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
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## PRAMOEDYA'S BURU NOVELS BANNED

Two novels written by Pramoedya Ananta Toer while a political prisoner on Buru island have been banned by the Attorney General, Ismael Saleh, on the instruction of KOPKAMTIB.

The two books, **Bumi Manusia** and **Anak Semua Bangsa**, part of a quartet of books dealing with the early beginnings of the nationalist movement in Indonesia, were published last year to widespread national and international acclaim. (For a review and reports regarding the publication of the books, see **TAPOL Bulletins** No. 41/42 September/November 1980, and No. 44, March 1981.) They both became instant best-sellers; **Bumi Manusia** has been reprinted five times (a total of 45,000 copies) and **Anak Semua Bangsa** has been reprinted twice. It is understood that following this ban, it will not be possible for the remaining two books in the quartet, **Jejak Langkah** and **Rumah Kaca** to be published.

The Attorney General's ban, issued on 29th May, prohibits "the keeping, possessing or trading of the books. All those who keep, possess or trade the books must hand them over to the local public prosecutor's office in order to be sent to the Attorney General's Office". The pronouncement states that the Attorney General issued the ban after getting "a letter from the Commander of KOPKAMTIB K-22/Kopkam/V/1981 concerning prohibition of the circulation of **Bumi Manusia** and **Anak Semua Bangsa**".

It asserts that the books have "caused various responses in society and . . . developed and influenced the security and order situation." As for the author, the Attorney-General's ban accuses him, "through the skills and fluency of his pen, of having been able by means of historical data to slip in Marxist-Leninist data in subtle, hidden ways".

### Sudomo: Pramoedya "May Still Write"

A few days after the ban was announced, Admiral Sudomo, Commander of KOPKAMTIB was quoted by **Kompas** (4 June 1981) as saying that "Every Indonesian citizen, including Pramoedya Ananta Toer, is allowed to write books.

There is no law prohibiting anyone from writing books." But, he added, once the books are published, they will be evaluated and, if they contain things connected with ideological matters, "it falls within the Attorney-General's powers to ban their circulation." Sudomo recalled that when Pramoedya was released, he made a pledge not to engage in political activity. (**Kompas** wryly adds that Sudomo did not explain whether he thought that writing books could be said to be a form of political activity.)

### Anti-Pramoedya Campaign

The ban was preceded by a well-orchestrated campaign in a number of cities in April and May, during which a number of people, who had apparently held special meetings to discuss the books, made a series of sharp attacks on Pramoedya. Setting the tone for the campaign was a meeting lasting several days, held in Jakarta, at the end of which a group calling itself the Group-of-17 issued a statement demanding that Pramoedya's books be banned and that he should not be permitted to write any more. It called for both the prohibition of the books and the destruction of all copies. Although the Group-of-17 claimed to include representatives of the Indonesian Council of Churches (DGI) and the Indo-

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nesian Bishops' Conference (MAWI), both these organisations denied this. In fact, they had both turned down invitations even to attend the conference at which the books were discussed. (**Tempo** 6 June 1981)

Typical of the kind of attacks made during this anti-Pramoedya campaign are statements quoted by **Pelita** (7 April 1981) reporting from Ujungpandang. The chairperson of the Makasar Arts Council described Pramoedya's books as "a threat, defiling the eternal moral values of Pancasila" and warning that all works from the pen of a communist writer "will always be oriented towards his ideology". A leading member of the Muslim students' organisation, HMI, in Ujung-Pandang referred to communist literary works as "a cultural sub-system which can disrupt our national resiliency".

A lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Hasanuddin University felt that the books were "of no educational value" and were "in conflict with our National Education Programme". A GOLKAR leader also spoke about the books "undermining our national resilience" because they contain "poisonous sentences". A member of the Ujungpandang Regional Assembly went one better than this, actually quoting a sentence that falls in this category. The sentence, taken from **Bumi Manusia**, is-

"My son, we have resisted as well as we could, and in the most honourable way possible."

This, he claimed, was really intended as a reference to the PKI's unsuccessful attempts at resistance in Indonesia.

### **Mahbub Djunaedi: Pram Should Get the Nobel Prize**

A totally different view was expressed by the well-known Muslim writer and journalist, Mahbub Djunaedi who is quoted by **Pelita** (18 April 1981) as describing Pramoedya's two novels as being "without parallel". They were both, he said, well up to the best standards of world literature. In his opinion, Indonesian literature had stagnated during the period Pramoedya was on Buru island. Nothing had appeared to compare in calibre with any of his works.

"The themes developed by Pram are the creations of a true nationalist who is deeply devoted to his people, who has succeeded in exposing the horrors of colonial society. It is probably because of this that Professor Teeuw\* has said that Pramoedya should get the Nobel Prize for Literature. And I fully agree with him," said Djunaedi.

According to recent reports from Jakarta, the media has now been ordered to avoid any references to Pramoedya even to the extent of not mentioning his name. Pramoedya's own response to this hysteria on the part of the authorities is well summed up in the statement he made a day or two after the ban had been imposed (**Tempo**, 6 June 1981)-

"I don't feel guilty of anything. I am not responsible for the charges and opinions of others about the books I write. My books are an expression of my innermost feelings, and my innermost feelings are in no way directed towards communist teachings. I am a writer and I will never stop writing."

\*Foremost Dutch scholar of Indonesian literature.

## **INTERNATIONAL — PEN PRESIDENT PROTESTS**

The following is the text of a cable sent to President Suharto on 6th June 1981 by Per Wastberg, President of International PEN:

The great writer of Indonesia, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, has had his works, written under his detention period, forbidden by the Procurator-General. International PEN urges you to reconsider this action against an author who has been mentioned as a candidate for the Nobel Prize.

## **A HUNDRED MINUS SIX**

A four-volume collection of Indonesian short stories covering the period from the forties to the seventies was compelled to appear minus six stories that had been selected by the editor, Satyagraha Hoerip. The excluded stories were the works of six writers deemed by the government to have been involved in the G30S/PKI. They are:

Pramoedya Ananta Toer  
Bakri Siregar  
Ananta Piola  
S. Rukiah  
Suprijadi Tomodihardjo  
Nyoman S. Pendit

With only 94 stories left, the title of the collection which should have been, **A Hundred Short Stories, A Hundred Writers** had to be changed to, **Indonesian Short Stories**.

The compiler was clearly angered by the government's insistence not to include these writers, and told **Tempo** (30 May, 1981): "It is not possible, in my opinion, to study the development of the Indonesian short story without including one from Pramoedya."

