



**VICTORIA UNIVERSITY**  
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

*Tapol bulletin no, 14, February 1976*

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1976) Tapol bulletin no, 14, February 1976. Tapol bulletin (14).  
pp. 1-12. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository <https://vuir.vu.edu.au/26419/>



British Campaign for the

Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners

BULLETIN No. 14

February, 1976

# TAPOL GOES TO U.S. CONGRESS

## EDITORIALS

We report in this issue the events surrounding the first hearings on Indonesia held in Washington by the Congressional Sub-Committee on International Relations. The ferocity of the attacks unleashed on that occasion and subsequently in the *Washington Post* reveals a deep fear that the campaign about the *tapols* may jeopardise current moves to increase U.S. military aid to Indonesia.

It is timely to reiterate that TAPOL's objective is not

to undermine the Indonesian Government. Our objective is to release the *tapols*. If this threatens Indonesia's relations with other countries, including the USA, that is a matter for which the military must be held responsible, not TAPOL or any individuals connected with it. Needless to say, we shall continue our efforts whatever charges are made, in the conviction that pressure based upon factual, widely-disseminated information, can help to undermine repression. We do not deny for a moment that that is our objective. ◀

## E.Timor .... and Pertamina

Two important problems are currently having a major effect on developments in Indonesia: Indonesia's invasion of East Timor and the catastrophic consequences of the debts incurred by the State oil company, *Pertamina*. We carry reports on these two problems in this issue because these developments need to be understood by those campaigning on behalf of the *tapols*. The report on East Timor is the responsibility of the British Campaign for an Independent East Timor. As we have indicated in earlier issues, TAPOL maintains a continuing interest in the situation in East Timor insofar as it may effect human rights issues in that area. At the moment war is raging and Indonesian troops have committed massacres in many places. TAPOL cannot campaign on the more general aspects on East Timor developments but has decided to give space in its Bulletin to the BCIET in order to keep our readers informed of latest developments which go virtually unreported in the media. ◀

\* \* \*

## Some signs of progress?

Much of the present issue is devoted to the Indonesian government's announced release plans. We also include two very important accounts that appeared in November in major London and New York newspapers.

The material we present is, we feel, self-explanatory but we would be failing in our duty if we did not attempt to draw some conclusions:

## Film on Tapols

A film on the *tapol* question is now in preparation. The film, to be produced by the German Section of Amnesty International, will include important documentary material about the arrests in 1965, shots of *tapols* in prisons, on trial, and case material on individual prisoners.

English-language and German-language versions are being made.

The film will be in black and white and will be about 30 minutes long. Prints will be on sale for about about £150 (subject to final cost calculations).

Please send enquiries to:

Silke Spliedt  
German Section, Amnesty International,  
2 Hamburg 54  
Flascheide 44  
West Germany.

- a) However the government may seek to deny it, these pronouncements are being made under pressure of growing concern from abroad and growing economic difficulties at home which have made foreign aid more important than ever to economic programmes.
- b) Some releases are, we know, taking place. But drawing on Martin Woollacott's article on 11 November in *The Guardian*, and Admiral Sudomo's statement on 2 December, plus other very cautionary comments, release is clearly still a very distant prospect for the vast majority of *tapols*. ◀

# Congressional hearing

On 18 December, 1975, Congressman Don Fraser, Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organisations, held a formal hearing on human rights in Indonesia. There were two witnesses, Carmel Budiardjo, former political prisoner in Indonesia, now living in Britain, and John Newmann, Programme Officer at the Ford Foundation who spent several years in Indonesia and gained an insight from personal acquaintances into the problem of political imprisonment.

The hearing provoked quite a response and was marked by a slanderous attack made against Carmel Budiardjo by two Congressmen. Several weeks later, a similar attack was made by the Washington Post columnists, Rowland Evans and Robert Novak. In the following remarks, Jacqui Chagnon of Clergy and Laity Concerned who attended the hearing, summarises the significance of these developments:

Called before the Subcommittee to testify on human rights, Carmel Budiardjo found herself subjected to an 'interrogation' full of accusations and leading questions, aimed at discrediting her testimony. In her concluding remarks, Mrs. Budiardjo said that only in the hands of the Indonesian military intelligence had she ever been 'interrogated' in such a manner before. Viewed in isolation, this blatant attempt at character assassination by two respected Congressmen is confusing. But seen in the context of developments in the past six months, the strategy behind it is obvious. If Carmel Budiardjo's powerful personal account is given any credence by Congress, Indonesia's chances of receiving the proposed \$56.5 million military aid for 1976-1977 would be irreparably damaged.

For the past ten years, the Indonesian government's incarceration of tens of thousands of political prisoners has received little attention in the US. But that is changing. Congress is examining seriously the link between foreign assistance programs and the overwhelming amounts of aid given to repressive regimes. Thus, the issue of Indonesia's political prisoners will no longer be ignored.

Sensing this change, the Jakarta military government commenced last summer a long-term Congressional lobbying effort, to support its request for substantial increases in military and economic aid from the US. Its latest tactic of attempting to discredit Carmel Budiardjo's testimony was merely part of its entire strategy toward Congress.

The setting for this cleverly planned diversion was the hearing on human rights in Indonesia. The hearing was replete with McCarthy-styled questions and anonymous materials, obviously compiled from Indonesian and American intelligence sources. The personal attack on Mrs. Budiardjo came from guests members, Congressmen Ryan and Hays, who barraged the witness with unsubstantiated accusations, damaging associations and red-baiting questions such as "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the Communist Party?"

## The Long-term Snow-job

In order to put this particular incident into perspective, one must examine the backdrop of events beginning last July. Consider the following:

- In early July, President Ford received President Suharto at Camp David when it appears that an undisclosed aid commitment was made—pending Indonesia's ability to convince Congress.

# on Indonesia

- A few weeks later, the *Washington Post* reported that Lt. Gen. Ali Murtopo, deputy head of the state-intelligence body, was organizing a "major lobby effort in Washington". (24 July, 1975, "Jakarta Draws Shopping List for Stepped-Up Arms Aid.")

- In September, a US Congressional delegation visited Jakarta for two days to discuss future foreign policy issues with the Indonesian government leaders but failed to pose any questions about the political prisoners.

- On 18 October, the Indonesian government announced its plan to release 35,000 political prisoners at a yearly rate of 2,500. The announcement failed to mention that at this rate (assuming that the 35,000 figure is correct) this plan would take 14½ years to complete.

