anniversary of the end of confrontation, incidentally the first time the event has ever been publicly celebrated. Suharto said:

If confrontation had not been speedily ended, our two kindred peoples would have fallen into the communist strategy trap. The Army leadership was afraid that if confrontation continued to be intensified, all the best troops of our Armed Forces would have had to confront Malaysia, thus making Indonesia 'empty'. This could have been utilised by the PKI to realise its proposal for the formation of a Fifth Force.

This secret betrayal began as early as May 1965 with the launching of Suharto's own Operasi Khusus (Special Operation) and the dispatch of a secret military mission to Malaysia, led by General (then Lieutenant-Colonel) Ali Murtopo. Ali Murtopo who was Suharto's First Assistant for Combat Operations in KOSTRAD, the Army's Strategic Command of which Suharto was then commander, was appointed 'Project Officer' of this Special Operation.

All this was happening at a time when virtually all organised political activity in Indonesia was being directed towards supporting Sukarno's policy of Confrontation. Men and women who, in their enthusiasm for this policy, went to the Halim air base outside Jakarta in late September for para-military training as 'confrontation volunteers', have spent years in prison for 'subversion.; their presence at Halim made it appear as if they were in some way involved in the so-called 'Untung abortive coup' against the Army leadership. Some are still in prison, serving long sentences or under sentence of death for this, not to mention the hundreds of thousands who were killed in the slaughter which followed in the wake of the coup which really happened and which was clearly of Suharto's own making.

DEFEND PEASANTS AND TAKE THE CONSEQUENCES!

Lawyers who defend peasants are more and more taking the risk of being charged themselves on totally spurious grounds. Two instances have come to light recently in East Java.

Guilty Verdict Despite Evidence from Almost All Witnesses In the first case, a "barefoot" lawyer, Umardani, who took up the case of hundreds of peasants in Blitar, East Java was charged in court with having 'misappropriated funds' from his clients. Although all 42 peasants testifying at the trial vehemently denied this, he was found guilty and sentenced to 1½ years. The only witness to testify against the lawyer was a military officer.

The land dispute concerns 240 hectares of land in the villages of Madongan and Karangrejo which were seized by the authorities in 1966, shortly after the military takeover. The peasants received a total of 7 hectares "in compensation" plus meaningless payments which anyhow lost their value altogether with the currency devaluation later that year. The peasants refrained from claiming their land back at the time out of fear they would be branded as

'PKI'. Their living conditions deteriorated sharply as they watched the seized lands producing profitable coffee crops for a private company. Some of the land was being used for clove cultivation by the local military command. Aggrieved by this injustice, they asked Umardani to help them get their land back. They each contributed Rp 5,000 to cover his expenses and this is the money he is now said to have missappropriated.

When the verdict was announced in court, Umardani was so angry that he threw a chair at the judges and when this missed, he attacked them with a wooden block. "I was driven so mad by that unjust and very damaging verdict that I didn't know what I was doing," Umardani told a Tempo journalist afterwards in his cell.

While he sits out the last two months of his sentence, having already spent one year and four months in detention, Umardani intends to appeal against the verdict. But he now faces new charges because of his outburst in court. (Tempo, 5 September, 1981)

Lawver Handed Over to KOPKAMTIB

In the second case, Franz Gunawan, who took up the case of ten peasants in the village of Manggis, Kediri District, has been handed over to the LAKSUSDA, the regional

Continued on page 16

FORMER GOVERNOR OF WEST IRIAN INTERVIEWED BY TAPOL

Eliezer Bonay, the man whom the Indonesian government first appointed governor of West Irian in May 1963, escaped from West Irian to Papua New Guinea in 1979. He went to Sweden in June 1981, having been forced to go there against his will, and is now living there as a political refugee.

Eliezer Bonay was the leader of the West Papuan pro-independence party, Parna at the time Indonesia took over formal administration of the country in 1963. In an interview with Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL, he spoke of his experiences as governor, and later as a political refugee in Papua New, Guinea. Two other Papuan refugees, D. Kafiar and Christopher Waney, also took part in the interview which took place at the hostel for political refugees in Flen, Sweden, on 19 September 1981. The first part is published below. The rest will be published in our next issue.

At the time of Indonesia's takeover of West Papua, you were, I believe, very much involved in the independence movement there. Please describe the background and the developments following the Indonesian takeover.

Before the New York Agreement was signed, on 15th August 1962, preparations were under way in West Papua New Guinea for the granting of independence in 1970. At the time I was acting Chairman of the Partai Nasional (Parna). Like other nations in the world, we too wanted independence. For 12 years, there had been hostility between Holland and Indonesia over the future of West Papua but neither country had firm grounds to decide the issue in their favour. During discussions in New York that led to the New York Agreement of 1962, the Papuan people were never involved. If they had been involved, the outcome would have been quite different. True, both Indonesian and Dutch delegations took Papuans with them to the UN but they were just sent off with pocket-money for sight-seeing, and were never involved in the discussions. Nicholas Jouwe went with the Dutch delegation and Silas Papare went with the Indonesians. I wasn't there at all.

When the New York Agreement emerged, the Papuan people believed they would have the chance to exercise their right to self-determination but this never happened despite that international agreement.

How did it come about that you were appointed Indonesia's first governor of their new province?

The decision to appoint me was taken by President Suharto. The Indonesians knew I was acting chairman of Parna, a party that was in favour of independence, so they thought: "Let's get hold of the man who has led the struggle for independence. If we appoint him governor, the matter will be solved." They thought that if I became governor, I would forget all about independence.

