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
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# The Releases: An Assessment

*In past issues of the Bulletin, we have reported in detail the release plan announced several years ago by KOPKAMTIB, the Army's Security Command in charge of political imprisonment, and have followed as closely as possible the implementation of this plan.*

*The following statement summarises our assessment of the plan and its implementation to date and enumerates the objectives which need to be pursued.*

The Indonesian Government's release plan, announced in December 1976, which promised the 'release or trial' of all political prisoners (the so-called G30S/PKI detainees arrested in connection with the 1965 events) by the end of 1979, represents a marked improvement in the political prisoner situation in Indonesia. But coming as it did at a time of growing worldwide concern about human rights violations which, in Indonesia's case, could materially affect its chances of obtaining desperately needed military and economic aid from the West, it is clearly an attempt to mollify international criticisms while at the same time distracting attention from other grave human rights violations, notably the atrocities being perpetrated by Indonesian troops in East Timor and West Irian as well as the repression of present-day opponents of government policies.

It should be stressed moreover that since the government has now conceded that all tapols with the exception of those in the A-category (those awaiting trial) are to be released, it is inexcusable for the government to keep them in detention any longer. Most of them have already spent nearly 13 years in detention without trial.

The release plan pledged the release of just under 30,000 B-category prisoners phased over three years: 10,000 in 1977, 10,000 in 1978 and 'the rest' in 1979. B-category prisoners are those defined as persons 'known to be guilty' of involvement in the 1965 events but regarding whom there is insufficient evidence for a trial. Until the announcement of the new policy, they were designated as being too dangerous to release.

On 20 December 1977, KOPKAMTIB announced the release of 10,000 tapols. In July this year, it announced that the 10,000 releases scheduled for 1978 would be phased. On 20 May, the release of 265 tapols was announced in Bandung, West Java, and on 26 July a further 3,921 releases were reported to have taken place in a number of regions throughout the country. The remaining 6,000 tapols due for release this year reportedly include 4,000 from Buru,

and will be released in two further stages, 2,000 in October and 4,000 in December.

For an assessment of the significance of these releases and the reliability of the government's promises, we need to examine several aspects:

1. Numbers: It is crucial to assess the accuracy of overall government figures, on the basis of which its promise to release all B-category tapols stands or falls. No independent sources in Indonesia are prepared to accept the government's total figure which stood at 19,791 for all categories after the December releases.\*

There are several reasons why sources in Indonesia believe that the actual figure is very much higher than the government's official figure:

- KOPKAMTIB figures for the officially-acknowledged places of detention are in many cases known to be below the actual number of detainees in these places;
- KOPKAMTIB administration and statistics are notoriously unreliable and probably exclude a number of places of detention (breakdowns of figures are always given in terms of regions, not places of detention);
- a considerable number of detainees are being held in non-formal places of detention, working for military offices or establishments or for individual officers, and are simply not

*(continued on page 2)*

\*In June, 1978, KOPKAMTIB's Chief-of-Staff, General Yoga Sugama gave a new figure of 20,127, but did not explain why the figure had increased. Since 265 tapols had been released in the previous month, the total figure should have gone down.

## TAPOL's New Address

Please note that all correspondence with TAPOL should now be addressed to our new address, as follows:

8a Treport Street,  
London SW18 2BP.

## Correction

The last TAPOL Bulletin issued in June 1978 was incorrectly numbered as No 27. We apologise for any confusion this may have caused.

'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all prisoners are 'criminals'.

accounted for in the official statistics.

For these reasons, official figures are known to be very incomplete. TAPOL believes therefore that tens of thousands of tapols are unaccounted for in the official figures.

**2. Actual Numbers Released:** On the basis of impressions received from various sources in Indonesia, it would appear that the actual number released in December 1977, including those transferred (forcibly or otherwise) to "resettlement areas" did approach 10,000. However, in the absence of a public list of released prisoners with clearly identifiable addresses, there is no way to check the accuracy of KOPKAMTIB's announcement. We are not yet in a position to comment on the reliability of reports that 4,186 tapols have been released so far this year.

KOPKAMTIB justifies its refusal to publish lists of released prisoners on the grounds that this would make them easily identifiable and therefore vulnerable to victimisation by hostile elements. But it is KOPKAMTIB itself which, by means of special regulations and discriminatory practices including marked identity cards, ensures that released prisoners are clearly distinguishable. This concern to conceal the identity of prisoners is therefore hypocritical.

There is, in addition, information being received that new arrests continue to take place. It appears, for example, that many persons who left their homes in 1965 to escape the killings or to avoid arrest have recently returned home under the impression that the change in policy towards tapols will have reduced the risk of arrest, only to discover that this is not so.

**3. Transfer to Resettlement Centres:** When the release plan was first announced, KOPKAMTIB also announced the establishment of labour camps. Initially, these were referred to as "transmigration centres" but KOPKAMTIB terminology now seems to have changed, in favour of *pemukiman* or resettlement areas, emphasising apparently that these places should not be seen as part of the transmigration programme designed to reduce population pressures in Java and Bali. The Buru Island labour camp, set up in 1969, is the prototype for these camps. The official justification for transferring

released prisoners to these centres was that they might encounter difficulties in finding work.

There was immediate international criticism of these plans, as a result of which implementation of compulsory transfers was considerably scaled down at the time of the December 1977 releases. Another reason why fewer transfers than anticipated occurred at that time may have been that some of the sites designated for released prisoners were not yet ready. From various sources in Indonesia it is now known that several hundred tapols said to have been released were forcibly transferred to such places because they had been classified as "diehards" by KOPKAMTIB psychotests. An even larger number are said to have "volunteered" for transfer; it is likely that altogether nearly one thousand 'released' tapols were sent to these centres following the December 1977 releases.

KOPKAMTIB clearly intends to ensure that a much larger percentage of tapols released in 1978 go to these camps. This is apparent from statements made by KOPKAMTIB officials in June and July this year. (We refer our readers to a detailed account of these statements in the item on page 4 reporting on the 1978 releases.)

As *Amnesty International* said in a Press Release issued on 28 July, 1978: "The government should also immediately cease its practice of forcibly sending some released detainees to resettlement camps in isolated areas of Kalimantan, Sumatra and Sulawesi."

The conditions under which "released" prisoners are held in these resettlement areas are the subject of continuing investigation and were spotlighted by the ILO at its 64th Session in Geneva this year when it had under consideration Indonesia's continuing violation of ILO Convention No. 29 outlawing forced labour. (see p8 of this Bulletin.) It is futile for KOPKAMTIB to give assurances that transfers are voluntary. The people in question have spent many years in detention, subjected to innumerable pressures. They can easily be prevailed upon by their military captors to accept solutions that they would find unacceptable if given free and unfettered choice. Under the present arrangements, some thousands at least of "released" tapols will find themselves in resettlement areas, substantially still detainees, working on government labour projects.



