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British Campaign for the

Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

Bulletin No. 16

June, 1976

EDITORIAL

# A QUESTION OF AID

The Indonesian Government is being compelled by the serious economic straits in which it has found itself since the scale of the Pertamina disaster came to light to endeavour to assuage international public opinion in order to ensure that foreign aid donors are not under too much pressure from the world human rights lobby.

On 9-10 June, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), the western aid consortium which coordinates bilateral and multilateral aid to Indonesia, is meeting in Amsterdam to fix Indonesia's aid requirements during the current year. With the debt caused by Pertamina's financial collapse now known to be in the region of a swingeing 10,000 million US dollars (three times as much as it was thought to be earlier this year), it is likely that Indonesia's credit needs will be set even higher than last year's 2,000 million US dollars. This fact and the proposal before the US Congress for a considerable increase in US military aid to Indonesia explains more than anything else the recent much-publicised releases in Indonesia.

The great sensitivity shown by the Indonesian Embassy in Canada (see page 4) is an example of how desperately the Indonesian Government needs to protect its aid channels and how it fears that more publicity about its human rights violations can jeopardise its aid.

All this means that it is necessary now more than ever to intensify our work for the release of Indonesia's 100,000 *tapols*. Indonesia's current releases are nothing more than a gesture and are totally inadequate because:

'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely used although it was banned in 1974 because the military authorities said that all the prisoners are 'criminals'.

- at the 1975 release rate (1,300) it will take more than 50 years to release all the *tapols*;
- the Government has made it clear that *tapols* on Buru and in other 're-settlement' prison camps will not be released;
- released *tapols* are being harassed, new arrests are taking place and there is no let-up in the degree of political persecution.

IGGI member governments should be continually reminded of this and should be urged to press for an end to all human rights violations before granting any more support to such a regime.

Now you can show a film about *tapols*!

## MORE THAN A MILLION YEARS

The first film ever made about Indonesia's *tapols* has now been completed and is available for showing. Entitled *More Than A Million Years*, it incorporates documentary material from several television companies and includes interviews with *tapols* and also with a prison commander and a woman religious instructor. It also highlights western government support for the Suharto Government in complete disregard for the fate of the 100,000 *tapols*.

The narrator for the English version is the well-known British film actor, Albert Finney. A German version, entitled *Indonesiens Schattenreich*, has also been made with Carl Fox-Duering, the German actor, as narrator.

TAPOL owns a print of the film and will hire it out to groups in the UK for a minimum fee of £3.00 plus expedition costs. Interested groups in other countries should contact their national Amnesty Section, or write to the producers, the German Federal Republic Section of Amnesty (Silke Spliedt, 2 Hamburg 54, Flassheide 44, West Germany).

Technical details: running-time 27 minutes.  
black-and-white, 16 mm  
optical track.

# FROM INSIDE THE PRISONS

The following extracts are taken from a letter written by a *tapol* and smuggled out of Indonesia in late 1975. Names and places have been deleted to protect the source.

After the new camp commander took charge of the camp several years ago, the *tapols* here became very demoralised. He is said to be an ex-member of the Darul Islam and a psychopath. Here are some examples of his cunning and savage measures:

\* So as to keep a close watch on the *tapols*, he has for the past two years remained at the prison almost every day until late into the night, coming round to all the blocks. He seems to prefer being here at the prison than going home to his wife and children.

\* Those block leaders who were elected by people in each block but whom he did not like have been replaced by people of his own choice.

\* As a result, he has been able to turn some of these appointees of his into spies who report to him about what goes on.

\* Then a number of new regulations were introduced in order to:

- restrict the movement of the *tapols*;
- dominate their lives so as to be able to exploit their labour for the benefit of the authorities and himself;
- extort money from the *tapols* or their families;
- destroy the solidarity of the *tapols*;
- abuse their freedom to perform their religious rites and to follow the religion of their choice.

\* To demonstrate his power, *tapols* who breach the rules are harshly reprimanded, intimidated and cruelly beaten. They are kicked, trampled on, ordered to crawl on their hands and knees, beaten with his heavy army belt, and put into solitary confinement.

\* He exploits their labour without pay and uses them as coolies, gardeners, servants and the like. Some have to work on the land and their produce is sold to the *tapols* at prices he fixes himself; and he uses the proceeds to buy barbed wire, locks and other things to tighten camp security.....



Early in 1968, Atjep<sup>2</sup>) from Jakarta led the Sumber Raga Operation during which arrests were made in Surabaya. This operation had its headquarters at a place known as the C.I. (formerly the home of Dr. ....) and was staffed by officers of the Intelligence Unit of Korem 084 (local regimental command). Since 1967, the C.I. has been used as an interrogation, torture and detention centre. It is a hell on earth. All people taken there are subjected to beatings or kicks even before any questions are asked. This is done to demoralise the *tapols*.

During the actual interrogation, all *tapols* are brutally maltreated and tortured. They have to take off their shirts and trousers and are left in their underwear; sometimes they are stripped naked.

They face 5 or 6 interrogators each armed with a rattan stick, a club or a whip. With the very first question, the beatings begin.... Electric shock is administered to the ears, nose and genital organs in order to extract forced confessions. From mid-1968, the dreadful screams of people under interrogation could be heard morning, afternoon and night, but to prevent the screams from being heard outside, music was played loudly over a tape recorder. Many people died under torture including ....., a member of the leadership council of the organisation for overseas Chinese in Surabaya. The authorities concealed many deaths by saying that the people in question had been transferred to other places although it subsequently became apparent that they had disappeared altogether.