I never wanted to become governor but they forced me to accept. I had never dreamed of any such thing. I rejected their offer. I didn't want to be used by them. I said this to de Freitas, the official from the Indonesian Foreign Ministry who came to tell me I had been selected by Sukarno for the job. When I turned it down, he said I would have three days to re-consider. But two days later, he came to see me again and pressed me to accept. When I refused again, he threatened me, saying I would be killed and others would be killed as well. When he said this, I knew of course that we in Parna would continue to struggle for independence during the transition period (up to 1969). But what about others? If the killings took place as threatened,

they might stop thinking altogether of fighting for a Free Papua. So in the end, I had to accept.

Some people think that I began to oppose Indonesia only after I was dismissed as governor. That is completely untrue. I always opposed the Indonesian takeover and favoured complete independence.

What were your experiences during your time as governor? At first, I believed that the Papuan people would have the right to decide their fate in 1969 in accordance with the New York Agreement [which provided for the holding of a referendum called an "Act of Free Choice" — C.B.]. But as soon as the Indonesians arrived in our country, totally unexpected things began to happen. There were numerous brutalities, thefts, torture, maltreatment, many things that had not happened before. People were arrested in many different places: the prisons everywhere were full. Even under Sukarno such things were happening. It became especially bad after 1965.

Weren't you, as governor, able to do anything to prevent this, or to raise problems with the government?

No. They ran everything themselves. There was an institution of provincial leadership in those days called the Panca Tunggal (Five-in-One) consisting of the four Armed Forces chiefs besides the governor, and the governor was nothing more than a puppet. Later, after 1965, the system came to be known as the Muspida. All decisions were taken collectively by the Army, Navy and Air Force chiefs together with the Public Prosecutor. In all regions, the Armed Forces commanders took the decisions, but this was particularly the case in West Irian which was then covered by an international agreement, the New York Agreement, and was therefore treated differently from other regions.

How did Indonesian officials who were sent to West Papua behave?

I should explain that during the time of confrontation between Holland and Indonesia, the Dutch government ordered their people to leave for home, taking only their clothes and leaving their household goods behind, because they would get compensation from the government. When the Indonesian came, they took literally everything, cassettes, television sets, even air-conditioners firmly installed in walls. All of them, officials and soldiers, behaved in the same way. Our people looked on, and laughed to themselves, thinking: "Is this how they are going to run things here, taking down

mirrors, wall fixtures, dismantling everything and taking it all away?"

Was there nothing you could do to stop this?

As I said just now, I was nothing more than a puppet.

When were you dismissed? And why?

I held the position for 19 months, from May 1963 until September 1964. I didn't agree with measures that were being taken at the time, but my dismissal came very suddenly and I wasn't told the reason. When I went to Jakarta, I asked Subandrio (then Foreign Minister): "What did I do wrong?" but I never got any reply. I was transferred to the Interior Ministry in Jakarta, as a senior official seconded to the Ministry. It was quite impossible to raise anything there about what was happening in West Papua. I had been "put on ice", and I had no function at all, so in 1966, I returned home. To use the expression, I had been "pushed aside". When I returned home, I was no longer a government official. Then I became involved in political activities. I did many things but maybe I'll be able to tell you about them some other time.

During that time, was any regional development taking place?

Nothing really, except in the field of education. Thousands of Papuans were taken to Indonesia for education. There was no physical development going on at all.

Did you feel that injustices were being committed?

Oh yes, even as early as 1962 and 1963. People were already being forced to make statements declaring that there should be no referendum in 1969. The Indonesians used these statements, saying, "Look, it's not necessary to hold a referendum."

How did the Indonesians get people to sign statements like this?

They gave them things, took them to Jakarta, treated them well. Students, leaders in the community and others. Paid their way, wrote out statements for them to sign. They used refined methods, not threats.

Then, when things changed . . .

Oh, nothing changed. In 1964 there was still a governor but he too could do nothing.

I mean when the military took power in Indonesia, when Sukarno lost power.

Things got even worse. From 1963 till 1969, up to the time of the so-called "referendum" - in fact there never was any referendum - 30,000 people were murdered. All that happened up to 1969, particularly from the time of the people's rebellion in Manokwari, in 1965. They kidnapped people, one by one. Anyone under suspicion in the regions was killed. Many villages were bombed during a number of rebellions, in Manokwari, in Enarotali, and in many other places. Up to the time of the so-called "referendum" alone, 30,000 people were murdered. Then many more were killed after 1969, in 1975, then in later years.

After the 'New Order' of Suharto was established, they adopted a different policy, didn't they? Whereas Sukarno had been saying no referendum was necessary because the people had already expressed their desire to be part of Indonesia, Suharto decided that a referendum should take place. He presumably wanted to show the world how democratic thing were, didn't he?

No referendum ever took place.

VILLAGERS M

From a report by Henk de Mari in De Telegraaf, 11,12, and M

"We publish only those stories that our reporter noted down from the lips of people who were involved themselves, who saw it happening, or who immediately afterwards happened to talk to the survivors. And further, only the stories of wilnesses whose reliability is acceptable according to representatives of the Roman Catholic and Protestant missions.

"The mass murders are said to have taken place on the west coast of the island of Biak in June 1970. What the immediate case was is not immediately clear. Members of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka are said to have fired at Indonesian soldiers in the jungle on the west coast. In the process, ten soldiers are said to have been killed. An Indonesian patrol of 50 red-beret and green-beret soldiers then went on a punitive expedition.

"The kampongs of Wusdori and Kridori, built on piles along the beach, were visited by the patrol. The villagers knew the patrol was coming and they fled, not because they had in any way been involved in the OPM but because they were, as is usually the case, afraid of Indonesian soldiers. It often happens, even to this day, that troops misbehave: they rape women, kill pigs, and demand food and drink without payment. "When the patrol reached the two kampongs, all they found

I am referring to that "Act of Free Choice".

There was never any Act of Free Choice either. They themselves said quite bluntly that it would not be organised according to international practice. But it wasn't even organised according to Indonesian practice. Neither method was used. Indonesia's method of musyawarah* was not used, it simply wasn't used.