However, since the collection was published by none other than the Department of Education and Culture's Centre for Language Guidance and Development, the exclusion of Pramoedya and the other five authors is, perhaps, hardly surprising. After all, this was the very Department that took the step of banning Pramoedya's two Buru novels months before the Attorney-General had decided to do so.

## GOVERNMENT WARNS AGAINST ELECTION BOYCOTT

In the midst of press reports that some political groups in Indonesia may be planning to organise a boycott of the forthcoming general elections, due to be held on 4th May 1982, General Amirmachmud, Minister of the Interior and chief of the General Elections Agency, has warned that the government "will take stern measures against anyone—individuals or groups— who incite others not to exercise their voting rights in the forthcoming elections".

He drew attention to Article 27 of Law 15/1969 which threatens penalties of up to five years' imprisonment for anyone "who deliberately disrupts, obstructs or disturbs the smooth running of the elections". Similar penalties can be imposed on those who use force or the threat of force to prevent others from voting. (*Tempo*, 18 July 1981)

Amirmachmud's threatening remarks followed quickly on the heels of a meeting held in Jakarta on 4th July by the Marhaen People's Movement (Gerakan Rakyat Marhaen—GRM) where it was announced that the GRM would pursue a policy of not voting at the forthcoming elections

because it considers that "the 1982 general elections are of no use". Copies of a statement outlining this policy have since been sent to the President, to the Minister of the Interior and other state functionaries.

In a statement issued on 4th July, the GRM called upon Indonesian people not to take part in next year's general elections. It condemned the current election laws as unconstitutional. For example, the restrictions on who can contest as candidates is a violation of the right to organise.

The GRM meeting was attended among others by Abdul Madjid, formerly of the PDI (from its national/PNI wing) who has recently been recalled as a member of parliament. Abdul Madjid together with four other PNI members of parliament refused to attend the PDI Congress held earlier this year; they have since refused to recognise the executive council set up at the Congress. They have all been expelled from the party and re-called as MPs.

"Just as people have the right to call upon others to vote so too is there a basic human right to call upon others not to vote," said Madjid. This could not be termed 'incitement', he added. Another former PDI member, Slamet Ginting, also now in the GRM, said that there are no grounds whatever to threaten legal action against people who exercise this right.

It is not possible, according to Abdul Madjid, to judge the success or otherwise of the elections by the number of people who turn out to vote. People may go to the polling booth only in order to tear up their voting papers, destroy election symbols or in other ways render their vote invalid. "Rather than do that, would it not be better for people not to go to the polling booth at all?" He said that elections had to proceed in an atmosphere of complete freedom, and this must include the freedom to vote or not to vote.

Reporting these opinions, *Tempo* (18 July 1981) commented that these moves were rather different from the GOLPUT (Golongan Putih or White Group) movement launched at the time of the 1971 elections. That was a movement that urged people to pierce only the white part of their voting papers as a sign of protest. A few weeks before the 1971 elections took place, the GOLPUT movement was banned.

General Yoga Sugama, till recently Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB. Although he is now officially pensioned, he still retains his post as chief of the intelligence agency, BAKIN.

*Tempo* (11 July 1981) reports Sugama as saying that he joined the Army because ever since he was a child, he loved seeing people in military uniforms, and because he was greatly inspired by the Japanese Army in Indonesia. For a man who has publicly compared his powers in KOPKAMTIB to those of Himmler's, this admiration for the Japanese fascist army of occupation comes as no surprise.

*Tempo* also reports that his military career included a period of training at the Japanese Military Academy and in the early 1950s a course on military intelligence in Britain.



*TAPOL recently received a copy of a verbatim report of the interrogation of a pensioned soldier questioned about his role in the murder of two Papuan detainees being held by the Army in West Irian. The two men were murdered in 1976. The fact that the incident occurred more than 4 years ago does not deter us from reporting it now. Information of this nature often takes years to reach us, if we ever hear about it at all.*

*The interrogation took place in December 1980 on the orders of the senior intelligence officer of the West Irian Military Command. The document does not explain why the interrogation was taking place 4 years after the event nor whether the Army officers believed to have been responsible for the murders are likely to be prosecuted.*

*The incident described is certainly not an isolated event and could well be a fairly accurate description of the way many detainees, subsequently reported to have disappeared, met their fate.*

The man under interrogation is named Soeyoto, 50 years old, a Christian, already pensioned from the Army, living in Jalan Rawa no. 1, Hamadi. He was interrogated on Saturday 27th December 1980 by 1st Sergeant Damianus Wenheden of Section I<sup>1</sup> (Intelligence) of the West Irian 17th Military Command/Cendrawasih. The document states that Soeyoto was interrogated "because he is thought to have taken part in *mengamankan*<sup>2</sup> murdering two detainees named Pilemon Wenda and Oscar Kaso who were being held by the Abepura Regimental Command." It is not made clear whether Soeyoto was under detention at the time of his interrogation, nor what later happened to him.]

(We have excluded some questions and answers in the translation to avoid repetitions).

**Question-** Whilst with Military Resort Command 172 (Korem 172), what duties were you charged with, and in what position?

**Answer:** I was attached to Section I/Coding, then under the command of First Lieutenant Drs Imam Subekti, head of Section I.

**Question:** Did you know that the detainees had been deposited at *Ki A*.<sup>3</sup> 753 in 1975?

**Answer-** Yes, I did.

**Q:** What was the case in connection with which the two men were arrested by Korem 172?

**A-** Some time in 1969, I forget the date, Pilemon Wenda of the GPL<sup>4</sup> murdered two soldiers at the Pyramid Post, Jayawijaya. He was arrested by District Military Command 1702 and later released by (West Irian) Military Commander, Brigadier-General Sarwo Edhie.

**Q:** Explain why Pilemon Wenda was arrested by Korem 172?

**A:** It had been reported that he was active in the GPL because he was in Abepura, and so he was arrested by Korem 172.

**Q:** On whose orders was Pilemon Wenda arrested and detained?

**A:** I don't know for sure, but the matter was handled by Section I.

**Q:** Who were the Korem 172 Section I men in charge of this?

**A:** All the members of Korem 172 Section I; 1st Lieu-

tenant Drs Imam Subekti, 2nd Sub-Lieutenant Soeyoto (me), 2nd Sub-Lieutenant Supangat, 2nd Sub-Lieutenant Bargowo, 2nd Sub-Lieutenant Siran, Sergeant Wiro Sudarmo, 1st Sergeant Kapitarauw, 1st Corporal Sarni, 1st Corporal Sarimin.