*Kompas*, 27 July 1978 published this photo with a caption that read in part as follows:

Bandung's Gelora Hall was charged with emotion as 715 B-category G30S/PKI detainees were released yesterday. Ex Army officer, Tatang Rosedi ardently hugs his wife. He has had to wait 12 years for this moment. His wife, Roekmini is like a gem that he lost but found again. "She went out of my life for a while and lived with another man to try to alleviate her own sufferings while I was in detention," said Tatang. The story of his wife's emotional conflict and of his own tribulations after she left him are recounted in a novel entitled *Roekmini Yang Kembali* (Roekmini Who Returned), written while he was in prison.

(Facilities for writing are not generally granted to political prisoners. *Kompas* does not explain whether the novel was written without official knowledge or with the help of special privileges granted to this prisoner.)



**4. The Buru Camp:** This camp remains the prototype of forced labour camps for political prisoners in Indonesia. After the release of 1,500 tapols from there in 1977, the total number remaining was officially said to be 10,152. To this figure must be added at least a thousand wives and children now living there with tapols, whose status is basically the same as the prisoners. Although KOPKAMTIB has announced that 4,000 more will be released this year, General Yoga Sugama's statement, reported in our item on page 4, suggests that a considerable number of these may be prevailed upon to remain on the island, living at the special resettlement area now said to have been set up there. In addition, it is known that prisoners who have their families with them and prisoners who get married to girls now living there with their families are required to give an undertaking never to leave Buru.

It is therefore certain that several thousand persons at least will remain at the Buru camp after the release plan has been completed.

**5. Released Prisoners Now at Home:** The circumstances of prisoners who have returned home are very grave. As a result of numerous official restrictions and a variety of discriminatory practices, they are encountering many economic and social problems. These can be summarised as follows:

- a. Only a tiny fraction have found jobs. This is probably well below 5 percent. Ex-prisoners are excluded from all government jobs and from "vital enterprises" (defined at the discretion of local military officers). Private "non-vital" companies are afraid of employing ex-prisoners because they are required to report all such appointments to the military authorities.
- b. Ex-prisoners wishing to travel or to move to another district must obtain permission from the military.
- c. Ex-prisoners are not allowed to take part in local elections either as candidates or as voters.
- d. They continue to be under close official scrutiny and, with virtually no chance of finding jobs, they are particularly vulnerable to pressures to work on government projects for little or no pay. Several examples of this have recently come to light. (See article on page 9.)
- e. Ex-prisoners are frequently held responsible for local disorders and are defenceless against such allegations.
- f. They cannot exercise their right to claim back properties seized before or after their arrest; in many cases, this involves properties such as land and equipment that are of productive value.

To sum up, released prisoners are being deprived of many civil rights, which greatly compounds their rehabilitation and re-adjustment problems. There is the danger, moreover, that the problems they encounter could be used by KOPKAMTIB to persuade other tapols now due for release to "volunteer" for the labour camps. The statements made in June and July by General Yoga Sugama and Admiral Sudomo appear to substantiate this.

The restoration of full civil rights for all released tapols is therefore essential not only to alleviate the circumstances of those already at home but also to remove the basis for official pressures on those now scheduled for release to opt for transfer to resettlement areas.

**6. A-category Prisoners:** In official terminology, these are the prisoners awaiting trial. When the release plan was announced, it was also announced that all trials of A-category prisoners would be completed by the end of 1978. Thereafter, any untried A-category prisoners would be re-classified into the B category and treated accordingly.

Persons who have been tried and convicted (totalling 904 according to a Government document issued in January 1978, although KOPKAMTIB officials still seem to prefer the figure of "about 800") are excluded from the aggregate figures of "G30S/PKI prisoners" announced from time to time by KOPKAMTIB. A new term is now being used for these prisoners; they are called "nadapol", a contraction of *narapidana politik* or political convicts. The government's claim that there will be no more political prisoners after the end of 1979 totally ignores the fact that at least a thousand nadapols will still be serving long sentences (including life sentences

and a number of death sentences not yet executed) for "involvement" in the 1965 events.

All trials are heavily biased against the defendant: the courts lack impartiality, defendants are denied the most elementary rights and facilities, and almost all are brought to trial many years after their arrest.

**Conclusions:** Although the release plan has brought about a marked improvement in the political prisoner situation in Indonesia, it is totally inadequate in a number of respects. The objectives which need to be pursued by human rights campaigners with regard to Indonesia's 1965 prisoners can be enumerated as follows:

1. The immediate, unconditional release of all untried political detainees.
2. The restoration of full civil rights to released prisoners, particularly with regard to jobs.
3. The immediate closure of all resettlement/labour camps set up for released prisoners, and the release of all persons now at these places.
4. The immediate closure of Buru Camp and the removal of all restrictions on the freedom of movement of all prisoners and members of their families now there.
5. An immediate amnesty for all persons who have been tried and convicted of political offences.
6. The granting of facilities to completely independent bodies to undertake relief work aimed at securing the speediest possible rehabilitation of all released prisoners.

At the same time it is essential to assess the Indonesian Government's current human rights record in the light not only of its policy towards the "G30S/PKI prisoners" but also of its human rights violations in East Timor, in West Irian and elsewhere, as well as its widespread suppression of dissent among Moslem groups, students, intellectuals and artists and its suppression of press freedom.

## Tapol-France

A TAPOL Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Indonesia has been set up in France.

In an inaugural press release issued in Paris on 30 June last, the Committee lists its objectives as being:

- to disseminate information about Indonesia's political prisoners, about their conditions and about violations of human rights;
- to organise meetings, discussions and exhibitions;
- to send or to participate in legal, medical and humanitarian missions;
- to make public the needs of the prisoners and their families, and eventually to respond to these needs, particularly in the form of financial solidarity and the collection of funds.

The Committee's address is: 68, rue de Babylone, 75007 Paris.

## CHRONOLOGY

### of HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDONESIA FROM JUNE 1976 TO MAY 1978.

This 28 page book was issued by TAPOL on the occasion of this year's IGGI Meeting. It details violations in all fields of human rights, from imprisonment to censorship, from the banning of films and songs to atrocities in East Timor.

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# More Releases Reported

On 26 July last, KOPKAMTIB announced the release of 4,186 B-category political detainees. They are the first of the tapols to be released in 1978, for which year KOPKAMTIB has promised total releases of 10,000.

This first phase occurred in two groups: 265 were released in Bandung, West Java on 20 May and 3,921 were released in a number of places throughout the country on 26 July or soon after. It has not yet been possible to verify independently that this number of tapols was actually freed.

The remaining 6,000 tapols scheduled for release this year are reportedly going to be released in two further phases: 2,000 in October and 4,000 in December. KOPKAMTIB had previously announced that the 1978 releases would include 4,000 tapols from the island of Buru. It is likely therefore that the group released in December will be the Buru tapols.