In 1968, the West Irian regional assembly (DPRD) adopted a decision demanding that the method of 'one person, one vote' should be used. The government rejected this and the DPRD was dissolved.

There was no musyawarah at all. The government simply appointed 1025 tribal chiefs, most of them illiterate people. They set up a new council, the Dawan Musyawarah Pepera (pepera is the abbreviation for penentuan pendapat rakvat. or 'determining the people's opinion'). And just imagine! Of these 1025 people, so many were chosen in Fak Fak, so

(*) Musyawarah: consensus through consultation.

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many in Merauki, and so on. If there was supposed to have been a musyawarah, all these people should have met together, but that never happened. They all stayed in their own regions and voted in those places. And before voting took place, they were housed in pre-fabricated buildings brought especially from Jakarta (as if we don't have enough time in West Papua!). Each of the groups of people stayed in their own regions where they were coached on what to do and how to vote. They never all came together for any musyawarah. For a period of time before the 'act' was scheduled to take place, for two weeks beforehand, they

MURDERED...

ld 19 October 1974:

were deserted huts... The patrol moved on without destroying anything. Next day, the villagers moved back....

"The rule is that when a patrol visits a Papuan kampong, all the villagers must report on the village square. Anyone failing to so is regarded as a member of the OPM and therefore an enemy. The fact that the villagers had left when the patrol came turned them all into enemies.

"After the villagers had been back for two days, the soldiers returned and encircled the villages. All the inhabitants were driven to an open space between the two kampongs, and the men, 25 from Wusdori and 30 from Kridori, were forced to dig a large hole.... That hole became their grave for they were all shot to death. The women and children were forced to look on....

"The day after the mass murder, the soldiers came back with some 30 Papuans, presumably from neighbouring kampongs. They were not known to the villagers of Wusdori and Kridori. The soldiers took the boats of the villagers they killed the day before and forced the 30 Papuans into the boats. Stones had been tied to their necks, and not far from the shore, the Papuans were thrown overboard and drowned."

Taken from: Tapol Bulletin No 8 January 1975.

were isolated from society and told what to do. They were guarded by soldiers. One person only was chosen to speak, then all the others just said, yes, yes, yes. Voting took place in each of the regions. The people in Merauki knew nothing about what the people in Fak Fak were doing and so on.

During that whole time, these people were not allowed to have contact with anyone, not even with their wives and children. The government used these emergency buildings so that everything could be controlled by the Army.

Yet, the UN was willing to accept that?

Yes. When I read the report made by Ortis Sanz [the UN observer of the "Act of Free Choice"] it was really strange, there were so many things he didn't even mention at all.

There has never been any referendum in West Papua. If there had been, the people would have been able to decide. They would not have needed to rebel. And don't forget, before the 'pepera', 30,000 people had already been killed. Then afterwards, rebellions took place everywhere and many more were killed.

(To Kafiar): What was happening at the time in Jayapura?

I was still going to senior secondary school at the time, and I already began to take part in political activities. we were very active in the schools, supporting the rebellion led by Fritz Awom in Manokwari in 1965, and elsewhere. From 1965 onwards, people all over the country were making preparations for an act of self-determination. Many small organisations were set up, supporting the principle of self-determination. School-pupils were very much involved in all this. Everyone was in favour of an act of self-determination. But then, things like this were not allowed and many school pupils were arrested and thrown into prison. Then some of us set up **Petanah (Pembela Tanahair** — Defence of the Motherland) and took over these school organisations because they had been suspended and prohibited from doing anything.

Did you all agree that a plebiscite should take place? And that you should oppose joining Indonesia?

We concentrated on explaining to people that the method used should be one person, one vote. In support of this demand, we organised a demonstration in Jayapura on 11th April, 1969 just before the plebiscite was to take place. We wanted to tell the regional government that this principle should be used. We planned to march to the DPRD building, demanding the right to self-determination. But this wasn't possible. They brought out panzers and other things and prevented the demonstration from taking place. Some of the leaders were arrested on the spot and thrown into prison.

How many people took part?

Very many indeed. Not only students, also government employees, people from all strata of the community.

(Bonay): It was the largest demonstration that had ever taken place in Jayapura. The demand raised was limited to the principle of one person, one vote. It was all very orderly. People were just walking in a very orderly fashion, with leaflets and posters. That's all.

(Kafiar): I personally didn't take part in the demonstration as I had already joined the guerrilla movement and I had a special task to do at the time.

Many organisations had been set up to demand a proper plebiscite but they were not allowed to function, so nothing was achieved by that movement. What the Indonesians did was just bring some tribal chiefs together, and they made sure these people would give their vote to Indonesia.

Is it true that the government was saying that anyone not agreeing that West Papua should become part of Indonesia was a traitor or a Dutch puppet?

(Bonay): Yes, but not only that. They were beaten and maltreated too.

10 48 November 1981

(Kafiar): Yes, and some of those who didn't want West Papua to become part of Indonesia disappeared altogether.

In June 1971, I was arrested in Jayapura and detained in a police cell. There were 15 of us altogether. Ten were released and five of us remained in detention without trial till 1972. Then, after being held for a year, we were tried and each of us got sentences of between 2 and 2½ years. After the trial, we were transferred from the police cell in Jayapura to the prison in Abepura. Then early in August 1972 (I think it was on the 2nd August), one of us was kidnapped.

Even after he had been tried?

Yes, even after being tried and sentenced. His name was Martin Luther Waring. He completely disappeared. Later on, we tried to trace him with the help of the security section of the Social Institute (Lembaga Kemasarakatan) but we were never able to discover anything about what happened to him.

