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
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British Campaign for the Defence

of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia

TAPOL Bulletin No 40

July 1980

## EDITORIAL

# WAITING FOR THE EXECUTIONER

Recently an habitual criminal who had been under sentence of death for sixteen years was executed by firing squad. His execution was a hotly debated issue and catalysed the formation of a campaign (HATI) calling for the abolition of the death sentence. Under Indonesian law the death penalty can be imposed for murder drug taking or trafficking, treason, and economic or political subversion. The HATI organisers include the human rights campaigners Adnan Buyung Nasution and Haji Ponke Princen, and also the Vice-President Adam Malik.

The great majority of those sentenced to death received their sentence several years ago as political prisoners. The indications are that nearly all have appealed to President Suharto for clemency, and their fate depends on his decision alone, according to the law. In response Suharto has simply ignored the appeals and hence the existence of

**"the fate of condemned political prisoners should be the subject of an inquiry."**

the death sentence prisoners: he has not pardoned anyone, nor rejected their appeals, nor signed their execution orders. There is no question that Suharto is avoiding making a formal decision on the matter.

Meanwhile, the Dutch Foreign Minister, Van der Klaauw, told the Dutch Parliament that he had been informed by the Indonesian government that there were 31 political prisoners under sentence of death (*De Waarheid*, 30 May 1980) and it seems that there are five condemned murderers. According to TAPOL records of 370 out of 1014 trials, 66 death sentences were given in military and civilian courts. Therefore it may be assumed that there were many more than 66 death sentences in all, and that a large number have either already been executed, died in prison, or that once again the government has been issuing wrong

statistics. The Dutch Foreign Minister also informed parliament that he had been assured by the Indonesian government that the (allegedly 31) death sentences would not be carried out. Clearly there is a disparity between official statements given for domestic and international consumption, and there are strong indications that the fate of condemned political prisoners should be the subject of an inquiry. It goes without saying that such an inquiry would require strong and determined international pressure on the Indonesian Government.

Among the condemned political prisoners are Sukarno's former Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio and the former Air Force commander Vice-Marshal Omar Dhani. The case of Subandrio has caused some confusion about the issue of the death sentence. According to some reports Adam Malik advised Suharto on humanitarian grounds not to execute Subandrio. Suharto's reply to Malik was mistakenly reported in the press as being that he would not sign the execution order, and it was thus assumed and quite widely reported that Subandrio was to be pardoned. Later the Minister of the State Secretariat, Sudharmono, stated that Suharto

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had made no decision at all about the case.

Suharto will choose to allow those under death sentence to live on in the shadow of death by ignoring them. On the one hand there is the small but vocal HATI campaign; on the other there are members of the military and Islamic groups who vehemently oppose the abolition of the death penalty. Muslim leaders are now reported to be speaking in the mosques, insisting on the maintenance of the death sentence. Furthermore a counter-campaign called *Pahuma* (Re-tai' the Death Penalty) has been formed. This campaign has

the support of the Attorney-General, Ali Said, who believes that the death penalty must remain as a deterrent for "hard-core criminals". Either he, like Suharto, is fudging the issue of the tried political prisoners . . . or maybe he sees them as "hard-core criminals".

The names of the 66 people on the TAPOL records are given below. In only a few of these cases is it known whether the sentence has been executed or not. It is known that two of them were commuted to life sentences. Some are known to have died in prison of illness:

Name	Year sentenced	Name	Year sentenced
Abdullah Alihamy	1968	Nur Rahoyan	?
Asep Suryaman	1975	Utomo Ramelan	1966
Sajid Fachrul al Baragbah	1966	Sgt. Raswad	1968
Boiman	?	Rohayan	1969
Bono (alias Muljono)	1968	Ruslan	1974
Bungkus	1971	Rustomo	1974
Gijadi	1968	Satar Suyanto	1971
Giroth	1968	Sitepu	1966
Hamim	?	Soma	1976
Hanan Effendi	1967	Subandrio	1967
Corporal Hargijono	1967	Sucipto	1968
S.P.Hartono	1967	Capt. Sudiono	1972
(later commuted to life)		Sudisman	1967
Heru Atmojo	1966	(carried out)	
(later commuted to life)		Sudono	1967
Iskandar Subekti	1972	Sugeng Sugiarto	1966
Ismanto	1974	Major Sujono	1967
Jayusman	1969	(carried out)	
Joko Untung	1974	Sukardjo	1969
Kamaruzaman	1968	Sukarman	1976
Lt. Kamil	1967	Sukatno	1971
Mardjoko	1972	Suleman	1969
(died in hospital 1979)		Sumbodo	1970
Marpaung	1968	Soenari	1976
Marsudi	1976	Brig. Gen. Supardjo	1967
Moederisman	1973	(carried out)	
Jusuf Muda Dalam	1966	Supono	1972
(died in hospital 1976)		Capt. Suradi	1971
Lt. Mukidjan	1968	(initially life, but raised to death after appeal)	
Muljono Surjowardoyo	?	Col. Suriyono	1973
Moh. Munir	1973	Surono	1970
Djalahuddin Jusuf Nasution	1966	Sutarto	1973
(thought to have died in prison of illness)		Gatot Sutaryo	1975
Nazir	?	Suwandi	1975
Njono	1966	Tamuri Hidayat	1967
(carried out)		Lt. Col. Untung	1966
Omar Dhani	1966	(carried out)	
Padjo Prasetyo	?	Wiroatmodjo	1966
Peris Pardede	1966		

## 500 MOSLEM TAPOLS STILL BEING HELD

Many detainees, including people accused of involvement in the "Holy War Command" (*Komando Jihad*), are still being held without legal protection, in violation of the most basic human right.

Announcing this, Mulya Lubis, Deputy Director of Indonesia's Legal Aid Institute, said that the Government should be honest enough to admit that even though G30S political prisoners had been released, there were others still being held who have the same rights and status in law. He showed reporters long lists of Moslem prisoners in many parts of the country. There were altogether about 500, including 126 in Aceh, 49 in South Sumatra, 26 in Central Java, 20 in East Java and 30 in South Sulawesi.

"The Legal-Aid Institute urges that detainees said not to be involved in the *Komando Jihad* should be tried speedily. If not, they should be released from detention immediately," said Mulya Lubis. "There can be no reason for the Government to go on hold-

ing these people who have already spent more than two years in detention. Even if they are being held on the basis of the Anti-Subversion Law (Penpres 11/1963), they should not be held any longer than one year."

Lubis also said that the Institute had written to the military authorities in all regions where Moslem prisoners are being held but had as yet had no response.

(Source: *Pelita*, 4 July 1980)

**TAPOL calls upon its readers to write to the Indonesian authorities in support of the Legal Aid Institute's appeal. Address your letters to:**

**President Suharto,  
Istana Negara,  
Jalan Veteran, Jakarta.**

**Admiral Sudomo,  
Commander, KOPKAMTIB  
Ministry of Defence,  
Jalan Merdeka Barat,  
Jakarta.**

## PRISONERS TORTURED IN ACEH

A.Q. Joelani Abdullah, a student at the Academy of Banking and Finance in Banda Aceh, North Sumatra, was tried in July 1979 and sentenced to two and a half years' imprisonment for supporting the Free Aceh Movement. He is one of many hundreds detained since 1977 on similar charges. According to a list recently obtained by TAPOL, at the end of 1979 there were 114 tapols being held at the military prison in Banda Aceh, almost all on charges of being connected with the Free Aceh Movement. Only a few have been tried. Many more are being held in other places of detention.

A copy of Abdullah's defence plea recently came into our hands, providing information for the first time about the treatment of detainees in Aceh. The document provides horrifying details of the torture suffered by the defendant and many other detainees. We feel obliged to reproduce these details regardless of the distress it may cause our readers. Abdullah took great risks in exposing these facts, and we owe it to him to ensure that they are brought to the attention of a wider audience.

### Defence Plea

Abdullah opened his defence plea by thanking the prosecutor for dragging him before the court. At least, he said, it gave him his first chance to secure justice after he had languished so long as a detainee of the security command (*Laksusda*) in Aceh. "I am amazed," he said, "that my body has withstood the treatment . . ."