The cruellest treatment of all was given to the women. They were stripped during interrogation and not only were lit cigarettes placed on their vaginas but rattan sticks were brutally shoved repeatedly up their vaginas. Among the women treated like this were .... and .... who both had miscarriages.....



People being arrested in 1966.

A shot from the film:

More Than A Million Years

From July 1968, the first deaths from starvation began to occur, and from then on someone died practically every day. The guards and the PKD's<sup>3</sup>) were very strict and permitted no food in except prison rations. Cells were frequently searched and if they found that a person had food from outside, that person and everyone else in the cell would be severely beaten. The guards often entered the cells and took any possessions they fancied from the *tapols*; they were continually on the lookout for infractions of the rules.... *Tapols* were allowed only two minutes to take a bath; anyone taking longer would receive lashes. Those considered to have committed serious offences were taken to the security office where they would be set upon and tortured by the guards and the PKDs.

In mid 1968, one *tapol* rebelled while he was being beaten by a PKD with a chain of keys; he turned on his torturer and hit him. He was beaten with army belts by four PKDs and collapsed. Then he was dragged to the security office and brutally beaten up.... When he

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# Congressional Hearings Continue

The second in the series of hearings on human rights violations in Indonesia was held in Washington before the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on International Organizations on 3 May, under the Chairmanship of Congressman Donald Fraser. The hearings are being held to determine the degree of human rights violations in Indonesia in view of the amendment written into the Foreign Assistance Act and the Military Aid Bill denying US aid to countries that violate human rights.

Testifying before the Sub-Committee was Benedict O'Gorman Anderson, Associate Professor of Government and Asian Studies at Cornell University and Associate Director of Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

His written testimony deals not only with the *tapols* but with "the wider picture of power increasingly concentrated in the hands of a tiny oligarchy and the concomitant general decline in the liberty and welfare among millions of their fellow Indonesians".

The areas he discussed are: the Press, Education, Political Rights, Other Abridgements of Basic Freedoms, as well as Political Prisoners and Trials. We can quote only briefly here from Professor Anderson's testimony on some of these topics.

The Press "...except for a brief flowering in the early New Order period (1967-1970), the number of newspapers published has steadily declined.... In a number of provinces such as Riau, Bengkulu, Nusatenggara Barat, Nusatenggara Timur and Irian Barat, no newspapers are published now at all. The Indonesian Democracy Party (PDI) has no daily press outlet...."

After dealing with the KOPKAMTIB's powers over the press through the control of printing licenses and the Information Ministry's powers through control of publishing licenses, Professor Anderson says on intimidation of reporters: "This practice is especially common in the provinces. Reporters may be arbitrarily summoned and interrogated, on occasions beaten. Proprietors may be warned that, unless certain reporters are dismissed, printing licenses may be suspended." And of KOPKAMTIB briefings: "On most matters of national importance such as the invasion of East Timor, political prisoners, elections, and so forth, the dreaded KOPKAMTIB holds briefings which while they have no formal legal force, nonetheless, in the present climate, have an intimidatory effect and ensure that a largely monolithic 'press opinion' is conveyed to the reading public."

**Political Rights** On the 1971 elections, Professor Anderson exposes the methods employed to ensure GOLKAR's 'victory'.

"Millions of citizens who had been members of the Communist Party or its affiliates were officially banned from participation. However, in many rural areas, such people were intimidated into voting for GOLKAR.... Voters in government service or in large enterprises were required to vote at their place of work rather than near their residences, providing additional pressure towards GOLKAR uniformity. Two thirds of the chairmen of provincial electoral commissions and half the chairmen of district electoral commissions were military men.

The Government security apparatus assumed the arbitrary right to screen party candidates and roughly 20% on the original list were rejected. The Chief of Military Intel-

ligence stated that the grounds for being screened included: involvement in the 1965 coup, lack of positive support for development and lack of support for Pancha Sila Democracy and Constitution. These extremely vague guidelines gave virtually complete discretion to the authorities to eliminate those of whom it disapproved. In addition, candidates screened were forbidden to participate further in the campaign. All posters, brochures and slogans had to be submitted in advance for approval by the authorities. Criticism of government officials and foreigners were banned.

**Abridgement of Basic Freedoms Regarding the peasants.** Professor Anderson spoke of lack of basic protections "... evident in the frequent cases of peasants being forcibly extruded from their lands with little or no compensation, to make room for hotels, new government buildings, foreign-owned factories, and so forth. In such cases peasants have almost no recourse, unless they happen to get the support of the pitifully small and localised Legal Aid Institutes. These bodies formed by a minority of idealistic lawyers have been repeatedly harassed by the authorities in recent years...."

**Political Prisoners and Trials** One very interesting source referred to by Professor Anderson regarding plans to increase the number of *tapols* on Buru Island is an informal briefing of concerned Christian leaders at which Admiral Sudomo indicated that another 10,000 would be taken to the island over the next four years.

Regarding political trials, he quotes from his own interview with a lawyer involved in one of the earliest trials in 1966 (name withheld): "I was given the case 36 hours beforehand, with no time to prepare a proper defence at all. I was never allowed to see the defendant alone. The one defence witness I was allowed was coached by the military authorities in advance. The court assigned me two army majors as aides but all they did was keep watch over me. Before and during the trial, the presiding judge gave interviews to the press commenting on the case."