(Bonay): I would like to add something here. One of the reasons Indonesia gave in 1969 for holding the pepera in the way they did was that the Papuan people are still ignorant and don't know how to vote. Yet, the funny thing is that in 1971, these same people had to vote in the general elections. As a matter of fact, the people had already participated earlier in elections, under the Dutch. These elections took place in 1961, for a Papuan Council. In 1969 Indonesia said that they were too ignorant, illiterate, and then two years later, they were all compelled to vote. This time, it was in the Indonesian elections. Strange, isn't it?

(To be continued)

OPM OFFENSIVE: TWO PLANES SHOT DOWN

OPM troops have launched a series of offensives in the past few months near and inside Jayapura, the capital of West Irian, according to OPM sources abroad. The first attack was on 1 August, in the Paui District, 13 kms from the capital. More than 250 Indonesian troops were killed; the OPM lost 51 dead.

On 9 September, OPM troops attacked the prison in Abepura where OPM prisoners are being held. They did not release anyone but caused a lot of damage. According to Tempo (24 October) which carried a long report about renewed military activity in West Irian, "the prison warders fled and the attackers destroyed the prison offices." (Tempo as well as AFP both give the date for this attack as 9 October.)

On 14 October, OPM troops attacked a lumber company, PT Hanura, on Holtekan Highway, taking 50 hostages. According to Tempo and AFP, they were later released. The OPM reports that when Indonesian troops were dropped in the region after the kidnapping, their troops shot down a Dakota/Merpati plane.

The third major encounter took place in Genyem/ Nimboran and Ceycloop, near the border with Papua New Guinea, and on this occasion too, according to OPM sources, a Hercules plane was shot down. AFP also confirms that a Hercules was "attacked from the surrounding hills near (Sentani) airport", and quotes Indonesian military spokesmen as saying that "a massive military operation" is underway from their side to deal with the new offensive.

In a fourth encounter, on 7 November, in the Arso/Jayapura district, 20 Indonesian soldiers were killed, according to OPM, who themselves sustained severe injuries among their troops.

The AFP report mentions an incident not referred to in the OPM reports, namely that several young women, "hoisted the OPM flag in the yard of the governor's office (in Jayapura) a few days before the attack (on Abepura prison) occurred". (Sources: Representative of the National (De Facto) Govt. of West PNG abroad, 22 November 1981; Tempo, 24 October 1981, and AFP, 13 October 1981.)

Number of OPM Prisoners

OPM sources abroad have provided the following breakdown of OPM prisoners being held in the period June-August 1981:

Jayapura	141	Manokwari	97	Sorong	16
Biak	52	Nabire	43	Enarotali	64
Seroei	34	Wamena	123	Merauki	94

VILLAGERS MALTREATED

From August to October this year, a large number of people in the district of Merauke left their villages and went into the jungle to join the OPM forces. As a reprisal, the Army arrested some 500 people and subjected them to the following forms of treatment:

- -they were each forced to swallow bullets;
- pistols were thrust into their mouths and held there for 30-45 minutes;
- men and women were forced to drink their own urine;
- women and girls were forced to strip naked and were repeatedly raped;
- those considered to be OPM leaders were then kidnapped (presumably this means taken to unknown destinations and made to disappear, Ed. TAPOL), while the remainder are still being held in underground cells.

(Source: OPM representative abroad, 22 November 1981)

Continued from page 14

The Faculty's Student Senate was also disbanded on 19th October, "in order", according to the Dean of the Faculty, Professor Tobias Subekti, "to prevent a repetition of student activities that are damaging to the Faculty and the University". Students' reaction to this is, to quote Bunga, Deputy Chairman of the Student Consultative Body, as follows: "We will certainly resist but don't ask us yet what form this will take." (Sources: Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 October, and Tempo, 24th October 1981.)

IN MEMORY OF SIAUW GIOK TJHAN

When Siauw Giok Tjhan died on 20 November, we in TAPOL lost a close and dedicated friend and supporter.

Writing so soon after the news of his death, it is difficult to offer an assessment of his many, varied contributions to political, social and cultural life in Indonesia since the time he first became involved, almost fifty years ago, as an activist in the Partai Tionghua Indonesia (Indonesian Chinese Party). What stands out most vividly in my mind at this moment are the many meetings I had with him and Ibu Siauw, discussing the things we should be doing to help those in Indonesia who are suffering from the injustices of the present regime.

Bung Siauw himself spent 13 years, from 1965 to 1978, as a political prisoner without trial. For the first ten of these years, he was held in Salemba Prison, Jakarta, then he was allowed home for health reasons but spent another three years under house arrest then under town arrest until he was finally "returned to society" on 1 May, 1978. Shortly afterwards, he went to Holland for medical treatment and remained there until his death.

For me, Bung Siauw was one of those few, cherished friends among Indonesians living abroad who remained totally committed to helping his friends and colleagues back home. He was an activist in the finest sense of the word. He remained in constant contact with his many friends at home and abroad. He assiduously read current political publications not just as an academic exercise but in order to respond - often with anger and indignation, never with cynicism - and to share his responses with others. He was always doing things himself and encouraging others to act. And, despite his failing health, he spent much of his time, especially since the anti-Chinese racist attacks in Java late last year, speaking to Indonesian students abroad in many parts of Europe about the problem closest of all to his heart, the realisation of proper integration of the Chinese in Indonesia which is the central them of his last published work, Lima Jaman (Five Periods). * It is symbolic of the substance and style of the last few years of his life that he died soon after collapsing as he was on his way to a student meeting in Leiden to talk about this very topic.