He was arrested in January 1978 while attending a lecture, and was locked in a dark room measuring 2.5m x 1.8m. In the middle of the night an officer came, stripped him of all his clothes, took his possessions and left him naked in the cell. Later, during interrogations which lasted several

days, he was kicked, trampled on, and beaten with wood and steel rods. Clumps of hair were pulled from his head causing extensive bleeding. His limbs were crushed and bruised. The beatings also caused internal bleeding, and severely damaged his heart and lungs. (At the time of his trial, nearly a year later, he was still under medical treatment.)

Two months later he was again interrogated. In reply to the first question, he told his tormentor to "write down everything that was written at the first interrogation. I can't cope with your questions as I still suffer a great deal of pain." A third series of interrogations took place in August 1978, when the interrogator warned that they could torture or kill him even though this was "outside the law" because "we enjoy the protection of the law".

### "Night of Hell"

Abdullah then described events during a "night of hell" in 1979, on the 18th day of Ramadhan \* when numerous detainees were interrogated and tortured. They were forced to drink powerful alcohol and to beat each other. They were beaten with many kinds of implements and forced to eat their own vomit after being sick as a result of the brutalities.

After strongly rejecting the charges of subversion, armed insurrection and attempting to overthrow the government, Abdullah declared that the person who should be charged is the sadistic security commander of Aceh, the man responsible for the torture. He gave details of other tortures inflicted during the army's operation to crush the Free Aceh Movement:

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# SUGENG: THE YOUNGEST TAPOL ON BURU

(Sinar Harapan, 24 December 1979)

(Translation)

"I've just bought some clothes at the Catholic Social Unit in the Cathedral. They were cheap, sold especially for Christmas," said Sugeng as we commenced our conversation. "I want to send my wife a dress and a skirt," he said, showing me a yellow dress with lace on the sleeves and around the bottom, and a brown denim skirt with a white silk blouse. "They cost altogether Rp. 2,250," he added.

Franciscos Sugeng was born in November 1953 in the village of Cilongok, Balapulang district in Tegal, Central Java. After going to primary school in Cilongok, he went to secondary school in Tuwal, but only reached the second grade. He had to leave because his family could no longer afford to pay. His father was a primary school teacher in Cilongok, with a family of eight children.

Besides lack of money he had to leave school in 1966 because his father was arrested in 1965 for being on the executive of the local branch of the non-federated Teachers' Union (PGRI-NV). The father, Soemarno, was sent to Nusakambangan Prison island where he died just two years after being arrested.

From 1966 onwards Sugeng could not go to school. He was only 13 years old. Then in 1967 he was suddenly arrested and detained in a prison in Tegal until 1970. Then he was moved to Nusakambangan where he stayed for only a month before being sent to Buru with other tapols. "I don't know what crime I committed. When my father was arrested I was only 12. I have absolutely no idea why I was

arrested," said Sugeng.

In Buru he was placed in Unit VII, Wanusurya, after being kept for a month in the officers' mess as a cook. The time he spent on Buru made a very deep impression on him. As Christmas draws near this year, he has the same feelings as when he was in Buru.

"When General Sumitro was still commander of KORKAMTIB, he visited Buru. He asked me, 'Do you know why you are being held here in Buru?' I replied with another question, 'Why are you asking me such a question?' 'Do you or do you not understand why you were brought here?' General Sumitro asked again. 'I do not understand. I was still very young and I had never been a member of anything. I was once active in the Students' All-Purpose Corps which later became **Pramuka** (Indonesian Scouts' Movement). I was never a member of any organisation,' I replied. 'Perhaps there was something else then?' asked General Sumitro. 'Perhaps it was because my father was a member of the PGRI-NV,' I replied. And that is what I have always frankly told everyone, because I never joined any of the organisations that were under the PKI.

"Then General Sumitro asked me another question, 'Do you feel revengeful?' 'Revengeful? Towards whom? It's all part of the situation. Just as you have become what you are now because of the situation! I don't feel revengeful towards anyone, but I look upon it as an experience, and it represents a part of my life,' I replied. And General Sumitro was silent."

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**Saleh Pakeh**, arrested in July 1977, was stripped naked. His pubic hair was pulled out, hair by hair. His penis was burnt and he was sexually assaulted.

**Abu Said**, arrested in July 1977, was subjected to the same gross indecency and torture.

**Kecik Hasan Ibrahim**, arrested in July 1977, was stripped naked, forced to walk on all fours like a dog, then beaten, trampled and sexually assaulted. A sergeant and a captain, in the presence of the local military staff, tortured him so ferociously that he completely lost control of himself. In July 1979 he was still in a mental hospital.

**M. Daud Ali**, arrested in July 1978 while working on his land, was stripped naked and beaten. He sustained many injuries and severe loss of blood. He was then held for 72 hours in a dark, windowless room.

**Tengku Usman Harun**, arrested in December 1977, was handcuffed with his hands behind his back, beaten and given electric shock treatment until he fainted.

Abdullah gave details of bribes being paid, and to whom, by some detainees as a condition for their release. He also gave the names and ranks of many of the officers involved in torturing.

Turning to the charges against himself, he declared that he had indeed delivered letters as charged, and had overheard some remarks as alleged in the indictment. On one occasion his attention had been drawn to an open-air meeting of several hundred people. As it transpired, they were listening to a speech about Free Aceh by Ir. Isnawi, followed by a speaker who read out the names of ministers in the Free Aceh cabinet. He had also overheard remarks about a students' demonstration.

But it was absolutely false to accuse him of subversion as he had no inkling of the contents of the letters he delivered, and denied being involved in the Free Aceh Movement. He was not a supporter of the ideology being advocated by Tengku M. Hassan Tiro, the leader of the Free Aceh Movement, he told the court.

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*\*It is particularly offensive for Moslems, as most of these prisoners are, to be maltreated during the sacred fasting month.*

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# THE COSTS OF A "CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE"

*The (British-ed.) Government looked to developing countries to provide "a climate of confidence for external investors and stable conditions in which they can operate". (The Guardian, 17 July 1980, reporting the negative reaction of the British Government to the Brandt Commission proposals).*

A further 2.1 billion dollars will be added to Indonesia's foreign debt burden as a result of a decision taken by the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) in May this year. This sum is the credit to be provided for the 1980-1 financial year. Bilateral aid will account for 1 billion dollars, with the rest coming from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other multinational agencies. The individual commitments made so far (excluding food aid in some cases) are as follows:

Japan	280 million dollars
West Germany	95 million dollars
Canada	20 million dollars
USA	160 million dollars
UK	22 million dollars
Australia	45 million dollars
Belgium	12 million dollars
France	74 million dollars
Netherlands	80 million dollars
Italy	5 million dollars
Switzerland	4 million dollars

Among the most striking increases in bilateral commitments are those from the UK (up from 2.7m dollars in 1979/80), France (up from 44.6m dollars), West Germany (up from 75.7m dollars) and the Netherlands (up from 64.4m dollars).

Meanwhile the 1979 *Annual Report on Fundamental Human Rights in Indonesia* published last December by the Legal Aid Bureau in Jakarta draws a clear connection between the style of economic development now being promoted by international financial interests in Indonesia and the question of basic human rights. One of the most prominent characteristics of the present Indonesian government, it says, is its concentration on economic development: "basic human rights are often sacrificed for the sake of the success of development..." The report continues that the policy of foreign capital investment, emphasis on technology, the supply of labour and the promotion of industry needs to be reversed because it is far removed from the basic realities of people's lives. It condemns the "trickle down theory" and complains that as a result of the 1967 Foreign Investment Law many economic sectors are controlled by foreigners. As for foreign debt which now "surrounds us on all sides", the report wryly comments: "Perhaps we should no longer speak about income per capita but rather about the amount of foreign debt per capita."

## WORLD BANK "CLEANS UP" SURABAYA

Bright yellow garbage bins supplied on credit by the World Bank now grace the fronts of poor peoples' homes in several districts of Surabaya. The bins are the focal element in the World Bank's project to "clean up" Surabaya. The project is due to receive Rp. 2½ billion from the World Bank, but the first stage, involving only five localities (out of a total of 600), has already absorbed Rp. 100 million to pay for the bins, and for the transport of garbage to dumps out of town.