- From 14 - 23 October, Ali Murtopo and a large entourage toured the US, speaking before the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, and the Asia Society. They also spent several days lobbying Congress, wining and dining numerous aides and members. One Congressional aide described their efforts as "a pretty slick snow-job". Another aide said the delegation readily admitted that the earlier announcement of the release plan was solely for Congress' benefit.

- Soon after, President Ford proposed to give Indonesia \$56.5 million in military aid, two—and-one half times larger than last year's amount.

- Then, Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib dubbed Indonesia a "fascination" with "all the makings of a leading power in the area." (Future Foreign Policy Subcommittee hearings, 16 November, 1975.)

- Finally, in early December, President Ford decided to make a last-minute stopover in Indonesia, allegedly to offset his visit to Peking. (It is interesting to note that BBC in London announced the Ford visit to Jakarta on 28 October, several weeks before any announcement was made in the US.) A day after Ford left Jakarta, Indonesian forces invaded East Timor and remain, despite a unanimous UN Security Council condemnation of the action.

(cont'd on page 3)

## A word of advice

Congressman Hays: The Indonesian Government couldn't be as bad as you say it is. If it were as bad as you say it is, they wouldn't let Mr. Newmann back in. \* If I were running the show, I wouldn't let him back in.

John Newmann: Well, we will see what happens in January.

Congressman Hays: They have already had my advice for what it is worth. A couple of people from their embassy are here.

[From the U.S. Congressional Hearings on Indonesia, Washington, 18 December 1975]

\*) John Newmann had stated in his testimony that he would be visiting Indonesia in January this year.

# Rep. Bonker opposes Ford's visit

Congressman Don Bonker (Dem., Washington State) placed the following statement (briefly abridged) in the Congressional Record on 12 December, 1975:

The President's recent visit to Indonesia seems as inappropriate as it does untimely. Surely this will be widely interpreted as an endorsement of the Indonesian regime; I can only hope it is not meant that way. The people of most of Indonesia are living in abysmal squalor, and the few members of the elite are living royally. The income distribution is one of the most uneven in the world. This is not because the country is as poor as the people. On the contrary, it is oil-rich and, of course, that is much of the reason underscoring our support of it. The corruption and callousness are as evident as is the scandalous mismanagement which has just accounted for the collapse of Pertamina, the state's oil conglomerate.



Presidents Suharto and Ford confer

Political conditions rival the economic conditions. The Government admits to holding at least 50,000 political prisoners, many of them having served years without charges. This is not to mention reliable accusations that literally hundreds of thousands of opponents were summarily executed in the reign of terror that followed the regime's accession to power by coup d'etat in the mid-1960's.

It is hard to believe that the President is going out of his way to associate himself with this repressive government. It may be argued that the President routinely visits countries whose social systems we do not condone. And when he travels to China or Russia, say, it appears only that he wants to do some talking and negotiating with an important adversary. To most Americans interested in preserving peace, this is justifiable. But Indonesia is in quite another category. The President obviously considers it a pillar of our foreign policy in Southeast Asia, and he currently has a request in Congress for over \$40 million in grant and credit military assistance. A personal visit at this time only reinforces the sorry appearance of that relationship.

Perhaps it is arguable that we should be aiding Indonesia if only because it is a non-Communist country. But the vivid fact is, it is not a democratic or benevolent or even honest country. It is hard to see, from a humanitarian perspective, how a Communist government could be much worse for the mass of the people than what they have got now. An argument has long been

that stability is a precondition of progress. But the only progress that has been registered during the last decade of stability has been that of the upper class. The gap between rich and poor is actually getting wider.

Even considered as just a practical matter — though it ought to be inadmissible to put morality aside — it is difficult to justify our coziness with the Indonesian regime. Exactly what vital interests of our national security have been jeopardized by the "loss" of Indochina — as if it were ever ours to "possess"? We may be in bad stead now, but that is precisely because we identified ourselves with the decadent old regime. It is a tenuous and backfiring policy to support factions that lack a popular and lasting base. Ultimately, our genuine and dependable allies are those who share our values and principles. Our greatest influence comes from setting an example worthy of emulation. If we are interested in influence, the last thing we should do is undermine the world's respect for us. Yet that is what we do by being seen so supportive of the likes of the Indonesian ruling clique.

---

(cont'd from page 2)

## Human Rights, Indonesia's Stumbling Block

Throughout the summer and fall, Indonesia's Congressional strategy was developing quite smoothly—until Carmel Budiardjo arrived in mid-November to begin a US speaking tour. Then, some intriguing events occurred:

- Several weeks before Carmel Budiardjo was to testify before Congress, TAPOL/USA, a US organization working for the release of Indonesian political prisoners, became aware of a heavy slander campaign being mounted by the Indonesian Embassy against Mrs. Budiardjo.
- A slanderous biographical sheet on Mrs. Budiardjo was distributed by the Embassy and the State Department to members of Congress and to Indonesian residents in the Washington area.
- At the hearing, Congressman Ryan accused Carmel Budiardjo of having ulterior motives for testifying (i.e. overthrowing the Indonesian government.) Furthermore, he charged that her husband, imprisoned for nine years without trial or charges, was involved in gun-running from China to Indonesia before the coup of 1965. No evidence was presented and to date he states that his source was "anonymous".
- Throughout the hearings, only Congressman Don Fraser asked questions to the two witnesses about the human rights situation in Indonesia. Congressmen Ryan and Hays directed their entire attention to imputing Mrs. Budiardjo's reputation. They ignored the second witness, Mr. John Newmann, an American with credible knowledge of the political prisoner situation, whose testimony paralleled Mrs. Budiardjo's.
- Congressman Hays threatened to prevent this testimony of Mrs. Budiardjo from being printed, by virtue of his power as Chairman of the Joint Committee of Printing.
- Upon returning to England, the US Embassy in London informed Mrs. Budiardjo that her multiple-entry visa to the US had been revoked, seemingly due to her candid admission at the hearings that she had been in the British Communist Party before 1946. She may now have difficulty in returning to the US on speaking tours.

# U.K. aid to Indonesia: Former minister speaks out

Judith Hart was Britain's Minister for Overseas Development until she was sacked in June 1975. In an article in the February 1976 issue of *New Internationalist*, she described some of the pressures she had to face as the country's Aid Minister. We publish below the section of her article dealing with a major inter-ministerial battle in which she became involved, concerning aid to Indonesia. Her dismissal came shortly after this battle had been resolved by a top-level decision to pledge more aid to Indonesia at the May 1975 meeting of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI). But as she points out, thanks to a compromise she proposed, payments are delayed for two years meaning that the issue can still be raised.