**Q:** Was there a written order from Korem 172 to Battalion Command 753 that detainees were to be deposited with *Ki A* 753?

**A:** It was with the agreement of Section I head/Commander of Korem 172 and Commander of Battalion 753 that the two detainees in question were placed in *Ki A* 753 because the Korem cells were full of detainees.

**Q:** Please describe the process by which the two detainees were *diamankan*.

**A:** Acting on the orders of 1st Lieutenant Imam at 22.00 hours on a date which I forget, some time in 1976, I, as the driver, together with Bargowo, Wiro Sudarmo, 1st Corporal Sarni and Corporal Sarimin as guards, fetched the detainees (Pilemon Wenda and the other man) and took them to Doyo (*Ki B* 753). When we arrived at Doyo, they were received by a team of men under 1st Lieutenant Wahab. The man named Pilemon Wenda was left at *Ki B* and the other man was taken to Dosay by a vehicle driven by me and under the guard of the Wahab Team. After arriving in Dosay, the detainee alighted from the vehicle and was taken away by the team of guards. I, meanwhile, returned to Doyo (*Ki B* 753) to fetch the other detainee and, under the guard of Wiro Sudarmo, Sarni and others from the Wahab Team, he was taken to the same place and received there by other members of the Wahab Team.

**Q:** Were the two men *diamankan*/murdered by means of being shot, strangled or beaten?

**A:** They were beaten with iron bars (hard weapons) by (members of) the Wahab Team (*Ki B*). I didn't see who actually did it as I was waiting about 100 metres away. I only heard the sound of the men being beaten.

**Q:** Who were the ones who murdered (beat) the two men, causing their deaths?

**A:** The Team of 1st Lieutenant Wahab, which had been made ready.

**Q:** Was there any prearranged plan between Section I head, Imam Subekti, and Lieutenant Abdul Wahab's Team to murder the two detainees?

**A:** I don't know anything about a plan, only that I, as a





## PNG GOVERNMENT ORDERS WEST PAPUAN REFUGEES TO LEAVE

Two West Papuan refugees, Eliezer Bonay and Dean Kafiar, were forced by Papua New Guinea and UN officials to leave Papua New Guinea in June and to go into political asylum in Sweden. A third refugee, John Hamadi, evaded compulsory deportation from PNG and went into hiding.

All three men, declared to be "security risks" by the PNG government, have been described by PNG's Foreign Affairs and Trade Secretary, Paulias Mantane, as being "potential dangers to PNG's relations with Indonesia". (Post-Courier, PNG, 2 July 1981). They had all been accommodated for several years at a PNG refugee camp in Wabo, Gulf Province, but when the camp closed down in May this year, their applications to remain in PNG as permissive residents were rejected, and they were ordered to leave the country. Commenting on an earlier suggestion by a UN official that they would have to return to Indonesia, Hamadi said:

That is one thing . . . we abhor because the moment we arrived back we will be the subject for public torture and disappearance because of the military regime. No, we

*continued on page 12*

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The six women arrested in West Irian for unfurling the OPM flag last August. (See TAPOL Bulletin, No. 45, May 1981).

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subordinate, acting on orders from my superior, fetched them and delivered them to Doyo and then to Dosay

**Q:** Where were Wiro and Sarni at the time of the murders?

**A:** They were waiting with me in the vehicle. 1st Corporal Sarimin was still at Ki B 753, in Doyo.

**Q:** What do you know of how Pilemon was treated by Wiro and the others whilst on the journey to their destination?

**A:** I only heard Pilemon Wenda asking: "Where am I being taken?" To which Wiro replied: "Nothing is going to happen to you." When we arrived at the place of the murder, I pretended that the engine had stopped, so I got down and opened the bonnet to examine the engine. This had been arranged beforehand by Wiro, that when we arrived at Dosay, I would pretend that the engine had stopped. Then Wiro blindfolded Pilemon Wenda and ordered him to get down from the vehicle. Then, escorted by Wiro, Abdul Wahad and another member of his team from Ki B 753 as mentioned above, he went to the place of the murder. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Sarni and I waited in the vehicle on the road. Not long after, Wiro returned to the vehicle and the three of us, Sarni, Wiro and I, returned to Doyo Baru to fetch Oscar who had been left at Ki B 753. Meanwhile, Wahab and his team (Ki B 753) waited at the place of the murder where a grave had been prepared by members of Ki B 753. According to my understanding, Pilemon Wenda had already been *diamankan*.

**Q:** How do you know that a grave had been prepared by Ki B 753 for Pilemon Wenda and Oscar Kaso? Who dug the grave? Under whose leadership were they and under whose orders were they acting? Who planned the murders?

**A:** I know and heard from Lieutenant Abdul Wahab and Wiro Sudarmo that it had been organised by Wiro Sudarmo. They didn't explain which members of Ki B 753 dug the grave. I had been given an oral order by Imam Subekti to take the detainees from their cell and bring them to the place of the murder.

**Q:** Do you know, did you see with your own eyes, the person who actually murdered Pilemon Wenda and Oscar Kaso?

**A:** I didn't see it with my own eyes because it was dark and the place of the murder was 75 metres from the road. But I know that Pilemon Wenda and Oscar were both taken to the place of the murder with their eyes blindfolded and that no-one other than Wiro Sudarmo, Abdul Wahab and another member of the Ki B 753 team was at the place of the murder.

[The photocopy of the interrogation report comes to an end at page 7, with the following question:

**Q:** And what happened with Oscar Kaso who had been left at Ki B 753 in Doyo Baru?]

### Footnotes

1. Section I: the section in charge of intelligence.
2. *Mengamankan*: to take care of. In political imprisonment terms it means, to take into custody. In this case, it obviously means to get rid of.
3. Where the military term cannot be identified, we retain the original.
4. **GPL**: *Gerakan Papua Liar* or 'Wild Papua Movement', the Army's pejorative term for **Free-Papua Movement (OPM)**.

The Legal Aid Institute (LBH) of Jakarta has recently come under attack from a variety of sources. Minister of Information, General Ali Murtopo, accused it in a well-publicised speech of turning away from its original purpose of defending the poor and towards a growing interest in "commercialism and political ambition". A few weeks after this attack, demonstrators claiming to represent workers at a taxi company involved in a labour dispute being handled by the LBH protested against the Institute's "interference" in their affairs and demanded that it drop the case. In addition, the military authorities are reportedly angry with it for the tone and contents of its second annual report, **Human Rights in Indonesia 1980** (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 45, May 1981 for a review) and are trying to exert pressure on the publishers, Sinar Harapan Publishing House, to halt distribution and stop advertising the book.