One of his last efforts only a few days before his death was to propose to us that Amnesty International should be urged to include in its forthcoming Campaign on Disappearances the cases of hundreds of thousands of people who disappeared in Indonesia during and after the massacres that occurred in the wake of the military takeover in late 1965. This was a matter he had taken up with TAPOL nearly two years ago, soon after reading that the UN Human Rights Commission had set up a Working Group on Disappeared Persons. How could such a campaign be limited to people who were disappearing now? What about all the disapperances in Indonesia since 1965? Was it not necessary to insist that the Indonesia government should be made publicly accountable for them? These were the reasons why he urged TAPOL to take up the issue, and in doing so, he supplied us with information about the disappearance of



many people and was largely responsible for the detailed material we published in TAPOL Bulletin No 39 (May 1980). Just imagine, if all Indonesians abroad made such concrete contributions to our work (and there's no denying that many people know just as much as he did), our bulletins could appear at twice the length and still not reproduce all the material made available to us.

My own last meeting with him was at his home in Amsterdam, less than two weeks before his death. He and Ibu Siauw had just returned from a visit to their children and grandchildren in China, during which he had spent a lot of time, much to his dismay, in hospital, having medical check-ups. It could well be that the doctors told him then that he didn't have much longer to live, but to me he was as lively and welcoming as ever. We spent the evening with several Dutch and Indonesian friends watching some films about Pramoedya Ananta Toer, Jacob Piry and other extapols in Jakarta, and discussing what to do to help them.

Bung Siauw always exuded optimism and his optimism was very contagious. There was no trace of bitterness or cynicism in him, only deep sincerity and down-to-earth commitment. Having had the chance of meeting him often during the past three years, it is not easy to contemplate work in future without Bung Siauw. As some friends have said, when someone like that dies, the only way to mourn is to redouble your own efforts. That is absolutely true but it doesn't lessen the pain and sadness of losing such a good and invaluable friend.

Carmel Budiardio

^{*} Lima Jaman, published by Yayasan Teratai in May 1981 is available (in Indonesia) from Stichting Informatie Indonesia, Postbus 4098, 1009 AB Amsterdam. 25 guilders

AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The UN Decolonisation Committee adopted a resolution on 9th November which again stresses that the East Timorese people should be allowed to exercise their right to selfdetermination. It also expresses deep concern at reports of famine in East Timor. The resolution calls upon Portugal, the East Timorese people and Indonesia to co-operate with the UN to enable the right of self-determination to be exercised.

Voting on the resolution was 58 for, 40 against, and 42 abstentions. Last year, voting on a similar resolution was 58 for, 36 against and 46 abstentions.

The following correspondence has appeared in The Times on the question of East Timor:

THE TIMES TUESDAY NOVEMBER 3 1981

East Timor invasion

From Lord Avebury

Sir, Evidence indicating that Britain and her allies, while making the right noises in public about the right of the people of East Timor to self-determination, East Ilmor to self-determination, were at the same time secretly encouraging the Indonesians in their aggression against that country has been available for some time. That such charges have now been made on Portuguese television (The Times, October 13) therefore comes as no surprise.

On December 10 last year, I initiated a debate in the House of Lords on this very matter. I referred to a secret letter from the British Ambassador to Indonesia to the Foreign Office of July 1975, the text of which had been published in a book which appeared a few weeks earlier in

Australia.

As far as the Ambassador's advice, to "keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indonesian Government", is concerned, this has indeed happened as is apparent from Britain's voting record on the annual resolutions tabled at United Nations General Assemblies. voting Nations Apart from one occasion in 1975 Britain has repeatedly abstained on resolutions calling for an act self-determination Timor, despite the Government's stated belief that such an act has not yet taken place, and its declarations on a number of occasions that Britain does not recognize Indonesia's integration of East Timor.

Meanwhile, news of a new offensive in East Timor has recently come from church sources there and Indonesia. Virtually the entire surviving male population is being conscripted in an operation aimed at forcing all

resistance fighters into the open. A report submitted in June this by the East Timor regional assembly, whose members were certainly appointed by the Indo-nesian Government, details gross human rights violations by Indonesian troops and widespread corruption and malpractices by Indonesian military personnel in charge of the economy.

While I consider that it is still necessary to pursue the issue of Britain's past role concerning Indonesia's invasion, the most crucial issue today is for western governments, including our own, all of whom have close economic ties with Indonesia, to press for immediate withdrawal of Indonesian troops from East Timor, and to work to create the necessary conditions for the people of that war-torn country to exercise their right to self-determination.

Yours faithfully. AVEBURY, House of Lords.

PRESIDENT NYERERE **ON EAST TIMOR**

We have always worked together at the UN or nonaligned nations' conferences. We are happy that Indonesia has always been in support of our anti-apartheid and anti-colonialist movements. We hope that Indonesia will refrain from trading with South Africa, no matter how attractive the offer. Some nations claim that trade and politics are two different things. Young nations, however, cannot afford to be cynical.

President Nyerere, at a press conference in Jakarta on 12th October 1981, according to Antara News Agency.

During his State Visit to Indonesia, President Nyerere of Tanzania said his country would continue to support UN resolutions on East Timor though it would no longer sponsor them "out of respect for Indonesia". At the same time, he spent the major part of his visit discussing ways of strengthening the economic ties between the two countries. If this is not an example of regarding trade and politics as two different things, then what is? To accept "anticolonialist support" over South Africa from a country engaged in its own colonial war of aggression is surely just about as cynical as you can get.

Editor's Note

A month before the Indonesian Charge d'Affaires' letter appeared in The Times, the Jakarta English-language daily. Indonesian Observer (6 October 1981) carried an AFP/ Antara report from Canberra about East Timor, the concluding paragraphs of which are in stark contradiction with Tarmizi's disclaimers. They read:

A Foreign Affairs Department spokesman meanwhile said yesterday that the Ministry had instructed the Australian ambassador to Indonesia to seek details on Indonesia's present "pacification" campaign in East Timor.

The campaign, known as "Operation Keamanan",* is aimed at rounding up remnants of the Fretilin forces.

*Operation Keamanan or Security Operation is the Indonesian Army's code name for the offensive referred to in Lord Avebury's letter.