Professor Anderson also brings to light some further information regarding Mr. Yap Thiam Hien's difficulties in his defence of Asep Suryaman in 1975 (fully reported in TAPOL Bulletins no. 11 and 12): "... the charges were presented to the accused 72 hours before the trial started; Most of the allotted 72 hours had to be spent in finding some legislative basis for the charges. Defense requests for even a week to study the charges and the voluminous pre-trial interrogation testimonies prepared by the prosecution and to see the accused in private were all denied. He (Mr. Yap) was only able to see the accused in a chamber of the court under heavy military and police guard.

Professor Anderson concluded his testimony as follows: "I am afraid that I must conclude with the judgment that the problem lies not in individuals abusing their authority but with a government which has shown itself over the whole decade to be increasingly authoritarian, suspicious of its own citizens, and indifferent to the rights of the weak and the vulnerable."

Just as we were going to press, we received a report that the six remaining untried malari *tapols* were released in Jakarta on 8th May. The only persons remaining in prison now in connection with the malari event are the three convicted *tapols*.

The releases were announced during the visit to Jakarta of Drs Jan Pronk, Dutch Minister for Overseas Development Assistance who was there to attend a meeting of the Asian Development Bank and also in connection with the preparations for the forthcoming meeting of the IGGI in June.



### HARIMAN'S SENTENCE REDUCED

The Jakarta High Court announced at the end of April that it has decided to reduce Hariman Siregar's sentence from six years to 4½ years. Hariman, who was convicted for his alleged role in the student unrest of 1973 and 1974, was chairman of the Student's Council of University of Indonesia. He has already served more than two years of his sentence.

A TAPOL reader attended the Shell Annual General Meeting in May and asked whether the Directors were aware of the Indonesian Government's regulations regarding certificates of non-involvement in the G30S/PKI, whether their Indonesian subsidiaries complied with these regulations when taking on new employees and whether they would seek to protest against the discrimination. The Chairman who had worked in Indonesia knew about the regulation and said that as guests working in the country, they could not and would not question the government's regulations. Answering a second question about rumours that *tapols* were being used as forced labour to build pipelines, he gave the assurance that Shell was not and would not be involved in such practices.

This small action, which got no publicity in the financial pages did give information on these matters which was clearly quite new to most shareholders and even to some Directors.

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# An Indonesian Embassy Gets Busy

When an Indonesian Embassy begins to display an unusual degree of activity in receiving deputations to discuss the *tapols* and in getting their views public in the press. it suggests a greater awareness on the part of the Indonesian authorities of the growing protest and a fear that the supply of aid to Indonesia from western countries may be adversely affected.

This appears to have happened in Canada recently. Canada is an important investment partner and aid donor for Indonesia - more important than most people realise. During President Suharto's State Visit to Canada last

July, an agreement for 200 million US dollars in credit was signed, an amount which accounts for more than one-fifth of total Canadian foreign aid.

The sudden and energetic reaction of the Indonesian Embassy in Ottawa was probably prompted by the press coverage given in several Canadian newspapers to the problem of human rights in Indonesia, during and following the visit to Canada in late November last year of Carmel Budiardjo, who had an opportunity of addressing meetings in several Canadian towns.

Typical of the Embassy's reaction is a letter sent by Karjadi Sindunegoro, Head of the Information Section, to the Amnesty Group in Guelph which was also sent by the Embassy to the local newspaper for publication (*Guelph Daily Mercury*, 30.1.76). The letter attempts to discredit Mrs. Budiardjo by "revealing" her so-called political motives and pleads with the readers to "judge her words objectively". However, the letter only shows how completely Embassy officials fail to grasp the issues at stake. The following are some examples:

"However, we have not forgotten our fellow Indonesians still being held in detention. Realistically, we cannot expect the situation the situation to change overnight." (After ten years!)

"It is in their own interest that they are held in protective custody..." (As the Guelph Amnesty group states in its reply, "The detainees are not asked if they want to be protected; They are simply taken away....")

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## Dutch Aid Review?

The Dutch Minister for Overseas Development Assistance, Drs Jan Pronk, announced on his return from a visit to Jakarta in May that he plans to draw up a note evaluating Dutch aid to Indonesia so far. The Note would attempt to answer three questions: (1) whether development aid had benefited the poorest people; (2) whether Indonesia had made improvements in the exercise of basic human rights, and (3) to what extent Dutch aid had developed positive tendencies in Indonesia.

He foresaw that the Note could pose some problems as it might lead to an overall review of Dutch aid to Indonesia.

# Sudomo Speaks Again

The following is taken from an interview of Admiral Sudomo, Chief-of-Staff of the KOPKAMTIB by the weekly magazine *Tempo*, which appeared in its issue of 20 March 1976:

**Question** The A category G30S/PKI prisoners who have already been sentenced and have served sentence are to be released. What is their status?

**Answer** They are ex-G30S/PKI convicts. They will be free just like other citizens, but for security reasons they will be under supervision. This does not mean that they are not permitted to engage in various occupations. They are prohibited from becoming civil servants, from enlisting with the Armed Forces or working at vital enterprises as specified by the Government and KOPKAMTIB, including educational institutions.

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“... insufficient evidence exists to bring them to court. This does not mean that they are not guilty...”

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**Q:** Theoretically, category B cases are lighter than category A cases. Will not those who remain in detention be regarded as heavier cases, as some A category prisoners are released after serving sentence?