## Ali Murtopo's Accusation

Ali Murtopo's accusation of commercialism and political ambition was made during a speech at a meeting of the Institute for Law Service and Guidance (LPPH), set up a few years ago by the Army's political party, GOLKAR. He asserted that GOLKAR had decided to set up its own legal aid institute in reaction to "abuses" of its function by the LBH. These remarks were not supported by top officers of the LPPH itself, whose chairperson, Albert Hasibuan (himself a founder member of the LBH in 1971) denied that the LPPH had been set up in response to abuses by the LBH. The LPPH General Secretary, R.O. Tambunan went even farther, declaring that the LBH has been functioning "quite properly" and that "law cannot be separated from politics". Tambunan also pointed out that it is "wrong to think that a defending lawyer necessarily holds the same political opinions as the persons she or he defends". (**Tempo**, 6 June 1981.)

Responding to Ali Murtopo's remarks, human rights lawyer, Adnan Buyung Nasution, who founded the LBH ten years ago and occupied the position of Director until his retirement earlier this year, made no attempt to deny that the LBH concerns itself with politics.

"The nature of the cases involved, the very outlook and concept of legal aid, confirms the charge that the LBH (has to) adopt a political position. This is the thing about which I am particularly proud." (**Tempo**, 6th June, 1981)

As for the charge that LBH has "gone commercial", this was totally dismissed by Nasution. "We have not shifted one iota from our original concept." No client is ever charged a single cent for any assistance provided. The LBH is supported by a monthly grant of Rp 2.5 million from the Jakarta Municipality plus donations from other sources, including Ford Foundation and the Dutch aid agency, NOVIB. Recently, it has requested voluntary contributions from some of its clients but the sums involved are very small and these contributions are under no circumstances a condition for the provision of legal aid.

Buyung Nasution announced his retirement as LBH Director on the occasion of the Institute's tenth anniversary in April this year. His place has been taken by T. Mulya Lubis who joined the staff of the LBH a few years ago. Nasution

continues to work with the Institute as Director of the National Foundation of Legal Aid Institutes, a body drawing together the 8 LBHs that now exist, in Jakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Jogjakarta, Surabaya, Palembang, Padang and Medan. Two more are soon to be set up in Ujungpandang and Samarinda.

The Jakarta Institute employs 15 fulltime and ten part-time lawyers and has a total staff of 45 persons. None of the other institutes is yet able to employ fulltime lawyers and therefore implement the principle that lawyers providing free legal aid should not be engaged in any other legal practice.

## Demonstrators Reject LBH "Interference"

The first ever anti-LBH demonstration occurred on 18th June when a group of taxi-drivers employed by the Blue-Bird Taxi Company came to the Institute carrying posters calling upon the LBH to drop the dispute brought to it by another group of drivers. The demonstrators claimed to represent "99.5 %" of the company's workforce.

People participating in this demonstration seemed however to be under considerable restraints. **Kompas** (19th June 1981) reporting the incident stated that immediately after the leader of the demonstration, representing the official union, Korps Karyawan (from the title, this is clearly part of GOLKAR) had read out a statement, the demonstrators were instructed to disband and return to their jobs. They were not permitted to say anything or to stay and listen to a statement made by T. Mulya Lubis who declared that the task of defending workers' rights was not a question of numbers. The LBH would feel obliged, he said, to defend workers, even if the claims that they only represented 0.5% of the workforce were true.

Immediately after the demonstration had disbanded, Lubis together with the LBH lawyer handling the Blue-Bird case, Maqdir Ismail, explained the dispute to journalists. The drivers are required to work 16 hours a day, receive a commission of only 30% from their takings and have had no wage increase for years. Jafar, the driver who first came to the LBH with a number of drivers to obtain legal assistance, has since been dismissed, and his dismissal has now been added to the issues that have been taken up by the LBH.

Mrs Djoko Sutono, Director of Blue-Bird Taxis, told the press: "Jafar really took things too far and behaved very badly, and that is why he had to be dismissed." His crime? According to this lady, who is also a lecturer in criminology at the Police Academy, he thumped on the table of the Director and turned his back as he was leaving the room after a briefing session! (**Tempo**, 27 June 1981)

As LBH lawyers were talking to journalists, a group of drivers who had been in the demonstration turned up to say that they had been forced to take part, and were threatened with dismissal if they didn't. They expressed full support for Jafar. (See **Kompas** 19 June and **Tempo**, 27 June 1981)

# TE UNDER ATTACK

## LBH's Broadening Concerns

Certainly the most significant development of LBH work in the past few years has been its growing stress on non-litigation or structural legal aid. This development is well described in a book entitled *Langkah Telah Diayunkan* (Steps Have Been Taken), published on the tenth anniversary of the LBH. The book contains a series of articles, written by Adnan Buyung Nasution, T. Mulya Lubis, Fauzi Abdullah, Tuty Hutagalung and Abdul Rachman Saleh. All the articles are also reproduced in English.

In terms of the number of cases handled, there has been a big increase, from a total of 595 cases received (of which 532 were resolved) in the first year to a grand total by the end of its tenth year of 13,642 cases resolved. Its first major case, and one which brought it much publicity, was the dispute over land in Lubang Buaya which was being taken over, with very inadequate compensation, for the Indonesia-in-Miniature Project sponsored by Tien Suharto, the wife of Indonesia's President. A similar land dispute soon followed involving land in Kampung Srimampung which was also being taken over, in this case for the construction of luxury houses; this dispute brought the Institute into direct conflict with the Jakarta Municipality, its chief benefactor.

An article in the book by Fauzi Abdullah outlines the main areas of activity of LBH and briefly summarises its achievements so far. In the provision of legal aid, in terms of the number of cases handled, the results are quite impressive, but its attempts to spread information about law and rights among poor people have made little progress so far, probably, says the writer, because too much stress has been placed on written forms of communication rather than audio-visual forms. On the other hand, it has had some success in spreading the concept of legal aid. In addition to the eight LBHs already established, many other bodies providing legal services have come into being. There are now ten legal aid bodies in Jakarta alone, and a total of about 80 in the country as a whole. Admittedly, some of these have been set up simply to lay claim to a share of the legal aid funds now being allocated in the State budget. This budgetary support started only two years ago, and the sum being provided in the current financial year amounts to Rp 800 million. (The LBH itself has never been provided with a single cent from this source.)