"The Aid Minister should of course be involved in all aspects of government policy as they relate to the Third World. But it does mean making rather a nuisance of oneself in Whitehall\*) terms and being interfering and aggressive. For we do not yet have a Cabinet Committee structure which permits the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) to be the voice of the Third World in all governmental discussions which affect poor countries.



I can give you an example of the kind of argument involved although it brings me on to delicate ground – really only to be covered when I am old and write my memoirs. It's perhaps a Crossman Diary-type situation, and I hope that the *New Internationalist* doesn't have to fight a High Court action about it.

The question of aid to Indonesia arose last April because a consortium meeting required specific and declared positions to be taken. (A consortium meeting brings together all a particular country's principal aid donors – individual countries and the World Bank – and each participant makes "a pledge" of its future assistance.) The Ministry\*\*) itself, given our concentration on poverty-focussed aid, was opposed to pledging a continuance of aid to Indonesia, which for three or four years ahead will have substantial oil revenues enough to finance its own development programme and it is, of course an underdeveloped country. To some extent this was regarded as a test case for the new strategy.\*\*\*)

## Indonesian Oppression

I completely agreed, and was also concerned about Indonesian oppression, involving political prisoners on a wide scale (20,000? 100,000). This was and is a matter on which the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party has expressed its active concern. So this added a second dimension to the issue. I wanted to give no pledge of further aid, and to allow this year's aid to run out with nothing to follow for the time being.

There were great pressures from other Ministers, one in particular. Correspondence flowed between us. Each of my letters was both "political", in the sense of Labour Party anxieties, and totally in accord with my own and my officials' views about aid strategy.

It came to the point when I either took it to Cabinet or compromised. I only take things to Cabinet if there is a sporting chance of winning and on this occasion there wasn't even a sporting chance. What is more, the compromise I offered gives the possibility of rethinking in terms of political trends in Indonesia. We settled on an agreement to

(cont'd on page 8)

## MPs LETTER CAMPAIGN - 1975

As a result of the hundreds of letters sent to MPs in November last year urging greater government action in support of Indonesia's tapols, many of those who took part in the campaign have received from their MPs a standard reply from Lord Goronwy Roberts of the Foreign Office.

The Foreign Office continues to argue that a friendly relationship with Indonesia, without any public condemnation, offers the best chance of helping the tapols. The only evidence to support this view is the highly contentious statement that the private representations of the British Government along with those of other western democracies may have led to the recent releases.

The severe limitations of the release plan and its actual motivation are fully analysed in this Bulletin. It is either naive or cynical of the British Government to link its own sotto voce efforts to influence the Indonesian Government with the highly-suspect release plan. Clearly, the Government seems to be prepared to allow the Indonesian Government to do what it likes with the tapols as long as trade and investment opportunities continue unhampered between the two countries. (Ex-Minister Judith Hart's experiences, related in her article on this page tend to confirm this).

So, as the tapols begin their second decade of imprisonment, they can get little comfort from the fact that the British Government and other western democracies are not prepared to upset the Indonesian Government publicly. So the deafening silence on the plight of the tapols continues.

We appeal to all our readers who have received the Foreign Office standard text to take the matter further with their MPs and to continue to urge that forthright action be taken by the British Government to press for the release of the tapols.

# Trials Two Death and Two Life Sentences

Two death sentences were passed against East Java communist leaders, who were tried before a Special Court in Blitar, East Java for their alleged involvement in the 1968 Blitar uprising. They are *Gatot Sutaryo*, aged 49, and *Djoko Untung*, aged 54. Both were said to have "been guilty of subversion, of trying to revive the banned Indonesian Communist Party and of attempts to undermine the Government". A third defendant, named *Basuki*, fell ill in court during the trial and died in hospital, according to *Antara News Agency*. Further details of this tragedy are not available.

A life imprisonment sentence is reported to have been passed against *Umar Lestahulu*, formerly secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party in the Moluccas. The trial took place before a Special Court in Ambon. Further details are not available.

Another life sentence was passed against *Masmira Subahadi* (50 years old), formerly treasurer and secretary of the PKI Committee in Karawang, West Java. This verdict was passed on 18 September 1975 although the trial had actually commenced in June 1972. The delay occurred because the prosecution required the presence of two witnesses who were then at the detention camp in Buru.

## Former Jakarta Police Chief on Trial

Major press reporting has been given to the trial of former Police Brigadier-General, *Sawarno Cokrodingrat*. He was Commander of the Jakarta Police Force at the time of the October event in 1965 and remained on active service until his arrest on 31 July, 1967.

After waving aside an objection from the defence counsel that the defendant was being tried before a Military Court even though he was a member of the Police Force, the Court read out an indictment which charged him with utilising his official position to undermine the lawful government and of siding with the Revolutionary Council announced after the coup attempt on 1 October, 1965. He was also charged with attempting to obstruct actions to suppress the G.30.S/PKI Movement. The accused strongly denied all the charges.

The reports of the trial suggest that Sawarno is regarded as having been a supporter of President Sukarno, although the allegation that he spoke words of support for

the Untung coup attempt were said by one witness to have been uttered not by the accused but by his assistant, Anwas Tanuamijaya, who also appeared in the trial as a witness and who is already under a life sentence.

An incident occurred during the trial when another witness, former Police Colonel Syamsul Bahri, was being questioned by the Prosecutor. The latter, Major Hari Musso, who had been the witness' subordinate in the Police Force in October 1965, and challenged the witness to admit to having uttered a statement supportive of the Untung coup which the Prosecutor said that he himself had heard. The witness complained that he was being treated like a person on trial, and the Judge admonished the Prosecutor to restrain himself.

The Prosecutor demanded a sentence of 20 years for the accused. The Court found Sawarno guilty and sentenced him to 13 years' imprisonment.

Another heavy sentence, 17 years, has been passed against a woman defendant named *Jasma*, found guilty of "subversion and involvement in the G.30.S/PKI Movement". She is charged with failing to report herself, having gone into hiding, helping PKI leaders to find places of hiding and helping circulate an illegal document entitled "*Saura Revolusi*" (Voice of the Revolution). She was also charged with having set up underground groups and organising political courses.

When asked after sentence had been passed whether she would appeal against the verdict, she said she would not.

## FORMER MINISTER ON TRIAL

The trial of a former Minister, member of the last Sukarno Cabinet which fell in March 1966, began on 26 January, before the State Court in Jakarta. He is *Oei Tju Tat* who was a minister without portfolio. His defence team consists of four persons including Yap Thiam Hien and Adnan Buyung Nasution, both of whom have themselves spent considerable periods of time in detention as *tapols*. The defendant is himself a lawyer and had been a leading member of the *BAPERKI* (organisation of Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent) and of the leftwing nationalist party, *PARTINDO*. Both organisations were banned in 1965.