**A:** Category B prisoners are those who were clearly indirectly involved in the G30S/PKI rebellion but regarding whom insufficient evidence exists to bring them to court. This does not mean that they are not guilty. The definition of category B is as follows;

- those who after knowing about the treacherous movement and its subsequent activities, displayed attitudes in deeds or words that were sympathetic with that movement and or opposed or retarded efforts to suppress it;
- former functionaries, leaders or members of the PKI and or those who have taken the oath of allegiance to the PKI, or functionaries and leaders of the mass organisations of the same ideology, under the protection of, or within the fold of the PKI and all its activities.

Basically, they are going to be released. This will be done in stages and will depend on two factors, the security situation and their own consciousness (of the need) to abandon the communist ideology and return to the Pancha Sila, to behave themselves as citizens and not to engage in activities that endanger the safety and security of the State. In other words, the release... of G30S/PKI prisoners is a security risk and the basic problem is how to reduce this to a minimum, and that is the Government's right.... Our State is still based on the rule of law where human rights are safeguarded in the Constitution but State security is something we simply cannot ignore.

**Q:** To what extent has the Buru Project been effective?

**A:** This is a project for the socialisation of G30S/PKI prisoners through transmigration. The agricultural activities of the prisoners have been successful and they are now self-sufficient in foodstuffs and other everyday needs..... We have taken some wives and children there too so that the prisoners can feel more at home.....

This reproduction was used by Tempo to illustrate the Sudomo interview:



BULLETIN ASING : TAHANAN G.30.S.  
Agar lebih "krasan"

The caption reads: Foreign Bulletin: G30S Prisoners  
So that they feel more "at home".

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“... We are not mind-readers.... We are developing a scientific method to differentiate between the diehards and the non-diehards....”

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**Q:** How many of them are still loyal to the PKI?

**A:** It is very difficult to determine whether a person has abandoned the communist ideology or not. We are not mind-readers.... and no machine has been invented yet that can measure such things. We are developing a scientific method with the help of psychologists to differentiate between the diehards and the non-diehards; the results will be processed by computers. Preliminary results show that many are still diehards though some have become conscious.

**Q:** Aren't you afraid that Buru will become a red island?

**A:** There is always a risk of that happening. We give them continual guidance through indoctrination and religion to get them to abandon the communist ideology and return to the correct path, the Pancha Sila, and behave like good citizens.... but it isn't an easy thing to change a person's conviction; this needs time, patience and tenacity.

**Q:** Is it true that some guards have fallen under the influence of the prisoners?

**A:** Not in Buru. This happened elsewhere but we found out and were able to take action.

# A TRIAL IN FOCUS

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The trial of Oei Tju Tat is fairly typical of the many political trials held in Indonesia since 1966. The sentence passed — 13 years — was comparatively light. There is nothing therefore particularly extraordinary about the case. But as we received the full texts of several statements by both the prosecution and the defence, we are able to give our readers a full account which may help provide some idea of how these trials are run.

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Oei Tju Tat, a 54-year old ex-Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, stood trial this February on charges of subversion in Jakarta. He was found guilty and sentenced to 13 years. As he was arrested, together with other members of President Sukarno's Cabinet, on 13 March 1966 and has been in detention ever since, this means that he still has another three years to serve.

Oei was a member and Second Chairman of the Central Board of *Partindo*, a nationalist party strongly supporting Sukarno. During the trial, Oei made no secret of his deep devotion to the teachings of "Bung Karno" as Sukarno was popularly known. *Partindo* was not a left-wing party and had no formal links with the Indonesian Communist Party though it had its left and right wings. After the fall of Sukarno, it was purged of its PKI sympathisers and was then banned in December 1966. It is necessary to bear in mind that at the time of the attempted coup in 1965, both it and the PKI were perfectly legal organisations, and a certain amount of rewriting of history appears to have been attempted by the prosecution in order to make sense of the case against Oei.

There are several most interesting aspects of the trial. First, although the charges against him were strictly speaking nonsense in terms of the anti-subversion law on which they were based, Oei did not seem to have felt it was possible to attack the charges themselves, but confined himself to denying the allegations and correcting the prosecution's fabrications about the political situation surrounding the actions for which he was now being charged. Secondly, the defence lawyers were able to show that almost every contention made by the prosecution was completely

unreliable, and were able to do this not only by presenting documents to refute points made by the prosecution (e.g. Oei's passport showing that he was out of the country on days when the prosecution claimed he was 'receiving messages' or attending meetings) but also through the testimony of many of the witnesses who had been called by the prosecution.

Oei was tried under Law No 11/PNPS/1963 which designates as subversive any act which a person "knew or should have known" could destroy the lawful authority of the State or which "disseminates feelings of hostility or anxiety among the population or among broad sections of the people". The primary act complained of was the issuance of a statement by the *Partindo* Central Board on 4 October 1965 to the effect that the coup attempt on 1 October 1965 was "an internal affair of the Army". This description is anathema in the present political situation as it is seen as being the PKI's line. Oei was held responsible for the statement though almost all witnesses, even those who were obviously hostile to Oei, confirmed Oei's explanation that he had not taken an active part in the meeting on 3 October at which the statement was discussed. The prosecution's main grounds for asserting that Oei "must have been responsible" was that the meeting had been held at Oei's home, but most witnesses concurred that Oei's house had been used as the venue because *Partindo's* office was deemed unsafe in the prevailing atmosphere in Jakarta.