The LBH's role as promoter of change in the content of laws is severely restricted for the obvious reason that laws serve the interests of those in power, a fact reflected in virtually all the new laws introduced in the past decade. The writer frankly acknowledges that the LBH must play a political role. It handles political cases (of students, Muslims, among others) and has published books such as students' defence pleas (some of which were later banned by the authorities) and for two years running, has published reports on human rights violations.

"For the LBH," writes Fauzi, "this political role is part

and parcel of its general responsibility because this cannot be separated from its efforts to uphold the law and defend human rights. The LBH is generally classified as being within the 'opposition camp' though there is a taboo on using this term in public. As an organisation that rests its strength on moral force, it will inevitably remain within this 'opposition camp'."

## Structural Legal Aid

A significant development in LBH work has been its growing concern for what it refers to as 'non-litigation' or 'structural' legal aid. In the first place, it should be explained that, as Adnan Nasution points out in his article, the work of litigation performs an important general, educational function. Most of our laws, he says, do not defend the poor and therefore litigation often proves unsatisfactory. As part of the process of conscientisation, it is always necessary during the course of litigation to evaluate the laws being used, not only for the benefit of the client but also for officials and if possible for the society at large, through publicity. Such cases can illustrate the structural injustices in society as an important part of increasing awareness. In his article, Mulya Lubis explains structural legal aid in the following way:

Structural legal aid is assistance in the broad sense to the lower social structure that is oppressed by the upper structure. Its purpose is not merely to try to resolve conflicts but rather to change existing legal relations: to transform structural oppression into structural equality. In his concluding remarks, he mentions the following as being among the objectives of structural legal aid:

To convince people of the lower structure of their political, economic, legal and cultural rights.

To cultivate an awareness among people to take up their cases collectively, not individually.

To create mobile legal aid bodies, moving from one place to another.

To concentrate the legal aid movement in the villages, the very heart of the lower structure, not in the towns.

### AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE LBH

1. To provide free legal aid to those members of society who cannot afford it and/or are ignorant of law, without regard for their religion, origin, race, political beliefs or social or cultural background.
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3. To nurture and renew laws and the implementation of laws, in keeping with the demands of the times.

Stop Press: Mulya Lubis was held by the Army in Bandung for 3½ hours in late July (More news next issue)



## MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS IN JAVA SERVING LONG SENTENCES

A list of tried political prisoners being held in one prison in East Java (probably Pamekasan) has recently reached TAPOL. The prisoners, all men, include both civilians as well as ex-members of the Armed Forces.

Nine of the men on the list have received death sentences, all of whom have made appeals or requested clemency. In two cases, the death sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment. There are also seven men who were sentenced to life by the courts.

In eleven cases, long terms of imprisonment, mostly between 15 and 20 years, were passed down by courts *without* deduction for time served in prison prior to the court verdicts. The following examples give some idea of how this affects the time actually spent in prison:

A. Sy., now 66 years old, arrested in May 1969, was sentenced to 20 years in 1976, *without* deduction. He will therefore serve a total of 27 years and will be 81 years old by the end of his sentence.

S.W. (ex-soldier), 49, arrested in October 1965, was sentenced to 20 years in 1978 *without* deduction. He will therefore serve a total of 33 years, fully half his life by then, when he will be 66 years old.

S., 40, arrested in April 1969, was sentenced in 1978 and given what is in Indonesian terms a 'light' sentence, namely 10 years. But because this is *without* deduction, he will serve a total term of 19 years.

One prisoner, T., was arrested in March 1968 and tried in 1979 when he was given a sentence of 13 years with deduction. He should therefore have been released in March this year but is still in prison.

These prisoners who still face many years in prison must certainly be hoping that remission will help reduce their sentences. But information given on the list provides little hope for this. Many with relatively 'lighter' sentences of 10 to 15 years *with* deduction are now fast approaching the completion of their full sentences, indicating that they have not been granted any remission.

Of the total of 57 men on the list (of whom 4 have been released in the past few months, and one died in May this year of a heart attack), only 14 received sentences of less than 15 years. But 2 of these 14 sentences were *without* deduction, meaning that the actual sentences are much longer.

### TREACHERY AND THE CIVIL SERVICE

"It is an act of gross treachery for civil servants not to be in GOLKAR," declared General Ali Murtopo, Minister of Information in a speech at a meeting of GOLKAR's law institute, the LPPH. He made this sweeping accusation after declaring that the "re-ordering" of the civil service that became necessary after 1965 required that all civil servants should be "free of politics" and should "surrender their political opinions to the government". (*Sinar Harapan*, 24 May 1981)

This statement provoked an angry reaction from Jusuf Syakir, member of Parliament for the Muslim party, PPP, who argued that although all civil servants are required to join KORPRI (the civil service association which is a part of GOLKAR, TAPOL), there is absolutely nothing in the present laws to prevent them from joining or voting for either of the other two political parties, the PPP or the PDI.

"Ali Murtopo's statement is an attempt to deprive civil servants of their political rights," he said, "and is also in conflict with the laws in force."

#### Editor's Note:

The political rights of civil servants are in a far more complicated mess than Mr Syakir's statement would suggest. There are two government regulations governing the restrictions on civil servants regarding membership of political parties. The first one, introduced in 1970, prohibits certain officials from engaging in political activity which is defined as including membership of the PDI, the PPP and GOLKAR. The officials in question include all members of the Armed Forces, all employees of the Defence Depart-

ment, judges and prosecutors, finance inspectors, and others as specified by the President. Six years later another regulation laid down basically similar rules though this time it was stated that exceptions to the rule were possible with the permission of a person's superior.

But negating the very essence of both these regulations is Presidential Decision No. 82, 1971, which makes it obligatory for all civil servants to join KORPRI, which, as everyone know, is an integral part of GOLKAR. (See "Civil Servants and Political Activities", by Tuty Hutagalung, in *Langkah Telah Diayunkan*, published by the Legal Aid Institute, April 1981).

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## US GREEN BERETS IN EAST TIMOR ?

The Reagan Administration's commitment of special (Green Beret) counter-insurgency military "advisers" in El Salvador has caused considerable public comment and protest. Recent reports suggest that Green Beret advisers have been sent to East Timor too. Based on experience regarding the number sent to El Salvador, the actual figure might well be much higher.