# Papuans shot trying to cross frontier

The two students were Jacob Yoel Kaffier and Tomas Wanaha, who had been arrested in Djajapura in July 1975 for nationalist activities, but who escaped from prison shortly afterwards and walked through dense jungle to reach the border.

This tragic incident took place against the background of an independence struggle that has been under way in Irian Jaya for many years. The struggle has intensified since the establishment in 1970 of a Provisional Government of West Papua New Guinea which claims to control an area stretching 250 miles from the border between East and West New Guinea. It seeks independence from the Indonesian Republic and an eventual merger with Papua New Guinea (PNG), the newly independent eastern part of the island.

Earlier in 1975, negotiations were held between the Provisional Government and members of the Papua New Guinea Government, but shortly before PNG independence

was declared on 16 September 1975, the country's Foreign Minister, Sir Albert Maori Kiki told Provisional Government representatives who had flown to Port Moresby that as a result of threats and pressures from Indonesia, his government would have to seal the border between PNG and the liberated areas in West Papua New Guinea. He also warned that any of the 10,000 West Papuan refugees now living in PNG who were found guilty of West Papuan nationalist activities would be handed over to the Indonesian authorities as would anyone found crossing the border between the two countries.

Two students at Djajapura University, Irian Jaya, were shot dead by Indonesian troops after they had been handed back to the Indonesian authorities by Papua New Guinea forces who had captured them as they were trying to cross the border from Indonesian-controlled Irian Jaya (West Papua New Guinea) into Papua New Guinea.

WHEN the prison gates closed on Buyung Nasution, a liberal lawyer and civil rights leader, in January 1974, it seemed like the end of hope for Indonesia's 50,000 political prisoners. Their plight had been one of the many issues raised in the unprecedentedly free public debates of 1973, but now the Government had locked up the very man who had championed their cause.

It had been a good year in Indonesia. The Suharto Government had almost welcomed criticism, had become, by Indonesian standards, amazingly flexible and open. Questions of economic strategy, democratic rights, social priorities were being discussed.

Scores of thousands of low grade political detainees were being released, and the Government seemed at least ready to consider the problem of the remaining prisoners accused of serious complicity in the pro-Communist 1965 coup.

In retrospect, it looks like a case of "Come into my parlour," but the year of hope ended in the disaster of the Tanaka riots, the Government's reversion to paranoia, and the end of "dialogue." The young economists, journalists, lawyers, and student leaders who had rushed boldly into the intellectual fray were packed off to gaol, most without the courtesy of a trial, to join those for whose release some of them had been calling.

Since then the pendulum has swung back a little, and Buyung Nasution is now free, after 21 months in various Jakarta prisons. Within a few days of his release he had resumed his work at the Legal Aid Centre, the organisation he founded in 1971 to help those put at a disadvantage by

MARTIN WOOLLACOTT, in Jakarta, describes the plight of the thousands of political prisoners under indefinite detention in Indonesia.

THE GUARDIAN Tuesday November 11 1975

# Suharto ready for the 'final solution'

Indonesia's legal system, both those up for trial and those already in prison.

Nasution, a handsome man of 40, wears coloured shirts and kipper ties and his long black hair is fashionably sprinkled with silver and grey. He looks like one of the smart young Indonesians who can be found in the bars of Jakarta's luxury hotels. But he is a rare phenomenon in this country, an old-fashioned rule of law moralist.

Educated at the universities of Indonesia and Melbourne, he founded his centre after realising, when working as a Government prosecutor, how heavily the scales were loaded against the poor, the ignorant, and the politically dissenting in Indonesian courts.

His own captivity having served only to strengthen his conviction that the continued holding of the detainees is both ethically wrong and politically stupid, he is one of the few articulate witnesses available on conditions in Suharto's gaols.

"I was not interrogated for long," he recalls. "I listened at first because I wanted to understand the scenario these

officers were trying to fit me into.

"It was pathetic nonsense, that there was a plot to overthrow the Government which culminated in the Tanaka riots, but they believed it. At least, they believed it then. Now they don't, of course. But I and all the others picked up in January and February, 1974, had to endure the consequences of this fantasy in the minds of those who run Indonesia. . . . I refused to take part in further interrogations."

Nasution was not allowed to see his wife and son for 13 months. He was moved from prison to prison to break up the friendships and relationships he had managed to establish, and he was officially denied books and writing paper, although he did eventually acquire these "unofficially."

But, he says, "I was a comparatively privileged prisoner. I was never physically maltreated, I had food coming in from outside, and drugs when I was ill, and I felt fairly sure I would eventually be released. . . ."

"The value of the experience for me was that I could now see the situation at first hand, when I met the detainees who have been in prison for seven, eight, 10 years and still have no prospect of release. Before I knew about their suffering intellectually; now I know about it in my stomach."

Nasution describes the food in the prisons as poor, the medical services as grossly inadequate, and the treatment of prisoners generally as inhumane, although he makes no charge of intentional brutality or torture. "That's not the point," he insists. "The real torture is to keep people for many years with no term set to their imprisonment. That is the torture of the spirit."

He describes well known politicians, academics, and intellectuals dragging out grey, meaningless lives, permanently undernourished, permanently suffering from all kinds of chronic ailments, and subject to fits of depression and mental instability.

Dr Subandrio, Sukarno's Foreign Minister, who has been tried but is now waiting for

## Admiral Sudomo on releases

Admiral Sudomo, Chief-of-Staff of KOPKAMTIB has announced the release of 1,309 political prisoners of the 'B' category. He said that 1,003 were civilians and the remainder were former members of the Armed Forces. While stating that none were leading members of the PKI, he refused to reveal what organisations they were from. Neither would he give details about the numbers being released from the various regions.

Speaking to the press on 2 December, he said that there were 34,000 'B' category *tapols* and that they would be released 'in stages'. But he added that those who were on Buru Island would not be allowed to return to their places of origin as "they have already settled down there and can cultivate the soil so they can be regarded as having become part of society there".

Regarding 'A' category *tapols* he said that 1,200 were still awaiting trial and 767 had already been tried, some of whom had been given death sentences, others life imprisonment and the rest imprisonment of varying lengths. He gave no further details, neither did he mention any acquittals.

He referred to another category, 'F', members of the PKI who have not yet been arrested. In this connection and also regarding the restoration of released *tapols* to society, he again called for vigilance against the 'latent danger' emanating from the G.30.S/PKI.