Furthermore, testimony presented during the trial revealed that the statement had in fact been issued a day after the meeting by one of the Board members (not Oei) without awaiting consultations which it had been agreed should be undertaken with President Sukarno. Oei told the court he had been "astounded" to see the statement as published and was in complete disagreement with its wording because he regarded the coup attempt as a "national event, not an internal affair of the Army". The prosecution were not able to refute this.

## Prosecution Re-Writes Indonesian History

No clear assertion was made that Oei or indeed any of the *Partindo* board members were doing anything illegal at the time though the prosecution sought to prove that Major-General Suharto had spoken prior to the 4 October declaring that the coup attempt was the work of the PKI, and argued that since Suharto was responsible for maintaining law and order, to issue a statement that went counter to his interpretation of events was an act of subversion. The defence countered this by showing (as indeed anyone with the slightest knowledge of Indonesia's events knows full well) that powers to maintain law and order were not conferred upon Suharto by President Sukarno until 11 March 1966. Moreover, whatever Suharto may have said, the *Partindo* members could not be held responsible for going against it if they had not heard it.

In addition, a barrage of minor offences were alleged against Oei in relation to his public acts during 1964 and 1965, designed to prove that he was a PKI sympathiser. Besides pointing to numerous inaccuracies in the prosecution's presentation of these events, the defence also argued that

there was indeed nothing illegal in those days about being sympathetic towards or working in cooperation with the PKI.

## Presentation of Evidence

The evidence in the trial appears to have been arranged and collected in the most extraordinary way. First, Oei was forced, despite protests from his lawyers, to give evidence in his own defence before the evidence against him was heard, a most unusual procedure! The court used the argument of tradition to justify the departure from procedure established in Indonesian law.

Second, it appears that several witnesses the defence wanted to call were not compelled — or not permitted — to give evidence. The defence for instance named several members of Sukarno's Cabinet of which Oei was a member, including Dr. Subandrio (now under sentence of death) and Dr. Leimena. These persons did not appear and no explanation was given. In fact, the only witnesses at the commencement of the trial did not appear. No explanation for the absence was offered regarding four of these. One who, as far as we can ascertain, was a prisoner, was stated to have died (during the course of the trial, apparently) and another was said by the military medical authorities to be unfit to attend. One of the other four witnesses who did not appear had actually been brought to Jakarta all the way from Surabaya. The defence indicated that they believed that he would testify in Oei's favour, but he never appeared. Of the thirteen witnesses that did attend, at least five are known to be prisoners themselves. (The actual figure is

probably much higher than this). Though they were all presumably prosecution witnesses, some certainly failed to uphold the accusations being made by the prosecution. It is not clear from the material in hand whether the defence had an opportunity to take statement from witnesses. Their opportunity even to confer with Oei was extremely limited, a situation that prevails in all political trials.

The charges against Oei were based on his alleged responsibility for the *Partindo* 4 October statement, but the prosecution also sought to prove that this statement, by indicating *Partindo*'s fidelity to the PKI, had aroused the wrath of people in the regions who then took things into their own hands by killing local *Partindo* leaders. In other words, Oei was being held responsible for massacres of his own party comrades. This allegation rested on the claim made, but never substantiated in court, that the statement had been "widely disseminated" throughout the country. The only 'proof' advanced was that one witness said he had received the statement through the post. The prosecution was unable to prove that the statement was ever published in any press organ or broadcast over the radio. No witness was able to bear testimony to *Partindo* leaders being killed as a reaction to the statement.

Regarding the charge that Oei had committed subversion against the Government, the defence argued that he had himself been a member of the government and a devoted supporter of the Head of State, Bung Karno. Nor had President Sukarno shown any sign of mistrust for he had done nothing to have Oei removed. On the contrary, he had reappointed Oei to a new cabinet in early 1966, knowing full well his connections with *Partindo*.

## Oei Acknowledges his International Support

Defence pleas were presented not only by the team of three defence lawyers, but also by Oei himself who commenced by expressing his gratitude to friends and sympathisers all over the world, mentioning specifically Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, Pax Christi and "members of the British House of Lords" (the sponsors of TAPOL-UK?). He explained that for three years after his arrest in 1966 he was not once interrogated. Then a series of interrogation in 1969 came to nothing, and he was left alone for another three years. He had got the impression that his case had become a kind of 'pingpong ball' between those in the military who thought he should be tried and those who disagreed. In fact, one officer in charge of one series of interrogations had told him that the charges against him were "nothing more than slanders".

A perusal of the statements and counter-statements by prosecution and defence show that the defence succeeded in destroying all the main allegations made against Oei, but that the prosecution did nothing to refute the evidence presented by the defence.



Oei Tju Tat

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# MORE PAPUANS SHOT DEAD

Twenty civilians from Irian Jaya, fleeing from the Indonesian authorities, who crossed the border into Papua New Guinea hoping to get medical treatment there, were handed back to the Indonesian authorities and shot dead. This is reported by the Senegal Information Office of the Papuan Provisional Government in Exile.

While the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, was strongly denying these reports and telling the press that "there is no separatist movement in Irian Jaya" (*Berita Buana*, 18 February), the Indonesian Ambassador in the Netherlands, Lieutenant General Sutopo Yuwono was giving a quite different account of the situation: "Frankly speaking, it is proving difficult to crush the guerrilla movement led by Runkorem. The region is a difficult one because it lies close to the border. Our troops cannot exercise effective control over them not only because it is jungle terrain but also because our equipment is inadequate". (*Tempo*, 28 February).