Much is known about the nature and extent of US military involvement in El Salvador. Given Indonesia's economic and strategic importance for the US, and Indonesia's aim of achieving a final-military-solution to the "problem" of East Timor, it is essential to establish the facts with respect to these questions:

- \*Has the advent of the Reagan Administration resulted in a significant increase in special American military training, advice and personnel in Indonesia and East Timor?
- \*What is the scale and character of US training and advice to Indonesian military and para-military units?
- \*Specifically, what is the number, the aims and the methods of US military advisers in East Timor?
- \*Are the Governments of Great Britain and Australia—of the US in supporting Indonesia's annexation of East Timor—also providing military "advice" and personnel in East Timor? If so, on what scale?

The aggressive defence of US economic, military and strategic "interests" by means of crusading anti-Communist military involvements is the essential characteristic of the Reagan Administration's foreign policy.

In this scheme, East Timor and El Salvador may become the sort of field for US practical experimentation in "counter-insurgency" provided by Indonesia and Chile in 1965 and 1973 (See Chomsky and Herman, *The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism*, Boston, Beacon Press 1979, p. 205).

The new Reagan-Haig foreign policy has resulted in record 1981-82 levels of military "aid" to El Salvador and Indonesia. Haig has singled out Indonesia as a crucial anti-Communist lynch-pin in the defence of "US interests" in Southeast Asia.

US military aid is not restricted to record arms levels, however. The normally reliable *International Herald Tribune* reports (June 25, 1981) that US "anti-terrorist" military advisers provided "behind the scenes assistance" to the Indonesians during their raid in May on a supposed Muslim-hijacked plane in Bangkok. The US "provided specialized equipment and weapons and trained the Indonesians to use the equipment." Did the US also "advise" or "assist" in the torture of the surviving hijacker(s) who died under "interrogation"?

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### TRIBUNAL CONDEMNS INDONESIA'S AGGRESSION IN EAST TIMOR

A People's Tribunal on the question of East Timor was held in Lisbon from 19-21 July. The Tribunal, convened by the People's Permanent Tribunal, founded by Lelio Basso, considered an indictment submitted by the Fretilin Central Committee against the Indonesian government for its colonial expansionism in East Timor. Fretilin's indictment also charged the US government with committing crimes against the people of East Timor.

After hearing testimony for 19 witnesses coming from many countries, including East Timor, Australia, Portugal, the USA, Holland, France, Italy and Indonesia, who covered a wide range of topics, the Tribunal issued a verdict condemning Indonesia for committing aggression by its invasion of East Timor in late 1975, after the people had already set up an independent state, the Democratic Republic of East Timor. This act was also condemned as a violation of the Timorese people's rights to self-determination. The Tribunal also condemned Indonesia for committing genocide and for gross violation of human rights. This included its treatment of prisoners of war in flagrant violation of the principles laid down by the International Red Cross. Neither the International Red Cross nor any other neutral body, it said, has access to the prisoners, many of whom are summarily executed soon after being captured or held under atrocious conditions.

The Tribunal condemned the US government for its consistent support of Indonesia's aggression by means of increased military aid, as well as with diplomatic and propaganda support. Similar verdicts were adopted against the Australian government and against governments within the Inter-Governmental Group of Indonesia, in particular the Netherlands, for their consistent economic support of Indonesia since the aggression.

Timorese refugees now living in Lisbon, who were to have testified before the Tribunal, regretfully announced that they were unable to do so chiefly because they feared that reprisals might be taken against relatives still living in Indonesian-occupied East Timor.

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## LABOUR DISPUTES AND MILITARY INTERVENTION

A glance at recent press clippings from Indonesia reveals that there is a constant flow of industrial disputes in many sectors of the economy. The disputes almost invariably involve demands for higher wages combined with protests against arbitrary dismissals of trade union activists and actions to safeguard workers' attempts to set up democratically-controlled trade union branches.

### KOPKAMTIB Sets Up Labour Disputes Team

The trend is clearly worrying the Army security apparatus. Admiral Sudomo, Commander-in-Chief of KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) announced in May (*Kompas*, 27 May 1981) that a special KOPKAMTIB/Opstipbus team "to handle labour problems and prevent the spread of industrial disturbances" would be set up early in June. The task of the Team, Sudomo said, would be to intervene as soon as information became available of a dispute emerging in any enterprise. Its task would be to bring workers' leaders and management together and "convince the workers it is no use striking in support of their demands".

"Press reports of labour problems are constantly being analysed . . . to see whether 'likely clients' of KOPKAMTIB were fanning incidents (*ada tukang kipas*) so as to turn these disputes into political issues and thus create unrest and security disturbances."

Closely in line with KOPKAMTIB moves to halt the growing wave of workers' unrest, the Department for Labour Power has warned (*Merdeka*, 27 May 1981) that workers' demands that are accompanied by strike actions "will not be met".

### Security Troops Intervene in Strikes

A sit-down strike of about 350 workers at the Gudang Garem cigarette factory in Kediri, East Java, was "neutralised" when police and Army troops intervened. The strike, over a demand for higher wages, "startled the inhabitants of Kediri", reports *Merdeka* (16 May 1981), and dozens of security forces were mobilised immediately to bring the situation under control. When around midday leaders of the several shopfloor units were summoned to meet the management for negotiations, both the Commander of the Kediri Police Force and the Commander of the Kediri Military Command were present at the talks.

Despite this heavy-handed security intervention, *Merdeka* reports that the workers' leaders declared during the negotiations that the workers were determined not to return to work until their demands had been met.

### Mass Dismissals Follow All-out Strikes at Fairchild

The Fairchild electronics factory in East Jakarta was affected by a series of strikes last March during which a number of workers were dismissed. Then in May, another 52 workers were arbitrarily dismissed on the very day that elections were to be held for the leading organ of the trade union branch at the factory. As the dismissal notices were posted, the management announced that the 52 workers

were ineligible to vote or be elected in the branch elections. Most of those dismissed were leading activists or elected functionaries of the local trade union branch that had been set up a month earlier, following the strikes in March.

Some 90 per cent of the 5,000-strong work force at Fairchild are women. In March, all the workers downed tools in protest against new work regulations and the introduction of new machinery which had resulted in a unilaterally-determined cut in working hours and resultant lower wages, particularly for those employees still employed as day labourers. (It is widespread practice for companies in Indonesia to keep workers on for months or even years as temporary or day labourers as a way of depriving them of rights and facilities to which they would be entitled as regular staff paid on a monthly basis.)

They were also protesting over the fact that employees who had worked for many years on the company's payroll were still having their wages cut for days lost because of illness, ie, being treated as temporary employees.