● *Buru: prison for the "free settlers"?*

"Cs." and except for some cases of rearrests or recategorisation this is generally accepted as true. Most of the 2,000 in the "A" category are still awaiting trial.

That is bad enough, but it is the likely fate of the "B" prisoners (about 25,000 say the Government) and of some of the "X" prisoners which is most disturbing.

If diplomatic sources are right, these men and women will be concentrated on the islands of Buru, near Abon in the Moluccas — where there are already 10,000 — and Nusa Kamabangan, off Java, after a definitive decision that they are never to be released.

"Nobody will ever be set free from Buru," a diplomat said. "These men are regarded as hardcore Communists." (Most of them undoubtedly are Communists, although how hardcore is another question.)

The legal cover for the decision may well prove to be a "change" in the status of detainees on Buru and other remote islands from that of prisoners to that of "free settlers" who will nevertheless, on account of their past political records, never be allowed to leave the islands.

The prisoners on Buru and other islands already farm small plots and produce handicrafts. But on nearly uninhabited islands where all facilities are controlled by the army, the difference between prisoner and "settler" status can only be marginal.

"If this is true," says Nasution, "it must be opposed. It is the opposite of a solution: it is a disaster."

commutation of his death sentence, wanders around like a "living corpse."

"A mature man like that, once a very able man," says Nasution. "What a condition of life."

It is "inhuman, against the rule of law, and, what is more, politically inept," Nasution claims.

"Think of those people and their families — as well as those who have been released but are still treated as third-class citizens. You are talking about a million or more people, a substantial section of the educated classes of Indonesia, permanently alienated from the nation, a position that will go down the generations. The wound must be healed."

The Government, Nasution argues, is thus in process of creating the very Fifth Column of dedicated enemies that is a part of its recurring nightmare of "instability."

Nasution appears to have resumed his work with the blessing of the Government, which is anxious to show the outside world that it is pre-

pared — cautiously — to begin liberalising again.

He will probably have a reasonably easy task seeking the release of other intellectuals picked up in 1974, like Professor Surbini of the University of Indonesia, Subardio, a former leader of the Socialist Party (PSI), and Haji C. Prinsen, another civil rights leader. The Government has already announced that it is releasing some of the long-term political prisoners.

These might look like welcome signs, but the unfortunate truth is that they appear to be part of a "final solution" to the prisoner problem that can hardly be described as either humane or in any real sense legal.

The Government's own announcements on the subject have been contradictory and confusing, but diplomats here believe that the plan is to release around 12,000 of the 36,000 detainees officially admitted, but to keep the rest in permanent detention for the rest of their natural lives.

If the Government figures are accepted, that would be over 20,000 men and women, and

even more if the basis is the figures of outside organisations like Amnesty International, who think there are 55,000 all told, or Tapol, who charge there are at least 70,000.

Nasution's own estimate is 50,000; but what is important is not the precise numbers, but the plan itself.

The Indonesian Government picked up an estimated 200,000 people after the 1965 coup, members of the Communist Party, of party-affiliated organisations and trade unions. They were classified into three groups.

"A" prisoners were defined as those directly involved in the coup, who will be charged and tried. "B" prisoners were defined as senior cadre, against whom there is insufficient evidence to go to trial. "C" prisoners are those guilty merely of some association with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

A fourth category "X" was later added to cover those whose eventual status had not been decided.

The Indonesian Government says it has now released all

He also denied that these releases were being made in response to pressure from abroad or at home. They were based, he said, on the security situation.

### Concern at Lack of Details

From a report in *Tempo* on 13 December and in other papers, it is clear that some persons are very concerned that Sudomo failed to give more details about the release plans.

One political party leader, *Sabam Sirait*, is reported as having said: "Society needs to know the names of those being released and the regions from which they come."

*Tempo* also felt that such clarifications were needed; otherwise a different interpretation may be given to the announcement "because there are voices that link this question of releases to the fact that pressure from abroad is intensifying."

### TAPOL Points to

#### Some Glaring Contradictions

1. Although foreign journalists and agencies had been reporting the planned releases since early October, the official

statement did not appear until 2 December.

2. Earlier reports from Jakarta had said that 35,000 would be released in stages (2,500 a year) and that 26,000 of these were 'B' category. Sudomo has now produced a different figure, namely that there are 34,000 B category *tapols* to which must presumably be added the 'A' and 'X' categories.

3. When the release plan was reported in October, it was said that 1,300 had been released in the past year. Sudomo's December announcement would appear to refer to the same 1,300. So far, although independent reports have been received that some releases took place in October last year, no reports have yet been received of releases in December 1975.

4. Sudomo's statement that Buru *tapols* would not be allowed to leave the island means that 20,000 (the 10,000 now there and another 10,000 to be brought there in the next few years) are in fact going to be excluded from any kind of release. This suggests that the plans we reported in our December 1975 issue are even more unfavourable than we then thought.



# Comments on the Sudomo statement

*Adnan Buyung Nasution*, Director of the Jakarta Legal Aid Bureau, who himself spent nearly two years in detention without trial, has warned that a misinterpretation of the meaning of rehabilitation could mean that *tapols* would remain in the same status for a very long time.

In a statement reported in *Kompas* on 3 December, he welcomed the government's move to start with releases but said that dragging out the process of preparation for release would mean the *tapols* would continue as prisoners under a different status, still prohibited from being in contact with society.

He stressed that according to the laws in force, the process of restoring prisoners to society and releasing them must be carried out as speedily as possible. It was not certain that those being held had committed crimes. Prolonged detention represents an infringement of a person's liberty; if the initial interrogation failed to provide evidence that could warrant a trial, the person should be released.

Nasution also said that the moves being taken by the Government to release some *tapols* could have an impact on people at home and abroad who follow this question with great interest. Up to now, he said, some circles did not believe that the *tapol* question could be quickly solved.

Another statement favouring speedy legal settlement was made by *H. Nuddin Lubis*, Deputy Chairman of the Moslem Party, the *United Development Party (PPP)*. He expressed the opinion that the releases should be based on law and justice, not other considerations. He welcomed the release announcement and said that this was necessary in the interest of protecting basic human rights as safeguarded by the Indonesian Constitution.

Basic human rights have, he said, been a matter of discussion in the community for a long time and people hoped fervently that these rights would be implemented. For this reason, it was essential to ensure that anyone, including political prisoners regarding whom there is no proof of guilt, be speedily released; they should not be allowed to remain in prison for years, suffering hardships.