Householders will be required to replace damaged or lost bins at their own expense and must contribute to the garbage removal costs. The bins are pierced with small holes to prevent them from being used for other purposes, a clever precaution as most of the houses have no pipe water, plumbing system or lavatories.

# EAST TIMOR:

## TIMORESE REFUGEE PRIEST MEETS ARCH-BISHOP OF CANTERBURY

Father Francisco Fernandes, a refugee Catholic priest now living in Australia, met Dr. Runcie, the Archbishop of Canterbury, in London on 17 July. He received assurances from the Primate of the world Anglican Church of deep sympathy and concern for the present tragic plight of the people of East Timor.

The meeting was the highlight of a brief but busy visit to London by Fr. Fernandes, at the invitation of the Catholic Institute of International Relations and the Centre of Concern for Human Dignity, a centre run by English and Irish Jesuits. Father Fernandes, who is Honorary President of the Timorese Refugee Commission in Portugal, was accompanied on his visit by An Seu Ki, a Timorese living in Lisbon, several members of whose family have reached Lisbon recently as refugees from Indonesian-occupied East Timor.

During their visit Fr. Fernandes and Mr. Au were received by a senior official of the Foreign Office, Mr. Burns, head of the Southeast Asia section. Mr. Burns said that the British Government agrees that there should be more foreign relief staff in East Timor. He explained that the UK does not recognise that any act of self-determination has taken place in East Timor, and supports East Timor's right to exercise this right. But he said that the reason why Britain had for the past few years abstained on the UN resolution upholding this right was because it **wished to preserve the balance of its friendship with both Indonesia and Portugal**. Portugal as the former colonial power in East Timor is constitutionally bound to secure the country's independence.

The Timorese visitors also met Peter Shore MP, foreign affairs spokesperson for the opposition Labour Party, the Liberal peer, Lord Chitnis, Thomas Hammerberg, the new Secretary-General of Amnesty International, and Mr. Muazzam Ali, the director of the Islamic Council of Europe, and addressed meetings of human rights and church organisations, and of the main voluntary relief organisations in the UK. Fr. Fernandes also addressed a meeting of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Rights in the House of Lords. The meeting was chaired by the Liberal peer, Lord Avebury.

## RESISTANCE IN EAST TIMOR INTENSIFIES

Reports both from official sources in Jakarta, as well as from East Timorese refugees newly arrived in Lisbon, confirm that resistance to the Indonesian occupation forces in East Timor has greatly intensified in the past few months.

The official report (FEER, 20 June 1980) spoke of an attack on the television installation on the outskirts of Dili during which two Indonesian soldiers were killed. The attack lasted for several hours. Another attack in Dili at about the same time also resulted in casualties for the Indonesians, including two deaths.

A *New York Times* report (29 July 1980) quoted newly arrived refugees in Lisbon as saying that Indonesian casualties were in fact as high as between 50 and 100 a week, of whom possibly as many as half were dying. James Markham, writing from Lisbon, said that the Indonesian government was now tightening exit visa restrictions in Jakarta, with the result that fewer Timorese were able to leave, and many are now stranded in Jakarta as a result. But some still get out after paying high bribes, in some cases as much as 3,000 dollars per person.

The refugees, who refused to be identified for fear of jeopardising the chances for relatives to leave, described conditions at the Antonio de Carvalho hospital in Dili as being "very dirty and overcrowded" with patients lying "all over the floor". Medicines supplied by the Red Cross were misappropriated by Indonesians, who then sold them to the patients. Indonesian soldiers being treated at the hospital also experienced this shortage of medicines. Foreign visitors were never taken to this hospital, but only saw the much better equipped, but rarely used military hospital, the refugees said.

The refugees told Markham that OV-10 Bronco planes took off regularly from Dili loaded with bombs. "It's a small place and everyone knows what happens. When a visitor comes, everyone knows because things change." Despite the massive supply of relief food to East Timor, the refugees spoke only of a "slight improvement" in the availability of food in Dili:

We can't keep a lot of food in the house because if we do the Indonesian soldiers will come and steal it. A lot of Chinese shops are closing because they are afraid of the soldiers.

## UK SELLING SIXTEEN HAWKS TO INDONESIA

It is now clear that the British Government has approved the sale of 16 (not 8) Hawk ground attack bombers to Indonesia. A news item from Jakarta (*Asia Record*, May 1980) reporting the arrival of the first eight of a squadron of 16 F-5E US jet fighters in Indonesia, also said that "one squadron" (i.e. 16 planes — ed.) of British-made Hawk "jet trainers" were being supplied to "re-equip the Indonesian air force". From another source TAPOL has heard that the first Hawks were due to reach Jakarta earlier this year.

Up till now the British government has confirmed only the sale of **eight** Hawks, the deal announced by British Aerospace in April 1978, which led to widespread protest in Britain. The British Government also claims that it is only supplying the "trainer version" and refuses to acknowledge that the planes can easily be re-equipped for aerial combat, and used in support of Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.

# CENSORSHIP OR THE BIG LIE

*"The great mass of the people will more easily fall victim to a big lie than to a small one." Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf.*

*Himbauan* (appeal) seems at first a reasonably polite word. It is one with which Jakarta's newspaper editors are very familiar, and it is nothing less than a euphemism for the heavy-handed censorship meted out by Suharto's security organisations (BAKIN and KORKAMTIB), the Department of Information (a curious misnomer) and the Jakarta police. If an editor ignores a *himbauan* not to publish something, it means a certain suspension of publication permits. This was the fate of seven major newspapers for a period early in 1978 at the height of student demonstrations.

Sometimes censorship backfires and catches the censors unawares as in the recent case involving the Vice-President, Adam Malik. The *Asian Wall Street Journal* made a reference to some documents which seemingly proved that Malik was taking commissions in return for securing an oil contract. The Asian edition of the paper was submitted to the process of "blacking" in Jakarta. However when Malik publicly denied the allegations, a Jakarta newspaper published the denials, thus immediately focussing intense interest on the story.

For some time now the best efforts of the blackers and the intimidators have failed to fully conceal the fact that Suharto now faces a more united and determined opposition than perhaps ever before. It includes workers, peasants, students, retired generals, parliamentarians and religious groupings, and these disparate forces have found common cause in the malaise of the economy and persistent reports of corruption which have somehow bypassed the censors; their grievances are directed at Suharto himself for, by its very nature, a life of luxury is difficult to conceal.

On March 27 this year, Suharto himself made the task of the censors harder when he made some surprising remarks at an army commanders' meeting in Pekanbaru (Sumatra). In his speech he lashed out at opponents, and in an extraordinary interpretation of state philosophy he attacked socialism, marhaenism, nationalism and religion as discredited philosophies, thereby alienating a good many people. Again he made it quite clear that the armed forces were expected to throw their weight behind GOLKAR's [1] election drive for the 1982 elections. This directly contradicts an earlier statement of General Jusuf's which guaranteed that the armed forces stood above all political groups.

Far from attempting to allay the fears and outrage inspired by his speech, Suharto followed it three weeks later with another which attacked "university students and housewives" who spread rumours. He was referring to stories that his wife Tien was receiving commissions and determining who would win tenders, and one which alleged that a well-known actress was his paramour. This speech was made at the 28th anniversary meeting of the *Kopassandha*

(Red Berets) unit in West Java, and Suharto concluded that the rumours were aimed at overthrowing him.

## The "Petition of 50" and the "Insulting" Letter

The speeches immediately triggered off a spate of angry comments from a number of prominent Indonesians. Lt.-General Mokoginta (retired) stated his concern in a letter to the Defence Minister, General Jusuf. A group of retired generals (FOSKO) sent another letter to the new army chief-of-staff, General Poniman. Most significantly, a group of 50 Indonesians on May 13, presented a one-page "Statement of Concern" to the Indonesian parliament. This petition struck hard at Suharto saying that he had falsely interpreted the State philosophy *Pancasila*, (something which the government itself has treated as 'subversion' on many occasions), using it as a tool to attack his political enemies. Suharto in presenting himself as the personification of *Pancasila*, had implied that an attack on himself was an attack on *Pancasila*. They particularly objected to Suharto's assumption that the armed forces were merely an instrument of those in power. The star-studded signatories included former prime ministers Burhanuddin Harahap, Moh. Natsir, Syafruddin Prawiranegara, the former Jakarta governor, Ali Sadikin, the former defence minister, General Nasution and the former military commander of Sumatra, General Mokoginta.