During the total strikes that hit Fairchild in March, security troops—from both the police and the Army—were brought in in an attempt to control the strikers. (*Merdeka* 18 March 1981, and *Pelita* 20 March 1981) On the first day of the strike, however, reports *Merdeka*, these security troops were "unable to disperse the workers who had gathered on the premises of the factory. Whilst negotiations were taking place, groups of workers blocked all the roads leading out of the factory complex," the paper said.

### FBSI Leader Sides With Management, Workers Complain

123 workers employed by the Cipto Garment Factory in Bekasi, West Java, were arbitrarily dismissed by the company earlier this year. Here again, according to the workers (*Kompas*, 26 May 1981), the management was acting in order to prevent the establishment of a trade union branch.

In this instance, the management, in clear breach of procedures, took their dismissal decision direct to the Central Arbitration Board for approval without first going through the district arbitration machinery and without giving the workers a chance to defend themselves. The management fraudulently claimed that the workers in question had consented to the dismissals. The Central Board issued a decision approving the dismissals without any consultations. When the dismissal notices were presented to the workers, they discovered that they had no further means of redress to oppose the decision.

The workers, who later took their grievances to Parliament, were particularly angry because the representative of the FBSI (All-Indonesia Workers Federation) on the Central Arbitration Board had sided with the management. (One worker claimed that the FBSI had been given Rp 500,000 by the management.) Besides dismissing the 123 workers, the management have given their names to other companies in the district, making it virtually impossible for them to obtain any other employment.

# BOOK REVIEW

Pacific-Asia Resources Centre (PARC). Japanese Transnational Enterprises in Indonesia AMPO (Japan-Asia Quarterly Review). Vol 12, No. 4, 1980

The Pacific-Asia Resources Centre (PARC) based in Japan is currently mid-way through a five-year project to study Japan-based transnational enterprises and their impact on the Third World. Their previous project culminated in a major report, "Free Trade Zones and the Industrialisation of Asia". (AMPO, Tokyo, 1977), which was well received, and of the present project, the report reviewed here presents the findings so far of their Indonesian Research Team. It provides many interesting details of the 271 Japanese companies which the Team has discovered operating in Indonesia.

The topic certainly needs researching. That there exists a "special relationship" between Indonesia and Japan is in no doubt. Indonesia is the single largest recipient of both Japanese investment capital and "aid" in S.E. Asia, and Japan is Indonesia's No. 1 investor. Japan provides the market for much of Indonesia's oil and (an unfortunate omission from this report, perhaps because most of its data is only taken up to 1977) all of its liquefied natural gas (LNG), the value of which now outstrips even oil. Together, oil and LNG sales currently provide 91% of the Indonesian Government's revenues. Japanese companies are also major exploiters of many of Indonesia's other natural resources, especially timber and fish. Further, Indonesia provides a growing market for Japan's manufactured goods and machinery, and a source of cheap labour for labour-intensive industries. Its authorities are also prepared to turn a blind eye to pollution. (The PARC Team alleges that some Japanese companies have run to Indonesia to avoid Japan's now stringent anti-pollution regulations, though without saying which specific companies.) As this report states, high rates of GNP growth may have been achieved by the Suharto regime, but this has only been possible through a relationship of dependency, on the West in general, and Japan in particular.

The strength of the PARC Team's findings so far lies in its detail on the Japanese companies which have invested in Indonesia. Especially valuable are the lists of these companies, their partners, share and value of capital approved or invested, field of operation and location. From this basic data, the Team has drawn up tabulations and preliminary conclusions about the scale and nature of this investment, worth some US\$1 billion, and about its changing nature. The late 1960s saw a rush into resource exploitation, followed by expansion in manufacturing in the early 1970s, and then a marked holding back of new projects from 1975 onwards. To explain this recent reluctance to invest, the PARC Team lays too much emphasis on the effect of the anti-Tanaka riots of 1974 and the resultant move towards more nationalist investment policies by the Indonesian Government; after all, corruption has made a nonsense of many official policies, even those backed by firm legislation. Other reasons must include a loss of confidence in the Indonesian authorities after the collapse of Pertamina in 1975, and the effects of the 1974-5 recession on Japanese capital exports. The last two years have seen a slight upturn in Japanese investment in manufacturing.

An area where the PARC Team could expand its analysis for the benefit of people not familiar with Japanese corporate capital is an introduction to these companies, their own domestic roles (politically, for example), and most importantly the part Indonesia plays in their global strategies. The PARC Team does promise us more concerning the investments made by the large trading companies (Mitsubishi, Mitsui, C. Itoh, etc.) in Indonesian agriculture (including animal feedstuffs, intensive farming and ranching) and how this fits in with their world grain strategy.

Also surveyed are the links between these Japanese companies and their Indonesian partners (though, regrettably, there are many spelling mistakes of Indonesian names). Typically, these partners are members of the most powerful factions of the military, and the few financial groups (usually domestic Chinese) who have prospered under the Suharto regime and its pro-foreign capital strategy. This

fascinating topic is still only partially developed here, but when put together with another PARC-based report, by Kitazawa Yoko, "Japan-Indonesia Corruption: Bribe, It Shall Be Given You" (AMPO, Vol. 8, Nos. 1 and 2, 1976), plus the work of Dick Robison, "Toward a Class Analysis of the Indonesian Military Bureaucratic State" (Indonesia, No. 25, April 1978), we are well on the way to understanding one of the keys to the Indonesian political-economy today. As this report shows, while the mass of the Indonesian people suffer from abysmally high levels of un- and under-employment and poverty, and even domestic capital formation among the urban bourgeoisie is very weak, these small cliques at the very top have seized all the vital sectors of the economy and from them reaped rich harvests.

A map showing the average annual GNP growth rates by Province (1968-72 only, unfortunately) well indicates one of the characteristic imbalances of this lop-sided development created by foreign capital. During that period, East Kalimantan boasted an annual GNP growth rate of 25% based on timber and oil. West Papua rendered 16.2% from the exploitation of its copper and oil, Bali had 9.1% thanks to tourism, while highly-populated Java, except Jakarta, was between 5 and 7.5% and many areas of Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan where valuable natural resources had not been discovered were left to flounder at under 5%. It is abundantly clear that in the high growth areas this "development" has little beneficial impact on the indigenous population but has remained encapsulated within the realm of foreign concessionaries and their few Jakarta-based brokers.