## Agricultural Resettlement "Intensified"

In a statement on 4 July, KOPKAMTIB's Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sudomo said that "efforts to resettle (the released tapols) in agricultural areas that had already been made ready would be intensified" and that "about 300 detainees had already registered to stay in resettlement centres in Kalimantan" (*Kompas*, 5 July, 1978).

In the same statement, Admiral Sudomo explained that releases this year would be phased because "releasing them all simultaneously causes too much trouble both in regulation and in supervision".

A month earlier, KOPKAMTIB's Chief-of-Staff, General Yoga Sugama had spoken of the need for "thoroughgoing preparations, particularly with regard to providing them with employment". He said that this problem would be particularly acute this year as no fewer than 4,000 of the total released would be from Buru, by comparison with 1,500 last year. "Only 23 of those released from Buru last year," he said were willing to take advantage of the resettlement areas located outside the Buru detention centre.

"All the rest had returned home to Java and, according to an evaluation carried out by KOPKAMTIB, only very few had found employment." (*Kompas*, 8 June, 1978.)

This is the first time that a KOPKAMTIB official has said that some tapols released in 1977 had opted to remain on Buru. None of the press reports carried after the December 1977 releases, including the many reports published by foreign journalists, made any mention of this.

It is also the first official reference to a "resettlement area made ready by the Government in Buru". General Yoga Sugama described this as an area of "1,400 hectares of wet riceland and 1,200 hectares of dry fields" which, he regretted, the released tapols "had not taken advantage of".

## Regional Breakdown of Recent Releases

The following is the regional breakdown of the releases that took place in July this year:

Aceh	4	Nusatenggara	56
W. Sumatra/Riau	106	E. Kalimantan	9
N. Sumatra	148	S. and C. Kalimantan	26
W. Kalimantan	44	Maluku	11
S. Sumatra	44	N. and C. Sulawesi	118
Jakarta	231	S. and S.E. Sulawesi	22
W. Java	715	Nusakambangan	748
C. Java	464	Plantungan	117
E. Java	954	Nirbaya	114

The 265 persons released in West Java on 20 May came from several prisons in the province: 162 from Kebun Waru, Bandung, and the remainder from prisons in Cirebon, Serang and Bogor. Among those released from Kebun Waru Prison were the well-known painter, Hendra Gunawan, and the poet, A.S. Sidharta. Both have been in detention without trial for almost 13 years.




Dr Ina Slamet, anthropologist and former lecturer at the University of Indonesia, reading the pledge of loyalty just prior to her formal release at Nirbaya Prison, Jakarta, on 26 July, 1978. Dr Slamet, who is Dutch by birth, has lived in Indonesia since her marriage to an Indonesian in the 1950s. She was arrested in 1967. Her appearance at a release ceremony has raised queries about the composition of prisoners released on this occasion as Dr Slamet is known to have been living at home already for a number of years. (Photo from *Kompas*, 27 July, 1978.)

## More Confusion Over Official Figures

In a statement which was reported in the press on 5 June, 1978, General Yoga Sugama gave a total figure for remaining tapols of 20,127, but on 26 July, during the main release ceremony which was held in Bandung, West Java, General Yoga Sugama said that the total number of tapols after the July releases was 15,605, that is to say 19,791 (KOPKAMTIB's official figure after the December 1977 releases) minus 4,186. It is not clear which figure General Yoga Sugama intends us to take seriously, his June total or his July total. This is yet another example of the exasperating confusions caused by KOPKAMTIB itself in the official figures it uses.



# NO WARPLANES FOR INDONESIA



The campaign to halt the sale of eight Hawk ground attack/trainer aircraft by Britain to Indonesia continues to develop in the UK and has also resulted in protest actions in other countries.

In the UK, many Members of Parliament have continued to press the issue by asking the Government questions about the sale and writing to the Foreign Office. A large number of constituency Labour Party branches have adopted resolutions opposing the sale, and have also written to the Government. This was acknowledged formally in a reply given by Dr John Gilbert, a Minister at the Department of Defence, when he told Frank Allaun, MP on 25 July:

The recent announcement by British Aerospace of the sale to Indonesia of eight Hawk trainer aircraft has prompted letters from MPs, members of the public, and constituency Labour parties, and questions have been tabled in the House.

On 27 July, a group of MPs led by Mr Robin Cook met Frank Judd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to register their concern at the sale.

In Portugal, a letter of protest against the sale was handed to the British Embassy in Lisbon on 25 July. The letter was signed by no fewer than 1,800 East Timorese refugees now living in Portugal. The letter urged the British Government to reconsider the sale of these deadly aircraft which could be used to silence the voice of the East Timorese people. The sale, said the letter, could turn Britain into an accomplice in genocide now taking place in East Timor.

In Australia, a three-hour picket took place outside the British Consulate in Adelaide on 26 May protesting against the sale of the Hawks. Over one thousand leaflets were distributed and a poster display drew attention from passers-by.

On the next day, the British Consul in Adelaide met a delegation from the South Australia Campaign for an Independent East Timor. He told them he could understand their concern over the East Timor situation which he described as "regrettable" but claimed that the Hawk aircraft were not attack aircraft.

## Tapol Protest to British Government

TAPOL has protested strongly to the British Government for its decision to cancel Indonesia's debts to the United Kingdom arising from past economic assistance to that country.

The decision was taken under a new policy entitled "retrospective terms adjustment" which allows the cancellation of debts owed by the world's poorest countries, a definition applied according to the World Bank's estimate of countries whose annual per capita income is less than \$280.

When announcing the new policy in the House of Commons on 31 July, the Minister for Overseas Development, Mrs Judith Hart declared that retrospective terms adjustment "will not be extended to countries which would otherwise qualify but which we regard as having seriously violated human rights". Besides Indonesia, sixteen countries will benefit from this policy. Three countries have been excluded on grounds of their human rights record: Cambodia, Uganda and South Yemen.

In its letter to Mrs Hart, TAPOL stated among other things:

"At the same time as awarding this major financial concession to Indonesia on the grounds of it qualifying as being among the poorest countries in the world, the Government has agreed to allow the sale to Indonesia of eight Hawk ground attack/trainer aircraft worth £25 million. This deal has aroused considerable protest within the Labour Party and in the (Labour Party's) National Executive Committee itself on the grounds of Indonesia's deplorable record of human rights violations. Moreover, it would suggest that Indonesia should be deemed capable of repaying its debts if it is capable of purchasing advanced aircraft."

The amount of debt to be cancelled in the case of Indonesia may be as high as £43 million (a precise figure has not yet been made available by the Ministry for Overseas Development). The sum of £43.1 million was given as total British aid to Indonesia in the period from 1966 to 1975, in a written reply to a Member of Parliament on 7 May, 1976 by Reginald Prentice who was then Minister for Overseas Development. Since that time, British aid to Indonesia has been supplied in the form of non-repayable grants. Altogether £15 million has been supplied in grant form, with another £3 million having been committed by the British Government at the 1978 meeting of the IGGI.