One of the signatories, Lt.-General Jasin, a long-standing

## CONSPIRACIES, CONSPIRACIES . . .

Yet another conspiracy has been unearthed, and yet again the story has been blacked out. It is another bizarre move by the government to play the rumour machine in an attempt to convince the Indonesian public that Suharto is dogged by dark and violent forces, and an attempt to gain sympathy for him before the 1982 elections.

No less than a "Black Brigade" which purportedly has links with the Japanese Red Army has now threatened to launch a terror campaign in Jakarta. Eighty University of Indonesia students are involved and four Red Army guerrillas. At least that is how the story goes. It is not entirely coincidental that such a nest of terrorists have grown out of the UI campus—for it is one of the universities where the students have committed "subversion" by defying a government order forbidding them to set up student councils. The government regards the students as such a grave threat that for some time it has been trying to "normalise" (depoliticise) the campuses—a task which has tested the ingenuity of the Education Minister Daoed Jusuf and the collective brains (or at least brawn) of the security forces. Needless to say, stories of the activities of the South Korean students were assiduously blacked out from the Indonesian press.



critic of the ruling group, presented his own statement, in unusually strong language, to the parliamentarians. He denounced Suharto as a hypocrite (*munafik*) for making conflicting statements about the role of the armed forces. He also produced evidence that Suharto's son, Sigit, to whom Suharto is a "consultant", has secured 720 hectares of land in the land-short Bogor district from the West Java governor for his own cattle project. The ministry of works put in roads and irrigation, and the navy shipped the cattle from Australia.

Immediately after the petition was delivered, the Ministry of Information ordered the mass media to ignore it. Next a large group of editors were given a peremptory summons to a meeting called in Jakarta by the heads of the security organisations BAKIN [2] and KOPKAMTIB [3], Yoga Sugama and Sudomo. The meeting was absurd and farcical in parts, especially when Sudomo divulged details of an alleged plot aimed at assassinating 76 senior Indonesians including Suharto. The evidence he produced strained credibility, but responsibility for the alleged plot was placed on the doorstep of FOSKO, a group of retired generals who have been critical of the government for some time. The petition itself was described as a "constitutional coup d'état" and Yoga announced that the signatories would be kept under 24 hour surveillance.

In a strange contrast to the reaction after the so-called coup of 1965, where up to a million were killed and hundreds of thousands were imprisoned, the government is treating this "attempted coup" very mildly. Yoga announced at the meeting that he would not give the plotters the satisfaction of making martyrs of them. (Put another way, the government probably would not risk making martyrs of the petitioners, who have common cause with so many other groups). Reprisals have been petty, and in fact have drawn attention to the government's corrupt system of patronage and handouts, rather than attracting any sympathy. Business licences and expiring work permits of the petitioners have not been renewed, credit lines to state banks severed, exit permits denied, and they will no longer be allowed to participate in government tenders.

Perhaps the most ludicrous element in the government's retaliation is in its measures dealing with Hugeng, the former police chief, who was forced to resign some time ago when his too zealous tracking down of corruption rackets and profiteering led into palace circles. For the past twelve years Hugeng has been appearing on Indonesian television performing Hawaiian music with his group, the **Hawaiian Seniors**. When it was known that Hugeng had signed the petition, the Minister for Information, Ali Murtopo, axed the show, saying that Hawaiian music "does not reflect the national culture" (*Far Eastern Economic Review* 27 June 1980). To compound the farce, Sudomo went one further at the press conference, saying:

Don't look on Hugeng as an innocent guitar player or Hawaiian singer... We must not exclude the possibility that he will one day sing a revolutionary song and incite people to riot.

(FEER 27 June 1980).

The informal network in Indonesia has seen to it that

the petition has been duplicated and circulated widely. At the same time the antics of the security forces and the would-be censors backfired somewhat as foreign editors presented the events without noting the element of farce in the affair, and immediately the already quavering confidence of foreign banks and investors plummeted.

### The Foreign Press

The foreign press is by no means immune to censorship, and now its long arm has reached **Radio Australia** and the **Australian Broadcasting Commission**. In April the government refused to renew the visa of the ABC representative in Jakarta, Warwick Beutler, and also refused a work permit to a **Radio Australia** officer. The ABC is accused of unbalanced reporting of Indonesian events, which, it is said, could lead to subversion. The officials are clearly not so concerned about Beutler's English language broadcast, as about the fact that the Bahasa Indonesia programme rebroadcast from Australia has some 30 million listeners. The expulsion of the ABC is seen as a warning to other

## POSTSCRIPT ON THE

*With ruin upon ruin  
Confusion worse than*

The government is having the utmost difficulty in holding down its blanket of censorship. There is dissension in the ranks and it has taken all the features of a wonderful farce. General Jasin has been interrogated for allegedly insulting the head of state. It doesn't matter whether what he said was true or not, the President is insulted just the same. The interrogation of Jasin was not supposed to be mentioned in the press, but thanks to the enthusiasm of the Jakarta security chief, who denounced Jasin by name for failing to turn up when first summoned, the story of Jasin's insult appeared prominently in the papers. Then the Minister of Information made some statements (which Sudomo later said he should not have made). First he denied the assassination story of the security chiefs (which until then had not been reported due to blacking) and then refuted the allegations of the petitioners (until then the existence of the petition had not been officially recognised), and finally, apparently warming to his speech, he brandished the threat of civil war if Suharto stepped down. Obviously Sudomo did not heed Murtopo's fears, because, according to an AFP report from Hong Kong (13 July 1980), he went off to play golf in Spain.

Following accounts in the international press about the Kartika story, the Indonesian editors were again told to ignore the story. This time Ali Said, the Attorney General, called a press conference in order to refute Kartika's allegations against Suharto. He had

members of the foreign press. The inbuilt perversity of censorship has become apparent in this instance too, as the Indonesian press has been curiously silent about the expulsion, when the government would no doubt have welcomed attacks in the Indonesian press about the "inaccuracy" and "subversive content" of ABC coverage.

As someone observed, lies are as contagious as fleas, and *Newsweek* has entered the fray, stoutly suggesting that the Indonesian government has legitimate grievances against the ABC (7 July 1980). So, there were "long standing grievances over Radio Australia's broadcasts", "overblown accounts of rebel claims during the 1975 East Timor crisis", "the station had given heavy air time to dissident movements aimed at toppling Suharto", and "the head of army intelligence charged Beutler—correctly—with picking up two erroneous reports from foreign news agencies. One suggested that plans were afoot to deport Indonesia's unpopular Chinese minority. The second had the Foreign Minister comparing East Timor's current condition with the 1968-70 famine in Biafra."

## THE PETITION AFFAIR

*in, rout on rout,  
unfounded. (Milton).*

personally been assured by Suharto that the allegations were groundless! Following the conference *Kompas* and *Merdeka* gave some prominence to the story. *Merdeka* (22 July 1980) in particular went into great detail and printed the names of the officials accused by Kartika of corruption. Both papers gave some prominence to the fact that Kartika is regarded to have committed "insult" (*penghinaan*), a popular new charge in Indonesia these days. *Merdeka* also seemed to come as close as possible to querying Suharto's denials of Kartika's claims, when it made a point of saying that Kartika's evidence was given under oath in the Singapore High Court, and that perjury is a serious offence.

On the same day as *Merdeka* published this story, security officials were still trying to keep it as the exclusive right of the Attorney General and the security forces to reveal any parts of it. This battle was lost on another front in parliament when General Daryatmo made a speech saying that it is wrong to insult the President, but if the allegations are proved true, then the President is answerable. Despite efforts to suppress these comments, the government news agency, *Antara*, and the Army newspaper *Berita Yudha* ran the story the following day, and many local papers followed suit... There is no doubt that this saga will go on and on. Suharto is in a tight corner and his few friends are at logger-heads with one another.