THE TIMES TUESDAY NOVEMBER 10 1981

East Timor

From the Indonesian Chargé d'Affaires (a.i.)

Sir, Lord Avebury in his letter (November 3) dramatises a so-called "new offensive" in East Timor as if this were a fact. There is no truth whatsoever in his description of a quite normal military exercise, carried out as a matter of routine.

Indonesia is a large country and it has to undertake military exercises to be ready to defend itself - manoeuvres such as are carried out in most countries. It so happens that, this year, Timor was chosen as the area in which the annual manoeuvres staged.

There is no true ground for Lord Avebury's statement that

"virtually the entire surviving "virtually the entire surviving male population is being conscripted in an operation aimed at forcing all resistance fighters into the open". By using the emotive words "resistance fighters" he is trying to suggest that there is an opposition force Noncense—the opposition force. Nonsense people of East Timor are trying to work together to develop the country.

A second implication is that Indonesian troops are incapable of carrying out their own military operation. If this were really the case then Indonesia would have collapsed during the days in which it had to struggle for its independence. independence.

Yours sincerely AGUS TARMIZI. Indonesian Embassy 38 Grosvenor Square, W1.

EAST TIMOR: PORTUGAL'S ROLE REVEALED

The cynical collaboration of the Western powers in the criminal Indonesian annexation of East Timor has been further exposed by the leaking and subsequent release of a 1,000-page secret government report in Lisbon last month. The report officially confirms claims made earlier in October on Portuguese television concerning the knowing complicity of the 1974-5 Portuguese government in the Indonesian takeover (see Jill Jolliffe, The Guardian, 12 and 17 October, and John Torres, The Times, 13 and 14 October). It is now clear that the Portuguese government wished to abandon-rather than discharge-its decolonisation obligations concerning the East Timorese as soon as possible, leaving East Timor defenceless and helpless for the Indonesian takeover. To this end, Portugal together with the American, British and Australian governments held secret talks with Indonesia in 1974. (The Suharto regime made clear its annexationist intentions to the Western powers in 1974.)

The latest revelations in Portugal confirm the sordid diplomatic betrayal of the East Timorese by the Western

powers, already documented by Richard Walsh and George Munster in Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, 1969-1975, published in defiance of an Australian government ban in November 1980. For example, a secret cable from the British Ambassador (in Indonesia) to the Foreign Office in July 1975 said in part: ". . . it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should absorb the territory as soon and as unobtrusively as possible; and that if it comes to the crunch and there is a row in the United Nations, we should keep our heads down and avoid siding against the Indonesian government."

In the light of the facts, the present Portuguese government's vote in support of the recent UN resolution on East Timor (see this Bulletin, page 12), like the British government's vote of "abstention" must be taken for what it is. Rhetoric and hypocrisy aside, nothing has changed since the 1974 betrayal in the Western powers' policy of compliant acquiescence in the Indonesian takeover. Meanwhile, the East Timorese victims of Western (and specifically Portuguese) complicity continue to suffer and die.



This photograph was sent to TAPOL in October. It shows a Fretilin prisoner being forced to stare at the sun until he goes blind. The sign on the hut reads: "Batugade Border Post".

The photo, taken at great risk, was shot from a distance, and had to be enlarged for reproduction. The more distant figure in white is wearing a helmet and the position of his left arm suggests he is holding a weapon, though this is indistinct against the background.

Although the photo has worsened in quality with enlargement, we decided to publish it, the only photo ever received from East Timor of an act of torture in progress.

THE CHARTER OF 61: OPPOSITION OR COLLABORATION?

On August 21, 1981, a group of 61 "opponents" of the Suharto (New Order) regime, headed by erstwhile New Order "hawk", H.R. Dharsono, issued a Charter to Uphold Law, Justice and the Sovereignty of the People in Accordance with the Aims of the New Order. The signatories include such seemingly diverse figures as General A.H. Nasution, Ali Sadikin (former mayor of Jakarta), Ibrahim G. Zakir (a student leader tried with others in 1979 for "insult"), Hoegeng (a former Police Chief), Mohamad Natsir (former Prime Minister) and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara (a leader of the 1958 PRRI CIA-backed rebellion against Sukarno.) Other critics of New Order "Justice", such as human rights lawyers working with the Legal Aid Institute (LBH) are significantly absent. If nothing else, the Charter is a revealing symptom of the ideological and political hollowness of respectable 'Opposition' to the regime's practices.

The Charter's fundamental demand is a return to the "purity" of the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila ideology. The signatories criticize the New Order for its deviations from these principles (Rule of Law and the five Pancasila principles: (1) Belief in God, (2) National Consciousness, (3) Humanism, (4) Social Justice, (5) Democracy). In addition, the Charter calls for the prohibition of "Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Neo-Colonialism, Militarism, Feudalism, together with all forms of Autocracy, Dictatorship, and Totalitarianism which conflict with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution". It calls for an economic system "in accordance with the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, free from colonial domination, repression and exploitation by foreign capitalism or national capitalism in any form", and appeals for freedom of expression for individuals and organizations, for the abolition of corruption and for free elections. It rejects KOPKAMTIB and "all forms of military pacts and foreign military bases."

There are two fundamental problems with all this. First, far from constituting a serious ideological or political challenge to the system of authoritarian domination economic corruption of the Suharto regime, the Charter ignores the fundamental contradiction between its acceptance of the "Aims of the New Order" and its call for a return to the Pancasila principles and the 1945 Constitution. Such uncritical acceptance is predictable, however given the role of some of the signatories in supporting the Suharto regime's 1965-66 Coup and Massacre. In truth neither the 'Old Order' (Sukarno regime) nor the New Order has paid real attention to either Pancasila or the Constitution. Their principles are in practice merely empty noises which the wielders of State power invoke to 'justify' their conduct, and which opponents use to criticize 'deviations' from these ideals. In using the empty ideology of Pancasila to 'criticize' the policies of the New Order, the Opposition is - wittingly or unwittingly - collaborating in the regime's abuse of power in the name of Pancasila, for its own ends.