\* \* \* \* \*

### Students' White Book Available in English

A full English translation of the White Book published by students of the Bandung Institute of Technology on 14 January this year as part of the students' campaign to oppose President Suharto's re-election has been published in the quarterly review, *AMPO*, Volume 10, Nos 1-2, 1978, which is published by Pacific-Asia Resources Center. Readers wishing to have copies could write direct to PARC, P.O. Box 5250 Tokyo International, Japan for a copy of *AMPO*, or to TAPOL for a photocopy of the item which we can supply at a cost of 75 pence plus postage.



# SUHARTO AND THE LATIEF TRIAL

by: Professor W. F. Wertheim

Translated from De Groene Amsterdammer, 19 July, 1978

It is already more than twelve years since Lieutenant-Colonel Untung was brought to trial in Jakarta as leader of an attempted coup on the night of 30 September and 1 October 1965. In that action, six Army generals were kidnapped and assassinated; General Nasution managed to escape. This was done, according to Untung and his associates, because they were members of a Council of Generals which had planned to overthrow President Sukarno. The coup d'état, intended to thwart the plot of the generals, failed and General Suharto, Commander of KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserves Command) succeeded in forcing the surrender of the rebellious officers in the course of 1 October.

As a result of these dramatic events, the political relations of power in Indonesia were transformed at a stroke. The internal contradictions within the Indonesian armed forces which came to the fore during the officers' coup were pushed into the background. The Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) which had also played a role in these events received full blame for the coup in a series of witch-hunt trials and in the Army's propaganda. President Sukarno was also, on the grounds of his "involvement in the coup", shorn of his powers and incarcerated by his successor, Suharto, until his death. Two of the three main leaders of the coup, Lieut-Col. Untung and General Supardjo, were sentenced to death and executed. But the third man, Colonel Latief, who was shot in the leg during his arrest was kept constantly in an isolation cell in Salemba Prison in Jakarta without being brought to trial.

Now, more than twelve years later, the trial of Latief is at last taking place in Jakarta. And by contrast with 1966 when Indonesian newspapers were filled with detailed reports of the Untung trial, the Latief trial is being treated in a very cursory and diffident way. For this, as well as for the long postponement of the trial, there is a reason. The fact is that this Latief trial is developing into an extremely painful affair for Suharto.

Already shortly after the coup, questions were being asked about Suharto's role in the affair. It was in itself remarkable that he was unharmed on that fateful night, although he had always, on grounds of seniority, taken army commander Yani's place during his absence, meaning that Suharto would logically have been the person to spring into action as soon as the coup which included the death of Yani, one of the kidnapped and assassinated generals, became known. At first, the rumour was spread that Suharto had also been on the list of generals to be kidnapped but that on the night he was away from home visiting his *dukun* (astrologer) on the outskirts of Jakarta. This story proved to be incorrect. At the time when his colleagues were being kidnapped by Untung's squads, Suharto was at home. When he was woken by his neighbours after some shooting in the neighbourhood, he drove straight to his KOSTRAD headquarters on Merdeka Square. It was a remarkable fact that the military squads involved in the coup ignored Suharto's headquarters although the presidential palace and other strategic buildings around the same square such as the radio station and the telecommunications centre were occupied. And this notwithstanding the fact that KOSTRAD possessed its own short-wave communications system. Remarkable too was the efficient and purposeful way Suharto acted on 1 October in suppressing the coup, by contrast with the bungling of Untung and his associates. Thus the question soon cropped up whether in this instance the well-known rule of detective stories was not applicable: the likely criminal is the one who benefits the most from the crime. And in our case, this was certainly not the PKI but . . . General Suharto.

If this is so, then one should also not speak any more about an abortive coup. On the contrary, Suharto's plan to grasp power was a phenomenal success, although this was achieved at the cost of much blood-letting: first the massacre of the generals and then the mass killings of supporters or alleged supporters of the PKI.

In view of all this, it was natural to examine whether there were

any connections between Suharto and the leaders of the coup. And in fact, there was evidence of such connections. Untung had served under Suharto's command and had distinguished himself in the struggle to wrest West Irian (West New Guinea) from Dutch control. In addition, Suharto attended Untung's wedding in a small town in Central Java in 1964.

But in 1969 a brand-new bit of information came to light. From a book by the vehemently anti-communist, American journalist, Arnold Brackman, the following facts became known: Suharto told him that Colonel Latief, Untung's closest associate during the coup,

## 'Suharto's plan to grasp power was a phenomenal success . . .'

had, during the night in question, just four hours before the action of the squads to kidnap the generals, met him at the Military Hospital where his small son was being treated for burns following an accident with a bowl of hot soup. Shortly after his meeting with Latief, at midnight, Suharto went home.

This contact with one of the main culprits immediately before the decisive action was a strong indication that Suharto had had at least foreknowledge of the coming events. This was all the more significant as it could be established that this contact took place in between two meetings of the plotters. On the basis of this contact, Suharto must certainly be considered as being "*terlibat* (involved) in the coup", and to a far greater degree than the tens of thousands of persons who were arrested all over the country simply for being left wing activists, and who were forced to languish in dreadful concentration camps and prisons on suspicion of being "*terlibat* in the coup". For the crux of the matter is this: if Suharto knew or suspected what was going to happen, why then did he not immediately warn his colleagues who were just about to be kidnapped?

Suharto's explanation to Brackman was that Latief had met him in the hospital apparently in a show of friendship because of the accident suffered by Suharto's son but, in retrospect, Suharto had realised that Latief was sent to the hospital on the orders of his associates to check whether Suharto was so preoccupied with his son's illness that he would not be in a state of mind to take military action against their coup on the following day. This is a strange supposition in view of Suharto's reputation as an inveterate fighting general. But then Suharto made things worse for himself by giving another explanation in an interview published in the German magazine, *Der Spiegel*; that Latief had come to the hospital to assassinate him but had got cold feet at the decisive moment.

Just imagine! Latief, all alone, coming to the hospital at 11 o'clock at night, four hours before the actual operation, to kill Suharto, thus raising the alarm and exposing the plan of the coup prematurely, and so thwarting its execution. The fact alone that

## 'Suharto must certainly be considered as being "*terlibat* (involved) in the coup . . .'

Suharto tried so disingenuously and by every means to give "innocent" explanations of his meeting with Latief at the military hospital, reports of which must have leaked out, made the whole affair far more suspicious.

Some time ago, I drew these facts together in an article, "Suharto and the Untung Coup: the Missing Link" (1). In it I wrote: "What was discussed between the two will remain a mystery until Colonel Latief is able and prepared to talk." And now Latief has at

# TRIAL: A PAINFUL REVELATION

last got the chance to present his version of that last-minute meeting with Suharto.