It is worth analysing the last statement in order to evaluate *Newsweek's* assessment of the expulsion of the ABC. First, none other than the intelligence mogul, Yoga Sugama, announced that staging camps had been set up preparatory to the deportation of a million Chinese. The announcement was made at the Defence and Foreign Affairs Commission of Parliament on 28 November 1979, and was recorded by *Guardian/Reuter*. Secondly, Mochtar's statement was widely reported in November, and the comparison of East Timor with Kampuchea and Biafra has been made by several well-informed sources. For example the *Guardian* (2 November 1979) reported the International Red Cross representative in East Timor, as saying that the situation there was:

worse than in Biafra during the Nigerian civil war a decade ago, and potentially more dangerous than in Cambodia.

There is only *Newsweek's* assertion that these reports are erroneous, and there is not much credibility in a magazine which writes off the Indonesian invasion and subsequent carnage in East Timor as "the 1975 East Timor crisis" and which refers to a national independence, and subsequent resistance movement, as "rebels". *Newsweek* smugly concludes its account of Beutler's expulsion, saying that what finally provoked the authorities to expel Beutler was "a more bluntly political pair of reports", which were concerned with the petition and "briefly became hot items on the Jakarta dinner party circuit." Trivialising news is, of course, another aspect of the Big Lie. Finally, as far as *Newsweek* and other major influences in the western press go, it is well to recall with regard to East Timor, that silence can be the cruellest and most insidious lie of all.

### Theatre and Students Muzzled

Returning to domestic censorship, Indonesian authorities have recently drastically cut a dramatised political biography of Sukarno, entitled "Son of Dawn". No excuse has been given, and obviously the excuse "does not reflect the national culture" will not suffice here. The play, which had already been performed in Jogjakarta in 1970 and 1978, was originally given the go-ahead for another performance, but at the last minute the Jakarta police ordered that the play had to end with Sukarno and Hatta's declaration of independence in 1945, thereby cutting the play to one third of its original length.

Yet another attempt to stifle the circulation of information has led to a crackdown on students who have been making some attempts to assess the malaise of the Indonesian economy and its social effects. In May domestic fuel prices were raised by 50%, severely penalising the poor who depend on kerosene for lighting and cooking. Students drew up a questionnaire seeking detailed answers on how the price rise would affect family living standards, and spending on education, food and medicine. When two students began to distribute the questionnaire in Jakarta's Rawa Mangun market on 13 May, the army sent three truck loads of soldiers to stop them. One student was wounded when his camera was seized as he photographed

the arrival of the troops.

Two press-related trials in recent months have kept would-be critics aware of the dangers of criticism. On March 3 Sumarsono, the editor of **Abadi**, a Muslim daily, was charged with subversion for allegedly publishing classified documents, obtained from some military officers. The alleged offence occurred at the time of student demonstrations in 1974. The **Salemba** case is yet another which cautions the press, and students in particular, not to criticise the government or any of its officials. **Salemba** is the University of Indonesia (UI) campus publication which has been forbidden on six separate counts from publishing or printing. The editor was given no prior warning of the ban, and the closure follows the banning of two other campus papers, **Gelora Mahasiswa** (University of Gadjah Mada) and **Kampus** (Bandung Institute of Technology) in September 1979 and April 1980 respectively. The latest closure seems to have followed the publication of a reader's letter, which accused a West Nusatenggara official of adultery, fathering an illegitimate child, and with forging his teaching qualifications.

The closure of **Salemba** was the outcome of discussions between the Minister of Education, Daoed Jusuf, and the Department of Information. Daoed Jusuf upheld the closure as he wishes to see "campus society as a 'scientific community' which means that campus newspapers must be in line with campus normalisation." (**Kompas** 18 May 1980) [4]. He held up the newspaper of the UI medical faculty as producing the sort of sanitised "scientific" articles of which the government approves. **Salemba's** articles, he said, contained:

commentary negatively focussed on government policy, and that leads to practical politics, which conflicts with campus normalisation (**Kompas** 18 May 1980)

He might well have added that the whole of Indonesian society is subjected to a sort of 'normalisation' (or depoliticisation) and that politics is the exclusive preserve of the Suharto circle and the intelligence and security organisations. Even retired generals are not allowed to play politics. To do so is "subversive".

The **Salemba** case has a further interesting aspect. Originally the press reported that the editor of **Salemba**, Wikrama, had been charged under the insult (*penghinaan*) article of the criminal code (KUHP art. 310) and with the economic subversion decree (UU11/PNPS/1959) (This is obviously a mistake: the law is UU5/PNPS/1959). (**Kompas** 10 May 1980). Two days later **Kompas** reported that it was the other anti-subversion decree under which Wikrama had been charged (UU11/PNPS/1963), and that on the strength of this, a defence team had been formed under the leadership of Adnan Buyung Nasution. However, during the trial proceedings, the prosecutor insisted that subversion had never been mentioned, that Wikrama had misheard the charge, and that in fact he had been charged with UU11/1966 (the Press Law). When the defence team demanded to know whether the defence *and* the accused had misheard the charge, or whether the prosecutor had misread the charge, the judge ruled that the prosecutor's rendering of

the charge had been consistent (**Merdeka** 19 May 1980). No newspaper editor would dare to challenge such a decision.

### Lid Lifted on High-Level Corruption

One item which is bound not to appear in the Indonesian press, appeared in **The Times** (whose correspondent is sensibly in Singapore) on 16 July. It transpires that Ms. Kartika Ratna Thahir has claimed in the Singapore High Court, US \$35 million from a joint account with her now deceased husband in a Japanese bank. Thahir was a senior employee of the state oil company Pertamina, which spectacularly crashed in the boom year of 1975. Pertamina is also claiming the money, charging that the money was obtained illegally by Thahir, through secret profits and bribery. Kartika has alleged that President Suharto and several senior officials knew of the commissions; that General Benny Moerdani, the head of the security organisation OPSUS, had told Kartika that he had accepted on behalf of Suharto 5% and 7% commissions on arms deals with Israel and West Germany respectively; and that Tien Suharto (the president's wife) had used Thahir as her private treasurer, requiring him to make large donations for her special projects. In addition he had given Tien Suharto rings worth US \$ 29,000. The Pertamina crash is one of the hottest political issues of the Suharto period and it is one that could never be aired in Indonesia because of its connection with palace circles. The former director of Pertamina, Ibnu Sutowo, although he resigned when the crash could no longer be concealed, still freewheels in Indonesia's financial and business circles.

In assessing the censorship practices of the Suharto government since its installation, one may find many instances. Amongst these instances one tactic stands out—to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw, murder is the severest form of censorship. Hundreds of thousands have died in Indonesia, East Timor and West Papua New Guinea at the hand of the government. Journalists such as the **Newsweek** reporters quoted above might recall that five foreign journalists were deliberately killed by Indonesian troops prior to the invasion of East Timor in December 1975. Another died just after the invasion. By past records it is reasonable to assume that the government will not fail to resort to silencing by murder again and again as less drastic methods fail in the upholding of the Big Lie.

### Footnotes

1. GOLKAR is a pseudo-party apparatus consisting of a number of loosely-linked functional bodies, which serves the government as an electoral vehicle. All civil servants are required to be GOLKAR members.
2. BAKIN is the intelligence coordinating body, headed by General Yoga Sugama who is also Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB (see footnote 3 below).
3. KOPKAMTIB is the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order. It was set up for a "limited period" after the 'coup' of 1965, and today still enjoys almost unlimited and extra-constitutional power.
4. See **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 38 for the comments of the student leader Heri Akhmadi, about campus normalisation.

# FILM CENSORSHIP

(Topik 17 May 1980) (Translation)

The film world is apparently inflicted with the fear of being accused of subversion, for hardly a single Indonesian film contains any hint of social criticism, still less criticism of the government. As a result the Indonesian film industry is marked by caution and anxiety. Themes are unrelated to reality and avoid referring to anything connected with the government.