He expressed the hope that the government would display a more positive attitude towards implementing the basic human rights of all sections of society, groups as well as individuals.

---

## SECOND BURU CAMP

A second detention camp for long-term *tapols* is now under preparation on the island of Buru. In fact, according to some reports, several hundred *tapols* have recently been transferred to this second camp. We have heard that the plans are to bring about 10,000 more 'B' category *tapols* to this new camp during the next few years. This would bring the total number of *tapols* in Buru to 20,000—minus those who have died or escaped.

These reports tally with information received about *tapols* in other parts of the country being transferred to Buru. In particular, we were able to report in our last issue about plans to empty Nusakambangan Island of *tapols*. It is believed that some of them may already have been moved to Buru.

## "They're not tapols"

A senior government official has once again sought to convince public opinion that there are no political prisoners in Indonesia and that the Indonesian Government has never arrested and held people for political reasons.

No less a person than the Attorney-General, Brigadier-General Ali Said SH\*) made this surprising statement to the press, as reported in the Jakarta press on 9 December, and stressed that this explanation should be given the widest possible dissemination, to the UN and everywhere else.

"There are only criminal prisoners," he said, "people who have committed misdemeanours or have been involved in major crimes aimed at overthrowing the lawful government."

Asked about the people now in detention who were members of the outlawed PKI, he said they were being held not because of their former PKI membership but because of their involvement in the G.30.S/PKI affair. "If they were being held for political reasons, none of them would be released, yet now many are going to be released because there is no longer any reason to hold them." The same also applies, he said, to *Malari* prisoners, those held in connection with the 15 January 1974 affair.

Ali Said said that as long ago as 1970, in a booklet produced to describe the Buru Island camp, he had refrained from using the term 'political prisoner' and had referred to the detainees as 'criminals', but even so, subsequent official decisions had spoken about 'tapols'. "We need to rectify this error. We must recognise our shortcomings in this respect."

\*) These initials indicate that he is a lawyer.

---

## 500 NEW TAPOLS A YEAR

"In recent years, we have arrested on an average 500 people a year in connection with the G.30.S/PKI affair," said Admiral Sudomo (*Kompas*, 23rd December 1975).

He was speaking at a Mohamadiyah Youth Congress in Semarang, and denied that the announced releases indicated greater leniency towards the prisoners. "We are at all times vigilant of the latent dangers," he told listeners.

He also explained his 'four K's' formula defining 'responsible freedom'. They are: that government policies should be studied and understood, that facts must be gathered, that contact must be maintained with the authorities responsible for policy, and that constructive opinions must be directed through the proper channels. (In the Indonesian language, all these points commence with the letter K.)

---

(cont'd from page 4)

offer no further aid for the next two years, when Indonesian oil revenues were certain, but to renew aid in 1978. It is only fair to add that there is a view, which could be proved right, that Britain can exercise more influence on the question of political prisoners by continuing an aid relationship."

\*) - Whitehall is the seat of government.

\*\*\*) - The Ministry of Overseas Development.

\*\*\*\*) - Described in an official British Government statement entitled: *The Changing Emphasis in British Aid Policies. More Help for the Poorest.* (October 1975, Her Majesty's Stationery Office).

# New York Times gets News from ex-tapols

The following are extracts from an article by David Andelman in *The New York Times* on 30 November. We have abridged the article somewhat for reasons of space.

By Government estimates, there are still 50,000 political prisoners, most of whom have been held for 10 years or more.

Although 1,300 have been released this year in response to the pressure of world opinion, many are still under close surveillance, others have been re-arrested and the intelligence police continue their scrutiny of activists and opposition sympathizers.

As some of these political prisoners are being released, insights are becoming available on life in that other world.

Over the last three weeks, a dozen former political prisoners and their families were interviewed in Jakarta and in Bandung. All spoke under assurances of anonymity. One pointed to pedicabs parked across the street, saying that their drivers logged guests going into and out of his house.

The former prisoners included lawyers, students and opposition members of Parliament. Of those interviewed, only one has found a job since his release. Several said that they would not look for work and that they had become professional revolutionaries as a result of their experiences in prison.

There are several different groups of political prisoners. Most were arrested 10 years ago during the round-ups following the uprising by the Communist Party and the resulting right-wing coup that overthrew President Sukarno and installed General Suharto as President.

Of the final group of 50 or so, arrested last year after the anti-Japanese riots in Jakarta and Bandung, all but nine have been released, three have been tried.

"Why do they keep them in prison so long, many of them, with no hope, under the most horrible of conditions?" asked one former prisoner, a lawyer.

He paused and answered his own question.

"Because they are trying to destroy us," he said.

"In my months in jail - and I was in seven different prisons - I found hundreds of people who suffered for many, many years, physically and mentally," he added.

There is no direct evidence that prisoners have been tortured during the almost daily interrogations. In some cases, prisoners who have been confined for 10 years are still asked to dredge up details from the period before their arrest in 1965.

But two former prisoners said they had seen deep scars on the feet of several Communist prisoners. They said they were told that the legs of tables had been placed on prisoners' feet while interrogators stood on the tables.

## A Writer's Account

One political writer for a leading Jakarta newspaper said interrogators used leather belts and "did not seem reluctant to use force".

More recently, he said, he visited a political prison in Borneo and found 200 prisoners packed into 10 cells. Most of them had been there for eight to ten years, he said.

The conditions in these political prisons are, by all reports, not good, even by Indonesian standards.

Two or three meals a day are served, in most cases a bowl of rice and what is referred to by the prisoners as "water soup" or lukewarm water with "an occasional vegetable or peel floating in it to give it a slight flavor."

No contact is allowed with the outside world and in the case of Communist prisoners, their families have long ceased to admit that they even exist.

It is the alleged lack of a home that the Government frequently offers as the reason for the slowness in the release program.

"We must find a way to absorb them into society," said Gen. Ali Mortopo, deputy chief of intelligence, who is a political adviser to President Suharto. "We must find them employment or they will get into trouble again. The absorption capacity of society is limited."

The Government is worried about the international impact of this large number of political prisoners as it is seeking economic and military assistance abroad.

Last week, newspapers publicized an effort by Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, Democrat of New York to slash economic aid for Indonesia in part because "Indonesia still has 25,000 political prisoners."

"The Government has been letting them out at the rate of 2,500 a year recently and that would take 10 years to let them all out," he told the House International Relations Committee.

## Student Infiltrators

This seems to have little impact on the activities of the secret police.

Students at the Bandung Technical Institute described last week how the military infiltrates student political meetings and keeps former political prisoners from speaking on campus.