On 12 July, *NRC-Handelsblad* published an article about the Latief trial by Peter Schumacher, which was based on my analysis. Schumacher stated that, according to Indonesian press reports, Latief contended during his trial that two days before the coup attempt he visited General Suharto and his wife at their home. He made a request that they be called as witnesses to explain what the three had discussed during that visit. This request was rejected by the Military Court. Schumacher wondered why Latief did not talk about the meeting at the hospital and did not say that Suharto knew about the coup plans.

When Schumacher wrote his article, he could not have known that the full text of Latief's 60-page long statement delivered in May (2) was circulating in Holland. It is clear from this document that Latief did not mince words. He did in fact expose the active role of Suharto in the coup plans. He not only mentioned his visit to Suharto's home two days before the coup but also dwelt at length on his visit to the Military Hospital on the eve of the coup where he met Suharto. Latief points out the ridiculous contradictions between the explanations given by Suharto concerning the meeting in his interviews, and says: "The truth is that on that night I not only went to see his son who had had an accident but also reported that a movement would be launched on the following morning to prevent a coup d'etat by the Council of Generals, which he already knew about beforehand." He had already talked about the plans of the Council of Generals during his visit to Suharto's home.

The reason why Latief reported the plans to Suharto, which, he did in close consultation with the other two coup leaders, Untung and Supardjo, was connected with the intimate ties of friendship between his family and Suharto's family. Latief describes these re-

## intimate ties of friendship . . . . .

lations in great detail. They originated in the years of the revolution. In this context, Latief says that history books on the struggle for independence have done him an injustice because the heroic attack against Dutch-occupied Jogjakarta on 1st March 1949 was led not by Suharto but by him. While the attack was in progress, Suharto remained in the safety of his headquarters.

But Latief also describes in detail the change in Suharto's attitude on the day after the meeting (in the hospital) when the latter suddenly turned against them (the coup leaders). According to Latief, the reason for this was that Suharto's personal ambitions had been offended when President Sukarno, who had to decide on a "caretaker" as a successor to Yani, assumed dead, appointed not Suharto but General Pranoto who came after Suharto in seniority. When someone mentioned Suharto as a candidate, the President retorted: "He is stubborn." Subsequently, says Latief, Suharto was to act against Sukarno in an absolutely disloyal and unlawful way. The President was accused of being "involved in the coup" because of his presence at the Halim Air Base where Untung and his associates were gathered, whereas Suharto, as is now apparent, was implicated in a far more substantial way on the grounds of his foreknowledge alone. If he, Latief, and his associates are held responsible for the events, then Suharto should at the very least be held co-responsible because of his failure to report to his superiors immediately about the coup plans. According to the rules of the Suharto regime itself, he would fall into Category A, the most serious category of suspects held in connection with the 1965 coup. Latief therefore believes that Suharto himself should also be brought to trial.

Why did Latief make a statement that is so damaging to Suharto's position and interests? It was certainly not because he hoped that by doing so he would be acquitted or receive a lighter sentence. This

would be quite unrealistic. Latief was apparently not afraid to face the judge either. In his statement, he sharply rejected reports disseminated at the time in the Indonesian press that he was trying to evade a trial by using his illness as a pretext. He has apparently been waiting all these years for the chance to make public his accusation of betrayal against his former friend, Suharto.

Suharto's unwillingness to appear in court and deny Latief's statements means that the accusations that have been made will hang over his head like the famous sword. The fact that Suharto was unable to prevent this trial at which Latief would open his mouth and speak shows how weak his own position had become in the meantime.

But meanwhile we in the Netherlands, and undoubtedly a number of well-informed people in Indonesia too, know who was an accomplice in the massacre of the generals, and who, by playing a double game, got rid of all his rivals -- first the generals including Nasution (although he escaped, he was subsequently neutralised by Suharto), and finally also Sukarno. By playing this game, he was able to climb to unprecedented heights, so high that his steep fall is now undoubtedly near.

The prosecution has demanded a death sentence for Latief and it is likely that the Military Court will pass such a sentence. But the courageous way in which Latief conducted his defence in addition to the fact that he was not the one, as became evident during the trial, who issued the order to kill the six generals, gives us reason to hope that he will be pardoned . . . by Suharto's successor.

1. Published in *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol 1, No. 2, Winter 1970. The article is also included in a recently-published book by Professor Wertheim: *Indonesia: Van Vorstenrijk Tot Neo-Kolonie*, (Boom Publishers).

2. Latief's statement, delivered on 5 May, 1978 was his *excepti* or demurrer, a procedure permitted to the defence before actual hearings commence to challenge the jurisdiction of the court or legal aspects of the trial.



Col. Latief, during a court session, listening to a prosecution witness.

### LATIEF GETS LIFE SENTENCE

Colonel Latief was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment by a Special Military Court on 1 August last. An important document submitted to the court, his *excepti* or demurrer, which was presented at the hearing on 5 May, is now in our hands. We shall carry a fuller report of this and other aspects of the trial in the next issue.



# ILO calls for prompt release of all tapols

At its Sixty-Fourth session held in Geneva in June 1978 the International Labour Organisation called for the prompt release of all Indonesian political detainees without "legal or moral pressure to participate in the transmigration scheme". The ILO Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations said that released prisoners should be able to "re-establish themselves in the community freely and unconditionally" and receive assistance from the government for "their reintegration into society and employment". The Committee noted that "some progress had been made in the application by Indonesia of the Forced Labour Convention", but "expressed concern that there was some delay in the implementation of the original plan for the release of the detainees which the Government had announced to the Committee in previous years". The ILO committee also expressed the hope that "some form of international supervision of the release of the detainees" would be accepted by Indonesia, "so that public opinion as well as the (ILO) Committee of Experts . . . could be satisfied that the Convention (on Forced Labour) was fully implemented".

The Applications Committee gave particular attention to the nature of the Indonesian government's transmigration programme for the political prisoners. Trade Union members stressed that transmigration "should be voluntary and not compulsory", and noted that the Indonesian government had promised that this would be the case. But, the trade unionists added, "the ILO Committee of Experts . . . and several other international bodies wonder whether the progress promised will be fully achieved. . ." They called for independent verification of Indonesian government promises regarding the political prisoners, "since world public opinion is very concerned".

## Camp Regulations Requested

The trade unionists also enquired into procedures by which released prisoners enter the transmigration facilities, and asked whether "impermissible pressures" were being applied on the prisoners to settle in these areas. The Employers' members of the Applications Committee went further, repeating a previous request of the Committee of Experts for "copies of the regulations concerning participation in the resettlement projects". They also asked whether it was "really possible" for ex-prisoners "to withdraw from a resettlement project by a simple notification and return freely to the (prisoner's) place of origin once having left the resettlement areas?"