Against this background of distorted legal constraints, the film **Village Girl** has come as a great surprise, because it has dared to voice sharp social criticism, aimed in particular at the much-vaunted principle of equality before the law. The fact is that it is the little person who is the victim of the law as depicted in this film. But because it has dared to speak out, it will not be seen in its original form. It has been drastically cut on several occasions by the Film Censorship Board which has held it back, made many revisions and will only release it when the "situation" permits.

## The Story in Brief

Sumirah (played by Yati Surachman) is the daughter of poor peasants, Suroto and Mien Brojo. Every day she goes to Jogya to sell eggs. Being a pleasant, attractive girl, she

gets many customers. But unfortunately she falls victim to a gang of long-haired youths who rape her in a car and throw her out, leaving her to lie the whole night in a ditch.

When she reports her misfortune to a friend who happens to be a journalist, the story becomes widely known, but with dreadful consequences. Sum is arrested by the police and accused of spreading falsehoods. They accuse her of doing this to achieve fame, like the case of the teacher Stela Duce, and she is forced to admit this by a policeman acting at the behest of the group of rapists who are the sons of senior officials.

She is taken to court but is acquitted because the charge of spreading falsehoods is not proved. Though she is eventually freed, the question of rape is never mentioned. So the victim of rape was the one taken to court. In the end she becomes a nurse.

The script-writer, Kamadjaya, was inspired by a real-life tragedy known in Jogya as the case of "Sum Kuning". Sum, an egg-seller, was raped by a group of youths, among whom were sons of officials. The case has not been taken up to this day. Although Sum has now been adopted, the incident has left a negative impression on Jogya's society. As a result of this case, some law enforcement officers were transferred to other posts.

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## STOP PRESS

### PRESSURE ON RADIO AUSTRALIA TO HALT INDONESIAN-LANGUAGE BROADCASTS

Following the expulsion of Australian Broadcasting Corporation(ABC)and Radio Australia journalists from Indonesia, the Indonesian Government is now pressing for an end to all Indonesian-language broadcasts by Radio Australia.

Radio Australia has extensively reported the recent political challenges to Suharto, and gave detailed coverage to the accusations against Suharto in the statement made to a Singapore court in July by Mrs Kartika Thahir. Its programmes, with an audience of some 30 million in Indonesia, reach far more people than the entire Indonesian press put together, and represents a serious breach in Indonesia's censorship system.

The **Far Eastern Economic Review** (8 August, 1980), reports that "high Indonesian officials are now speaking privately of a major falling out with Australia unless Radio

Australia stops its broadcasts in Bahasa Indonesia . . . 'We are not prepared to put up with this any more', one influential government official told the **Review** last week. 'Radio Australia is stirring up the Indonesian people against their government.'"

Meanwhile, Warwick Beutler, the ABC journalist who was forced to leave Jakarta in June after the authorities refused to renew his visa, said on his arrival in Australia that "the threat of expulsion hangs over every foreign correspondent in Jakarta". He had been accused, he said, of reporting Indonesian affairs in "a biased and negative way".

He said that all foreign correspondents were given indications when they went to renew their visas that their applications might not be successful because of news items they had written. (**Canberra Times**, 1 July 1980.)

Elizabeth Marlow, "Keeping the Lid on Indonesia", **Issues**, no. 3, June 1980.

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# BARRIERS TO CHINESE NATURALISATION

Illegal levies by regional officials are exacting payments of up to one million rupiahs for each single application from ethnic Chinese for Indonesian citizenship. Applicants from Central Java and other regions are also encountering many obstructions when documents are sent to central government officials, who often claim that the documents failed to arrive or "got lost in the post". This has sparked a flourishing trade in illegal brokerage. Some Chinese are having to pay between one million and one and a half million rupiahs for the services of brokers who have the confidence of officials at the Department of Justice and the courts.

A member of parliament from the nationalist party PDI, Soewardi Setyowardono, has recently investigated the implementation of Presidential Regulation No. 13 (February 1980), promulgated allegedly to speed up and simplify naturalisation procedures. He points out that according to the regulation, applicants are required to pay only Rp. 3,000 administrative fees. He believes that obstructions are intended deliberately to sabotage the naturalisation procedure. About 850,000 ethnic Chinese who have been living in Indonesia for generations are required to complete their

naturalisation formalities within the next year or to face forced repatriation (see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 37 and 38).

Mr Soewardi said that in many places local officials are creating additional requirements, for instance that applicants must produce evidence that numerous taxes have been paid before they can obtain loyalty certificates. He also observed that certain stipulations of the regulation itself were making it very difficult for any but wealthy ethnic Chinese to complete the formalities. One stipulation requires that applicants must be over 21 years of age. Yet persons over the age of 18 can not be covered by their parents' naturalisation status. Moreover people in this age group face the additional difficulty that applicants must produce proof that they are gainfully employed. This is an impossibility for many people because of the critical level of unemployment in Indonesia.

Mr Soewardi failed to mention that the employment stipulation will automatically lead to the deportation of tens of thousands of ethnic Chinese in refugee camps in West Kalimantan and North Sumatra. (Source: **Merdeka**, 20 May, 1980).

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## ALL "A" TAPOLS BUT ONE NOW TRIED?

An Indonesian Government representative claimed, at this year's International Labour Conference of the ILO, that all A-category political prisoners except one have now been tried. The one remaining trial had been delayed, he said, because the person in question was unwell.

This claim was made during discussions at the ILO's Committee on the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations. This Committee has for the past six years undertaken a detailed review of the Indonesian political prisoner problem on the grounds that the treatment of prisoners violated ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labour.

At the end of 1979, the Indonesian Government was claiming that there were still 23 A-category prisoners awaiting trial. Since then, not more than half a dozen trials have been reported in the press. Some of the persons named then as awaiting trial were Army generals including Brigadier-General Suharjo, Major-General Rukman and Major-General Pranoto Reksamodra, whose trials, if they have indeed taken place, would certainly have been widely reported in the press.

Referring to ex-tapols, the Indonesian representative declared, in contradiction to all reports reaching us from Indonesia, that they were "completely free to live and work where they liked" and even claimed that "The work experience and vocational training they had received during their detentions would be very useful to them in finding jobs"!

Serious discrepancies in figures about releases were raised by members of the ILO Committee. The West German Government member complained that the Indonesian representative had told the Committee at this year's session that 9,285 B-category prisoners were released

in 1979, whereas last year, the Committee had been told that 9,739 B-category prisoners would be released during the year. Were there still 454 B-category detainees awaiting release, she asked. The reply she was given was that these people might have been re-classified to category C. (Hardly a reply in fact, since even if this were true, they should still have been included in the 1979 release figure.)

The Indonesian Government representative felt the need to make a special reference to persons with C-category status who were being compelled against their wishes to remain on plantations in North Sumatra where they are working as contract labour. This matter was raised at last year's ILO meeting. (For more details about these 6,157 plantation workers, see **TAPOL Bulletin** No. 31, Dec-Jan 1979.)

While admitting that these people did indeed have C-category status, he claimed that now only 1,758 were still in Sumatra, of whom 1,494 had "elected to stay permanently". The remaining 264 who wanted to return home had not yet done so "because of technical reasons".

Despite Indonesian claims that all problems previously raised had now been resolved, the ILO Committee decided to keep the issue on the agenda for next year's meeting. There was dissatisfaction that Indonesia had not submitted an official report in time for the ILO Committee of Experts to make a report and recommendations, and trade union representatives urged that a "direct contacts mission" be established "to verify that the process of release had been finalised and also that total reintegration (of ex-tapols, Ed.) had been achieved". This proposal was incorporated into the final report of the 1980 Session of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations.

# A MASSACRE SCENE REVISITED

In February 1969 Brian May visited areas of East Java where the Government had conducted, in June the previous year, a mopping up operation which cost many lives. In a camp in Purwodadi, at least 860 suspected communists who had been rounded up by the army were cold-bloodedly massacred. Brian May has the following to say of his visit:

On the way to Purwodadi in a locally hired car, I was struck by the absence of people as we drove through what was generally one of the most densely populated areas of Indonesia. There were houses at intervals along the road, but few women and children and practically no men. I asked the driver why this was. He replied dully: 'Semua mati' (all are dead). Apparently he was referring to what had taken place in 1965 and later; for this was far from the scene of the latest massacre...