Second, the Charter's signatories fail to address the problem of (a) how a 'return' to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution would suffice to abolish the evils of national and foreign capitalism, KOPKAMTIB, foreign alliances and bases etc.; and (b) what real-world alternatives for the prevailing economic and State institutions the Pancasila ideology provides. In truth the Pancasila consists of ideological abstractions, not realizable alternative social-politicaleconomic institutions.

Far from constituting a serious alternative to the criminal domestic and foreign policies of the Suharto regime, the Charter merely symbolizes the intellectual and political bankruptcy of its loyal — collaborationist — "opposition". Fortunately opposition to New Order "Justice" is not confined to such 'respectable', 'responsible' critics.

FOUR STUDENTS EXPELLED: STUDENT SENATE DISBANDED

Four students of the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Social Sciences have been expelled for 'engineering' the lecture meeting in September at which Pramoedya Ananta Toer, the author, spoke about the role intellectuals. The Faculty's Student Senate has also been disbanded.

The four students, Rafendi Djamin, Widi Krastawan, Verdi Jusuf (the son of Joesoef Ishak, see page 3), and Alexander Irwan, were under arrest for several days early in October. Pressure for their expulsion came from KOPKAMTIB but the Rector, Dr Mahar Mardjono was unwilling to comply, according to the Far Eastern Economic Review, and personally asked KOPKAMTIB Commander, Admiral Sudomo, for assurances that the matter be handled by the university because "he was upset by what he considered an infringement by the government of the autonomy of the university".

The students were released soon afterwards. A few days later, the University Disciplinary Committee recommended that the students be expelled "for undermining the Rector's authority" and "undermining the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution". The Rector issued his expulsion order on 19th October.

Thus, the Rector had no interest in defending the students, only in defending what he considers to be "the university's autonomy", namely the chance to carry out the expulsion through university machinery rather than appearing to act on direct instructions from KOPKAMTIB.

While this shadow-boxing was going on, the students were again summoned by KOPKAMTIB for interrogations lasting six days. According to information made available to TAPOL by independent sources, they were under pressure to admit that Pramoedya's lecture "contained Marxist teachings" and to say who it was who first suggested that Pram be invited to speak.

Continued on page 10

BRITISH INVESTMENTS IN INDONESIA INCREASING

A large delegation of 60 British businessmen, "the largest ever to visit Indonesia", according to Indonesian officials, attended the second British-Indonesian Business Meeting on Trade and Investment in Jakarta, in October this year. The delegation was headed by Britain's Minister of Trade, Peter Rees.

At a press conference before leaving Jakarta, Trade Minister Rees said he looked forward to a "large-scale expansion in Britan's trade with and investment in Indonesia. British businesses are particularly interested in setting up joint ventures in Indonesia and in the transfer of advanced technology, especially in communications and transport.

A major new advance for British capital in Indonesia is the joint venture to be set up between Dunlop, a company that has operated in Indonesia since 1928, and PT Intirub, the Indonesian state-owned rubber manufacturing company. The new plant, to be set up in Cilegon, West Java, at a cost of \$ 150 million will be financed with assistance from the Commonwealth Development Coroporation.

Other major British companies benefitting from expanding commercial ties with Indonesia are the construction company, Balfour Beatty and British Insulated Callenders Cables (BICC). These two companies are currently involved

in negotiations with the Indonesian government for a huge construction contract to handle a major share in setting up the high-pressure electricity transmission system now being built throughout the island of Java. The trade resulting from this contract could increase the cumulative value of Balfour Beatty's exports to Indonesia over the past few years to a total of \$\mathbb{S}\$ 400 million.

Trade Minister Rees stressed that the conflict that arose between Britain and Indonesia over Britain's imposition last year of quotas on the import of textile goods from Indonesia had "long since been resolved". He had not explained that the Thatcher government had reacted so speedily to resolve this crisis so as to safeguard Britain's exports to Indonesia of Hawk ground-attack jets and other military equipment.

New British capital investments in Indonesia since Suharto came to power include a total of 43 projects, altogether worth \$ 95.6 million. (This does not include projects currently under negotiation).

At the end of his visit, the British Trade Minister also announced that Indonesia's Minister of Research, Dr Habibie, would be visiting the UK soon. (Sources: Pikiran Rakyat, 9 October, and Tempo, 17 October, 1981.)

Letters to the Editor

Thank you to those who responded to our request for letters. We look forward to receiving many more for the next issue. Additional information from you or

Dear TAPOL,

I was very interested to read your item "US Green Berets in East Timor?" (TAPOL BULLETIN, No. 46, July 1981, p.9). Since the December 1975 US-backed Indonesian invasion, there have been persistent, periodical reports in the Australian (non-mainstream) press to this effect, along with reports of Australian and British "counter-insurgency" advisers (see, for example various items over the years in Nation Review, Tribune and East Timor News).

In fact, as part of the global anti-communist drive of the Kennedy administration, American "counter-insurgency" "advisers" began operating in Indonesia (under the cover of the so-called "civic action" programmes also practised in Latin America and Vietnam) as early as 1963 (see T. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 631-3; R. Mrazek, The United States and the Indonesian Military, Vol. 2, pp. 76-7; H. McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia, p. 34). By this time, these "advisers" were already called Green Berets (see Sorensen).

In the light of these facts, the presence of American Green Berets in East Timor would seem almost certain. As early as 1970, for example, American Green Berets were openly training Indonesian troops in "counter-insurgency" and other "pacification" projects in both East and West Java (see P. Britton, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, July-Sept. 1975, p. 20; and M. Klare, in M. Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years' Military Terror in Indonesia, p. 270).