"They have hired a number of students as informers," said Aldi Anwar, a 29-year-old physics student, sitting in the campus common room. "But we know who they are and they do not have many friends."

Other students said intelligence officials still took student leaders into custody for a day or two and interrogated them on ties between students at different universities, apparently fearful of a conspiracy.

Many former prisoners fear a further crackdown as the date for the next Presidential election in 1977 approaches. The Suharto Government reportedly will be seeking a mandate to continue its development program.

General Mortopo said that, of the 1,300 prisoners released, 10 have been imprisoned again.

The former member of Parliament said prison had converted him to a professional revolutionary. While he was gone, his wife baked cakes and cookies and sold them in a local grocery stall to feed the family. Now she continues to do that while he thinks about the future. He believes that he will continue the opposition he began before he was jailed.

"Then I thought I could change things from within the system," he said. "Now I know that cannot be done."

# The Pertamina Disaster

President Suharto's budget speech to Parliament on 7 January dealt with the devastating effect upon the Indonesian economy of the debts piled up by the State oil company, Pertamina.



Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, Pertamina's President-Director, with Pres. Suharto. Pertamina, which is listed among the 200 largest non-US companies in the world, has been put virtually into receivership as a result of Sutowo's operations.

These are some of the facts:

- \* Contrary to expectations based on greatly increased earnings from oil exports, dependence on foreign aid has this year increased almost threefold. In the 1975-1976 budget, foreign aid accounted for 9 per cent of revenue. In the 1976-1977 budget, it will account for 20 per cent.
- \* The dependence on foreign aid is all the more important as Indonesia, by virtue of the rapid growth of its petroleum industry, is no longer entitled to soft credit terms and must now pay much higher interest rates than formerly.
- \* For the first time in six years, Indonesia's balance of payments recorded a deficit, which will amount to \$285 million. This has happened despite the enormous short-term loan of \$1,050 million contracted by the Bank Indonesia from a consortium of foreign banks to tide over Pertamina's short-term loans. In addition, the country's foreign exchange reserves have been used up to repay Pertamina's short-term debts (repayable in nine months or less) which are said to have amounted to at least \$1,300 million.
- \* The total foreign debt incurred by Pertamina (short, medium and long-term) is now believed to be at least \$3,200 million, not including the \$850 million Pertamina failed to pay into the State Treasury as its contribution to revenues by virtue of payments made to it from foreign oil companies operating in Indonesia. Pertamina's debts to domestic companies so far traced amount to Rp47,000 million (about \$113 million) but more 'creditors' notes may well come in. So the total debt is thought to amount to \$3,500 million.

\* Added to this are the high rates of interest that must be paid on the emergency loans contracted. The average rate is about 15 per cent, which means that Indonesia will have to pay approximately \$200 million on interest payments alone this year.

No wonder members of Parliament sat in stony silence listening to Suharto. Says Tempo (17 January): "Some were shaking their heads in amazement, as if they were only able to grasp it when uttered by the head of state himself."

---

## Abolished? Yes...and no!

Admiral Sudomo, KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff has announced the abolition of the need to possess a Certificate of Non-Involvement in the G.30.S/PKI Movement. However, the 'abolition' is not quite what one would expect because Sudomo declared that non-involvement certificates would still be required for those wishing to become civil servants, to join the Armed

Forces, or to be employed by vital enterprises, though exceptions are now to be made for those who were under 12 years old at the time of the October 1965 affair.

Although it was also announced that non-involvement certificates would not be required any longer for travel abroad and for a change of domicile, Sudomo added that former G.30.S/PKI detainees would only be permitted to travel abroad or change their domicile with the permission of the Regional KOPKAMTIB Special Executor, the local Police Chief and the Local Government head.

The Indonesian Ambassador in London, speaking to a group of representatives who visited the Embassy on 8 December 1975, mentioned this abolition decision but admitted that it was not easy to ensure that such a regulation would be implemented properly in all parts of the country, or that very many people even knew about it.

\* \* \* \* \*

### 13 MALARI TAPOLS STILL BEING HELD

Following the news in *TAPOL Bulletin No. 13* of the release of twelve *Malari tapols*, we should also report that according to a news item in *Kompas* on 10 October, there are still 13 *Malari tapols* in detention. They are: Drs. Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti, Professor Sarbini (under house arrest because of ill health), Subroto, Mardanus, Murdijanto, Lucien Pahala Hutapaol. Soemarno, Subadio, Suwardi, Puguh, H.C. Princen, Baroto and Gede Oka. The last three are being held at the *Losmen Jaya* in Jatinegara, Jakarta, while the others are being held at the Military Detention Centre in Budi Utomo, Jakarta.

It should be added that there may well be some *Malari tapols* being held in other parts of the country, not included in this total.

Meanwhile, a spokesman of the Public Prosecutor's Office in Jakarta announced in December that the documents of a *Malari* case have been handed over to the Office, which was now considering whether to bring this case to trial. The spokesman refused to give any name. So far, three *Malari* cases have been tried.

# INDONESIAN INVASION RESISTED

Indonesia's armed invasion into East Timor is meeting fierce resistance. After two months of prolonged attacks by some 30,000 Indonesian troops, supported by aircraft and naval artillery, the Indonesian army still only controls about one-third of East Timor. The remainder is under the control of Fretilin. When a group of journalists was finally allowed into East Timor in mid-January on a guided tour led by Adam Malik, Indonesia's Foreign Minister - a tour which tried unsuccessfully to cover-up the presence of Indonesian troops - they were told by a soldier in Dili: "You are safe here, but don't ask me about security in the nearby hills".

Meanwhile, the Indonesian regime has been increasingly criticised for its attempts at forced annexation of East Timor. On 16 December, the United Nations Security Council passed a unanimous resolution calling on Indonesia to withdraw its troops. Such significant international censure, coupled with the inability of the army to achieve a rapid victory, appear to be reinforcing existing splits in the Indonesian military. There are reports of troops in Eastern Java refusing to fight in East Timor, and more recently the Jakarta daily, *Merdeka*, criticised the invasion as a necessary consequence of Indonesia's reliance on the West, which it rejects. Such a statement, in a country renowned for its rigorous press censorship, clearly signifies a growth in the opposition to the ruling Suharto group.

At the same time, the Democratic Republic of East Timor, established prior to the Indonesian invasion, has been recognised by many African and Asian countries, including the People's Republic of China. These developments strengthen Fretilin's position further.