## Political Persecution in Irian Jaya

A report drawn up in 1973 has recently been received, \* giving details of political persecution in Irian Jaya during the years immediately following the 'act of free choice' which "unanimously" confirmed the territory as part of

the Indonesian Republic despite widespread opposition which was given no chance of expression.

The report says that in 1973, there were about one thousand political prisoners in the territory. The arrests commenced on 1 December 1969.

In another town, *Biak*, three detention camps are identified, two of them run by the Indonesian Air Force and one by the Navy. Numerous executions and mass murders are listed:

- 20 people executed in the village of Adadikam (near Biak on 25 April 1970;
- 85 people executed on 18 May 1970, also in a village near Biak;
- 150 people from two villages, Krisdori and Mundori, executed in June 1971. The men were shot down on a nearby beach; the women and children were herded into a large house which was burnt down;
- Nataniel Awom, secretary of the Biak Section of the Operation Free Papua, was executed in September 1972.

\* The report was circulated by the *Actie-Comite Vluchtelingenhulp Papoea's* in the Netherlands.



Haji J. C. Princen with his wife, immediately after his release on 3 April. He spent 26 months in detention without trial, in connection with the 15 January 1974 event. He and six other *malari* prisoners were released, leaving seven still in detention.

Haji Princen is Chairman of the League for the Rights of Man and can be expected to continue his fight for human rights, of which he has been a champion for many years.

# INDONESIA HEADS BLACK LIST

Twenty-one of the 67 journalists imprisoned for their political beliefs, according to a list published in May by Amnesty International, are Indonesians. The list which covers the whole world, also names seven journalists in the Soviet Union, six in Brazil, five in Yugoslavia and four in India. So, Indonesia holds far more journalists in detention than any other country.

Moreover, most of the Indonesian journalists in prison have been held since 1965, and only one has been tried - Sujinah, one of the two women on the list.

The list was compiled on the occasion of the opening of the International Press Institute Conference in Philadelphia on 10 May.

It also includes such names as Karim D.P., formerly chairman of the Indonesian Association of Journalists (PWI), Naibaho, editor-in-chief of the banned communist daily, *Harian Rakjat*, Suroto, home news editor of the national news agency, Antara, and Rivai Apin, journalist and poet.

Amnesty emphasises that the list is by no means complete and this almost certainly applies in the case of Indonesia. Neither, should we add, does it include any of the many journalists who have at one time or another since 1965 spent months or years in prison without trial, or even if not detained, who have lost their jobs and their professions as a result of the closure of their papers by the authorities.

# Civil Servants' Rights

Are civil servants in Indonesia permitted to be members of political parties other than GOLKAR? According to the Law on Political Parties and GOLKAR enacted last year, they are allowed to join any of the three parties (the PPP, the PDI and GOLKAR) as long as they report this to the authorities. Yet it is a fact that civil servants are required to be members of KORPRI, the union of government employees which is part of GOLKAR. Obviously the position is far from clear.

The issue was highlighted recently by some controversy over a statement made to the press by Drs H. K. A. Sjis, the head of the Central Java Regional Office of the Department of Religious Affairs who said that all his employees and their families were prohibited from joining political parties; their duty, he said, was to strengthen KORPRI. Following some expression of dismay over this statement, the gentleman in question felt it necessary to further 'clarify' the position. And so, a second report appeared in the same newspaper, *Pelita*, which had the following to say:

"Without positively denying this *Pelita* news, Sjis said that the heart of my speech was to build up KORPRI and not to prohibit people from joining the political parties. Of course, a civil servant may join a political party; to leave KORPRI is also possible, said Sjis, who then added quickly, but he also leaves the civil service.

"In answer to a question: 'Does that not mean forbidding civil servants to join political parties,' Sjis answered: That's an interpretation. He repeated his explanation: it is obligatory for civil servants to join KORPRI. The fact is that KORPRI is a unit in GOLKAR, and it was not me who made that regulation; that was from our superiors, he added." (*Pelita*, 28 February 1976)

This declaration has an important bearing in particular on the appointment of Islamic religious lecturers by the Religious Affairs Department. The stand taken and publicly confirmed by this regional office head means, as

he also made clear in this statement to *Pelita*, that religious leaders from the Moslem party, the Development Unity Party (PPP), cannot be appointed to undertake lecturing work for the department. They are required to be members of KORPRI before they can undertake such activities. It is restrictions such as these that are causing considerable unrest within the Moslem community in Central Java and in many other parts of the country.

## Correction

The stop press item on page 4 refers to the release of the six remaining untried malari prisoners. In fact, after the release of six malari prisoners in April (see page 8), there were seven still being held, which means that one is now still in detention. According to our records, his name is Suwardio.

## MORE THAN A MILLION YEARS



Dr Sumiarsih Caropeboka, a prisoner being held at the Plantungan Women's Detention Camp, being interviewed by a Dutch TV cameraman, with an officer listening in. (Taken from the film, *More than a Million Years*.)

## 1977 GENERAL ELECTIONS

### DID YOU KNOW?

That the Minister of the Interior, General Aminmachmud, has instructed provincial governors to be 'good referees' between contesting parties during the election campaign.

That provincial governors are however *ex officio* chief sponsors of GOLKAR, the Army-backed party that won 227 of the 360 contested seats at the 1971 elections. They are also *ex officio* chairmen of the provincial election committees and therefore control finances, acceptance of nominations, the regulation of electioneering activity, etc.

### DID YOU KNOW?

That 300 PNI members in East Java alone were dismissed from the civil service for their activities (in opposing GOLKAR?) during the 1971 election campaign.