It was obvious that anyone who criticised the government which meant almost any landless peasant and any thinker, would fall under suspicion and easily find himself in one of the big iron sheds (of the prison—ed.)... Some would doubtless be tortured in futile attempts to make them reveal the names of others in some imagined conspiracy; the army's habit of suspecting a plot and then finding characters to fit it would have prevailed here as in any other district.

(The Indonesian Tragedy, p. 206)

East Java is an area which is extremely poor and where the peasants who were mainly non-Muslim, had in Sukarno's time given their support to the PKI and its policy of forcing the implementation of the 1960s land reform laws. The people in the area were subjected to extreme terror in 1965-6 and again in 1968. Recently the Defence Minister General Jusuf was asked by President Suharto to go and inspect the area to be sure that government control is fully asserted, especially since tapols, all regarded as PKI sympathisers, have been released from prison. According to the **Kompas** report of the visit (9 May 1980) Jusuf was accompanied by a large entourage of senior military and security officials.

Jusuf was well pleased with what he saw. Observing "they are no longer like they were before", he noted with pleasure that the inhabitants of the area have gone back to the mosque and now worship very well. So too with the Christians. He was delighted that the areas visited, Purwodadi, Salatiga, Boyolali, and Klaten, have now been restored by the government efforts to develop the area, and commented: "Their attitude conveyed that clearly it is us who are good and not them (the PKI—ed.)". He approved heartily of the local KOPKAMTIB representative who suggested that "social development cadres" be brought in to the development effort. This may be connected with an admonition Jusuf gave to the local commanders at the conclusion of his tour, when he urged them within three months to herd together all the former prisoners in the area so that they might be given lectures and instructions. The content of these lectures and instructions was undisclosed. There is a comment from Jusuf:

All along the road I saw no empty land. It was all under cultivation. The standard of living is very pleasing.

This seems a strange comment when land is known to be so scarce in the poverty-stricken area. The only reason for a good standard of living in the area could be that land holdings have greatly concentrated into a few hands, and if the mosques are full, then it is likely that the land has gone over to the Muslim landlords. What has happened to all the poor, non-Muslim peasants who were in the area before? Can their apparent absence have something to do with the fact that Jusuf is so well pleased by what he saw?



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## A NEW ASSAULT ON RULE OF LAW

On 17 May 1980 *Sinar Harapan* reported that a delegation from a new advocates' (defence lawyers') association, known as *Fosko (Forum Studi dan Komunikasi) Advokat* were received by members of parliament. The delegation reported to parliament the formation of *Fosko Advokat*, saying that this reflected a democratic system in which many advocates' organisations can flourish.

The *Fosko Advokat* delegation lost little time in stating its support for the new Procedural Code (HAP), now in draft form, and here the reason for its formation became clear. The new law has been strongly criticised by many in Indonesian legal circles including the University of Indonesia law school, and the Legal Aid Bureau (LBH) which published 17 pages of comments. Even judges and the Attorney-General have criticised the draft. One of the main objections is that the new draft law greatly expands the powers of the police for arrest and detention. One lawyer commented wryly that it is not known who drafted the law, but the police are the only group who have not complained about it.

An article which appeared in *Tempo* on 14 June revealed that the main figures in *Fosko Advokat* are lawyers who have either been expelled from *Peradin*, or who have left because of disagreements. Commenting about *Fosko Advokat*, and yet another new organisation, HPHI (*Himpunan Penasehat Hukum Indonesia*—Association of Indonesian Defence Lawyers), Adnan Buyung Nasution of the Legal Aid Bureau stated:

Their target is clearly to damage the image of advocates who until now have been affiliated to only one organisation, *Peradin*.

According to Buyung the breakway is the deliberate work of an outside hand. He observed that funds had been provided from outside. He surmised that the split was also connected to a draft law on legal aid, which is expected to be presented to Parliament in 1980. Some articles of the proposed law severely limit the freedom of movement of advocates—which is already restricted by the insult laws, anti-subversion laws and the unlimited powers of KOP-KAMTIB, the security apparatus. **One article in the proposed legal aid law forbids attacks on existing laws or the government.** In order to achieve that goal, the government needs support to balance the opposition of *Peradin*. As if this threat to *Peradin* and to defence lawyers committed to rule of law were not enough, it should be recalled that there are only 1,000 advocates in Indonesia for some 138 million people, and 500 of them are in Jakarta, leaving *pokrol bambu* (bush lawyers) to handle defence work in small towns. The prosecution side has traditionally, and unlike advocates, been closely tied to the state, and most lawyers have chosen prosecution as it is much safer and more prestigious. If the government succeeds in encouraging or forcing any more defections from *Peradin*, there is little hope that any "legal" defence of human rights can survive in Indonesia.

## EXIT PERMIT SYSTEM DENIES A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT

A little more is now known about the refusal of the Indonesian government to grant an exit permit to the poet/playwright, Rendra (see *TAPOL Bulletin* No. 39 page 11). Initially the Department of Immigration in Jogjakarta granted Rendra permission to go to Australia on a lecture tour, but the permission was suddenly withdrawn after an instruction was issued by the Department of Immigration in Jakarta. Officials in Jakarta were reluctant to discuss the matter with the press, saying only that permission was refused after a request came from the government. It later transpired that the request had come from the intelligence agency, BAKIN (Age, 8 May 1980).

A friend of Rendra, the member of parliament, Jusuf Hasjim, strongly objected to the instruction, saying that Indonesia is a law state, and that such a refusal should not be made on the arbitrary grounds that there is a 'suspicion' that Rendra might say something that will damage the name or threaten the well-being of the state. In fact he said that the refusal itself would damage the image of Indonesia far more in the eyes of the outside world. (*Pelita*, 10 May 1980).

Meanwhile, through the Legal Aid Bureau (LBH) Rendra has challenged the government, observing that the practice of requiring exit permits is the mark of an iron-fisted state. It is not, he said, just a matter of his own rights as an individual, but a matter of principle—the infringement of a basic right, i.e. the right of free movement (*Pelita*, 22 May 1980). Other prominent Indonesians who have been refused exit permits in the past include Syuman Jaya, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Ismael Suny, Bung Tomo and Hugeng.

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## TRAFFICKING IN CHILD LABOUR

A thirteen year old boy from Bojonegoro in East Java is reported in *Sinar Harapan* (1 May 1980) to have escaped from a syndicate which sells under-age workers to Sumatran plantations. The boy, Sumadi, stated that he was playing in the street with some friends when a man approached them and promised them Rp. 70,000 a year if they would go and work on a coffee plantation in Lampung, South Sumatra. The children, attracted by the offer of money, went off with the man, and were immediately taken by bus straight to the Merak ferry port. Fifteen boys in all were in this labour gang, all of them from East Java. The day after arrival in South Sumatra all the boys were taken off to the coffee plantation to work.

Sumadi was separated from the other boys. Shortly after arrival in the plantation he was able to hide in a coffee tree and escape attention. In the early hours of the morning he fled, and succeeded in getting a lift and a ferry trip and reaching Jakarta. Once there Sumadi asked the North Jakarta police to help him return to his village. It remains to be seen whether the government will take any steps to stop this traffic in children. . . There is of course a possibility that the plantations in question are state owned.

# BOOK REVIEWS

**Indonesia: An Alternative History**, Malcolm Caldwell and Ernst Utrecht, Alternative Publishing Co-operative, Sydney, paperback, 208 pages. £7.95.

As an alternative history of Indonesia, meaning one which is not Euro-centric, not apologist, not state propagandist, and one which states it is written with a radical commitment to an egalitarian, just and humane society in Indonesia, this book is very welcome. It is one of Malcolm Caldwell's last projects before his tragic death in Kampuchea.

The first four chapters of the book were written by Caldwell, the fifth jointly with Ernst Utrecht, and the final six by Utrecht. Caldwell's chapters deal with the period up to independence. With his unique approach to history which combines several different traditions and which stimulated so many of his students, readers and audiences, Malcolm Caldwell begins his contribution with the early history of Indonesia, giving an introduction to the colony which the Dutch were hardly able to subdue, let alone to change. This is particularly important, as the entire course of Indonesian history has been significantly influenced by the fact that following the mercantile period of colonialism, the Dutch, as an economically weak colonial power, were at best only able to overlay the existing economic and social structure by bribing and coercing the *priyayi* ruling circles into their own service. The legacy of this maintenance of centralised power linked only loosely to local leaders and then to producers by ties of patronage, is something which must be understood in order to comprehend the nature of today's Indonesian state.