Yours sincerely, (Professor) Bruce McFarlane Dept. of Politics, University of Adelaide.

This reminds us to correct errors in the item to which Professor McFarlane is responding. The second sentence in the first paragraph should read: "Recent reports suggest that six Green Beret advisers..." (the figure six was left out). Also, the two columns in this piece were placed in the wrong order. In fact, the item begins, "The aggressive defence of US..."

Editor, TAPOL

requests for more information from us are particularly welcome.

Editors, TAPOL

Dear TAPOL,

I feel I ought to mention a mistake in the translation of the letter from the *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Timor Timur* to the President of Indonesia (TAPOL Bulletin No. 47, September 1981, p. 7).

The word "high-minded" for mulia can definitely be misleading. This was a letter written by members of the Indonesian regional parliament to their President. It seems extremely doubtful to me that they would have used mulia to mean "high-minded" in an official plea to their Paymaster. That is to say, of course, unless we are to assume further that these members were in such defiant a mood that they could not care less if they lose their jobs.

Translating between distinctly different cultures being (very often) quite tricky, the word mulia would probably have been best left unmentioned in the translation. If it must be translated, then "august" is, to my mind, more faithful to the "spirit" of the original.

Fraternally, Taunus Kemasang London

Dear TAPOL,

Can you please print in one of the next issues whether there are any translations into English or German of the works of Pramoedya Ananta Toer. I think not only I am interested. Thank you. Many dear greetings.

Erik Appeltofft Esstingen, West Germany

Yes, we have received several requests like this. We hope to publish a list in our next issue.

BOOK REVIEW

Olle Tornquist & Hendrik Amahorseja, Ost-Timor — det glomda kriget, (East Timor — the forgotten war), (in Swedish) Stockholm 1981, 69pp.

In Sweden, a Timor committee has existed for several years, and now the group has published this small book. It is written by Olle Tornquist, a Swedish Indonesia-specialist, who covers the period up until December 1975, and Hendrik Amahorseja, an Indonesian living in Sweden, who deals with the period after the invasion. Both writers are members of the Swedish group.

One can criticise this book for some weaknesses. In the first place, they forgot to indicate the publisher. The existence of the group is mentioned once in the text, but the address is not given, (see below).

Secondly, they have not referred to such standard works as Jill Jolliffe's book East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism (1978) or Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman's The Political Economy of Human Rights (1979). Instead, they list many other which, by comparison, seem less essential.

Thirdly, they have not used any of the many hearings held by the US Congress since 1977, during which much important information emerged because spokesmen from the US administration were pressed to account for American foreign policy in detail.

Finally, there are some confusing typographical errors, and, on page 16, something appears to have been left out: Olle Tornquist writes that Jose Ramos Horta visited Indonesia in 1974, and continues: "The visit was very useful which is clear from the following letter from Adam Malik, then Minister of Foreign Affairs." A photocopy of Malik's letter to Horta should apparently have been placed here, but there is nothing. The letter is important, since Malik here assures Horta that East Timor has a right to self-determination no matter who governs the country, a promise he did not keep. However, it cost him nothing: today he holds the rank of vice-president. A copy of his 1974 letter can be found on page 16 of An Act of Genocide by Arnold Kohen and John Taylor, a TAPOL publication (1979).

However, these objections must not overshadow the fact that the book is both well written and well documented. It exposes the double standards of the Swedish government which on the one hand has voted in favour of Timor's right to self-determination in the the UN while on the other hand exporting weapons to Indonesia. Lately, however, the double standards have come to an end: during the UN vote in 1980, Sweden for the first time did not support the Timor resolution, and has since then asked to join the IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia), an organisation of Western countries giving economic assistance to Indonesia.

The book also contains an appendix with FRETILIN's program which is moderate and nationalist.

As the first comprehensive account in a Scandinavian language on an issue which is often ignored by the mass media, this book by Tornquist and Amahorseja is both important and worth reading.

The book is available from the Swedish Committee, address c/o Eva Belfrage, Odelbergsvagen 68, S-121 63 Johanneshov, postal giro account 1 81 92-5, price 20 Swedish crowns.

PEASANTS VICTIMISED

Thirty peasants from the village of Bajongrenged, Tangerang, in West Java are soon to be tried for trespassing and tilling land that is now in the hands of a group of senior officials and their wives.

The land, 21 hectares in all, had been tilled by these peasants and their families since 1935 until they were ordered some time ago to vacate it because it was going to be used as the site for a new Tangerang military command (Kodim) headquarters. No Kodim headquarters was built however. Instead, the land was handed over to a group of senior officials and their wives for their own personal use. Feeling that they had been tricked, the peasants decided to re-occupy the land and start tilling it again. For this, they are now to be charged.

The Jakarta Legal Aid Institute has announced that it will defend the peasants when their case comes before the Tangerang District Court. (Merdeka, 4 July, 1981)

Continued from page 6

KOPKAMTIB officer. Gunawan had been invited to visit the Bupati (district chief) and when he turned up, thinking this was a routine affair, he found himself confronted by military officers, officials and journalists.

"You are helping PKI elements formerly under regular reporting requirements. I therefore regard you as being like them and am handing you over to the LAKSUSDA," said the Bupati, as he handed Gunawan to an officer present in the room. Gunawan is now apparently under arrest.

The peasants who had appealed to him for help complained that village officials forced them to hand over their land 'for development' and gave them totally inadequate compensation. When Gunawan investigated the title-deeds, he found evidence of manipulation and wrote to the Minister of the Interior requesting that action be taken against the officials in question.

With Gunawan now in the hands of the LAKSUSDA, the officials have announced that they intend to charge him for 'insult'. The Bupati who handed him over to KOPKAMTIB has told the press that "there are strong suspicions that Gunawan has collaborated with and helped ex-PKI elements engaged in provocations". (Tempo, 24 October 1981).

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