Trade Union members of the Committee raised additional questions concerning the employment opportunities of released prisoners. They noted that former prisoners face severe discrimination "in that former employers do not dare to re-engage former detainees". They called for an end to this and other kinds of discrimination faced by ex-prisoners, and requested that "the promises made by the Indonesian government be fully carried out, and that clarifications and precise replies be provided to the doubts expressed on the international level, for instance through verification of the situation by external parties such as international groups or experts".

The trade union representative of Sweden also called for the Indonesian government to accept "the supervision of an international body" over the release of the political prisoners. He also asked the Indonesian government to "publish the names of those persons liberated as well as those not yet liberated", and noted that other sources had higher estimates of the number of prisoners still detained than that of the official government figure.

## "End the Stigma"

Further questioning of the Indonesian government position came from the trade union representative of the Netherlands, concerning

the true meaning of the term "unconditional freedom", as defined by the Indonesian government. The Dutch trade unionist asked pointedly if the Indonesian government was taking all necessary measures "to end the stigma" under which released prisoners were living. The Indonesian government spokesman only cited photographs of prisoners being released from Buru island, claiming that this was evidence that released prisoners enjoy "unconditional freedom". On the question of ending the stigma, the government spokesman stated that the former detainees were free to work in the public sector and in any other industry they so choose—a claim contradicted by repeated official statements. (See, for example, the interview with KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff Admiral Sudomo, *Tempo*, 24 December, 1977, published in *TAPOL Bulletin*, No. 26, February 1978.)

The Dutch trade representative went on to ask the Indonesian government spokesman to specify the kind of help it was providing ex-prisoners in the area of employment. There was no response to this point. He also asked whether the government was taking any initiatives to help ex-prisoners who did not wish to join resettlement areas: "If so, in what way?" queried the Dutch unionist. And, the Dutch unionist added "What happens when the released detainees are too old or too sick to work?" The Indonesian government spokesman replied that released prisoners may reassume their pension rights, a statement contradicted by all available evidence (see story on page 9). There was no reply, however, to the question of what initiatives the government is taking to help those who do not want to transmigrate.



## SWEAT BOXES FOR PRISONERS IN W. IRIAN

A report in the Melbourne daily, *The Age*, dated 22 May, said that Indonesian authorities held 30 West Irianese prisoners in steel "sweat boxes" for three months.

*The Age* reported that the prisoners, who "possibly" were members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), were "allegedly beaten before being locked in steel cargo containers, with no light or ventilation, near the Freeport Copper mine in central west Irian Jaya." A European who had travelled extensively in Irian Jaya over the past two years was the source of the reports. The European said that he had "personally seen" the compound where the people were jailed in the containers measuring 7 metres by 2½ metres by 2½ metres. The prisoners, said the European, had all been "savagely beaten", and after being held for three months, "disappeared."

The European said that in addition to having seen the "sweat boxes", he had also witnessed the shooting of unarmed Irianese and the bombing of several villages by Indonesian planes. The bombings and other actions were said to have been in retaliation for the sabotage of a copper ore pipeline by OPM guerillas. After the pipeline incident, the man said, Indonesian soldiers launched "search and kill" operations in the area, "indiscriminately shooting people".

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In order to solve these problems, it is essential to restore full civil rights to ex-tapols and to eliminate all restrictions and discrimination which totally violate fundamental human rights.

# The lot of an ex-tapol

*The following article was written by an ex-tapol released in December 1977 who is now living in Java.*

The unrest in Indonesian society which is becoming increasingly complex cannot be resolved by Suharto's military neo-fascist government. This unrest is the inevitable result of the social and governmental system that now exists. All manner of policies, activities or statements by those in power not only fail to end this unrest but only show just how quickly it is intensifying. This was very clearly reflected by the Secretary-General of the Council for National Defence and Security, Lieutenant-General M.M.R. Kartakusumah when he said, speaking before a meeting of Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament on 16 June last, that:

"In order to overcome unrest in society and provide a guarantee for national resilience, it is necessary to establish a basis of power that includes equal opportunities for all in economic and social affairs, the distribution of welfare and sovereignty of the people."

This statement only confirms that there are several elements of the problem which have not yet been resolved:

1. Unrest exists in Indonesian society and the Government has not yet been able to resolve it.
2. It has not yet provided a guarantee for national resilience.
3. Equal opportunities have not yet been granted to all.
4. The economic sector has until now been dominated by an individual or a group of people, and its fruits have not only not been distributed but have been concentrated in the hands of those who are in power.
5. The statement and the suggestions made by Gen. Kartakusumah come only from an individual, they are not government proposals. Even though the statement was made by a general who is Secretary-General of the National Defence Council, it only reflects the opinions of an individual and not the general attitude of those in power.

The social unrest described by Lieut-Gen. Kartakusumah is especially keenly felt by ex-tapols. They experience social, political, economic and other forms of discrimination. Restrictions and discriminatory measures are created by the authorities from the very first day of their release. On the day they are released, they are ordered to sign a twelve-point declaration which includes the following:

- ex-tapols may not take part in political activities or spread communist or Marxist-Leninist views,
- they may not become employees of the State or the army,
- they must accept all the past actions of the Government and the Kopkamtib,
- they must be ready at all times to be summoned and interrogated by Kopkamtib.

Although Admiral Sudomo, the Chief-of-Staff of Kopkamtib has said that society must be willing to accept back the ex-tapols, the Government's own restrictions and discriminatory measures turn Sudomo's words into empty phrases with little meaning in practice.

## Restrictions and Discrimination

Besides all this, many unwritten restrictions and discriminations exist, such as:

- when an ex-tapol wants to travel anywhere, he must apply for permission and obtain a special letter from the local military authority (*Koramil*),
- when he moves, he must apply for and obtain permission from the district military authority (*Kodim*),
- if he gets a job, his employer must report to the local authorities,
- ex-tapols are obliged to report themselves once a week for two months and must at the same time undergo indoctrination.

A released person naturally wants to take part in the same activities as other free people, especially in seeking a livelihood. But as a result of government restrictions, employers are reluctant to take them on and use a variety of reasons to turn them down; they just

tell them to wait to be called, and so on. In addition, the system of requiring a letter of non-involvement in the G30S/PKI and submitting a personal history means that an employer will know that the person in question is an ex-tapol with the result that the chances of working in the private sector are closed to them. Even if they are taken on by a company, they face discrimination in promotion, even in perfectly straightforward things like being granted permanent status or becoming head of a section.

Another example of discrimination concerns those ex-tapols who were formerly employed in military or civilian departments. Those who had worked long enough to be eligible for a pension but who had not completed the necessary arrangements because of the G30S/PKI now find, after their release, that their pensions are being held up. Every time an ex-tapol approaches the authorities about such matters, he gets an evasive answer such as: "There are no instructions from our superiors. Please wait till we have heard".