That so far only 100 of these dismissal cases have been handled, with only some being rehabilitated to their jobs.

That the Chairman of the PDI (into which the PNI has fused) admits that many civil servants will refrain from voting for the PDI because they still feel afraid. (*Tempo*, 10 April 1976).

# £43m U.K. Aid Since '66

Total UK aid to Indonesia since Suharto came to power and since the establishment of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia in 1966 amounts to £43,163,000. This is clear from figures contained in a written reply to Stan Newens MP by Overseas Development Minister, Reg Prentice (Hansard, May 7th).

In another written reply on the same day, the Minister stated that "the future level of British aid to Indonesia is at the moment under consideration." This is no doubt in

connection with the forthcoming meeting of the IGGI, scheduled for 9-10 June at which current aid needs of Indonesia will be fixed and new bilateral commitments made by IGGI members, including the UK. Last year, the UK committed £10 for a period commencing in 1977.

Apart from direct aid, the British Government also supports a number of credit deals between British exporters and the Indonesian Ministry of Finance or Indonesian corporations, by granting guarantees against default of payment through the Export Credit Guarantee Department scheme.

UK Aid to Indonesia 1966-1975 (in millions of £'s)

	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Project Aid	-	-	-	0.178	0.428	1.901	2.309	3.401	5.604	4.796
Non-Project Aid	-	0.687	1.041	2.055	2.070	3.524	3.860	4.113	2.472	0.568
Technical Assistance	0.004	0.003	0.057	0.082	0.161	0.410	0.602	0.634	0.790	1.413
Total	0.004	0.690	1.098	2.315	2.659	5.835	6.771	8.148	8.866	6.777

## PERTAMINA CRISIS WORSENS

The debt incurred by the Indonesian State oil company, Pertamina, thought earlier this year to amount to about 3,500 million US dollars, is now known to be well over 9,000 million dollars. This is clear from new figures published by *Tempo*, the Jakarta weekly (27 March, 1976).

- Short-term loans (repayable in 12 months or less) are now thought to amount to 1,900 million dollars.
- The amount owing to pay for 80 100,000-ton oil tankers is 2,400 million dollars (which, *Tempo* says, is about 3 times the current market price for that number of tankers!)
- The oil money owed by Pertamina to the State Treasury (all levies on foreign oil companies are paid to the Treasury through Pertamina) is now calculated at 1,500 million dollars.
- Pertamina's debts to domestic contractors are now calculated at 1,900 million dollars.
- The trade debt is now thought to be much higher than the initial estimate of 700 million, probably double that.

Since the Indonesian Government has decided to honour these debts, it means that new credits have been sought on the international money market. The international indebtedness of the Indonesian economy has been severely worsened as a result of the corruption and mismanagement in Pertamina. Pertamina's debts are nearly twice the total sum now owing to IGGI countries and incurred in the ten years since IGGI began.

### Ibnu Sutowo Dismissed

The dismissal of Pertamina's President-Director, General Ibnu Sutowo, was eventually announced in March this year. His dismissal is regarded as a sacrifice President Suharto was forced to make to preserve his own position and to protect the interests of his wife, Tien Suharto, who is known to be at the centre of a vast network of corruption.

Ibnu Sutowo's dismissal was designated an "honorable dismissal", irony indeed for those many hundreds of thousands of people who have suffered dishonorable dismissal and much worse for the "crime" of having been members of organisations that were perfectly legal at the time.

Continued from page 7

The prosecution spokesman went ahead regardless in his second summing-up statement to repeat his demand for a sentence of 20 years. It is difficult to understand how the panel of judges could have so completely ignored the force of arguments presented by the defence and gone ahead to find Oei guilty of subversion and sentence him to 13 years. A savage sentence by any standard, yet by comparison with the numerous death and life sentences passed in Indonesia at political trials, Oei must presumably

consider himself lucky, and fortunate to have had such a dedicated team of defence lawyers whose arguments may have compelled the judges to give a lighter sentence than originally intended. For there is little doubt that the judges were bound to find him guilty and to go a long way to meet the prosecution's demand for sentence.

But at least Oei Tju Tat knows that, all being well, he should be released in three years. How many of his fellow prisoners would be glad to know that!

# Holland America Line

requires immediately personnel for placement in its passenger ships, on the basis of work contracts of at least one year's duration with the employee signing a work agreement for the following vacancies:

1. Seven carpenters
2. Seven upholsterers
3. Four fitters
4. Eight plumbers

Applicants must comply with the following conditions:

1. Can understand and take orders in English or Dutch.
2. Has at least three years' experience in his respective occupation.
3. Can work independently.
4. Possesses a certificate of non-involvement in the G.30.S/PKI and a good conduct letter.

Applications together with letters of reference and other documents should be sent not later than 20 March 1976 to:

SAMUDERA INDONESIA Ocean-Shipping Line  
Marine Department/Unit Nautika,  
Jalan Raya Pelabuhan No. 47  
Tanjung Priok

In December last year, Admiral Sudomo, Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB, announced that certificates of non-involvement in the G.30.S/PKI are no longer required. But he specified exceptions to this rule. They are: enlistment in the Armed Forces, employment with the Government and employment in 'vital enterprises'.

We reproduce above an announcement of job vacancies which appeared in the Indonesian press in March this year. We don't know whether the Holland America Line has been designated a 'vital enterprise' or whether carpenters, fitters and plumbers are deemed to be 'vital' (in the security sense of course), but the announcement which is typical of announcements that appear from day to day in the Indonesian press reveals that Sudomo's new rule does not seem to have made any difference.