## Australia Thwarts United Nations Mission

Yet the Suharto regime still has staunch allies. In addition to the British, American and Japanese governments, there is, most notably, the Fraser government in Australia. Not only has Prime Minister Fraser persistently refused to condemn the invasion but recently, on 25 January, he went so far as to directly obstruct the activities of the United Nations mission to East Timor. Unable to obtain any access to Fretilin-held areas through the Indonesian Government, the U.N.

special envoy, *Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi*, contacted the Australian Campaign for an Independent East Timor on 25 January, which via its radio transmitter, has the only direct link with Fretilin.

Guicciardi asked CIET to arrange with Fretilin a suitable landing place and a tour of Fretilin-held areas so that he could see for himself the actual situation. In the course of this message being transmitted, the Australian police entered the CIET office and proceeded to confiscate the transmitter. Fretilin's only link with the outside world, through which it could communicate with those of its ministers who are outside the country, and through which it was trying to organise the humanitarian evacuation of people from the fighting zones, was thus broken by the action of the Australian Government.

U.N. Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim was reported to be angered at this outright act of obstruction of *Mr. Guicciardi's* mission. Particularly since it has been subsequently revealed that the decision to close down the transmitter had already been reached the week before in discussions between Australian Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock and Adam Malik in Jakarta. Under mounting internal criticism, particularly from the Trade Union movement, which organised large demonstrations in all the major cities on Australia Day (26 January),



the Government now appears, however, to be reversing its policy. It announced on 29 January that it would restore the transmitter to CIET, and "give every assistance" to the U.N. envoy. Nevertheless, this incident demonstrates the extent to which the Australian Government is prepared to go in assisting the Indonesian military in its invasion and continuing war against the people of East Timor.

## British CIET Working Too

The international campaign in solidarity with Fretilin and the people of East Timor is growing rapidly. Committees have been set up in several European countries and in the U.S.A. and Japan. In Britain, the British Campaign for an Independent East Timor is planning a series of events, culminating in three days of action on 17-19 March, which will include a meeting addressed by a Fretilin speaker and by an Australian who has recently returned from East Timor. For further information, contact the BCIET at: 40 Concanon Road, London SW2. (Tel.: 01-274-9308 or 01-274-5945).

## HUMAN RIGHTS COURT ?

According to a *Reuters* report from Jakarta on 6 February 1976, Indonesia is to set up a special court "to protect people from human rights violations by the government". This announcement was made by the Minister for Justice. The *Reuters* report linked this announcement to 'frequent attacks by international human rights organisations' about Indonesia's continued detention of the *tapol*s.

We received this report just at press time, and hope to deal with it more fully in our next issue.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*Black Armada* by Rupert Lockwood, published by Australasian Book Society Ltd. Publishing date not certain. Was due out before the end of 1975.

This book gives a well-documented account of the Indonesian-Australian boycotts and other struggles against the Netherlands-Indies re-occupation forces from 1942-1945. The chronicle begins with the 1942 flight to Australia of the Netherlands Indies Government, after Japanese troops had occupied Indonesia. They brought with them many Indonesian soldiers, sailors, merchant seamen and administrative clerks. It describes the vital Indonesian mutinies and Australian dockland boycotts, as well as diplomatic action against the Dutch who were planning their return to Indonesia after the Indonesian Republic has been proclaimed. It covers also events in Australia during the West Irian crisis of the early 1960's. The book underlines what aroused trade unions and humanitarians can achieve in the cause of freedom.

Please address enquiries to: Australasian Book Society, Ltd., 6th Floor, 104 Bathurst Street, Sydney, NSW, Australia.

Justus M. van der Kroef, "The Papuans of Irian Jaya (West New Guinea)", *Case Studies on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1975, p. 219-246.

The author describes the pattern of continuing ethnic conflict between the Indonesian authorities and significant segments of the nearly 850,000 indigenous Papuans. This conflict persists amidst outward signs of significant economic development, but in which Papuans seem to participate only minimally. Of 100,000 school pupils in Irian Jaya, only 30,000 are Papuans. The author describes Papuan opposition to Indonesian rule, the racial and religious elements in this conflict, and some of its history. External "improvement" and efforts to "civilize" the Papuans have met resistance. Many Papuans believe that their territory is ruthlessly exploited even though Irian Jaya appears to receive grants from Jakarta larger than any other Indonesian province. The author describes the parties and elections in Irian Jaya and the prospects for Papuan unification. He concludes that Papuan development and Indonesian rule are on a collision course, posing a problem which the rest of the world still prefers to ignore. ◀

## SUBSCRIPTION DRIVE

It is more than a decade now since the first mass arrests in Indonesia, yet as this issue clearly shows, the *tapol* problem is still as far as ever from solution.

TAPOL's campaign may have helped to compel military leaders to at least speak of releases. But this is not enough. We must reach out to more people with the facts.

**But we need your help!**

Please send us the name of at least one possible new subscriber and we will send them two issues free of charge.

Please send us also the names of journalists, educational or research institutions, libraries, organisations or other bodies who you think should receive the *TAPOL Bulletin*.

## NEW SUBSCRIPTION RATE

In our last two issues, we published an appeal for cash, as our survival was seriously threatened. We are glad to announce that there has been an encouraging response.

However, as our regular readers will have noticed, we had to expand our last issue to ten pages plus an insert and this issue consists of twelve pages. Even at this size, we are compelled to exclude important material.

So we face not only rising printing and postage costs but also the need for a larger *Bulletin*, at least occasionally. We have therefore decided very reluctantly that our subscription rates must go up.

New annual rates (six issues)

UK and Europe: £2.50 (\$5.50)

Overseas: £3.00 (\$6.75)

Even at these rates, our receipts will not fully cover costs so we must continue to appeal to our supporters to help with donations.

**PLEASE GIVE GENEROUSLY!**

TAPOL Bank Account No. 40987493, Wandsworth Common Branch, National Westminster Bank, 27 Bellevue Road, London, S.W.17 7EF. All foreign currency cheques should be endorsed on the reverse as follows:

'As made payable to on the front'.

**TAPOL  
INDONESIA**



100,000  
POLITICAL PRISONERS  
x 10  
YEARS EACH  
= 1 million  
YEARS OF INJUSTICE

TAPOL IS THE INDONESIAN WORD FOR POLITICAL PRISONER

The new TAPOL Poster, designed and silk-screened last October on the tenth anniversary of mass imprisonment in Indonesia. In two colours - red and black and measuring 20" by 30", it is available for only 45 pence plus postage. Reduced rates for bulk orders. Get yours while they last!

Please address correspondence and subscriptions to:  
TAPOL - 103 Tilehurst Road, Wandsworth Common,  
London, S.W.18, United Kingdom.