## Confiscated Property Cannot be Restored

As for private property seized by the authorities from 1965 to 1967, it is not possible to have this property restored despite verbal assurances that this will be done. The properties confiscated or grabbed by individuals included such things as houses, furniture, cars, wet and dry rice-fields, fishponds, bicycles and radios. The failure to return this property makes it difficult for ex-tapols to cope with their basic daily needs. The things seized include means of production like land, rice-fields, houses and vehicles which could be used to earn a living.

Ex-tapols living in villages feel the effect of political restrictions particularly strongly. In elections for village chief, for village government or councils they have neither the right to vote or to be elected. In one *kecamatan* (sub-district) in East Java, Kedungpring in the *kabupaten* (district) of Lamongan, there are no fewer than 2,000 ex-tapols and ex-members of left wing political and mass organisations who do not have the right to vote. They only have the right to work. About 400 ex-tapols from Buru and Nusakambangan in the *kecamatan* of Bojonegoro in East Java were ordered to work on the construction of a tobacco factory owned by the Kretek cigarette company, "Gudang Garam", from February until April 1978 in the village of Waru, and they were paid only Rp. 300 (about 35 pence) a day. In addition, ex-tapols are also the object of labour mobilisation for "service" (*kerja-bakti*) projects, such as road repairs or construction village government buildings. They are also required to pay a levy of Rp. 1,000 towards each development project. Those who have lost their houses and gardens and no longer have families are forced to lodge in other people's homes and take whatever they can get in order to be able to live.

The mental pressures are equally severe. Ex-tapols and ex-members of left wing organisations are still under surveillance by the authorities both in the countryside and in the towns. If anything happens, especially in the villages, they are always the ones who the authorities turn against first.

## Civil Rights Must be Restored

These, then are the consequences of the restrictive and discriminatory practices employed against ex-tapols and ex-members of left wing organisations. Such restrictions affect no fewer than about one million people, applying as they do also to the families of these people. As a result of such restrictions, these people are forced to do any kind of work just in order to survive, at below minimum standards. People who have degrees in law, economics, literature and other subjects are compelled to work as coolies at the docks, as labourers on building sites or become casual office workers. As for those who previously had no qualifications, many have now become trishaw drivers, street vendors, black-market ticket sellers, or drivers' companions.

*continued on opposite page \*\*\**

# TRIALS

## SAWITO GETS EIGHT YEARS

Mr Sawito Kartowibowo, the man held responsible for the so-called letter plot which came to light in September 1976, has been found guilty and sentenced to eight years. He has also been ordered to pay costs. His sentence is to be reduced by the two years already spent in detention (he was arrested on 14 September, 1976).

When Sawito told the court he would appeal against the verdict and declared, "I reject your verdict", spectators in the public gallery applauded loudly, cheering, "Long Live Sawito!"

The prosecution had demanded 20 years. The prosecutor stated after sentence had been passed that he would consider whether to appeal. (By Indonesian law, prosecution can appeal against sentence if it is considered too light.)

The trial which had dragged on for one whole year came to an end on 1 August 1978.

Passing sentence, the presiding judge declared that Sawito had been found guilty of trying to undermine the government's authority and causing unrest in society. He had persuaded other persons to believe that he was the appointed "King of Justice" and had played the key role in all meetings leading to the drafting of five documents. At these meetings, Sawito had consistently blamed President Suharto for all society's ills. The document entitled, "Surrender of Powers" had been designed to imitate the 11 March 1966 surrender of powers document on the basis of which President Sukarno had handed full powers to General Suharto, now the country's President, the court declared.

In an earlier hearing, Sawito in his defence plea accused the court of deliberately withholding documents of crucial importance to his defence. These documents had been confiscated from his home at the time of his arrest. His demand that these documents be returned to him for formal presentation to court had been ignored. The subsequent verdict specified that all documents of evidence were to be kept by the state.

Sawito also bitterly complained of the court's refusal to call witnesses whom he had requested, including Indonesia's former Vice-President and elder statesman, Moh. Hatta, and religious dignitaries who had signed documents for which Sawito was being held responsible.

Throughout the trial, hearings were attended by large crowds who displayed strong sympathy for the defendant.

## Dr AIDIT TO BE TRIED

Dr Tanti Aidit, the widow of D. N. Aidit, the late chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), will be brought to trial soon after spending over 11 years in detention, according to a July 8 statement from the prosecution office in Jakarta. Mrs Aidit, a medical doctor, has been under detention since 1967. She will be charged with "complicity in the G30S/PKI affair."

Dr Aidit was born in Central Java. Her father was a descendant of Kartini, who was known for her writings on women's emancipation at the beginning of this century. Dr Aidit married in the late 1940s, then studied medicine in Jogjakarta, graduated in 1957, and became a lecturer in histology at the University of Indonesia in Jakarta. She also worked at the Central Hospital in Jakarta and ran a medical clinic for the left wing women's organisation, Gerwani (banned in 1965).

After the events of October 1, 1965, Dr Aidit went into hiding to avoid arrest, but was eventually detained in 1967. Although her husband was killed in 1965, she has still not been officially informed of his death.

Since her arrest, Tanti Aidit has been isolated from other prisoners. Although other political detainees who are medical doctors have been allowed to practice in prison, Dr Aidit has been barred from similar activity. She herself suffers from a serious heart condition, but was only taken to a hospital for examination in 1971, after four



Mr Sawito Kartowibono was greeted enthusiastically by crowds as he left the court-room after being sentenced to eight years imprisonment on charges of attempting to overthrow President Suharto. (Photo from *Kompas*, 17 July, 1978.)

\* \* \*

years during which her health was neglected by the prison authorities. Mrs Aidit's mother, Mrs Mudigdio, who was a Member of Parliament for the PKI until 1965, was also a political detainee at the same prison for nearly 12 years, but the daughter's isolation status made it virtually impossible for them to meet.

Although Dr Aidit had strong ties with the left wing movement in her own right—in particular as a member of Gerwani—the main reason for her arrest and for the unusually harsh treatment she has received in prison is her identity as the widow of the chairman of the PKI.





# Rendra still in prison

## RENDRA AND THE CENSORS

W. S. Rendra, who remains in prison without charges or trial, still appears to be very much a matter of concern to the Indonesian military authorities. According to *Tempo* (24 June, 1978), Minister of Information General Ali Murtopo appeared recently before the Indonesian Parliament to clarify the status of the hitherto banned film, *The Young in Love*, which features Rendra in the leading role. (See TAPOL bulletin No. 28, June 1978.)

What first caused problems for the film, said General Murtopo, was "director Syuman Dyaya's interpretation of the script" which "introduced an element of politics which could be considered to bring a negative influence to bear on society." Another problem, however, was Rendra's prominence in the film. "The introduction of a political element was emphasised by the choice of Rendra as leading actor", Murtopo said.