Perhaps the weakest aspect of the report is its reliance on official data, which is notoriously poor. The sections on employment and working conditions illustrate this. For example, the official figure of 50,000 jobs "created" by the 271 Japanese enterprises is obviously far too low; though the PARC Team does not question it, it is simply not possible that only 2196 persons are employed in all the many Japanese construction and hotel projects. The Sari Pacific and Borobudur Hotels in Jakarta alone would probably account for about this number. Equally, the declared percentages of female employees do not ring true, especially in the textile, pharmaceutical and electrical industries (14-27% reported, whereas in reality 70% or more of the workers are young girls). The official figures must be underreported; the question is why.

The use of official reports for data on working conditions and wages also leads to over-simple conclusions. Though apparently perplexed to say so, the PARC Team is led to admit that "foreign firms offer a relatively privileged working environment" (adding, however, that wages usually only just keep workers' families above the poverty line and are pathetically poor when compared with wages in capitalist industrial countries). For some firms, this is true; some foreign companies fear potential national consciousness against foreign exploitation, and some are interested in establishing a long-term, stable workforce. But this is not the whole story; foreign firms *do* engage in gross exploitation. The rash of labour actions throughout 1979-80 reported in the Indonesian press make this quite clear, and any progressive report cannot and must not ignore it. Analysis based on official reports, however critical, will not reveal the true story, for it is hidden, not only through concealment from prying eyes, but also because what is being reported is the *permanent* workforce only.

To get an accurate account not only of the numbers employed but also of their exploitation, we must seek out those who are not entered into the official reports: the casual labourers, those hired on a daily basis, the girl "trainees" paid only "pocket money", the unpaid wives and children, the workers hired from "sub-contractors" and traffickers, the former political prisoners forced to work on timber concessions (TAPOL Bulletin 34, June 1979, and 38 March 1980). In many firms these categories of workers outnumber the relatively privileged workers; they are subjected to below subsistence wages, an almost total lack of "extras" such as holidays, paid sick-leave, and paid overtime, and are refused job security. They are ignored for the most part by the only labour organisation allowed to exist, the FBSI (*Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia*, or All Indonesia Labour Federation), and they are certainly strictly prevented from any autonomous labour organisation amongst themselves. >



continued from page 5 .

cannot standing thinking of going back because it will mean public execution for us. (*Post-Courier*, 7 July 1981)

## PNG Students Protect Papuan Refugee

Up to mid July, Hamadi was still in hiding, according to the PNG press, and under the protection of the University of PNG Students Representative Council. The Council's President, Gabriel Ramoi, insists that they will not surrender him to the authorities until they receive a reply to their request that he be granted asylum. Anyone trying to remove him from the university campus would, said Ramoi, "have to use force to do so".

Hamadi, formerly a student at Cendrawasih University in Jayapura, West Irian, says he has not been told why he is regarded as a "security risk".

I have not the slightest idea why I am being hunted. Maybe because of my involvement with the recent self-appointed South Pacific human rights tribunal which heard evidence of alleged human rights violation against Indonesia. (*Post-Courier*, 7 July 1981)

(The Tribunal he refers to took place as part of a West Irian Solidarity Week in Port Moresby in May this year. It was chaired by Bernard Narakobi, a retired PNG judge.)

## Ex-Governor of West Irian Becomes Refugee

Eliezer Bonay, the Papuan who became the first Indonesian appointed governor of the province of West Irian, was active in West Papuan politics before the territory's integration in Indonesia. Initially opposed to integration, he later changed his opinion, hoping to be able to collaborate with the Indonesian authorities. Because of his

Continued from page 11

The girls of PT Southern Cross Textile Industry (85% owned by Teijin, C. Itoh, and Toyo Menka Kaisha, all Japan-based TNEs) are most likely part of this section of the labour force unreported in official documents. Engaged as day-labourers, who are fired and rehired every week (even those working for the firm for eight years), refused holidays and sick pay, housed in quarters described as "fit for beggars" (*gelandangan*), their plight remained ignored by all until publicity in September 1979. They had been forced to submit to physical examination for stretch-marks and drooping breasts to establish that they had never borne children; young people without dependents can be paid the lowest wages of all; barring children themselves, that is, who comprised 25% of the labour force (*Kompas* 29.9.79 and 4.1.80).

Nevertheless, the general conclusions drawn by the PARC Team are on the right lines. Like other foreign capital, Japanese interests have done virtually nothing to make a dent in Indonesia's huge unemployment problems. If the official figure of 50,500 were doubled, or even quadrupled, to account for "non-permanent" workers, and some "indirect employment" was added on top, just what does this do for a labour force which is growing by 1.4 million every year? As the PARC report points out, some of the new industries have directly caused unemployment, by squeezing out traditional industries; textiles and soft drinks are prime examples. A strategy based on foreign capital investment can have no hope of tackling Indonesia's employment problems. When it is accompanied by the Green Revolution package for agriculture, which has been demonstrated by the ILO, amongst others, to turn small farmers off their land and to reduce rural job opportunities, the Indonesian people are faced with a recipe for disaster.

prominence in pre-integration politics, this change of attitude led the Indonesian government to select him as the first governor of the province. However, he was dismissed in November 1964 following an incident involving the distribution of anti-Indonesian pamphlets. He spent the new few years under arrest in Jakarta.

## TWO HAWKS IN MID-AIR COLLISION

Two of the Hawk ground-attack jet aircraft delivered to Indonesia in September last year by British Aerospace collided in mid-air and crashed in June. The four crew members managed to jump to safety but they all sustained injuries. No-one else was hurt although the planes crashed in fields in densely populated Central Java.

The planes were being flown for formation practice. They are both total write-offs.

Reporting the accident, *Kompas* (19 June 1981) said that Indonesia plans to have a full squadron of Hawks. A squadron consists of 16 planes.

In addition to the eight Hawks delivered last year, another four were placed on order early this year. If Indonesia is to have a full squadron of the planes, this means they will now need to purchase another six Hawks from Britain.

## PANCASILA MEETING REFUSED PERMIT

A public meeting to celebrate the anniversary of Pancasila Day, 1st June, had to be cancelled at the last minute because the Jakarta Police refused to grant permission. The cancellation was not announced till after the hall where the meeting was to have been held was already full of people.

1st June is the day on which, in 1945, Sukarno, who later became Indonesia's first President, delivered a speech proposing that the Pancasila, the contents of which he made public on that day, should be adopted as the central philosophy of an independent Indonesia.

Permission was refused, apparently on the advice of the Minister for Youth Affairs, Abdul Gafur, the reason given being that "the meeting is not relevant to the commemoration of Pancasila". (*Merdeka*, 3rd June 1981).

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