There is a good account of Anglo-Dutch rivalry, and of the Dutch resort in 1830 to the *Cultuurstelsel* or system of forced deliveries of cash crops, especially sugar. This system depended on state control by way of coercion, of land, and this gives some telling insights into the fact that coercion is central to the maintenance of the Indonesian state today. Theoretical state control, (as opposed to ownership) of land is enshrined in the constitution today, and there are still many instances, for example a recent attempt to revive a modified sugar system, which are strongly reminiscent of the colonial period and its harsh exactions. Sukarno at independence inherited what was virtually a broken-backed economy, with the sugar system in collapse after being dealt its death blow after the depression, and with its resurrection being out of the question. Caldwell's chapter "War, Boom and Depression", gives a good account of the imperialist forces at work on an already ravaged economy, and shows the sheer stupidity of those historians and commentators who have in the past attempted to pin the blame for Indonesia's economic misfortunes entirely on the policies of Sukarno.

The jointly written chapter on the Indonesian revolution has an interesting discussion of the dangers of narrow nationalism, and an account of the antecedents of the technocratic "Berkeley Mafia" compradors, in the now banned PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party). Interestingly, it was the so-called "PSI elements" who were blamed for the 1974 anti-

Japanese (and anti-Government) student demonstrations, and today the U.S. oriented technocrats are clearly at odds with much of the government policy, and with Suharto's patronage of freewheelers like Ibnu Sutowo. In their discussion of the independence struggle, the authors refer to the British role in supporting the Dutch against the Indonesian republicans, and to something which most western historians prefer to let alone—the fact that atrocities were committed by British troops in Indonesia, atrocities which turned the stomachs of the Indian troops under British command.

Utrecht's chapters on nation building and populism to 1959, the Guided Democracy period, the rise of the army, the 1965 'coup' and its aftermath, and the army's New Order are generally stimulating and there are good discussions of the state philosophy *Pancasila* and the return to the 1945 Constitution. These are significant political and ideological elements in Indonesia today. He discusses the tragically failed attempt of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) to enforce the implementation of the much delayed land reform laws. The rural upheavals which accompanied these attempts must be regarded as a watershed in the history of Indonesian peasant struggles, and the conditions which led to the 1960s upheavals have now been greatly aggravated by the class-polarising Green Revolution imposed by the New Order with its ill-conceived notion that technology supplies the solutions to agrarian distress.

The chapter on the 'coup' is a summary of fairly readily available material. Given that there are some important unanswered questions about the 'coup', Utrecht is unfortunately sweeping in some statements. For instance he asserts that Aidit gave the 30 September coup plotters the names of the people to be appointed onto the Revolutionary Council (p. 129), and yet he gives no source for this very significant piece of information. Later he maintains that Aidit was killed by the army at Surakarta (p. 133). While this is by no means improbable, Utrecht should have added that there are still some doubts about the circumstances of Aidit's death, and that at least until 1979, Aidit's wife had never received confirmation of her husband's death. The discussion on political prisoners could have been much fuller (everyone knows about Buru), and Utrecht wrongly states that of the 25,000 prisoners released in 1977 (the correct figures are 2,500 in 1976 and 10,000 in 1977), the majority were placed under house arrest. While their movements were severely restricted, as TAPOL Bulletin has documented, they were not, strictly speaking, under house arrest.

The documentation of Suharto's coup, i.e. his determined and deliberate steps towards displacing Sukarno, culminating with his 'legal' seizure of power of 11 March 1966 with the signing away of Sukarno's powers, and the attempts to transform Indonesia into an investors' paradise, is well done. One point which needs to be disputed is Utrecht's seeming to blame the post-'coup' inflation, which contributed to Sukarno's downfall, on the anti-Chinese witch-hunts. Obviously this was a factor, but not the only one. This paragraph (p. 138) is not alone in being facile and carelessly written.



The final chapter does not do justice to the rest of the book. It is supposed to be about East Timor and recent developments. Utrecht jumps around in a disorganised and rambling fashion from the invasion of East Timor, to the Majapahit expansionist dream, to a few homilies about repression in general, back to East Timor, then to Gough Whitlam's Australia, to an incomplete account of those who have taken up the cause of the East Timorese in the face of massive international indifference and so on through Indonesian party politics (such as they are), Indonesian political prisoners, and finally, and strangely, a mini-review of Brian May's book **The Indonesian Tragedy**. The chapter can by no means be described as East Timor-centric. Utrecht entirely misses the point about East Timor and its struggle for self-determination by submerging it with all the other mish-mash about Indonesia (including **secessionist** movements).

Finally a point for the publishers: the book is riddled with typographical and spelling mistakes, and worst of all, the glossary not only wavers between old and new Indonesian spelling (sometimes the same word appears in both spellings), but some of the Indonesian words are mis-spelt.

On the balance, the book is recommended, especially to those new to Indonesian studies, as a readable, useful and stimulating book. Copies may be obtained by sending an order and £7.95 to TAPOL, plus postage.

Oey Hong Lee, 1979, **Indonesia Facing the 1980s. A Political Analysis**. Research Report to South-East Asia Research Group, Europress, Hull, England, 413pp, £19.50.

By 1979 it was clear that the support upon which Suharto had come to power in 1966 had all but eroded, and that Suharto himself was facing increasingly strong challenges from opposition groups, including strong criticism from within the military. Student criticism was by far the most vocal, but in the face of all this Suharto has continued to cling to power while becoming more and more isolated from the Indonesian public and his original supporters. Oey Hong Lee addresses himself to these matters, charting the course of the New Order's isolation, and attempting to analyse the implications of this for the next decade. Apart from the amazing cost of the book, its main problem is that while the author provides some very interesting information, he accepts so much as given, and adopts such an a-historical approach, that the book can hardly be called an analysis.

From his starting point in assessing the performance of the New Order, the author begins with the *Pancasila*, the five principles spelt out in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, and which the New Order claims to uphold—Belief in God, Humanitarianism, Nationalism, Democracy and Social Justice. Left undefined by Sukarno and Sukarto alike, these “principles” are almost as meaningless, or as subject to as many definitions as are the anti-subversion “laws”, which fry smugglers and political opposition (including of course anti-Pancasilaists) alike. After describing the emergence of the New Order and its background of intra-military, and military-civilian conflict, the author moves

into a description of “the power elite”, after C. Wright Mills (1956). He identifies the different groups jockeying for power, and sketchily describes their economic bases, providing some useful biographical information. The “power elite” framework for analysis in this chapter seems gratuitous and useless—after all it was about America. (A much more serious and historical attempt to analyse the Indonesian social structure has been made by John Taylor in his discussion of the Asiatic Mode of Production, pp. 172-275 in his **From Modernisation to Modes of Production**, 1979. The MacMillan Press Ltd.)

The next four chapters ask, “Are they really implementing the Constitution of 1945, and thus the Panca Sila, in a ‘pure and consistent’ manner?” The answer of course is no. Neither did Sukarno for that matter, and this too would hardly be surprising to the observer who recognises the Panca Sila as an ideological prop to both the Sukarno and Suharto states. Consistent with his approach of taking the Panca Sila as given, the author also takes the so-called Act of Free Choice at face value, “. . . the official transfer of sovereignty over West Irian took place after a plebiscite . . .” (p. 113). Some plebiscite! Only 1022 “representatives” voted.

The chapter on the general character of the New Order has some good information of the mechanisms of political control, but the general ruminations about whether the New Order is fascist or not are not very illuminating. Such questions imply the acceptance of the Panca Sila principles as if they could somehow be upheld by a just government in a different political structure. So either the New Order will become increasingly repressive with only a change in personnel, or “the regime changes its policy placing more emphasis on the needs of the masses and liquidating its undemocratic feature” (p. 391). Just how this could come about is not clear, except that the author seems to think that change has to come from the top.

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