Murtopo added that KOPKAMTIB had banned the film "on the assumption that the film had already been thrown out by the censorship board." This, Murtopo said, was a wrong assumption, as the censors "did their job on 15 April 1978," with the result "that the film could be released for 17-year-olds upwards as long as all scenes and dialogue of a political nature were cut as it was believed they could affect law and order." In General Murtopo's view, the film "wasn't cut too much" since even after the censors had cut "600 metres", the film "still runs for 2 hours 28 minutes" which is long enough for any Indonesian film.

It was still unclear, however, if the public would see the film. According to *Tempo*, that awaited instructions from KOPKAMTIB.

## UK GOVT WANTS RENDRA TRIED OR FREED IMMEDIATELY

In a letter replying to enquiries made by Member of Parliament Hugh Jenkins about the fate of W. S. Rendra, the Indonesian poet and playwright imprisoned in May this year, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated the hope that Rendra would be "brought to trial without delay, or that, if charges against him cannot be substantiated, he will be released as soon as possible".

Lord Goronwy-Roberts said of Rendra that "he has long been an outspoken critic of the Indonesian government, which has previously allowed him to express his criticisms in his plays". (This overlooks the fact that military authorities in some parts of the country have banned his works on a number of occasions.)

The Foreign Office letter about Rendra was the subject of a question in Parliament on 26 July. In reply to a question whether the Government would publish this letter expressing the view that Rendra should immediately be tried or released, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Evan Luard said that it would not, but that Mr Jenkins was at liberty to publish it if he so wished.



## PEN-USA Calls for Rendra's Release

American PEN sent the following cable to President Suharto on 25 July:

*1700 writers of American PEN defending the right to free expression, distressed over two-month detention of poet W.S. Rendra. Urge his release without delay. Signed, Richard Howard, President PEN American Center.*

## TESTIMONY OF 1967

W. S. Rendra

The world we are building is an iron world  
of glass and howling holes.  
Tomorrow's world is no longer virginal  
but mined and open to all  
like some liberated slut.  
The dreams we chase are dreams of shining platinum.  
The world we walk in is a world of poverty.  
The situation which imprisons us is the gaping jaw of a jackal.

Our fate flies like a cloud  
opposing and mocking us,  
becoming mist in the sleep of night  
and sun in the work of day.  
We shall die in the middle of our fate  
with hands arrogant and clenched.  
Hands which rebel and labour  
Hands which tear at the sacred envelope  
unfold the holy letter  
written in difficult characters which we cannot read.



## PEN-JAPAN ADOPTS PRAMUDYA AND RIVAI APIN AS HONORARY MEMBERS

Japan's PEN-Club has decided to confer honorary membership on two imprisoned Indonesian writers, Pramodya Ananta Toer and Rival Apin. The decision was taken at the Club's Board meeting on 15 July. Others conferred this honour were Alexander Ginsberg, the Soviet dissident who has just been sentenced to 8 years, the imprisoned Malaysian poet Said Zahari, and writers from Singapore and Kenya.

The system of conferring honorary membership was devised as a way of expressing support to writers who are experiencing imprisonment, exile or other forms of political oppression as a result of their literary activities.

Earlier this year, Dutch PEN also conferred honorary membership on Pramodya Ananta Toer.

## ALI MURTOPO WARNS JOURNALISTS

Indonesia's Information Minister, General Ali Murtopo, has warned journalists not to set up a trade union. Speaking in Jakarta on 13 May, he said that this would disturb relationships in the press world and would create conflicting groups of employees and employers. And that, he said, is Marxism.

# East Timor up-date

## BRITISH AMNESTY CALLS FOR SPECIAL ACTION

An urgent call for immediate action to secure respect for Amnesty principles in East Timor was made at the Annual General Meeting of the British Section of Amnesty International in July this year.

The resolution which received overwhelming support from the AGM reads as follows:

This AGM strongly urges the International Secretariat to seek further information regarding alleged widespread atrocities and human rights violations committed in East Timor since Indonesian troops invaded the country in 1975. This AGM urges the International Secretariat to take steps at the earliest possible moment to secure respect for Amnesty principles in East Timor. This AGM further requires the International Secretariat to investigate the possibility of adopting East Timor under the country-action dossier scheme.

The country-action dossier scheme is a scheme as yet in an experimental stage which is being applied to countries where the risk of retaliation against individual prisoners if adopted is great or where the information regarding human rights violations and atrocities which are known to be being committed is difficult to corroborate by independent sources. The scheme is currently being applied to Ethiopia and Uganda.

It is believed that this resolution will now be raised at the forthcoming A.J. International Council meeting in September this year.



## Literature

- |   |            |
|---|------------|
| <b>Indonesia, the Prison State</b>  | 10p each   |
| A 16-page pamphlet with photographs.  |            |
| <b>Indonesia, Unions Behind Bars</b>  | 10p each   |
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| <b>Treatment of Indonesian Political Prisoners. Forced Labour and Transmigration</b>  |            |
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TAPOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian political prisoners and is a humanitarian organisation. It is not associated with any political groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is supported by individuals and organisations of many shades of opinion.

## SUHARTO VISITS EAST TIMOR

In a visit designed to convince the world that Indonesia is in control of the country, President Suharto went to East Timor on 16-17 July, the second anniversary of its forced integration into Indonesia.

On the first day, Suharto announced the opening of a television station in Dili, the capital, and also went to a small gathering of boy scouts, but no public rally was held. While in Dili, he addressed East Timor's Indonesian-sponsored Regional People's Assembly (DPRD), and said that "the urgent matter is the restoration of peace and order." The Indonesian-appointed governor of East Timor, Arnaldo Araujo, put in more bluntly: "Funds supplied by the Indonesian government cannot all yet be used for development because we face not only questions of material development but we must still convince a small segment of people who are being misled. Efforts continue to bring them back to the right path. If they still refuse to listen, the only way will be for us to crush all those who stand in the way of integration."

On July 17, Suharto was said to have spoken before a large rally in Maliana, a town close to the Indonesian border. The Maliana area has been under Indonesian control since its troops launched the initial border invasion of East Timor in early October 1975. According to a report from Australia, journalists were barred from going to Maliana for the Suharto visit.

Interestingly enough, Guilherme Gonçalves, the chairman of the aforementioned Regional People's Assembly, shed some light on Suharto's choice of Dili and Maliana as the only two places he visited in East Timor. In a July 8 interview with *Tempo*, Gonçalves was asked if East Timor was ready to participate in Indonesian's forthcoming Five-Year Plan. He replied that "there must be reconciliation and tranquility among the people first." At present, Gonçalves continued, "people can still only work in places where our army has a concentration of forces, such as Dili, Same or Maliana."

### Change of Address

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