Further, may we ask, why does a foreign firm persist in requiring political clearance for its employees? Dutch and US readers, please note and see if you can find out. And let us know the answers!

Continued from page 2

was half dead, he was thrown into a ditch and dragged up and down till his face was caked with mud and blood. By this time he no longer resembled a human being. But still his torturers were not satisfied. He was then *dipilentong* (crucified with nails) in his cells. One leg and one arm were chained down so that he could neither stand up straight or lie down. He was left like this for eleven months. (Even in colonial days, such torture was administered for a maximum of two weeks.) Even while like this, they continued to harass him, guards would often come and beat him or kick him. As a result, he went mad. Finally at the end of 1974..... he was released but he will most probably remain insane for the rest of his life.....

Other forms of torture would make one's hair stand on end..... *Tapols* were first beaten and then emerged several

times in a septic tank filled with human excrement so that they were covered from head to foot in excrement and blood.....

About six hundred *tapols* died from starvation and torture in Kalisosok4).

1) *Darul Islam*: an organisation fighting some years ago for an Islamic state.

2) *Atjep*: This same interrogator is also named in *Report on Torture*, published by Amnesty International (Duckworth, London 1971), page 147.

3) PKDs are convicted criminals who are used as interrogators.

4) *Kalisosok* is a prison in Surabaya.

## HOLLAND AMERICA LINE

Membutuhkan dengan segera tenaga2 untuk di tempatkan di kapal2 penumpang milik, atas dasar kerja kontrak sedikitnya satu tahun dengan menanda tangani PERJANJIAN KERJA untuk lowongan:

1. 7 (TUJUH) ORANG MISTRI (CARPENTER)
2. 7 (TUJUH) ORANG TUKANG KAYU DAN JOK (UPHOLSTERER)
3. 4 (EMPAT) ORANG TUKANG BUBUT (FITTER)
4. 8 (DELAPAN) ORANG AHLI / MONTIR SANITER.

dengan syarat2 :

1. Mengerti/dapat menerima perintah dalam bahasa Inggris atau Belanda.
2. Berpengalaman sedikitnya 3 tahun dalam bidangnya masing2.
3. Dapat bekerja sendiri.
4. Memiliki surat keterangan bebas G.30 S/ P.K.I./dan berkelakuan baik (surat dari polisi).

Lamaran disertai surat pengalaman dan keterangan lainnya diantarkan sendiri selambat-lambatnya tanggal 20 Maret 1976 ke alamat :

P.T. Perusahaan Pelayaran Samudera  
"SAMUDERA INDONESIA"  
Marine Department / Unit Nautika  
Jln. Raya Pelabuhan No. 47  
Tanjung Priok.

# Glossary

**G30S/PKI** Abbreviation for 30th September Movement/ Indonesian Communist Party. the term used by the Army to describe the coup attempt which actually occurred on 1 October 1965.

**KOPKAMTIB** Abbreviation for the Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, the special Army command under the direct command of President Suharto, which is responsible for political security and the arrest and detention of political prisoners.

**GOLKAR** The Functional Groups, the name of the political party set up by the military which "won" the 1971 general elections by means of intimidation and control of the electoral machinery.

**PPP** The initials of the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan. the Development Unity Party, the name given to the fusion of the Moslem parties.

**PDI** The initials of the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, the Indonesian Party of Democracy, the name given to the fusion of nationalist and Christian parties.

**Pancha Sila** (Spelt in Indonesian, **Panca Sila**). The Five Pillars, originally formulated in 1945 by Indonesia's first President, Sukarno. These are: Belief in one God, nationalism, humanitarianism, democracy and social justice. The military regime asserts its adherence to these principles, and proclaims that the *tapols* must abandon their ideology and "become good Pancha Sila-ists".

**MALARI** The acronym used for the 15 January 1974 event when students demonstrated against the visit to Indonesia of the Japanese Prime Minister, Tanaka, and in protest against many aspects of current economic policy.

# Tapol Principles

TAPOL campaigns for the release of Indonesian political prisoners and is a humanitarian organisation. It is not associated with any political groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is supported by individuals and organisations of many shades of opinion.

# Suggested Reading

*The Military Balance 1975-1976*. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam Street, London, WC2N 6AL, September 1975, 104 pp., price £1.50.

The publication gives "the facts of military power as they existed in July 1975" (preface). For Indonesia, the following information is given: Total armed forces: 266,000; defence expenditure 1975-76: 460 bn rupiahs (Rp1,108 m). Army: 200,000, about one-third being engaged in civil and administrative duties. Navy: 38,000. Air Force: 28,000, 47 combat aircraft. Para-military Forces: police mobile brigade 12,000, militia about 100,000. Some equipment, ships and aircraft are non-operational, for lack of spares. In 1973 the defence expenditures were Rp452 million, Rp4 per head (1975: Rp9 per head), 21.8% of government expenditure, 3.6% of GNP. Numbers of armed forces in previous years: 1971: 319,000, 1972: 317,000, 1973: 322,000, 1974: 270,000. To these numbers the para-military forces should be added.

# Notes To Readers

## SUBSCRIPTION DRIVE

It is more than a decade now since the first mass arrests took place in Indonesia, but the problem is still as far as ever from solution.

TAPOL's campaign may have helped to compel the military leaders to at least speak of releases, but clearly that is not enough. We must reach out to more people with the facts.

For this, we need your help!

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